1AC
Inherency
The US currently lacks sufficient ice breaker capabilities to open up sea lanes of
transportation around the United States
Beilinson, Deputy Editor of Popular Mechanics, 12 (Jerry, February 17th, “Why the U.S. Must Build
More Icebreakers Now,” Popular Mechanics,
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/engineering/infrastructure/why-the-us-must-buildmore-icebreakers-now-6693195)
Coast Guard cutters are stationed in the Bering Sea, and C-130s take infrequent flights over American
waters beyond the North Slope. However, the United States does not have what you’d call a persistent
maritime presence in the Arctic, a region with increasing geopolitical importance. Most of the time,
there are no patrol ships or planes up there at all. It’s ironic, but the warming Arctic has actually
increased demand for icebreakers. The Coast Guard needs more of the ships to prepare for search-andrescue missions, oil-spill response (offshore drilling by Shell could commence in the Beaufort and
Chukchi Seas this summer), law enforcement, and plain old flag-waving in northern waters. These
ships are also needed for science. The United States is a leader in oceanography, climate investigations,
and all kinds of polar studies, thanks partly to the National Science Foundation’s first-rate support of
research. (In fact, the NSF has overseen the budget for maintaining icebreakers since 2006; the
proposed budget properly puts that responsibility back with the military.) But with just one or two
working icebreakers, there’s no way the NSF and Coast Guard can accomplish all they need to. When
the Healy churned its way to Alaska to help deliver fuel, its maintenance schedule was thrown off. As a
result, scientific projects may have to be delayed this summer. To deliver supplies to America’s
McMurdo Station in Antarctica each year, the NSF has been relying on foreign-flagged vessels. As PM
reported last July, Sweden’s move to pull its icebreaker Oden off the McMurdo job put the entire 2011–
2012 research season in jeopardy. NSF scrambled and eventually was able to commission a Russian vessel.
This feels a lot like the situation in space: With the retirement of the space shuttle, the United States
can’t fly astronauts to the International Space Station without a lift from Russian rockets. Now, it
appears, the country can’t supply its main Antarctic base without Russian help, either. Building up
America’s fleet of icebreakers will resolve such situations while allowing the Coast Guard to react to a
changing world.
Plan Text
The United States federal government should modernize the icebreaker fleet for
icebreaking operations in the United States.
Advantage 1 – Arctic War
The Arctic zone will be the next arena for global military conflict – the US has fallen
behind in the currently militarizing ice race
Huffington Post 4/16/12, “Arctic Climate Change Opening Region To New Military Activity.” Eric
Talmadge. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/16/arctic-climate-change-militaryactivity_n_1427565.html
To the world's military leaders, the debate over climate change is long over. They are preparing for a new kind of Cold
War in the Arctic, anticipating that rising temperatures there will open up a treasure trove of
resources, long-dreamed-of sea lanes and a slew of potential conflicts. By Arctic standards, the region is
already buzzing with military activity, and experts believe that will increase significantly in the years
ahead. Last month, Norway wrapped up one of the largest Arctic maneuvers ever — Exercise Cold Response — with 16,300 troops from 14
countries training on the ice for everything from high intensity warfare to terror threats. Attesting to the harsh conditions, five Norwegian
troops were killed when their C-130 Hercules aircraft crashed near the summit of Kebnekaise, Sweden's highest mountain. The U.S., Canada
and Denmark held major exercises two months ago, and in an unprecedented move, the
military chiefs of the eight main
Arctic powers — Canada, the U.S., Russia, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland — gathered at a Canadian military
base last week to specifically discuss regional security issues. None of this means a shooting war is likely at the North
Pole any time soon. But as the number of workers and ships increases in the High North to exploit oil and gas
reserves, so will the need for policing, border patrols and — if push comes to shove — military muscle
to enforce rival claims. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and 30
percent of its untapped natural gas is in the Arctic. Shipping lanes could be regularly open across the
Arctic by 2030 as rising temperatures continue to melt the sea ice, according to a National Research Council analysis commissioned by the
U.S. Navy last year. What countries should do about climate change remains a heated political debate. But that has not stopped north-looking
militaries from moving ahead with strategies that assume current trends will continue. Russia,
Canada and the United States
have the biggest stakes in the Arctic. With its military budget stretched thin by Iraq, Afghanistan and more pressing issues
elsewhere, the United States has been something of a reluctant northern power, though its nuclear-powered
submarine fleet, which can navigate for months underwater and below the ice cap, remains second to none. Russia — one-third of which lies
within the Arctic Circle — has been the most aggressive in establishing itself as the emerging region's
superpower. Rob Huebert, an associate political science professor at the University of Calgary in Canada,
said Russia has recovered enough from its economic troubles of the 1990s to significantly rebuild its
Arctic military capabilities, which were a key to the overall Cold War strategy of the Soviet Union, and
has increased its bomber patrols and submarine activity. He said that has in turn led other Arctic
countries — Norway, Denmark and Canada — to resume regional military exercises that they had
abandoned or cut back on after the Soviet collapse. Even non-Arctic nations such as France have
expressed interest in deploying their militaries to the Arctic. "We have an entire ocean region that had
previously been closed to the world now opening up," Huebert said. "There are numerous factors now
coming together that are mutually reinforcing themselves, causing a buildup of military capabilities in
the region. This is only going to increase as time goes on." Noting that the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of
the globe, the U.S. Navy in 2009 announced a beefed-up Arctic Roadmap by its own task force on climate change that called for a three-stage
strategy to increase readiness, build cooperative relations with Arctic nations and identify areas of potential conflict. "We want to maintain our
edge up there," said Cmdr. Ian Johnson, the captain of the USS Connecticut, which is one of the U.S. Navy's most Arctic-capable nuclear
submarines and was deployed to the North Pole last year. "Our interest in the Arctic has never really waned. It remains very important." But
the U.S. remains ill-equipped for large-scale Arctic missions, according to a simulation conducted by the U.S. Naval War
College. A summary released last month found the Navy is "inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime
operations in the Arctic" because it lacks ships able to operate in or near Arctic ice, support facilities
and adequate communications. "The findings indicate the Navy is entering a new realm in the Arctic," said Walter Berbrick, a War
College professor who participated in the simulation. "Instead of other nations relying on the U.S. Navy for
capabilities and resources, sustained operations in the Arctic region will require the Navy to rely on
other nations for capabilities and resources." He added that although the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet is a
major asset, the Navy has severe gaps elsewhere — it doesn't have any icebreakers, for example. The
only one in operation belongs to the Coast Guard. The U.S. is currently mulling whether to add more icebreakers.
Ice breakers are a key to keeping up – failure to modernize the fleet ensures that the
US will fall behind
Tyler Davis, Young Leaders Program at Heritage Foundation, 11 (December 9, 2011The Lone
Icebreaker: U.S. Sovereignty in the Arctic,” http://blog.heritage.org/2011/12/09/the-lone-icebreaker-us-sovereignty-in-the-arctic/, Heritage foundation) DG
The United States Coast Guard is being left behind in the Arctic. While countries such as Russia are
building up their icebreaker fleet and actively increasing their presence in the Arctic, the United States
is losing its only form of sovereignty in the region. On December 1, Rear Admiral Jeffrey M. Garrett, U.S. Coast Guard,
testified before Congress on protecting U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic. He stated in Second Line of Defense that “the Icebreaker fleet
represents the main surface presence that the U.S. can exert in what is essentially a maritime domain
in the Arctic Ocean.” Yet today, the Coast Guard has an icebreaker fleet of only three ships. Worse yet,
two of these ships are out of commission due to maintenance work and will not be available for at
least seven more years. The lone icebreaker in commission is the USCGC Healy, which conducts all types of missions from
search and rescue to navigational aid to scientific research. Though the ship has been effective at its job in the Arctic, it
is designed to break through ice of only medium thickness; for ice of heavy thickness, the Healy is
absolutely useless. And like the other two icebreakers, it is quickly aging. Without efforts to
modernize the fleet, the future of the U.S. national maritime interest and security in the Arctic is
looking pretty bleak. Icebreakers are a necessity in the region, and without them the U.S. might as
well throw in the towel. These ships are key to year-round access to the Arctic and are the only U.S. insurance policy for future
hazardous events. If something happens to the Healy, then the United States would not only lose access to
the region but would not be able to react to potential oil spills and would become less effective in
search-and-rescue missions. Complicating matters even further, ice in the Arctic is melting, producing more
ocean area for the transportation of goods and services in the region. Essentially, whoever best utilizes
this route will control trade and transportation of goods and materials in the upper hemisphere. With all
other nations around the Arctic building their icebreaker fleets and exploiting the key transportation
route that connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the United States is falling behind. In order to create an
icebreaking fleet to maintain U.S. presence in the region, the Administration should look toward privatizing the fleet. Allowing private
companies to own and operate the U.S. icebreaking fleet and perform national security functions would not only allow for crucial
modernization but also save federal dollars and expand U.S. capabilities in the Arctic. This is particularly important at a time when the
Ultimately, something must be done. If the U.S. does not act
fast, it will come in last in the race for the Arctic.
government is looking to cut corners in federal spending.
Ice breakers are the biggest internal link to all US activity in the Arctic – the plan is key
to ensuring US leadership
O’Rourke, specialist in naval affairs, 6/14. Ronald O’Rourke “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf
***[The study] concludes that future capability and capacity gaps will significantly impact four [Coast Guard]
mission areas in the Arctic: Defense Readiness, Ice Operations, Marine Environmental Protection,
and Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security. These mission areas address the protection of important
national interests in a geographic area where other nations are actively pursuing their own national
goals.... The common and dominant contributor to these significant mission impacts is the gap in
polar icebreaking capability. The increasing obsolescence of the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet will further exacerbate mission
performance gaps in the coming years.... The gap in polar icebreaking capacity has resulted in a lack of at-sea
time for crews and senior personnel and a corresponding gap in training and leadership. In addition to
providing multi-mission capability and intrinsic mobility, a helicopter-capable surface unit would eliminate the need for acquiring an
expensive shore-based infrastructure that may only be needed on a seasonal or occasional basis. The
most capable surface unit
would be a polar icebreaker. Polar icebreakers can transit safely in a variety of ice conditions and
have the endurance to operate far from logistics bases. The Coast Guard’s polar icebreakers have conducted a wide
range of planned and unscheduled Coast Guard missions in the past. Polar icebreakers possess the ability to carry large
numbers of passengers, cargo, boats, and helicopters. Polar icebreakers also have substantial
command, control, and communications capabilities. The flexibility and mobility of polar icebreakers
would assist the Coast Guard in closing future mission performance gaps effectively.... 17 For examples of
bill and report language in recent years relating to the study of Coast Guard missions and capabilities for operations in high latitude areas, see
Appendix C. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service 9 Existing
capability and capacity gaps are expected to significantly impact future Coast Guard performance in two Antarctic mission areas: Defense
Readiness and Ice Operations. Future
gaps may involve an inability to carry out probable and easily projected
mission requirements, such as the McMurdo resupply, or readiness to respond to less-predictable events. By
their nature, contingencies requiring the use of military capabilities often occur quickly. As is the case in
the Arctic, the deterioration of the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet is the primary driver for this
significant mission impact. This will further widen mission performance gaps in the coming years. The
recently issued Naval Operations Concept 2010 requires a surface presence in both the Arctic and
Antarctic. This further exacerbates the capability gap left by the deterioration of the icebreaker
fleet.... The significant deterioration of the Coast Guard icebreaker fleet and the emerging mission demands to meet future functional
requirements in the high latitude regions dictate that the Coast Guard acquire material solutions to close the capability gaps.... To meet the
Coast Guard mission functional requirement, the Coast Guard icebreaking
fleet must be capable of supporting the
following missions: • Arctic North Patrol. Continuous multimission icebreaker presence in the Arctic.
• Arctic West Science. Spring and summer science support in the Arctic. • Antarctic, McMurdo Station resupply. Planned deployment
for break-in, supply ship escort, and science support. This mission, conducted in the Antarctic summer, also requires
standby icebreaker support for backup in the event the primary vessel cannot complete the mission. • Thule Air Base Resupply and Polar
Region Freedom of Navigation Transits. Provide vessel escort operations in support of the Military Sealift Command’s Operation Pacer Goose;
then complete any Freedom of Navigation exercises in the region. In addition, the joint Naval Operations Concept establishes the following
mission requirements: • Assured access and assertion of U.S.
this mission requires continuous icebreaker presence in both Polar Regions.
policy in the Polar Regions. The current
demand for
This allows the US to play a critical role in de-escalating Arctic conflict
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
In the Arctic, economic activity is expected to increase as the southern extent of the Arctic summer
ice pack thins, providing opportunity for ice-capable ships to travel through these regions. Greater human
activity will increase the need for the United States to assert a more active and influential presence in the
Arctic to protect not only its territorial interests, but also its presence as a world power concerned
with the security, economic, scientific, and international political issues of the region. Icebreakers
will play a critical role in supporting U.S. interests because the sea-ice margin does not retreat uniformly or
predictably, which may create difficult ice conditions in these waters. Possible U.S. ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea will require the United States to collect data to extend its economic zone and/or to
counter territorial claims by other Arctic nations. Icebreakers will be needed to provide access to ice-covered waters to
acquire this necessary data.
Absent de-escalation, current militarization will ensures Arctic conflicts go nuclear
Wallace and Staples, 10(Michael Wallace and Steven Staples. *Professor Emeritus at the University
of British Columbia AND ** President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear
Weapons: A Task Long Overdue,”http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf) DG
The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President
Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian
General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that
Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.” 55 Recently, two Russian attack
submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. 56 In January 2009, on the eve of
Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a
priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic,
including the Northwest Passage, and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic. 57 The Bush administration’s disastrous
eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in
Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the
planned deployments. The
Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems,
particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern
Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new
military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed icecapable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark
released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated
Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with shipbased helicopters
able to drop troops anywhere. 58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic
airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their
suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000
soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. 59 The
manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the
end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. 609 Ridding
the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for
disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From
those in the international peace and security sector,
deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the United States
and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world –
converge on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied
NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into
the threat or use of nuclear weapons. ” 61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist,
but no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken
lightly. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low – for now, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, “[the]
issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of
climate change.” 62
Advantage 2 – US Sea Lanes
China is currently exploiting the Arctic to overtake the US economically – failure to
develop ice breakers cedes the region to Chinese economic dominance
Beilinson, Deputy Editor of Popular Mechanics, 12 (Jerry, February 17th, “Why the U.S. Must Build
More Icebreakers Now,” Popular Mechanics,
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/engineering/infrastructure/why-the-us-must-buildmore-icebreakers-now-6693195)
China, a country with no Arctic coast, is building icebreakers—and that should get America’s attention. It’s one thing for
Russia, with the world’s longest Arctic coastline, to operate a couple dozen of the ships. (Fortunately,
they’re available for leasing, at a price.) It’s understandable, maybe, for Finland, Sweden, and Canada to surpass
the United States in this area. But why is China constructing an 8000-ton vessel capable of breaking through 4.5 ft of ice at a steady
clip, to join the XueLong, its existing ice-class vessel? In fact, China’s interest is unsurprising given its role as a world
economic power. Commercial ships are already traversing the Northern Sea Route above Russia,
carrying goods between Europe and East Asia. Often, icebreakers go along as insurance against bad conditions. And soon,
ships will start carrying liquefied natural gas from Norway along the route. Traffic through the Northwest Passage above Canada is building
more slowly, and talk of the Arctic sea routes competing with the Suez Canal is overblown. Nevertheless, the
Bering Strait between
Alaska and Russia is already getting crowded. According to Rear Adm. Thomas P. Ostebo, who commands the U.S. Coast
Guard in Alaska, about 1000 vessel transits take place in the Strait each summer. That’s America’s
backyard.
Ice breakers are key to giving the US economic control of Arctic sea lanes – solves
Chinese dominance and allows the US to control the international economy
Treadwell, Lieutenant Governor of Alaska, ’11 (Mead, December 1, “America is Missing the Boat”
Congressional Testimony United States House of Representatives Committee Transportation on
Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation,
http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyCGMT/2011-12-1-Treadwell.pdf)
Meanwhile, other Arctic and circumpolar nations are investing in fleets of icebreakers. The report of exactly how many ships
are being operated by other countries varies (some count polar, medium and light icebreakers, as well as ice ‘strengthened’ or ‘capable’ vessels), but all the tallies
make one thing clear: other
nations have seen the writing on the wall and are investing in infrastructure.
Sweden has at least four vessels; Finland, at least six; and Russia over two dozen (and counting). Canada has
about eight, and even the European Union is constructing an icebreaker – a heavy, polar class icebreaker. 3 Our
Arctic neighbors are leaps and bounds ahead of our position, and non-Arctic nations are in hot
pursuit. A Chinese researcher, Mr. Li Zhenfu of Dalian Maritime University, writes that, “Whoever has control of the Arctic route will
control the new passage of world economics and international strategies.” The prospect of
commercial and strategic opportunities presented by receding sea ice cover and accessibility of Arctic
resources has moved the Chinese government to allocate more resources for Arctic research, and they have
asked to join the Arctic Council as an observer. China’s Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo has asserted that no nation has sovereignty
over the Arctic, and said that China must plan to have an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as they
have one-fifth of the world’s population.
Relative US economic strength key to preventing aggressive Chinese adventurism and
war over Taiwan
Pape, PolSci Prof at UChicago, ‘9 (Robert, January, “Empire Falls”
http://nationalinterest.org/article/empire-falls-2952)
Over time, America's power is fundamentally a result of its economic strength. Productive capacity-defined by
indicators such as wealth, technology and population size-is a prerequisite for building and modernizing military forces.
The United States, like any state, may choose to vary the degree to which its productive capacities are used to create military assets. But it is
the economy as a whole that constrains the choice. And the size of the economy relative to potential
rivals ultimately determines the limits of power in international politics. Major assessments of this relative
position have long turned heavily on a single statistic: America's share of world economic product. Advocates of
extending America's unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and
routinely present detailed statistics on the U.S. share of world product. The basic notion is simple: take U.S. domestic product in any year and
divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. To measure gross domestic product, the unipolardominance school prefers to compare every country's output in current-year U.S. dollars, a method that tends to show America is much further
ahead of other countries than alternative measures. Indeed, the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in
2008) rests on the presumption of U.S. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures.2 By this metric, in 2006 the United States had 28
percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor, China, had 6 percent. Looks pretty good for America, right? Alas, single-year
"snapshots" of America's relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. For grandstrategic concerns-especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments-the trajectory of American
power compared to other states is of seminal importance. For the sake of argument, let us start with the unipolar-dominance school's
preferred measure of American hegemony, but look at the trajectory of the data over time. According to GDP figures in current U.S. dollars
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
United States increased its share of world production during the
1990s, reached its apogee in 2000, and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the
Bush administration, with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first decade of
the twenty-first century. At the same time, the relative power of China, the state many consider America's most
likely future rival, has grown consistently. If we look out as far as the IMF can see (2013), things get even worsewith the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising. The United States has been
going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than before, but substantially weaker. How good are the numbers?
Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP, constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity.3 Although each
offers advantages and disadvantages, for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America's relative decline. And
regardless of the metric, the trend is the same. Again using IMF figures, Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the
United States and China using both alternative measures. Simply put, the
United States is now a declining power. This new
reality has tremendous implications for the future of American grand strategy. THE EROSION of the
underpinnings of U.S. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America, China and
other states in the world. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration, the fact is that since 2000, U.S. growth
rates are down almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward
as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest. As Table 3 shows, over the past two decades, the average rate of U.S.
growth has fallen considerably, from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. At the same
time, China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year-a truly stunning performance. Russia has also turned its
economic trajectory around, from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000. Worse, America's decline was
well under way before the economic downturn, which is likely to only further weaken U.S. power. As the most recent growth estimates
(November 2008) by the IMF make clear, although all major countries are suffering economically, China and Russia are expected to continue
growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States. True, the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in
the world, with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. However, the
ability to diffuse new technology-to
turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced applications-has been spreading rapidly across many parts of
the globe, and with it the ultimate sources of state power-productive capacities. America is losing its
overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy . In past erasthe "age of iron" and the "age of steel"-leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades.4 As Fareed Zakaria describes
in his recent book, The Post-American World, technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today, and their rapid
global diffusion is
a profound factor driving down America's power compared to other countries. For instance, although the United
States remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis, this
grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. Whereas in 2000,
the United States had three times the computer sales, five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China, in
2008, the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate.5 The fact that the United States remains
ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter-it means that China,
with more than four times the U.S. population,
can create many more knowledge workers in the future. So, how much is U.S. decline due to the global diffusion of
technology, U.S. economic weaknesses under Bush or China's superior economic performance? Although precise answers are not possible, one
can gain a rough weighting of the factors behind America's shrinking share of world production by asking a few simple counterfactual questions
of the data. What would happen if we assumed that the United States grew during the Bush years at the same rate as during Clinton's? What
would have happened had the world continued on its same trajectory, but we assume China did not grow at such an astounding rate? Of
course, these are merely thought experiments, which leave out all manner of technical problems like "interaction effects." Still, these back-ofthe-envelope approximations serve as useful starting points. The answers are pretty straightforward. Had the American economy grown at the
(Clinton) rate of 3.7 percent per year from 2000 to 2008 instead of the (Bush) rate of 2.2 percent, the United States would have had a bigger
economy in absolute terms and would have lost less power relative to others. Assuming the rest of the world continued at its actual rate of
growth, America's share of world product in 2008 would have risen to 25.2 percent instead of its actual 23.1 percent.6 When compared to the
share of gross world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008-7.7 percent-the assumed marginal gain of 2.1 percent of world
product amounts to some 27 percent of the U.S. decline. How much does China matter? Imagine the extreme case-that China had not grown,
and the United States and the rest of the world continued along their actual path of economic growth since 2000. If so, America's share of
world product in 2008 would be 24.3 percent, or 1.2 percent more than today. When compared to the share of world product lost by the
United States from 2000 to 2008-7.7 percent-the assumed marginal gain of 1.2 percent of world product accounts for about 15 percent of the
U.S. decline. These estimates suggest that
roughly a quarter of America's relative decline is due to U.S.
economic weaknesses (spending on the Iraq War, tax cuts, current-account deficits, etc.), a sixth to China's
superior performance and just over half to the spread of technology to the rest of the world. In other words,
self-inflicted wounds of the Bush years significantly exacerbated America's decline, both by making the decline steeper and faster and crowding
out productive investment that could have stimulated innovation to improve matters. All of this has led to one of the most significant declines
of any state since the mid-nineteenth century. And when one examines past declines and their consequences, it becomes clear both that the
U.S. fall is remarkable and that dangerous instability in the international system may lie ahead . If we end up believing
in the wishful thinking of unipolar dominance forever, the costs could be far higher than a simple percentage drop in share of world product.
THE UNITED States has always prided itself on exceptionalism, and the U.S. downfall is indeed extraordinary. Something fundamental has
changed. America's
relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of
relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end
of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history. Indeed, in size, it is clearly
surpassed by only one other great-power decline, the unexpected internal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Most disturbing,
whenever there are major changes in the balance of power, conflict routinely ensues. Examining the
historical record reveals an important pattern: the states facing the largest declines in power compared to other
major powers were apt to be the target of opportunistic aggression. And this is surely not the only possible danger
from relative decline; states on the power wane also have a history of launching preventive wars to
strengthen their positions. All of this suggests that major relative declines are often accompanied by highly dangerous international
environments. So, these declines matter not just in terms of economics, but also because of their destabilizing consequences. Tsarist
Russia presents the first case in point. Compared to other great powers on the European continent, its power declined the most
during the mid-nineteenth century. And, it became the target of opportunistic aggression by the state with the greatest rising power, Great
Britain, during the Crimean War (1854-1856). Indeed, the consequences of Russia's decline were not fully recognizable until the war itself.
Though Russia was still a great power and the war cost Britain and France more than expected, Russia emerged the clear loser. Russia's inability
to defend the status quo in the Crimea confirmed its grand-strategic weaknesses, and ultimately left it worse-off than had it anticipated its
vulnerabilities and sought to negotiate a reduction in its military commitments to the region peacefully. Considering that the Crimea conflict
left Russia with fairly gaping wounds, and that even its slow 10 percent decline in relative power over twenty years left the country bruised and
battered, one might wonder how our far more rapid descent might play out. Meanwhile, similar
destabilization occurred in the
two decades before World War I and before World War II, when France and Great Britain were declining
European powers. In both instances, France and Britain became targets of opportunistic aggression by one of the
strongest rising powers in the region: Germany. And as a small cottage industry of scholarship suggests, Germany's fairly modest relative
declines compared to Russia prior to World War I and the Soviet Union prior to World War II encouraged German leaders to wage preventive
wars. Again, these declines occurred as another power was concomitantly rising (Germany in the case of France and Britain, and Russia-later
the Soviet Union-relative to Germany). Of course, this only served to increase the danger. But again, these
rises and falls were less
precipitous than America's current losses, and our descent appears far trickier to navigate. As we look to
address our current fall from grace, lest we forget, the United States faced two major declines of its power during the cold war as well. Neither
was without risk. The first occurred shortly after World War II, when the devastation of the Soviet, European and many Asian economies,
combined with the increasingly productive American economy, left the United States with a far larger share of gross world product-41 percent
in 1948-than it even possessed in the age of unipolar dominance beginning in 1991. As the war-torn economies recovered, U.S. share of world
product fell 20 percent by 1961 while that of its main rival, the Soviet Union, grew by 167 percent. This relative American decline corresponds
to the height of U.S.-Soviet cold-war rivalry in Europe and Asia. Eight of the nine U.S.-Soviet nuclear crises occurred from 1948-1962, all of
which involved efforts by the Soviet Union or its allies to revise the political status quo in their favor7-that is, all could be reasonably
interpreted as instances in which the United States or its allies became the targets of opportunistic aggression. The second major U.S. relative
decline occurred from 1970 to 1980, when the U.S. share of world product fell 27 percent. This decade brought with it challenges to America's
position in the world. This was especially true toward the end of the decade with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution,
which collectively increased concern about Soviet dominance of Persian Gulf oil. However, the 1970s was mainly a period of "détente" between
the cold-war protagonists, which corresponds to the fact that the shares of world product for both the United States and the Soviet Union were
in decline. In other words, it is reasonable to think that America's decline in the 1970s did not lead to more significant trouble for the United
States because its main rival was descending even faster. Clearly, major
shifts in the balance of power in the
international system often lead to instability and conflict. And America's current predicament is far
more severe. This time, our relative decline of 32 percent is accompanied, not by an even-steeper decline
of our near-peer competitor, but rather by a 144 percent increase in China's relative position. Further, the
rapid spread of technology and technological breakthroughs means that one great discovery does not buoy an already-strong state to decadeslong predominance. And with a rising China-with raw resources of population, landmass and increasing adoption of leading technology-a true
peer competitor is looming. America's current, rapid domestic economic decline is merely accelerating our own downfall. The distinct quality of
a system with only one superpower is that no other single state is powerful enough to balance against it. A true global hegemon is more
powerful still-stronger than all second-ranked powers acting as members of a counterbalancing coalition seeking to contain the unipolar leader.
By these standards, America's relative decline is fundamentally changing international politics, and is fundamentally different from Russia circa
1850 and Great Britain circa 1910. In current-U.S.-dollar terms-the preferred measure of the unipolar-dominance school-the United States has
already fallen far from being a global hegemon and unipolarity itself is waning, since China will soon have as much economic potential to
balance the United States as did the Soviet Union during the cold war. At the beginning of the 1990s, the United States was indeed not only
stronger than any other state individually, but its power relative to even the collective power of all other major states combined grew from
1990 to 2000. Although the growth was small, America almost reached the crucial threshold of 50 percent of major-power product necessary to
become a true global hegemon. So it is understandable that we were lulled into a sense of security, believing we could do as we wished,
whenever and wherever we wished. The instability and danger of the cold war quickly became a distant memory. Near the time of the Iraq
War, it would have required virtually every major power to actively oppose the United States in order to assemble a counterbalancing coalition
that could approximate America's potential power. Under the circumstances, hard, military balancing against the United States was not a
serious possibility. So, it is not surprising that major powers opted for soft-balancing measures-relying on institutional, economic and diplomatic
tools to oppose American military power. And yet we are beginning to see "the conflict of history" repeat itself. Even with less relative power,
in the run-up to the Iraq War, people grossly underrated the ability of Germany, France, Russia and China, along with important regional
powers like Turkey, to soft balance against the United States; for instance, to use the United Nations to delay, complicate and ultimately deny
the use of one-third of U.S. combat power (the Fourth Infantry Division) in the opening months of the Iraq War. This is not yet great-power war
The balance of world
power circa 2008 and 2013 shows a disturbing trend. True, the United States remains stronger than any
other state individually, but its power to stand up to the collective opposition of other major powers
is falling precipitously. Though these worlds depict potential power, not active counterbalancing coalitions, and this type of alliance
of the kind seen in centuries past, but it harkens the instability that future unilateral efforts may trigger.
may never form, nonetheless, American relative power is declining to the point where even subsets of major powers acting in concert could
produce sufficient military power to stand a reasonable chance of successfully opposing American military policies. Indeed, if
present
trends continue to 2013 and beyond, China and Russia, along with any one of the other major powers,
would have sufficient economic capacity to mount military opposition at least as serious as did the
Soviet Union during the cold war. And it is worth remembering that the Soviet Union never had more than about half the world product of
the United States, which China alone is likely to reach in the coming decade. The faults in the arguments of the unipolar-dominance school are
being brought into sharp relief. The world is slowly coming into balance. Whether or not this
will be another period of greatpower transition coupled with an increasing risk of war will largely depend on how America can
navigate its decline. Policy makers must act responsibly in this new era or risk international opposition that poses far greater costs and
far greater dangers. A COHERENT grand strategy seeks to balance a state's economic resources and its foreign-policy commitments and to
sustain that balance over time. For America, a coherent grand strategy also calls for rectifying the current imbalance between our means and
our ends, adopting policies that enhance the former and modify the latter. Clearly, the United States is not the first great power to suffer longterm decline-we should learn from history. Great powers in decline seem to almost instinctively spend more on military forces in order to shore
up their disintegrating strategic positions, and some like Germany go even further, shoring up their security by adopting preventive military
strategies, beyond defensive alliances, to actively stop a rising competitor from becoming dominant. For declining great powers, the allure of
preventive war-or lesser measures to "merely" firmly contain a rising power-has a more compelling logic than many might assume. Since
Thucydides, scholars of international politics have famously argued that a declining hegemon and rising challenger must necessarily face such
intense security competition that hegemonic war to retain dominance over the international system is almost a foregone conclusion. Robert
Gilpin, one of the deans of realism who taught for decades at Princeton, believed that "the first and most
attractive response to a society's decline is to eliminate the source of the problem . . . [by] what we shall call a hegemonic
war." Yet, waging war just to keep another state down has turned out to be one of the great losing strategies in
history. The Napoleonic Wars, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War, German aggression
in World War I, and German and Japanese aggression in World War II were all driven by declining
powers seeking to use war to improve their future security. All lost control of events they thought they could control.
All suffered ugly defeats. All were worse-off than had they not attacked. As China rises, America must avoid this greatpower trap. It would be easy to think that greater American military efforts could offset the consequences of China's increasing power and
possibly even lead to the formation of a multilateral strategy to contain China in the future. Indeed, when China's economic star began to rise in
the 1990s, numerous voices called for precisely this, noting that on current trajectories China would overtake the United States as the world's
leading economic power by 2050.8 Now, as that date draws nearer-indeed, current-dollar calculations put the crossover point closer to 2040and with Beijing evermore dependent on imported oil for continued economic growth, one might think the case for actively containing China is
all the stronger. Absent provocative military adventures by Beijing, however, U.S.
military efforts to contain the rising power
are most likely doomed to failure. China's growth turns mainly on domestic issues-such as shifting the workforce from rural to
urban areas-that are beyond the ability of outside powers to significantly influence. Although
China's growth also depends on
external sources of oil, there is no way to exploit this vulnerability short of obviously hostile alliances (with India,
Indonesia, Taiwan and Japan) and clearly aggressive military measures (controlling the sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf to Asia) that together
could deny oil to China. Any
efforts along these lines would likely backfire-and only exacerbate America's
problems, increasing the risk of counterbalancing. Even more insidious is the risk of overstretch. This selfreinforcing spiral escalates current spending to maintain increasingly costly military commitments, crowding out productive investment for
future growth. Today, the cold-war framework of significant troop deployments to Europe, Asia and the Persian Gulf is coming unglued. We
cannot afford to keep our previous promises. With American forces bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and mounting troubles in Iran and
Pakistan, the United States has all but gutted its military commitments to Europe, reducing our troop levels far below the one hundred
thousand of the 1990s. Nearly half have been shifted to Iraq and elsewhere. Little wonder that Russia found an opportunity to demonstrate the
hollowness of the Bush administration's plan for expanding NATO to Russia's borders by scoring a quick and decisive military victory over
Georgia that America was helpless to prevent. If
a large-scale conventional war between China and Taiwan broke
out in the near future, one must wonder whether America would significantly shift air and naval
power away from its ongoing wars in the Middle East in order to live up to its global commitments. If the United States
could not readily manage wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time, could it really wage a protracted struggle in Asia as well? And as the
gap between America's productive resources and global commitments grows, why will others pass up
opportunities to take advantage of America's overstretched grand strategy? Since the end of the cold war,
American leaders have consistently claimed the ability to maintain a significant forward-leaning
military presence in the three major regions of the globe and, if necessary, to wage two major regional
wars at the same time. The harsh reality is that the United States no longer has the economic capacity for such
an ambitious grand strategy. With 30 percent of the world's product, the United States could imagine maintaining this hope. Nearing 20
percent, it cannot.
China will escalate the conflict – perception of rational escalation ensures US gets
drawn into the nuclear arms race
Glaser, PolSci Prof at George Washington, ’11 (Charles, March/April, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?”
Foreign Affairs, Vol 90 Issue 2, EbscoHost)
ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN? THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in
China's
power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find
disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades
ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal
for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has
been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high
because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different
attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the
U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily
escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors
involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United
States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to
protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests
and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which
the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for
decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to
escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to
increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory
holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining
position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to
behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to
defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive
value on Taiwan and
targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further
Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.
A protracted decline in the US economy will shred global economic resilience and lead
to a complete breakdown of the world economy
Mandelbaum, Director of Foreign Policy Program at John Hopkins, ‘5 (Michael, “The Case for Goliath:
How America Acts as the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century” p 192-195)
Although the spread of nuclear weapons, with the corresponding increase in the likelihood that a nuclear shot would be fired in anger
somewhere in the world, counted as the most serious potential consequence of the abandonment by the United States of its role as the world's
government, it was not the only one. In
the previous period of American international reticence, the 1920s and 1930s, the global
economy suffered serious damage that a more active American role might have mitigated. A twentyfirst-century American retreat could have similarly adverse international economic consequences. The
economic collapse of the 1930s caused extensive hardship throughout the world and led indirectly to World War II by
paving the way for the people who started it to gain power in Germany and Japan. In retrospect, the Great Depression is widely believed to
have been caused by a series of errors in public policy that made an economic downturn far worse than it would have been had governments
responded to it in appropriate fashion. Since
the 1930s, acting on the lessons drawn from that experience by
professional economists, governments have taken steps that have helped to prevent a recurrence of
the disasters of that decade.5 In the face of reduced demand, for example, governments have increased rather than cut spending.
Fiscal and monetary crises have evoked rescue efforts rather than a studied indifference based on the
assumption that market forces will readily reestablish a desirable economic equilibrium . In contrast to the
widespread practice of the 1930s, political authorities now understand that putting up barriers to imports in an attempt to revive domestic
production will in fact worsen economic conditions everywhere. Still,
a serious, prolonged failure of the international
economy, inflicting the kind of hardship the world experienced in the 1930s (which some Asian countries also suffered as a result of their
fiscal crises in the 1990s) does not lie beyond the realm of possibility. Market economies remain subject to
cyclical downturns, which public policy can limit but has not found a way to eliminate entirely.
Markets also have an inherent tendency to form bubbles, excessive values for particular assets, whether seventeenth
century Dutch tulips or twentieth century Japanese real estate and Thai currency, that cause economic harm when the bubble
bursts and prices plunge. In responding to these events, governments can make errors. They can act too slowly, or
fail to implement the proper policies, or implement improper ones. Moreover, the global economy and the national economies that comprise
it, like a living organism, change constantly and sometimes rapidly: Capital flows across sovereign borders, for instance, far more rapidly and in
much greater volume in the early twenty-first century than ever before. This means that measures that successfully address economic
malfunctions at one time may have less effect at another, just as medical science must cope with the appearance of new strains of influenza
against which existing vaccines are not effective. Most importantly,
since the Great Depression, an active American
international economic role has been crucial both in fortifying the conditions for global economic
well-being and in coping with the problems that have occurred, especially periodic recessions and
currency crises, by applying the lessons of the past. The absence of such a role could weaken those
conditions and aggravate those problems. The overall American role in the world since World War II therefore has something
in common with the theme of the Frank Capra film It's a Wonderful Life, in which the angel Clarence, played by Henry Travers, shows James
Stewart, playing the bank clerk George Bailey, who believes his existence to have been worthless, how life in his small town of Bedford Falls
would have unfolded had he never been born. George Bailey learns that people he knows and loves turn out to be far worse off without
him. So it is with the
United States and its role as the world's government. Without that role, the world very likely would have
been in the past, and would become a less secure and less prosperous place. The abdication by the United States of some or
all of the responsibilities for international security that it had come to bear in the first decade of the twenty-first century would deprive the
international system of one of its principal safety features, which keeps countries from smashing into each other, as they are historically prone
to do. In this sense, a
world without America would be the equivalent of a freeway full of cars without
brakes. Similarly, should the American government abandon some or all of the ways in which it had, at the dawn
of the new century, come to support global economic activity, the world economy would function less
effectively and might even suffer a severe and costly breakdown. A world without the United States would in this way
resemble a fleet of cars without gasoline.
That’s the key internal link to escalation of regional wars – makes every conflict go
global
Friedberg, IR Professor at Princeton, ‘8 (Aaron, “The Dangers of a Diminished America” Wall Street
Journal)
Then there
are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For
of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of
the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as
decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages
we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future?
Meanwhile, traditional
foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist
Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and
Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give
cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power
vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as
defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are
shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies
failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of
economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become
ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the
financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The
dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance
hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending
heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and
perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is
good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with
external adventures. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are
struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism,
Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and
geopolitical power. What does this all mean? There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we
have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of
continued American leadership.
affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North
Advantage 3 – Science Leadership
Scenario 1 – Warming
Warming is real and anthropogenic—models and scientific consensus are on our side
Rahmstorf 8 (Richard. Professor of Physics of the Oceans at Potsdam University.
Global Warming: Looking Beyond Kyoto. Edited by Ernesto Zedillo. “Anthropogenic
Climate Change?” Page 42-49)
It is time to turn to statement B: human activities are altering the climate. This can be broken into two parts. The first is as follows
: global climate is warming. This
is by now a generally undisputed point (except by novelist Michael Crichton), so we deal with it only briefly. The two leading compilations of data measured
with thermometers are shown in figure 3-3, that of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and that of the British Hadley Centre for Climate
Change. Although they differ in the details, due to the inclusion of different data sets and use of different spatial averaging and quality control procedures, they both show a
consistent picture, with a global mean warming of 0.8°C since the late nineteenth century. Temperatures over the past ten years clearly were
the warmest since measured records have been available. The year 1998 sticks out well above the longterm trend due to the occurrence of a major El Nino event that year (the last El
Nino so far and one of the strongest on record). These events are examples of the largest natural climate variations on multiyear time
scales and, by releasing heat from the ocean, generally cause positive anomalies in global mean
temperature. It is remarkable that the year 2005 rivaled the heat of 1998 even though no El Nino event occurred that year. (A bizarre curiosity, perhaps worth mentioning, is that
several prominent "climate skeptics" recently used the extreme year 1998 to claim in the media that global warming had ended. In Lindzen's words, "Indeed, the absence of any record
breakers during the past seven years is statistical evidence that temperatures are not increasing.")33 In addition to the surface measurements, the more recent portion of the global warming
trend (since 1979) is also documented by satellite data. It is not straightforward to derive a reliable surface temperature trend from satellites, as they measure radiation coming from
throughout the atmosphere (not just near the surface), including the stratosphere, which has strongly cooled, and the records are not homogeneous' due to the short life span of individual
Current analyses of these satellite data
show trends that are fully consistent with surface measurements and model simulations." If no reliable
temperature measurements existed, could we be sure that the climate is warming? The "canaries in the coal mine" of
climate change (as glaciologist Lonnie Thompson puts it) ~are mountain glaciers. We know, both from old photographs and from the position of the
terminal moraines heaped up by the flowing ice, that mountain glaciers have been in retreat all over the world during the
satellites, the problem of orbital decay, observations at different times of day, and drifts in instrument calibration.'
past century. There are precious few exceptions, and they are associated with a strong increase in precipitation or local cooling.36 I have inspected examples of shrinking glaciers myself in field
trips to Switzerland, Norway, and New Zealand. As glaciers respond sensitively to temperature changes, data on the extent of glaciers have been used to reconstruct a history of Northern
Hemisphere temperature over the past four centuries (see figure 3-4). Cores drilled in tropical glaciers show signs of recent melting that is unprecedented at least throughout the Holocene-the
Another powerful sign of warming, visible clearly from satellites, is the shrinking Arctic sea ice cover (figure 3), which has declined 20 percent since
1979
past 10,000 years.
5
satellite observations began in
. While climate clearly became warmer in the twentieth century, much
discussion particularly in the popular media has focused on the question of how "unusual" this warming is in a longer-term context. While this is an interesting question, it has often been
mixed incorrectly with the question of causation. Scientifically, how unusual recent warming is-say, compared to the past millennium-in itself contains little information about its cause. Even a
even a warming within the bounds of past
natural variations could have a predominantly anthropogenic cause. I come to the question of causation shortly, after briefly visiting
highly unusual warming could have a natural cause (for example, an exceptional increase in solar activity). And
the evidence for past natural climate variations. Records from the time before systematic temperature measurements were collected are based on "proxy data," coming from tree rings, ice
cores, corals, and other sources. These proxy data are generally linked to local temperatures in some way, but they may be influenced by other parameters as well (for example, precipitation),
they may have a seasonal bias (for example, the growth season for tree rings), and high-quality long records are difficult to obtain and therefore few in number and geographic coverage.
Therefore, there is still substantial uncertainty in the evolution of past global or hemispheric temperatures. (Comparing only local or regional temperature; as in Europe, is of limited value for
our purposes,' as regional variations can be much larger than global ones and can have many regional causes, unrelated to global-scale forcing and climate change.) The first quantitative
reconstruction for the Northern Hemisphere temperature of the past millennium, including an error estimation, was presented by Mann, Bradley, and Hughes and rightly highlighted in the
twentieth-century
warming is indeed highly unusual and probably was unprecedented during the past millennium. This result,
2001 IPCC report as one of the major new findings since its 1995 report; it is shown in figure 3_6.39 The analysis suggests that, despite the large error bars,
presumably because of its symbolic power, has attracted much criticism, to some extent in scientific journals, but even more so in the popular media. The hockey stick-shaped curve became a
symbol for the IPCC, .and criticizing this particular data analysis became an avenue for some to question the credibility of the IPCC. Three important things have been overlooked in much of the
media coverage. First, even if the scientific critics had been right, this would not have called into question the very cautious conclusion drawn by the IPCC from the reconstruction by Mann,
Bradley, and Hughes: "New analyses of proxy data for the Northern Hemisphere indicate that the increase in temperature in the twentieth century is likely to have been the largest of any
." This conclusion has since been supported further by every single one of close to a
dozen new reconstructions (two of which are shown in figure 3-6). Second, by far the most serious scientific criticism raised against Mann, Hughes, and Bradley was
century during the past 1,000 years
simply based on a mistake. 40 The prominent paper of von Storch and others, which claimed (based on a model test) that the method of Mann, Bradley, and Hughes systematically
underestimated variability, "was [itself] based on incorrect implementation of the reconstruction procedure."41 With correct implementation, climate field reconstruction procedures such as
If
their analysis underestimated past natural climate variability, this would certainly not argue for a
smaller climate sensitivity and thus a lesser concern about the consequences of our emissions. Some have
the one used by Mann, Bradley, and Hughes have been shown to perform well in similar model tests. Third, whether their reconstruction is accurate or not has no bearing on policy.
argued that, in contrast, it would point to a larger climate sensitivity. While this is a valid point in principle, it does not apply in practice to the climate sensitivity estimates discussed herein or
to the range given by IPCC, since these did not use the reconstruction of Mann, Hughes, and Bradley or any other proxy records of the past millennium. Media claims that "a pillar of the Kyoto
Protocol" had been called into question were therefore misinformed. As an aside, the protocol was agreed in 1997, before the reconstruction in question even existed. The overheated public
debate on this topic has, at least, helped to attract more researchers and funding to this area of paleoclimatology; its methodology has advanced significantly, and a number of new
reconstructions have been presented in recent years. While the science has moved forward, the first seminal reconstruction by Mann, Hughes, and Bradley has held up remarkably well, with
its main features reproduced by morerecent work. Further progress probably will require substantial amounts of new proxy data, rather than further refinement of the statistical techniques
most of the observed
warming over the past fifty years is anthropogenic. A large number of studies exist that have taken different approaches to analyze this issue, which
is generally called the "attribution problem." I do not discuss the exact share of the anthropogenic contribution (although this is an interesting question). By "most" I imply mean
"more than 50 percent.” The first and crucial piece of evidence is, of course, that the magnitude of the warming is what is
expected from the anthropogenic perturbation of the radiation balance, so anthropogenic forcing is
able to explain all of the temperature rise. As discussed here, the rise in greenhouse gases alone corresponds to 2.6 W/tn2 of forcing. This by itself, after
pioneered by Mann, Hughes, and Bradley. Developing these data sets will require time and substantial effort. It is time to address the final statement:
subtraction of the observed 0'.6 W/m2 of ocean heat uptake, would Cause 1.6°C of warming since preindustrial times for medium climate sensitivity (3"C). With a current "best guess'; aerosol
forcing of 1 W/m2, the expected warming is O.8°c. The point here is not that it is possible to obtain the 'exact observed number-this is fortuitous because the amount of aerosol' forcing is still
. Depending
on aerosol forcing and climate sensitivity, it could explain a large fraction of the warming, or all of it,
or even more warming than has been observed (leaving room for natural processes to counteract some of the warming). The second important piece
of evidence is clear: there is no viable alternative explanation. In the scientific literature, no serious alternative hypothesis has been proposed to explain the
observed global warming. Other possible causes, such as solar activity, volcanic activity, cosmic rays, or orbital
cycles, are well observed, but they do not show trends capable of explaining the observed warming.
very' uncertain-but that the expected magnitude is roughly right. There can be little doubt that the anthropogenic forcing is large enough to explain most of the warming
Since 1978, solar irradiance has been measured directly from satellites and shows the well-known eleven-year solar cycle, but no trend. There are various estimates of solar variability before
this time, based on sunspot numbers, solar cycle length, the geomagnetic AA index, neutron monitor data, and, carbon-14 data. These indicate that solar activity probably increased somewhat
up to 1940. While there is disagreement about the variation in previous centuries, different authors agree that solar activity did not significantly increase during the last sixty-five years.
Therefore, this cannot explain the warming, and neither can any of the other factors mentioned. Models driven by natural factors only, leaving the anthropogenic forcing aside, show a cooling
in the second half of the twentieth century (for an example, See figure 2-2, panel a, in chapter 2 of this volume). The trend in the sum of natural forcings is downward. The only way out would
some as yet undiscovered unknown forcing or a warming trend that arises by chance from an unforced internal variability in
has to be considered highly unlikely. No evidence in the observed
record, proxy data, or current models suggest that such internal variability could cause a sustained
trend of global warming of the observed magnitude. As discussed, twentieth century warming is unprecedented over the past 1,000 years (or even 2,000 years, as the few
be either
the climate system. The latter cannot be completely ruled out, but
longer reconstructions available now suggest), which does not 'support the idea of large internal fluctuations. Also, those past variations correlate well with past forcing (solar variability,
volcanic activity) and thus appear to be largely forced rather than due to unforced internal variability." And indeed, it would be difficult for a large and sustained unforced variability to satisfy
the fundamental physical law of energy conservation. Natural internal variability generally shifts heat around different parts of the climate system-for example, the large El Nino event of 1998,
which warmed, the atmosphere by releasing heat stored in the ocean. This mechanism implies that the ocean heat content drops as the atmosphere warms. For past decades, as discussed, we
observed the atmosphere warming and the ocean heat content increasing, which rules out heat release from the ocean as a cause of surface warming. The heat content of the whole climate
system is increasing, and there is no plausible source of this heat other than the heat trapped by greenhouse gases. ' A completely different approach to attribution is to analyze the spatial
patterns of climate change. This is done in so-called fingerprint studies, which associate particular patterns or "fingerprints" with different forcings. It is plausible that the pattern of a solarforced climate change differs from the pattern of a change caused by greenhouse gases. For example, a characteristic of greenhouse gases is that heat is trapped closer to the Earth's surface
and that, unlike solar variability, greenhouse gases tend to warm more in winter, and at night. Such studies have used different data sets and have been performed by different groups of
researchers with different statistical methods. They consistently conclude that the observed spatial pattern of warming can only be explained by greenhouse gases.49 Overall, it has to be
considered, highly likely' that the observed warming is indeed predominantly due to the human-caused increase in greenhouse gases. ' This paper discussed the evidence for the anthropogenic
mass of
evidence points to a CO2 effect on climate of 3C ± 1.59C global-warming for a doubling of concentration. (This is,
increase in atmospheric CO2 concentration and the effect of CO2 on climate, finding that this anthropogenic increase is proven beyond reasonable doubt and that a
the classic IPCC range; my personal assessment is that, in-the light of new studies since the IPCC Third Assessment Report, the uncertainty range can now be narrowed somewhat to 3°C ± 1.0C)
This is based on consistent results from theory, models, and data analysis, and, even in the absence-of
any computer models, the same result would still hold based on physics and on data from climate
history alone. Considering the plethora of consistent evidence, the chance that these conclusions are wrong has to be considered minute. If the preceding is accepted, then it follows
logically and incontrovertibly that a further increase in CO2 concentration will lead to further warming. The magnitude of our emissions depends on human behavior, but the climatic response
to various emissions scenarios can be computed from the information presented here. The result is the famous range of future global temperature scenarios shown in figure 3_6.50 Two
additional steps are involved in these computations: the consideration of anthropogenic forcings other than CO2 (for example, other greenhouse gases and aerosols) and the computation of
CO2 is the largest and most
important forcing. Concerning concentrations, the scenarios shown basically assume that ocean and biosphere
take up a similar share of our emitted CO2 as in the past. This could turn out to be an optimistic assumption; some models indicate
the possibility of a positive feedback, with the biosphere turning into a carbon source rather than a sink under growing climatic stress. It is clear that even in the more
optimistic of the shown (non-mitigation) scenarios, global temperature would rise by 2-3°C above its
preindustrial level by the end of this century. Even for a paleoclimatologist like myself, this is an extraordinarily high temperature, which is very likely unprecedented in
concentrations from the emissions. Other gases are not discussed here, although they are important to get quantitatively accurate results.
at least the past 100,000 years. As far as the data show, we would have to go back about 3 million years, to the Pliocene, for comparable temperatures. The rate of this warming (which is
important for the ability of ecosystems to cope) is also highly unusual and unprecedented probably for an even longer time. The last major global warming trend occurred when the last great
The expected
magnitude and rate of planetary warming is highly likely to come with major risk and impacts in terms
of sea level rise (Pliocene sea level was 25-35 meters higher than now due to smaller Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets), extreme events (for example, hurricane
activity is expected to increase in a warmer climate), and ecosystem loss. The second part of this paper examined the evidence for the current warming of the planet and
Ice Age ended between 15,000 and 10,000 years ago: this was a warming of about 5°C over 5,000 years, that is, a rate of only 0.1 °C per century. 52
discussed what is known about its causes. This part showed that global warming is already a measured and-well-established fact, not a theory. Many different lines of evidence consistently
show that most of the observed warming of the past fifty years was caused by human activity. Above all, this warming is exactly what would be expected given the anthropogenic rise in
greenhouse gases, and no viable alternative explanation for this warming has been proposed in the scientific literature. Taken together.,
the very strong evidence
accumulated from thousands of independent studies, has over the past decades convinced virtually every
climatologist around the world (many of whom were initially quite skeptical, including myself) that anthropogenic global warming is
a reality with which we need to deal.
Ice breakers are needed for continued polar research – allows key access for
resupplying and scientists
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
The health and continued vitality of polar research are intimately linked to the availability of the
appropriate infrastructure and logistical support to allow scientists to work in these harsh environments. Access to the polar
regions is essential if the United States is to continue to be a leader in polar science. To operate
reliably and safely in these regions necessitates a national icebreaking capability. Icebreakers enable
resupply of land-based stations and field camps in the south. The availability of polar icebreakers with
greater icebreaking capability would enable important new research in the Southern Ocean in locations where ice is
thick. While other assets and platforms such as airplanes and space borne sensors are useful tools, surface ground-truth and in situ sampling
will not be replaced in the near future. Because
there are no land sites in the central Arctic, an icebreaker is an
essential platform to support sustained scientific measurements in the Arctic Ocean. The availability
of adequate icebreaking capabilities will be essential to advancing research in both polar regions.
Polar Research is pivotal to create a societal concern and scientific initiative necessary
to solve global warming
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
Because science and engineering research in the polar regions is critical to U.S. national interests , its
relevance and impact continue to increase. The Arctic and Antarctic provide natural laboratories where extreme
environments and geographically unique settings enable research on fundamental phenomena and
processes not feasible or possible elsewhere (NSF, 2005). Significant advances in many scientific disciplines and engineering
applications have resulted from polar research and many of these discoveries have provided critical knowledge of direct benefit to society (Box
4.1).
As global climate has garnered worldwide attention, the polar regions have been found to react
acutely to fluctuations in climate and temperature. Since ice tends to reflect solar radiation and water absorbs it, melting
in the polar regions can exert a strong influence on both atmospheric climate and ocean circulation. Huge reservoirs of water are
held in massive ice sheets and glaciers; substantial release may create major climate and social
dislocations. Thus, research in these regions plays a pivotal role in the global Earth system exerting
influences of critical importance. The 40 percent reduction in Arctic sea-ice thickness over the past four decades and the collapse
of ice shelves in West Antarctica are some of the most dramatic examples of recent changes that have captured the public’s imagination. In
many ways, these events have come to represent societal concerns about human influence on Earth’s
climate. From a scientific standpoint, evidence continues to accumulate that not only are the polar
regions an important focus of research as unique systems, but they also play a pivotal role in global
Earth systems.
Warming magnifies every impact and causes extinction
Burke 8 (Sharon, sr fellow and dir of the energy security project at the Center for a
New American Security, Chapter 6 of Climatic Cataclysm: The Foreign Policy and
National Security Implications of Climate Change, edited by Kurt Campbell, p 157-165)
, the implications
for human
survival raise the stakes
At the same time, however
of both trends
society and
; it is crucial to try to understand what
the future might look like in one hundred years in order to act accordingly today. This scenario, therefore, builds a picture of the plausible effects of catastrophic climate change, and the
implications for national security, on the basis of what we know about the past and the present. The purpose is not to "one up" the previous scenarios in awfulness, but rather to attempt to
the year 2040 marks
an important tipping point. Large-scale, singular events of abrupt climate change will start occurring,
greatly exacerbated by the collapse of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (MOC), which is believed to play and important role in
regulating global climate, particularly in Europe.8 There will be a rapid loss of polar ice, a sudden rise in sea levels , totaling 2 meters (6.6
feet), and a temperature increase of almost 5.6°C (10.1°F) by 2095. Developing countries, particularly those at low latitudes and those reliant on subsistence,
imagine the unimaginable future that is, after all, entirely plausible. Assumed Climate Effects of the Catastrophic Scenario. In the catastrophic scenario,
rain-fed farming, will be hardest and earliest hit. All nations, however, will find it difficult to deal with the unpredictable, abrupt, and severe nature of climate change after 2040. These changes
will be difficult to anticipate, and equally difficult to mitigate or recover from, particularly as they will recur, possibly on a frequent basis. First, the rise in temperatures alone will present a
fundamental challenge for human health. Indeed, even now, about 250 people die of heatstroke every year in the United States. In a prolonged heat wave in 1980, more than 10,000 people
died of heat-related illnesses, and between 5,000 and 10,00 in 1988.9 In 2003, record heat waves in Europe, with temperatures in Paris hitting 40.4°C (104.7°F) and 47.3°C (116.3°F) in parts of
Portugal, are estimated to have cost more than 37,000 lives; in the same summer there were at least 2,000 heat-related deaths in India. Average temperatures will increase in most regions,
and the western United States, southern Europe, and southern Australia will be particularly vulnerable to prolonged heat spells. The rise in temperatures will complicated daily life around the
world. In Washington, D.C., the average summer temperature is in the low 30s C (high 80s F), getting as high as 40°C (104°F). With a 5.6°C (10.1°F) increase, that could mean temperatures as
high as 45.6°C (114.5°F). In New Delhi, summer temperatures can reach 45°C (113°F) already, opening the possibility of new highs approaching sO.sOC (123°F). In general, the level of safe
exposure is considered to be about 38°C (lOO°F); at hotter temperatures, activity has to be limited and the very old and the very young are especially vulnerable to heat-related illness and
Sudden shifts in temperature, which are expected in this scenario, are particularly lethal. As a result of higher temperatures and
lower, unpredictable precipitation, severe and persistent wildfires will become more common, freshwater will be
more scarce, and agricultural productivity will fall, particularly in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean, and the western United States. The
World Health Organization estimates that water scarcity already affects two- fifths of the world population-s-some 2.6 billion people. In this scenario, half the world
population will experience persistent water scarcity. Regions that depend on annual snowfall and glaciers for water lose their supply; hardest hit
will be Central Asia, the Andes, Europe, and western North America. Some regions may become uninhabitable due to lack of water: the Mediterranean,
mortality.
much of Central Asia, northern Mexico, and South America. The southwestern United States will lose its current sources of fresh water, but that may be mitigated by an increase in
precipitation due to the MOC collapse, though precipitation patterns may be irregular. Regional water scarcity will also be mitigated by increases in precipitation in East Africa and East and
The lack of rainfall will also threaten tropical forests and their dependent
species with extinction. Declining agricultural productivity will be an acute challenge. The heat, together with shifting and
unpredictable precipitation patterns and melting glaciers, will dry out many areas, including today's grain-exporting
regions. The largest decreases in precipitation will be in North Africa, the Middle East, Cen tral America, the Caribbean, and northeastern South America, including Amazonia. The World
Southeast Asia, though the risk of floods will increase.
Food Program estimates that nearly 1 billion people suffer from chronic hunger today, almost 15 million of them refugees from conflict and natural disasters. According to the World Food
Program, "More than nine out of ten of those who die I of chronic hunger] are simply trapped by poverty in remote rural areas or urban slums. They do not make the news. They just die."
Mortality rates from hunger and lack of water will skyrocket over the next century, and given all that wiII be happening, that will probably
not make the news, either--people will just die. Over the next one hundred years, the "breadbasket" regions of the world will shift northward. Consequently, formerly subarctic regions will be
able to support farming, but these regions' traditionally small human populations and lack of infrastructure, including roads and utilities, will make the dramatic expansion of agriculture a
extreme year-to-year climate variability may make sustainable agriculture unlikely
challenge. Moreover,
, at least on the
scale needed. Northwestern Europe, too, will see shorter growing seasons and declining crop yields because it will actually experience colder winters, due to the collapse of the MOC. At the
Ten percent of the world population now lives
in low-elevation coastal zones (all land contiguous with the coast that is 10 meters or less in elevation) that will experience sea level
rises of 6.6 feet (2 meters) in this scenario and 9.8 feet (3 meters) in the North Atlantic, given the loss of the MOC. Most major cities at or near sea level have some kind of flood
protection, so high tides alone will not lead to the inundation of these cities. Consider, however, that the combined effects of more frequent and
severe weather events and higher sea levels could well lead to increased flooding from coastal storms
and coastal erosion. In any case, there will be saltwater intrusion into coastal water supplies, rising water tables, and the loss of coastal and upstream wetlands, with impacts
on fisheries. The rise could well occur in several quick pulses, with relatively stable periods in between, which will complicate planning and adaptation and make
any kind of orderly or managed evacuation unlikely. Inundation plus the combined effects of higher sea levels and more
frequent tropical storms may leave many large coastal cities uninhabitable, including the largest American cities,
New York City and Los Angeles, focal points for the national economy with a combined total of almost 33 million people in their
same time that the resource base to support humanity is shrinking, there will be less inhabitable land.
metropolitan areas today. Resettling coastal populations will be a crippling challenge, even for the United States. Sea level rises also will affect food security. Significant fertile deltas will
. Fisheries and marine ecosystems,
will collapse. Locally devastating weather events will be the new norm for coastal and mid-latitude locations-wind and flood damage will be much
more intense. There will be frequent losses of life, property, and infrastructure-and this will happen every
year. Although water scarcity and food security will disproportionately affect poor countries-they already do-extreme weather events will be more or less evenly distributed around the
become largely uncultivable because of inundation and more frequent and higher storm surges that reach farther inland
particularly in the North Atlantic,
world. Regions affected by tropical storms, including typhoons and hurricanes, will include all three coasts of the United States; all of Mexico and Central America; the Caribbean islands; East,
Southeast and South Asia; and many South Pacific and Indian Ocean islands. Recent isolated events when coastal storms made landfall in the South Atlantic, Europe, and the Arabian Sea in the
last few years suggest that these regions will also experience a rise in the incidence of extreme storms. In these circumstances, there will be an across-the-board decline in human development
there will be a decline
in personal freedoms as states fall to anocracy (a situation where central authority in a state is weak or nonexistent and power has devolved to more regional
or local actors, such as tribes) and autocracy. The Age of Survival: Imagining the Unimaginable Future If New Orleans is one harbinger of
indicators. Life spans will shorten, incomes will drop, health will deteriorate-including as a result of proliferating diseases-infant mortality will rise, and
the future, Somalia is another. With a weak and barely functional central government that does not enjoy the trust and confidence of the public, the nation has descended into clan warfare.
Mortality rates for combatants and noncombatants are high. Neighboring Ethiopia has intervened, with troops on the ground in Mogadishu and elsewhere, a small African Union peacekeeping
force is present in the country, and the United States has conducted military missions in Somalia within the last year, including air strikes aimed at terrorist groups that the United States
government has said are finding safe haven in the chaos." In a July 2007 report, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia reported that the nation is "literally awash in arms" and factional groups
are targeting not only all combatants in the country but also noncombatants, including aid groups. Drought is a regular feature of life in Somalia that even in the best of times has been difficult
to deal with. These are bad times, indeed, for Somalia, and the mutually reinforcing cycle of drought, famine, and conflict has left some 750,000 Somalis internally displaced and about 1.5
million people-17 percent of the population-in dire need of humanitarian relief. The relief is difficult to provide, however, given the lawlessness and violence consuming the country. For
example, nearly all food assistance to Somalia is shipped by sea, but with the rise of piracy, the number of vessels willing to carry food to the country fell by 50 percent in 2007.u Life
expectancy is forty-eight years, infant mortality has skyrocketed, and annual per capita GDP is estimated to be about six hundred dollars. The conflict has also had a negative effect on the
there will be a sharp rise in
failing and failed states and therefore in intrastate war. According to International Alert, there are forty-six countries,
home to 2,7 billion people, at a high risk of violent conflict as a result of climate change. The group lists an
stability of surrounding nations. In the catastrophic climate change scenario, situations like that in Somalia will be commonplace:
additional fifty-six nations, accounting for another 1.2 billion people, that will have difficulty dealing with climate change, given other challenges. 12 Over the next hundred years, in a
there are likely to be at least 102 failing and failed states, consumed by internal
conflict, spewing desperate refugees, and harboring and spawning violent extremist movements. Moreover, nations all over the world will be destabilized as a result, either by the crisis on their borders or
the significant numbers of refugees and in some cases armed or extremist groups migrating into their
territories. Over the course of the century, this will mean a collapse of globalization and transnational institutions
and an increase in all types of conflict-most dramatically, intrastate and asymmetric. The global nature of the conflicts
catastrophic future, that means
and the abruptness of the climate effects will challenge the ability of governments all over the world to respond to the disasters, mitigate the effects, or to contain the violence along their
There will be civil unrest in every nation as a result of popular anger toward governments, scapegoating of migrant and minority populations, and
a rise in charismatic end-of-days cults, which will deepen a sense of hopelessness as these cults tend to see no end to
misery other than extinction followed by divine salvation. Given that the failing nations account for half of the global population, this
will also be a cataclysmic humanitarian disaster, with hundreds of millions of people dying from climate effects and conflict, totally overwhelming the
borders.
ability of international institutions and donor nations to respond. This failure of the international relief system will be total after 2040 as donor nations are forced to turn their resources
There will be a worldwide economic depression and a reverse in the gains in standards of living
made in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. At the same time, the probability of conflict between
nations will rise. Although global interstate resource wars are generally unlikely;" simmering conflicts between nations, such as that between India
and Pakistan, are likely to boil over, particularly if both nations are failing. Both India and Pakistan, of
course, have nuclear weapons, and a nuclear exchange is possible, perhaps likely, either by failing central
governments or by extremist and ethnic groups that seize control of nuclear weapons. There will also
be competition for the Arctic region, where natural resources, including oil and arable land, will be increasingly accessible and borders are ill defined. It is
inward.
possible that agreements over Arctic territories will be worked out among Russia, Canada, Norway, the United States, Iceland, and Denmark in the next two decades, before the truly
there is a strong probability of conflict over the Arctic, possibly
even armed conflict. In general, though, nations will be preoccupied with maintaining internal stability and will have difficulty mustering the resources for war. Indeed, the
catastrophic climate effects manifest themselves in those nations. If not,
greater danger is that states will fail to muster the resources for interstate cooperation. Finally, all nations are likely to experience violent conflict as a result of migration patterns. There will be
increasingly few arable parts of the world, and few nations able to respond to climate change effects, and hundreds of millions of desperate people looking for a safe haven-a volatile mix. This
will cause considerable unrest in the United States, Canada, Europe, and Russia, and will likely involve inhumane border control practices. Imagining what this will actually mean at a national
level is disheartening. For the United States,
coastal cities in hurricane alley along the Gulf Coast will have to be
abandoned, possibly as soon as the first half of the century, certainly by the end of the century. New Orleans will obviously be first, but Pascagoula and Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, and
Houston and Beaumont, Texas, and other cities will be close behind. After the first couple of episodes of flooding and destructive winds, starting with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, the
the third major incident will make it clear that the risk of renewed destruction is too
high to justify the cost of reconstruction. The abandonment of oil and natural gas production facilities
in the Gulf region will push the United States into a severe recession or even depression, probably before the abrupt
climate effects take hold in 2040. Mexico's economy will be devastated, which will increase illegal immigration into the United
States. Other major U.S. cities are likely to become uninhabitable after 2040, including New York City and
Los Angeles, with a combined metropolitan population of nearly 33 million people. Resettling these populations will be a massive challenge that will preoccupy the United States,
cities will be partially rebuilt;
cause tremendous popular strife, and absorb all monies, including private donations, which would have previously gone to foreign aid. The United States, Canada, China, Europe, and Japan will
, this will provoke a deep,
persistent economic crisis. Standards of living across the United States will fall dramatically, which will provoke civil unrest across the country. The imposition of
martial law is a possibility. Though the poor and middle class will be hit the hardest, no one will be immune. The fact that wealthier Americans will be able to manage the
effects better, however, will certainly provoke resentment and probably violence and higher crime rates. Gated communities are likely to be commonplace. Finally, the level of
have little choice but to become aggressively isolationist, with militarized borders. Given how dependent all these nations are on global trade
popular anger toward the United States, as the leading historical contributor to climate change, will
be astronomical. There will be an increase in asymmetric attacks on the American homeland. India will
cease to function as a nation, but before this occurs, Pakistan and Bangladesh will implode and help
spur India's demise. This implosion will start with prolonged regional heat waves, which will quietly kill hundreds of thousands of
people. It will not immediately be apparent that these are climate change casualties. Massive agricultural losses late in the first half of the century, along
with the collapse of fisheries as a result of sea level rise, rising oceanic temperatures, and hypoxic
conditions, will put the entire region into a food emergency. At first, the United States, Australia, China, New Zealand, and the Nordic
nations will be able to coordinate emergency food aid and work with Indian scientists to introduce drought- and saltwater-resistant plant species. Millions of lives will be saved, and India will
be stabilized for a time. But a succession of crippling droughts and heat waves in all of the donor nations and the inundation of several populous coastal cities will force these nations to
concentrate on helping their own populations. The World Food Program and other international aid agencies will first have trouble operating in increasingly violent areas, and then, as
Existing internal tensions in India will explode in the latter half of the century, as
hundreds of millions of starving people begin to move, trying to find a way to survive. As noted above, a nuclear exchange
between either the national governments or subnational groups in the region is possible and perhaps even likely.
By mid-century, communal genocide will rage unchecked in several African states, most notably Sudan and Senegal,
where agriculture will completely collapse and the populations will depend on food imports. Both nations will be covered with ghost towns, where entire
populations have either perished or fled; this will increasingly be true across Africa, South Asia, Central Asia, Central
America, the Caribbean, South America, and Southeast Asia. Europe will have the oddity of having to deal with far colder winters, given
donations dry up, will cease operations.
the collapse of the MOC, which will compromise agricultural productivity.
Scenario 2 – Oil Spills
Current capabilities can’t solve for Arctic spills – US can’t get access to spills quickly
enough to effectively clean up
Kroh et al, ’12. Kiley Kroh, Associate Director for Ocean Communications at the Center for American
Progress, Michael Conathan, Director of Ocean Policy at the Center for American Progress, and Emma
Huvos, February 2012. “Putting a Freeze on Arctic Ocean Drilling.” Center for American Progress.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/pdf/arcticreport.pdf
Obviously the Beaufort Sea and Chukchi Sea—located on the edge of the Arctic Ocean—are home to weather conditions
that differ dramatically from the Gulf of Mexico. As the commission’s final report illustrated, “The Alaskan Arctic is
characterized by extreme cold, extended seasons of darkness, hurricane-strength storms, and
pervasive fog—all affecting access and working conditions. The Chukchi and the realities of the Arctic |
www.americanprogress.org 13 Beaufort Seas are covered by varying forms of ice for eight to nine months a year. These conditions
limit exploratory drilling and many other activities to the summer months. The icy conditions during
the rest of the year pose severe challenges for oil and gas operations and scientific research. And oil
spill response efforts are complicated year-round by the remote location and the presence of ice, at
all phases of exploration and possible production.”
Icebreakers are key to mitigating oil spills – opening up sea lanes allows for rapid
response times
Sullivan 2/27/12. John A. Sullivan, news editor for Oil and Gas Investor. “Coast Guard Muscles Up Arctic Presence in Advance of
Drilling.” Natural Gas Week. Lexis. http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20_T15105743963
Meanwhile, a
Center for American Progress report, written by Kiley Kroh, Michael Conathan and Emma Huvos, highlights glaring
deficiencies in coordinating a response to a minor spill, much less one approaching the Macondo disaster. The key
problem in mounting a spill response in the Arctic is that the region lacks airports, rail lines, highways, deepwater ports
and, oddly enough, icebreakers. In April 2010, first-line responders to the Macondo disaster could count on immediate access to 3,217 ports as well as 95
airports with runways 8,000 feet or longer and another 442 with runways 5,000 feet or longer. In a 500-mile radius of Shell's planned drilling in the Chukchi and
Beaufort seas, there are four airports with runways 8,000 feet or longer; 13 airports with runways 5,000 feet or longer; five equipment staging areas for spill
response cooperatives and no permanent US Coast Guard facilities or major public ports. The report also notes that efforts have been made to station response
teams and equipment in the Arctic. Founded in 1979, Alaska Clean Seas runs an emergency operations center in Deadhorse, Alaska.
The cooperative
has a large amount of equipment and trained personnel ready to respond -- but not in the dead of
winter when temperature can drop well below zero, effectively neutralizing any chemical dispersants now in use. Looking at
conditions, it would seem that Mother Nature is also siding with those opposed to drilling above the Arctic Circle. During May 2010, the first full month of the
Macondo spill, the average temperature was 80.2 degrees Fahrenheit with winds of about 7.8 mph and there were 13 hours of daylight. All of that changes in the
Arctic, where the weather "is characterized by extreme cold, extended seasons of darkness, hurricane-strength storms and pervasive fog -- all affecting access and
working conditions." During October, there may only be a few hours of daylight in the Arctic -- cutting the effectiveness of any airborne response .
Just to
reach the scene of an accident would require the use of icebreakers -- specially designed vessels with reinforced bows and
the power to break their way through ice. The US has two -- and both are currently sidelined; the Russians have 20
with seven of them being nuclear powered; and China has one with a second one being built. Other
nations such as South Korea, Japan, Brazil, Sweden and Norway have also invested in icebreakers.
Arctic oil spills would devastate the local ecosystem
Kollewe and Macalister 4/11/12. Julia Kollewe and Terry Macalister. “Arctic oil rush will ruin
ecosystem, warns Lloyd's of London.” The Guardian.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/12/lloyds-london-warns-risks-arctic-oil-drilling
But the new report from Lloyd's, written by Charles Emmerson and Glada Lahn of Chatham House, says it is "highly likely" that
future economic activity in the Arctic will further disturb ecosystems already stressed by the
consequences of climate change. "Migration patterns of caribou and whales in offshore areas may be
affected. Other than the direct release of pollutants into the Arctic environment, there are multiple
ways in which ecosystems could be disturbed, such as the construction of pipelines and roads, noise
pollution from offshore drilling, seismic survey activity or additional maritime traffic as well as
through the break-up of sea ice." The authors point out that the Arctic is not one but several ecosystems, and is
"highly sensitive to damage" that would have a long-term impact . They are calling for "baseline knowledge about the
natural environment and consistent environmental monitoring". Pollution sources include mines, oil and gas installations, industrial sites and, in the Russian Arctic,
nuclear waste from civilian and military installations, and from nuclear weapons testing on Novaya Zemlya. The report singles out a
potential oil spill as
the "greatest risk in terms of environmental damage, potential cost and insurance" – but says there are significant
knowledge gaps in this area. Rates of natural biodegradation of oil in the Arctic could be expected to be lower
than in more temperate environments such as the Gulf of Mexico, although there is currently insufficient understanding of how oil will
degrade over the long term in the Arctic. Sea ice could assist in some oil-spill response techniques, such as in-situ
burning and chemical dispersant application, but this could lead to air pollution and the release of
chemicals into the marine environment without knowing where moving ice will eventually carry
them. Unclear legal boundaries posed by a mosaic of regulations and governments in the Arctic are an additional challenge. The Lloyd's report notes that
there is no international liability and compensation regime for oil spills. An EU proposal under discussion would apply to
offshore oil projects in the Arctic territories of Norway and Denmark, and possibly to all EU companies anywhere they operate. Meanwhile, a taskforce is drawing up
recommendations for the intergovernmental Arctic Council on an international instrument on marine oil pollution designed to speed up the process for clean-up
and compensation payments, due for release next year. This may include an international liability and compensation instrument. Greenland has argued that
"different national systems may lead to ambiguities and unnecessary delays in oil pollution responses and compensation payments" and that any
regime
must adapt as understanding of the worst-case scenario in the Arctic changes. The Lloyd's report says the
"inadequacies" of both company and government in the event of a disaster were demonstrated after
the Macondo blowout. A smaller company than BP, faced with estimated $40bn clean-up and
compensation costs, might have gone bankrupt, leaving the state to foot the bill, it notes. Lloyd's says it is essential
that there is more investment in science and research to "close knowledge gaps, reduce uncertainties and manage risks". It calls for sizeable investment in
infrastructure and surveillance to enable "safe economic activity" and argues that "full-scale exercises based on worst-case scenarios of environmental disaster
should be run by companies". The
Arctic's vulnerable environment, unpredictable climate and lack of a precedent
on which to base cost assessments have led some environmental NGOs to argue that no
compensation would be worth the risk of allowing drilling to take place in pristine offshore areas. Others
are campaigning for more stringent regulations and the removal of the liability cap for investors.
Arctic ecosystem key to global biodiversity
Gill, Chair of the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program, 2009. Michael Gill, 3-6
March 2009, “ABSTRACT: BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES.” UNESCO.
http://www.unesco.org/csi/LINKS/monaco-abstracts/Gill_abstract_MonacoUNESCOarctic.pdf
Arctic ecosystems and the biodiversity they support are experiencing growing pressure from climate
change and resource development while established research and monitoring programs remain largely uncoordinated, lacking
the ability to effectively monitor, understand and report on biodiversity trends at the circumpolar scale. The maintenance of
healthy Arctic ecosystems is a global imperative as the Arctic plays a critical role in the Earth’s
physical, chemical and biological balance. A coordinated and comprehensive effort for monitoring
Arctic ecosystems is needed to facilitate effective and timely conservation and adaptation actions.
The Arctic’s size and complexity represents a significant challenge towards detecting and attributing
important biodiversity trends. This demands a scaled, pan-Arctic, ecosystem-based approach that not only identifies trends in
biodiversity, but also identifies underlying causes. It is critical that this information be made available to generate
effective strategies for adapting to changes now taking place in the Arctic - a process that ultimately depends on
rigorous, integrated, and efficient monitoring programmes that have the power to detect change within a ‘management’ time frame.
Biodiversity is a popular way of describing the diversity of life on earth: it includes all life forms and the ecosystems of which they are a part.
World Food Day — the anniversary of FAO's founding on 16 October 1945 — celebrates, in particular, that part of biodiversity that nurtures
people and contributes to long-term food security for all. Biodiversity forms the foundation for sustainable development. It is the basis for the
environmental health of our planet and the source of economic and ecological security for future generations. In the developing world,
biodiversity provides the assurance of food, countless raw materials such as fibre for clothing, materials for shelter, fertilizer, fuel and
medicines, as well as a source of work energy in the form of animal traction. The rural poor depend upon biological resources for an estimated
90 percent of their needs. In the industrialized world access to diverse biological resources is necessary to support a vast array of industrial
products. In the continuing drive to develop efficient and sustainable agriculture for many different conditions, these resources provide raw
material for plant and animal breeding as well as the new biotechnologies. In addition, biodiversity maintains the ecological balance necessary
for planetary and human survival.
Loss of biodiversity leads to extinction
Environment News Service 2005. May 24, 2005. “Humans Undermining the Very Biodiversity
Needed for Survival.” http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/may2005/2005-05-24-01.html
In the last 50 years, humans have changed the diversity of life on the planet more than at any other
time in history. Human activities have lifted many people out of poverty, but at a price - the loss of
biodiversity. A new assessment of biodiversity and human well being by top scientists from throughout the world shows that if
humanity continues down this road, biological diversity will be depleted with life-threatening
consequences for all, including human beings. "Biodiversity is where the human hunger for resources
is taking its heaviest toll, and the inclusion of 15,589 species on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species is the clearest sign that we
need to change the way we produce and consume, said Jeff McNeely, chief scientist of the IUCN-World Conservation Union and contributor to
the report. The assessment, launched as part of the celebrations for the International Day for Biological Diversity on May 22, was conducted by
a panel of the Millenium Assessment, a partnership involving some 1,360 scientists who are experts in their fields. It is supported by 22 of the
world’s scientific bodies, including The Royal Society of the United Kingdom and the Third World Academy of Sciences. The panel defined
biodiversity as "the variability among living organisms from all sources, including terrestrial, marine, and other aquatic ecosystems and the
ecological complexes of which they are part."
Loss of biodiversity is a major barrier to achieving development
goals, and poses increasing risks for future generations, said Dr . Walter Reid, director of the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment. The second Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report, "Biodiversity and Human Well-being: A Synthesis
Report for the Convention on Biological Diversity," finds that although biodiversity is the foundation for human well-being,
all of the likely future scenarios in the report lead to a further decline in biodiversity, contrary to the agreed global target to reduce the rate of
biodiversity loss by 2010. The
diversity of life provides the materials humans need for food, clothing and
shelter, and also bestows security, health and freedom of choice. But, the assessment found, "the current pace and
rhythm of human activities are harming ecosystems, consuming biological resources and putting at risk the well-being of future generations.
Topicality
In the US
Jurisdiction
United States means all areas subject to US jurisdiction
Words and Phrases, 6 (Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, “United States,” Volume 43A, p. 265267 December 2006, Thomson West)
C.A.5 (Fla.) 1974. Term “United States,” as used in Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
act in a territorial sense, includes all the places and waters, continental or insular, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, except the Canal Zone.
Coastal States have jurisdiction over natural resources of its continental shelf
Campbell, 2008( 05/08/2008, United States Arctic Ocean Management & the Law of the Sea
Convention, This paper was written while on a summer externship at the U.S. Dept. of Commerce (DOC),
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) General Counsel for International Law,
http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/US_Arctic_Ocean_Mgt_08-05-08.pdf)
Under UNCLOS, the coastal state has jurisdiction over the natural resources of the shelf including
sedimentary species, oil, gas, and mineral resources. The continental shelf “comprises the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond [a coastal state’s] territorial sea.”18 Every coastal
state may claim a continental shelf of two hundred miles. This claim is made automatically, and there is
no need to submit evidence of a continental shelf up to two hundred miles. However, under UNCLOS, a
coastal state has the opportunity to claim extended continental shelf if the state can demonstrate that
certain criteria are met under Article 76 of UNCLOS.
Coastal States have the right to ensure safe maritime commerce in the arctic to
prevent pollution
Campbell, 2008( 05/08/2008, United States Arctic Ocean Management & the Law of the Sea
Convention, This paper was written while on a summer externship at the U.S. Dept. of Commerce (DOC),
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) General Counsel for International Law,
http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/US_Arctic_Ocean_Mgt_08-05-08.pdf)
The melting sea ice in the Arctic region will precipitate an increase in ship traffic from both commercial
and passenger vessels. However, the Arctic will present many navigational challenges, and great
caution will need to be exercised by ships transiting these waters. The most prominent threat to the
marine environment is shipping. The management of this threat will play an integral role in the
regulation and development of the Arctic, as the risk of damage to invaluable marine resources is
much higher in this region. Many provisions of UNCLOS address shipping and its relation to the
protection of the marine environment and pollution from ships. International entities such as the
International Maritime Organization and the Arctic Council have addressed the issues that are likely to
arise with the increase of shipping into, out of, and through the Arctic. The U.S. Arctic policy dates to
1994. However, climate change and the increase in shipping has prompted the need for key changes to
that policy that are being addressed in a forthcoming update of the 1994 policy. The top priorities of the
U.S., revised for today’s Arctic circumstances, will be to facilitate safe, secure, and reliable navigation,
to protect maritime commerce and the marine environment. As previously mentioned, a shipping
incident involving the release of a harmful substance into the pristine Arctic environment could have
lasting catastrophic affects. In addition to the right to explore and exploit the resources of the extended
continental shelf, UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate such activities as shipping in order
to “protect and preserve rare and fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or
endangered species and other forms of marine life.”31 While this protection is ideally achieved though
cooperative and preventative international measures, the U.S. has developed policy to address Arctic
issues in waters under its jurisdiction and beyond because UNCLOS also imposes certain duties on
coastal states that have jurisdiction over the extended continental shelf.32 The ability of a coastal state
to take action with regard to pollution from ships in its EEZ is arguably limited. Article 234 of UNCLOS,
however, is applicable in ice-covered waters only, making it an important provision when considering
the regulation of the Arctic region. To ensure safe maritime commerce in the Arctic, it is understood
that the U.S. will likely work to develop infrastructure to support shipping, search and rescue
capabilities, short and long range aids to navigation, high-risk area vessel traffic management, iceberg
warnings, other sea ice information, and effective shipping standards. To achieve this, the U.S. seeks to
establish a risk-based capability to prevent and respond to all hazards, threats, and weather in all
seasons in the Arctic environment
Territories/Possessions
United States includes territories and possessions
US Code, 07 (2 USCS § 1966, lexis)
(f) Definition of United States. As used in this section, the term "United States" means each of the
several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and territories and possessions of the
United States.
The United States controls much of the Arctic (Northwest Passage) via territorial sea –
sovereignty laws means its considered “in” the United States.
NSPD-66 2009 (“National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential
Directive” http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm)
A. The United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling interests in that region.
This directive
takes into account several developments, including, among others:
Altered national policies on homeland security and defense;
The
effects of climate change and increasing human activity in the Arctic region;
The establishment and ongoing work of the Arctic Council; and
It is the policy of the United States
to:
Meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region;
Protect
the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources;
Ensure that natural resource
management and economic development in the region are environmentally sustainable; Strengthen
A growing awareness that the Arctic region is both fragile and rich in resources. III. POLICY A.
institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations (the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian
Federation, and Sweden);
Involve the Arctic's indigenous communities in decisions that affect them; and
Enhance scientific monitoring
and research into local, regional, and global environmental issues. B. National Security and Homeland Security Interests in the Arctic
The
United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is
prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these
interests. These interests include such matters as missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift,
strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight. The
United States also has fundamental homeland security interests in preventing terrorist attacks and
mitigating those criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United States vulnerability to
terrorism in the Arctic region. The Arctic region is primarily a maritime domain; as such, existing
policies and authorities relating to maritime areas continue to apply, including those relating to law
enforcement.[1] Human activity in the Arctic region is increasing and is projected to increase further in coming years. This requires
the United States to assert a more active and influential national presence to protect its Arctic
interests and to project sea power throughout the region. The United States exercises authority in
accordance with lawful claims of United States sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the
Arctic region, including sovereignty within the territorial sea, sovereign rights and jurisdiction within
the United States exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf, and appropriate control in
the United States contiguous zone. Freedom of the seas is a top national priority. The Northwest Passage is a
strait used for international navigation, and the Northern Sea Route includes straits used for international navigation; the
regime of transit passage applies to passage through those straits. Preserving the rights and duties
relating to navigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports our ability to exercise these rights
throughout the world, including through strategic straits. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to
national security and homeland security interests in the Arctic, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, in coordination with
heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall:
Develop greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to protect
United States air, land, and sea borders in the Arctic region;
Increase Arctic maritime domain awareness in order to protect maritime
commerce, critical infrastructure, and key resources;
Preserve the global mobility of United States military and civilian vessels and aircraft
throughout the Arctic region;
Project a sovereign United States maritime presence in the Arctic in support of essential United States
interests; and
Encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Arctic region.
Existing treaties establish many areas of the artic seabed as within United States
boundaries
NSPD-66 2009 (“National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential
Directive” http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm)
Defining with certainty the area of the Arctic seabed and subsoil in which the United States may
exercise its sovereign rights over natural resources such as oil, natural gas, methane hydrates, minerals, and living marine species is
critical to our national interests in energy security, resource management, and environmental protection. The most effective way to achieve
international recognition and legal certainty for our extended continental shelf is through
the procedure available to States
Parties to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. The United States and Canada have an unresolved
boundary in the Beaufort Sea. United States policy recognizes a boundary in this area based on equidistance. The
United States recognizes that the boundary area may contain oil, natural gas, and other resources. The United States and Russia
are abiding by the terms of a maritime boundary treaty concluded in 1990, pending its entry into force. The
United States is prepared to enter the agreement into force once ratified by the Russian Federation. Implementation: In carrying out this
policy as it relates to extended continental shelf and boundary issues, the Secretary of State, in coordination with heads of other relevant
the outer limit of the continental
shelf appertaining to the United States, in the Arctic and in other regions, to the fullest extent
permitted under international law;
Consider the conservation and management of natural resources during the process of
executive departments and agencies, shall:
delimiting the extended continental shelf; and
boundary agreement.
Take all actions necessary to establish
Continue to urge the Russian Federation to ratify the 1990 United States-Russia maritime
US can use icebreakers in the arctic, Bush said so.
NSPD66, 2009, (National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive
January 9, 2009 http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm)
Maritime Transportation in the Arctic Region The United States priorities for maritime transportation in
the Arctic region are: To facilitate safe, secure, and reliable navigation; To protect maritime
commerce; and To protect the environment. Safe, secure, and environmentally sound maritime
commerce in the Arctic region depends on infrastructure to support shipping activity, search and rescue
capabilities, short- and long-range aids to navigation, high-risk area vessel-traffic management, iceberg
warnings and other sea ice information, effective shipping standards, and measures to protect the
marine environment. In addition, effective search and rescue in the Arctic will require local, State,
Federal, tribal, commercial, volunteer, scientific, and multinational cooperation. Working through the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United States promotes strengthening existing measures
and, as necessary, developing new measures to improve the safety and security of maritime
transportation, as well as to protect the marine environment in the Arctic region. These measures may
include ship routing and reporting systems, such as traffic separation and vessel traffic management
schemes in Arctic chokepoints; updating and strengthening of the Guidelines for Ships Operating in
Arctic Ice-Covered Waters; underwater noise standards for commercial shipping; a review of shipping
insurance issues; oil and other hazardous material pollution response agreements; and environmental
standards. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to maritime transportation in the
Arctic region, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Transportation, Commerce, and Homeland Security, in
coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall: Develop
additional measures, in cooperation with other nations, to address issues that are likely to arise from
expected increases in shipping into, out of, and through the Arctic region; Commensurate with the
level of human activity in the region, establish a risk-based capability to address hazards in the Arctic
environment. Such efforts shall advance work on pollution prevention and response standards;
determine basing and logistics support requirements, including necessary airlift and icebreaking
capabilities; and improve plans and cooperative agreements for search and rescue; Develop Arctic
waterways management regimes in accordance with accepted international standards, including vessel
traffic-monitoring and routing; safe navigation standards; accurate and standardized charts; and
accurate and timely environmental and navigational information; and Evaluate the feasibility of using
access through the Arctic for strategic sealift and humanitarian aid and disaster relief.
A2: Throughout
In means “within the limits” NOT throughout
Cullen, Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 52, Commissioner, Court of Appeals of Kentucky, November 13,
1952 Riehl et al. V. Kentucky unemployment compensation commission; the judgment is affirmed.
Rehearing denied; COMBS, J., and SIMS, C. J., dissenting.
http://ky.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19521113_0040095.KY.htm/qx
We do not find any ambiguity in KRS 341.070(1). It is our opinion that the key word in the statute is the
word 'in,' preceding the words 'each of three calendar quarters', and if the word is accorded its
ordinary and common meaning, the statute does not require simultaneous employment. According to
Webster's New International Dictionary, the word 'in,' used with relation to a period of time, means
'during the course of.' The same meaning, expressed in another way, would be 'within the limits or
duration of.' Employing this meaning, the statute says that an employer is subject to the Act if, during
the course of, or within the limits or duration of each of three calendar quarters, he had in covered
employment four or more workers, to each of whom the required amount of wages was paid. This
clearly means that the employment need not be simultaneous. Obviously, the word 'in' does not mean
'throughout' or 'for the entire period of,' because then there would be no point in adding the
requirement of the payment of a minimum of $50 in wages. In these times, no worker employed for a
full calendar quarter would be paid less than $50 in wages. The appellant seeks to read into the statute
the words 'at the same time,' following the words 'had in covered employment'. There is no justification
for this, unless the word 'in' means 'during any one period of time in.' We are not aware of any
authority for ascribing such a meaning to the word 'in'.
A2: Geographic Inside
In not within – in means “location” whereas within means “well inside”
Dilip 11, Aron Dilip (Contributing Editor – India) – Professor in Social Science “Difference Between in
and within in English Grammar Jan 24th, 2011 http://www.differencebetween.com/difference-betweenin-and-within/#ixzz1yL723hra BK
In and within though look alike, they differ in their usage in English grammar. The preposition ‘in’ is
used to describe the noun in locative case. It describes the location of a particular thing or an individual.
In the sentence ‘he lives in New York City’, the preposition ‘in’ describes the location of a person. On the
other hand the word ‘within’ gives the sense of ‘well inside’. For example in the sentence, ‘he works
well within himself’, the word ‘within’ conveys the sense of ‘well inside’ and gives the idea ‘he works
well inside his self’. Here the word ‘within’ gives the extra meaning of ‘good’. In the same way these
two words ‘in’ and ‘within’ give different meanings when used differently with other words. For
example the expressions ‘in time’ and ‘within the given time’, the two words ‘in’ and ‘within’ are used in
different senses. Loot at the two examples, namely, ‘he came in time’ and ‘he came within two hours’.
In the first sentence the preposition ‘in’ gives the sense of ‘advance’ and gives the idea of ‘he came in
advance’. In the second sentence the word ‘within’ gives the sense of ‘under’ and gives the idea of ‘he
came under two hours’. Thus it is interesting to note that the word ‘within’ is used in the sense of
‘under’ whereas on the other hand the preposition ‘in’ is used in the sense of ‘advance’ and not in the
sense of ‘under’. Look at the usage, namely, ‘he came in two hours’. Here the preposition ‘in’ is used in
the sense of ‘at the completion’ or ‘at the stroke of’. Hence it gives the idea of ‘he came at the
completion of two hours’. These two words are very much used in combination of several verbs too.
Transportation Infrastructure
Money Shot
Plan is investment in transportation infrastructure
Alaska Northern Waters Task Force, ’12 (January, “Arctic Planning & Infrastructure Investment”
http://housemajority.org/coms/anw/pdfs/27/draft_recommendations_part_02.pdf)
A number of state initiatives are underway to look at the potential needs and feasibility of
infrastructure projects in Arctic regions of the state. These include the Alaska Department of
Transportation and Public Facilities’ Industrial Use Roads Study, Arctic Ports Study, and similar work
relating to possible land transportation links to Nome, Ambler, and the Umiat region. Immediate
investment in Arctic infrastructure is a foremost priority for Alaska and the entire United States.
Action is needed to enable the responsible development of resources; facilitate, secure, and benefit
from new global transportation routes; and safeguard the wellbeing of Arctic residents and ecosystems.
This investment will improve the safety, security, and reliability of transportation in the region—a
goal established by the U.S. Arctic Policy signed by President Bush in 2009. As interest and activity in
the Arctic continues to rise, U.S. preparedness in the region becomes ever more important to national
security.
Domestic ice breakers develop transportation infrastructure
LT Benjamin Morgan, Mobility and Ice Operations, US Coast Guard Office of Maritime Transportation
Systems, “Domestic Icebreaking Operations,” Proceedings, Spring 2011,
http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/spring2011/articles/39_Morgan.pdf
While domestic icebreaking operations may fall among the Coast Guard’s less glamorous assignments, this mission is important for
maritime mobility and supports our national transportation infrastructure. Operations include establishing
and maintaining tracks (paths through the ice) in connecting waterways during the winter navigation season, escorting
vessels to ensure their transit is not impeded by ice, freeing vessels that become beset, clearing/relieving ice jams,
removing obstructions or hazards to navigation, and advising mariners of current ice and waterways
conditions. This vital icebreaking mission is executed domestically by one heavy icebreaker, nine ice-breaking tugs, 11 small harbor tugs,
and 12 ice-capable buoy-tending vessels.
Maritime Territories
Transportation infrastructure includes facilitation of safe navigation in maritime
territories.
NSPD-66 2009 (“National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential
Directive” http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm)
Maritime Transportation in the Arctic Region The United States priorities for maritime transportation in the Arctic region
are:
To facilitate safe, secure, and reliable navigation;
To protect maritime commerce; and
To protect the
environment.
Safe, secure, and environmentally sound maritime commerce in the Arctic region
depends on infrastructure to support shipping activity, search and rescue capabilities, short- and
long-range aids to navigation, high-risk area vessel-traffic management, iceberg warnings and other
sea ice information, effective shipping standards, and measures to protect the marine environment.
In addition, effective search and rescue in the Arctic will require local, State, Federal, tribal, commercial, volunteer, scientific, and multinational
cooperation. Working through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United States promotes strengthening existing measures
and, as necessary, developing new measures to improve the safety and security of maritime transportation, as well as to protect the marine
These measures may include ship routing and reporting systems, such as
traffic separation and vessel traffic management schemes in Arctic chokepoints; updating and
strengthening of the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters; underwater noise
standards for commercial shipping; a review of shipping insurance issues; oil and other hazardous
material pollution response agreements; and environmental standard.
environment in the Arctic region.
Arctic Transportation Routes
Icebreakers help protect nation’s ports and waterways, they be topical
ANWTF, 1/30/2012 (ANWTF, consisting of state legislators, leaders from Alaska communities, and
representatives of key state and federal agencies, Findings and Recommendations of the Alaska
Northern Waters Task Force,
http://housemajority.org/coms/anw/pdfs/27/NWTF_Full_Report_Color.pdf)
Immediate investment in Arctic infrastructure is a foremost priority for Alaska and the entire United
States. Alaska will need to explore ways to attract substantial sources of capital investment in addition to state and
federal funding. Action is needed to enable the responsible development of resources; facilitate, secure,
and benefit from new global transportation routes; and safeguard Arctic residents and ecosystems. This
investment will improve the safety, security, and reliability of transportation in the region—a goal established by the
U.S. Arctic Policy signed by President Bush in 2009. As interest and activity in the Arctic continues to rise,
America’s preparedness in the region becomes ever more important to national security. Increased human
activity related to shipping, oil and gas development, commercial fishing, and tourism will require , at a
minimum, new ports and safe harbors, equipment and facilities for oil spill response, additional Polar Class
icebreakers for the U.S. fleet, and improved charting and mapping. The U. S. Coast Guard’s needs in these areas
well illustrate the magnitude of infrastructure investment necessary in the Arctic. The Search & Rescue (SAR)
agreement recently negotiated by the eight Arctic Nations through the Arctic Council commits the United States to
search and rescue response in regions of the Arctic. Domestically, the National Contingency Plan requires the U.S.
Coast Guard to oversee oil spill planning and preparedness in coastal waters and to supervise any oil spill response.
Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard’s mission is to protect the public, the environment, and U.S.
economic interests in the nation’s ports and waterways, along the coast, on international waters, or in
any maritime region as required for national security.1
In the US
As long as the icebreakers are built in America, they fall under transportation and
infrastructure
DeMarban, 2012 (Alex, April11th, writer for Alaska Dispatch, “Should Alaska Take the Lead in Financing
New Icebreakers,” Alaska Dispatch, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/should-alaska-take-leadfinancing-new-icebreakers)
Last fall, Young introduced legislation calling on the federal government to lease two large icebreakers for at least 10 years from private entities
that own and operate the ships. The
ships must be built on American soil, according to the bill, which remains in the
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
Inherency
Now Key
Increase in water space hasn’t been accompanied with increased investment in
icebreakers – we don’t have the capacity to operate in the Arctic.
States News Service 5/9. May 9, 2012. “COAST GUARD: U.S. SHOULD HAVE 3 HEAVY, 3 MEDIUM
ICEBREAKERS ADMIRAL PAPP OPEN TO "LEASING OPPORTUNITIES" BEFORE FUTURE SHIPS ARE BUILT, ALASKA
"LUCKED OUT" THAT HEALY WAS AVAILABLE FOR NOME MISSION.”
http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/auth/checkbrowser.do?rand=0.6300832076938608&cookieState=0&ipcoun
ter=1&bhcp=1
The following information was released by Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski: The funding priorities and needs of the
United States Coast Guard took center stage today at a hearing of the U.S. Senate Homeland Security
Appropriations Subcommittee held at Senator Murkowskis request. Spurred on by USCG Commandant Admiral
Robert Papps recent comments that the U.S. is behind the power curve regarding the Arctic, Murkowski
drilled down into multiple issues critical to Alaska. During testimony, Papp informed Murkowski and the committee
that Alaska lucked out by having the USCGC Healy nearby for the emergency mission to Nome earlier
this year. The Admiral had been asked to deploy it to Antarctica, and he testified I am delighted I do not have to
sit here today and explain why Healy was in Antarctica when Nome was starving for fuel. Murkowski also asked
Admiral Papp directly, How many icebreakers do we need? (below) He informed her that the Coast Guards study
indicated optimally, we would have three heavy icebreakers and three medium-sized icebreakers. The
U.S. presently has one active medium icebreaker. Murkowski also called attention (below) to the $8 million in the
FY2013 Coast Guard budget allocated for an icebreaker in March, she told the Alaska state legislature that amount
wont get you a porthole and asked what Alaska can realistically expect as a timeframe for a new icebreaker to be
launched. Though Papp informed her that a decade will be needed until a new one is in the water, he said he will
look at leasing opportunities and assess how that would work. Other key moments during the hearing:
Murkowski: We are seeing more water in the Arctic that the Coast Guard is charged with. What we
havent done as a Congress is step up to that responsibility as an Arctic Nation. Committee Chair Senator
Mary Landrieu (D-LA): Weve got to build an icebreaker; we have to build an icebreaker. Admiral Papp: Senator,
you and I know we are an Arctic Nation, but its difficult to convince some people of this fact. We need to educate
people.
Changes in artic makes now key time
Treadwell 2011, “Hon. Mead Lieutenant Governor, Alaska testified in hearing to examine the U.S.
Coast Guard’s role and operations in the Arctic.”: U.S. Subcommittee: USCG Needs Icebreakers BY
GCAPTAIN STAFF ON DECEMBER 4, 2011 http://gcaptain.com/u-s-subcommittee-uscg-icebreakers/
“It is time for the nation to act – and act now – to add new polar class icebreakers to the United States
Coast Guard’s fleet. With so much happening in the North today, the need is more urgent and apparent
than ever. We would like to ask this Committee, and by extension Congress and the Executive Branch, to look with us at the bigger picture –
the historic changes happening in the Arctic and what they portend for world commerce and Alaska’s
shores – and recognize three imminent needs: First, the United States must commission new heavy
icebreakers to operate in the Arctic. Second, we need legal measures in addition to icebreakers to protect our
shores from the dangers of unregulated itinerant vessels carrying hazardous cargoes near our coasts.
And third, Congress and the Administration must fulfill the legal mandates that are already in place
regarding icebreakers.”
As we reach a crisis, the time is now to invest in icebreakers
Strohm, Reporter at Bloomberg News, 10 (Chris, February 12th, Former reporter at Government
Executive Magazine, “Coast Guard Commandment Cites Urgent Need for Icebreakers,” Government
Executive, http://www.govexec.com/defense/2010/02/coast-guard-commandant-cites-urgent-need-foricebreakers/30855/#disqus_thread)
Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen on Friday said the United States faces a "looming crisis" when it
comes to operating in the Arctic Circle, adding that a discussion within the government on how to
proceed "cannot happen soon enough." The U.S. government should rapidly determine its policy
toward the Arctic Circle, which will guide decisions on what the Coast Guard should do about aging
polar icebreakers, Allen said during a National Press Club speech on the state of his agency. It was
Allen's last major address, as he is scheduled to retire in May. Allen said a decision needs to be made on
the Coast Guard's three icebreakers, two of which are over 30 years old. He said buying new ones will
cost about $1 billion each. But the Coast Guard is not seeking any funding for icebreakers in its fiscal
2011 budget request to Congress because the nation's policy toward the Arctic has not yet been
determined, Allen told reporters after his speech. "What we have to have is a discussion about what to
do because the service life of these vessels is less than eight years . It takes almost that long to build a
new ship," he said. "So we're at a tipping point as far as making a decision. That's got to be preceded by
a policy discussion which can't happen fast enough.
More Ships Needed
Icebreakers are failing now
Ahlers 2012 January 05, |By Mike M., CNN Coast Guard mission to Nome exposes U.S. limits in icebreaking capability http://articles.cnn.com/2012-01-05/us/us_alaska-nome-icebreaker_1_icebreakerspolar-star-polar-sea/3?_s=PM:US
The nation's two heavy polar icebreakers -- the Polar Star and the Polar Sea -- are out of commission, with the
Polar Sea unlikely to see service again. The 420-foot Healy, meanwhile, is a medium-sized icebreaker
and it does not have the capabilities of its larger predecessors. The Nome mission has lengthened the
eight-month deployment of its 80-person crew, robbing them of a Christmas holiday. And it is delaying scheduled repairs to
the ship, possibly affecting its scientific mission scheduled for next summer. This further underscores just how thin the
nation's ice-breaking capabilities have become. By contrast, Russia has 25 polar icebreakers (including
eight heavy ones), according to a Congressional Research Service report. Finland and Sweden have
seven icebreakers each. Canada has six. " The United States needs icebreakers , and this incident
proves it," said Alaska's Lt. Gov. Mead Treadwell. Treadwell said the dearth of icebreakers means the U.S. is not
competitive with other Arctic nations, which are exploiting new water passages created by climate
changes. Icebreakers could extend the seasons for some state industries, he said. But many people in the Lower 48 just don't understand,
Treadwell said. "The United States has been an Arctic nation since 1867, but most people still think of Alaska as Seward's Folly," he said. The
Nome mission "brings awareness that there is a bigger issue there," said Nome Mayor Denise Michels. "It really does."
"There is more
of a need now than ever before in our history for new ice-breaking ships capable of reaching the
shores of our communities," wrote Jason Evans, chairman of Sitnasuak Native Corporation, Nome's village corporation.
Status quo fails – Coast Guard lacks icebreakers - resource extraction
Reiss has covered Arctic issues for Smithsonian, Parade and Outside Magazines, 2010 (Bob, March 13,
Cold, Hard Facts: U.S. Trails in Race for the Top of the World, Politics Daily,
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/03/13/cold-hard-facts-u-s-trails-in-race-for-the-top-of-the-world/)
But more traffic means more danger from collisions and fuel spills, and the Coast Guard lacks the
icebreakers and communication equipment necessary for a year-round Arctic presence. Resource
extraction presents another challenge, as there are enormous untapped reserves of oil and gas in the
region. The 5.5 million-square-mile area north of the Arctic Circle -- part of the U.S., Russia, Canada, Denmark (which
owns Greenland), Finland, Norway, Iceland and Sweden -- contains up to 25 percent of the Earth's undiscovered oil and
gas reserves, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. In 2007, Norway opened its Snow White gas field, projected to
supply more than $1.5 billion of liquefied natural gas annually for the next quarter-century. And Russia's resurgence as a world
power has been aided by Arctic resources. But to remove those resources you have to own them, and
nations are now scrambling to claim vast new areas of sea bottom. They can do so by proving them to be extensions
of their continental shelves.
Underfunded Now
Ice breakers are underfunded, under-maintained, and diminished
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
The committee finds that both operations and maintenance of the polar icebreaker fleet have been
underfunded for many years, and the capabilities of the nation’s icebreaking fleet have diminished
substantially. Deferred long-term maintenance and failure to execute a plan for replacement or
refurbishment of the nation’s icebreaking ships have placed national interests in the polar regions at
risk. The nation needs the capability to operate in both polar regions reliably and at will. Specifically, the
committee recommends the following:
U.S agencies are unable to meet Arctic mission requirements with current resources
GAO An analysis of the reports assembled by various government offices 12/01/11 [Government
Accountability Office] DHS-OIG “Report on the Coast Guard's Polar Icebreakers”
http://www.gao.gov/htext/d12254t.html
DHS-OIG Report on the Coast Guard's Polar Icebreakers.[Footnote 22] The DHS Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) reported that the Coast Guard and other U.S. agencies are unable to meet their current
Arctic mission requirements with existing icebreaking resources. This January 2011 report noted that
the Coast Guard's icebreaking resources are unlikely to meet future demands as well, in part because
the agency has not followed its life cycle replacement plan, which requires replacement of icebreaking
ships after 30 years of service. Further, between fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2009, the National
Science Foundation (NSF) had budgetary authority over the Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet. Among other
things, the Inspector General reported that this funding arrangement resulted in deferred maintenance
on the icebreakers, which has affected their long-term operability. The report concludes that without
funding for new icebreakers or major service life extensions of existing ones, the U.S. will lose all polar
icebreaking capabilities by 2029.[Footnote 23] The OIG report included four recommendations related
to the Arctic.[Footnote 24]
Ships Decaying Now
The ships are currently too old and not in working condition- New reinforcements are
needed now
Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, 2012 (June 14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress” Congressional Research Service)
The Coast Guard’s three polar icebreakers are multimission ships that can break through ice, support
scientific research operations, and perform other missions typically performed by Coast Guard ships.
Heavy Polar Icebreakers Polar Star and Polar Sea. Polar Star (WAGB-10) and Polar Sea (WAGB-11),5
sister ships built to the same general design (Figure 1 and Figure 2), were procured in the early 1970s
as replacements for earlier U.S. icebreakers. They were designed for 30-year service lives, and were
built by Lockheed Shipbuilding of Seattle, WA, a division of Lockheed that also built ships for the U.S.
Navy, but which exited the shipbuilding business in the late 1980s. Neither ship is currently in
operational condition. Polar Star was commissioned into service on January 19, 1976, and consequently
is now several years beyond its intended 30-year service life. The ship currently is not in operational
condition due to worn out electric motors and other problems. The Coast Guard placed the ship in
caretaker status on July 1, 2006.7 Congress in FY2009 and FY2010 provided funding to repair Polar Star
and return it to service for 7 to 10 years; the Coast Guard expects the $62.8 million reactivation
project to be completed in December 2012.8 The ship is to undergo testing during the summer of2013,
and be ready for operations in FY2014.9 Although the repair work on the ship is intended to give it
another 7 to 10 years of service, an August 30, 2010, press report quoted the Commandant of the
Coast Guard, Admiral Robert Papp, as saying, “We’re getting her back into service, but it’s a little
uncertain to me how many more years we can get out of her in her current condition, even after we
do the engine repairs.”10
Current Ships Fail
The lack of maneuverability of the Ice Breakers means a lack of performance in 4 key
areas
Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, 2012 (June 14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress” Congressional Research Service)
In July 2011, the Coast Guard provided to Congress a study on the Coast Guard’s missions and
capabilities for operations in high-latitude (i.e., polar) areas. The study, commonly known as the High
Latitude Study, is dated July 2010 on its cover.17 The High Latitude Study concluded the following: [The
study] concludes that future capability and capacity gaps will significantly impact four [Coast Guard]
mission areas in the Arctic: Defense Readiness, Ice Operations, Marine Environmental Protection, and
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security. These mission areas address the protection of important
national interests in a geographic area where other nations are actively pursuing their own national
goals.... The common and dominant contributor to these significant mission impacts is the gap in
polar icebreaking capability. The increasing obsolescence of the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet will
further exacerbate mission performance gaps in the coming years.... The gap in polar icebreaking
capacity has resulted in a lack of at-sea time for crews and senior personnel and a corresponding gap in
training and leadership. In addition to providing multi-mission capability and intrinsic mobility, a
helicopter-capable surface unit would eliminate the need for acquiring an expensive shore-based
infrastructure that may only be needed on a seasonal or occasional basis. The most capable surface unit
would be a polar icebreaker. Polar icebreakers can transit safely in a variety of ice conditions and have
the endurance to operate far from logistics bases. The Coast Guard’s polar icebreakers have
conducted a wide range of planned and unscheduled Coast Guard missions in the past. Polar
icebreakers possess the ability to carry large numbers of passengers, cargo, boats, and helicopters.
Polar icebreakers also have substantial command, control, and communications capabilities. The
flexibility and mobility of polar icebreakers would assist the Coast Guard in closing future mission
performance gaps effectively....Existing capability and capacity gaps are expected to significantly impact
future Coast Guard performance in two Antarctic mission areas: Defense Readiness and Ice Operations.
Future gaps may involve an inability to carry out probable and easily projected mission
requirements, such as the McMurdo resupply, or readiness to respond to less-predictable events. By
their nature, contingencies requiring the use of military capabilities often occur quickly. As is the case
in the Arctic, the deterioration of the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet is the primary driver for this
significant mission impact. This will further widen mission performance gaps in the coming years. The
recently issued Naval Operations Concept 2010 requires a surface presence in both the Arctic and
Antarctic. This further exacerbates the capability gap left by the deterioration of the icebreaker fleet....
The significant deterioration of the Coast Guard icebreaker fleet and the emerging mission demands to
meet future functional requirements in the high latitude regions dictate that the Coast Guard acquire
material solutions to close the capability gaps....
The ice breaker fleet have increasingly limited operations
GAO An analysis of the reports assembled by various government offices 12/01/11 [Government
Accountability Office] DHS-OIG “Report on the Coast Guard's Polar Icebreakers”
http://www.gao.gov/htext/d12254t.html
The most significant issue facing the Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet is the growing obsolescence of
these vessels and the resulting capability gap caused by their increasingly limited operations. As we
noted in our 2010 report, Coast Guard officials reported challenges fulfilling the agency's statutory
icebreaking mission, let alone its standing commitment to use the icebreakers to support the Navy as
needed.[Footnote 19] Since then, at least three reports have further identified the Coast Guard's
challenges to meeting its current and future icebreaking mission requirements in the Arctic with its
existing polar icebreaker fleet, as well as the challenges it faces to acquire new icebreakers. The Coast
Guard's existing fleet includes three icebreakers that are capable of operating in the Arctic.
SQ ice breakers will fail to meet Arctic benefits – New fleet is key
Smith, Colonel U.S. Air Force, 10 (Reginald R. Smith , Oct 27, 2010
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-62/JFQ62_117-124_Smith.pdf “The Arctic: A New Partnership
Paradigm or the Next Cold War?”) DG
The Arctic is the fastest-warming region on the planet, and scientific models forecast an ice-free summer Arctic sea within 30 years, with
As the Arctic ice cap recedes, expansive virgin areas rich in natural resources
and new, commercially lucrative maritime routes will open for exploitation by those nations most
prepared to capitalize on these opportunities. The potential for economic gain is enormous as 10
percent of the world’s known and an estimated 25 percent of undiscovered hydrocarbon resources,
84 percent of which are offshore, exist in the region. 5 Transport of these resources poses high profit
potential as well. For example, tanker traffic between northern Russian terminals and Southeast Asian ports can save $1 million in
fuel costs using an Arctic routing instead of the Suez Canal. 6 Those countries with the requisite capability stand to be
handsomely rewarded. An essential resource in the Arctic is a fleet of ships capable of icebreaking
operations. They are needed not only for the maintenance of waterways and ship escort when sea
ice is present, but also for year-round sovereignty projection, SAR, resource protection, and rule of
law enforcement. Notably, none of the U.S. icebreakers is configured for these additional duties. 7
Polar Sea and Polar Star, two of the three U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers that constitute America’s
entire heavy ice capability, have exceeded their service lives and are currently nonoperational. 8
Polar Sea is undergoing repairs with an expected return-to-service date of June 2011; Polar Star
requires extensive repairs and upgrades with an expected completion in 2013. 9 The third
icebreaker is a mediumclass ship that is configured for scientific research support and is unable to
handle thick Arctic ice. Cost estimates in 2008 dollars are $800 million to $925 million for a new icebreaker with a 10-year lead
some predictions as early as 2013. 4
time and $800 million to extend the lives of the two Polar-class ships. 10 The National Research Council in its 2007 report to Congress
stated that “U.S.
icebreaking capability is now at risk of being unable to support national interests in
the north and the south.” 11
A2: US Building More
The Coast Guard has a single ice breaker still in commission, with no plans to make
more
Miller, Author for KQED News, 5/7 (Craig, KQED News, “Iconic Icebreaker Makes Last Voyage”,
http://blogs.kqed.org/climatewatch/2012/05/07/iconic-icebreaker-makes-last-voyage-to-scrapyard/,
DOA: 7/9/12)
Glaciers are slipping away everywhere. It was tough to see this one go. I’m talking about a ship, not an
actual river of ice. This morning I watched the retired Coast Guard icebreaker Glacier cast off on what
is likely to be its final voyage, from a Vallejo dry dock to a scrapyard in Brownsville, Texas. It seemed
like a poignant moment, given the decline of the U.S. icebreaker fleet. Just as Arctic seas are opening
up to unprecedented shipping activity, the Coast Guard is left with just one icebreaker in working
order. Icebreakers are important research platforms and could play a vital role in responding to oil
spills from offshore drilling in far northern waters. Ben Koether sees it as more than poignant. “It’s a
tragedy and a crisis,” he told me by phone from Connecticut. “It’s just ludicrous.” Koether is an
electronics executive who was the Glacier’s navigator for two Antarctic voyages, in 1959 and 1962. In its
heyday, the ship participated in annual re-supply missions to Antarctic bases and was used as a platform
for oceanographic research in polar waters. Launched in 1954, the Glacier was decommissioned more
than 20 years ago and is well beyond seeing active service. But Koether has been leading an effort to
save the Glacier from the blowtorch and turn it into a floating museum of oceanography.
The Glacier may be replaced, but there is no plan for more
Miller, Author for KQED News, 5/7 (Craig, KQED News, “Iconic Icebreaker Makes Last Voyage”,
http://blogs.kqed.org/climatewatch/2012/05/07/iconic-icebreaker-makes-last-voyage-to-scrapyard/,
DOA: 7/9/12)
Seeing the ship’s 300-foot rusting form depart ADR’s Mare Island shipyard between two tugs, one might
reasonably conclude that the battle has been lost. “Absolutely not,” says Koether, who says the
dismantling contractor has agreed in principle to swap the Glacier for another one in the U.S. reserve
fleet, managed by the federal Maritime Administration (MARAD), but MARAD has yet to approve the
deal. The Glacier rests in a Mare Island drydock while its hull is prepared for towing to Texas. Each of its
twin propellers was 17 feet across. Koether says the Glacier’s design is “unequaled even today.” Built
originally for the Navy, the Glacier had a “heeling” system that could free it from heavy ice by rapidly
pumping 140,000 gallons of water from side-to-side. Her power came from giant diesel engines and twin
17-foot propellers and Koether says she was built more stoutly than subsequent breakers in the fleet,
with thicker steel and more ribbing. As for beefing up the U.S. polar fleet, prospects appear dim,
though the Coast Guard has asked for funding to build at least one more icebreaker. “As the ice melts,
you need more icebreakers instead of less,” says Koether, noting that the Russians have more than a
dozen in the works, some nuclear-powered.
A2: 2012 Budget
Even with one repaired demands are still not met- even with 2012 budget
Foreign Policy Blogs Network, December 7 (2011, Congressional Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation holds hearing on icebreakers, Lexis)KW
During his testimony before the subcommittee, Coast Guard Admiral Robert J. Papp also expressed his
concern about taking the Polar Star out of service. Interestingly, though, he also noted that the
National Security Cutter Program is essential to the USCG's role in the Last Frontier. Papp stated, "The
National Security Cutter is more important to me to carrying out Coast Guard missions in Alaska - but
we still need new icebreakers as well. In sum, it is my judgment and advice to you that Polar Star must
be kept as part of the heavy icebreaker bridging strategy for the next five to ten years, and that the
NSC shipbuilding program momentum must be maintained." National Security Cutters are a class of
ship that , and this summer, the first NSC carried out a patrol in Alaska. The Coast Guard Cutter
Bertholf took part in Operation Northern Edge, demonstrating that cutters can be useful in northern
waters. The fiscal year 2012 budget would allow for one heavy icebreaker and one medium icebreaker,
which the Department of Homeland Security says "will allow the Coast Guard to meet operational
requirements." Yet the USCG's High Lati-tude Region Mission Analysis Report, submitted to Congress in
July 2011, states that the services needs four heavy icebreakers and two medium ones to fulfill both its
statutory missions and the Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC-2010). In a small footnote (#30), the
concept states, "The current Icebreaker demand requires a 1.0 presence in the Arctic and 1.0 in the
Antarctic."
A2: Global Warming Solves Ice
Melting polar ice doesn’t matter – actually increases demand for icebreakers due to
increased arctic travel
O’Rourke, specialist in naval affairs, 6/14. Ronald O’Rourke “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf
Although polar ice is diminishing due to climate change, observers generally expect that this
development will not eliminate the need for U.S. polar icebreakers, and in some respects might
increase mission demands for them. Even with the diminishment of polar ice, there are still
significant ice-covered areas in the polar regions. Diminishment of polar ice could lead in coming years to
increased commercial ship, cruise ship, and naval surface ship operations, as well as increased
exploration for oil and other resources, in the Arctic—activities that could require increased levels of
support from polar icebreakers. 2 Changing ice conditions in Antarctic waters have made the McMurdo resupply mission more
challenging since 2000. 3 An April 18, 2011, press report states that the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral
Robert Papp, sees plenty of reasons the United States will need polar icebreakers for the
“foreseeable future,” despite speculation that thinning ice in the Arctic could make the icebreakers
replaceable with other ice-hardened ships, the admiral said last week…. “I don’t see that causing us to back
down on some minimal level of polar icebreakers,” Papp told Inside the Navy. “The fact of the matter is, there’s still
winter ice that’s forming. It’s coming down pretty far. We don't need to get up there just during
summer months when there’s open water.” 4
Climate Change makes now key time for new icebreakers
GCaptain 11 U.S. Subcommittee: USCG Needs Icebreakers BY GCAPTAIN STAFF ON DECEMBER 4, 2011
http://gcaptain.com/u-s-subcommittee-uscg-icebreakers/
“As we all know, the ice caps are shrinking in the Arctic, effectively creating new coastline and navigable
waters where the Coast Guard will be required to operate,” said Chairman LoBiondo. “This opening is already
providing significant economic opportunities for the energy and maritime transportation sectors, but
has also exposed a new set of risks and challenges to our national security and sovereignty. The Coast
Guard maintains two Polar Class icebreakers however neither is currently operational . The POLAR SEA
is being decommissioned and the POLAR STAR is undergoing significant repairs to extend its service
life. Questions remain about how long the POLAR STAR will last after its repairs are complete, as well
as whether the Service and the Administration are prepared to make critical decisions regarding our
nation’s goals and objectives in the Arctic and provide Congress with a fiscally responsible plan to meet those goals and
objectives. “The Subcommittee has been talking about the Arctic for years and has continuously advocated for increased polar capabilities,”
LoBiondo continued. “However,
the Coast Guard’s ability to respond to emerging threats and emergencies in
the Arctic is less today than it has been at any point in the past 50 years. Neither of the Polar Class
icebreakers is currently operational, though the taxpayer is spending millions of dollars a year to maintain those ships in a
caretaker status. It is time that we stop wasting money on old, ineffective assets and focus instead on acquiring assets that will provide the
capabilities we will need as we continue to increase our foothold in the Arctic. We
need to have an honest national
conversation about what we want our involvement to be in the Arctic and what we need to do to
maintain that presence.”
Thinning sea ice doesn’t matter – much of the Arctic still remains ice-covered
Brigham, retired captain of the US Coast Guard, 10. Lawson W. Brigham. “The FastChanging Maritime Arctic.” Usni.org.
http://www.princeton.edu/lisd/events/talks/brigham_may2010.pdf
The maritime Arctic
continues to experience a steady pace of development and expansion of marine
operations. During the past year, a record number of vessels transited the Northwest Passage, and
several milestone operations occurred in the Russian Arctic. Affecting all commercial and naval
operations, and of particular importance to planners of future ventures, is the recent observed
decline of the Arctic Ocean’s sea-ice cover, as well as its year-to-year variability. While this historic retreat and climatechange impacts on the Arctic received global attention, the realities of the region’s natural-resource development and greater commercial use
have gained higher profiles in political discussions. sea ice changes NASA researchers and the National Snow and Ice Data Center, University of
Colorado at Boulder, reported that the
area of the Arctic Ocean covered by sea ice on 12 September 2009 was
the third lowest since satellite measurements began in 1979. While this area was larger than the record minimum
coverage observed in 2007 and the minimum area for 2008, it represents one of the smallest areas on record. Arctic sea-ice coverage has
declined by nearly 12 percent each of the past three decades, for a remarkable total decrease of 34 percent. 1 Despite
this
extraordinary change in coverage and observed thinning of sea ice (estimated from recent satellite measurements
compared with declassified sonar measurements from U.S. Navy submarines), much of the Arctic Ocean today remains fully
or partially ice-covered for most of the year. This is a significant factor when considering new
regulatory requirements for polar-class ships and potential operational restrictions for nonicecapable naval and commercial ships.
Rebuilding Inevitable
Rebuilding and funding inevitable in the meantime key operations are being affected
Foreign Policy Blogs Network, December 7 (2011, Congressional Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation holds hearing on icebreakers, Lexis)KW
In the Arctic, the Coast Guard's icebreaker deficit could affect four out of the eleven missions it has:
Defense Readi-ness, Ice Operations, Marine Environmental Protection, and Ports, Waterways, and
Coastal Security. The USCG estimates it will take eight to ten years to design and build a new
icebreaker. Since the Polar Sea will only last for approximately that time, at most, many advocate that
the U.S. should start designing a new icebreaker immediately. The USCG presented findings of an
independent third-party regarding icebreakers to Congress on November 1, 2011. It will cost $859
million to construct a new polar class icebreaker and $1.2 billion to reconstruct the Polar Sea or Polar
Star from scratch to the current standard for heavy icebreakers. These current USCG budget cannot
fund these projects, so funding from other agencies will be necessary. However, David Whitcomb,
Chief Operating Officer of Vigor Industrial, the company repairing the Polar Star, testified on Thursday
on behalf of the Shipbuilders' Council of America that the engine of the mothballed Polar Sea could be
fixed for as little as $11 million. This would add another seven to ten years to the ship's lifespan. Even if
it is fixed soon, this still puts the U.S. in the same time crunch eventually, where by as soon as 2018 the
U.S. could again be without icebreakers, and this time for a decade while a new one is designed. China
was able to simply purchase an icebreaker from the Ukraine. While the U.S. is content to lease
icebreakers from other countries, it does not seem like an actual purchase of maritime or military
equipment from another country would go over as well in Washington.
Advantages
Arctic Conflict Advantage
Arctic War Coming
The Arctic is a powder keg waiting to explode; many different countries want to
control the territory in the arctic and the resources within them.
Carlson, Jon D.., Hubach, Chris., Long, Joe., Minteer, Kellen. and Young, Shane. 2009 (April 02
The Scramble for the Arctic: The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Extending
National Seabed Claims) http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p363540_index.html
Before beginning a discussion of various Arctic territorial claims, where geographic knowledge of
landmarks and seabed descriptions is esoteric at best, a visual reference is undoubtedly helpful. One of
the best visual representations of the regions is available through the International Boundaries
Research Unit (IBRU) at Durham University, in the UK. [See Appendix 1] What becomes immediately
apparent is that if we view seabed claims as essentially territorial claims, and we recognize that
conflicting territorial claims are a traditional basis for armed conflict, then the situation in the Arctic
seems quite serious. This situation becomes even direr once the purported resource variable is
added in to the equation, as countries are becoming more assertive with regard to securing access to
strategic resources such as oil. The good news – at least as far as avoiding potential armed conflict – is
that the debate about territory (and the subsidiary control over as-yet largely hypothetical
petroleum deposits) is taking place within the institutional regulatory framework of the United
Nations and the UNCLOS dispute-resolution mechanisms. Accordingly, the Scramble for the Arctic
may be seen as a ‘hard case’ for conflict resolution. Not only are the potential stakes high, but these
stakes (territory and strategic resources) are at the heart of the realist behavioral model in IR: states
generally seek to control territory as a defensive mechanism and prevent others from controlling
necessary resources. If institutions and dispute-resolution mechanisms can constrain conflict here –
where very central elements to state behavior are at stake and two of the players are acknowledged
‘great powers’ – then perhaps an idealist vision of IR is more appropriate for understanding state
behavior in the contemporary international environment.
Status quo perceives Arctic as useless – leads to geopolitical conflict
Reiss has covered Arctic issues for Smithsonian, Parade and Outside Magazines, 2010 (Bob, March 13,
Cold, Hard Facts: U.S. Trails in Race for the Top of the World, Politics Daily,
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/03/13/cold-hard-facts-u-s-trails-in-race-for-the-top-of-the-world/)
Most Americans give little thought to our far north. We think of the Arctic as a single region, a cold place divorced
from our everyday lives, a setting for documentaries from which we learn that polar bears are in
danger as their icy habitat shrinks. But the U.S. also faces huge, new geopolitical consequences from
the melt. A whole new area of Earth is suddenly open for international conflict, environmental
destruction, and an economic bonanza. On March 1, Alaska's senators sat down at the Council for Foreign Relations with other
experts on the region to figure out how to get the rest of America to stop ignoring what the Council's Fellow on Ocean Governance considers
"one of the biggest stories of the 21st century." Republican Sen. Lisa Murkowski told a roundtable discussion at the gathering that the U.S. is
"an Arctic nation," but the top of the world is changing fast as it melts.
The dispute over the Arctic is heating up, and many countries have begun to attempt
to exercise control over Arctic waters.
CBC News 2010 (August 20th, Battle for the Arctic heats up)
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2009/02/27/f-arctic-sovereignty.html
The Arctic is under siege as never before. The Russians send submarines deep below the North Pole. The
Americans dispatch surveillance planes to monitor new threats in the North. And Canada scrambles to
defend territories it has ignored for too long. In 2007, the stakes were raised considerably when Russia
launched a naval manoeuvre designed to plant an actual Russian flag, in a titanium capsule, at the
base of the North Pole, 4,200 metres below sea level. Russia's game plan was to extend its territory
almost up to the Pole itself, to claim the vast mineral and energy resources many feel lie underneath
the Arctic ice. The North Pole is considered an international site and is administered by the International
Seabed Authority. But if a country can prove its underwater shelf is an extension of its continental
border, then it can claim an economic zone based on that. And that's what Russia is doing by
systematically charting the reach of its Lomonosov underwater shelf. As a spokesman for its Arctic and
Antarctic Institute said, "It's like putting a flag on the moon." For Canadians, of course, this is more like
waving a red flag in front of a bull. Canadians have always tended to regard the northernmost reaches of
their land as an integral, if isolated, part of the country. The vast and frozen Arctic archipelago even gets
its own reference in the country's national anthem: "The true north, strong and free." But how much of
"Canada's North" is Canada's? Just about everyone agrees that the many islands that dot the Arctic to
the north of Canada's mainland belong to Canada. But what about the water between them? Who, if
anyone, has jurisdiction over the waters separating Somerset Island from Devon Island, or Melville
Island from Banks Island? The Canadian government says the jurisdiction is clear — they're Canadian
waters. But the U.S. and some other countries, especially now Russia, don't agree. They see the
Northwest Passage as an international strait that any ship should be free to transit. And increasingly,
they are seeing the Arctic seabed as a resource to be carved up among certain northern nations. Who
is right?
Countries are preparing for war
Apps, Political Risk Correspondent ’12 (Pater, April 3, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/usarctic-resources-idUSBRE8320DR20120403, Reuters “Melting Arctic may redraw global geopolitical
map”)
But growing unease is also clear. Norway and Canada, for example, have spent recent years quietly reequipping its military and moving troops and other forces to new or enlarged bases further north.
Having largely withdrawn most of its forces from the region in the aftermath of the Cold War, officials
and experts say the US is only now rediscovering its significance. But for now, Washington has no
concrete plans to build even a single new icebreaker – in part because experts estimate that the price
tag for a single ship could be as high as $1 billion (R8bn). For the first time, some officers worry the US is
losing its foothold as new rivals such as China prepare to muscle in. “We are in many ways an Arctic
nation without an Arctic strategy,” US Coast Guard Vice-Admiral Brian M Salerno told the same
Washington DC event.
Land disputes heighten tensions
Apps, Political Risk Correspondent ’12 (Pater, April 3, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/usarctic-resources-idUSBRE8320DR20120403, Reuters “Melting Arctic may redraw global geopolitical
map”)
The US has yet to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which most countries use
as the basis formdiscussing thorny Arctic territorial issues. Arctic experts point to at least nine separate
disputes within the region, from disagreements between the US and Canada over parts of the
northwest passage to fishing conflicts that also drag in China, Russia, South Korea, Japan and others.
US Falling Behind
US Posture towards the arctic in face of Russian expansionism is inadequate
Cohen et. al 8 (Ariel, Lajos F. Szaszd, Jim Dolbow , a Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian
Studies and International Energy Policy, is a non staff member at The Heritage Foundation, Experienced
Congressional Defense Staffer and Homeland Security Professional, ‘ The New Cold War: Reviving the
U.S. Presence in the Arctic’ (http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/10/the-new-cold-warreviving-the-us-presence-in-the-arctic BHS)
The U.S. requires a modern flotilla of icebreakers to conduct mapping and to sustain U.S. claims. The
U.S. currently has only three icebreakers that belong to the Coast Guard, of which only the Healy
(commissioned in 2000) is relatively new. The other two icebreakers, while heavier than the Healy and
thus capable of breaking through thicker ice, are at the end of their designed service life after operating
for about 30 years. Yet even if the U.S. begins now, it will be eight to 10 years before a new icebreaker
can enter service, and no money has been allocated to build a new-generation heavy icebreaker.[31]
Russian Claims After its invasion of Georgia, Russia has clearly hardened its international posture and is
increasingly relying on power, not international law, to settle its claims. Moscow has also intensified its
anti-American policies and rhetoric and is likely to challenge U.S. interests whenever and wherever it
can, including in the High North. Russia takes its role as an Arctic power seriously. In 2001, Russia
submitted to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea a formal claim for an area of 1.2 million
square kilometers (460,000 square miles) that runs from the undersea Lomonosov Ridge and
Mendeleev Ridge to the North Pole. This is roughly the combined area of Germany, France, and
Italy.[32] The U.N. commission did not accept the claim and requested "additional data and
information."[33] Russia responded by sending a scientific mission of a nuclear-powered icebreaker
and two mini-submarines to the area. During this meticulously organized media event, the mission
planted the Russian flag on the ocean's floor at the Lomonosov Ridge after collecting soil samples that
supposedly prove that the ridge is part of the Eurasian landmass. During the mission, Deputy Chairman
of the Russian Duma Artur Chilingarov, the veteran Soviet explorer heading the scientific expedition,
declared, "The Arctic is ours and we should demonstrate our presence."[34] Such statements run
counter to the spirit and potential of international cooperation and seem inappropriate for a scientific
mission. The U.S. has objected to these claims and stated that they have "major flaws." Professor Timo
Koivurova of the University of Lapland in Finland stated that "oceanic ridges cannot be claimed as part
of the state's continental shelf."[35] Russia intends to resubmit its claim by 2009.[36] Russia is also
moving rapidly to establish a physical sea, ground, and air presence in the Arctic. In August 2008,
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a law that allows "the government to allocate strategic oil
and gas deposits on the continental shelf without auctions." The law restricts participation to companies
with five years' experience in a region's continental shelf and in which the government holds at least a
50 percent share, effectively allowing only state-controlled Gazprom and Rosneft to participate.[37]
President Medvedev also featured the Arctic prominently in the new Russian Foreign Policy Concept,
which states: "In accordance with the international law, Russia intends to establish the boundaries of its
continental shelf, thus expanding opportunities for exploration and exploitation of its mineral
resources."[38] During 2008, Russian icebreakers have constantly patrolled in the Arctic. Russia has 18
operational icebreakers, the largest flotilla of icebreakers in the world.[39] Seven are nuclear, including
the 50 Years of Victory, the largest icebreaker in the world.[40] Russia is planning to build new nuclearpowered icebreakers starting in 2015. Experts estimate that Russia will need to build six to 10 nuclear
icebreakers over the next 20 years to maintain and expand its current level of operations.[41] Russia's
presence in the Arctic will allow the Kremlin to take de facto possession of the underwater territories
currently in dispute. In addition to icebreakers, Russia is constructing an Arctic oil rig in the northern
shipbuilding center of Severodvinsk, which will be completed by 2010. The rig will be the first of its kind,
capable of operating in temperatures as low as minus 50 degrees Celsius (minus 58 degrees Fahrenheit)
and withstand the impact of ice packs. The new rig was commissioned by the state-controlled Gazprom
and demonstrates that Russia is serious about oil exploration in the Arctic.[42] Russia's Polar Saber
Rattling In August 2007, shortly after sending the scientific expedition to the Arctic ridge, then Russian
President Vladimir Putin ordered the resumption of regular air patrols over the Arctic Ocean. Strategic
bombers including the turboprop Tu-95 (Bear), supersonic Tu-160 (Blackjack), and Tu-22M3 (Backfire)
and the long-range anti-submarine warfare patrol aircraft Tu-142 have flown patrols since then.[43]
According to the Russian Air Force, the Tu-95 bombers refueled in-flight to extend their operational
patrol area.[44] Patrolling Russian bombers penetrated the 12-mile air defense identification zone
surrounding Alaska 18 times during 2007.[45] Since August 2007, the Russian Air Force has flown more
than 90 missions over the Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans.[46] The Russian Navy is also expanding
its presence in the Arctic for the first time since the end of the Cold War.[47] Lieutenant General
Vladimir Shamanov, head of the Defense Ministry's combat training department, said that the Russian
Navy is increasing the operational radius of the Northern Fleet's submarines and that Russia's military
strategy might be reoriented to meet threats to the country's interests in the Arctic, particularly with
regard to its continental shelf. Shamanov said that "we have a number of highly-professional military
units in the Leningrad, Siberian and Far Eastern military districts, which are specifically trained for
combat in Arctic regions."[48] On July 14, 2008, the Russian Navy announced that its fleet has
"resumed a warship presence in the Arctic." These Arctic naval patrols include the area of the
Spitsbergen archipelago that belongs to Norway, a NATO member. Russia refuses to recognize
Norway's right to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone around Spitsbergen. Russia deployed an
anti-submarine warfare destroyer followed by a guided-missile cruiser armed with 16 long-range antiship cruise missiles designed to destroy aircraft carriers.[49] The resumption of Cold War–style patrols
and increased naval presence in the Arctic is in keeping with Moscow's more forward posture and is
intended to increase its leverage vis-à-vis territorial claims. Moscow is taking a dual approach of
projecting military power while invoking international law. Regarding the naval deployments near
Spitsbergen, the Russian Navy stated: Sorties of warships of the Northern Fleet will be made
periodically with a necessary regularity. All actions of the Russian warships are fulfilled strictly in
accordance with the international maritime law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.[50]
At a meeting of the Russian government's Maritime Board in April 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov backed a policy of settling territorial disputes in the region with the countries bordering the
Arctic through cooperation. First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, who is now deputy prime
minister, stressed at the meeting that Russia observes the international law on the matter through
adherence to "two international conventions": the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, signed by
Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S., and the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea.[51] While paying lip service to international law, Russia's ambitious actions hearken back to 19thcentury statecraft rather than the 21st-century law-based policy and appear to indicate that the
Kremlin believes that credible displays of power will settle the conflicting territorial claims. By
comparison, the West's posture toward the Arctic has been irresolute and inadequate.
U.S Navy and Coast Guard falling behind – icebreakers key to restoring dominance
Wright ’10 (January, Austin, reporter for POLITICO, “Coast Guard Examines Future of Patrolling The
Arctic”http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2010/January/Pages/CoastGuardExaminesFut
ureofPatrollingTheArctic.aspx)
The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, which dwarf all other countries’ warship fleets in size and capability,
have fallen behind several Arctic nations when it comes to patrolling these icy waters. Canada has
announced plans for an Arctic training facility, China has sent an icebreaking ship to the North Pole
and Russia already planted a flag there — a symbolic gesture that the country maintains is not a claim
to the land. Canada also has asserted control over parts of the Northwest Passage, an icy waterway
that in recent years has become more navigable because of the retreating ice. Government studies
have concluded that previously unreachable Arctic waterways could hold as much as one-fourth of
the world’s undiscovered oil reserves, a statistic that leads some experts to believe there will be a
conflict among the world’s naval powers for a stake in this potential jackpot. And the United States
could find itself outmatched.
Actions must be taken now to seize the Arctic – Canada and Russia are main
competitors
Reiss has covered Arctic issues for Smithsonian, Parade and Outside Magazines, 2010 (Bob, March 13,
Cold, Hard Facts: U.S. Trails in Race for the Top of the World, Politics Daily,
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/03/13/cold-hard-facts-u-s-trails-in-race-for-the-top-of-the-world/)
That's not all the lumbering bear is up to. Russia is building floating nuclear power plants for its Arctic ports, and last year opened its northern
route between Asia and Europe to two German commercial ships. Their trip from Korea to Holland made history, cutting the usual distance by
Russia is so protective of the region that it routinely denies
U.S. science missions access to Russian waters, complained Treadwell, head of the Arctic research commission. Meanwhile,
the Russians plan to have 340 ice-strengthened vessels in the water by 2014. A State Department expert told me
30 percent. A Russian icebreaker escorted the vessels.
on background that Russia's aggressive moves are cosmetic, designed to make the country look strong for its domestic audience, and that
Americans shouldn't take the bellicose language seriously. But Ariel Cohen, a
Russia expert at the conservative Heritage
Foundation, called the Russian claims "a time bomb." And never mind old enemies; let's talk about old friends. Canada
and the United States disagree on their offshore boundary in the Arctic and also over whether the Northwest
Passage is owned by Canada, as Ottawa insists, or is an international passage, as the U.S. believes. So far the disagreement is friendly, but
billions could be at stake as well as unencumbered passage of military ships. "Use the Arctic or lose it," Canadian
Prime Minister Stephen Harper has said. Regardless of which countries emerge as Arctic powers, oil companies are anxious to know where
boundaries are. "This will be the biggest land distribution in history," Paul Kelly, spokesman for the American Petroleum Institute, told me last
year. As the clock ticks, Alaska Sen. Mark Begich, a Democrat, worries that "every
day that goes by, we lose our sovereignty
as other countries recognize our inability to act." Perhaps Begich is remembering his Kipling. At the dawn of the 20th
century, writing about Central Asia, Rudyard Kipling described the way international issues play out in remote regions as "The Great Game." In
the 21st century the northernmost regions will be the board on which the game is played. Think Saudi Arabia in 1880. Or the Isthmus of
Panama before the canal was built. Those who got control of those places prospered while the losers gnashed their teeth. At the War College
gathering last year, American and Canadian speakers showed slides depicting the different Arctic countries as animals reflecting their national
character. Russia showed up as an aggressive bear. The U.S. appeared as a sleeping elephant.
Russia Dominating Now
Russia is reemerging as a hegemon – recent statements and resources prove
Reiss has covered Arctic issues for Smithsonian, Parade and Outside Magazines, 2010 (Bob, March 13,
Cold, Hard Facts: U.S. Trails in Race for the Top of the World, Politics Daily,
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/03/13/cold-hard-facts-u-s-trails-in-race-for-the-top-of-the-world/)
And Russia's resurgence as a world power has been aided by Arctic resources. But to remove those
resources you have to own them, and nations are now scrambling to claim vast new areas of sea
bottom. They can do so by proving them to be extensions of their continental shelves. In summer, U.S., Russian, Canadian, and Danish
scientists aboard icebreakers conduct studies to support claims submitted to a U.N. commission. In theory, the U.S. could gain an
undersea region as big as California. That's the good news, but the bad news is that the United States
is last in the claims race. The U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf has begun examining claims from Russia and
Norway, which could be granted before the U.S. formally joins the process. Although the U.S. is gathering information for a claim, it cannot be
submitted -- nor can the U.S. have a say in the claims of other nations -- until the government signs an international treaty. The agreement
under which the apportionment of riches will go forward -- the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention -- lays out a
comprehensive set of rules governing ocean issues, including protection of marine environments. All
Arctic nations except the U.S. have signed. "If this were a ball game," one Coast Guard admiral told me, "the U.S. wouldn't be
on the field or even in the stadium." What's the holdup? Ironically, in this era marked by fierce partisan politics, the treaty has had the
backing of both the Obama White House and the Bush administration before it, along with oil and
shipping industries, the Pentagon and even environmental groups such as the Sierra Club (which applauds the environmental
protection provisions). The treaty's passage has been delayed by a few Republican Senators such as Louisiana's
David Vitter, Jim DeMint of South Carolina and Mississippi's Trent Lott, who worry that the treaty would provide a backdoor way for the U.N. to
regulate U.S. military activity on the high seas, as well as U.S. environmental law. Lott also posits the treaty would impact American commercial
authority: "When American businesses . . . invest time and money and effort for a . . . seabed discovery and want to make use of it, they then
have to turn it over to a U.N. bureaucracy to decide who gets it and how it's shared with the rest of the world." In the meantime, while
America dithers, Russia is emerging as top dog in the far north. The stakes go beyond trillions of dollars in
potential oil and gas rights, fishing privileges, and shipping authority; they also include establishing a military hegemony that
would give nightmares to Cold War strategists. In 2007, Russian explorer and legislator Artur Chilingarov -- with great
symbolic, if not diplomatic or legal, authority -- dropped a titanium flag by mini sub at the North Pole. "The Arctic is ours," he said. Russia
has claimed an area the size of France and Spain combined, but it is uncertain whether the claim will be granted. Russia operates 19
icebreakers while the U.S. Coast Guard has only two. Russia has beefed up its Arctic troops and begun
military over-flights in the region for the first time since the Cold War, according to a recent Coast
Guard report. "We are looking at how far the region will be militarized. Depending on that, we'll decide what to do," Gen. Nikolai
Makarov, head of Russia's General Staff, said in 2009. Last summer, the U.S. Naval War College in Rhode Island hosted a
conference on Arctic security concerns that was attended by military representatives from around the
world. Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, said that Russia defines the Arctic as a "national heritage"
and identifies the region as "strong for military conflict over resources." The Norwegian delegation described
Russian bomber sorties along Norway's coast, although the two countries are quite friendly at the moment.
Russia’s security strategy ensures Arctic wars over resources
Ariel Cohen 10 (Ph.D, June 15, 2010, In conjunction with the heritage foundation, “From Russian
Competition to Natural Resources Access: Recasting U.S. Arctic Policy,”
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2421.pdf)
Russia’s Commercial Presence. Russia’s energy rush to the Arctic continues apace. On May 12, 2009,
President Dmitry Medvedev approved Russia’s security strategy. 34 This document views Russia’s
natural resources in the Arctic as a base for both economic development and geopolitical influence.
Paragraph 11 identifies potential battlegrounds where conflicts over energy may occur: “The attention
of international politics in the long-term will be concentrated on controlling the sources of energy
resources in the Middle East, on the shelf of the Barents Sea and other parts of the Arctic, in the
Caspian Basin and in Central Asia.” The document seriously considers the use of military force to
resolve competition for energy near Russia’s borders or those of its allies: “In case of a competitive
struggle for resources it is not impossible to discount that it might be resolved by a decision to use
military might. The existing balance of forces on the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies can
be changed.
Russia pushing for Arctic control now
Revkin 8. Senior fellow at Pace University's Pace Academy for Applied Environmental Studies. Andrew
C. Revkin. “A Push to Increase Icebreakers in the Arctic.” August 17, 2008.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/world/europe/17arctic.html?_r=1&ref=world&pagewanted=prin
t
A growing array of military leaders, Arctic experts and lawmakers say the United States is losing its
ability to patrol and safeguard Arctic waters even as climate change and high energy prices have
triggered a burst of shipping and oil and gas exploration in the thawing region. The National Academy of
Sciences, the Coast Guard and others have warned over the past several years that the United States’
two 30-year-old heavy icebreakers, the Polar Sea and Polar Star, and one ice-breaking ship devoted
mainly to science, the Healy, are grossly inadequate. Also, the Polar Star is out of service. And this
spring, the leaders of the Pentagon’s Pacific Command, Northern Command and Transportation
Command strongly recommended in a letter that the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorse a push by the Coast
Guard to increase the country’s ability to gain access to and control its Arctic waters. In the meantime,
a resurgent Russia has been busy expanding its fleet of large oceangoing icebreakers to around 14,
launching a large conventional icebreaker in May and, last year, the world’s largest icebreaker, named
50 Years of Victory, the newest of its seven nuclear-powered, pole-hardy ships. Adm. Thad W. Allen,
the commandant of the Coast Guard, who toured Alaska’s Arctic shores two weeks ago with the
homeland security secretary, Michael Chertoff, said that whatever mix of natural and human factors is
causing the ice retreats, the Arctic is clearly opening to commerce — and potential conflict and hazards
— like never before.
Russia seeking arctic military dominance
Macalister 7/6/12 Terry Macalister, Energy editor for the Guardian, The Guardian, “Militarisation:
The 21st-century cold war hots up,”
http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T150989
84508&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T15098984512&cisb=22_T15
098984511&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=138620&docNo=5
A buildup of military forces around the Arctic amid growing excitement about its oil wealth has the
ability to undermine stability in the region, a research paper has warned. According to the report called Climate Change and International Security: the Arctic as a Bellwether - the military buildup is
neither advisable nor a sensible peacekeeping measure, as it is increasingly designed for combat
rather than policing. The paper, published by the US not-for-profit organisation, the Centre for Climate
and Energy Solutions (C2ES), warns: "Although the pursuit of co-operation is the stated priority, most
of the Arctic states have begun to rebuild and modernise their military capabilities in the region. The
new military programs have been geared towards combat capabilities that exceed mere constabulary
capacity." It adds: "States such as Norway and Russia are building new naval units designed to engage
in high-intensity conflicts. While this capability may be understood as prudent, the ability of rivals to
intimidate or subdue with sophisticated weapons systems could, if collegiality falters, undermine
diplomacy and stability in the region." The US Geological Survey has estimated that about a quarter of
the world's oil and gas reserves could lie under the ice cap - encouraging a race for resources. Shell has
applied for drilling rights in the Arctic off Alaska this summer and is also planning to make boreholes on
behalf of other oil companies off Greenland. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev said in 2008
that "our first and main task is to turn the Arctic into Russia's resource base of the 21st century." His
successor, Vladimir Putin, has just unveiled plans to give tax breaks to encourage companies to exploit
new oil and gas fields, such as the Shtockman field in the Barents Sea. Russia and Norway have recently
signed a boundary agreement in the Barents Sea and undertaken joint military exercises, but the C2ES
research paper says Norway "continues to take seriously its preparations for the defence of the High
North, as it calls it."
Russia has already submitted a claim to the UN for control over Arctic waters and is
willing to use its military to backup the claim.
Carlson, Jon D.., Hubach, Chris., Long, Joe., Minteer, Kellen. and Young, Shane. 2009 (April 02
The Scramble for the Arctic: The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Extending
National Seabed Claims) http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p363540_index.html
During deliberation, the Sub-commission recommended that the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law
of the Sea visit the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, where the Division analyzed seismic and
observational data from the arctic zone. With the data provided by Russia and the Division, the Subcommission found that a recommendation for Russia's claim to the continental shelf would take
longer than the two weeks allocated, and an additional week of meetings were scheduled,
whereupon completion the Sub-commission's findings were reported to the full Commission.
However, since this claim has been put forth, Russia is no longer under an official deadline for
resubmission, but it is under competitive pressure from the other coastal states. Russia has signaled
their intent to back up their claims through their military, flexing their potential power through
activities such as strategic bomber flights during mid-2008, and they have been expanding the
operational zone of their northern fleet in order to show their intent on “‘protecting [their] national
interests’ in the Arctic” (Blomfield, 2008).
Ice Breakers Key
Melting ice spurs arctic militarization – US needs to ramp up its icebreaking
capabilities
Morello, 5/2. Lauren Morello, E&E reporter, May 2, 2012. ClimateWire.
http://eenews.net/public/climatewire/2012/05/02/1
Interest in the Arctic is growing as climate change shrinks the region's cap of sea ice, opening the area
to new shipping, fishing, tourism and oil and gas exploration. But a new report from the Center for
Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES) warns that there are signs of creeping militarization that could
disrupt the cooperation that has defined Arctic geopolitics since the end of the Cold War. It's a
situation that lead author Rob Huebert, associate director of the Center for Military and Strategic
Studies at the University of Calgary, described as "cooperation, but ... " The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter
Healy is the United States' one functional icebreaker. With no plans to beef up a military presence in
the Arctic, some experts worry the United States is in danger of falling behind. Photo courtesy of U.S.
Coast Guard. "We've had intense periods of cooperation and liking each other in the Arctic," Huebert
said yesterday, speaking at a conference organized by the American Geophysical Union. "Why? Because
the stakes weren't that high." But that is changing as the world considers the economic potential of
untouched shipping grounds, rich oil and gas deposits, new tourist attractions and long-sought
commercial shipping routes. Since 2008, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, the United States, the
European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a coalition of Nordic countries have made
major Arctic policy announcements. At the same time, NATO has increased the frequency of exercises
it conducts in the Arctic, and non-Arctic nations are building icebreaking ships and developing their
own polar strategies. "Even a little country like Singapore is determined to become an Arctic state,"
Huebert said, adding that he met Singapore's Arctic ambassador at a science conference in Montreal last
week. But that argument was rejected by a top U.S. military officer. Money driving politics "These border
disputes will get solved, but it's all about the money," said Rear Adm. David Titley, oceanographer of the
Navy. "It's the economics that will drive the time to see that." Titley heads the Navy's Task Force
Climate Change, which warned in a 2009 strategy paper that as rising temperatures open the Arctic to
new shipping, fishing, tourism and resource extraction, the ensuing resource grab could increase the
potential for competition and conflict between nations. But economic considerations can also prove a
compelling reason to negotiate a peaceful solution to international conflicts, he said yesterday. Heather
Conley, director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, agreed,
pointing to recent developments in the Barents Sea. Russia and Norway surprised the world in 2010
when they resolved a long-running border dispute in the region. The day after the two nations inked
their new boundary agreement, each began seismic testing for oil and gas deposits on the Barents
seabed. "The opportunities are driving good geopolitics here," Conley said. And the purchases of new
planes, submarines and ships described in the new report as signs of militarization may not amount to
new shows of fighting might, Titley said. No U.S. military buildup planned The analysis notes, for
example, that the United States is replacing aging F-15 fighter planes stationed in Alaska with new F-22
Raptors. And the Navy has sent one of its newest Virginia-class submarines, the USS Texas, to the region
on patrol. But looks can be deceiving, said Titley. With the Defense Department required by law to cut
between $500 billion and $1 trillion from its budget over the next decade, "we're not really looking at
building up there," he said. Instead, he said, the United States and other countries are modernizing
their fleets and infrastructure. That does not always bring a greater ability to operate in harsh Arctic
conditions. The Navy's current submarines are not as capable of operating in polar ice as their 1970s
predecessors, Titley said. And while Huebert remains convinced that creeping militarization could
jeopardize the friendly atmosphere that has taken root in the Arctic since the Cold War ended, he said
the situation is not as dire as some media reports have suggested. A widely reported 2007 incident in
which a Russian expedition planted a Russian flag on the ocean floor near the North Pole was "a
publicity stunt -- by a member of the Duma who isn't even within [Russian Prime Minister Vladimir]
Putin's party." A greater concern, Huebert said, was the Russian Navy's decision in 2008 to conduct
first-ever launch exercises in the Arctic with a batch of new missiles. He's rooting for Arctic nations to
strengthen their diplomatic ties by striking a prohibition that prevents the multination Arctic Council
from discussing military matters. Does the U.S. need to catch up? Meanwhile, experts agreed that the
United States' Arctic ambitions are hobbled in at least two ways. First, the United States is one of a
handful of nations -- including Iran, North Korea and Cuba -- that have not ratified the U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea. The treaty, which took effect in 1994, allows member nations to apply to extract
oil, gas and mineral deposits beyond a 200-mile exclusive economic zone -- if a country can show its
continental slope extends beyond that point. Because it has not signed the agreement, the United
States cannot file a claim to expand its EEZ or dispute claims made by other nations, including Canada
and Russia. The other difficulty confronting the United States is a dwindling polar fleet, experts said.
With just one functioning icebreaker and no immediate plans to build more, the United States is
falling behind non-Arctic countries like China that are busy commissioning state-of-the-art vessels.
"The economic potential of the Arctic is becoming more apparent," said Jay Gulledge, senior scientist
and director of C2ES's science and impacts program. "And as that has happened, governments and
industries have started to reposition themselves.”
Ice breakers key to heg; increases geopolitical power and science initiatives
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
The United States has enduring national and strategic interests in the Arctic and Antarctic, and the
importance of these regions is growing with time. In the north, the United States has territory and
citizens above the Arctic Circle, creating significant national interests. In the south, the United States
maintains three year-round scientific stations to assert U.S. presence and ensure U.S. leadership
among the nations that are signatories to the Antarctic Treaty. Repeated highlevel policy reviews
have reaffirmed the importance of this U.S. presence and leadership in the polar regions. To achieve
national purposes in both polar regions, the nation needs to be able to access various sites
throughout these regions at certain times of the year, reliably and at will. Ensured access to the polar
region requires polar icebreaking ships capable of operating in a variety of challenging ice conditions.
Over the past several decades, the U.S. government has supported its polar interests with a fleet of
four icebreakers. The current seagoing U.S. fleet of four ships includes three multimission ships
operated by the U.S. Coast Guard (POLAR SEA, POLAR STAR, and HEALY) that support U.S. Coast Guard
missions as well as science and one single-mission ship operated by the National Science Foundation
that is dedicated solely to scientific research (PALMER). Today, two of the multimission ships, the POLAR
STAR and the POLAR SEA, are at the end of their service lives. Over the last decade, some routine
maintenance on these ships has been deferred due to a lack of funds and no major life extension
program has been planned; as a consequence, U.S. icebreaking capability is now at risk of being
unable to support national interests in the north and the south.
Icebreakers are key to US arctic leadership- withdrawal causes power vacuums
National Research Council 7 . "2 U.S. Strategic Interests and Missions in the Polar Regions."Polar
Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs. Washington, DC: The National
Academies Press, 2007. 1. Print.
Until recently, the two Polar class icebreakers (sometimes together and sometimes separately depending on ice conditions) were
used to break open a channel for resupply.4 However, more challenging ice conditions and the deteriorating status
of the Polar class ships now adds uncertainty and risk of failure to the operation. The National Science Foundation
(NSF) is concerned that the lack of reliable icebreaking support may make it increasingly difficult to
maintain the permanent stations and associated science programs. Investigations of alternate logistics plans by NSF
(discussed in Chapter 8) have reaffirmed that icebreaker support is necessary to the Antarctic resupply chain for now and in the foreseeable
future. According to a representative of the Department
of State assigned to Antarctic issues, if resupply of South
Pole Station is not successful and the station were abandoned, this would jeopardize, and probably reduce, the
influence of the United States in Antarctic governance. There would be significant consequences because abandonment of that key site would
create a vacuum in leadership and likely result in a scramble for control. Abandoning it would be detrimental to the U.S. position as well as to
the stability of the treaty system. To preserve the U.S. presence in Antarctica and hence its influential role in the Antarctic Treaty, it is
paramount to maintain the three permanent research stations and their associated active research programs throughout the Antarctic
continent. Icebreaker
operations are critical to the continued existence of these stations and their
associated outlying field sites
Lack of icebreakers renders the US useless in the polar regions and cripples Coast
Guard operations
O’Rourke, specialist in naval affairs, 6/14. Ronald O’Rourke “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf
Should the Coast Guard not obtain funding for new icebreakers or major service life extensions for its
existing icebreakers with sufficient lead-time, the United States will have no heavy icebreaking capability
beyond 2020 and no polar icebreaking capability of any kind by 2029. Without the continued use of
icebreakers, the United States will lose its ability to maintain a presence in the Polar Regions, the
Coast Guard’s expertise to perform ice operations will continue to diminish, and missions will
continue to go unmet.
Icebreakers are key to US Arctic presence
Revkin 8. Senior fellow at Pace University's Pace Academy for Applied Environmental Studies. Andrew
C. Revkin. “A Push to Increase Icebreakers in the Arctic.” August 17, 2008.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/world/europe/17arctic.html?_r=1&ref=world&pagewanted=prin
t
As early as 2001, the Navy issued reports saying that it had limited ability to operate ships and planes
reliably in the Arctic. But with two costly wars under way, the region has remained a low priority with
Navy budgets for polar analysis declining. The letter from the three military commands to the Joint
Chiefs last spring said reliable icebreakers were essential to controlling northern waters and to
maintaining American research stations in Antarctica. But the Arctic was clearly the commands’
biggest concern, with the letter citing “climate change and increasing economic activity” as reasons
for upgrading the icebreaker fleet. With no current program aimed at upgrading ships and no new
ones planned, the letter said, “The nation’s icebreaking capability has diminished substantially and is
at risk of being unable to support our national interests in the Arctic regions.”
Canada is strengthening its claim to artic waters, and the United States needs to
respond in kind by building more icebreakers.
CBC News 2010 (August 20th, Battle for the Arctic heats up)
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2009/02/27/f-arctic-sovereignty.html
Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which Canada ratified in 2003, coastal countries have
the right to control access to the belt of shoreline along their coasts. Barring some exceptions, that belt
is 12 nautical miles (22.2 kilometres) wide. But the waterways dividing some of the islands in Canada's
north are often nearly 100 kilometres wide. That would seem to leave plenty of room down the middle
for foreign ships. Every country now controls the resources under its coastal waters up to 200 nautical
miles from its shore. Under the treaty, a country's territory can be expanded much further if you can
prove the ridges and rock formations underneath the water are connected to your continental shelf.
But it's a race against time. Countries have 10 years from when they sign the treaty to submit their
scientific data to a UN commission. Canada has just four years left — until 2013. Even if the world were
to agree that Canada's Arctic waters are internal, a country might still lose the right to exercise absolute
sovereignty over those waters if they include a "strait used for international navigation." Donald McRae,
a law professor at the University of Ottawa, says Canada must prove two things to win a sovereignty
claim over its Arctic waters. "It must be demonstrated that the waters are the internal waters of
Canada and that the waters of the Northwest Passage do not constitute an international strait," he
wrote in a 1995 paper published by the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee. Canada is on record as
saying it can satisfy both of those requirements. Over the years, Canada has cited several reasons or
precedents spelling out why its Arctic waters should be considered entirely "internal." An International
Court of Justice ruling in 1951 established that the 12-mile limit could be extended in some instances.
Countries could draw a straight baseline across coastal areas dotted with many islands and basically
declare that all the water between that line and the mainland is internal, even if it lies outside the 12mile limit. The ruling was about a case involving Norway, but some observers say Canada's geographic
case is similar. Occupied territory When it comes to Arctic sovereignty, Canada also points out that the
waters separating most of the islands in Canada's Arctic are frozen over most of the year. Inuit hunt and
spend large amounts of time working and even living on the ice — in effect turning it into an extension
of the land. We also boast one of the few year-round sites of human habitation close to the North Pole
at Alert, a military base at the northern tip of Ellesmere Island. A formidable presence, Alert is more
than 700 kilometres north of the nearest Inuit town at Grise Fiord (and more than 4,300 kilometres
north of Toronto, just to give an example of how far north it is.) But it is still 817 kilometres from the
Pole, and the Russians are edging closer on that front as well. Since 1994, they have staffed year-round a
research base called Ice Station Borneo on the deep Arctic ice, only 60 kilometres from the Pole. If ice
counts for Canada's Inuit when it comes to international negotiations over the Arctic, then it might
count for the Russian researchers as well. As for whether the waters of the Northwest Passage can be
considered an international strait under maritime law, one study reported that there were just 11
foreign transits between 1904 and 1984. Because it has not been an international navigation or shipping
route, many observers say it fails the required "use" test. But other analysts say Canada's sovereignty
case is weak, and it might lose if tested in international courts. Even worse, the critics say, is that Canada
hasn't been doing enough to declare and enforce its jurisdiction. That explains the Harper
government's moves to beef up Canada's presence in the North. During the 2005 election campaign,
the Conservatives promised to buy three huge, armed icebreakers to patrol the melting Arctic seas,
build a deep-water port, and establish an Arctic warfare training centre.
Icebreakers bolster heg in the face of Arctic competition
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, there are no direct military threats in
the Arctic basin. However, with the most recent missile testing, although seen as a failure, it may be
possible for missiles launched from North Korea to reach parts of Alaska. In response, the United
States has positioned significant missile tracking assets in the Aleutian Islands. Although at present, the
U.S. Coast Guard is not actively patrolling these waters for national defense, this may change if the
political climate in this region changes. It also appears that geopolitical competition in the Arctic is
under way and increasing. Indicators include Canadian initiatives toward a more overt Arctic presence,
aggressive Russian and Danish claims to the Arctic, and Danish-Canadian sovereignty disagreements
over Han Island. This competition will likely develop further if exploitation of oil and gas reserves
proves economical. U.S. national interests can only benefit from an active and capable presence in
this competitive environment. Icebreaking capability would strengthen U.S. defense posture in the
Arctic by (1) creating a visible presence and thereby providing a clear statement of national interest in
the region; (2) establishing an ability to monitor and react to events as necessary; and (3) preserving a
basic capability for direct military action if ever required. The U.S. Coast Guard’s military status would
offer advantages for protecting U.S. interests anywhere along the spectrum from peacetime
operations to conflict.
Ice breakers are necessary to achieve geopolitical goals
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
Projecting an active and influential presence in the polar regions requires that the United States be
able to access polar sites at various times of the year to accomplish multiple missions, reliably and at
will. Airborne, spaceborne, and submarine assets can only partially address these missions. The
presence of surface ships in ice-covered waters is necessitated by geopolitics. In recent
correspondence to this committee, the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department
of Homeland Security further validated that icebreaking capability is necessary to protect national
interests in the polar regions. Thus, the United States requires ships that can ensure access through
thick, multiyear ice in the northern and southern polar regions. Based on these broad missions, the
committee believes that the core of the icebreaking fleet must be the multimission ships operated by the
U.S. Coast Guard, a military organization.
Polar icebreakers are key to defense, security, sovereignty, economic, and scientific
initiatives to maintain hegemony
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
The committee believes that the nation continues to require a fleet that includes a minimum of three
multimission ships. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of an earlier study, the 1984 United
States Polar Icebreaker Requirements Study conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), NSF, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Department of
Defense, Maritime Administration, and Department of Transportation. It is also consistent with a 1990
Presidential Report to Congress that reiterated that polar icebreakers were instruments of national
policy and presence and that three (multimission) polar icebreakers were necessary to meet the
defense, security, sovereignty, economic, and scientific needs of the nation (together with a fourth,
dedicated research ship, the PALMER). The committee agrees with the findings of the two previous
reports. In addition, the committee notes that icebreaking needs have increased since 1990 and will
continue to increase into the foreseeable future. This projected increased demand is a direct effect of
a changing climate that facilites increased human presence in the Arctic.
A competent icebreaker fleet is key to U.S. sovereignty, relations, and global
commerce, including access to new passages for transit.
Carafano and Dean ’11 (Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom, Deputy Director,
Foreign, Defense, Trade, and HSP in the Gov. Relations Department at Heritage, James, James, States
News Service, “Breaking an Ice-Bound U.S. Policy: A Proposal for Operating in the Arctic”, Heritage
Foundation, Accessed through Lexis Nexis , DOA:7/10)
The United States is losing the race to protect its own interests in the Arctic region. It is important to
create a sensible policy to field an adequate fleet of U.S.-owned ice-breakers. An adequate, competent,
and sustainable fleet is the key to maintaining American presence in the region, protecting U.S.
sovereignty, working with allies, and rebuilding the nation's edge in global commerce. Making America
more competitive at a time when Washington is looking to cut corners in federal spending requires
creative solutions to demanding problems. The U.S. can jump-start its fleet by privatizing ice-breaker
operations and using ships as platforms for national security and federal scientific activities. This
initiative would save federal dollars by eliminating old, inadequate, and expensive-to-operate assets
while greatly expanding U.S. capacity to operate in the Arctic.
Global shipping patterns will change in the years ahead. Melting of Arctic ice will open up new
passages for transit, offering significantly shorter routes between Europe and North America and the
Pacific-perhaps up to 40 percent faster sailing times and significant fuel savings and emissions
reductions. Seasonal commercial lanes through the Arctic ice could appear within less than five years.
The ability to navigate the region will increase the search for and development of significant natural
resources including oil. Scientific research in the Arctic will also expand.
US must invest in Icebreakers in order to ensure sovereignty and security in the face of
regional threats
Ariel Cohen 10 (Ph.D, June 15, 2010, In conjunction with the heritage foundation, “From Russian
Competition to Natural Resources Access: Recasting U.S. Arctic Policy,”
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2421.pdf)
The Icebreaker Gap. To achieve the stated goals of its Arctic Region Policy, the United States needs an
increased maritime surface presence in the High North. Specifically, to protect U.S. sovereignty and
sovereign rights and to take “all the actions necessary to establish the outer limit of the continental
shelf appertaining to the United States,” the U.S. needs more polar icebreakers.Of America’s two
operational polar icebreakers, only the 16,000-ton, medium-ice-capable Healy (commissioned in 2000)
meets modern standards. The USCGC Polar Sea underwent a major refit to extend its operational life to
2014, and Congress recently allocated $62 million to return the USCGC Polar Star, the Polar Sea’s sister
ship, to service by 2013. 13 The U.S. icebreaker fleet contrasts starkly with Russia’s 24 polar-capable
icebreakers and Canada’s seven polarcapable icebreakers. While both Russia and Canada—and even
China— are budgeting for more icebreakers, the Obama Administration’s fiscal year (FY) 2011 budget
request includes no funding for new icebreakers.
Ice breakers are critical to enable US military operations in the Arctic
Ariel Cohen 10 (Ph.D, June 15, 2010, In conjunction with the heritage foundation, “From Russian
Competition to Natural Resources Access: Recasting U.S. Arctic Policy,”
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2421.pdf)
The United States needs to elevate the Arctic to a higher geopolitical priority and fully commit to
implementing the Arctic Region Policy. The Arctic Interagency Policy Committee (AIPC) should have full
responsibility for Arctic policy coordination, although it should not allow environmental and climate
change issues to dominate the agenda. To advance U.S. sovereign territorial rights in the High North,
the area inside the Arctic Circle, Congress should allocate funding to acquire additional icebreakers
and to increase the number of Coast Guard forward operating locations (FOLs) on the North Slope and
in western Alaska. In the international realm, the U.S. should expand dialogue with members of the
Arctic Council, including Russia, on cooperating in the High North through the Arctic Policy Group (APG).
However, the U.S. should oppose Russia’s territory grab without joining the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also called the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST). The U.S. should raise the Arctic as
a priority on NATO’s agenda and explore an agreement with Canada on joint management of navigation,
security, and commercial exploitation of hydrocarbons in the Northwest Passage. Finally, Congress
should authorize expanded oil exploration and production in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR)
and other promising Arctic areas to increase the national energy supply.
Failure to bolster US military capabilities in the Arctic causes US to fall behind
geostrategically; leads to Arctic nuclear wars
Ariel Cohen 10 (Ph.D, June 15, 2010, In conjunction with the heritage foundation, “From Russian
Competition to Natural Resources Access: Recasting U.S. Arctic Policy,”
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2421.pdf)
Russian Militarization of the Arctic. The military is an important dimension of Moscow’s Arctic push.
The policy calls for creating “general purpose military formations drawn from the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation” as well as “other troops and military formations [most importantly, border units]
in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, capable of ensuring security under various military and
political circumstances.” 28 These formations will be drawn from the armed forces and from the “power
ministries” (e.g., the Federal Security Service, Border Guard Service, and Internal Ministry). Above all,
the policy calls for a coast guard to patrol Russia’s Arctic waters and estuaries. Russia views the High
North as a major staging area for a potential nuclear confrontation with the United States and has
steadily expanded its military presence in the Arctic since 2007. This has included resuming air patrols
over the Arctic, including strategic bomber flights. 29 During 2007 alone, Russian bombers penetrated
Alaska’s 12-mile air defense zone 18 times. 30 The Russian Navy is expanding its presence in the Arctic
for the first time since the end of the Cold War, increasing the operational radius of the Northern Fleet’s
submarines. Russia is also reorienting its military strategy to meet threats to the country’s interests in
the Arctic, particularly with regard to its continental shelf. 31
Nuclearization of the Arctic makes Arctic war inevitable
General Assembly First Committee 12 (I. Militarization of the Arctic II. International Migration III.
Combating Cyber Terrorism, http://www.ubcmun.org/downloads/Backgrounds2012/
General_Assembly.pdf)
Throughout the years, beginning with the work of the Seabed Committee in 1968 and later during the
nine-year duration of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations
General Assembly (UN GA) has been actively engaged in encouraging and guiding the development and
eventual adoption of the Law of the Sea Convention. 49 Today, it continues to be engaged in this
process, by monitoring developments as they relate to the Convention and providing assistance to
States, when called for, in either the ratification or the implementation process. The goal of the UN GA
is to help States to better understand and implement the Convention in order to utilize their marine
resources in an environment relatively free of conflict and conducive to development, safeguarding the
rule of law in the oceans. In this context, the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS)
of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs helps to coordinate activities and programs in the area of
marine affairs. 50 It is active in assisting and advising States in the integration of the marine sector in
their development planning. It also responds to requests for information and advice on the legal,
economic and political aspects of the Convention and its implications for States.51 Such information is
used by States during the ratification process, in the management of the marine sector of their
economies and in the development of a national sea-use policy. 52 The United Nations also gives
assistance to the two newly created institutions - the International Seabed Authority and the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. 53 Other than the UN, member countries have taken
action to prevent further conflagration of tensions. The Canadian Pugwash Group issued a call in 2007
for an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (ANWFZ) which will follow the guide for NWFZ established by
the UN General Assembly in 1975. 54 While nuclear weapons are not the only threat to peace in the
region, they are the most potent.
Arctic War Bad
High risk of Arctic conflict—multiple nations are ramping up their military and
economic presence in the region to guarantee control
Hart et al. ’12 Andrew Hart, doctoral candidate at the University of Colorado, Bruce Jones, Senior
Fellow and Director of the Managing Global Order Initiative at Brookings and NYU’s Center on
International Cooperation, and David Steven, Senior Fellow at NYU’s Center on International
Cooperation and leads MGO’s Geopolitics of Scarcity Project, “Chill Out: Why Cooperation is Balancing
Conflict Among Major Powers in the New Arctic,” Brookings, May 2012,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/30%20arctic%20cooperation%20jon
es/30%20arctic%20cooperation%20jones.pdf
With so much at stake, interest in the Arctic is not only commercial, but once again strategic . While some scientists
now predict the region will experience largely ice-free summers within twenty years, 31 in the short term, navigation will pass through a series
of new maritime choke points in the Bering Sea and in Canada’s waterways. 32 Control
of Arctic navigation confers
important political, economic and military leverage. There are also concerns that competition for
energy reserves will become militarized, with U.S. maritime strategy identifying the potential for
“competition and conflict for access and natural resources.” 33 The United States and Canada have long clashed over
the legal status of the Northwest Passage. Shortly after his election in 2006, the Canadian Prime Minister promised to “assert Canada’s
jurisdiction over the islands, waterways and resources in the Arctic”, 34 and argued that sovereignty had to be earned by “having planes in the
air, ships in the sea and, most importantly, boots on the ground.” 35 Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy of 2011 takes a similar, if somewhat less
confrontational, line. 36 Russian
sabre rattling has aroused the greatest fears. In 2007, Russian explorer and
Presidential Envoy for the Arctic, Artur Chilingarov, led an expedition that planted a flag on the Arctic sea
bed. He told the media that “the North Pole is an extension of the Russian coastal shelf.” 37 In 2008, the
head of the Russian navy saw the potential for a future “redistribution of power [in the Arctic], up to armed
intervention.” 38 A year later, Russia’s new Arctic policy underlined the importance of securing sovereignty over the country’s strategic
resource base in the region and of ensuring ‘exclusive’ control over the Northern Sea Route. 39 Reacting to the building ill-will, the Center for a
New American Security quipped that “the only thing in the Arctic melting faster than the northern ice cap is the international comity.” 40 A
military reaction to increased tensions is now well underway. Although the classified nature of many decisions
hampers observers from making a sound assessment of the evolving military balance, each of the five major Arctic States (U.S.,
Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia) is either rebuilding its Arctic capabilities or planning to do so in the near
future. 41 In September 2011, Russia announced plans to deploy two brigades to the Arctic. 42 It has also ordered three nuclear and six
diesel ice-breakers. 43 Russia has fired cruise missiles over the Arctic, resumed regular patrols of the region
for the first time since the break-up of the USSR, and announced plans to augment its naval surface
capabilities and its submarine force. 44,45 Canada is buying 65 F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft in part to
defend its Arctic sovereignty. 46 It is also expanding its Arctic fleet, building a flagship icebreaker that
should be launched in 2017, 47 and developing ground satellite stations to enhance its surveillance of the region. 48 Denmark is
establishing an Arctic Command that will eventually deploy F-16 aircraft to Greenland, while Norway
has recently moved its military headquarters to a disused Cold War base in the Arctic 49 and, in
building five frigates equipped with the Aegis combat system, has undertaken its largest ever military
expenditure. 50
A2: No Arctic War
Countries will massively bolster their military presence in the Arctic to protect their
interest and secure resources
Smith, Colonel U.S. Air Force, 10 (Reginald R. Smith , Oct 27, 2010
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-62/JFQ62_117-124_Smith.pdf “The Arctic: A New Partnership
Paradigm or the Next Cold War?”) DG
International state actors are far outpacing the United States in Arctic presence and preparedness for
what the future of the region may hold. The so-called Arctic Five nations of Canada, Denmark (via
Greenland), Norway (via Svalbard), Russia, and the United States all have sovereign coastlines in the
area. 27 The first four of the five nations are making obvious and in some cases aggressive
programmatic initiatives in preparation for their exploitation of Arctic opportunities. The promise of
vast, predominantly untapped resources and national security concerns is at the heart of these
international moves . Infrastructure improvements, fleet expansion, increased military presence, and
often conflicting territorial claims dominate the actions of the Arctic Five in extending the protection
of perceived national interests, sans the United States, which “has remained largely on the
sidelines.” 28 Via uncharacteristic political maneuvering, Canada has demonstrated significant strides in its Arctic
preparedness and has asserted its bold national Arctic policy through both rhetoric and action. In
reference to claims of sovereignty in the region, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper has frequently
declared, “Use it or lose it ,” illustrating a new, almost nationalistic fervor that resonates well with
the Canadian populace. 29 National impetus to support extended continental shelf claims and secure
economic interests has resulted in the allocation of $109 million for Arctic seabed scientific research
intended to be complete by 2014. 30 Similarly, Canada is expanding the existing deep-water docking port,
a project dating to 2009, into a $100 million naval base on Baffin Island. 31 Additional allocations include a
new $675 million icebreaker in 2010, establishment of a Canadian Forces winter fighting school in Resolute Bay near the
Northwest Passage, and an initiative to build six to eight ice hardened offshore patrol vessels, the first of which
will be delivered in 2014. 32 Presence and visibility in the Arctic have been bolstered by sponsorship of three
major sovereignty exercises annually, including the joint and combined Operation Nanook. 33
Incorporating air, land, and maritime forces to demonstrate and exercise operational capability in the
Arctic region, the purpose of these exercises is unequivocally “to project Canadian sovereignty in the
High Arctic.” 34 Canada also maintains a staunch position on the sovereignty of the Northwest Passage
as internal waters, a claim refuted by the United States, which contends these waters are international straits. 35
Similarly, Canada asserts overlapping territorial claims with the United States in the Beaufort Sea and the
maritime border between Alaska and Yukon, with Russia in conflicting extended continental shelf
claims, and with Denmark over Hans Island in the Nares Strait. 36 With its fleet of 12 existing icebreakers and the
programmed additions noted above; national level emphasis on planning, preparedness, and presence; and the legal basis granted as a
signatory to UNCLOS, Canada
appears to be well ahead of the United States in its ability to address vital
national interests in the Arctic. 37 Danish extensions into the realm of Arctic issues track along the major subject areas of
sovereignty and security, economic interests, and political activism. Denmark’s precarious tie to being one of the Arctic Five lies in Greenland,
historically a colonial possession whose relationship to the parent Denmark has evolved into the present-day status of self rule. Under
self
rule, Greenland is autonomous in many domestic respects but is still supported by Denmark in the
areas of “defense, foreign policy, sovereignty control, and other authority tasks,” providing the parent
country broad powers to deal with Arctic issues. 38 Denmark shares competing claims to the hotly contested Lomonosov
Ridge with both Canada and Russia, and all three countries believe the ridge is an extension of their continental
shelves and is rich in hydrocarbon reserves . 39 In an interesting dichotomy, Denmark and Canada are working in a joint
scientific venture to map their respective continental shelves despite the perceived encroachment by the Canadians into Danish-claimed Hans
Island waters. 40
In response to sovereignty concerns generated by Canadian and Russian moves and the
general increase in Arctic activity, Danish military forces are adapting by reorganizing and combining
their Greenland and Faroe Commands into a joint service Arctic Command and creating an Arctic
Response Force. 41 While neither of these moves will increase the size of the Danish forces appreciably, they nonetheless demonstrate
the emphasis Danes place on the region. 42 Force basing at both Thule Air Base in northwestern Greenland and
Station Nord in extreme northeastern Greenland, combined with $117 million in military upgrades in
country, use of combat aircraft for surveillance and sovereignty missions, and an impressive maritime
presence including RDN Vaedderen, one of a select few frigates in the world built to operate in Arctic
ice conditions, demonstrates credible Danish resolve and capability to exercise presence in the region.
43 Economically, Greenland and surrounding waters promise a resource-rich environment, with 2008 estimates ranking the area as 19 th out of
500 of the world’s largest potential oil-producing areas. In addition, receding
ice is exposing potential mining areas rich in
a number of minerals including large diamond reserves. 44 Leveraging both credible forces and a
possible economic boom, Danish international politics has improved the country’s standing in the Arctic arena. Through leadership
on the Arctic Council, organizing support for and brokering the Ilulissat Declaration, and assuming the lead for the Copenhagen Climate Change
Summit, Denmark has attempted to become a more influential political player in addressing international Arctic issues and appears to be well
on the road toward the ability to deal with vital national interests in the region. 45 Norway has capitalized on a concerted national planning and
preparation effort driving a number of key successful regional actions in preservation of its High North interests. As the second nation to submit
an extended continental shelf claim to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, it was the first such claim to be
recognized and approved. 46 This development, combined with skillful bilateral Russian engagement resulting in the resolution of a 40-year-old
border dispute in the Barents Sea, solidified Norway’s impressive Arctic maritime domain in international law. 47 The country quickly put this
success to work by opening up a new oil field in the western Barents Sea ahead of its Russian counterparts. 48 As articulated in Norway’s High
North Strategy, a whole-of-government approach characterizes the nation’s resolve to “exercise our authority [in the Arctic] in a credible,
consistent and predictable way.” 49 With largely successful diplomatic efforts and an ongoing commitment to bilateral and multilateral
cooperation, Norway
has also strengthened its military presence , demonstrating a northward shift in
strategic focus. A large portion of the armed forces, including its modern frigate fleet, jet fighter forces, and the army staff, has been
moved north with relocation of the joint headquarters inside the Arctic circle. 50 Oslo has also committed to buy 48 F–35
fighter aircraft and negotiated the addition of advanced air-to-sea missiles to the purchase. 51 This
action clearly demonstrates the nation’s stated objectives of enabling “Norway to exercise its
sovereign authority and . . . maintain its role in resource management [in the High North].” 52 Norway’s
strategy also underscores programs necessary to further develop the capacity to safeguard Nordic interests; coordinated research programs are
in force in both governmental and private sector institutions. 53 Anticipating the increase in maritime traffic through Norwegian exclusive
economic zone waters and following an aggressive development program, Norway
launched an experimental advanced
technology satellite to provide high-fidelity regional ship tracking . 54 The multifaceted and pragmatic approach to
Arctic policy issues, combined with advanced planning, strong presence, diplomatic efforts, and rule of law in approved continental shelf
extensions, has Norway well positioned to exploit and capitalize on opportunities in the Arctic. With the largest swath of Arctic territory in the
world, state policy and action have garnered Russia the reputation of “the most determined and assertive player in the [region].” 55 Economic
interests, infrastructure and transportation means, and a formidable Denmark has attempted to become a more influential politica player in
addressing international Arctic issues and appears to be well on the road toward the ability to deal with vital national interests in the region
U.S. Coast Guard (George Degener) USCGC Alder transits iceberg field above Arctic Circle during Operation Nanookndupre s s.ndu.edu issue 62,
3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 121 SMITH military presence illustrate the advanced state of Russian preparedness for Arctic opportunities. Both major
policy documents, the
National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 (published May 2009)
and the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic in the Period up to 2020
and Beyond (adopted September 2008) strongly articulate the critical importance of the region as its
“top strategic resource base.” 56 This stance appears well founded, as one-fifth of the country’s gross domestic
product and exports totaling 22 percent are generated in the Arctic. Similarly, estimates of up to 90
percent of Russia’s oil and gas reserves are in the Arctic region; expansion, exploitation, and
protection of these resources are deemed “crucially important for Russia’s further wealth, social and
economic development and competitiveness on global markets.” 57 To gain access to these lucrative riches, Russia
was the first to file an extended continental shelf claim in 2001. However, the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
determined there was insufficient evidence to approve the claim. 58 As a result, an ambitious research effort including use of the Northern
Fleet submarine forces is under way to complete the geographical studies necessary to support the claim. These efforts are to be completed by
2015. 59 Russia
appears to perceive itself as the leading Arctic power with the most to gain, a perception
supported by impressive plans and resources. 60 It operates the largest icebreaker fleet in the world: 20 ships, 7 of which are
nuclear powered. 61 Nonetheless, many of these ships are reaching the end of their service lives, which will result in significantly reduced
icebreaking capability by 2020. 62 However, continued investment in new icebreaking technology and partnership with the Russian private
sector drove the deployment of new double-acting tankers and cargo vessels. These vessels employ azimuthal pod propulsion with the ability to
cruise bow-first in open water for good performance and sternfirst in ice conditions using its reinforced icebreaking aft hull. The newest such
vessel was commissioned in 2010, bringing the fleet of the state-owned shipping company, Sovcomflot, up to three, each with a 70,000-ton
capacity. 63 Additional capability in the form of diesel-electric icebreakers is intended to replace that lost as the Soviet-era nuclear fleet ages.
64 Maritime fleet upgrades are interwoven with planned infrastructure support in the Transport Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2030,
which includes upgrades of existing Arctic ports and new development on both Russia’s regional oceans and its inland waterways. 65 Also key
to the transportation strategy are the Northern Sea Route and Northeast Passage, a number of straits in and between the Russian Arctic
archipelagos that Moscow claims as sovereign internal waters to be administered according to state regulations. Among these regulations is the
requirement for all ships to provide advance notice of passage and apply for guidance through the route; implied here is also the payment of a
fee for services rendered, a sea-based toll way of sorts. 66
In defense and protection of the border and resource
areas, Russia continues to bolster military presence and capability in the Arctic.
In addition to the Northern
Fleet, whose naval military capabilities run the full gamut of surface and subsurface operations, Moscow has created the Federal Security
Service Coastal Border Guard. 67 Additional activities in the border and coastal areas include development of control infrastructure and
equipment upgrades for the border guard, implementation of an integrated oceanic monitoring system for surface vessels, and a number of
equipment and weapons testing and deployment initiatives. 68 Many of these initiatives demonstrate presence and resolve, such as the 2007
launch of cruise missiles over the Arctic, additional Northern Fleet exercises in 2008, and the resumption of Arctic aerial and surface patrols not
seen since the end of the Cold War. 69 While many of these actions may appear provocative, Russia has also asserted its commitment to
working within the framework of international law, participated actively in the Arctic Council and other international bodies, and expressed
interest in partnership in the region, particularly in the area of SAR. 70
In the aggregate, Russia emerges as among the
most prepared of Arctic nations for the opportunities available and may well be poised to gain early
regional commercial and military supremacy with the goal of similar successes in the international
political arena. 71 Russian commitment to multilateral venues, along with the demonstrated attitudes of other Arctic nations, presents
the opportunity for U.S. partnership in the region. Opportunities for Partnership Each of the Arctic Five participates in a number of multilateral
political venues and has expressed interest in partnership to address current and emerging regional issues. The Arctic Council, one such venue,
was formed in 1996 as a high-level membership forum to engender collaboration and cooperation on issues in the region; it has no legal
authority through charter but has functioned well to promote multinational visibility and study on Arctic issues by all the Arctic states and
indigenous peoples. 72 The 2009 report Arctic Maritime Shipping Assessment, a combined effort of a council working group from Canada,
Finland, and the United States, identified many areas ripe for cooperation, including development of hydrographic data and charting,
harmonization of regulatory shipping guidelines, and the critical lack of SAR capability in the region. 73 Russia has taken the lead on SAR within
the council for developing an international cooperation plan. With the Obama administration’s intent to reset relations with Russia by seeking
areas where the two nations can work together, SAR may prove to be a unifying construct beneficial to all the Arctic nations, especially the
United States. 74 Initial groundbreaking work on the issue occurred in December 2009 in key to the transportation strategy are the Northern
Sea Route and Northeast Passage, a number of straits in and between the Russian Arctic archipelagos that Moscow claims as sovereign internal
waters Navy SEAL freefalls from Austrian C−130 above Arctic Circle during NATO winter exercise Cold Response 2010 U.S. Navy (Ashley
Myers)122 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupre s s.ndu.edu FEATURES | The Arctic Washington, DC, with additional discussions in Moscow
the following February under an Arctic Council resolution to develop a SAR agreement. The archetype for a U.S.-Russian effort is thus coming
into being. 75 Regional synchronization of SAR assets would address one of many U.S. critical capability shortfalls; the
United States
has no Coast Guard bases on the northern coast of Alaska (the closest is 1,000 miles south), and the closest
deep-water port is Dutch Harbor, over 800 miles south of the Arctic circle. 76 Another multilateral collaboration
was the Danish-led Ilulissat Initiative, which resulted in the unanimous Ilulissat Declaration. In the declaration, all the Arctic Five
nations affirmed that “an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean . . . notably, the law
of the sea [UNCLOS] provides for important rights and obligations [and] we remain committed to this
legal framework. . . . [UNCLOS] provides a solid foundation for responsible management by the five coastal states and other users. We,
therefore, see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal scheme to govern the Arctic Ocean.” 77
Russia Dominance Bad
With resources from the arctic, Russia is poised to dominate the world’s oil and gas
markets
Carlson, Jon D.., Hubach, Chris., Long, Joe., Minteer, Kellen. and Young, Shane. 2009 (April 02
The Scramble for the Arctic: The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Extending
National Seabed Claims) http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p363540_index.html
There are many reasons for the Russian Federation to maximize their claim, as there is for any country
with potential for expansion. What makes the Russian Arctic claims unique, however, is the scope of
their potential. In 1999, the head of Russia's Ministry of the Environment, Viktor Orlov, estimated that
there are 88 billion metric tonnes of hydrocarbon resources within the areas of the Arctic they already
own and an additional 9 to 10 billion tonnes in the claims Russia has submitted to the UN
(Куколевский & Шкуренко, 2007). Russia is already a world leader in the production of natural gas and
oil exports. They hold the largest proven natural gas reserves in the world, followed by Qatar and Iran,
and they produce more natural gas than any other country in the world (BP Statistical Review, 2008). In
oil, they are out produced only by Saudi Arabia by a mere 1.8 million metric tonnes, which is within
99.6% of Saudi Arabia's total output. Russia also has the 7 th largest proven oil reserves, trailing behind
the major OPEC members Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. If
Russia's proven reserves are combined with their estimated potential hydrocarbon resources in the
Arctic, Russia has the potential to dominate the oil and gas markets in the near future, and become
especially dominant in Europe, as they are a major supplier to Eastern Europe. Within the next 20 to
30 years, estimates predict enough melting of glacial ice to allow for the extraction and use of the Arctic
resources, which is a good time frame for Russia. However, the estimates of resources in the Arctic
could be far off, as the data on the Russian Arctic territory only covers between 9 to 12% of seabed
geological features, which may not be an efficient estimator of overall resources, in either over- or
under-estimation (cf., Yenikeyeff & Krysiek, 2007)
US Sea Lanes Advantage
Ice Blocking Now
Ice blocks critical sea routes to Alaska
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
During winter, the entire Alaskan northern coast and a substantial portion of the Alaskan western
coast are ice bound. In summer the Arctic sea-ice margin retreats northward, although not uniformly
or predictably, usually creating open waters along the entire coastline for several weeks to several
months. Summer sea-ice extent is expected to continue to retreat over the next several decades,
creating more broken ice along the Alaskan coastline.Economic activity is predicted to increase and
move northward as a result of sea-ice retreat. Those deploying fishing fleets, cruise ships, mining, and
the associated ore transit ships, as well as petroleum recovery and tanker ship transport, anticipate
increased operations in the region. When current orders for ice-strengthened tankers have been filled,
the worldwide fleet of these vessels will double in number. Ice retreat increases the cost-effectiveness
of using the Northern Sea Route (primarily north of Russia) and the Northwest Passage (primarily north
of Canada) for transporting petroleum, ore, and cargo. Both routes include U.S. Arctic waters.
US Losing Trade Routes Now
China’s currently does not have clear policy defining their action in the arctic, but
currently lean towards taking action
Campbell, USCC Policy Analyst on Foreign Affairs and Energy, 12 (Caitlin, April 13, 2012. “China and
the Arctic: Objectives and Obstacles” in the “U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff
Research Report” http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2012/China-and-the-Arctic_Apr2012.pdf)
High-level officials in China have yet to make any significant policy announcements regarding the
Arctic region. China’s Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Hu Zhengyue stated in 2009 that “China
does not have an Arctic strategy,”2 and no significant policies have been announced since then.
However, a few mid-level officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Oceanic
Administration have commented publicly on China’s interests and activities related to the Arctic. Most
of these official remarks or writings emphasize China’s interests in environmental and climate change
developments in the region. Official commentary has also stressed that Arctic states must ensure that
the Arctic remains a global commons, with non-Arctic states having access to the region and its
resources.3 To date, official Chinese comments on the Arctic have been limited to noting the
importance of the Arctic to China and the value of open access to the region for all. At a 2009 Arctic
forum in Norway, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Hu emphasized that the Arctic impacts China’s
environment, economy, society, and consequently, the trajectory of its sustainable development,
noting, “the government of China is, therefore, greatly concerned” about Arctic issues.4 Hu also
expressed that China respected the territorial rights of Arctic countries, but also warned that “Arctic
countries should protect the balance between the interests of states with shorelines in the Arctic
Ocean and the shared interests of the international community” in settling territorial claims. Some
western analysts suggest that this comment reflects Chinese anxieties about being denied access to
Arctic waterways by Arctic countries. This is reflected also in a 2010 article published by China’s State
Oceanic Administration, which concludes that the Arctic is the “inherited wealth of all humankind…The
Arctic Ocean is not the backyard of any country and is not the ‘private property’ of the Arctic Ocean
littoral states. As with Europe’s other oceans, under the framework of international law, every country
in the world has an equal right to exploit the Arctic Ocean.”5
The US is falling behind in the race for trade routes
Koring, International affairs and security correspondent ’11 (Paul, winner of Amnesty International’s
award for human rights journalism and the Globe’s Richard Doyle award for reporting September, The
Globe and Mail “Canadian icebreaker joins the polar parade; Massive loss of ice cover has made High
Arctic passages much easer and stoked the race for trade routes” lexis)
Russia With four nuclear-powered leviathans, Russia remains the unchallenged superpower of Arctic
icebreaking. Another half-dozen smaller, conventionally powered icebreakers round out the fleet.
Moscow just ordered six more, including three advanced nuclear-powered versions. The nuclearpowered Artika class, 160 metres long and 25,000 tonnes, dwarfs everything else in the Arctic. United
States Like Canada, the U.S. Coast Guard is awaiting long-promised icebreaker replacements that are
still marooned on the drawing board. America's two largest icebreakers; the Polar Star and Polar Sea,
both need replacing. For now, the Coast Guard's relatively new, powerful and sophisticated icebreaker
Healy is America's icebreaking flagship. China China's Xue Long (Snow Dragon) caught Canada by
surprise - and exposed the inadequacy of its surveillance when it appeared off Tuktoyaktuk, far inside
Canada's claimed territorial waters, in 1999. China's polar ambitions seem unbounded. Beijing wants a
seat at the Arctic Council table, has developed a powerful polar presence and is exploring new export
trade routes.
Arctic key – growing trade, the US needs to catch up
Hambling, ’12 (David, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2012/jan/11/weatherwatch-arcticicebreakers-trade, January ’11 “Weatherwatch: Trade traffic in Arctic waterways is increasing”)
As Arctic ice gets thinner, you could expect that icebreakers would become less important. However,
the volume of traffic in Arctic waterways is now increasing, and with it the demand for ships that can
navigate ice-covered waters. President Putin of Russia has suggested that the Arctic sea could overtake
the Suez Canal in trade volume, as it offers a short route from Europe to the Asian Pacific, and he
wants more icebreakers to escort convoys. In winter, the ice cover in the Arctic Ocean can be up to two
and a half metres thick. Nuclear powered icebreakers can force a passage through this at up to 10 knots,
leaving a path clear for other vessels. Thinner ice in other seasons or farther south can be traversed
more quickly. Ships trapped in ice can only be rescued by icebreakers, and they are also the only
vessels able to help with oil spills in frozen conditions. The Russians have seven nuclear icebreakers and
proposals to build three more. They also possess several non-nuclear icebreakers. The US Coast Guard
has just three heavy (non-nuclear) icebreakers, and there are plans to decommission two of them. Mead
Treadwell, Lieutenant Governor of Alaska, fears that the US is being left behind. He wants more Coast
Guard icebreakers, not just for emergency rescue, but also to boost international trade . "A couple of
icebreakers at $750m (£484m) or so apiece can actually open up a major sea route for global
commerce," he said.
China is preparing to expand into the Arctic
States News Service 5/9. May 9, 2012. “COAST GUARD: U.S. SHOULD HAVE 3 HEAVY, 3 MEDIUM
ICEBREAKERS ADMIRAL PAPP OPEN TO "LEASING OPPORTUNITIES" BEFORE FUTURE SHIPS ARE BUILT, ALASKA
"LUCKED OUT" THAT HEALY WAS AVAILABLE FOR NOME MISSION.”
http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/auth/checkbrowser.do?rand=0.6300832076938608&cookieState=0&ipcoun
ter=1&bhcp=1
China Prepares for an Ice-free Arctic received
China’s expanding polar research capabilities, describes its commercial
interests in summertime trans-Arctic voyages, and comments on the nation’s diverse views on
engagement with the Arctic states. 6 Many others see China’s real interests in terms of access to the
region’s immense natural-resource wealth.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s March 2010 release of a report titled
global media attention. This report reviews
Trade Route Conflict Now
All major powers are running to claim trade routes
Koring, International affairs and security correspondent ’11 (Paul, winner of Amnesty International’s
award for human rights journalism and the Globe’s Richard Doyle award for reporting September, The
Globe and Mail “Canadian icebreaker joins the polar parade; Massive loss of ice cover has made High
Arctic passages much easer and stoked the race for trade routes” lexis)
Meanwhile, other nations, notably China, South Korea and Russia, all with an eye on Arctic trade
routes as well as polar research, have built and launched big icebreakers. Russia has added to its
already world-beating icebreaker fleet. "These other nations get it in terms of climate change," said
Michael Byers, referring to the icebreaker building boom and the concerted effort to get vessels into the
High Arctic for research. "It should send a strong signal to Canada about the seriousness of these other
countries," added Prof. Byers, who holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International
Law at the University of British Columbia. But the race to the Arctic is only partially about research.
Untold oil wealth, the prospect of new, if seasonal, trade routes have turned the top of the world into
the 21st-century version of The Great Game, with major powers jockeying for influence. Exxon anted
up billions for risky Arctic Russian drilling rights this week, and the large tankers - escorted by
(unneeded) icebreakers - sailed the shortcut across the top of Russia this summer.
Ice Breakers Key
Developing sea lanes of transit through the Arctic creates massive cost reductions in
shipping—spills over globally
Scott G. Borgerson, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former
Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security
Implications of Global Warming,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63222/scott-g-borgerson/arctic-meltdown#
An even greater prize will be the new sea-lanes created by the great melt. In the nineteenth century,
an Arctic seaway represented the Holy Grail of Victorian exploration, and the seafaring British Empire spared no
expense in pursuing a shortcut to rich Asian markets. Once it became clear that the Northwest Passage was ice clogged and impassable, the
Arctic faded from power brokers' consciousness. Strategic interest in the Arctic was revived during World War II and the Cold War, when
nuclear submarines and intercontinental missiles turned the Arctic into the world's most militarized maritime space, but it is only now that the
routes so coveted by nineteenth century explorers are becoming a reality. The shipping
shortcuts of the Northern Sea Route (over Eurasia) and the Northwest Passage (over North America) would cut
existing oceanic transit times by days, saving shipping companies-not to mention navies and smugglersthousands of miles in travel. The Northern Sea Route would re duce the sailing distance between
Rotterdam and Yokohama from 11,200 nautical miles-via the current route, through the Suez Canal-to only 6,500
nautical miles, a savings of more than 40 percent. Likewise, the Northwest Passage would a voyage from
Seattle to Rotterdam by 2,000 nautical miles, making it nearly 25 percent shorter than trim the
current route, via the Panama Canal. Taking into account canal fees, fuel costs, and other variables that determine freight rates, these
shortcuts could cut the cost of a single voyage by a large container ship by as much as 20 percent-from
approximately $17.5 million to $14 million-saving the shipping industry billions of dollars a year. The savings would be even
greater for the megaships that are unable to fit through the Panama and Suez Canals and so currently
sail around the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn. Moreover, these Arctic routes would also allow
commercial and military vessels to avoid sailing through politically unstable Middle Eastern waters
and the pirate-infested South China Sea. An Iranian provocation in the Strait of Hormuz, such as the one that occurred in
Arctic sea
January, would be considered far less of a threat in an age of trans-Arctic shipping. Arctic shipping could also dramatically affect global trade
patterns. In 1969, oil companies sent the S.S. Manhattan through the Northwest Passage to test whether it was a viable route for moving Arctic
oil to the Eastern Seaboard. The Manhattan completed the voyage with the help of accompanying icebreakers, but oil companies soon deemed
the route impractical and prohibitively expensive and opted instead for an Alaskan pipeline. But today such voyages are fast becoming
economically feasible. As
soon as marine insurers recalculate the risks involved in these voyages, trans-Arctic
shipping will become commercially viable and begin on a large scale. In an age of just-in-time delivery,
and with increasing fuel costs eating into the profits of shipping companies, reducing long-haul sailing
distances by as much as 40 percent could usher in a new phase of globalization. Arctic routes would
force further competition between the Panama and Suez Canals, thereby reducing current canal tolls;
shipping chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca would no longer dictate global shipping patterns;
and Arctic seaways would allow for greater international economic integration. When the ice recedes
enough, likely within this decade, a marine highway directly over the North Pole will materialize. Such
a route, which would most likely run between Iceland and Alaska's Dutch Harbor, would connect shipping megaports in the
North Atlantic with those in the North Pacific and radiate outward to other ports in a hub-and-spoke
system. A fast lane is now under development between the Arctic port of Murmansk, in Russia, and the Hudson Bay port of Churchill, in
Canada, which is connected to the North American rail network.
Icebreakers open up vital trade and commerce routes that are vital to the US economy
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
Within the role of maritime mobility, the U.S. Coast Guard facilitates maritime commerce and
eliminates interruptions and impediments to the efficient and economical movement of goods and
people, while maximizing recreational access to and enjoyment of the water. The U.S. marine
transportation system is a critical component of the nation’s economy, and the U.S. Coast Guard has
primary responsibility for managing waterways and ports. U.S. Coast Guard cutters, boats, and
personnel maintain the aids to navigation system, marking navigable areas and obstructions with buoys,
fixed structures, and a variety of audible, visual, and electronic signals. Notices to Mariners provide uptodate navigation information on system exceptions, special events, et cetera. The U.S. Coast Guard
operates vessel traffic services (VTS) using AIS technology, tailored to the needs of particular port areas,
to monitor and direct waterborne traffic. VTSs promote the efficient movement of vessels, seek to
prevent collisions and groundings, and enhance the security of critical port areas. Small icebreakers and
ice strengthened cutters in the Great Lakes and the northeastern United States assist vessels and
facilitate their movement in port areas and along the St. Lawrence Seaway system. Oversight of bridge
design standards and drawbridge openings ensures that waterway transportation needs are
accommodated. Polar icebreaking to facilitate maritime commerce, scientific exploration, and national
security activities is included in the goal of maritime mobility. The role of vessel assistance, which was
formally instituted by a 1936 Executive Order (Appendix C) and what the U.S. Coast Guard has termed
“domestic” icebreaking, has historically been confined to the Great Lakes and northeastern United
States. Similar routine icebreaking services have never developed in Alaska due to the rarity and limited
seasonal nature of commercial shipping in ice-affected area, other than occasional events such as the
Prudhoe Bay sealifts mentioned above. New commercial ventures, exemplified by the Red Dog Mine
north of the Bering Strait, and planned offshore North Slope oil and gas development, may result in
pressure for a capable icebreaker presence in the spring and fall “shoulder” seasons. From a business
perspective, the presence of an icebreaker operating in the general area could serve to mitigate the
risks of unpredictable ice and weather conditions and improve the economics of projects subject to
seasonal shipping limits. This would be a natural extension of the rationale for U.S. Coast Guard
domestic icebreaking
Icebreakers key to defense readiness, polar environmental monitoring, and trade
waterways
O’Rourke, specialist in naval affairs, 6/14. Ronald O’Rourke “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf
***[The study] concludes that future capability and capacity gaps will significantly impact four [Coast Guard]
mission areas in the Arctic: Defense Readiness, Ice Operations, Marine Environmental Protection,
and Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security. These mission areas address the protection of important
national interests in a geographic area where other nations are actively pursuing their own national
goals.... The common and dominant contributor to these significant mission impacts is the gap in
polar icebreaking capability. The increasing obsolescence of the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet will further exacerbate mission
performance gaps in the coming years.... The gap in polar icebreaking capacity has resulted in a lack of at-sea
time for crews and senior personnel and a corresponding gap in training and leadership. In addition to
providing multi-mission capability and intrinsic mobility, a helicopter-capable surface unit would eliminate the need for acquiring an
expensive shore-based infrastructure that may only be needed on a seasonal or occasional basis. The
most capable surface unit
would be a polar icebreaker. Polar icebreakers can transit safely in a variety of ice conditions and
have the endurance to operate far from logistics bases. The Coast Guard’s polar icebreakers have conducted a wide
range of planned and unscheduled Coast Guard missions in the past. Polar icebreakers possess the ability to carry large
numbers of passengers, cargo, boats, and helicopters. Polar icebreakers also have substantial
command, control, and communications capabilities. The flexibility and mobility of polar icebreakers
would assist the Coast Guard in closing future mission performance gaps effectively.... 17 For examples of
bill and report language in recent years relating to the study of Coast Guard missions and capabilities for operations in high latitude areas, see
Appendix C. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service 9 Existing
capability and capacity gaps are expected to significantly impact future Coast Guard performance in two Antarctic mission areas: Defense
Readiness and Ice Operations. Future
gaps may involve an inability to carry out probable and easily projected
mission requirements, such as the McMurdo resupply, or readiness to respond to less-predictable events. By
their nature, contingencies requiring the use of military capabilities often occur quickly. As is the case in
the Arctic, the deterioration of the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet is the primary driver for this
significant mission impact. This will further widen mission performance gaps in the coming years. The
recently issued Naval Operations Concept 2010 requires a surface presence in both the Arctic and
Antarctic. This further exacerbates the capability gap left by the deterioration of the icebreaker
fleet.... The significant deterioration of the Coast Guard icebreaker fleet and the emerging mission demands to meet future functional
requirements in the high latitude regions dictate that the Coast Guard acquire material solutions to close the capability gaps.... To meet the
Coast Guard mission functional requirement, the Coast Guard icebreaking
fleet must be capable of supporting the
following missions: • Arctic North Patrol. Continuous multimission icebreaker presence in the Arctic.
• Arctic West Science. Spring and summer science support in the Arctic. • Antarctic, McMurdo Station resupply. Planned deployment
for break-in, supply ship escort, and science support. This mission, conducted in the Antarctic summer, also requires
standby icebreaker support for backup in the event the primary vessel cannot complete the mission. • Thule Air Base Resupply and Polar
Region Freedom of Navigation Transits. Provide vessel escort operations in support of the Military Sealift Command’s Operation Pacer Goose;
then complete any Freedom of Navigation exercises in the region. In addition, the joint Naval Operations Concept establishes the following
mission requirements: • Assured access and assertion of U.S.
this mission requires continuous icebreaker presence in both Polar Regions.
policy in the Polar Regions. The current
demand for
Drilling procedure in the Arctic requires the aid of icebreakers
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
It is not possible to accurately predict the level of oil and gas activity that will occur in the U.S. Arctic
over the next decade because oil prices, exploration, and development activity onshore and State of
Alaska offshore areas adjacent to the OCS and in the Canadian Beaufort Sea influence the rate and level
of activity. However, the U.S. Minerals Management Service (MMS) anticipates that between one and
three exploratory wells will be drilled annually over the next five years (Elmer Danenberger, personal
communication). To support resource exploration efforts, the MMS anticipates multiple geophysical
(seismic) surveys to occur in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas over the next several years during the
open-water seasons. Up to four seismic vessels could be operating in any one year. In addition, MMS
expects that up to two ice-reinforced floating drilling units will be operating simultaneously in the
Beaufort and/or Chukchi Sea during open-water conditions. Drilling operations could extend into the
early fall freeze-up conditions. Each drilling operation would be supported by an icebreaker to provide
ice management during drilling and to assist in demobilization to “over-wintering” harbors at the end
of the drilling season. Additionally, up to two ice class vessels and icereinforced barges could be
staged in the Beaufort Sea during drilling to support oil spill response operations.
New icebreakers key to trade routes and jobs – now is key time to maintain presence
in artic
Young 2011 Don U.S. Rep. –testified in hearing to examine the U.S. Coast Guard’s role and operations
in the Arctic.”: U.S. Subcommittee: USCG Needs Icebreakers BY GCAPTAIN STAFF ON DECEMBER 4, 2011
http://gcaptain.com/u-s-subcommittee-uscg-icebreakers/
“As the sole Arctic representative in the United States, I have made it my mission to ensure that we
move decisively to protect our interests in the high latitudes. The Northwest Passage is becoming an
increasingly viable shipping route and could soon offer a more economical route between the Pacific
and Atlantic oceans than the Panama Canal. Additionally the combination of improved technology and
easier access to the continental shelf in the Arctic has allowed us greater access to vast deposits of
valuable natural resources. The Arctic offers jobs, energy, and money, three things this country
desperately needs right now. “While we have been given this great opportunity, it does not come
without competition,” Young continued. “Other nations are increasing their claims in the Arctic daily.
We need to maintain an active presence there to protect our waters and our national sovereignty.”
New ice breakers are key to trade – US interests
Venzke Retired Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard ‘9 (Norm, icebreaker sailor, severed on four
icebreakers, March, http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/icebreakers.pdf, “We Need More
Icebreakers!”)
Operations in the western Arctic involve the fulfilling of statutory requirements and the need for both
research and a national presence in an area of increased international interest. Apparently, the Healy is
deemed adequate for the current level of operations. But she is only one ship, not immune from
damage and delays and can only operate in one place at a given time. Given that diminishing ice will
result in increased foreign shipping in the United States’ area of interest, it’s obvious that an
additional icebreaker will be needed. Now is the time to plan for that vessel with recognition that even
more might be required to support our future requirements. Presumably, the Canadian Coast Guard
will continue providing icebreaker support for the annual Thule (Greenland) Air Base resupply as long as
it is needed. If not, additional icebreaker support would be necessary for that mission.
A competent icebreaker fleet is key to U.S. sovereignty, relations, and global
commerce, including access to new passages for transit.
Carafano and Dean ’11 (Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom, Deputy Director,
Foreign, Defense, Trade, and HSP in the Gov. Relations Department at Heritage, James, James, States
News Service, “Breaking an Ice-Bound U.S. Policy: A Proposal for Operating in the Arctic”, Heritage
Foundation, Accessed through Lexis Nexis , DOA:7/10)
The United States is losing the race to protect its own interests in the Arctic region. It is important to
create a sensible policy to field an adequate fleet of U.S.-owned ice-breakers. An adequate, competent,
and sustainable fleet is the key to maintaining American presence in the region, protecting U.S.
sovereignty, working with allies, and rebuilding the nation's edge in global commerce. Making America
more competitive at a time when Washington is looking to cut corners in federal spending requires
creative solutions to demanding problems. The U.S. can jump-start its fleet by privatizing ice-breaker
operations and using ships as platforms for national security and federal scientific activities. This
initiative would save federal dollars by eliminating old, inadequate, and expensive-to-operate assets
while greatly expanding U.S. capacity to operate in the Arctic.
Global shipping patterns will change in the years ahead. Melting of Arctic ice will open up new
passages for transit, offering significantly shorter routes between Europe and North America and the
Pacific-perhaps up to 40 percent faster sailing times and significant fuel savings and emissions
reductions. Seasonal commercial lanes through the Arctic ice could appear within less than five years.
The ability to navigate the region will increase the search for and development of significant natural
resources including oil. Scientific research in the Arctic will also expand.
Icebreaker competition aids the U.S. commercially, as well as in security infrastructure
Carafano and Dean ’11 (Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom, Deputy Director,
Foreign, Defense, Trade, and HSP in the Gov. Relations Department at Heritage, James, James, States
News Service, “Breaking an Ice-Bound U.S. Policy: A Proposal for Operating in the Arctic”, Heritage
Foundation, Accessed through Lexis Nexis , DOA:7/10)
America's capacity to exercise its sovereignty, protect its interests, and participate in global scientific
research and commerce, however, is collapsing. The U.S. had eight polar ice-breakers in 1970. Today,
the U.S. Coast Guard has three. The youngest was commissioned 10 years ago, and the other two are
approaching 35 and 40 years old, respec-tively. One other ship is owned by the National Science
Foundation. The Department of Homeland Security Inspector General recently concluded that the
Coast Guard has neither sufficient ships nor budgetary authority to accomplish its current missions. In
contrast, other powers including Russia, Finland, China, South Korea, and South Africa are looking to
expand their capacity significantly. America is leaving itself out in the cold. The lead that other nations
will enjoy includes more than just numbers. A new generation of energy-efficient ships with advanced
ice-breaking capability is being developed. The best modern ships are multi-purpose vessels that
remain operational throughout the year. Ice-breaker competition is important for more than just
commercial advantages. Ice-breakers are a key component of maritime and national security
infrastructure. They can serve, for example, as mobile stations or search-and-rescue assets in addition
to aiding maritime law enforcement and navigation.
The Arctic has major economic benefits but icebreakers are needed.
Steffen Weber and Andreas Raspotnik, 12(April 30th, 2012, Weber is organizing expert and
stakeholder input into the political process and facilitating debate being the political driving engine on
Arctic Policies in Brussels, Raspotnik is an Analyst - Arctic Energy Security/International Law, “Trade
Routes in the High North – The Arctic shortcut between Europe and Asia,” http://eu-arcticforum.org/publications/opinions-publications/trade-routes-in-the-high-north-the-arctic-shortcutbetween-europe-and-asia-by-steffen-weber-and-andreas-raspotnik-european-parliament-magazine30th-april-2012/)
Climate change and economic developments will lead to unprecedented changes in the Arctic region,
posing significant economic, ecological and social challenges, but also open up increased potentials for
shipping, fishing, offshore petroleum exploration, and maritime tourism. The Arctic has already
become an area of serious economic opportunity, amidst of which the prospective establishment of
new international maritime trade routes stands out. Using the Arctic Ocean as a marine link, the two
trans-Arctic shipping routes, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest Passage (NWP) have
the potential to significantly influence global shipping. Additionally a Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) may
soon be considered an important option as well – alone or in combination with elements of the NSR and
NWP. Annual variations in ice-conditions may change the most suitable route on a yearly basis and
lead to a combination of all three routes. These navigation would considerably shorten trips from
Europe to Asia, ensuring environmental and economic benefits. First transits of non-Russian flagged
vessels i.e. from Germany and Norway, using the NSR, have generated considerable commercial
interest, Arctic shipping has quadrupled in the last years. Maritime transport has long been a catalyst of
European economic development and prosperity and is indeed vital for Europe’s international and
domestic trade. The EU’s Member States collectively control the world largest merchant fleet.
The NSR would shorten trade routes to Europe and Asia increasing trade.
Malte Humpert, 2011(September 15, 2011, found and executive of The Arctic Institute, “The Future
of the Northern Sea Route - A “Golden Waterway” or a Niche Trade
Route,”http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2011/10/future-of-northern-sea-route-golden_13.html)
Growing economic activity in the Arctic invites questions about the medium- and long-term prospects
of shipping along the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Do Arctic shipping routes, especially the NSR,
represent a commercially viable alternative to traditional shipping routes? What are the crucial
variables in predicting the future of Arctic shipping? Part 2 looks at global trade dynamics and explains if
the NSR would be compatible with world trade patterns. The NSR represents a shortcut for the transfer
of goods between Europe and Asia and thus offers significant cost savings for shipping companies. In
theory, distance savings along the NSR can be as high as 50% compared to the currently used shipping
lanes via Suez or Panama. Whereas a voyage from Japan to Europe takes roughly 29 days via the Cape
of Good Hope and 22 days via the Suez Canal, it takes just 10 days via the Arctic Ocean.[1] The actual
sailing distance between Yokohama in Japan to Rotterdam in the Netherlands is roughly 20,000
kilometers passing through the Suez Canal, but less than 9,000 kilometers via the NSR. Over the past
decade, Asia has overtaken North America as the largest market for European exports and the
doubling of world trade by 2020 will further increase the importance of shipping lanes.[2] The
attractiveness of the NSR as a shorter connection between Europe and Asia may increase further as
container ship operators adopt “super-slow steaming” in order to reduce fuel consumption and
costs.[3] The majority of cargo ships that ply the world’s oceans operate on regular schedules, called
liner service. In total more than 6,000 ships, most of them container ships, follow a set route calling at a
number of ports to load and unload cargo. The global maritime industry operates on just-in-time cargo
deliveries. The ability to schedule journeys long-time in advance and to guarantee uninterrupted
service are key for container ship operators.
Ice breakers are critical to gain access to massive Arctic economic opportunities
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
Changing Arctic environmental conditions reinforced by robust climate model predictions for
widespread ice-free summer conditions in the coming decades (Holland and Bitz, 2003; Meier et al.,
2005; Arzel et al., 2006; Zhang and Walsh, 2006) should provide new impetus to the Senate debate over
U.S. accession to UNCLOS. A more accessible Arctic in the near future has profound implications for
changing the polar mission of the U.S. Coast Guard given the expectation for increased surveillance of
commercial ship traffic transiting either the Northern Sea Route (across northern Russia) or the
Northwest Passage (Canada) via the Bering Strait around Alaska. Growing demands for oil, gas,
minerals, and fisheries will drive many of the developed Arctic countries to look to the polar regions
for accessible untapped resources. Estimates by the U.S. Geological Survey and other international
sources indicated that up to 25 percent of the world’s undiscovered petroleum reserves are in the
Arctic. Of great importance will be planned and unplanned tasking that requires use of polar
icebreakers to exert a national presence within the U.S. EEZ and across an expanded continental shelf
region year-round.
Arctic Region Key
U.S. can’t be left behind, opportunity for trade and economic growth in Northern sea
ways
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
Economic activity is predicted to increase and move northward as a result of sea-ice retreat. Those
deploying fishing fleets, cruise ships, mining, and the associated ore transit ships, as well as
petroleum recovery and tanker ship transport, anticipate increased operations in the region. When
current orders for ice-strengthened tankers have been filled, the worldwide fleet of these vessels will
double in number. Ice retreat increases the cost-effectiveness of using the Northern Sea Route
(primarily north of Russia) and the Northwest Passage (primarily north of Canada) for transporting
petroleum, ore, and cargo. Both routes include U.S. Arctic waters. The potential for increased human
activity in northern latitudes will likely increase the need for the United States to assert a more active
and influential presence in the Arctic not only to protect its territorial interests, but also to project its
presence as a world power concerned with the security, economic, scientific, and international
political issues of the region.
The Arctic is home to much of the worlds untapped energy reserves
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
The Arctic has long been viewed as a likely source of natural resources such as oil, gas, minerals, ores,
and other commodities. Indeed, U.S. West Coast Refineries are fueled primarily by Arctic oil produced
on Alaska’s North Slope. In 2005, approximately 335 million barrels of oil was produced on Alaska’s
North Slope (State of Alaska Department of Resources). There is further expectation that additional
large volumes of recoverable oil are to be found in the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve, although
environmental concerns and political pressures have blocked development to date. Alaska’s North Slope
has large proven natural gas reserves that have not been developed in commercial quantities as of
yet. The principal producers (ExxonMobil, BP, and ConocoPhillips) are planning to build a pipeline for
moving Alaska North Slope gas directly to the U.S. Midwest.
Tensions heightening could lead to war
Revkin, senior fellow at the Pace Academy for Applied Environmental Studies at Pace University, ‘8
(Andrew, August 19, The International Herald Tribune “Russian icebreakers challenge U.S. role in Arctic”
lexis)
A growing array of American military leaders, Arctic experts and lawmakers say the United States is
losing its ability to patrol and safeguard Arctic waters even as climate change and high energy prices
have triggered a burst of shipping and oil and gas exploration. In the meantime, a resurgent Russia has
been busy expanding its fleet of large oceangoing icebreakers to about 14. It launched a large
conventional icebreaker in May and, last year, the world's largest icebreaker, named 50 Years of Victory,
the newest of its seven nuclear-powered, pole-hardy ships. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the
Coast Guard and others have warned over the last several years that the United States' two 30-year-old
heavy icebreakers, the Polar Sea and Polar Star, and one smaller ice-breaking ship devoted mainly to
science, the Healy, are grossly inadequate. Also, the Polar Star is out of service. And this spring, the
leaders of the Pentagon's Pacific Command, Northern Command and Transportation Command strongly
recommended in a letter that the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorse a fresh push by the Coast Guard to
increase the United States' ability to gain access to and control its Arctic waters. Admiral Thad Allen,
the commandant of the Coast Guard, who toured Alaska's Arctic shores two weeks ago with the
homeland security secretary, Michael Chertoff, said that whatever mix of natural and human factors is
causing the ice retreats, the Arctic is clearly opening to commerce - and potential conflict and hazards
- like never before .
A2: US-China Econ Coop Solves
China seeks a partner for harnessing arctic energy and bids currently don’t include the
US
Campbell, USCC Policy Analyst on Foreign Affairs and Energy, 12 (Caitlin, April 13, 2012. “China and
the Arctic: Objectives and Obstacles” in the “U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff
Research Report” http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2012/China-and-the-Arctic_Apr2012.pdf)
In 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the Arctic contains up to 30 percent of the
world’s undiscovered gas and 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil resources.‡14 These
untapped resources will become more readily accessible as Arctic sea ice melts.§ According to the
USGS, most of the potential oil and gas resources in the region are located within the territorial
jurisdiction of Arctic states, and will thus be subject to the management and legal oversight of those
countries.15 China’s territorial disadvantage, combined with its lack of cold-water drilling expertise,
will preclude any substantive energy acquisitions by China in the Arctic, according to several
analysts.16 Still, there will be attractive opportunities for Chinese energy investments in the region. A
promising destination for these investments is Russia. China and Russia already have extensive energy
ties and could cooperate on Arctic energy as well.** Speaking at the 2010 Shanghai Expo, the governor
of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous region in Russia - a coastal region which accounts for over 90
percent of Russian natural gas production - welcomed resource cooperation with China, saying “*w+e
are ready to act as intermediaries between an investor country and the oil and gas sector and create a
good investment climate.”17 Another potential partner for China’s Arctic energy ambitions is Canada.
In recent years, Chinese energy investments in Canada have grown significantly, with Chinese stateowned companies purchasing minority and controlling stakes in Canadian oil and gas projects worth
$16 billion in 2010 and 2011. 18 Meanwhile, Canadian policymakers seem to be looking to Asia to
diversify the country’s energy trade away from the United States (which is the destination for the vast
majority of Canadian energy exports).19 Norway is another likely partner on energy. During meetings
of the Bilateral Dialogue on Arctic Issues between China and Norway, discussions have been held on
energy and resource issues. Norway’s cold-water drilling expertise will likely be targeted by Chinese
energy firms looking to gain know-how and investment.20 However, some reports suggest that current
diplomatic tensions between Norway and China might hinder these collaborative efforts. Since the Oslobased Nobel Committee awarded Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, China has
stalled or halted economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries. It has been reported
that in response to China’s behavior, Norway might block Beijing’s attempts to gain permanent observer
status in the Arctic Council, a high-level intergovernmental regional forum that addresses
environmental, resource, and climate issues in the Arctic.†† These reports contradict a recent foreign
policy address by Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressing support for China’s application for
permanent observer status.21 While gaining permanent observer status will not allow China any
decision-making powers in the region, it would grant China unrestricted access to Arctic Council
meetings.22
Shipping Routes Good – Economy
Economic dominance of the Arctic strengthens trade and primacy key to control
Wegge, Department of political science, University of Tromsø, 10 (Njord, March, 2010. “The political
order in the Arctic: power structures, regimes and influence” http://byers.typepad.com/files/wegge-onir-theory-and-arctic-1.pdf)
Economic strength. Economic strength could be moulded into relevant capacities. This ductile and
indirect role makes the states’ general economic strength relevant. Economic strength could also
create patterns of dependency or be used to reward desired behaviour. The following frequently used
indicators of a state’s economic strength: GDP, GDP per capita and share of world trade, are applied.
Administrative capacity. Administrative capacities indicate an ability to develop and execute policy.
Measuring this capacity in the Arctic is difficult. However, two key elements provide an indication and
will be employed in the analysis: the existence of governmental structures focusing primarily on Arctic
issues, and general institutional efficiency. Control over natural resources and territories. Both control
over natural resources and control over territories are directly linked to state sovereignty and stand out
as relevant sources of power, which mitigates physical presence and the utilisation of raw materials.
Arctic trade key to international commerce
Borgerson, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 (Scott, May 2009. “The National Interest and the Law of
the Sea”)
The world has changed dramatically in the last half century, making the legal tools and protections the convention provides essential for the
United States to shape and influence the security environment of the twenty-first century. The political polarization of the Cold War has yielded
to a rise of both nations and nationalism. In 1958, there were eighty-two members of the United Nations; today there are 192. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Americas’ bedrock national security alliance, has grown from fifteen member nations to twenty-six members
and twenty-four partners. While the threat of international conventional and nuclear war has diminished, the transnational threats of WMD
proliferation and violent extremism by nonstate interests with international reach have mushroomed. Expanding populations, combined with
the growth of the newly industrialized economies, have fueled an increasing demand for and competition over natural resources. The
energy security of the United States and every major world economy now depends on a global fuel
market in which half of the world’s oil travels by sea, with most passing through a handful of strategic
straits. Global commerce is the cornerstone of every nation’s economic security, with approximately
90 percent of both international physical and electronic trade traveling across the sea in ships or
under the sea in cables.17 Changes in politics and economics have been matched or exceeded by
changes in the physical world. Readily exploited reserves of oil and gas have been depleted. Entire
species of highly valued apex predators, like tuna, and less palatable but economically critical forage
fish, like menhaden, are collapsing. Meanwhile, a warming climate is opening the Arctic Ocean to navigation, providing access to
previously unreachable resources and bringing about competing jurisdictional claims over this frontier.
Shipping Routes Good – Hegemony
The US must maintain a strategic hold on resource shipping routes in the Arctic in
order to avoid resource wars and hegemony
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
The average demand for oil in China and India is expected to grow by approximately 4 percent per
year until 2020, increasing Asia’s foreign oil dependence from 69 percent (1997) to 87 percent in 2020
(Ögütçü, 2003). In addition, China’s need for natural gas will out strip its own resources and will force
new energy agreements, most likely with Russia in the near future (Ögütçü, 2003). In anticipation of the
increased demand for oil and potential economic and environmental changes, China has begun building
strategic relationships to secure the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea to ensure
unimpeded delivery of oil (Ögütçü, 2003). Instability in the Middle East, coupled with increased
demand in Asia, may make Arctic oil reserves more economically attractive, spurring further oil
exploration, development, and production. Chinese demand for these resources may fundamentally
alter shipping patterns if the Arctic sea ice recedes and the Arctic routes become routinely navigable
(Hanna, 2006). With potential access to the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage at certain
times of the year, the Chinese may pursue these northern routes. In support of national interests, the
United States currently patrols the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz and is prepared to defend these
important shipping lanes, but if transit routes develop in the Arctic, the United States must be
prepared to patrol and defend these routes equally (Hanna, 2006).
Shipping Routes Good – Piracy
Empirics show that the northwestern passage is faster, less expensive, and completely
avoid threats of piracy
Sweeney ’11 (Capt. Kelly, 8/29. Professional Mariner, Arctic update: Maritime 'gold rush' heats up in
the northern passages, http://www.professionalmariner.com/September-2011/Arctic-update-Maritimegold-rush-heats-up-in-the-northern-passages/)
In 1997, the Finnish-flag ice-class tanker Uikku became the first commercial ship to cross the passage
along the northern coast of Russia. Since then, a number of commercial ships have used the route including cruise ships running from Anchorage, Alaska, to Helsinki, Finland. The economic benefits of
using the Northeast Passage are striking. Last summer the Danish bulker, Nordic Barents, took a
40,000-ton load of iron ore from Norway across the passage, through the Bering Strait and then down to
China. The trip took 33 percent less time and saved thousands of miles in distance, thereby reaping
nearly $200,000 in fuel savings alone - compared to a conventional sea route to China. Even better,
taking the passage allowed the ship to completely avoid the Suez Canal and the high-risk piracy areas
off of Somalia.
Without Icebreakers companies are forced to travel through the pirate infested Suez
Canal rather than the safer northwestern passage
Bennet ’11 (Mia, 8/24. Alaska Dispacth, Is the Northwest Passage 'too small' to compete with the
Northern Sea? http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/northwest-passage-too-small-competenorthern-sea)
it's not entirely true, however, that Canada is "too small" to develop the Northwest Passage. In fact,
economically speaking, it has a slightly larger GDP than Russia, though it does have a lot fewer people,
especially in the Arctic. Its problems stem more from geography and politics. Geographically, the
Northwest Passage has several disadvantages. First of all, there isn't one clear route through the many
islands in the Canadian Archipelago, whereas the Northern Sea Route mostly follows the northern coast
of Russia. Additionally, Canada has very little infrastructure near the Northwest Passage. Towns and
settlements along the route, like Cambridge Bay and Resolute, are only reachable from the rest of
Canada by plane. Favorably for Russia, Murmansk, an ice-free port and large city with a direct rail link to
St. Petersburg, sits on the Northeast Passage. Even though the two routes are at similar latitudes a little
bit south of 70°N, the Northwest Passage is generally more covered by ice than its counterpart. In
Canada, recent changes in melting have not been thoroughly mapped for shipping purposes, either.
Since Canada does not have the icebreakers necessary to guide ships through the treacherous
passage, companies have been reluctant to transfer their shipping traffic from the Suez Canal to the
Northwest Passage, despite how ferocious the Somali pirates have become.
Increase in arctic trade reduces emissions and reliance on fossil fuels, as well as
combats piracy
Macallister ’11 (Terry, July 5. “Thawing Arctic opens up new shipping routes on the 'roof of the
world” The Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jul/05/arctic-shipping-traderoutes)
The attraction of the voyage is that it is one-third of the distance of more traditional routes through
the Suez Canal. This means less carbon-dioxide (CO2) emissions and less fuel. It also means less pirates.
Attacks on ships off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden have become so severe that some owners are
already using longer sea routes around South Africa to avoid conflict. Christian Bonfils, the managing
director of Nordic Barents operator Nordic Bulk Carriers, claims it will save him $180,000 in fuel costs.
New Arctic voyages are starting all the time. Russian oil company, Novatek is currently carrying a trial
shipment of 60,000 tonnes of oil products to China via northern Siberia on the vessel, Perseverance.
Northwest Passage Good – Solves Panama
The Northwest Passage is kind of neat, allows ships to avoid using the Panama Canal
Michael Byers, Suzanne Lalonde, 2009 ( February 6, 2009 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF
TRANSNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 42:1133, Who Controls the Northwest Passage?, Lalande-Byers-final-crv2.pdf, findpdf.net/pdf-viewer/Who-Controls-the-Northwest-Passage.html
There is little doubt that the Northwest Passage will become attractive to foreign shipping, for it
offers a route between East Asia and the Atlantic seaboard that is 4000 miles shorter than the curren
route through the Panama Canal—saving time, fuel, and transit fees.39 It could also accommodate
super-tankers and container ships that are too large for the Canal.40 In the near term, uncertainties
about the weather, availability of search and rescue, and movement of multiyear ice, along with higher
insurance premiums, will likely dissuade reputable international shipping companies from using the
Northwest Passage. However, less solvent and reputable companies might take the risk, raising the
prospect that some of the least safe vessels on the oceans might actually be the first to use th
waterway.41 Franklyn Griffiths argues that ships are more likely to go straight across the Arctic Ocean
to the north of Canadian territory.42 This is probably accurate for voyages between Asia and Europe or
between the west coast of North America and Europe, but goin around Greenland adds more than 1000
miles to voyages to or from the east coast of North America. Three or four foreign cruise ships already
traverse the Passage each summer.43 In August 2008, a Danish cable laying ship, the M/V Peter Faber,
needed to move from a project near Taiwan to another project between Newfoundland and
Greenland.44 The captain chose the Northwest Passage, sailing through without incident or
fanfare.45The deepwater route of the Northwest Passage can also accommodate super-tankers and
container ships that are too large for the Panama Canal. More and more ships are being built that
exceed the “Panamax” dimensions of 294 meters by 32 meters with a maximum draft of 12 meters
(giving rise to a displacement of around 65,000 tons).46 The relatively calm waters within the
Archipelago will also be attractive. In 1999, a massive Russian dry dock was towed to the Bahamas
through the Northwest Passage in order to reduce its exposure to ocean storms.
Science Leadership Advantage
Science Leadership I/L – Ice Breakers
Icebreakers are uniquely key to maintain the United States’ stance as a leader in
science
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
The execution of polar science faces special challenges due to the harsh environment encountered in
conducting experiments, making observations, and collecting samples. A primary characteristic of the
polar regions—the presence of ice—while fundamental to the global importance of these regions,
presents major logistical challenges. Many locations are difficult to access, and reliable infrastructure
must be maintained to safeguard scientists operating safely in these areas. To this end, a network of
stations, field camps, laboratory facilities, ships, airplanes, observing networks, and other support
infrastructure has been developed over the years in both the Arctic and the Antarctic. Essential to these
operations is access through and operation ice-covered oceans and coastal seas. The support of polar
research requires ships of various icebreaking capabilities, including those that are the subject of this
report. This chapter highlights some of the major research themes being pursued in polar science,
demonstrating the value provided by this work to the nation. A glimpse of where this science will go in
the future is also provided. The scientific value justifies the significant investment needed for polar
research to continue and indeed flourish over the next several decades. Simply put, access to the
polar regions is fundamentally important if the United States is to continue to be a leader in polar
science. Icebreakers are a key part of the necessary infrastructure: They are needed to conduct science
in Arctic waters and to open a channel to allow resupply of McMurdo Station (and, in turn, South Pole
Station and inland sites) in Antarctica.
Arctic Key – Science Research
Polar research is invaluable to science and has directly benefitted society
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
Fundamental advances resulting from polar research have directly benefited society. Polar research
led to the identification of the presence and cause of the “ozone hole” and has resulted in coordinated
worldwide actions to discontinue the use of chlorofluorocarbons. Understanding how the polar regions
affect ocean circulation is leading to a better understanding of global climate. The study of Weddell
seals, which dive to great depths and cease breathing for long periods, led to better understanding of
how such mammals handle gas dissolved in blood during and after deep diving events. This has
contributed to advances in understanding sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). The study of
mammals, insects, and plants that endure freezing temperatures, yet prevent the formation of ice
crystals in their internal fluids, is aiding in the design of freeze-resistant crops and improved
biomedical cryopreservation techniques. The Arctic and Antarctic are natural laboratories whose
extreme, relatively pristine environments and geographically unique settings enable research on
fundamental phenomena and processes that are feasible nowhere else. Today, researchers seek a
better understanding of how new ocean crusts form, how organisms adapt to the extremes of
temperature and seasonality (light conditions), how ice sheets behave, and how the solar wind and the
earth interact. Unexplored, subglacial lakes in the Antarctic that have been sealed from the atmosphere
for millions of years are soon to be explored and entered. Beneath the South Pole Station a cubic
kilometer of clear ice is being instrumented with 5,000 detectors to observe high-energy neutrinos that
may tell us about phenomena such as supernovae. Pristine ice cores that span centuries give direct data
about temperature changes and atmospheric gas concentrations in the past.
Polar research is key to scientific advancement
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
Polar research has brought, and will continue to bring, tangible societal benefits. The success of polar
research is intimately linked to the availability of appropriate infrastructure and logistical support to
allow scientists to work in these natural laboratories whose unique settings enable research on
fundamental phenomena and processes that are feasible nowhere else. Access to the polar regions,
predicated on the availability of adequate icebreaking capability, is essential if the United States is to
continue as a leader in polar science.
Science Research I/L
Ice race is happening now – Ice breakers are key to the exploration of science by
delivering supplies to hundreds of scientists
Io9, 12 (JAN 6, 2012, KEITH VERONESE, daily publication that covers science, science fiction, and the
future “Shortage of icebreaker ships could lose us the race to explore the Antarctic,” io9
http://io9.com/5873385/shortage-of-icebreaker-ships-could-lose-us-the-race-to-explore-the-antarctic)
DG
What happens when scientists need supplies, but are hundreds of miles from civilization and
surrounded by an 8 foot thick sheet of ice? Billion dollar, specially designed icebreaker ships act as mobile
science platforms and make way for supply, personnel, and refueling ships. Due to destructive forces and rough
terrain, these ships are often in short supply. Let's take a look at these massive ships — and what happens when
hundreds of scientists are stranded and in need of supplies in Antarctica. Icebreaker ships are Necessary to
Explore Earth's true Final Frontier Icebreaker ships are necessary to move and supply scientists studying the
extreme climate and fascinating extremophile organisms living Antarctica and other ice-covered parts
of the world. Built in 1955 on a sea of volcanic rock, McMurdo Station is the largest Antarctic base and the U.S. hub
for its NSF funded Antarctic Program, with over 900 scientists living and working at McMurdo.
Antarctica is also home to Palmer Station , a smaller outpost holding 40 scientists. Both stations are
surrounded by miles of six to eight feet thick ice. McMurdo Station in Pop Culture McMurdo Station is a common plot point
in sci-fi and pop culture quite often due to its extreme location. Sheldon from The Big Bang Theory likely spent the summer between seasons
two and three at McMurdo while Leonard and the gang falsified data. Stargate SG-1 used McMurdo as one of humanity's last military bases
and John Carpenter's The Thing makes reference to the station. Greg Rucka's Whiteout, a comic turned movie, is told from the perspective of a
How does an Icebreaker work? The ships come in a variety of sizes, with only a handful
of the ships able to navigate the ice covered waters of Earth's poles. Icebreaker ships rely on a reinforced
hull, a specially designed bow, and an enormous power supply to create a path for ships carrying
people and supply to some of the most inhabitable and environmentally hostile regions on the planet.
The ice is broken not by the forward driving force of the ship, but by using the specially designed front
of the ship to move on top of the ice - the weight of the ship then breaks the ice. Shaping the front of
the ship (the "bow") like a spoon allows the ship to slide up and onto the ice. National Science Foundation
U.S. Marshal working at McMurdo Station.
Funded Ships The United States' National Science Foundation also outfits two icebreakers, the Nathaniel B. Palmer and the Laurence M. Gould.
The ships act as mobile research stations for climate and polar research. The Polar Star & Polar Sea are operated by the U.S. Coast Guard, with
Russia is home to several functioning icebreakers, including
the only nuclear-powered icebreakers in the world. The icebreakers used within Russia are necessary
to keep commercial shipping channels in northern parts of the country open for trade. How much do
the NSF funding repairs and fuel for duo in recent years.
Icebreaker ships cost? Due to the rigors of the work these ships perform, routine damage piles up. Temporary decommissioning for repairs can
take 2 years and cost $200 to 400 million for a refit that lasts only 7-10 years. Building
a new heavy icebreaker costs upwards
of one billion dollars. Individual icebreakers are decommissioned several times during their lifespan for large scale repairs, with wellmaintained ships in service for 25-30 years. Cutting off supplies to NSF research stations? A typical refueling mission to McMurdo station calls
for an icebreaker to pass through 12-14 nautical miles of ice — sheets of ice 6 to 8 feet thick. Without
a high-powered icebreaker
ship, re-supplying the sites is impossible. The Polar Star is currently out of service for repairs until 2014, the Polar Sea is unlikely
to ever sail again, while the Laurence M. Gould shuttles supplies to the Antarctic on another path from the coast to Chile to Antarctica. What
happens when you can't get supplies to McMurdo Station? This scenario played out in the Fall of 2011. With no other
option, the National Science Foundation asked Sweden use their icebreaker, Oden, to resupply McMurdo
Station and camps throughout the Antarctic. The Swedish government refused the request, leading the
NSF to consider a contingency plan pulling researchers out of Antarctica and temporarily ending polar
research. To end the stalemate, the NSF chartered a Russian icebreaker, the Vladimir Ignatyuk, to
supply McMurdo and other Antarctic stations. Losing the Space Race & the Snow Race? Do we want to
continue researching one of the most bizarre environments on earth? Imagine the medicinal and biochemical opportunities that lie amongst
the thermophilic organisms living within the world's most extreme terrain. The United States' crewed space efforts are non-existent at the
moment — does the country want to lose the foothold established by two previous generations in Antarctica?
Is humanity's search
for unknown knowledge and adventure on Earth over?
Icebreakers are necessary for continuing to improve research in the Arctic
Walter B. Parker 2011 (Oct 27 What, research needs and priorities are important to Arctic
development?) http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/essay_parker.html
The most rapid advances in developing better scientific and technological answers to the problems
that global change and increasing populations will generate for the Arctic in the next century can be
obtained by continuing the declassification of the information collected since World War II, especially
ocean temperature and current information. Combined with a continued presence of icebreaker and
submarine cruises, we may find the necessary information in the Arctic Basin to gives us better
predictive capabilities. Those involved in SEARCH will be promoting better underwater research vehicles
also. It will be critical to bring together on a continuing basis those studying physical systems with those
working on biological systems in each region. It would be a mistake to assume that this is happening as a
regular part of our way of doing science. We have come a long way in the past decade on incorporating
traditional history and knowledge on local indigenous peoples in our findings. Joint efforts sponsored by
Working Groups of the Arctic Council with U.N. agencies are breaking new ground. Permanent
participants are being sponsored by their national funding sources. There is still a great deal of
information to gain by continuing and enhancing these efforts. It is not probable that there will be large
increases in Arctic populations due to immigration as occurred in the last century, but even small
increases can have a major effect. The greatest danger will come from the continued global population
increase and the stresses created for all of the planet, including the Arctic.
Warming Research I/L
Having ice breakers facilitates research in the arctic and antarctic and they are needed
even though warming exists
Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, 2012 (June 14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress” Congressional Research Service)
Operations to support National Science Foundation (NSF) research activities in the Arctic and Antarctic
have accounted in the past for a significant portion of U.S. polar icebreaker operations.1 Supporting
NSF research in the Antarctic has included performing—or, in more recent years, standing ready to
assist in—an annual mission, called Operation Deep Freeze, to break through the Antarctic ice so as to
resupply McMurdo Station, the large U.S. Antarctic research station located on the shore of McMurdo
Sound, near the Ross Ice Shelf. Although polar ice is diminishing due to climate change, observers
generally expect that this development will not eliminate the need for U.S. polar icebreakers, and in
some respects might increase mission demands for them. Even with the diminishment of polar ice,
there are still significant ice-covered areas in the polar regions. Diminishment of polar ice could lead in
coming years to increased commercial ship, cruise ship, and naval surface ship operations, as well as
increased exploration for oil and other resources, in the Arctic—activities that could require increased
levels of support from polar icebreakers.2 Changing ice conditions in Antarctic waters have made the
McMurdo resupply mission more challenging since 2000.3 An April 18, 2011, press report states that
the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Robert Papp, sees plenty of reasons the United States
will need polar icebreakers for the “foreseeable future,” despite speculation that thinning ice in the
Arctic could make the icebreakers replaceable with other ice-hardened ships, the admiral said last
week…. “I don’t see that causing us to back down on some minimal level of polar icebreakers,” Papp told
Inside the Navy. “The fact of the matter is, there’s still winter ice that’s forming. It’s coming down
pretty far. We don't need to get up there just during summer months when there’s open water.”4
Our future ability to predict and solve global warming is dependent upon icebreakers,
the US NEEDS to invest to maintain leadership because there is NO alternative
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
This chapter has highlighted some of the most exciting polar research being conducted today. Polar
research is contributing to a wide range of disciplines, providing fundamental information about Earth’s
systems and how they operate. The continued vitality of polar research is intimately linked to the
availability of the appropriate infrastructure and logistical support to allow scientists to work in these
challenging environments. Conducting research in the polar regions is as complex and challenging as
space science. Like research in outer space, U.S. leadership in international polar science is being
challenged as countries increasingly exercise their national prerogatives at the poles. As polar science
advances, more and more difficult scientific questions are being asked that will require sustained and
continuous observations and measurements in these regions. In the north, access to the central Arctic
Basin will provide an understanding of the evolution of northern climates. Prediction of future change
can be based only on a full understanding of the Arctic and Antarctic systems. In the south, year-round
scientific access will be vital, with current research limited by the ability of researchers and teams to
access on a regular basis all of the ice-covered seas of Antarctica and the Arctic. While assets and
platforms such as airplanes and spaceborne sensors are important technological tools for future
investigations, surface ground-truth and in situ sampling cannot and will not be replaced in the
foreseeable future. The availability of adequate icebreaking capabilities is fundamental and essential
to research in the polar regions of our planet, from which we gain an understanding of human life on
Earth, both historically and climatically. The committee noted the successful relationship between U.S.
Coast Guard HEALY operations and the U.S. Arctic marine science community, fostered in part by the
UNOLS (University-National Oceanographic Laboratory System) Arctic Icebreaker Coordinating
Committee (AICC) and supports the continuation of this successful relationship.
Icebreakers are THE critical infrastructure that enables polar research which is key to
solve global warming
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
Atmospheric processes in the Arctic, such as the formation and persistence of clouds, the transport and
disposition of solar radiation, and large-scale patterns of variability in the atmospheric pressure fields,
play a central role in global climate. A more detailed understanding and representation of these
processes in global climate models is essential to improving predictions of future climate (ACIA, 2005).
Such advances in understanding require intensive observations of the Arctic atmosphere over the
oceans, which depend strongly on icebreaker support, for the deployment of drifting ice camps,
transects with icebreakers across the Arctic Ocean, and deployment of measurement systems (e.g.,
Perovich et al., 2003).
Understanding climate change in the Arctic is key to understanding climate change
across the world
Nick Bond, Jim Overland and Nancy Soreide, writers for the NOAA 2012 (Why and how do
scientists study climate change in the Arctic? What are the Arctic climate indices?)
http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/essay_bond.html
Dramatic changes have been occurring in the Arctic during the past decade. These changes include
unusual melting of glaciers, sea ice, and permafrost, and shifts in patterns of rain and snow fall,
freshwater runoff, and forest/tundra growth. The consequences include disrupted wildlife migration
patterns, altered fish stocks, modified agricultural zones, and increased forest fires. These changes have
impacted the lives of Native residents who depend on the environment for a continuation of their
traditional subsistence lifestyle, and may also have significant impacts on the oil industry, tourism, and
shipping routes. The US Arctic Research Commission (1999) stated "change in the Arctic may play a
substantial role in climate change throughout the globe", and moreover, that "global change,
particularly climate change may have its most pronounced effects in the Arctic." Conditions in the
Arctic are very different from those at lower latitudes on the globe, and "the Arctic remains one of the
least explored, studied and understood places on earth."
Arctic research is key to understanding and solving climate change
Walter B. Parker 2011 (Oct 27 What, research needs and priorities are important to Arctic
development?) http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/essay_parker.html
The global models on climate change will require a steady flow of data from the Arctic. Northern
regions, if we are to answer the questions raised thus far on the long term effects of carbon dioxide
emissions on global warming, the role of the Arctic Ocean as a generator of major changes in the
oceans worldwide, and the other controversies generated by a world population that has quadrupled in
the past century; it will require programs that are designed to continue through most of the next
100years. These needs have been recognized by a major effort launched by the United States titled
Study of Environmental Arctic Change (SEARCH), which is already generating a strong response
throughout the circumpolar world as well as nations not a part of the Arctic that have strong Arctic
interests. SEARCH has been conceived as a broad interdisciplinary, multi-scale program to understand
the recent and ongoing changes that have resulted in dramatic decreases in sea ice in the Arctic,
dramatic changes in permafrost, radiation effects including the ultra violet holes at both ends of the
planet, and concurrent changes in animal and plant populations. It includes a long term program to track
environmental changes, a modeling program to test ideas about the coupling between different
components, and to attempt to predict the future course of change in the Arctic and its effect upon
other systems linked to the Arctic. It will institute process studies to test hypotheses about feedback
processes; and an assessment component to explain, to the best of our abilities, the ultimate impact
of global change on the Arctic and the global ecosystem and the societies that live within and depend
upon those ecosystems.
Enviro Disaster I/L
An increase in use of Arctic waters creates more need for icebreakers that can respond
to environmental disasters or other accidents
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
Any increase in marine activity in the Arctic will almost assuredly create greater risks of
environmental impact and the potential for human activities that push the limits of safety near the ice
edge, especially in the shoulder seasons. These activities will increase the necessity to respond to
accidents and create a greater need for law enforcement in ice margin areas, which will increase the
need for ice-capable ships (ice-strengthened ships and icebreakers) in the Arctic. This increase in human
activity in more northerly latitudes will most likely increase the demand on the United States to have a
greater presence in and around the ice margin to perform its many safety, security, and law
enforcement missions. U.S. government-controlled access and oversight will be needed with increased
vessel traffic, particularly to maintain U.S. interests around the State of Alaska and in U.S. territorial
waters.
Icebreakers solve Arctic environmental degradation through disaster and accident
relief
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
Protecting the Arctic marine environment begins with ensuring the safety of vessels operating in these
challenging conditions, including the availability of icebreaking assistance and comprehensive
monitoring of vessel movements. Prevention might also include a regulatory regime, limiting vessels to
geographic areas and seasonal periods appropriate to their ice capabilities. The Canadian Arctic Shipping
Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASPPR) would serve as an obvious example. Increases in traffic,
especially from Russian or Canadian waters, may create U.S. interest in establishing regulations;
enforcement and deterrence would necessitate an on-scene presence capable of operating in ice. The
U.S. Coast Guard would clearly have regulatory responsibility for this type of waterways management.
Responding to a major oil spill in the Arctic is challenging, as cleanup activities for an onshore spill near
Prudhoe Bay in early 2006 attest. Oil cleanup offshore would be even more difficult due to the dearth
of infrastructure and the possibility of ice. Where depth of water permits access, an icebreaker could
offer command-and-control capabilities, communications, berthing, helicopters, boats, cargo space,
heavyweight handling gear, tankage, and support services to smaller craft, all of which would be of
great benefit to cleanup operations. Direct oil recovery could also be included as an icebreaker
capability: POLAR SEA successfully tested a boommounted skimming system known as the Vessel of
Opportunity Skimming System (VOSS) (as well as other capabilities) while participating in an oil spill
exercise off Sakhalin Island in 1998. The U.S. Coast Guard’s new fleet of coastal buoy tenders is
equipped with VOSS, and thought should be given to the need for new polar icebreakers to be equipped
with the latest technology for oil spill response
Oil Spills I/L
Arctic presence key to respond to oil spills
Snow, 6/11/12. Nick Snow, Washington Editor. "Salazar orders first deepwater gulf oil containment
exercise.” Oil and Gas Journal. Lexis.
http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T151056
98873&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T15105698881&cisb=22_T15
105698880&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8039&docNo=9
BSEE officials also participated on May 24 in an all-day table top exercise designed to simulate the response to a
well blowout in the Chukchi Sea. The exercise, planned over the past several months, included representatives
from the US Coast Guard, the US Environmental Protection Agency, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, the State of Alaska, the North Slope Borough, and Shell Exploration & Production Co., which has requested
approval to conduct exploratory drilling in the Arctic Ocean this summer, the agency said. "This
exercise allowed us to do a
large-scale test of how the federal government and industry would carry out many of the key
components of a response," Watson said. "It also tested the ability to get crucial data in real time to officials in Washington, DC."
BSEE said it will conduct a series of planned and unannounced exercises and inspections throughout the year to test
industry's ability to meet the conditions of their oil spill response plans and effectively respond to a
potential spill in the Arctic, in the event that exploratory drilling activities are approved. The bureau will also continue
to participate in joint exercises, such as yesterday's event, to evaluate and improve communication and
coordination among federal and state partners and the company. Exercise's details The table top scenario began on
the second day of a simulated response to a subsea blowout with a 25,000 b/d flow rate, according to BSEE. Exercise participants completed an
Incident Action Plan outlining the details of the release, coordinated response efforts among participating agencies, developed response
objectives, and identified response assets. The Alaska Regional Response Team worked with participants on the approval and use of dispersants
and in-situ burning during the simulated response. DOI's Emergency Operations Center was used to notify key personnel in Washington of the
exercise's progress, and provided real-time data feeds from Anchorage, the agency said. "While
this exercise gives us confidence
in the preparedness levels of our federal, state, and local partners, and Shell, it is only one piece of the
spill response puzzle," Watson said. "We will be repeatedly testing Shell's equipment and their ability to respond, including through
field deployments and unannounced drills. We will hold Shell accountable to its plans, and ensure that all personnel and equipment are
positioned and ready before any proposed drilling activities could proceed."
Coast Guard key to solve oil spills
Kroh et al, ’12. Kiley Kroh, Associate Director for Ocean Communications at the Center for American
Progress, Michael Conathan, Director of Ocean Policy at the Center for American Progress, and Emma
Huvos, February 2012. “Putting a Freeze on Arctic Ocean Drilling.” Center for American Progress.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/pdf/arcticreport.pdf
In the event of an oil spill, the Coast Guard would be called upon to coordinate the federal response.
Testifying before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation last July, Coast
Guard Commandant Robert Papp expressed grave concern about the lack of support and infrastructure
in the Arctic, stating, “If this were to happen off the North Slope of Alaska, we’d have nothing. We’re
starting from ground zero today. … We have zero to operate with at present.” 67 In December
testimony before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee, Papp also said his agency
“will work to ensure its force structure is appropriately sized, trained, equipped and postured to meet its
Arctic mission requirements.” 68 But in order to carry out this mission in a changing Arctic, the
commandant emphasized that “The Coast Guard’s most immediate operational requirement is
infrastructure.”
Oil Spills Bad – Enviro
Destroys ocean ecosystems
P.F. KINGSTON, Flanders Marine Institute, Spill Sciences and Technology Bulletin, 7/2/99
These arguments hold true where there is a reservoir of species that can replace those lost by oiling.
However , the recent oil spills resulting from the wreck of the Jessica off San Cristobal on the Galapagos
islands has focused attention on the fact that species lost as the result of an oil spill may not always be
replaceable. The Galapagos had a lucky escape. The Jessica, spilled around 1000 tonnes of oil about
600 tonnes of diesel, and 400 tonnes of bunker fuel oil. Fortunately wind and currents took the oil away
from San Cristobal giving time for the diesel to evaporate and the fuel oil to disperse before it could do
major damage to the other islands. Nevertheless some oiling took place. Had the oil slick not broken
up the world may have suffered its first true ecological disaster in which entire animal species could
have been wiped out. About 40% of the species found on the Galapagos are unique to the archipelago.
Amongst theses are the lava gull (only 400 breeding pairs known to exist), and the Galapagos penguin
and the flightless cormorant (more or less confined to a single island), and the marine iguanas. A few
tonnes of fuel oil in the wrong place at the wrong time have the potential to extinguish these species
forever.
Extinction
Craig 3 (Robin Kundis, professor of law @ Florida State, University of Colorado Law Review, Summer,
Lexis)
Marine ecosystems have immense value. Oceans cover more than 70% of our planet, 314 support vast
reserves of biodiversity (in all senses), 315 produce at least half of the Earth's atmospheric oxygen, 316
drive the planet's hydrological cycle, 317 sequester carbon dioxide, 318 and play a significant role in the
earth's climate and weather. 319 As such, oceans and estuaries are critical providers of ecosystem
services - those "myriad of life support functions, the observable manifestations of ecosystem
processes that ecosystems provide and without which human civilizations could not thrive." 320
According to a comprehensive study that appeared in Nature in 1997, "about 63% of the estimated
value [of the world's ecosystem services] is contributed by marine ecosystems," especially coastal
ecosystems. 321 Specifically, "coastal environments, including estuaries, [*892] coastal wetlands, beds
of sea grass and algae, coral reefs, and continental shelves ... cover only 6.3% of the world's surface, but
are responsible for 43% of the estimated value of the world's ecosystem services."
Oil spill in the arctic would be even more devastating than previous catastrophic spills
Kroh et al, ’12. Kiley Kroh, Associate Director for Ocean Communications at the Center for American
Progress, Michael Conathan, Director of Ocean Policy at the Center for American Progress, and Emma
Huvos, February 2012. “Putting a Freeze on Arctic Ocean Drilling.” Center for American Progress.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/pdf/arcticreport.pdf
When the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico in the early morning hours of April
20, 2010 it spawned one of the worst environmental disasters in U.S. history. BP Plc’s Macondo well
blowout lasted 89 days, spewing nearly 5 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, and taking the
lives of 11 men. The catastrophe showed the clear need for a massive, well-coordinated response
when disaster strikes. Though the refrain “never again” was echoed time and again in the wake of the
BP oil catastrophe, we are now facing a new oil spill threat. After spending over five years and $4
billion on the process, the Royal Dutch Shell Group is on the cusp of receiving the green light to begin
exploratory drilling in Alaska’s Beaufort and Chukchi Seas this summer. 1 Though Shell emphasizes it
would drill exploratory wells in shallow water rather than establishing deep-water production wells like
Macondo, the fundamental characteristics of the vastly unexplored and uninhabited Arctic coastline
may increase the likelihood of a spill and will certainly hamper emergency response capability. 2 The
decision to move forward with drilling in some of the most extreme conditions on Earth has deeply
divided Alaska Native communities, drawn stark criticism from environmental groups, and caused
other federal agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, or NOAA, to raise concerns about the glaring absence of sound science in the region.
This is highlighted in a recent letter to the Obama administration, signed by nearly 600 scientists from
around the world, calling on the president and Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar to follow through on
their commitment to science and enact recommendations made by the U.S. Geological Survey before
approving any drilling activity in the Arctic. 3 In addition to the lack of a scientific foundation, the Arctic
has inadequate infrastructure to deal with an oil spill, and response technologies in such extreme
environmental conditions remain untested.2 center for American Progress | Putting a Freeze on Arctic
drilling As we detail in this report, the resources and existing infrastructure that facilitated a grandscale response to the BP disaster differ immensely from what could be brought to bear in a similar
situation off Alaska’s North Slope. Even the well-developed infrastructure and abundance of trained
personnel in the Gulf of Mexico didn’t prevent the Deepwater Horizon tragedy. Our Arctic response
capabilities pale by comparison. There are no U.S. Coast Guard stations north of the Arctic Circle, and
we currently operate just one functional icebreaking vessel. Alaska’s tiny ports and airports are
incapable of supporting an extensive and sustained airlift effort. The region even lacks such basics as
paved roads and railroads. This dearth of infrastructure would severely hamper the ability to
transport the supplies and personnel required for any large-scale emergency response effort.
Furthermore, the extreme and unpredictable weather conditions complicate transportation,
preparedness, and cleanup of spilled oil to an even greater degree. Much of the Arctic region quite
simply remains a mystery, largely untouched by human activity. Yet other Arctic countries are moving
forward with oil and gas exploration—Russia signed a $7.9 billion exploration deal with BP last year and
Exxon Mobil Corp. and Chevron Corp. are both expected to drill off Greenland over the next few years.
4, 5 Last year Norway rejectedplans to drill in some areas north of the Arctic Circle, but has indicated it
intends to ramp up production in the Barents Sea, a region it shares with neighboring Russia. 6, 7 Due to
the need for specially designed equipment, long supply lines, and limited transportation, a recent
analysis from the nonpartisan U.S. Energy Information Administration found that “studies on the
economics of onshore oil and natural gas projects in Arctic Alaska estimate costs to develop reserves in
the region can be 50 to 100 percent more than similar projects undertaken in Texas.” 8 Despite these
hurdles, some in the United States are eager to keep pace with other Arctic nations by tapping into the
“great opportunity” for economic gain they believe lies beneath the pristine Arctic waters. Drilling for oil
in this fragile region, however, should not be pursued without adequate safeguards in place. If we’ve
learned anything from the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, it’s that the importance of preparedness
cannot be overstated. That is why we strongly recommend specific actions be taken by the federal
government, by Congress, and by Shell and other companies before beginning exploratory drilling in the
Arctic.
Oil Spills Bad – Economy
Oil spills devastate the environment and the economy
Kroh et al, ’12. Kiley Kroh, Associate Director for Ocean Communications at the Center for American
Progress, Michael Conathan, Director of Ocean Policy at the Center for American Progress, and Emma
Huvos, February 2012. “Putting a Freeze on Arctic Ocean Drilling.” Center for American Progress.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/pdf/arcticreport.pdf
Even with the resources and infrastructure in place at the time of the spill, plus the extraordinary
mobilization of people and equipment to the region, the damage to the Gulf Coast was catastrophic.
Nearly 5 million barrels of oil leaked from the Macondo well, contaminating 665 miles of coastline and
necessitating the use of 1.8 million gallons of dispersant, 13.5 million feet of boom, and 411 in-situ
burns to contain the spill. 13, 14 The final price tag will be astronomical. BP has said the total bill for
the oil spill will be $42 billion, while some analysts have projected a worst-case scenario price tag in
excess of $70 billion. 15 The spill came at a cost to the unsuspecting American taxpayer, as well. The
oil giant was able to cut its 2010 tax bill by almost $13 billion by writing off its losses due to the spill.
16 Recovery from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is ongoing, and restoration will likely take decades
to complete. Its long-term effects on the ecosystem, the economy, and health of Gulf Coast residents
won’t be known for years to come. In the case of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, for instance, it took
several years for the herring population to collapse and it has yet to recover.\
Arctic ecosystem and indigenous communities uniquely vulnerable
Kroh et al, ’12. Kiley Kroh, Associate Director for Ocean Communications at the Center for American
Progress, Michael Conathan, Director of Ocean Policy at the Center for American Progress, and Emma
Huvos, February 2012. “Putting a Freeze on Arctic Ocean Drilling.” Center for American Progress.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/pdf/arcticreport.pdf
The Arctic is often referred to as the world’s last wild frontier, bordered by eight countries over the
northernmost portion of the Earth. The U.S. Arctic shoreline extends more than 2,250 miles and serves
as home to numerous indigenous communities that have subsisted for centuries in the harshest
surroundings our planet has to offer. It also serves as habitat for some of the rarest and most fragile
species on the planet. Any drilling activity in the region would be operating without sufficient
scientific knowledge to determine the potential effects of operations. A report released earlier this
year by the U.S. Geological Survey identified major gaps in Arctic science and research, emphasizing
that “significant questions” remain regarding the scientific and technical information needed to
adequately prepare for drilling in the challenging Arctic environment. 29 A subsequent review by the
Pew Environment Group and Ocean Conservancy reiterated those deficiencies, outlining further steps
that should be taken prior to drilling approval. 30 Upon releasing the report, Marilyn Heiman, director of
Pew’s U.S. Arctic Program, stated that “if we are to avoid irreparable harm to an ecosystem found
nowhere else in U.S. waters, we need to develop a comprehensive research and monitoring plan and
set aside significant areas for protection.”
A2: Oil Spills Containable
Other spills were only contained because of available infrastructure
Kroh et al, ’12. Kiley Kroh, Associate Director for Ocean Communications at the Center for American
Progress, Michael Conathan, Director of Ocean Policy at the Center for American Progress, and Emma
Huvos, February 2012. “Putting a Freeze on Arctic Ocean Drilling.” Center for American Progress.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/pdf/arcticreport.pdf
While devastating, the images of the Deepwater Horizon tragedy available to the public—oiled birds and
sea turtles, dead fish, crude-covered beaches, distraught residents, multiple failed attempts to stop the
gush of oil into the Gulf of Mexico—didn’t tell the whole story. Behind the scenes, the Coast Guard-led
response was a well-orchestrated logistical feat and an unprecedented mobilization of people, supplies,
vessels, and aircraft. Given the size and scope of the spill it’s difficult to imagine how it could have been
much worse. But in many ways the Gulf of Mexico is the ideal setting for oil spill response with its
warm weather, highly developed roads, rail lines, and numerous major port cities. Despite the
favorable conditions in the Gulf, it still took three months, billions of dollars, and tens of thousands of
responders to cap the well. At peak response, there were 9,700 vessels, 127 aircraft, and 47,829 people
responding to the disaster. 9 Facilitating all of this was the well-developed infrastructure in place at
the time of the spill. The abundance of ports, docks, airfields, Coast Guard facilities, and road and rail
lines enabled a coordinated mobilization of people and equipment that streamed through the entire
Gulf Coast during the response effort. Within a 500-mile radius of the blowout site, responders
benefitted from access to 95 airports with runways 8,000 feet or longer (and 442 with runways 5,000
feet or longer), and 3,217 total ports. That area also includes multiple large cities replete with hotels,
restaurants, gas stations, hospitals, and other facilities and equipment to support and sustain the largest
environmental disaster response effort in U.S. history.6 center for American Progress | Putting a Freeze
on Arctic drilling As a result of decades of oil and gas exploration in the Gulf and extensive experience
dealing with oil spills, responders also had the benefit of a pre-existing network of oil spill-response
resources in place when the Macondo well blowout occurred. These were mobilized immediately. Clean
Gulf Associates—the largest oil spill response cooperative in North America—has served the Gulf of
Mexico offshore oil industry for nearly 40 years. 10 In 1997, it partnered with the Marine Spill Response
Corporation, an independent, nonprofit spill response company, to offer superior response capabilities
in the Gulf region. 11 In the aftermath of Deepwater Horizon, these two companies provided services
including mechanical recovery, dispersant application, in-situ burning of oil on the ocean’s surface,
emergency communications, aircraft support, and hiring of subcontractors. They operate a combined
total of 16 strategically positioned staging areas within a 500-mile radius of the Macondo well site,
consisting of equipment and responders on call at all times. Though oil companies and their contractors
are designated the responsible parties for oil spill response, cleanup, and restoration, it’s the U.S. Coast
Guard that manages, directs, and coordinates response efforts when a spill occurs. The Coast Guard
boasts a strong network of resources and personnel along the Gulf coast, including 30 facilities within a
500-mile radius of the spill site. In addition to providing crucial logistical support, the Coast Guard
contributed 7,000 active and reserve personnel, 60 vessels, and 22 aircraft to the response effort. 12 Oil
spill response capacity in the Gulf of Mexico and Arctic Resources within 500-mile radius BP Macondo
well drilling site Shell’s proposed Chukchi/Beaufort drilling sites Airports with runways 8,000 feet or
longer 95 4 Airports with runways 5,000 feet or longer 347 13 Equipment staging locations (oil spill
response cooperatives) 15 5 Coast Guard permanent facilities 30 0 Major public ports 35 0 Sources:
Center for American Progress, ESRI, Army Corp of Engineers 2011, NTAD 2011, Alaska DOT the
deepwater horizon response and aftermath | www.americanprogress.org 7
Add-ons
Emergency Response Add-on
Currently the US is unable to respond to an arctic catastrophe
Huffington Post 4/16/12, “Arctic Climate Change Opening Region To New Military Activity.” Eric
Talmadge. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/16/arctic-climate-change-militaryactivity_n_1427565.html
The most immediate challenge may not be war — both military and commercial assets are sparse
enough to give all countries elbow room for a while — but whether militaries can respond to a disaster.
Heather Conley, director of the Europe program at the London-based Center for Strategic and
International Studies, said militaries probably will have to rescue their own citizens in the Arctic before
any confrontations arise there. "Catastrophic events, like a cruise ship suddenly sinking or an
environmental accident related to the region's oil and gas exploration, would have a profound impact
in the Arctic," she said. "The risk is not militarization; it is the lack of capabilities while economic
development and human activity dramatically increases that is the real risk.
Icebreakers key to patrol waters year-round and to mitigate arctic catastrophes
Revkin 8. Senior fellow at Pace University's Pace Academy for Applied Environmental Studies. Andrew
C. Revkin. “A Push to Increase Icebreakers in the Arctic.” August 17, 2008.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/world/europe/17arctic.html?_r=1&ref=world&pagewanted=prin
t
“All I know is, there is water where it didn’t used to be, and I’m responsible for dealing with that,” Admiral Allen said in a recent interview.
Given the 8 or 10 years it would take to build even one icebreaker, he added, “I think we’re
at a crisis point on making a
decision.” The cost of building icebreakers and keeping the older vessels operating until the new ones
have been launched could easily top $1.5 billion, according to several estimates. Arguments for new
ships include the strategic, like maintaining a four-seasons ability to patrol northern waters, and the
practical, like being able to quickly reach a disabled cruise ship or an oil spill in ice-clogged waters,
Admiral Allen said. Even with the increasing summer retreats of sea ice, which many polar scientists say probably are
being driven in part by global warming caused by humans, there will always be enough ice in certain parts of the Arctic
to require icebreakers. Admiral Allen and members of the presidential U.S. Arctic Research Commission have been pressing lawmakers
for support and urging the White House to issue a presidential directive that emphasizes the need for increased oversight of the Arctic and for
new ships.
Onshore Infrastructure Add-on
Increased Icebreaker fleet eliminates need for onshore infrastructure
US Coast Guard 2010 “United States Coast Guard High Latitude Region Mission Analysis” Coast
Guard (http://assets.fiercemarkets.com/public/sites/govit/hlssummarycapstone.pdf)
The gap in polar icebreaking capacity has resulted in a lack of at-sea time for crews and senior personnel
and a corresponding gap in training and leadership. In addition to providing multi-mission capability
and intrinsic mobility, a helicopter-capable surface unit would eliminate the need for acquiring an
expensive shore-based infrastructure that may only be needed on a seasonal or occasional basis. The
most capable surface unit would be a polar icebreaker. Polar icebreakers can transit safely in a
variety of ice conditions and have the endurance to operate far from logistics bases. The Coast
Guard’s polar icebreakers have conducted a wide range of planned and unscheduled Coast Guard
missions in the past. Polar icebreakers possess the ability to carry large numbers of passengers, cargo,
boats, and helicopters. Polar icebreakers also have substantial command, control, and
communications capabilities. The flexibility and mobility of polar icebreakers would assist the Coast
Guard in closing future mission performance gaps effectively.
Ports Add-on
Current Icebreaker capabilities put ports, waterways, and coasts at risks – increase in
icebreaking capabilities are the only way to solve
US Coast Guard 2011 “The High Latitude Study” Coast Guard
(http://www.uscg.mil/history/docs/CRS_RL34391.pdf)
[The study] concludes that future capability and capacity gaps will significantly impact four [Coast
Guard] mission areas in the Arctic: Defense Readiness, Ice Operations, Marine Environmental
Protection, and Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security. These mission areas address the protection of
important national interests in a geographic area where other nations are actively pursuing their own
national goals.... The common and dominant contributor to these significant mission impacts is the
gap in polar icebreaking capability. The increasing obsolescence of the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet
will further exacerbate mission performance gaps in the coming years
Solvency
Mechanism
Agents
The Coast Guard would coordinate with many federal agencies to achieve longtem
solvency
GAO An analysis of the reports assembled by various government offices 12/01/11 [Government
Accountability Office] DHS-OIG “Report on the Coast Guard's Polar Icebreakers”
http://www.gao.gov/htext/d12254t.html
The Coast Guard also coordinates with federal agencies, such as the NSF, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and DOD, and is involved with several interagency coordination
efforts that address aspects of key practices we have previously identified to help enhance and sustain
collaboration among federal agencies.[Footnote 35] For example, as discussed above, the Coast Guard
collaborates with the NSF to manage the nation's icebreaker fleet, including scheduling icebreaker
time for research activities,[Footnote 36] while NOAA provides the Coast Guard with weather
forecasts and warnings, as well as information about ice concentration and type. Additionally, the
Coast Guard is involved with interagency efforts such as the Interagency Policy Committee on the Arctic,
created in March 2010 to coordinate government wide implementation of National Security
Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25.[Footnote 37]
6 Ice Breakers Solve
Six ice breakers needed to fulfill requirement- research and defense can then continue
Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, 2012 (June 14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress” Congressional Research Service)
• The Coast Guard requires three heavy and three medium icebreakers to fulfill its statutory missions.
These icebreakers are necessary to (1) satisfy Arctic winter and transition season demands and (2)
provide sufficient capacity to also execute summer missions. Single-crewed icebreakers have sufficient
capacity for all current and expected statutory missions. Multiple crewing provides no advantage
because the number of icebreakers required is driven by winter and shoulder season requirements.
Future use of multiple or augmented crews could provide additional capacity needed to absorb mission
growth. • The Coast Guard requires six heavy and four medium icebreakers to fulfill its statutory
missions and maintain the continuous presence requirements of the Naval Operations Concept.
Consistent with current practice, these icebreakers are single-crewed and homeported in Seattle
Washington. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service 10 • Applying crewing and home porting alternatives reduces the
overall requirement to four heavy and two medium icebreakers. This assessment of non-material
solutions shows that the reduced number of icebreakers can be achieved by having all vessels
operate with multiple crews and two of the heavy icebreakers homeporting in the Southern
Hemisphere.
Would only require six icebreakers.
O’Rourke, specialist in naval affairs, 6/14. Ronald O’Rourke “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf
The Coast Guard requires three heavy and three medium icebreakers to fulfill its statutory missions.
These icebreakers are necessary to (1) satisfy Arctic winter and transition season demands and (2) provide sufficient capacity to also execute
summer missions. Single-crewed
icebreakers have sufficient capacity for all current and expected
statutory missions. Multiple crewing provides no advantage because the number of icebreakers required is driven by winter and
shoulder season requirements. Future use of multiple or augmented crews could provide additional capacity needed to absorb mission
growth.
2 Ice Breakers Solve
Fleet would require more than 1 new ship
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
One new polar icebreaker is insufficient for several logical reasons. First, a single ship cannot be in
more than one location at one time. No matter how technologically advanced or efficiently operated, a
single polar icebreaker can be operational (on station) in the polar regions for only a portion of any year.
An icebreaker requires regular maintenance and technical support from shipyards and industrial
facilities, must reprovision regularly, and has to effect periodic crew change-outs. These functions
cannot be conducted practically or economically “in the ice” and therefore require transit time to and
from polar operating areas. A single icebreaker, therefore, could not meet any reasonable standard of
active and influential presence and reliable, at-will access throughout the polar regions. A second
consideration supporting the need for more than a single polar icebreaker is the potential risk of failure
in the harsh conditions of polar operations. Icebreakers are the only ships designed to collide regularly
with hard objects and to go independently where no other surface vessels can survive. Despite their
intrinsic robustness, damage and system failure are always a risk, and the U.S. fleet must have enough
depth to provide backup assistance. Being forced to operate with only a single icebreaker would
necessarily require the ship to accept a more conservative operating profile, avoiding more
challenging ice conditions because reliable assistance would not be available. A second capable
icebreaker, either operating elsewhere or in homeport, would provide ensured backup assistance and
would allow for more robust operations by the other ship.
We need more ice breakers
Venzke Retired Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard ‘9 (Norm, icebreaker sailor, severed on four
icebreakers, March, http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/icebreakers.pdf, “We Need More
Icebreakers!”)
Absent knowledge of future plans and prioritizing of missions, one can only conclude that two
operational Coast Guard icebreakers (even if a foreign charter were guaranteed) are grossly inadequate
for supporting both Arctic and Antarctic operations. Polar-class replacements might not be available for
at least eight years. Therefore, it would appear prudent to repair the Polar Star and return her to service
as an interim measure. Although that increase to three would improve the situation, it would not solve
the problem. Therefore, planning should provide for the expedited replacement of the two Polar-class
icebreakers as well as a backup for the Healy. Finally, the Coast Guard’s cadre of icebreakerqualified
operating and design personnel has been diminished because of the small fleet. The United States
simply does not possess an icebreaker fleet commensurate with its national needs. Corrective action
must commence as soon as possible. Otherwise, the aging fleet will continue its decline and actually
become a dying breed and the success of vital national missions will suffer accordingly
Only two Icebreakers needed to take on responsibilities in the arctic –active patrols in
northern waters protect arctic regions
Ben Muse, Alaskan Economist ’08. “How Many Polar Icebreakers Does the U.S. Need?” Arctic
Economics (http://benmuse.typepad.com/arctic_economics/2008/04/us-ice-breaking.html)
From a more strategic, longer-term perspective, two new icebreakers will far better position the nation
for the increasing challenges emerging in both polar regions. Building two new icebreakers will ensure
maintenance of this level of capability. A second new ship would allow the U.S. Coast Guard to
reestablish an active patrol presence in U.S. waters north of Alaska to meet statutory responsibilities
that will inevitably derive from increased human activity, economic development, and environmental
changes. Other unplanned situations can include search-and-rescue cases, pollution incidents where
initial response and U.S. Coast Guard monitoring are necessary, and assistance to ships threatened
with grounding or damage by ice. The likelihood of these situations will increase as the number of icestrengthened tankers, tourist ships, and other vessels in the polar regions grows.
Repair Solves
Aff takes 8-10 years to put out ships, only short-term maintenance is necessary
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
It is expected that the new polar icebreakers will not enter service for another 8 to 10 years until the
program, budget, design, construction, and test phases are completed. During this time the United
States needs a transition strategy to ensure a minimum level of icebreaker capability. The committee
recommends a continuing maintenance and repair program for the POLAR SEA, building on the work
recently completed, to keep it mission capable until at least the first new polar ship enters service. The
cost to keep this ship mission capable will be much lower than a service life extension program. The
resulting capability, an upgraded POLAR SEA and a fully capable HEALY, is less than this committee
believes the nation needs, but a cost-effective strategy should emphasize new construction rather
than maintenance of aging ships. The nation may have to charter supplemental ship services during the
transition to new ships. The committee also advises that the POLAR STAR continue to be kept in
caretaker status, indefinitely moored at the U.S. Coast Guard pier. If the POLAR SEA has catastrophic
problems, the POLAR STAR could be reactivated and brought back into service within a year or so.
The ships are repairable- no need to build new if life can be extended another 25 years
Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, 2012 (June 14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress” Congressional Research Service)
The Coast Guard stated in February 2008 that performing the extensive maintenance, repair, and
modernization work needed to extend the service lives of the two ships by 25 years might cost
roughly $400 million per ship. This figure, the Coast Guard said, is based on assessments made by
independent contractors for the Coast Guard in 2004. The service life extension work, the Coast Guard
said, would improve the two icebreakers’ installed systems in certain areas. Although the work would
be intended to permit the ships to operate for another 25 years, it would not return the cutters to
new condition.34 An August 30, 2010, press report stated that the Commandant of the Coast Guard,
Admiral Robert Papp, estimated the cost of extending the lives of Polar Star and Polar Sea at about
$500 million per ship; the article quoted Papp as stating that Polar Star and Polar Sea “were built to
take a beating. They were built with very thick special steel, so you might be able to do a renovation on
them and keep going…. I think there are certain types of steel that, if properly maintained, they can go
on for an awful long time. What the limit is, I’m not sure.”35
Remodeling and repairing is cheaper and will be good to go in 2 years
Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, 2012 (June 14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress” Congressional Research Service)
Regarding the potential cost to repair Polar Sea and return it to service, at a December 1, 2011, hearing
that focused on the polar icebreaker fleet (see “December 1, 2011, Hearing” below), Dave Whitcomb,
the chief operating officer of Vigor Industrial—the owner of the shipyard that has conducted
maintenance and repair work on Polar Sea and Polar Star for many years—testified that Polar Sea can
be restored to full mission readiness with a comparable longevity [to that of Polar Star] at relatively
modest cost and in a reasonably short period of time. Vigor Industrial estimates that bringing the
Polar Sea up to an operationally capable condition would require approximately 11 million dollars.
We base this on the fact that we have done comparable work on the Polar Star already and are well
aware of what is required.… This work would require approximately two years to complete and might
well be finished faster depending on availability of key components.36 Whitcomb further testified
that the above estimated cost of $11 million includes overhauling the ship’s diesel engines ($5 million),
replacing the ship’s obsolete cranes ($3 million), and upgrading the ship’s propellers ($3 million).
Whether the work described above includes everything that would be needed to return Polar Sea to
service is not clear, particularly given that the Coast Guard is transferring certain major equipment from
Polar Sea to Polar Star to facilitate Polar Star’s return to service.37
Plan could be solved by extending the life of current icebreakers
O’Rourke, specialist in naval affairs, 6/14. Ronald O’Rourke “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf
The Coast Guard stated in February 2008 that performing the extensive maintenance, repair, and modernization
work needed to extend the service lives of the two ships by 25 years might cost roughly $400 million
per ship. This figure, the Coast Guard said, is based on assessments made by independent contractors for the Coast Guard in 2004. The
service life extension work, the Coast Guard said, would improve the two icebreakers’ installed systems in
certain areas. Although the work would be intended to permit the ships to operate for another 25 years, it would
not return the cutters to new condition. 34
Contracting Solves
Spending more money to buy ships bad- Leasing is a better option.
Gramling, doctoral degree in marine geochemistry from the Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institution/Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joint Program for Oceanography, as well as bachelor’s
degrees in geology and history, 7/6/12 (Carolyn, 6 July, “NSF Finds an Icebreaker to Reach McMurdo”,
Science Insider,http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2012/07/nsf-finds-an-icebreaker-toreach.html)KW
After 2 months of negotiations, the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) has struck a deal with a
Russian shipping company to charter a heavy-duty icebreaker to clear a path this winter to the largest
U.S. scientific base in the Antarctic. The icebreaker Vladimir Ignatyuk (above), operated by the
Murmansk Shipping Company, led the break-in and resupply of McMurdo Station last year after the
Swedish government ended a long-standing agreement to lease its icebreaker, the Oden. In May,
Murmansk informed NSF that the Ignatyuk would not be available for the 2012-13 season, due to
concerns about the ship's ability to operate safely in the Antarctic pack ice. But on 3 July, NSF
announced that it had reached an agreement with Murmansk to charter the Ignatyuk for the coming
season after all.
There are other options- Contracting or leasing ice breakers would not burn a hole in
the Coast Guard’s pocket and would still provide access to key research and defense
Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, 2012 (June 14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress” Congressional Research Service)
Another potential issue for Congress is how many polar icebreakers, with what capabilities, the Coast
Guard will need in the future. In assessing this issue, factors that Congress may consider include, but
are not limited to, the following: • current and projected mission demands for Coast Guard polar
icebreakers as analyzed in the High Latitude Study and other recent studies, including an assessment of
how those demands might be affected by NSF decisions on how to acquire icebreaking services to
support its research activities; • the potential for various mission demands (not just those conducted
in support of NSF research activities) to be met by non-Coast Guard icebreakers, including leases or
charters of icebreakers owned by foreign governments or private firms; and • the Coast Guard’s
overall missions-vs.-resources situation, which includes the Coast Guard’s requirements to perform
many non-polar missions and the Coast Guard’s desire to fund programs for performing these nonpolar missions.42 Regarding the first factor above, the NSF states that although Coast Guard polar
icebreakers are very capable, the NSF is mandated by presidential directive to perform its research
activities in the most cost-effective way possible, and that it can be more expensive for NSF to
support its research activities with Coast Guard polar icebreakers than with charters of icebreakers
crewed by contractor personnel. Although Coast Guard polar icebreakers in the past have performed
the annual McMurdo break-in mission, the NSF in recent years has chartered Russian and Swedish
contractor-operated icebreakers to perform the mission (with a Coast Guard polar icebreaker standing
ready to assist if needed). The NSF has also noted that Healy, though very capable in supporting Arctic
research, operates at sea for about 200 days a year, as opposed to about 300 days a year for foreign
contractor-operated polar icebreakers. Regarding the second factor above, issues to consider would
include, among other things, the potential availability of ships for lease, leasing costs, regulatory
issues relating to long-term leases of capital assets for the U.S. government, and the ability of leased
ships to perform the missions in question, including the mission of defending U.S. sovereignty in
Arctic waters north of Alaska, the challenging McMurdo resupply mission, or missions that emerge
suddenly in response to unexpected events.43 Regarding the first two factors above, some observers
note the size of the polar icebreaking fleets operated by other countries. Countries with interests in the
polar regions have differing requirements for polar icebreakers, depending on the nature and extent of
their polar activities. According to one source, as of January 2009, Russia had a fleet of 25 polar
icebreakers (including 6 active heavy icebreakers, 2 heavy icebreakers in caretaker status, 15 other
icebreakers, and 2 additional icebreakers leased from the Netherlands); Finland and Sweden each had 7
polar icebreakers; and Canada had 6.44 Regarding the third factor above, a January 17, 2011, press
report stated that while the current Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Robert Papp, remained
committed to funding the procurement of eight National Security Cutters (NSCs),45 “the admiral was
less optimistic about the prospects of replacing the Coast Guard’s heavy polar icebreakers, both of
which are currently in port for restoration or repairs. He estimated that replacing them would cost
$800 million each, and he does not see a national will to provide that kind of funding right now.”
Incremental Funding
Incremental funding solves cost problems and establishes sufficient capabilities
Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, 2012 (June 14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress” Congressional Research Service)
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Coast Guard’s proposal to fund the
acquisition of a new icebreaker using incremental funding (i.e., a series of annual funding
increments—see “Funding in FY2013 Budget for New Polar Icebreaker” in “Background”) rather than full
funding (i.e., placing most or all of the ship’s acquisition cost into a single year). Section 31.6 of Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-1147 normally requires executive branch agencies to use full
funding for acquiring capital assets such as a new ship. The Coast Guard appears to have received
permission from OMB to propose the use of incremental funding for acquiring a new polar
icebreaker; Congress may choose to approve, reject, or modify this proposal. Supporters of using
incremental funding to acquire a new polar icebreaker could argue that funding this ship in a single
year would create a one-year “spike” in Coast Guard funding requirements that could require
offsetting and potentially disruptive one-year reductions in other Coast Guard programs, and that
using incremental funding mitigates the spiking issue by spreading the ship’s cost over several years.
Supporters could argue that avoiding such budget spikes is a principal reason why the Navy in recent
years has been given permission by OMB and Congress to use incremental funding to procure aircraft
carriers and amphibious assault ships,48 and that a polar icebreaker is analogous to an aircraft carrier or
an amphibious assault ship in being a very expensive (for the Coast Guard) ship that is procured once
every several years. Supporters of using full funding to acquire a new polar icebreaker could argue that
the acquisition cost of a polar icebreaker (roughly $900 million), though large by Coast Guard standards,
is much less than that of an aircraft carrier (more than $11 billion) or an amphibious assault ship (more
than $3 billion). They could argue that OMB believes using full funding reduces risks in the acquisition of
capital assets,49 and that permitting the use of incremental funding for the procurement of a polar
icebreaker could weaken adherence to the policy by setting a precedent for using incremental funding
for acquiring other capital assets costing less than $1 billion. The issue of incremental funding as an
alternative to full funding in the acquisition of Navy ships is discussed at length in other CRS reports.50
Bulbous Bow
Coclusive results show that the bulbous bow proves the most effective
Kim et al, (Hyun-Soo Kim, Mun-Keun Ha, Dang Ahn Samsung Heavy Industries, Marine Research
Institute, Koje Shipyard, Korea and David Molyneux Institute for Ocean Technology, National Research
Council, Canada. “Hull form design for icebreaking tankers”. NRC Publications Archive.)
The results of this research have been extremely important to SHI’s strategy to become the world leader in the construction of large
icebreaking merchant ships. Model testing has been an essential element of this strategy, since it is the opinion of the authors that analytical
methods are not sufficiently well developed for accurate performance predictions.
The results of the research have shown
that: 1) Quite different bow shapes can result in similar resistance in ice, once allowances for hull-ice friction
coefficient and ice thickness have been included. 2) Icebreaker designs have the lowest resistance in level ice and
pack ice. Such a design is characterized by a raked bow with a long overhang. This type of bow is
effective at breaking the ice, and directing the broken pieces around the hull. However, this type of
bow has relatively poor performance in open water. 3) Bulbous bows in ice have distinctive
properties, compared to conventional icebreaker bows. The bow shape results in a lot of secondary
breaking where the ice floes come into contact with the upper surface of the bulb. When the ice is
already broken before it comes into contact with the ship, this penalty is removed. It is possible for a
ship with a bulbous bow to be effective in light ice conditions, especially pack ice. The ice breaking
performance is clearly much worse than a bow designed for heavy ice, but the improvement in open
water performance compensates for this. It may be particularly effective in an area with extensive icebreaker support.
General
Laundry List
The best way to solve is building more ice breakers – scheduling, distance, solves
research and presence
Venzke Retired Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard ‘9 (Norm, icebreaker sailor, severed on four
icebreakers, March, http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/icebreakers.pdf, “We Need More
Icebreakers!”)
The United States icebreaker fleet is absolutely inadequate. That opinion is supported by the fact that
the fleet is incapable of meeting mission requirements without a chartered foreign icebreaker. Why is
the United States in this position? Polar icebreakers are very expensive to build and support and,
therefore, are neither popular nor of high priority within the appropriate federal agencies. One of the
three Coast Guard icebreakers, the Healy (WAGB-20) is new, very capable, and well equipped for
research but not the most powerful. The Polar Star (WAGB-10) and Polar Sea (WAGB-11) are quite
powerful, but are more than 30 years old. Furthermore, the Polar Star has been placed in
commissionspecial status and would require almost a year to be restored to operational status even on
an emergency upgrade schedule. Thus, the United States effectively has only two polar icebreakers, the
Healy and the Polar Sea. All polar icebreaking is hazardous even with the stoutest and most powerful
ships manned by experienced professionals. The only remedy for crippling ice damage and delays due
to long shipyard availabilities are back-up icebreakers. Also, ship scheduling is complicated by lessthan-precise ice forecasts—is it a light or heavy ice year or, in other words, will one or two icebreakers
be required? Further, those considerations are complicated by the vast distances between homeport,
the Arctic, Antarctica, and repair facilities. Operations in the western Arctic involve the fulfilling of
statutory requirements and the need for both research and a national presence in an area of increased
international interest. Apparently, the Healy is deemed adequate for the current level of operations.
But she is only one ship, not immune from damage and delays and can only operate in one place at a
given time. Given that diminishing ice will result in increased foreign shipping in the United States’ area
of interest, it’s obvious that an additional icebreaker will be needed. Now is the time to plan for that
vessel with recognition that even more might be required to support our future requirements.
Presumably, the Canadian Coast Guard will continue providing icebreaker support for the annual Thule
(Greenland) Air Base resupply as long as it is needed. If not, additional icebreaker support would be
necessary for that mission. Operations in Antarctica include the annual McMurdo base resupply that is
vital and must be accomplished by sea during a narrow window of time. Without it, the U.S. Antarctic
Research Program of the National Science Foundation would grind to a halt except for the virtually icefree Palmer Station. Whether one or two icebreakers are required at McMurdo depends on the ice year,
heavy or light. In 2006, ice conditions were forecast to be relatively light. Otherwise, a Russian
icebreaker, the Krasin, would not have been chartered and scheduled for a solo break-in. Ultimately, she
aborted that mission due to ice damage (a broken propeller blade). That necessitated an emergency
deployment of the Polar Star on an estimated 7,000-mile transit to complete resupply at McMurdo. At
that time, the Polar Sea was in the yard. The insufficiency of U.S. icebreakers is again exemplified by the
necessity to charter a Swedish icebreaker to support the 2008-09 McMurdo resupply.
Ice breakers solve laundry list
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
From a strategic, longer-term perspective, two new Polar class icebreakers will far better position the
nation for the increasing challenges emerging in both polar regions. A second new ship would allow
the U.S. Coast Guard to reestablish an active patrol presence in U.S. waters north of Alaska to meet
statutory responsibilities that will inevitably derive from increased human activity, economic
development, and environmental change. It would allow response to emergencies such as searchand-rescue cases, pollution incidents, and assistance to ships threatened with grounding or damage
by ice. Moreover, a second new ship will leverage the possibilities for simultaneous operations in widely
disparate geographic areas (e.g., concurrent operations in the Arctic and Antarctic), provide more
flexibility for conducting Antarctic logistics (as either the primary or the secondary ship for the McMurdo
break-in), allow safer multiple-ship operations in the most demanding ice conditions, and increase
opportunities for international expeditions. Finally, an up-front decision to build two new polar
icebreakers will allow economies in the design and construction process and provide a predictable cost
reduction for the second ship.
A2: Cost
The plan is cost effective and will provide at least a 30 year lifespan for these new
ships
Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, 2012 (June 14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress” Congressional Research Service)
The Coast Guard estimated in February 2008 that new replacement ships for the Polar Star and Polar
Sea might cost between $800 million and $925 million per ship in 2008 dollars to procure.31 The Coast
Guard said that this estimate is based on a ship with integrated electric drive, three propellers, and a
combined diesel and gas (electric) propulsion plant. The icebreaking capability would be equivalent to
the POLAR Class Icebreakers [i.e., Polar Star and Polar Sea] and research facilities and
accommodations equivalent to HEALY. This cost includes all shipyard and government project costs.
Total time to procure a new icebreaker [including mission analysis, studies, design, contract award,
and construction] is eight to ten years.32 The Coast Guard further stated that this notional new ship
would be designed for a 30-year service life. The High Latitude Study provided to Congress in July 2011
states that the above figure of $800 million to $925 million in 2008 dollars equates to $900 million to
$1,041 million in 2012 dollars. The study provides the following estimates, in 2012 dollars, of the
acquisition costs for new polar icebreakers: • $856 million for 1 ship; • $1,663 million for 2 ships—an
average of about $832 million each; • $2,439 million for 3 ships—an average of $813 million each; •
$3,207 million for 4 ships—an average of about $802 million each; • $3,961 million for 5 ships—an
average of about $792 million each; and • $4,704 million for 6 ships—an average of $784 million each.
The study refers to the above estimates as “rough order-of-magnitude costs” that “were developed as
part of the Coast Guard’s independent Polar Platform Business Case Analysis.”33
A2: Timeframe
The plan is cost effective and will provide at least a 30 year lifespan for these new
ships
Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, 2012 (June 14, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress” Congressional Research Service)
The Coast Guard estimated in February 2008 that new replacement ships for the Polar Star and Polar
Sea might cost between $800 million and $925 million per ship in 2008 dollars to procure.31 The Coast
Guard said that this estimate is based on a ship with integrated electric drive, three propellers, and a
combined diesel and gas (electric) propulsion plant. The icebreaking capability would be equivalent to
the POLAR Class Icebreakers [i.e., Polar Star and Polar Sea] and research facilities and
accommodations equivalent to HEALY. This cost includes all shipyard and government project costs.
Total time to procure a new icebreaker [including mission analysis, studies, design, contract award,
and construction] is eight to ten years.32 The Coast Guard further stated that this notional new ship
would be designed for a 30-year service life. The High Latitude Study provided to Congress in July 2011
states that the above figure of $800 million to $925 million in 2008 dollars equates to $900 million to
$1,041 million in 2012 dollars. The study provides the following estimates, in 2012 dollars, of the
acquisition costs for new polar icebreakers: • $856 million for 1 ship; • $1,663 million for 2 ships—an
average of about $832 million each; • $2,439 million for 3 ships—an average of $813 million each; •
$3,207 million for 4 ships—an average of about $802 million each; • $3,961 million for 5 ships—an
average of about $792 million each; and • $4,704 million for 6 ships—an average of $784 million each.
The study refers to the above estimates as “rough order-of-magnitude costs” that “were developed as
part of the Coast Guard’s independent Polar Platform Business Case Analysis.”33
A2: Don’t Build Enough
We wouldn’t need many to make a difference in the arctic
Beilinson, Deputy Editor of Popular Mechanics, 12 (Jerry, February 17th, “Why the U.S. Must Build
More Icebreakers Now,” Popular Mechanics,
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/engineering/infrastructure/why-the-us-must-buildmore-icebreakers-now-6693195)
The defense budget is shrinking, and previous studies have pegged the price of a high-powered
icebreaker at $800 million to $1 billion. However, the Coast Guard’s wish list for icebreakers is a small
one, including up to four heavy-duty and two or three medium-duty ships. Even just one additional
heavy-duty icebreaker would make a big difference, which is why it’s important for the project
envisioned in the White House’s budget proposal to get rolling. The Pentagon saved several billion
dollars last year by canceling the Marine’s Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, an amphibious assault
technology. Investing a fraction of the savings in an icebreaker program could double or triple U.S.
capabilities. Similarly, the Navy plans to build dozens of littoral combat ships for operations relatively
close to shore: That’s an important program. But as Lawson Brigham, a University of Alaska professor
and former icebreaker captain, has pointed out, sacrificing just one or two of those ships could provide
the money to roughly double the Coast Guard’s icebreaking muscle. The Arctic will become steadily
more important politically and economically as the 21st century progresses, and the United States is
fortunate to be an Arctic nation. It’s time for the country to rebuild its northern seafaring capabilities.
Disadvantage Answers
Spending
Funding Available
Funding is available and currently being wasted on chartered ships
Bement, Director National Science Foundation, ’06 (Dr. Arden L. Jr., September 26, NSF Testimony
Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation, http://www.nsf.gov/about/congress/109/alb_icebreaker_092606.jsp) KW
After opening the channel, the icebreaker escorts two vessels, a tanker and a freighter, to and from the
ice pier at McMurdo. These re-supply vessels are ice-strengthened commercial vessels chartered by the
Military Sealift Command (MSC). (The Navy used to operate all of their own tankers and freighters, but
more recently has depended on commercial contractors for construction, maintenance and staffing of
vessels. As a result, MSC now charters virtually all of the tankers and freighters used by the DoD either
through a direct industry charter or through a government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO)
arrangement.) Two years ago, acting on advice from the Coast Guard that a second icebreaker should be
brought in to assist the Polar Star, NSF chartered the Russian icebreaker Krasin for the purpose. The
Coast Guard’s Polar Sea was undergoing repairs and no other U.S. icebreakers other than Healy were
available – but Healy was needed in the Arctic. Last year the Polar Sea was undergoing extensive repair.
NSF again chartered the Russian icebreaker Krasin and held Polar Star in reserve (and eventually brought
her in to assist in the final stages of the break-in). The situation for the coming year is again similar. Polar
Sea is ready for duty but the Coast Guard has recommended that a backup vessel be employed. NSF
has therefore nearly concluded a charter for the Swedish icebreaker, Oden. The USCG has performed its
icebreaking mission in Antarctica with distinction for many decades, but with increasing difficulty in
recent years. Its two Polar Class icebreakers are nearing the end of their estimated lifetime and are
becoming increasingly difficult and costly to keep in service. The need to charter the Krasin and Oden
has already been mentioned. Given this state of affairs, NSF has given careful consideration to how
best to meet the needs of the scientific community over the long-term. Under the current
arrangement between NSF and the Coast Guard, NSF provides all the funding for USCG icebreaker
operations and maintenance, and the Coast Guard carries out those duties. NSF provided $55.74M for
operation of the USCG polar class icebreakers in 2006. In addition, NSF provided approximately $8
million for fuel and charter of Krasin. When chartering commercial vessels such as the Krasin and the
Oden, NSF pays only for the time that the ships are under charter.
Plan Cheap
The US does not need to spend much to greatly increase its ice breaking capabilities.
Jerry Beilinson 12 (Feb 17, Why the U.S. Must Build More Icebreakers Now)
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/engineering/infrastructure/why-the-us-must-buildmore-icebreakers-now-6693195
The defense budget is shrinking, and previous studies have pegged the price of a high-powered
icebreaker at $800 million to $1 billion. However, the Coast Guard’s wish list for icebreakers is a small
one, including up to four heavy-duty and two or three medium-duty ships. Even just one additional
heavy-duty icebreaker would make a big difference, which is why it’s important for the project
envisioned in the White House’s budget proposal to get rolling. The Pentagon saved several billion
dollars last year by canceling the Marine’s Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, an amphibious assault
technology. Investing a fraction of the savings in an icebreaker program could double or triple U.S.
capabilities. Similarly, the Navy plans to build dozens of littoral combat ships for operations relatively
close to shore: That’s an important program. But as Lawson Brigham, a University of Alaska professor
and former icebreaker captain, has pointed out, sacrificing just one or two of those ships could provide
the money to roughly double the Coast Guard’s icebreaking muscle. The Arctic will become steadily
more important politically and economically as the 21st century progresses, and the United States is
fortunate to be an Arctic nation. It’s time for the country to rebuild its northern seafaring capabilities.
Plan relatively inexpensive compared to other Coast Guard expenditures
O’Rourke, specialist in naval affairs, 6/14. Ronald O’Rourke “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf
Supporters of using full funding to acquire a new polar icebreaker could argue that the acquisition cost of a polar icebreaker
(roughly $900 million), though large by Coast Guard standards, is much less than that of an aircraft carrier (more
than $11 billion) or an amphibious assault ship (more than $3 billion). They could argue that OMB believes using
full funding reduces risks in the acquisition of capital assets, 49 and that permitting the use of incremental funding for
the procurement of a polar icebreaker could weaken adherence to the policy by setting a precedent for using incremental funding for
acquiring other capital assets costing less than $1 billion.
Trade Outweighs
Economic benefits of sea lanes trumps initial investment cost
Treadwell, Lieutenant Governor of Alaska, ’11 (Mead, December 1, “America is Missing the Boat”
Congressional Testimony United States House of Representatives Committee Transportation on
Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation,
http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyCGMT/2011-12-1-Treadwell.pdf)
However we work out our finances, America and its trading partners could reap huge economic benefits from accessing
northern sea routes. Former U.S. Coast Guard Lieutenant Commander Scott Borgerson wrote nearly four years ago about the financial
advantages available to world commerce through Arctic shipping. 8 He told us how plying the Northern Sea Route from
Rotterdam to Yokohama instead of traveling via the Suez Canal would yield distance savings of more
than 40 percent. He told us that one container ship voyage from Seattle to Rotterdam via the Northwest
Passage instead of the Panama Canal could save about 20 percent of its costs – then about $3.5 million
dollars. Borgerson envisioned a future of global Arctic shipping where “a marine highway directly over the North Pole will
materialize. Such a route,” he wrote, “which would most likely run between Iceland and Alaska’s Dutch Harbor, would connect
shipping megaports in the North Atlantic with those in the North Pacific and radiate outward to other
ports in a hub-and-spoke system.” As the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment predicted, most Arctic shipping traffic today is
destinational, carrying resources out from or products in to Arctic regions. But we need to envision a time, coming soon, when products
travelling to and from non-Arctic ports traverse our Arctic Ocean and Bering Sea – and we need to be ready.
Politics
Plan Popular
Plan is popular with Republicans – Arctic seen as key priority
Strohm, Reporter at Bloomberg News, 10 (Chris, February 12th, Former reporter at Government
Executive Magazine, “Coast Guard Commandment Cites Urgent Need for Icebreakers,” Government
Executive, http://www.govexec.com/defense/2010/02/coast-guard-commandant-cites-urgent-need-foricebreakers/30855/#disqus_thread)
Some lawmakers have stressed the need to recapitalize or buy new ice breakers, especially Maine
Republican Sens. Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe, whose state's Bath Iron Works shipyard would likely
get the work. Allen said the country faces "an ice-diminished Arctic," rather than an ice-free Arctic,
meaning ice-faring ships are still needed. "If you have an event up there, you need to be able to
respond, create command and control, very much like putting a cutter off Port-au-Prince [Haiti] to give
you situational awareness and tell everybody what's going on," he said. "There is no infrastructure off
the north slope of Alaska from which we can conduct operations." He said there are two airstrips but
"as far as moving large numbers of people and equipment up there it's very difficult to do." "The way
you do that is with an icebreaker that gives you access, presence, command and control and the ability
to coordinate operations across that entire mission set," he added. "That is what we need to be talking
about in my point of view." On other fronts, Allen defended the Obama administration's fiscal 2011
budget request even though it proposes to reduce Coast Guard personnel by nearly 800 positions. He
said the budget gives the agency flexibility to recapitalize aging ships, and the Coast Guard will
constantly evaluate its options for effectively handling missions. But he said as a result of the response
to the earthquake in Haiti, the Coast Guard moved one of its cutters from off the shore of Panama and
Ecuador to Port-au-Prince. That left a gap in a region where 10 metric tons of cocaine are smuggled
per month, he said.
Congress cares about icebreakers – Polar Sea proves
AP ’12 (June 15, http://www.adn.com/2012/06/15/2506218/coast-guard-to-keep-seattle-based.html,
“Coast Guard icebreaker gets reprieve from demolition”)
"The Polar Sea's hull is still in sound condition," Cantwell said. "Postponing its scrapping allows the
administration and Congress more time to consider all options for fulfilling the nation's critical
icebreaking missions." The United States needs more icebreakers in the Arctic, the Alaska senators said.
"While this may only be a six-month respite for the Polar Sea, I will use this period to work through my
role on the Appropriations Committee to make America's icebreaking capacity a top priority,"
Murkowski said.
Republicans support it – Just need a plan
Ahlers ’11 (Mike, November 4, http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/03/politics/congress-polaricebreakers/index.html, “Polar icebreaker dispute ties up Coast Guard bill”
The Congressional Research Service said one potential concern for Congress is the absence of a plan for
replacing the Polar Star upon completion of its seven- to 10-year life after it returns to service in late
2012. That is why Rep. Frank LoBiondo, R-New Jersey, included the provision to decommission the Polar
Star, said spokesman Jason Galanes. "We absolutely support the Arctic icebreaker mission," Galanes
said. "We're forcing this decision rather then allowing the administration to kick the can down the
road." In a statement, the Office of Management and Budget said the administration "strongly opposes"
the provision, and that the repairs to the Polar Star "will stabilize the United States' existing polar fleet
until long-term icebreaking capability requirements are finalized."
Popular – Larsen
Dickie, columnist for the Seattle Times, ’11 (Lance, December 13,
http://www.standard.net/stories/2011/12/13/coast-guard-needs-new-icebreakers-protect-us-interestsarctic, Seattle Times “The Coast Guard needs new icebreakers to protect U>S. interests in the Arctic”
U.S. Rep. Rick Larsen, D-Wash., is working to focus congressional attention on giving the U.S. Coast
Guard the ability to protect America's interests. As the ranking member of the House Transportation
subcommittee on the Coast Guard, and a member of the House Armed Services Committee, he is well
positioned to do so. Icebreakers are the key to "assured access to ice-covered seas independent of ice
conditions." Those words, from a 2007 National Research Council report, are reinforced by Coast Guard
studies, including "The High Latitude Region Mission Analysis," and a comprehensive look at icebreaker
issues and options published in November by the Congressional Research Service. All conclude the
Coast Guard lacks the icebreaker capacity to represent U.S. interests in coming years. At least two new
ships are needed. In the face of such clarity, the political jumble in Congress is a bit of a puzzle. Just to
be clear:
Congress supports new ice breakers
Ahlers 11. Mike M. Ahlers, November 3, 2011. “Polar icebreaker dispute ties up Coast Guard
appropriations.” CNN. http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-03/politics/politics_congress-polaricebreakers_1_icebreakers-polar-star-polar-sea?_s=PM:POLITICS
The Congressional Research Service said one potential concern for Congress is the absence of a plan for replacing the
Polar Star upon completion of its seven- to 10-year life after it returns to service in late 2012. That is why Rep. Frank
LoBiondo, R-New Jersey, included the provision to decommission the Polar Star, said spokesman Jason Galanes. "We
absolutely support the Arctic icebreaker mission," Galanes said. "We're forcing this decision rather then
allowing the administration to kick the can down the road." In a statement, the Office of Management and
Budget said the administration "strongly opposes" the provision, and that the repairs to the Polar Star
"will stabilize the United States' existing polar fleet until long-term icebreaking capability
requirements are finalized." Regardless of the outcome of the dispute, a gap in icebreaking capabilities is almost certain, according to the CRS
report. Following any decision to design and build new icebreakers, the first replacement polar icebreaker might enter service in eight to 10 years, the report says.
Oil
Plan Helps Oil Access
Coast Guard icebreaker presence in the arctic key to resolve Arctic catastrophes.
Sullivan 3/26/12. John A. Sullivan, news editor for Oil and Gas Investor. “Coast Guard Muscles Up Arctic Presence in Advance of
Drilling.” Natural Gas Week. Lexis. http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20_T15105743963
Faced with patrolling a gradually opening Arctic frontier north of Alaska, the US Coast Guard is also
faced with another task -- providing security for the energy companies planning on drilling for oil and
gas in the region. Shell Oil has plans to drill three wells in the Chukchi Sea and two wells in the Beaufort Sea during the next two summer
drilling seasons. For the Coast Guard, that means adding more muscle to its forces in Alaska including a
major exercise called Arctic Shield 2012 to test its oil spill response abilities. The Coast Guard is also
moving two cutters to patrol the Chukchi Sea where they will monitor vessels moving through the Bering
Strait and the Beaufort Sea. The cutters expected to take on this duty are the 282-foot <em>Alex Haley</em>, currently homeported in Kodiak,
Alaska; and the 420-foot <em>Bertholf</em> which calls Alameda, California, its homeport. While on patrol, the two vessels will use Dutch
Harbor as a refueling and resupply base. The Coast Guard is also moving two Jayhawk helicopters to Barrow, Alaska, where they will be able to
respond to emergencies in the region. The Coast Guard is also building a new communications center in the area. The two cutters will also be
able to provide security for the vessels that will be used by Shell for its drilling projects. Shell's vessels will be operating out of Dutch Harbor and
have already been involved in one highly public incident where Greenpeace activists boarded the <em>Noble Discoverer </em>while it was
attempting to leave the Port of Taranaki, New Zealand. Shell has the drillship under contract to drill its exploratory Chukchi wells. Greenpeace
teams also were trying to stop vessels from the North Sea under contract by Shell to begin their voyage to Alaska. Activists boarded the
<em>Fennica </em>and <em>Nordica</em>, two
protesting the drilling before leaving the vessels
Arctic-class icebreakers under contract by Shell and hung banners
Canada Relations
Relations Resilient
US-Canada relations remain resilient – There’re at an all time high
KENNEDY, JULY 5, 2012 (Mark Kennedy, “U.S.-Canada relationship 'has never been stronger,' says
American ambassador,”
http://www.canada.com/business/Canada+relationship+never+been+stronger+says+American+ambass
ador/6889006/story.html, Post media news) DG
OTTAWA — The American ambassador to Canada has issued a reassuring statement about the state of
relations between the two countries — insisting that while there have been "bumps in the road" and
"strains", the relationship has never been better. David Jacobson's written message was issued this week to
commemorate the national birthdays of both countries. Notably, it came just days after a controversial article by two Canadians who declared
the bilateral relationship has sunk to its worst level in decades. The document, entitled "How Obama Lost Canada" appears in the online edition
of Foreign Affairs and makes a detailed case for how U.S. President Barack Obama is "botching relations with the United States' biggest trade
partner." But Jacobson, while not referring to that article directly, cited
a long list of examples — from security cooperation and increased trade, to the Americans' heavy reliance on Canadian energy exports — to
conclude that things aren't so bad. "I believe the relationship between the United States and Canada
has never been stronger, " wrote Jacobson in the message posted on the embassy's website. "On so many fronts we are
working together to achieve our shared goals: managing our border for greater efficiency and greater
security; expanding trade for greater prosperity; and enhancing peace and security around the world."
Jacobson wrote he is extending a clear message on behalf of Obama and the American people : "We
are very lucky to have Canada as our neighbor." "None of this is to say that everything is perfect or
that we do not — on occasion — have some bumps in the road. The economic challenges we face,
particularly in my country, have, at times, caused strains. "And it's inconceivable that two sovereign
nations with the largest economic relationship between two countries in the history of the world, two
countries with the longest shared border in the world, would not have issues from time-to-time. But
like the friends we are, we address those issues and we try to resolve them forthrightly ." That
assessment is far rosier than the picture painted in the Foreign Affairs essay written by Derek Burney,
Canada's former ambassador to the U.S., and Fen Hampson, a foreign policy expert at Carleton University. "Whether on trade,
the environment, or Canada's shared contribution in places such as Afghanistan, time and again the United States has jilted its northern
neighbour," they write. "If the pattern of neglect continues, Ottawa will get less interested in co-operating with Washington. Already, Canada
has reacted by turning elsewhere — namely, toward Asia — for more reliable economic partners." The authors note that only 68 per cent of
Canadian exports were destined for the United States in 2010, down from 85 per cent in 2000. The biting essay points to a litany of problems,
such as: - The Obama administration "caved to environmental activists" by postponing a decision to allow the Keystone XL pipeline from Alberta
to the Gulf Coast; - The White House "jeopardized" the important Canadian-American economic relationship by failing to combat the Buy
American provision in a stimulus bill in Congress; - The U.S. has "violated the substance and spirit" of NAFTA and meetings between the prime
minister and president have "mostly fallen by the wayside"; - Canada's military involvement in operations such as Afghanistan were significant,
and yet there have been few "tangible benefits" in return from the U.S. - While
last year's "Beyond the Border" deal aimed
at improving security and cross-border traffic was initially "good news", it has yet to deliver much of
substance; But Jacobson is much more positive. He noted that Prime Minister Stephen Harper praised the recent agreement
for the Detroit-Windsor bridge as a visionary project that will increase trade. As well, the Canadian Parliament adopted a "long-awaited"
copyright reform bill. Also in June, Obama
and Harper announced Canada has been invited to join negotiations
in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a proposed free-trade agreement. Jacobson cast a positive light on
trade — saying that from 2009 to 2011, trade between the U.S.and Canada increased by 37.8 per cent,
or $188.7 billion. In the wake of the Keystone XL decision, Harper declared Canada will look to other markets, such as Asia, to sell its oil.
But Jacobson pointed to the close energy ties as an example of a strong bilateral relationship. "Canada
remains the overwhelmingly largest foreign supplier of every form of energy to the United States," he
wrote. " You send us virtually 100 per cent of the electricity we import; 85 per cent of the natural gas;
and stunningly 27 per cent of our foreign oil. The next highest foreign source of oil is Saudi Arabia at
12 per cent!!!”
Canada is dependent upon US coop, will maintain relations in the name of Canadian
sovereignty
Zachary Fillingham 12 (Staff writer for the Geopolitical Moniter, Jun 18, 12, “Canada’s Arctic Defense
Policy: Grand Theory, Stunted Practice.” http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/canadas-arctic-defensepolicy-grand-theory-stunted-practice-4691/)
However, this is not to say that the Arctic has completely dropped off the political radar. The Canadian government is still
looking for cost-effective ways to assert its sovereignty in the region. Recent reports suggest that the Harper
government is considering a proposal to buy three high-altitude unmanned drones to patrol the Northwest Passage. These could go a long way
in monitoring international shipping traffic and possible breaches of Arctic sovereignty, though as other projects have indicated- there’s a huge
gulf in Canada between announcements and deployment.The
Canadian government is well aware that it is falling short
of what is required to create a credible independent military presence in the Arctic, so it may look to
its neighbour in the south to help rectify the situation. The United States is feeling its own pinch on
defense spending, making it reluctant to commit on its own icebreakers. Thus, it’s possible that
Canada and the US could come together and pool their resources in a coordinated North American
take on Arctic security ala NORAD. And perhaps this kind of American involvement is exactly what
Canada needs to get the US on board for supporting Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest
Passage.
US-Canada Relation decline is empirically denied – we have not consulted 2 times and
never seen an impact
BYERS 2012 (MICHAEL February 6Toward a Canada-Russia Axis in the Arctic
http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2012/02/06/toward-a-canada-russia-axis-in-the-arctic/)
Canada takes the view that the Northwest Passage constitutes internal waters, where the full force of
its domestic law applies. Internal waters are not territorial waters, and there is no right – at
international law – to access them without the permission of the coastal state. Internal waters arise in bays or
along fragmented coastlines through the long-term acquiescence of other countries and/or by the drawing of ‘straight baselines’ between
headlands in accordance with a judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case. The US
insists that the Northwest Passage is an ‘international strait,’ according to criteria set out by the ICJ in
the 1949 Corfu Channel Case – namely, that “its geographical situation [connects] two parts of the high seas and the
fact [that it is] being used for international navigation.” Foreign vessels sailing through an international strait necessarily
pass within 12 nautical miles of one or more coastal states, but instead of the regular right of ‘innocent passage’ through territorial waters, they
benefit from an enhanced right of ‘transit passage.’ This entitles
them to pass through the strait without coastal state
permission, while also freeing them from other constraints. For instance, foreign submarines may sail submerged
through an international strait – something that they are not allowed to do in regular territorial waters. On two occasions, the US
has sent surface vessels through the Northwest Passage without seeking Canada’s consent : the SS
Manhattan, an American owned-and-registered ice-strengthened super-tanker in 1969; and the USCGC (US Coast Guard Cutter) Polar Sea, a
coastguard icebreaker in 1985. Most Canadian specialists argue that these two transits are insufficient to fulfill the ‘used for
international navigation’ criterion. American analysts respond that the ICJ did not specify a threshold – with some of them even arguing that
prospective use is itself enough.
US-Canada relations resilient now – they have never been better
Kennedy 7/5/12 JULY 5, 2012 U.S.-Canada relationship 'has never been stronger,' says American
ambassador BY MARK, POSTMEDIA NEWS
http://www.edmontonjournal.com/business/Canada+relationship+never+been+stronger+says+America
n/6889006/story.html
OTTAWA — The American ambassador to Canada has issued a reassuring statement about the state of
relations between the two countries — insisting that while there have been "bumps in the road" and
"strains", the relationship has never been better . David Jacobson's written message was issued this
week to commemorate the national birthdays of both countries. Notably, it came just days after a
controversial article by two Canadians who declared the bilateral relationship has sunk to its worst level
in decades. The document, entitled "How Obama Lost Canada" appears in the online edition of Foreign
Affairs and makes a detailed case for how U.S. President Barack Obama is "botching relations with the
United States' biggest trade partner." But Jacobson, while not referring to that article directly, cited a
long list of examples — from security co-operation and increased trade, to the Americans' heavy
reliance on Canadian energy exports — to conclude that things aren't so bad. "I believe the
relationship between the United States and Canada has never been stronger ," wrote Jacobson in the
message posted on the embassy's website. "On so many fronts we are working together to achieve our
shared goals: managing our border for greater efficiency and greater security; expanding trade for
greater prosperity; and enhancing peace and security around the world." Jacobson wrote he is
extending a clear message on behalf of Obama and the American people: "We are very lucky to have
Canada as our neighbor.”
Relations Low Now
Relations low now – keystone proves
Burney and Hampson 6/21/12 How Obama Lost Canada Botching Relations With the United States’ Biggest Trade Partner
Derek H. Burney a former ambassador to the United States and Fen Osler Hampson and Carleton University academic in the American
periodical Foreign June 21, 2012 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137744/derek-h-burney-and-fen-osler-hampson/how-obama-lostcanada
Permitting the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline should have been an easy diplomatic and
economic decision for U.S. President Barack Obama. The completed project would have shipped more than 700,000
barrels a day of Albertan oil to refineries in the Gulf Coast, generated tens of thousands of jobs for U.S. workers, and met the needs of
refineries in Texas that are desperately seeking oil from Canada, a more reliable supplier than Venezuela or countries in the Middle East. The
project posed little risk to the landscape it traversed. But instead
of acting on economic logic, the Obama
administration caved to environmental activists in November 2011, postponing until 2013 the decision
on whether to allow the pipeline. Obama’s choice marked a triumph of campaign posturing over
pragmatism and diplomacy, and it brought U.S.-Canadian relations to their lowest point in decade s. It
was hardly the first time that the administration has fumbled issues with Ottawa. Although relations have
been civil, they have rarely been productive. Whether on trade, the environment, or Canada’s shared contribution in places such as
Afghanistan, time and
again the United States has jilted its northern neighbor. If the pattern of neglect
continues, Ottawa will get less interested in cooperating with Washington. Already, Canada has
reacted by turning elsewhere -- namely, toward Asia -- for more reliable economic partners.
US and Canada relations are low now – empirics.
CBS News, 10(8/20/10, global news network that writes about main issues, “Battle for the Arctic
heats up,” http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2009/02/27/f-arctic-sovereignty.html)
The most direct challenge to Canada's sovereignty in Arctic waters came in 1985, when the U.S. sent
its icebreaker Polar Sea through the Northwest Passage without informing Canada or asking
permission. The political skirmish that followed led to the 1988 Arctic Co-operation Agreement
between the two countries. Boiled down to its essence, the agreement said the U.S. would not send any
more icebreakers through the passage without Canada's consent, and Canada would always give that
consent. The wider issue of whether Canada's Arctic waters were internal or international was left
unresolved. While most of the Arctic sovereignty disputes are Canada-U.S. affairs, Denmark has also
weighed in. The Danish navy recently occupied Hans Island, a barren hunk of rock between Ellesmere
Island and Greenland that Canada claims as its territory. For now, the countries agree to disagree on
Hans Island's status. The dispute over whether Canada has sovereignty over Arctic waters might seem
like an academic dispute. After all, they are locked in ice for the vast majority of the year.
Ice Breakers Boost Relations
The US and Canadian relations are high; cooperation on icebreakers proves
Michael Valliant 12, (Acquisition Directorate -- May 5, 2012, “U.S. and Canadian Coast Guard
collaborate on acquisition.”http://www.uscg.mil/servicelines/archive/20120505-CanadianAcq.asp)
When it comes to Coast Guard acquisition, the United States and Canada have a lot to talk about. And with officials
from the Canadian Coast Guard traveling to U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters and members of the surface program
recently visiting Ottawa, Ontario, the conversation is picking up.
The Canadian Coast Guard Ship Louis S. St-Laurent makes an approach to the Coast Guard Cutter Healy in the Arctic Ocean Sept. 5, 2009. The
two ships are taking part in a multi-year, multi-agency Arctic survey that will help define the Arctic
continental shelf.In January, Michel Vermette, the Canadian Coast Guard’s deputy commissioner for vessel procurement—the equivalent
to the U.S. Coast Guard's Assistant Commandant for Acquisition—visited Washington to brief Deputy Commandant for Mission Support Vice
Adm. John Currier, key acquisition personnel, and Dana Goward, the director of marine transportation systems management about the
Canadian Coast Guard’s polar icebreaker program. Cmdr. Tim Newton, the assistant project manager for polar capabilities, currently part of InService Vessel Sustainment, was one of the acquisition representatives in attendance.“Mr.
Vermette briefed us on the
Canadian Coast Guard’s national shipbuilding strategy and specifically the polar icebreaker program,”
Newton said. “They announced their polar icebreaker program in 2008. So if you say we started ours this
year, they are four years ahead of us. One of our biggest benefits from working with them could be
getting our polar icebreaker requirements developed more quickly. We may be able to compress the time it takes to
get good requirements if we can incorporate some of the lessons learned from the Canadian Coast Guard.”On Feb. 29, it was the Acquisition
Directorate's turn to visit Canadian Coast Guard headquarters in Ottawa. Surface Program Manager Capt. Lisa Festa, Polar Icebreaker
Replacement Interim Project Manager Ken King and Newton made presentations on the Fast Response Cutter, the role of the Project Resident
Office, the 225-foot Seagoing Buoy Tender and the U.S. Coast Guard’s surface acquisition portfolio. In return, the Canadian Coast Guard briefed
Festa, King and Newton on their fleet renewal plan and recapitalization projects for a polar icebreaker, the Multi-Tasked Vessel and offshore
patrol vessel, as well as Canada’s National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy.“The Canadian Coast Guard is building the first of their Mid-Shore
Patrol Vessels, which is a Damen parent-craft, a similar hull to our FRC,” Newton said. “And as part of their national fleet recapitalization, they
are looking at some medium-endurance MTVs, which could look a lot like our 225s. Mr. King, who was actually Capt. King when we finished
production of the 225s, was the project manager for those, so he was able to talk about that project.” Talks in Ottawa concluded with
identifying multiple initiatives for further discussion and planning for a potential joint visit to the Canadian Coast Guard’s MSPV production line
at Irving Shipbuilding in Halifax, Nova Scotia, this spring. An annual summit between the two services is also set for this summer at Victoria,
British Columbia.
Collaboration between the two governments began in June 2009, when the U.S. and Canada signed a
memorandum of understanding recognizing that both countries had “a common interest in the design
and construction techniques of ships” and could mutually benefit from sharing “information on
research, design, analysis, development, testing and evaluation of ship design and construction
techniques.” The agreement also outlines possible ways the Coast Guards might work together.
King said the visit made clear that the two services can collaborate such that the accomplishments
and strengths of each benefit the other.“The Canadian Coast Guard is well under way on their fleet recapitalization plan, but
they have not recently procured vessels like we have,” King said. “I think they can leverage some of the expertise we generated over the last 10
years in the set up of our current acquisition organization. At the same time, they are well ahead of us on the recapitalization of a heavy polar
icebreaking capability. We may realize significant benefits, in the future and at the proper point in our major systems acquisition process, if we
take advantage of the work they’ve completed.”
Ice Race Kills Relations
Canada plans to militarize the arctic hurting US Canada relations
Griffeths [Writer for the Globe and Mail] 02-22-06 “Breaking the ice on Canada-U.S. Arctic cooperation” http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/breaking-the-ice-on-canada-us-arctic-cooperation/article727956/
Prime Minister Harper is surely doing the right thing in seeking a radical improvement in Canada-U.S.
relations. The same applies to his appointment of Michael Wilson as Canadian ambassador. But if the
Prime Minister and our man in Washington are to turn things around, the Prime Minister will have to
undo one of his election pledges. This is the pledge, made December 22, to defend Canada's Arctic
sovereignty by military means. Specifically, Mr. Harper undertook to place anti-submarine sensors in
the Northwest Passage, and to build and deploy three heavy, troop-carrying naval icebreakers to
enforce Canada's exclusive jurisdiction in its Arctic waters.
Coast Guard Trade-off
Trade-off Now
Coast guard already cutting operational programs – increased spending spurs more
tradeoffs
Korb, et al 2010. Lawrence J. Korb, former assistant Secretary of Defense, Sean Duggan, a Research
Associate for national security at the Center for American Progress, Laura Conley, Research Assistant for
National Security and International Policy. June 2010. “Building a U.S. Coast Guard for the 21st Century.”
Center for American Progress. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/pdf/coast_guard.pdf
As a result of an already constrained fiscal environment, the Coast Guard is engaged in making difficult
trade-offs even before any further possible cuts to its budget are made. The recently retired Coast
Guard Commandant Thad Allen says the service is now shifting funding away from programs that
support current operational capacity in order to focus scarce resources on asset modernization and
recapitalization programs. This is the same trade-off that confronted his immediate predecessors,
Adms. Thomas Collins and James Loy. Meanwhile, the service has lowered its performance goals in
anticipation that it will not be able to meet previous standards as a result of major asset
decommissionings.
Counterplan Answers
A2: Private Actor CP
Private companies in Alaska willing to bid for the job and get it done faster and
cheaper
DeMarban, Writer/Contributor Alaska Journal of Commerce, 2012 (“Should Alaska take the lead in
financing new icebreakers?” Alex, Apr 11, Alaska Dispatch,
http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/should-alaska-take-lead-financing-newicebreakers?page=full)KW
Jim Hemsath, deputy director at the Alaska Industrial and Development Authority (AIDEA), said the
financing agency hasn't been involved in discussions with the governor about paying for icebreakers.
But one option could include state-issued bonds, a concept that wouldn't necessarily involve AIDEA,
he said. The agency could be involved by assessing the market for an icebreaker, he said. Would Shell,
for example, consider renting an icebreaker when it begins exploratory drilling, possibly this summer?
"Too early to comment on the commercial appeal of an Alaska-owned Arctic vessel," said Curtis Smith, a
Shell spokesman, in an email. A new icebreaker could cost $900 million, while refurbishing the Polar Sea
or Polar Star could run $500 million apiece, according to the Congressional Research Service. Michael
Terminel of shipbuilder Edison Chouest Offshore said his company might be interested in working
with the state in developing an icebreaker if it won that right through a competitive bidding process.
Edison, based in Cut Off, La., has built four icebreakers, including the Nanuq and Aiviq, to support
Shell's proposed drilling operations in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas. The Aiviq was built relatively
quickly and for a little more than $200 million -- considerably less than the Coast Guard estimates for
a new icebreaker. "We're open to looking at all business opportunities," Terminel said. Chouest
companies have been huge donors to Young and other members of the Alaska delegation. Some state
lawmakers, such as Sen. Lesil McGuire, have also called for Alaska-owned icebreakers.
Private actors cant own ships, destroys sovereignty and foreign policy incentives
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
The committee was asked to consider alternative ship ownership options. Considering the McMurdo
break-in mission alone, the committee found that to best meet mission assurance requirements, only
a U.S.-flagged, U.S.-owned, and U.S.-operated ship provides sufficiently reliable control. While that
ship might be leased commercially through a long-term lease-build arrangement, from a total fleet
perspective it may be more cost-effective if science mission users pay only incremental costs—as has
been the case in the past—and if the U.S. Coast Guard provides McMurdo resupply support from the
multimission icebreaker fleet. Also, the sovereign presence of the United States is not well served by a
“leased ship.” Lease arrangements do not ensure that the United States could assert its foreign policy
will at times and places of its choosing.
Fed key to negotiate the future of the icebreakers
Robertson VP of the Adfero Group 1/18 (Jeff, Security Debrief, “Need an Icebreaker? The Coast
Guard Does”, http://securitydebrief.com/2012/01/18/need-an-icebreaker-the-coast-guard-does/, DOA:
7/9)
As the U.S. fleet of icebreakers continues to age and fall behind the world’s arctic maritime
community, the vision and fortitude of U.S. decision makers continues to wane. The recent
announcement by Shell Oil to launch their $200 million arctic icebreaker in April 2012 should send a
shiver up the spine of every Coastguardsman and mariner who has considered how the United States
will deal with the future of operations in the high latitudes. Year after year and exercise after exercise,
the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy continue to identify the need for U.S. icebreakers – either new or
repaired mothballed fleet. The M/V AIVIQ is intended to support Shell’s arctic oil exploration and has
been built to withstand the rigorous demands of the Arctic ice and remote operations. One can only
scratch one’s head and wonder how this ship could be designed, constructed and launched in less
than 3 years, and the U.S. Congress, Coast Guard and maritime industry has been unable to agree on a
plan to replace the broken USCG icebreaker fleet for the past several decades. It is time to get serious
and put our money where our long-term national security priorities are – in the Arctic.
Priv CP fails – doesn't meet the capacity of even MEDIUM icebreakers
O’Rourke, specialist in naval affairs, 6/14. Ronald O’Rourke “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf
Healy is a bit larger than Polar Star and Polar Sea—it is 420 feet long and displaces about 16,000 tons. Compared to Polar Star and Polar Sea,
Healy has less icebreaking capability (it is considered a medium polar icebreaker), but more capability
for supporting scientific research. The ship can break through ice up to 4½ feet thick at a speed of 3 knots,
and embark a scientific research staff of 35 (with room for another 15 surge personnel and two visitors). The ship is used primarily
for supporting scientific research in the Arctic.
Privatization fails – their limited capabilities simply aren’t enough to solve
Kroh et al, ’12. Kiley Kroh, Associate Director for Ocean Communications at the Center for American
Progress, Michael Conathan, Director of Ocean Policy at the Center for American Progress, and Emma
Huvos, February 2012. “Putting a Freeze on Arctic Ocean Drilling.” Center for American Progress.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/pdf/arcticreport.pdf
Even though Shell announced plans to construct its own customized icebreaking ship, icebreaking
capacity in the Arctic would still be well below the amount recommended by the 2010 High Latitude
Study, which projects that the Coast Guard needs three heavy and three medium icebreaking vessels
in order to fulfill its statutory mission requirements in the Arctic. 83,
A2: States CP
Alaska should work in junction with the US for optimal financing and efficacy
DeMarban, Writer/Contributor Alaska Journal of Commerce, 2012 (“Should Alaska take the lead in
financing new icebreakers?” Alex, Apr 11, Alaska Dispatch,
http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/should-alaska-take-lead-financing-newicebreakers?page=full)KW
Gov. Sean Parnell says the state might be interested in helping finance a new icebreaker so the U.S.
can make up lost ground in the race for Arctic dominance. That's the gist of the governor's response to
a lengthy letter from Rep. Don Young offering ideas on how Alaska can help the cash-strapped federal
government put costly new icebreakers off Alaska's increasingly busy northern coasts. With the
nation's icebreaking fleet reduced to a single working ship -- its two large icebreakers are undergoing
repairs or being decommissioned -- the state and U.S. government should consider sharing costs to
make new icebreakers a reality, Young suggested in a Feb. 7 letter to Parnell. New or refurbished
icebreakers will cost hundreds of millions of dollars. More ships are plowing through the Bering Strait as
sailing seasons lengthen in the warming but often ice-choked Arctic. The U.S. Coast Guard predicts
traffic will continue growing as shipping, resource development and tourism expands. But the Healy, a
"medium duty" icebreaker that escorted a Russian fuel tanker to Nome this winter, is the Coast Guard's
lone functioning icebreaker. 'Creative financing' "Without access to heavy icebreakers, we will be unable
to adapt to historic changes in the Arctic," Young wrote. "Icebreakers are critical for ensuring safe
shipping and resource operations and providing for field research opportunities." He continues: "Given
the current fiscal climate in D.C., funding the acquisition of new vessels presents a significant challenge.
It is clear that we must consider creative financing and ownership options to move forward." In
addition to helping bankroll the project, the state should also think about owning an icebreaker with
private firms. The state could refurbish the Polar Sea or the Polar Star. It could then lease its
icebreakers to the Coast Guard and National Science Foundation, wrote Young.
The U.S. Coast Guard must have icebreakers to remain competitive with 8 different
polar powers including Russia and Canada.
Treadwell, 13th and current Lieutenant Governor of Alaska and former Chair of the U.S. Arctic
Research Commission, ‘6 (Mead, CQ Congressional Testimony, “REPORT ON ICEBREAKERS”, Lexis Nexis,
DOA: 7-11-12)
With respect to icebreakers and the Federal icebreaking mission, USARC works with other agencies,
and the Arctic statute reads, "The Office of Management and Budget shall seek to facilitate planning
for the design, procurement, maintenance, deployment, and operations of icebreakers needed to
provide a platform for Arctic research by allocating all funds necessary to support icebreaking
operations, except for recurring incremental costs associated with specific projects, to the Coast
Guard." Over the past several years, the USARC has communicated to the President (see letter
attached), to Congress, and to other entities, including the National Academies, the importance of
maintaining a fleet of icebreaking vessels to the U.S., and is one of only eight Arctic nations, including
Russia, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, and Finland. Alaska is our nation's
Arctic territory, and the gateway to the high north.
Scientific research, primacy, trade, and U.S. sovereignty are four independent reasons
icebreakers must stay federal
Treadwell, 13th and current Lieutenant Governor of Alaska and former Chair of the U.S. Arctic
Research Commission, ‘6 (Mead, CQ Congressional Testimony, “REPORT ON ICEBREAKERS”, Lexis Nexis,
DOA: 7-11-12)
While scientific research may be our particular purview, we also recognize that such a fleet is a vital
part of the nation's strategic presence in the polar regions. The Arctic environment is changing rapidly,
as reported daily in the global press. Climate change is presenting both challenges and opportunities,
such as improved prospects for research, enhanced access to natural resources, and favorable
circumstances for marine transportation via previously ice-infested passageways and polar routes.
These changes are not going unnoticed by our fellow Arctic nations, and activities ranging from
scientific research to commercial development are increasing apace. I would like to make these 4
specific points regarding the necessity of a Federal icebreaker fleet. 1. Vital for scientific research.
Because icebreakers conduct operations in ice-covered waters that no other ships can perform, they
are essential to the support of research in high latitudes, not only as research platforms, but also to
enable access to and support of research facilities locked within permanent ice pack of the polar seas.
Because the Coast Guard icebreakers are aging, the National Science Foundation has had little choice
but to charter a Russian commercial icebreaker for Antarctic work, and a Swedish icebreaker is likely to
be leased by NSF next year for work at both poles. Shouldn't a US federal icebreaker fleet be supporting
our research and polar interests? 2. National presence in polar waters. US Coast Guard icebreakers
maintain our national presence in both the Arctic and the Antarctic in support of the US policy in the
Antarctic and our standing in the Antarctic Treaty organizations. Cana-da's Prime Minister, Stephen
Harper, has become particularly vocal about sovereignty issues. He has proposed the pur-chase of three
new heavy icebreakers to be based in a new port near Iqualuit, and the addition of 500 personnel in
Canada's north. In a speech in Winnipeg last December 22, he said, "As Prime Minister, I will make it
plain to foreign governments - including the United States - that naval vessels traveling in Canadian
waters will require the consent of the government of Canada." (from "Breaking the Ice on Canada-U.S.
Arctic Co-operation, by Franklyn Griffiths, Globe and Mail, February 22, 2006). We also need to consider
our domestic waters in the great state of Alaska. Alaska's coastline constitutes roughly half of the
nation's total. Enforcing the nation's laws and protecting the marine environment requires polar
icebreakers. We also have a growing need for an oil spill response system in the Arctic, which requires
icebreaker support. 3. Marine access and shipping is increasing. As waterways in the Arctic open up,
due to the melting and retreat of sea ice, support of Arctic transportation (which shortens shipping
distances and times, and are thus of significant economic interest) will become more important as will
the nation's need to maintain freedom of navigation in these regions. As Arctic sea ice disappears
during the summer months over the next 50 years, marine access will open up, and routes across the
polar ocean could shorten the distance between Europe and Asia for commercial shipping. With this
potential increase in Arctic shipping comes a greater US responsibility for environmental protection,
search and rescue, navigation, safety, and overall security of the Bering Strait region and Alaska's coastal
seas. 4. Claims to extend US sovereignty in the Arctic. Whether or not the US accedes to the
Convention on the Law of the Sea, we must conduct surveys of our nation's extended continental
shelf in order to support our claims of sovereignty. Many of these regions are rich in natural
resources, and if they are to be developed, we will need to know definitively if these areas are part of
the United States. Many regions requiring surveys are adjacent to Alaska, in ice-infested waters,
accessible by icebreakers.
To remain competitive in the Arctic Ocean the U.S. requires a federal fleet.
Treadwell, 13th and current Lieutenant Governor of Alaska and former Chair of the U.S. Arctic
Research Commission, ‘6 (Mead, CQ Congressional Testimony, “REPORT ON ICEBREAKERS”, Lexis Nexis,
DOA: 7-11-12)
Of all the world's oceans, the Arctic Ocean is the last frontier, a mare incognitum. It's a demanding
place, remote, and operations in this region are expensive. Nevertheless, due to a rapidly changing
environment, the Arctic is a region of great opportunity. Access is improving, and will continue to do
so. Nine out of ten people in the world live on the con-tinents that surround the Arctic Ocean, which
means this area will not go unnoticed in the 21st century. An icebreaker fleet is a national asset and is
an important element of broad national interest. A fleet is required to meet national needs in
scientific research, national and homeland security, sustainable use of resources, maritime activity,
and sovereignty. NSF's Dr. Bement cites a daily operational cost of $100,000 for icebreaker Healy. This
should be a challenge to all involved: what combination of crewing configuration, long-term
maintenance, cost sharing on missions, and other factors may be called into play to reduce this figure? In
summary, the US cannot meet these needs with flags, rhetoric, outsourcing abroad, and public affairs
campaigns. We require US ships in the sea and the missions they accomplish. Most of the vessels in the
existing fleet are near, or at the end of their lifespan and refurbishment is not prudent. A new fleet of
polar class icebreakers is required, and it must be a Federal fleet rather than one created entirely
through private enterprise.
A2: Refurbish CP
Cant refurbish ships; similar costs but far less effective
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
The committee was asked in what manner to acquire ships. The benefits of constructing a new ship
were compared to overhauling and extending the life of POLAR STAR or POLAR SEA. A so-called service
life extension program (SLEP) involves wholesale replacement of the propulsion plant and of auxiliary,
control, and habitation support systems. While the cost of a new hull could be avoided, the retrofit of
most systems would be costly and limited by the constraints of the existing hull. The committee
recommends new construction for several reasons. There is effective, new technology—particularly
new hull designs—that could not be retrofitted to an existing ship. The hull and ship interior structure
limit retrofit design choices, thus diminishing capability. The committee estimates that a SLEP would
likely cost at a minimum more than half of a new construction cost. Some SLEP programs have overrun
their budgets and have cost as much as the construction of a new ship. A newly designed ship would
also meet more stringent environmental standards than the current ships.
A2: Foreign Country Contract CP
Only short-term solution and links to politics
Foreign Policy Blogs Network, December 7 (2011, Congressional Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation holds hearing on icebreakers, Lexis)KW
In the Arctic, the Coast Guard's icebreaker deficit could affect four out of the eleven missions it has:
Defense Readi-ness, Ice Operations, Marine Environmental Protection, and Ports, Waterways, and
Coastal Security. The USCG estimates it will take eight to ten years to design and build a new
icebreaker. Since the Polar Sea will only last for approximately that time, at most, many advocate that
the U.S. should start designing a new icebreaker immediately. The USCG presented findings of an
independent third-party regarding icebreakers to Congress on November 1, 2011. It will cost $859
million to construct a new polar class icebreaker and $1.2 billion to reconstruct the Polar Sea or Polar
Star from scratch to the current standard for heavy icebreakers. These current USCG budget cannot
fund these projects, so funding from other agencies will be necessary. However, David Whitcomb,
Chief Operating Officer of Vigor Industrial, the company repairing the Polar Star, testified on Thursday
on behalf of the Shipbuilders' Council of America that the engine of the mothballed Polar Sea could be
fixed for as little as $11 million. This would add another seven to ten years to the ship's lifespan. Even if
it is fixed soon, this still puts the U.S. in the same time crunch eventually, where by as soon as 2018 the
U.S. could again be without icebreakers, and this time for a decade while a new one is designed. China
was able to simply purchase an icebreaker from the Ukraine. While the U.S. is content to lease
icebreakers from other countries, it does not seem like an actual purchase of maritime or military
equipment from another country would go over as well in Washington.
Over time the cost to “rent” foreign cutters would pay for a new ship or repairs on old
ones- we are at the hand of other nations
Foreign Policy Blogs Network, December 7 (2011, Congressional Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation holds hearing on icebreakers, Lexis)KW
The Polar Star and Polar Sea's main missions include supporting National Science Foundation research
in Antarctica. However, they have not assisted in a mission to Antarctica since 2007. Since then, the
NSF has paid $8 million annually to Russia and Sweden for use of their icebreakers. This situation
draws a parallel to the country's lack of space shuttles, which has caused it to rely on Russian Soyuz
rockets to reach the International Space Station. This year, the U.S. was counting on Sweden's
icebreaker Oden for its annual Antarctic breakout, but Stockholm decided that it needed to keep the
ship at home to patrol sea lanes. Without any active icebreakers, not only does the U.S. have to rely
on a tight global supply. Coast Guard members' skills at operating icebreakers grow rustier as they
lose at-sea time and hands-on training, too.
Icebreakers are in high demand world-wide, makes renting or leasing ships nearly
impossible
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
A workshop on marine transportation in the Arctic (Arctic Marine Transport Workshop, 2004)
suggested that it is plausible to expect increased marine tourism as cruise ships venture further north
following the retreat of the ice edge. There has also been an increase in oil and gas tanker traffic,
particularly in the Siberian Arctic and sub-Arctic. It is also likely that resource exploration, recovery, and
shipping activities will expand into previously inaccessible areas. Several companies have begun to
develop the extensive oil and gas fields near Sakhalin (Mikko Niini, personal communication, 2005) and
the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas. These companies have begun to charter the majority of existing
icebreakers for the foreseeable future, which could create a scarcity of these types of ships on the
world market. In addi tion, many orders for double-acting tankers—ships that can both break ice and
transport cargo—have been placed and demand is expected to grow (Mikko Niini, personal
communication, 2005)
We’re too reliant on other countries – aging kills competitiveness
Venzke Retired Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard ‘9 (Norm, icebreaker sailor, severed on four
icebreakers, March, http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/icebreakers.pdf, “We Need More
Icebreakers!”)
T he United States icebreaker fleet is absolutely inadequate. That opinion is supported by the fact that the fleet is
incapable of meeting mission requirements without a chartered foreign icebreaker. Why is the United States
in this position? Polar icebreakers are very expensive to build and support and, therefore, are neither popular nor of high priority within the
appropriate federal agencies. One of the three Coast Guard icebreakers, the Healy (WAGB-20) is new, very capable, and well equipped for
research but not the most powerful. The Polar Star (WAGB-10) and Polar Sea (WAGB-11) are quite powerful, but are more than 30 years old.
Furthermore, the Polar Star has been placed in commissionspecial status and would require almost a year to be restored to operational status
even on an emergency upgrade schedule. Thus, the United States effectively has only two polar icebreakers, the Healy and the Polar Sea. All
polar icebreaking is hazardous even with the stoutest and most powerful ships manned by experienced professionals. The only remedy for
crippling ice damage and delays due to long shipyard availabilities are back-up icebreakers. Also, ship scheduling is complicated by less-thanprecise ice forecasts—is it a light or heavy ice year or, in other words, will one or two icebreakers be required? Further, those considerations
are complicated by the vast distances between homeport, the Arctic, Antarctica, and repair facilities. Operations in the western Arctic involve
the fulfilling of statutory requirements and the need for both research and a national presence in an area of increased international interest.
Apparently, the Healy is deemed adequate for the current level of operations. But she is only one ship, not immune from damage and delays
and can only operate in one place at a given time. Given that diminishing ice will result in increased foreign shipping in the United States’ area
of interest, it’s obvious that an additional icebreaker will be needed. Now is the time to plan for that vessel with recognition that even more
might be required to support our future requirements. Presumably, the Canadian Coast Guard will continue providing icebreaker support for
the annual Thule (Greenland) Air Base resupply as long as it is needed. If not, additional icebreaker support would be necessary for that
mission. Operations in Antarctica include the annual McMurdo base resupply that is vital and must be accomplished by sea during a narrow
window of time. Without it, the U.S. Antarctic Research Program of the National Science Foundation would grind to a halt except for the
virtually ice-free Palmer Station. Whether one or two icebreakers are required at McMurdo depends on the ice year, heavy or light. In 2006, ice
conditions were forecast to be relatively light. Otherwise, a Russian icebreaker, the Krasin, would not have been chartered and scheduled for a
solo break-in. Ultimately, she aborted that mission due to ice damage (a broken propeller blade). That necessitated an emergency deployment
of the Polar Star on an estimated 7,000-mile transit to complete resupply at McMurdo. At that time, the Polar Sea was in the yard. The
insufficiency of U.S. icebreakers is again exemplified by the necessity to charter a Swedish icebreaker
to support the 2008-09 McMurdo resupply. Absent knowledge of future plans and prioritizing of
missions, one can only conclude that two operational Coast Guard icebreakers (even if a foreign charter were
guaranteed) are grossly inadequate for supporting both Arctic and Antarctic operations. Polar-class replacements
might not be available for at least eight years. Therefore, it would appear prudent to repair the Polar Star and return her to service as an
interim measure. Although that increase to three would improve the situation, it would not solve the problem. Therefore, planning
should provide for the expedited replacement of the two Polar-class icebreakers as well as a backup
for the Healy. Finally, the Coast Guard’s cadre of icebreakerqualified operating and design personnel has been diminished because of the
small fleet. The United States simply does not possess an icebreaker fleet commensurate with its national
needs. Corrective action must commence as soon as possible. Otherwise, the aging fleet will continue
its decline and actually become a dying breed and the success of vital national missions will suffer
accordingly.
A2: LOST CP
The United States needs to strengthen its claim to the arctic before commercial waters
are opened up for trade and control.
CBC News 2010 (August 20th, Battle for the Arctic heats up)
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2009/02/27/f-arctic-sovereignty.html
The dispute over whether Canada has sovereignty over Arctic waters might seem like an academic
dispute. After all, they are locked in ice for the vast majority of the year. But there are two main issues
to consider. The first deals with security. Even though the Arctic waterway is frozen over most of the
year, military subs are able to make the trip year-round by simply diving under the ice (and there are
reports that many countries have secretly sent their subs through). Right now, we cannot routinely
detect submarine transits though those waters. Critics say the world is right to wonder how we can
claim an area as our sovereign territory if we don't patrol or monitor it more thoroughly. The second
point is about the ice. Plainly put, the Arctic ice is thinning at an alarming rate. Because of global
warming, there are predictions that the Northwest Passage could be open for large parts of the
summer in as little as 15 years. Critics say that risks turning the Northwest Passage into the
commercial sea route that explorers began searching for in the 15th century. The rest of the world is
sure to take more notice of a shipping route between Asia and Europe that would knock 5,000
kilometres off the current route through the Panama Canal.
LOST didn’t work thirty years ago, and it doesn’t work now
LA Times, 12 (June 5th, Los Angeles Times, “Still Lost on Law of the Sea Treaty,” Los Angeles Times website,
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/
commentary/la-oe-meese-law-of-the-sea-20120605,0,6473043.story)
The man who tried to renegotiate the treaty was Ambassador James Malone. In 1984, he explained why Reagan
considered LOST to
be unacceptable: "The treaty's provisions were intentionally designed to promote a new world order
— a form of global collectivism … that seeks ultimately the redistribution of the world's wealth through a
complex system of manipulative central economic planning and bureaucratic coercion." Eleven years
later, Malone declared: "This remains the case today." Despite the claims that the 1994 agreement
"fixed" the offending deep seabed provisions, the "new and improved" pact remained fundamentally objectionable. As senators
ponder the treaty yet again, they would do well to consider the question: What, exactly, do we gain by joining LOST? In the most recent Senate
hearing, Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.) asked Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs: "Does
failure to ratify this treaty … in
any way compromise the ability of the United States to project force around the world, to support and sustain our
allies…? Are we at risk as a result of failure to ratify this treaty?" Dempsey's response boiled down to "no." "Our ability to project
force will not deteriorate," he said, if we refrain from ratifying the treaty. Why risk sacrificing U.S. sovereignty under
the treaty if it makes us no more secure? After all, what initially established and still ensures freedom
of navigation under international law is naval power. To secure navigational freedom, territorial rights and all national
and international interests addressed in LOST, we must maintain the strength of theU.S. Navy, not look to an anachronistic pact that is intent on
advancing a one-world agenda.
Ratifying LOST means gives the UN power to raise taxes
Borowski, Policy Analyst, 2012 (Julie, May 31th, “The U.N.’s Law of the Sea Treaty Threatens our National Sovereignty,”
Townhall.com, http://townhall.com/columnists/julieborowski/2012/05/31
/the_uns_law_of_the_sea_treaty_threatens_our_national_sovereignty/page/full/)
The latest threat to U.S. sovereignty is the United Nations’ Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) that is being pushed by the Obama
administration. LOST rises from the dead every few years. For more than thirty years, the United States has refused to
become a party to LOST for good reasons. But this could be the year that the United States surrenders its sovereignty over the seas to
an international body if Obama gets his way. Under this treaty, the U.N. would have control over 71 percent of the
Earth’s surface. This would be a huge step towards global governance. The Senate may vote to ratify the sea treaty as early as next week.
President Ronald Reagan rejected LOST back in 1982, stating it would grant the U.N. the power to tax U.S. companies and redistribute wealth
from developed to undeveloped nations. For
the first time in history, the U.N. would have the authority to collect
taxes from U.S. citizens. The thought of global taxation should send goose bumps down the spine of
every American. Any form of global taxation would be a direct violation of the U.S. Constitution.
American citizens are already overtaxed and overregulated. The last thing we need is an unelected, unconstitutional international body
imposing even more harmful taxes and regulations on us. LOST
could end up costing trillions of dollars and the
American people would have no say on how the money is spent.
US Gains nothing by signing the treaty
Darling, Senior Fellow in Governmental Studies at the Heritage Foundation, 12 (Brian, May 28th, “Attacks on American Sovereignty,”
Townhall.com, http://townhall.com/columnists/briandarling/2012/05/28/attack_on_american_sovereignty/page/full/)
Any way you slice it, the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST)
threatens American sovereignty. So why would the Senate even consider
proponents such as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry, D-Mass., claim the treaty
would give the United States important new rights and advantages. But, as Heritage Foundation expert Kim Holmes, a former
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, observed last year, LOST offers the U.S. nothing we’re not
already entitled to under customary international law. “Treaty supporters claim ratification will give the U.S. additional
rights to oil, gas and minerals in the deep seabed of its extended continental shelf,” Holmes wrote. “But the U.S. already has clear
legal title and rights to the resources of its continental shelf (even though the current administration bans drilling
ratifying it? Treaty
there).” How ironic that the anti-drilling Obama Administration is pushing for LOST with the argument that it would somehow it easier for
American companies to drill.
A2: Arctic Drilling CP
Arctic drilling unpopular and kills the environment
Sullivan 3/26/12. John A. Sullivan, news editor for Oil and Gas Investor. “Coast Guard Muscles Up Arctic Presence in Advance of
Drilling.” Natural Gas Week. Lexis. http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20_T15105743963
Greenpeace teams also were trying to stop vessels from the North Sea under contract by Shell to
begin their voyage to Alaska. Activists boarded the <em>Fennica </em>and <em>Nordica</em>, two Arctic-class icebreakers under
contract by Shell and hung banners protesting the drilling before leaving the vessels. In New Zealand, a seven-person team, led by actress Lucy
Lawless, occupied the vessel for four days before being arrested on charges of burglary by local law enforcement officials. Their protest delayed
the ship from sailing for several days, but the drillship is expected to arrive in time for the summer drilling season beginning in June. During
testimony before Alaskan lawmakers in Juneau, Coast Guard Capt. Buddy Custard said the agency will be at Dutch Harbor with enough forces to
make sure potential protests do not get out of hand. In addition to Dutch Harbor being the staging area for Shell's drilling plan, June
is also
the start of one of the region's busiest fishing seasons and any disruptions of the port could have
regional economic consequences.The Coast Guard will be watching to see what Greenpeace protesters, who are expected in
large numbers, do on the water. Greenpeace spokesman James Turner told <em>Natural Gas Week</em> the green group is opposed to
any drilling in the Arctic, but refused to say what the group might do in Dutch Harbor. "Greenpeace and our many
thousands of supporters will continue to oppose Arctic drilling vigorously and passionately until a
global framework is in place to protect the region for the long term," he said. "However, Greenpeace does not
reveal what it might or might not do in the future." The Arctic nations see the energy potential of the Arctic where some reports suggest as
much as 22% of the world's potentially recoverable, but undiscovered oil and natural gas lies. And that has them at odds with Greenpeace,
Turner said. "Greenpeace
believes that the Arctic should be off limits to major industrial developments
like oil drilling or factory fishing," Turner said. "Even putting aside the local risks to wildlife and coastal
communities, the global threat of climate change is so serious that we need to put our engineering
skills and investment into developing clean energy technology instead of finding the last
unconventional sources of oil." Turner also noted that a warming climate has aided access to Arctic reserves. "In terms of the Arctic
drilling issue, our primary concern is that companies like Shell are choosing to ignore the clear evidence of global
warming in the high north and instead are exploiting those changes to drill for more of the fossil fuel
that is causing the problem," Turner said. "We believe that in years to come this will be seen as a major mistake, especially while our
transport fleet remains inefficient and clean technologies relatively undeveloped.”
Arctic drilling infeasible – expenses and extreme conditions
Sullivan 2/27/12. John A. Sullivan, news editor for Oil and Gas Investor. “Coast Guard Muscles Up Arctic Presence in Advance of
Drilling.” Natural Gas Week. Lexis. http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20_T15105743963
There are three words that could best describe the frontier above the Arctic Circle -- potential, mystery and costs. Potential: The US Geological
Survey in 2008 issued a report stating that undiscovered, but technically recoverable Arctic frontier reserves could total 90 billion barrels of oil,
1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. Mystery: Much of the Arctic region is largely untouched by
human activity. Costs: The
US Energy Information Administration estimates that developing onshore oil and
natural gas projects in Arctic Alaska can cost from 50% to 100% more than undertaking a similar
project in Texas. Those are some of the conclusions reached in a recent report on Arctic drilling by the Center for American Progress, a
DC-based advocacy group. Even as the Arctic Council -- the nations that share an Arctic frontier border -- are
working to develop plans to respond to an accident or a spill, companies are already preparing to push
into the region ( related ). Among some of the highlights of this push: Royal Dutch Shell is preparing for drilling in the Beaufort and
Chukchi seas by the summer; in 2011, Russia signed a $7.9 billion deal with BP and both Exxon Mobil and Chevron are expected to drill
exploratory wells off the coast of Greenland before the end of the decade. However, the report concludes, while
the potential
rewards are high, the risks are even greater and the US and the other Arctic nations should keep the
region off-limits to E&P work until a workable response program is in place. Reinforcing that conclusion was an
earlier report by the US Energy Information Administration examining the cost of doing business in an environment where the temperature can
reach minus 60 degrees. The EIA report pointed out that a
new range of equipment based on new metals and alloys
will have to be developed to endure extended exposure to freezing and subfreezing temperatures.
Drilling both onshore and offshore in the Arctic will present challenges that will raise the cost of
drilling, according to the EIA report. "On Arctic lands, poor soil conditions can require additional site
preparation to prevent equipment and structures from sinking," the report stated. "The marshy Arctic
tundra can also preclude exploration activities during the warm months of the year. In Arctic seas, the
icepack can damage offshore facilities, while also hindering the shipment of personnel, materials,
equipment and oil for long time periods." The changing environment as well as the prospect of icepacks scouring the bottom of
the sea would require that any expedition going to the Arctic bring floating production and supply vessels with them to store the oil and gas
before it can be transported to refineries or pipeline connections. The EIA report also pointed out that any group of companies -- and these
would have to be the larger majors and supermajors -- would require extensive inventories of spare parts since they would be on a supply chain
thousands of miles long with limited transportation options. There is also the human element, the EIA said, concluding that companies
will have to give workers higher wages and salaries to induce personnel to work in the Arctic .
A2: Consult CP
Its normal means to consult – Arctic Cooperation Agreement Proves
BYERS 2012 (MICHAEL February 6Toward a Canada-Russia Axis in the Arctic http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2012/02/06/toward-a-canadarussia-axis-in-the-arctic/)
Nor has the dispute posed a problem for Canada and the US since 1988, when the two countries concluded
an Arctic Cooperation Agreement. In the treaty, the US “pledges that all navigation by US icebreakers
within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the
Government of Canada.” In return, Canada promises to give consent whenever it is requested. The two countries
also agree that “[n]othing in this Agreement [...] nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the Government of the United States and of Canada
on the Law of the Sea in this or other maritime areas [...].” In other words, the treaty is essentially an agreement to disagree.
Neg
Topicality
In the US – Excludes Territories
In the “United States” excludes territories
Siksi 11 Markku Suksi, Professor (Department of Law) National Director of the EMA Programme “SubState Governance Through Territorial Autonomy: A Comparative Study in Constitutional Law of Powers,
Procedures and Institutions” Google books
http://books.google.com/books?id=d7UUkiwi_9cC&pg=PA173&lpg=PA173&dq=%22the+united+states+
excludes+territories%22&source=bl&ots=HugdwNR3e7&sig=e09lLC4W8Fxe_1bL0oCA1E4bleg&hl=en&s
a=X&ei=r-rhT8f3BIj69QS_y7mGCA&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false BK
The interpretation soon emerged that Puerto Rico would be governed under the plenary powers of
Congress with reference to, in particular, Article IV, section 3(2), of the US Constitution. which
constitutes the so-called territorial clause and according to which "the Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States". As a possession of the US. Puerto Rico is regarded as a territory that is
unincorporated in the federal structure of the State." The political discussion continued between two
alternatives, whether or not the US Constitution followed the Hag. A third interpretation, a middle
ground of some sort was ultimately the one upon which the legislative approach and later also rulings
of the US Supreme Court were based: the concept of the "United States" excludes territories and
therefore, the new territories could be governed as colonies it" Congress so chose." This interpretation
was adopted from the very beginning of the US - Puerto Rico relationship when the Organic Act of
Puerto Rico, or the so called Foraker Act was enacted in 1900.
In the US – International Waters
Maintaining the Northwest passage is untopical – in International Waters
Campbell, 2008( 05/08/2008, United States Arctic Ocean Management & the Law of the Sea
Convention, This paper was written while on a summer externship at the U.S. Dept. of Commerce (DOC),
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) General Counsel for International Law,
http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/US_Arctic_Ocean_Mgt_08-05-08.pdf)
Current unresolved boundaries include the U.S. – Canada boundary in the Beaufort Sea, and the
Northwest Passage. Other maritime states, including the U.S., maintain the position that the
Northwest Passage is an international strait, and therefore flag states enjoy a right of transit passage.
11 Canada’s position is that this shipping route is on the landward side of its baseline and is therefore
internal waters.
Transportation Infrastructure
Icebreaking is distinct from transportation infrastructure
LT Benjamin Morgan, Mobility and Ice Operations, US Coast Guard Office of Maritime Transportation
Systems, “Domestic Icebreaking Operations,” Proceedings, Spring 2011,
http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/spring2011/articles/39_Morgan.pdf
While domestic icebreaking operations may fall among the Coast Guard’s less glamorous assignments, this mission is important for
maritime mobility and supports our national transportation infrastructure .
Case
Squo Solves
Commercial incentive spurs private icebreaking ops
Scott G. Borgerson, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former
Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Coast Guard, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security
Implications of Global Warming,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63222/scott-g-borgerson/arctic-meltdown#
In order to navigate these opening sea-lanes and transport the Arctic's oil and natural gas, the world's
shipyards are already building ice-capable ships. The private sector is investing billions of dollars in a
fleet of Arctic tankers. In 2005, there were 262 ice-class ships in service worldwide and 234 more on order. The oil and gas
markets are driving the development of cutting-edge technology and the construction of new types of
ships, such as double-acting tankers, which can steam bow first through open water and then turn
around and proceed stern first to smash through ice. These new ships can sail unhindered to the
Arctic's burgeoning oil and gas fields without the aid of icebreakers. Such breakthroughs are
revolutionizing Arctic shipping and turning what were once commercially unviable projects into
booming businesses.
Icebreakers cause more traffic and they are unnecessary due to low a low amount of
ice in the Artic.
Kyung M. Song, 11(October 9th, 2011staff writer for the Seattle Times, “Lawmakers confronting cold
reality for pricey icebreakers,”
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2016456549_icebreaker10m.html)
The state of American capacity to ply frozen waterways has long caused alarm. Thanks to warming
polar climates, what was ice is now sometimes water. Some scientists believe that the Northwest
Passage, which links the Pacific and Atlantic oceans via Canada's Arctic Archipelago, could become icefree in the summer in this century. That would open a shipping route that would be days or even weeks
shorter than traversing the Panama Canal. The result is more traffic — and more potential trouble,
said Jeffrey Garrett, a retired Coast Guard rear admiral who has served on all three icebreakers,
including as commanding officer of the Polar Sea. For instance, more than 325 vessels crossed the
Bering Strait between Russia and Alaska in 2010, a third more than just two years earlier. In 2007, a
Canadian cruise ship became the first such vessel to sink in Antarctica after puncturing its hull on
submerged ice. Garrett traveled through the Northwest Passage last month. He saw hardly any ice,
unusual for this time of the year. Now a Mercer Island maritime consultant, Garrett expects to see
more oil drilling, tourism, and scientific and shipping activity in the Arctic.
Loss of ice happening now – oceans will be melted by 2020
Reiss has covered Arctic issues for Smithsonian, Parade and Outside Magazines, 2010 (Bob, March 13,
Cold, Hard Facts: U.S. Trails in Race for the Top of the World, Politics Daily,
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/03/13/cold-hard-facts-u-s-trails-in-race-for-the-top-of-the-world/)
Summer sea ice shrank 40 percent between 1970 and 2007, and even agnostics on global warming
such as Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen say the U.S. better prepare for a new Arctic. "There's
open water where there used to be ice. We better deal with it," he said. The issues to consider in a defrosting Arctic
include possible skirmishes over territory, a race among major powers for undersea resources, and environmental disasters from ship collisions
and oil spills. "We are at a critically important time," Murkowski told the council.
"There are two ways we could go. The path
of competition and conflict. Or cooperation." As huge swaths of once inaccessible polar region open, few Americans realize
how woefully behind the U.S. government has lagged in addressing security and commerce issues. For instance, tourist ships have already
started sailing through the once legendary Northwest Passage, graveyard for explorers in times past. This
formerly iced-over link
between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans is melting so fast it could very well be completely ice-free in
summers as soon as 2020, according to Mead Treadwell, head of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission.
That would make commercial shipping viable, meaning that a single Chinese container ship using the Northwest Passage instead of the Panama
Canal could save $2 million each way between Shanghai and New York. "The Bering Strait may become the new Panama Canal," Treadwell said.
Up to 25 percent of the Earth's shipping may, in our lifetime, be sailing the polar route. The Council for Foreign Relations' Scott Borgerson said
the north coast of Alaska may soon "resemble the coast of Louisiana, lit by the lights of ships and oil rigs." He predicted that some Alaskan port
could become a new Singapore.
A2: Arctic Conflict Advantage
No war—recognition of high risk and momentum for cooperation and peaceful
resolution
Hart et al. ’12 Andrew Hart, doctoral candidate at the University of Colorado, Bruce Jones, Senior
Fellow and Director of the Managing Global Order Initiative at Brookings and NYU’s Center on
International Cooperation, and David Steven, Senior Fellow at NYU’s Center on International
Cooperation and leads MGO’s Geopolitics of Scarcity Project, “Chill Out: Why Cooperation is Balancing
Conflict Among Major Powers in the New Arctic,” Brookings, May 2012,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/30%20arctic%20cooperation%20jon
es/30%20arctic%20cooperation%20jones.pdf
Over the coming decades, risk in the Arctic will continue to intensify, although there could be a pause if the region experiences a run of cold
summers, if resources prove hard to extract at a reasonable cost, or if global economic malaise drives down the oil price to a level where the
Arctic’s resources have no hope of being competitive. Recent
years, however, have already heightened states’ sensitivity
to the challenges a changing Arctic poses. Sufficient momentum has been created that the impetus to
explore routes for cooperation, or to unleash unilateral and coercive responses when cooperation fails, is likely to remain
strong in the short to medium term. So far, the Arctic has defied the predictions of pessimists who expected the region to
become a focus for unchecked commercial and strategic competition. Given this success, can it offer some lessons for deconfliction, the
management of tensions, and perhaps even cooperation in other regions where energy or resource competition has the potential to create
geopolitical friction? Hardest will inevitably be the South China Seas. At one level, that terrain has a similar mix of uncharted energy resources,
ill-defined boundaries, and great power security tensions. In the Arctic, the Ilulissat Agreement has set a precedent for states to apply the
provisions of the Law of the Sea, despite the U.S. not ratifying that agreement. Such an approach will not easily be followed in the South China
Seas, given the intensity of boundary disputes and long running tensions over Taiwan. However, some of the second-order mechanisms that
have emerged in the Arctic could provide lessons towards the reduction of conflict and crisis containment in that more volatile region. In
the
Arctic, states are recognizing the need for new types of cooperation to address fast-changing
challenges. The United States and Russia are, of course, playing a central role, but middle powers have
demonstrated their potential as conveners and pioneers of new approaches. Perhaps most importantly, the
assumption of inevitable conflict in the region has been successfully challenged. In an unstable world, and one
where many global arrangements are straining to adapt to changing power dynamics, we could do worse than learn lessons from what the
Arctic states are trying to achieve.
No resource war—most deposits are in non-contested areas and the rest isn’t worth
fighting for
Hart et al. ’12 Andrew Hart, doctoral candidate at the University of Colorado, Bruce Jones, Senior
Fellow and Director of the Managing Global Order Initiative at Brookings and NYU’s Center on
International Cooperation, and David Steven, Senior Fellow at NYU’s Center on International
Cooperation and leads MGO’s Geopolitics of Scarcity Project, “Chill Out: Why Cooperation is Balancing
Conflict Among Major Powers in the New Arctic,” Brookings, May 2012,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/30%20arctic%20cooperation%20jon
es/30%20arctic%20cooperation%20jones.pdf
Tensions over resources are yet to multiply risk in the way some observers expect. Resources have the greatest potential to drive conflict when
they lie in contested territory. However, overlaying
a map of undiscovered energy with a map of territorial
disputes reveals that the vast majority of undiscovered reserves (85-90% as a rough estimate) are in the nondisputed EEZs of Arctic nations. This creates an important check on aggressive behavior . 67 Uncertainty
about the economic viability of Arctic reserves has also played a moderating role, given technical
obstacles and the high risk premium of any investment in exploitation, and the incentives for states to
collaborate given the financial and technological obstacles to operating in the region. Indeed, Russia’s
heightened interest can be explained, in part, by the fact that, alone among the five Arctic coastal states, its
investment decisions are primarily state rather than market-controlled. A similar dynamic is at play for
transshipment. Over
the next twenty years, and however fast the ice melts, Arctic navigation will continue
to be seasonal, hazardous, and unpredictable—all factors that mitigate the benefits of faster routes to
Asian markets. As a result, initial excitement about Arctic navigation is giving way to a more sober assessment of the commercial
opportunities that the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route will provide. In conclusion, it is clear that the geography of risk is shifting
rapidly due to climate change, with the loss of ice proceeding more rapidly than many had predicted. Each Arctic state has had to react to these
changes and to the uncertainty about how other states will react to new opportunities and threats in the region. Much popular
analysis,
however, neglects factors that are slowing transformation in the Arctic (the expense and riskiness of resource
extraction and navigation) or making it easier to manage (the relatively small resource endowment that lies in contested territory).
The Arctic’s commercial potential is still heavily discounted—in other words, providing time for states to resolve strategic challenges. As a
result, they have become more willing to explore what help, if any, the multilateral arena can provide.
No risk of Arctic war
Tom Fries, Nonresident Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute, “Perspective Correction: How We
Misinterpret Arctic Conflict,” The Arctic Institute, 4/18/2012,
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/perspective-correction-how-we.html
War and conflict sell papers -- the prospect of war, current wars, remembrance of wars past. Accordingly, a growing cottage
industry devotes itself to writing about the prospect of conflict among the Arctic nations and between those
nations and non-Arctic states, which is mostly code for “China.” As a follower of Arctic news, I see this every day, all the time: eight articles last week, five more
already this week from the Moscow Times, Scientific American or what-have-you. Sometimes this future conflict is portrayed as a political battle, sometimes
military, but the
portrayals of the states involved are cartoonish, Cold-War-ish...it’s all good guys and bad
guys. I’m convinced that this is nonsense, and I feel vindicated when I see the extent to which these countries' militaries collaborate in the high North. From
last week's meeting of all eight Arctic nations' military top brass (excepting only the US; we were represented by General
Charles Jacoby, head of NORAD and USNORTHCOM) to Russia-Norway collaboration on search & rescue; from US-Canada
joint military exercises to US-Russia shared research in the Barents...no matter where you look, the arc of this
relationship bends towards cooperation. But there's a bigger misconception that underlies the predictions of future Arctic conflict that we
read every week. This is the (usually) unspoken assumption that the governments of these states are capable of acting quickly, unilaterally and secretly to pursue
their interests in the Arctic. False. This
idea that some state might manage a political or military smash-and-grab
while the rest of us are busy clipping our fingernails or walking the dog is ridiculous . The overwhelming weight of
evidence suggests that the governments of the Arctic states are, like most massive organizations, bureaucratic
messes. Infighting between federal agencies is rampant all around, as are political shoving matches
between federal and state/provincial/regional governments. Money is still scarce, and chatter about
military activism isn’t backed up by much: Canada is engaged in a sad debate over the downgrading of the proposed Nanisivik port; the
United States’ icebreaker fleet is barely worth mentioning and shows little sign of new life in the near-term future; US Air Force assets are being moved 300+ miles
south from Fairbanks to Anchorage; and Russia’s talk about a greater Arctic presence has been greatly inflated for the sake of the recent elections. In a more general
sense, we have viciously polarized governments in the US and, to a lesser extent, Canada, as well as numerous “hotter” wars elsewhere that will take the lion’s
share of our blood and treasure before the Arctic gets a drop of either.
Russia won’t act aggressively over Arctic resources
Tom Fries, Nonresident Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute, “Perspective Correction: How We
Misinterpret Arctic Conflict,” The Arctic Institute, 4/18/2012,
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/perspective-correction-how-we.html
And then there is Russia. From the outside, it can often seem as though the Russian government rules by fiat. This reasonably leads to the
concern that someone might take it into his head to assert Russia’s military might or otherwise extend the country’s sovereignty in the Arctic.
But it is fairly clear that Russia’s
success is currently, and for the near-term future, dependent on its position
within the constellation of global hydrocarbon suppliers. To continue to develop its supply base,
Russia needs the assistance of the oil majors of neighboring states, and indeed it is showing signs of
warming up to foreign engagement with its Arctic hydrocarbons in significant ways. Its political
relationships with its regular customers are also critical to its future success. Russia isn’t likely to
wantonly sour those relationships by acting aggressively against all four of its wealthy, wellnetworked littoral brothers in Europe and North America.
Established norms of conduct prevent Arctic conflict
Tom Fries, Nonresident Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute, “Perspective Correction: How We
Misinterpret Arctic Conflict,” The Arctic Institute, 4/18/2012,
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/perspective-correction-how-we.html
It’s not only the handcuffs of many colors worn by the Arctic states that will keep them from getting aggressive, it is also the good precedents
that exist for cooperation here. Russia
and Norway recently resolved a forty year-old dispute over territory in
the Barents. There are regular examples of military cooperation among the four littoral NATO states
and between Norway and Russia. Even the US and Russia are finding opportunities to work together.
Meanwhile, the need to develop search-and-rescue capabilities is making cross-border cooperation a
necessity for all Arctic actors. There are numerous international research and private-sector ventures,
even in areas other than hydrocarbons. These will only grow in importance with time. In fact, it would seem that for many of
these countries, the Arctic is a welcome relief - a site where international collaboration is comparatively
amicable.
No military conflict
SIPRI 3/26/12. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. “Increased military capabilities in
the Arctic reflect border demarcations.” http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/26-mar-increasedmilitary-capabilities-in-the-arctic-region-reflect-territorial-consolidation.
The background paper, entitled Military Capabilities in the Arctic, is based on the findings of SIPRI Senior Researcher Siemon Wezeman and
shows that while governments of the five Arctic states have made protection of their Arctic territory a priority, the military build-up is
limited. The effects of climate change are making the Arctic more accessible to economic activity—including exploitation of oil, gas and
fish—and increased commercial traffic. Arctic governments have responded with increased attention to the region in several fields, including
the military. However, rather
than projecting power over the Arctic as a whole, the increased military
capabilities described in the background paper are generally limited to forces and equipment for
policing and protection of recognized national territories and territorial waters. Military build-up occurring but
cooperation remains the goal Military interest in the region does exist. Canada, Denmark and Norway are moving forces into their
respective Arctic regions and acquiring weapons and equipment for specific Arctic use. Russia has also started to expand its Arctic military
capabilities, while the
USA’s Arctic security concerns still play only a minor role in its overall defence policy.
and Russia have
settled a 40-year border dispute in the Barents Sea and Arctic states are enjoying stable and peaceful
bilateral relations. Meanwhile, the Arctic Council is coming into its own as an important sub-regional organization. The so-called
‘scramble for the Arctic’, whereby Arctic states compete for the region's resources, has not proven to be a military
affair. Rather, the littoral states remain committed to follow existing legal frameworks to settle border
issues and claims on Arctic exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves. Confidence-building measures could be necessary in the
Although some tensions have emerged in the region, cooperation, not conflict, is more visible in the Arctic. Norway
future ‘While some media outlets, politicians and researchers have portrayed these changes in the capabilities of the Arctic littoral states as a
significant and possibly destabilizing military build-up, the SIPRI
analysis finds no basis for claims of an Arctic arms
race,’ stated Wezeman.
Activity in the arctic invites - disaster, illegal fishing, terrorism, war
Apps, Political Risk Correspondent ’12 (Pater, April 3, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/usarctic-resources-idUSBRE8320DR20120403, Reuters “Melting Arctic may redraw global geopolitical
map”)
This summer will see more human activity in the Arctic than ever before, with oil giant Shell engaged in
major exploration and an expected further rise in fishing, tourism and regional shipping. But that,
experts warn, brings with it a rising risk of environmental disaster not to mention criminal activity
from illegal fishing to smuggling and terrorism. “By bringing more human activity into the Arctic you
bring both the good and the bad,” Lieutenant-General Walter Semianiw, the head of Canada Command
and one of Ottawa’s most senior military officers responsible for the Arctic, told the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies in Washington DC last week. “You will see the change whether you wish to or
not.” With indigenous populations, researchers and military forces reporting the ice receding faster
than many had expected, some estimates suggest the polar ice cap might disappear completely during
the summer season as soon as 2040, perhaps even earlier. That could slash the journey time from
Europe to Chinese and Japanese ports by well over a week, possibly taking traffic from the southern
Suez Canal route. But with many of those key sea routes passing through already disputed waters
believed to contain much of the world’s untapped energy reserves, some say they already fear a rising
risk of confrontation.
No war
Apps, Political Risk Correspondent ’12 (Pater, April 3, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/usarctic-resources-idUSBRE8320DR20120403, Reuters “Melting Arctic may redraw global geopolitical
map”)
Nevertheless, some experts believe that if handled properly, the opening of the Arctic could benefit
many, if not all, countries in the northern hemisphere. “I see the Arctic as ultimately more of a venue
for co-operation than confrontation,” says Christian le Miere, the senior fellow for maritime affairs at
London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies. “China, northern Europe, Russia will all benefit in
particular from the new sea routes. The only real losers will be countries much further south that
cannot take advantage.”
A2: US Sea Lanes Advantage
The trade routes are opening up
Apps, Political Risk Correspondent ’12 (Pater, April 3, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/usarctic-resources-idUSBRE8320DR20120403, Reuters “Melting Arctic may redraw global geopolitical
map”)
This year’s frenzy of oil and gas exploration in newly accessible Arctic waters could be the harbinger of
even starker changes to come. If, as many scientists predict, currently inaccessible sea lanes across the
top of the world become navigable in the coming decades, they could redraw global trading routes –
and perhaps geopolitics.
Clearing ice will increase China’s involvement in Arctic resources—summer conditions
prove
Campbell, USCC Policy Analyst on Foreign Affairs and Energy, 12 (Caitlin, April 13, 2012. “China and
the Arctic: Objectives and Obstacles” in the “U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff
Research Report” http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2012/China-and-the-Arctic_Apr2012.pdf)
It is the consensus of many within the scientific community that large areas of the Arctic region will be
ice-free during summer months in the coming decades.†1 This potential environmental
transformation will likely have profound impacts on regional and global trade and security, especially
related to shipping patterns and resource extraction activities. While China is not an Arctic littoral state,
the melting of Arctic sea ice will impact China’s environmental, energy, and trade circumstances. As a
result, official and unofficial Chinese actors have expressed greater interest in the forthcoming
“opening” of the Arctic in recent years. However, without a claim to territory in the region, China is
largely excluded from regional politics and regulatory management of Arctic resources. For this
reason, China has thus far pursued a low-profile approach in its policies toward the region, and will
likely have to rely on the invitation and cooperation of the Arctic states – especially Russia and
Canada – in order to advance its interests there.
A2: Environment/Oil Spills Advantage
More than the plan key to solve for Arctic spills – freezing temperatures, darkness,
high winds
Kroh et al, ’12. Kiley Kroh, Associate Director for Ocean Communications at the Center for American
Progress, Michael Conathan, Director of Ocean Policy at the Center for American Progress, and Emma
Huvos, February 2012. “Putting a Freeze on Arctic Ocean Drilling.” Center for American Progress.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/pdf/arcticreport.pdf
The colder temperatures, stronger winds, darkness, snow, and ice characteristic of Arctic climates can
greatly inhibit the containment and recovery equipment necessary for successful oil spill response. 38
A major component of any containment effort is the deployment of floating barriers called booms used
to limit the spread of oil. Once collected, as much of the oil as possible is either recovered from the
surface of the water using devices called skimmers, or when it collects in extremely high concentrations,
it can be burned off using a process known as in-situ burning. Throughout the course of the Deepwater
Horizon response, nearly 900 skimmers and 13.5 million feet of boom were used as part of the
mechanical recovery process, and the Coast Guard conducted 411 in-situ burns. 39, 40 Cold
temperatures can cause skimmers, boom, and pumps to freeze, hindering mechanical recovery.
Additionally, nearly 2 million gallons of the dispersant Corexit were injected directly into the Macondo
wellhead to help break up the oil as it gushed out so less of it would rise to the surface and reach the
shore. Dispersants are not preapproved for use in Arctic conditions and likely wouldn’t be a feasible
option even if they were, as they’ve shown reduced effectiveness in cold waters. 41 High winds like
those found at times in the Arctic can also make it unsafe for response vessels to operate and prevent
aircraft from flying, impeding clean up techniques and delivery of supplies. Vessel and aircraft
responses are also limited by darkness. During the month of October there is less than half the amount
of daylight in the Arctic than there was in the Gulf of Mexico in May during the Deepwater Horizon
cleanup. Snow can further diminish response capabilities by interfering with onshore mobilization
efforts.14 As temperatures drop, the potential for hypothermia among responders rises and they
must limit the length of their shifts, decreasing the efficiency of response operations. As Rob Powell of
the World Wildlife Fund explains, this is especially significant because “if a major spill were to occur in
Arctic waters, cleanup crews would have to spend, on average, three to five days of each week simply
standing by, watching helplessly as the blowout or spill continued to foul fragile Arctic ecosystems.”
42 All these environmental challenges would make responding to an oil spill deeply challenging in the
best of times—never mind during frequent storms
Human activity in the artic increases catastrophic accedents
AP [Associated Press] 04/16/12 “World's armies circle as Arctic warms to reveal untapped supplies of
oil and gas” http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/04/16/11222215-worlds-armies-circle-asarctic-warms-to-reveal-untapped-supplies-of-oil-and-gas?lite
Heather Conley, director of the Europe program at the London-based Center for Strategic and
International Studies, said militaries probably will have to rescue their own citizens in the Arctic
before any confrontations arise there. "Catastrophic events, like a cruise ship suddenly sinking or an
environmental accident related to the region's oil and gas exploration, would have a profound impact
in the Arctic," she said. "The risk is not militarization; it is the lack of capabilities while economic
development and human activity dramatically increases that is the real risk."
Arctic trade increases risk of oil spills
Mahony, EU Observer Author, ’11 (Honor, EU Observer, “Arctic shipping routes unlikely to be ‘Suez of
the north”, Lexis Nexis, DOA: 7-10-12)
Environment And then there is the environmental impact of increased shipping. More traffic means
there is a greater risk of oil spill. The ships will introduce alien species through their hull water and are
likely to interrupt the migratory patterns of marine mammals. Carbon emissions could accelerate ice
melting even further, and this in a region where the average temperature has risen almost twice as
fast as the rest of the world's. Other ship emissions , such as SOx and NOx, may also have unforeseen
consequences on the Arctic environment. Norwegian explorer Borge Ousland says it is vital not to forget
that changes in the Polar regions could have global ef-fects. "It is easy to look at the Polar regions as an
isolated area but any change in temperature has an effect on the rest of the world," he said recently. "I
am very worried about what I have seen in the last 20 years. When I went up to the North Pole for the
first time in 1990, the ice was three to four metres thick. In 2007 we measured the ice for the Norwegian
Polar Institute and the coverage of ice was now 1.7 metres thick."
A2: Arctic Resources Advantage
Barriers around the Continental Shelf in Alaska prevent oil exploration from occurringlegal barriers.
Peter Slaiby, 2011(July 27, 2011, Vice President, Alaska Venture, Shell Oil Company, “Senate
Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast
Guard Hearing; "Defending U.S. Economic Interests in the Changing Arctic: Is There a Strategy."”
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg72568/html/CHRG-112shrg72568.htm)
Although regulatory and legal challenges have blocked the drilling of even a single well, I am hopeful
that in 2012 we will be able to move forward with exploration wells in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas.
Since returning to Alaska to purchase leases in 2005, Shell has drilled more than 400 exploration wells
around the world. I remain hopeful that the barriers to exploring in Alaska's Outer Continental Shelf
will be addressed so that Shell can begin its exploration drilling in 2012. Today I will focus on the
economic benefits of developing our nation's Arctic oil and gas resources. Specifically: * Global energy
demand forecasts, and the critical role that oil and gas will play in meeting future energy needs and in
fueling the economy. * Alaska's offshore resource potential, and the benefits to the nation of
developing those resources. * Shell's proposed exploration program in Alaska and the challenges that
have blocked the program. * And finally, recommendations for moving forward. The world must grapple
with the reality that global energy demand is projected to increase by roughly 50 percent over the
next 20 years and could double by 2050. The global recession will eventually fade and as economies
recover, demand will accelerate. A key driver will be strong economic growth and a vast, emerging
middle-class in developing nations. To address this demand, we will need all sources of energy hydrocarbons, alternatives, renewables and significant progress in energy efficiency. Oil and gas will
be the dominant energy source for decades. Renewables and energy efficiency will play an everincreasing role. Shell is actively pursuing research and development into next-generation biofuels. We
also have a wind business in North America and Europe.Future growth for alternative energy forms will
be paced by the speed of technological development, public and private investment capacity,
government policies, and the affordability of energy supply. Still, it takes several decades to replace
even one percent of conventional energy with a renewable source. The effort to tip the scale towards
more renewable sources of energy is worthwhile but even unprecedented growth in renewables
would leave an enormous energy gap that must be filled with oil and gas.
America’s foreign oil dependence has been declining since Obama took office
Slack 03/01 [Associate Director of Digital Content for the Office of Digital Strate] 03/01/12 “Our
Dependence on foreign oil is declining.”http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/03/01/ourdependence-foreign-oil-declining
America’s dependence on foreign oil has gone down every single year since President Obama took
office. In 2010, we imported less than 50 percent of the oil our nation consumed—the first time that’s
happened in 13 years—and the trend continued in 2011. We’re relying less on imported oil for a
number of reasons, not least that production is up here in the United States. In fact, America is
producing more oil today than at any time in the last eight years. As part of his strategy to increase
safe, responsible oil production in the United States, President Obama has opened millions of new
acres for oil and gas exploration and we now have more working oil and gas rigs than the rest of the
world—combined.
Solvency
Ice Breakers take a long time to build and require large amounts of fuel
Kyung M. Song, 11(October 9th, 2011staff writer for the Seattle Times, “Lawmakers confronting cold
reality for pricey icebreakers,”
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2016456549_icebreaker10m.html)
Rita Colwell, former director of the National Science Foundation, which runs the McMurdo Station and is
the main user of the three Coast Guard icebreakers, agrees. Colwell believes the United States has long
ceded dominance in the Arctic to Russia and other nations. Like Garrett, Colwell served on the National
Research Council panel that recommended building two replacement icebreakers for the Polar Sea
and the Polar Star. She called it an urgent military, economic and scientific issue. But Garrett and
Colwell are both resigned to the likelihood that it may be a long while before a modern icebreaker
gets built. So it would make sense, they say, to rescue the Polar Sea and squeeze more life out of it.
Garrett acknowledges that could be akin to pouring money into fixing a beat-up gas guzzler. Still, he
said, absent any foreseeable money for new vessels, that "is the only tool we have in the short term."
Canada DA
Uniqueness – Relations High
Relations higher then ever – Canada loves Obama
Martin 7/3/12 LAWRENCE MARTIN How Obama won Canada The Globe and Mail Published Tuesday,
Jul. 03 2012, 12:00 AM EDT http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/how-obama-woncanada/article4381177/
Barack Obama is ultra popular in Canada, easily one of the most popular presidents in history . A recent
Angus Reid poll found that 65 per cent of Canadian voters would vote for him, only 9 per cent for Republican
Mitt Romney. Sixty per cent of Canadians think the Obama administration has been good for this
country, only 13 per cent bad. So when an analysis gets published by two Canadian heavyweights titled How Obama Lost Canada,
people can be forgiven for thinking how the nameplates got mixed up. The analysis, injecting a sour bilateral note at the time of the countries’
birthday celebrations, was written by Derek Burney, a former ambassador to the United States, and Carleton University academic Fen Hampson
in the American periodical Foreign Affairs. It has been roundly criticized by bilateral specialists on both sides of the border for lacking fairness
and perspective and for being just plain obtuse. What
the record shows is that given America’s dire conditions of
the past few years and given the political divides between the Ottawa and Washington governments,
the relationship has been managed for the most part in a pragmatic, respectful and constructive fashion. Following
the ugliness of the Bush years, things could have gone off the rails . Mr. Burney and Mr. Hampson seem to have
forgotten those years. Losing Canada? Do they recall how W. peevishly cancelled an Ottawa summit because Canada did not join his bogusly
motivated invasion of Iraq? Do they recall his trying to bully Ottawa into joining his ballistic missile defence program? Do they remember the
introduction of passports at the Canada-U.S. border or the Bush administration’s blatant abrogation of free-trade rules in the softwood lumber
dispute? How about the economic havoc Mr. Bush’s policies abetted, his leaving even a one-word mention of Canada out of his landmark 9/11
address, his unilateralism in spurning a host of multilateral agreements that Canada was party to? In succeeding him, Mr.
Obama
immediately struck a chord. Canadians liked his moderate values and fair-mindedness. They sensed
that his heart and mind were in the right place and, despite many disappointments from him, they
still do. He hasn’t been pushy or overbearing in his relations with Canada as have several presidents.
Link – Sovereignty
Canada is getting upset over the US and Russia trying to enter their shorelines.
CBS News, 10(8/20/10, global news network that writes about main issues, “Battle for the Arctic
heats up,” http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2009/02/27/f-arctic-sovereignty.html)
Canadians have always tended to regard the northernmost reaches of their land as an integral, if
isolated, part of the country. The vast and frozen Arctic archipelago even gets its own reference in the
country's national anthem: "The true north, strong and free." But how much of "Canada's North" is
Canada's? Just about everyone agrees that the many islands that dot the Arctic to the north of
Canada's mainland belong to Canada. But what about the water between them? Who, if anyone, has
jurisdiction over the waters separating Somerset Island from Devon Island, or Melville Island from
Banks Island?The Canadian government says the jurisdiction is clear — they're Canadian waters. But
the U.S. and some other countries, especially now Russia, don't agree. They see the Northwest
Passage as an international strait that any ship should be free to transit. And increasingly, they are
seeing the Arctic seabed as a resource to be carved up among certain northern nations. Who is right?
Canadian scientists are now joining the soldiers on the front lines of this battle, as they race to chart
Canada's Arctic claims under the looming deadline of an international treaty. Under the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which Canada ratified in 2003, coastal countries have the right to
control access to the belt of shoreline along their coasts. Barring some exceptions, that belt is 12
nautical miles (22.2 kilometres) wide. But the waterways dividing some of the islands in Canada's north
are often nearly 100 kilometres wide. That would seem to leave plenty of room down the middle for
foreign ships. Every country now controls the resources under its coastal waters up to 200 nautical
miles from its shore. Under the treaty, a country's territory can be expanded much further if you can
prove the ridges and rock formations underneath the water are connected to your continental shelf.
But it's a race against time. Countries have 10 years from when they sign the treaty to submit their
scientific data to a UN commission. Canada has just four years left — until 2013.
Icebreakers in the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage piss off Russia and
Canada
Byers 2012 (Michael Byers, The Moscow Times, Canada Can Help Russia With Northern Sea Route,
http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/2012/06/canada-can-help-russia-with-northern-sea-route.html#more
06/08/2012)
The Arctic Ocean's coastline belongs mostly to Russia and Canada, the two largest countries in the
world. Each country owns territory on either side of a series of contested, and increasingly ice-free,
Arctic straits. Russia considers the narrowest parts of the Northern Sea Route to be "internal waters."
Canada takes the same view of the Northwest Passage. Internal waters are not territorial waters, and
foreign ships have no right to access them without permission from the coastal state. Russia and
Canada face a single, common source of opposition to their claims — namely, the United States, which
insists that both the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage are "international straits." The
United States thus accepts that Russia and Canada "own" the Northern Sea Route and Northwest
Passage, while asserting that foreign vessels have a right of "transit passage" through the straits that
exceeds the right of "innocent passage" in regular territorial waters. A right of transit passage entitles
foreign ships to pass through a strait without coastal state permission. It also means that foreign
submarines can sail submerged, something that they are not allowed to do in regular territorial
waters. The Northern Sea Route has become seasonally ice-free. Thirty-two ships traversed the
waterway last summer, most of them transporting natural resources from Russian ports to Asian
markets. The Kremlin is intent on turning the Northern Sea Route into a commercially viable alternative
to the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal. In September 2011, then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said:
"The shortest route between Europe's largest markets and the Asia-Pacific region lies across the Arctic.
This route is almost a third shorter than the traditional southern one. I want to stress the importance of
the Northern Sea Route as an international transport artery that will rival traditional trade lanes in
service fees, security and quality. States and private companies that choose the Arctic trade routes will
undoubtedly reap economic advantages." The dispute over the legal status of the Northern Sea Route
began in 1965 when the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Northwind set out to traverse the Vilkitsky Strait
between the Kara and Laptev seas. Strong diplomatic pressure was applied by the Soviet Union,
pressure that, according to a U.S. State Department spokesman, extended to a threat to "go all the
way" if the American ship proceeded into the strait. Washington responded by ordering the
Northwind to turn around. Since then, no foreign surface vessel has sailed through the Northern Sea
Route without Moscow's permission. The Northwest Passage has been ice-free for four of the last five
summers. Twenty-two ships sailed through in 2011. The United States has twice sent surface vessels
through the Northwest Passage without seeking Canada's permission: the SS Manhattan, an American
owned-and-registered ice-strengthened super-tanker, in 1969; and the USCGC Polar Sea, a coastguard
icebreaker, in 1985. On the 1985 occasion, the press attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa publicly
expressed support for Canada's claim: "Whether it is the Northwest Passage or the Northeast Passage
does not matter. Our position is based on provisions of international law. The waters around islands
belonging to a country are the internal waters of that country." But there is no evidence of any prior
or subsequent statements of support by the Soviet Union or Russia for Canada's position, nor any
evidence of Canadian statements in the reverse. During the Cold War, it would have been difficult
enough for Canada to oppose the United States — its most powerful NATO ally — on the Northwest
Passage issue. Taking the Soviet Union's side in the Northern Sea Route dispute was simply not an
option. As for the Soviet Union's near-complete silence on the Northwest Passage, one can postulate
that Moscow decided not to disrupt the delicate balance that allowed Ottawa and Washington to "agree
to disagree" on the issue. Had Moscow expressed more support for Ottawa's position, Washington
might have decided that Ottawa's independent stance was no longer tolerable. But the Cold War is long
over, and Russia has become an important trading partner of the West, as reflected in its recent
admission to the World Trade Organization. Economic opportunities and environmental concerns
dominate the policy landscape, and cooperation has replaced conflict as the dominant paradigm in the
North. In January 2010, according to WikiLeaks, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper told NATO
Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen that the alliance had no role to play in the Arctic because
"there is no likelihood of Arctic states going to war." Harper also said that "Canada has a good working
relationship with Russia with respect to the Arctic, and a NATO presence could backfire by exacerbating
tensions." Nine months later, Putin told an international conference: "It is well known that if you stand
alone, you cannot survive in the Arctic. Nature alone, in this case, demands that people, nations and
states help each other." Putin's comments came just a week after the Russian and Norwegian foreign
ministers signed a boundary treaty for the Barents Sea, where the two countries had previously disputed
175,000 square kilometers of oil- and gas-rich seabed. Then, in May 2011, Russia, Canada, the United
States, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland signed an Arctic search-and-rescue treaty. All
this cooperation provides Russia and Canada with a narrow window of opportunity. With foreign
shipping companies looking north, it is only a matter of time before other countries join the United
States in overtly opposing Russia and Canada's internal waters claims. It is time for a joint RussianCanadian position on the legal status of the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage — before it's
too late.
Cooperation Key
Cooperation with Canada key
Coast Guard Proceedings, 2011. Coast Guard Proceedings of Marine Safety and Security Council –
Journal of Safety and Security at Sea. Spring 2011. Vol. 68.
http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/archive/2011/Vol68_No1_Spr2011.pdf
The USCG and Canadian Coast Guard keep each other advised on the location and status of
icebreaking facilities/assets and coordinate operations to keep critical waterways open for commerce. A
cooperative agreement between our two nations allows the assets from one country to conduct icebreaking
operations in the territorial waters of the other, as necessary.
Quebec Secession Impact
Secession of Quebec will embolden anti-US sentiments in Russia and prompt a nuclear
attack by miscalculation[Unbeatable impact]
Lamont 94, President of American Trust for the British Library [Lansing, Breakup: The Coming End of
Canada and the Stakes for America, p. 237-239]
That prospect, however dim at the moment, could take on sharper tones in the context of these possible developments:
Quebec's separation and the
emergence to America's north of a fragmented Canada, neither event enhancing the continent's security;
Canada's military inadequacies and an erosion of Canada-U.S. relations, which might send signals inviting aggression by the
Western alliance's adversaries; or a political upheaval in the former Soviet Union, which would
precipitate an international crisis. Any prolonged crisis, as security analysts know, involves not only heightened
tensions and escalating suspicions but a shift in emphasis to preparing for a very rapid response if
hostilities erupt. In such situations the usual safeguards are sometimes apt to be disregarded or even
removed. That is why, with Canada's and Russia's future in doubt today, it is possible to imagine this scenario in the wake of
Quebec's secession: Economic reform has collapsed throughout Russia. Widespread despair over soaring prices, injured pride over Russia's loss of stature,
and disgust with Moscow's leadership boil over. A cabal of so-called "Reds" and "Browns"-unreconstructed former Communist officials and neo-Fascist militaristssweeps the Yeltsin reformers from office. In the name of restoring social order and averting total economic ruin, the leaders of the coup establish an authoritarian
provisional government backed by key elements of the disaffected military. The new government resents the Western Alliance for its Cold War triumph and
humiliation of the Soviet Union, resents the infatuation with Western culture and consumer products. It especially resents the United States for having won the arms
race and reduced Russia to a beggar nation, then acting niggardly in its response to Russian requests for massive economic aid. The
Russians, who have
always regarded Canada as a less vehemently anti-Soviet balance against the United States in the continental
partnership, particularly resent Canada's fracturing after Quebec's separation and the prospect of its pieces
eventually attaching to the U.S. empire. Russian-North American relations move from tepid to
subfreezing. The new hardliners running the Kremlin reassess Russia's arsenal of Bear and Blackjack long-range bombers, its nearly
1,200 air-launchable cruise missiles. They reanalyze the strategic value of the Arctic , whose jigsawed desert of ice conceals not only an
estimated 500 billion barrels of oil but lurking nuclear-armed submarines. Then, the Russians order a sequence of airborne
reconnaissance missions to hard probe the Arctic and North American defenses. Somewhere on the eastern end of
the Beaufort Sea, 30,000 feet above the approaching Parry Islands, a Russian Bear-H intercontinental bomber prepares to enter North American airspace
clandestinely. The turboprop bomber, a bright red star on its side, has averaged 400 miles per hour since it left its base in Siberia and headed over the polar
icecap. It carries inside its bulky frame eight AS-X-15 cruise missiles, each a little over 20 feet long, each packing a nuclear warhead with more
than five times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. As it wings over Canadian territory, high enough so that air resistance is minimal,
the Bear approximates the flight mode of a glider, moving silently through the ether except for short irregular bursts of acceleration from its engines. The
bomber is some 200 miles off Canada's Arctic coast when the ultrasensitive radars of the North Warning System's CAM-M
site at Cambridge Bay pick it up. CAM-M instantaneously relays the raw data on the unknown aircraft or "bogie " to NORAD's
Region Operations Control Center (ROCC) at North Bay. In the operations room of the center's subterranean complex, 600 feet deep in a Laurentian mountain, the
"ass opers" (Air Surveillance Operators) start a 3112-minute sequence to establish whether the bogie is a military or civil aircraft, friend or foe, and the nature of its
flight path and probable destination. The Bear does not respond to ROCC requests to identify itself. The ass opers within seconds have established some basic
information on the bogie: military, unfriendly, Bear-Hotel class, and on a flight path pointing generally toward Winnipeg and Minneapolis. What the ass opers do not
know is whether the Bear is carrying nuclear weapons, its intentions, and whether it is the vanguard of a possibly larger attack force. At the command post on the floor
above the operations room, the commanding major general and two deputies quickly assess the ass opers' data and order fighter-interceptors to scramble from an
airfield at Paved Paws' nearest Forward Operation Location. They also notify NORAD's central U.S. command post in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado.
CF-18 Hornets, attached to the Alouettes, the 425th Tactical Fighter Squadron based in Bagotville, Quebec,
A pair of
race into the skies and somewhere
above Victoria Island lock their radars onto the approaching Bear. One of the jets springs a fuel leak and turns back. The other, armed
with six AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles and a 20-millimeter rapid-fire cannon, intercepts the intruder and buzzes it at close range. The young francophone pilot gets no
response to his repeated demands that the Russians confirm whether they are carrying a nuclear payload. He frantically radios his base command for instructions and
zooms in for a closer look at the bomber, narrowly avoiding the Bear's tail on the pass. The Bear's pilot takes immediate evasive action, banking his plane steeply at
the same time he finally identifies himself and his payload in angry, almost threatening tones. For one fearful moment intruder and interceptor seem transfixed in
uncertainty, hovering above the icy barrens of Victoria Island. The
Hornet pilot prepares to respond with a warning burst from
fuming pilot of the Bear considers activating the ejector cartridges that would thrust a
single silvery cruise into the blue, streaking along its computer-programmed flight path toward a NORAD target. Then discipline and cold
his cannon. The
sense reassert themselves. The Bear makes a shuddering 180-degree turn and heads homeward. The Hornet lingers several minutes to track the Bear's retreat before it,
too, swings back toward its base. In
a dangerously unpredictable, post-Cold War world, some arms experts believe
the chances of a fatal miscalculation happening in the near future are better than 50 percent. The likelier prospect is
that a fragmented Canada without Quebec would itself become a lost missile cruising aimlessly
through the international sphere, its guidance system irreparably damaged, doomed to fizzle and fall
into some purgatory reserved for nations that selfdestruct.
Coast Guard Trade-off
Trade-off Links
Plan collapses the Coast Guard budget
Caldwell, Director of Homeland Security and Justice, ’11 (Stephen, December 1, “Coast Guard:
Observations on Arctic Requirements, Icebreakers, and Coordination with Stakeholders” Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives”http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyCGMT/2011-12-1Caldwell.pdf)
As mentioned above, the Coast Guard faces budget uncertainty and it may be a significant challenge for the
Coast Guard to obtain Arctic capabilities, including icebreakers. Given our analysis of the challenges that the
Coast Guard already faces in funding its existing acquisition programs, it is unlikely that the agency’s
budget could accommodate the level of additional funding (estimated by the High Latitude Study to range
from $4.14 billion to $6.9 billion) needed to acquire new icebreakers or reconstruct existing ones. The
Recapitalization report similarly concludes that the recapitalization of the polar icebreaker fleet cannot be funded within the existing or
projected Coast Guard budget. 31 All three reports reviewed alternative financing options, including the potential for leasing icebreakers, or
funding icebreakers through the NSF or DOD. The Recapitalization report noted that a funding approach similar to the approach used for the
Healy, which was funded through the fiscal year 1990 DOD appropriations, should be considered. 32 However, the Coast Guard has a more
immediate need than DOD to acquire Arctic capabilities, including icebreakers, making it unlikely that a similar funding approach would be
feasible at this time. For more details on Coast Guard funding challenges and options specific to icebreakers, see appendix IV.
Coast Guard budget spread thin – new spending would force internal tradeoffs
Biesecker 11. Calvin Biesecker, April 14, 2011. “GAO Says Coast Guard Budget Assumptions High;
Admiral Says They're Not.” Defense Daily.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6712/is_10_250/ai_n57479707/
The Coast Guard is making unrealistically high assumptions about the budgets it can expect to receive
in the coming years, a problem that could manifest itself in program delays and waiting to make
trade-offs in programs that should be considered today, a Government Accountability Official (GAO) said
yesterday. However, a Coast Guard Admiral said he fully understands the nation's fiscal situation but
that "our requirements are our requirements" and a minimum level of funding is needed to
aggressively recapitalize assets or costs will increase for new and legacy systems. "I understand that
we're asking more than we've gotten before but I believe...that we've proved our value to the nation
and it's really up to Congress and the will of the people if they're willing to make that investment in
their Coast Guard," Vice Adm. John Currier, deputy commandant for Mission Support, told the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on the Coast Guard. "I think it's justified." The biggest risk to Coast Guard's
acquisition efforts is how it is marrying resources to plans, John Hutton, director of Acquisition and
Sourcing Management at the GAO, told the panel. For example, the Coast Guard's long-term budget plan
assumes it will receive $2.4 billion in acquisition funding in FY '15, yet the service hasn't received more
than $1.5 billion in any recent fiscal year, and with "rapidly building fiscal pressures in our
government, this unrealistic budget planning exacerbates the challenges the Coast Guard programs
face," he said. The service has experienced a number of program funding breaches because of this
unrealistic planning and there will be more cost breaches if long-term planning remains "much higher
than past appropriated or requested levels," Hutton said. Rep. Frank LoBiondo (R-N.J.), chairman of the subcommittee, said in
his prepared remarks that the Coast Guard's National Security Cutter (NSC), which is being acquired to replace
aging high-endurance cutters, is 38 percent over revised budget plans and two-years behind schedule.
"In addition, both vessels require substantial retrofits to meet expected service lives," LoBiondo said. "That
one's really hard for me to understand and accept." So far, the Coast Guard has taken delivery of two NSCs of a planned eight-ship buy. The
vessels are being built by Northrop Grumman [NOC]. The third and fourth vessels are under construction and Currier said that if Congress
approves a continuing budget resolution for the remainder of FY '11, which is expected to occur shortly, then the fifth ship should be under
contract later this summer. Hutton also discussed a new study that the Coast Guard expects to complete this summer that is looking at its fleet
needs amid the changing fiscal environment. Phase two of the Fleet Mix Analysis appears to include unrealistic cost constraints, he said. At the
upper end planning for the
Coast Guard's Deepwater program, spending is expected to average $1.7 billion
annually, which is higher than the service's entire acquisition program receives, Hutton said. "More
importantly, we understand that the Coast Guard does not plan to assess any fleet mixes smaller than the
program of record, a step that would help them better prepare for and make any tradeoff decisions
given our nation's fiscally constrained environment," he said. Hutton credited the Coast Guard with acknowledging
that it needs to establish priorities among major programs and make some tradeoffs here to better align
future budgets based on historical experience. But, he said, "The key will be whether and how the Coast
Guard makes such tradeoffs. This is a key moment in time and it's important that the Coast Guard
does not push tradeoff decisions to tomorrow."
Disadvantage Links
Spending
Little spending on icebreakers now—plan would cost billions
“Reprieve for Seattle-based icebreaker Polar Sea,” AP, 6/15/2012,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2018443011_apwacoastguardicebreakers1stldwritet
hru.html
The United States currently has only one working icebreaker, the Healy. It was used last winter to escort a Russian
tanker to Nome to make an emergency delivery after a fuel barge failed to arrive before the Bering Sea froze. The Healy is a medium-duty
icebreaker designed to crush ice about 5 feet thick. The Polar Sea is designed to break through ice up to 21 feet thick. One Coast Guard study
said the agency and the Navy need six heavy duty icebreakers and four medium icebreakers, the senators said. The reduction in Arctic ice has
created more opportunities for Northwest Passage trade, fishing and oil exploration, as well as more environmental and security concerns. The
icebreakers also travel to Antarctica to resupply McMurdo Station. The hull is the costliest part of an icebreaker to build, said
Brian Baird,
a former Washington congressman who is now vice president of Vigor Industrial, formerly Todd Shipyards,
which repairs the icebreakers. Building a new icebreaker could take 10 years and cost more than $800
million, Baird told The Seattle Times.
Immense cost of icebreakers means funding won’t be allocated
Kroh et al, ’12. Kiley Kroh, Associate Director for Ocean Communications at the Center for American
Progress, Michael Conathan, Director of Ocean Policy at the Center for American Progress, and Emma
Huvos, February 2012. “Putting a Freeze on Arctic Ocean Drilling.” Center for American Progress.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/pdf/arcticreport.pdf
In an era of budgetary woes, the cost of updating our icebreaking capabilities will be difficult to
swallow. A recent GAO analysis found that, “Given the challenges that the Coast Guard already faces in
funding its Deepwater acquisition program, it is unlikely that the agency’s budget could accommodate
the level of additional funding (estimated by the High Latitude Study to range from $4.14 billion to $6.9
billion) needed to acquire new icebreakers or reconstruct existing ones.” 82
Plan too expensive – almost 1 billion dollars per ship AND would take a decade to
actually be operational.
O’Rourke, specialist in naval affairs, 6/14. Ronald O’Rourke “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf
The Coast Guard estimated in February 2008 that new replacement ships for the Polar Star and Polar Sea might cost between
$800 million and $925 million per ship in 2008 dollars to procure. 31 The Coast Guard said that this estimate is based on a
ship with integrated electric drive, three propellers, and a combined diesel and gas (electric) propulsion plant. The icebreaking capability would
be equivalent to the POLAR Class Icebreakers [i.e., Polar Star and Polar Sea] and research facilities and accommodations equivalent to HEALY.
This cost includes all shipyard and government project costs.
analysis, studies,
Total time to procure a new icebreaker [including mission
design, contract award, and construction] is eight to ten years. 32
Politics – Plan Unpopular
Republicans hate the plan – they’re not going to back down
Ahlers 11. Mike M. Ahlers, November 3, 2011. “Polar icebreaker dispute ties up Coast Guard
appropriations.” CNN. http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-03/politics/politics_congress-polaricebreakers_1_icebreakers-polar-star-polar-sea?_s=PM:POLITICS
With the nation's only two heavy-duty polar icebreakers broken and out of service, the Obama
administration and congressional Republicans are clashing on how best to put the U.S. Coast Guard
back into the ice-busting business. House Republicans, who say they want to force the
administration's hand, are pushing a Coast Guard appropriations bill that would decommission the
icebreaker Polar Star, which is now being repaired, in just three years, saying that keeping the 35-year-old
ship afloat is "throwing good money after bad." The bill requires the administration to come up with a comprehensive plan
to replace the aging icebreaker fleet. On Thursday, the administration responded by announcing it is opposing the
appropriations bill, citing the icebreaker issue.
Icebreakers are a contentious issue in the house. House republicans are fighting
Obama over what to do with the fleet.
Mike M. Ahlers ,reporter for CNN, 11 (November 3, Polar icebreaker dispute ties up Coast Guard)
appropriations) http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-03/politics/politics_congress-polaricebreakers_1_icebreakers-polar-star-polar-sea?_s=PM:POLITICS
With the nation's only two heavy-duty polar icebreakers broken and out of service, the Obama
administration and congressional Republicans are clashing on how best to put the U.S. Coast Guard
back into the ice-busting business. House Republicans, who say they want to force the
administration's hand, are pushing a Coast Guard appropriations bill that would decommission the
icebreaker Polar Star, which is now being repaired, in just three years, saying that keeping the 35-yearold ship afloat is "throwing good money after bad." The bill requires the administration to come up
with a comprehensive plan to replace the aging icebreaker fleet. On Thursday, the administration
responded by announcing it is opposing the appropriations bill, citing the icebreaker issue.
Decommissioning the Polar Star would "create a significant gap in the nation's icebreaking capacity,"
the administration said. The ship is needed until long-term plans can be developed, it said. The
Congressional Research Service said one potential concern for Congress is the absence of a plan for
replacing the Polar Star upon completion of its seven- to 10-year life after it returns to service in late
2012. That is why Rep. Frank LoBiondo, R-New Jersey, included the provision to decommission the Polar
Star, said spokesman Jason Galanes. "We absolutely support the Arctic icebreaker mission," Galanes
said. "We're forcing this decision rather then allowing the administration to kick the can down the
road."
House republicans are against repairing Ice Breakers. The plan is unpopular.
Mickey McCarter, HS today writer, 2011 (March 2nd, Coast Guard Balances Broadening Missions,
Tightening Funds) http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/today-s-news-analysis/single-article/coast-guardbalances-broadening-missions-tightening-funds/9375c0db781c458a2bac9e0bd643f5d9.html
Congressmen led by Rep. Frank LoBiondo (R-NJ), the subcommittee chairman, questioned the Coast
Guard's plan to repair a heavy polar icebreaker used in Arctic missions although it would
decommission that icebreaker as soon as six months after returning it to sea. "To add insult to injury,
the service intends to spend millions of unbudgeted dollars to refurbish the Polar Sea's engine and
then decommission the icebreaker. This is a classic example of throwing good money after bad,"
LoBiondo asserted.
Obama pushes the plan
AP 2011. AP News, November 4, 2011. “Congress and White House differ over icebreakers.”
http://townhall.com/news/politicselections/2011/11/04/congress_and_white_house_differ_over_icebreakers
The country's only two heavy-duty icebreaker ships are old and broken, and Congress and the White House are at odds
over how to respond as the melting of polar ice increases the economic and security stakes in the Arctic region. The House on Friday was
working on a Coast Guard spending bill that would decommission the Polar Star, slated to be the last
somewhat seaworthy icebreaker after its sister ship, the Polar Sea, goes out of service in the near future. The White House, in a
statement issued Thursday, said it "strongly opposes" the legislation because decommissioning the Polar Star
would "create a significant gap in the nation's icebreaking capacity." In the Senate, Sen. Maria Cantwell, DWash., is trying to block the decommissioning of either ship with a provision she added to a Coast Guard
bill. The ships are based in the Seattle area and support hundreds of jobs there. "Our nation needs
icebreakers," she said at the committee meeting. "With Russia moving many troops to the Arctic, and Chinese investors buying parts of
Greenland, this is also a national security issue." There's
little disagreement on the need for a U.S. presence in the
Arctic. The Congressional Research Service, in a report last year, said the shrinking of the icecap will result in increased commercial and
military ship activity and greater exploration for oil and other resources. That calls into demand the functions of icebreakers: defending U.S.
sovereignty and economic interests, monitoring sea traffic, law enforcement, conducting search and rescue operations and scientific research.
"We
desperately need the Coast Guard and the administration to do what we have asked them to do
really now for more than 10 years _ define what our mission is in the Arctic ," said Rep. Frank LoBiondo, R-N.J.,
chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's Coast Guard subcommittee. He said it costs tens of millions of
dollars a year to keep the two vessels tied up at the dock, and he hopes the House move to take them
out of service will push the administration into deciding how large a fleet is needed in the future. The
lone Alaska congressmen, Republican Don Young, opposes decommissioning icebreakers and wants to increase the number of vessels in any
way possible, spokesman Luke Miller said. Young has introduced a bill that would authorize the Coast Guard to enter into long-term lease
agreements for two new icebreakers. The icebreakers are supposed to have a 30-year service life. The Polar Star, commissioned in 1976, is
docked in Seattle, in caretaker status since 2006. The Polar Sea, commissioned in 1978, suffered an engine breakdown last year and has been
out of service. The Coast Guard also has a third, medium-duty icebreaker, the Healy, that is used mainly for scientific research. The White
House said Congress
has previously approved funds to reactivate the Polar Star by the end of next year,
extending the life of the ship for seven to 10 years. That, it said, "will stabilize the United States' existing polar fleet until
long-term icebreaking capability requirements are finalized."
Congress split on icebreakers— debate over alts like privatization, ratification, and
leasing
Forgey, of Juneau Empire, 11 (Pat, Juneau Empire <Alaskan news>. December 2011. “Congress urged
to act on icebreakers” <http://juneauempire.com/local/2011-12-02/congress-urged-acticebreakers#.T_4qwFSqkew>)
Lt. Gov. Mead Treadwell joined Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Robert Papp on Thursday in making a push before Congress to better protect
Alaska’s Arctic. Other nations, they said, were aggressively developing their Arctic resources and the United States needs to be there too, they
told the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’s Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Marine Transportation. “America is
missing the boat,” was Treadwell’s key message, and among the boats he’d like to see the Coast Guard have are new heavy icebreakers.
Currently, the nation’s two Polar-class heavy icebreakers are in limbo, with only the medium icebreaker Healy available, Papp said. Among
the strategies the committee discussed for beefing up the country’s icebreaking fleet was leasing
privately owned vessels, just recently the topic of discussion at an Arctic investment forum at the University of Alaska Southeast.
That strategy got aggressive support from at least one Republican member of Congress, but there
were concerns as well. Treadwell said Arctic ice cover was at historic minimums, but still limited activity in the winter. Ice-breaking
capability extends the season as ice begins forming in the fall, and then breaks up in the spring. Other strategies for asserting
American sovereignty that were discussed included ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty and
developing further north port infrastructure. Papp said having the ice-breaking cutter Healy operating in Arctic waters helps
the U.S. assert its claims there. “The Healy provides a sovereign presence in those waters,” Papp said. Rep. Jeff Landry, R-La., repeatedly
advocated the use of leasing to get the United States new icebreakers. Those new vessels would presumably be built in his home state, where
Shell Oil Co. is building its own icebreaking vessels. Treadwell
said leasing privately owned icebreakers might be the
way to go. “It seems like it may be a way to get us the capability that the admiral needs,” Treadwell said.
Congressman Don Young, a member of the subcommittee, suggested Alaska could build icebreakers and
lease them to the federal government to get around the initial funding hurdle. Papp warned leasing might not
provide the cost savings some believe it might, but said he wasn’t taking a stand. “I’m ambivalent,” he said. “We just need the icebreaking
capability.” Landry aggressively pushed the benefits of leasing. “If you blow a rod on a leased vessel, you get a newer, more up-to-date vessel,”
he said. Leasing could provide two icebreakers at the same costs of owning one, he said. The commandant seemed skeptical. “There
is a
point where leasing becomes more expensive,” he said. “The government tends to operate its vessels
for many years and may exceed that point.” Papp said he’d just returned a leased car, and “at the end of my lease I have no
car, and I’ve been spending a lot of money,” he said. A congressman told Papp he now had the opportunity to get a completely new car, but
that’s not how Papp said he viewed it. “I was really considering buying my next car,” he said. Landry said the Congressional Budget Office’s
formula for calculating costs was biased against leasing, and requires lease expenses to be counted up front. “The
federal
government doesn’t understand cash flow,” Landry said.
Congressional debate over funding icebreakers inevitable
O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, 12 (Ronald, June 14. “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf)
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Coast Guard’s proposal to fund the
acquisition of a new icebreaker using incremental funding (i.e., a series of annual funding increments—see “Funding in
FY2013 Budget for New Polar Icebreaker” in “Background”) rather than full funding (i.e., placing most or all of the ship’s acquisition
cost into a single year). Section 31.6 of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-1147 normally requires executive branch agencies
to use full funding for acquiring capital assets such as a new ship. The
Coast Guard appears to have received permission
from OMB to propose the use of incremental funding for acquiring a new polar icebreaker; Congress
may choose to approve, reject, or modify this proposal. Supporters of using incremental funding to acquire a new
polar icebreaker could argue that funding this ship in a single year would create a one-year “spike” in Coast
Guard funding requirements that could require offsetting and potentially disruptive one-year reductions in other Coast Guard programs,
and that using incremental funding mitigates the spiking issue by spreading the ship’s cost over several years. Supporters could argue
that avoiding such budget spikes is a principal reason why the Navy in recent years has been given
permission by OMB and Congress to use incremental funding to procure aircraft carriers and
amphibious assault ships,48 and that a polar icebreaker is analogous to an aircraft carrier or an amphibious assault ship in being a
very expensive (for the Coast Guard) ship that is procured once every several years. Supporters of using full funding to acquire
a new polar icebreaker could argue that the acquisition cost of a polar icebreaker (roughly $900 million),
though large by Coast Guard standards, is much less than that of an aircraft carrier (more than $11 billion) or
an amphibious assault ship (more than $3 billion). They could argue that OMB believes using full funding
reduces risks in the acquisition of capital assets,49 and that permitting the use of incremental funding for the procurement
of a polar icebreaker could weaken adherence to the policy by setting a precedent for using incremental funding for acquiring other capital
assets costing less than $1 billion. The
issue of incremental funding as an alternative to full funding in the
acquisition of Navy ships is discussed at length in other CRS reports.50 Funding Ships in Coast Guard Budget or
Elsewhere Another potential issue for Congress, if it is determined that one or more new icebreakers should be procured by the government
through a traditional acquisition, is whether the acquisition cost of those ships should be funded entirely through Coast Guard’s Acquisition,
Construction, and Improvements (AC&I) account, or partly or entirely through other parts of the federal budget, such as the Department of
Defense (DOD) budget, the NSF budget, or both.51 Within the DOD budget, possibilities include the Navy’s shipbuilding account, called the
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account, and the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF), which is an account where DOD sealift ships
and Navy auxiliary ships are funded. There
is precedent for funding Coast Guard icebreakers in the DOD budget:
The procurement of Healy was funded in FY1990 in the DOD budget—specifically, the SCN account.52
Advocates of funding new icebreakers partly or entirely through the SCN account or the NDSF might argue that this could permit the funding of
new icebreakers while putting less pressure on other parts of the Coast Guard’s budget. They might also argue that it would permit the new
icebreaker program to benefit from the Navy’s experience in managing shipbuilding programs. Opponents might argue that funding new
icebreakers in the SCN account or the NDSF might put pressure on these other two accounts at a time when the Navy and DOD are facing
challenges funding their own shipbuilding and other priorities. They might also argue that having the Navy manage the Coast Guard’s
icebreaker program would add complexity to the acquisition effort, and that it is unclear whether the Navy’s recent performance in managing
shipbuilding programs is better than the Coast Guard’s, since both services have recently experienced problems in managing shipbuilding
programs—the Coast Guard with the procurement of new Deepwater cutters, and the Navy in the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program and the
LPD-17 class amphibious ship program.53
More congressional debate
Song, 11 (Kyung, November 2011. “2 parties' icebreaker plans on collision course”
<http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2016713336_icebreaker08m.html>)
WASHINGTON — For a pair of battered ships that in recent years have mostly sat docked in Seattle, the
Coast Guard's heavy-duty icebreakers are facing roiling waters in Congress. The Coast Guard wants to mothball the
hobbled Polar Sea and scavenge the 33-year-old vessel for parts for its sister ship, the Polar Star. Sen. Maria Cantwell, D-Wash., opposes the
move. Last week, the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee passed a two-year
Coast Guard authorization bill that included an amendment co-sponsored by Cantwell barring the service from decommissioning the Polar Sea.
But over in the House, Republicans are pushing for the exact opposite: They want the Coast Guard to
permanently mothball the Polar Sea in six months, and to decommission the Polar Star — now undergoing a
$57 million overhaul near West Seattle — in three years. That measure passed a House committee in September and was scheduled for consideration by
the full House on Friday before being postponed. And on Thursday, the White House issued a statement that it "strongly
opposes" the House version of the reauthorization bill on grounds that it would prematurely yank the Polar Star from service and
"create a significant gap in the nation's icebreaking capability." The legislative tussle is playing out as warming climates are
opening up frozen regions to increased exploration just as the nation's two biggest icebreakers are
past their original life spans. Experts say the thinning ice will increase demand for icebreakers as more
people flock to the hazardous polar environs. House Republicans are using the threat of
decommissioning in an effort to push the Coast Guard and the administration to articulate its Arctic
mission and just how large an icebreaker fleet is needed. Out of the Coast Guard's three general-purpose icebreakers, all based in
Seattle, only the medium-duty Healy is currently operating. The 399-foot Polar Sea was refurbished in 2006, only to be crippled by engine failure last year. The
rehabbed Polar Star, the Polar Sea's twin, is slated to return to service in 2013 with hopes of squeezing an additional seven to 10 years of use out of it. "These
icebreakers have not been in regular service since 2006, but we have been spending tens of millions of dollars every year just to keep them tied to the dock," said
Just last month, Congress received an
independent analysis of whether the Coast Guard should build new icebreakers or keep going with its
two aged vessels. The report has not been made public. Rep. Rick Larsen, of Lake Stevens, the top Democrat on the House
Justin Harclerode, Republican spokesman for the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
transportation panel's Coast Guard subcommittee, said it would be unwise to order the two icebreakers decommissioned before concluding a definitive study about
how the United States can best maintain economic and scientific presence in the polar regions. Larsen has scheduled a hearing on Dec. 1 titled "Protecting U.S.
Sovereignty: Coast Guard Operations in the Arctic." Earlier, Larsen withdrew an amendment to block the decommissioning provision after Republicans agreed to
address his concerns before the bill went up for a floor vote. But Larsen said he "couldn't convince the Republican majority" to drop the language. The
full
House is expected to consider the bill after it returns from recess next week. Passage likely will put it
on collision course with the Senate's Coast Guard reauthorization bill.
Counterplans
Private Actor CP
Private companies solve the aff better – spend less money and make it more
environmentally friendly
Demer 11. Lisa Demer, December 6, 2011. “Shell to unveil icebreaker for Arctic Alaska offshore
drilling.” Anchorage Daily News. http://www.adn.com/2011/12/05/2204274/shell-about-to-unveil-200million.html
A longtime Shell contractor has nearly completed a massive, customized icebreaking ship for the
company's drilling projects in the Chukchi Sea off Alaska. The icebreaker is part of a specialized fleet
Shell hopes to deploy for exploration drilling next summer, if it can clear all the legal and regulatory
hurdles. Named the Aiviq, the Eskimo word for walrus, the $200 million, 360-foot steel vessel's main
job will be to move anchor lines that will attach drilling rigs to the sea floor in the shallow Arctic. But
it's also on standby in case of an oil spill -- it could recover about 10,000 barrels of spilled crude. The
ship was designed to cut through ice a meter thick and likely will be able to move through thicker ice,
its builder says. It can operate at minus 58 degrees. Shell points to the ship as evidence that it's serious
about drilling in -- and protecting -- the fragile Arctic. Edison Chouest Offshore is building the ship at its
Larose shipyard, North American Shipbuilding. Edison Chouest is a family-owned company active in the
oil business, especially in the Gulf of Mexico. Along with affiliated businesses, Edison Chouest builds,
owns and operates a fleet of vessels that serves offshore oil field operations, conducts research for the
National Science Foundation and engages in other marine activities, its executives say. The company has
9,000 employees around the world. The firm's president, Gary Chouest, donates thousands of dollars
every year to political candidates in Louisiana, Alaska and other states. He has given to the campaigns of
U.S. Rep. Don Young and U.S. Sens. Lisa Murkowski and Mark Begich. In the first quarter of this year, he
and members of his family used various corporate entities to contribute $60,000 to Young's legal
defense fund, according to the congressional newspaper Roll Call. Those contributions are under
investigation by the U.S. House Committee on Ethics, according to Young's office. Since 2007, Chouest
has donated almost $325,000 to candidates, political action committees and Republican Party
organizations, including $20,000 to the Alaska Republican Party, according to the website
opensecrets.org. Edison Chouest and a partner, Fairweather LLC, are building a 70,000-square-foot
aviation center in Deadhorse, on Alaska's North Slope. The company has operated one of its research
icebreakers, the Nathaniel Palmer, in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas, said Michael Terminel, an Edison
Chouest ship captain who oversees the company's Alaska operations. The company's main Alaska
project is the Aiviq. The ship's name came from a North Slope school girl as part of a competition. "It will
be the world's largest and most powerful anchor-handling icebreaker," Gary Chouest said. Unloaded,
the ship will weigh as much as 26,000 Chevy Suburbans, said Gary Rook, who, as technical director for
Edison Chouest, designed the Aiviq. It's double hulled and was designed with redundancies like dual
oil-water separators. Features include ultra low emissions -- it was built to 2016 Environmental
Protection Agency standards -- and extra insulation so that it operates as quietly as possible.
Cooperation with private entities key to solve
Coast Guard Proceedings, 2011. Coast Guard Proceedings of Marine Safety and Security Council –
Journal of Safety and Security at Sea. Spring 2011. Vol. 68.
http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/archive/2011/Vol68_No1_Spr2011.pdf
Another vital component of the continued success of the domestic icebreaking program is sustaining
professional relationships with commercial industry stakeholders such as the Lake CarriersAssociation, tug/tow operators,
commercial fishing fleets, ferry services, and the businesses thatrely on year-round maritime transportation. Close cooperation with
commercial icebreaking companies is also important, as there are many demands for icebreaking
assistance on the Great Lakes that the Coast Guard simply cannot meet. Working together, the Coast
Guard will continue to meet the demands of commercial shipping, and prepare for successful
operations well into the future.
Private sector investment key to solve
Young, Alaskan congressman, 6/7/12. Don Young, “Rep. Young Works to Keep Icebreaker from
Being Scrapped” http://donyoung.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=298929
Fighting to prevent one third of our nation’s icebreaking fleet from being scrapped, Alaskan
Congressman Don Young today successfully attached an amendment to H.R. 5887, the Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation Act of 2012. Rep. Young’s amendment aims to gauge private sector interest in
operating an icebreaker and directs the Coast Guard to also assess any interest the private sector
would have in buying or leasing the USCGC Polar Sea. This amendment builds on a provision already contained in
the underlying bill that requires the Coast Guard to complete an assessment and report back to Congress on what the cost
would be to refurbish and get the ship back into service. “I have said it before and I’ll say it again – our icebreaking
capabilities are woefully inadequate,” said Rep. Young. “The race for the Arctic and its resources has
begun and we need to ensure all capable icebreakers are in service. The Coast Guard must explore all
possibilities; that means making sure we’re not completely scrapping an icebreaker that the private
sector has shown interest in. “It’s time to get creative -- whether it’s leasing or owning icebreakers, or
even working with the private sector, we must work harder to improve our icebreaking capability.”
Private firms should develop Icebreakers, and they could be leased out
DeMarban, 2012 (Alex, April11th, writer for Alaska Dispatch, “Should Alaska Take the Lead in Financing
New Icebreakers,” Alaska Dispatch, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/should-alaska-take-leadfinancing-new-icebreakers)
"Without access to heavy icebreakers, we will be unable to adapt to historic changes in the Arctic ,"
Young wrote. "Icebreakers are critical for ensuring safe shipping and resource operations and providing for field research opportunities." He
continues: "Given
the current fiscal climate in D.C., funding the acquisition of new vessels presents a
significant challenge. It is clear that we must consider creative financing and ownership options to move forward." In addition to
helping bankroll the project, the state should also think about owning an icebreaker with private firms. The state
could refurbish the Polar Sea or the Polar Star. It could then lease its icebreakers to the Coast Guard and N ational
Science Foundation, wrote Young.
Congress supports the usage of privately owned icebreakers
Forgey, Reporter at Juneau Empire, 11 (Pat, December 2nd, “Congress Urged to Act on Icebreakers,”
Juneauempire.com, http://juneauempire.com/local/2011-12-02/congress-urged-acticebreakers#.T_5DzXCUo5B)
Among the strategies the committee discussed for beefing up the country’s icebreaking fleet was
leasing privately owned vessels, just recently the topic of discussion at an Arctic investment forum at the University of Alaska
Southeast. That strategy got aggressive support from at least one Republican member of Congress, but there
were concerns as well. Treadwell said Arctic ice cover was at historic minimums, but still limited activity in the winter. Ice-breaking capability
extends the season as ice begins forming in the fall, and then breaks up in the spring.
Other strategies for asserting American
sovereignty that were discussed included ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty and developing further north port
infrastructure. Papp said having the ice-breaking cutter Healy operating in Arctic waters helps the U.S. assert its claims there. “The Healy
provides a sovereign presence in those waters,” Papp said. Rep. Jeff Landry, R-La., repeatedly advocated the use of leasing to get the United
States new icebreakers. Those new vessels would presumably be built in his home state, where Shell Oil Co. is building its own icebreaking
vessels. Treadwell
said leasing privately owned icebreakers might be the way to go. “It seems like it may
be a way to get us the capability that the admiral needs,” Treadwell said.
LOST CP
US ratification of the treaty facilitates government credibility and legitimacy
Smith, Colonel U.S. Air Force, 10 (Reginald R. Smith , Oct 27, 2010
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-62/JFQ62_117-124_Smith.pdf “The Arctic: A New Partnership
Paradigm or the Next Cold War?”) DG
The significance of the declaration is paramount to cooperation in that UNCLOS provides the international rallying point for the Arctic states. 78
Similarly important, by virtue of the unanimous and strong affirmation of UNCLOS, the declaration effectively delegitimized the notion to
administer the Arctic along the lines of an Antarctic-like treaty preserving the notions of sovereignty and resource exploitation in the region. 79
With U.S. participation and declaration of support for UNCLOS in these venues, failure to ratify the
treaty suggests that U.S. credibility and legitimacy, and hence the ability to build cohesive
multilateral partnerships, are appreciably degraded.
This conclusion is illustrated in Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s refusal to
join the Proliferation Security Initiative using the U.S. refusal to accede to UNCLOS as their main argument. 80 Accession
to the treaty
appears to be a key first step to preserving U.S. vital interests in the Arctic and building necessary
credibility for regional and global partnerships in the political spectrum. Equally important to political
partnerships in the region are those available through military collaboration of the Arctic nations.
There are a number of existing constructs for military partnership, most of which are currently
bilateral and trilateral militaryto-military ventures among the Arctic states and other interested
states. The majority of these constructs are military exercises, such as the joint Canadian-DanishAmerican Northern Deployment 2009, that promote interoperability and cooperation among
participating nations. 81 Others include longstanding mutual defense organizations such as the U.S. and Canadian integration in the
North American Aerospace Defense Command, a standard that has been suggested for an overall Arctic collaboration model. 82 Similarly, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) includes among its membership all Arctic states except Russia. While NATO supports member states
and has exercised member militaries in the Arctic areas off Norway, it is a divisive influence when trying to include Russia in an Arctic solution
set. 83 Ad hoc arrangements also promote cooperation as in the 2010 agreement between Norway and the United States solidifying a plan for
the two national navies to train together in the northern Norwegian waters. 84 Another ad hoc relationship is also forming among the
Scandinavian countries seeking to “enhance security in the Arctic.” 85 The North Atlantic and North Pacific Coast Guard Forums are multilateral
organizations that promote information sharing and cooperative efforts in a number of maritime issues including SAR. These forums have been
generally successful in promoting maritime cooperation through information sharing and interoperability through training exercises and may
provide a model for similar cooperation in the Arctic region. 86 Another program that shows promise for a more broad-based cooperative
effort is the U.S. Coast Guard’s “Shiprider” initiative, under which the United States and partner nations exchange maritime law enforcement
officials on each other’s patrol vessels, allowing rule of law enforcement in both host and partner nation waters. 87 To
one extent or
another, all “Arctic coastal states have indicated a willingness to establish and maintain a military
presence in the high north.” 88 However, decidedly lacking among the Arctic nations’ military forces is
a unifying construct to promote cooperation and mutual interests in an allinclusive multilateral basis.
This is similarly reflected in the U.S. military enterprise as there are currently no “mechanisms for
joint operations in the Arctic.” 89 Promoting a new broad-based military partnership paradigm to
complement those opportunities available and emerging in the political arena seems to be the next
logical step for preservation of the United States’ vital Arctic interests.
The US needs to ratify their claim to the arctic through the UN to prevent disputes.
Carlson, Jon D.., Hubach, Chris., Long, Joe., Minteer, Kellen. and Young, Shane. 2009 (April 02
The Scramble for the Arctic: The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Extending
National Seabed Claims) http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p363540_index.html
Typically, the mechanisms for resolving disputes resulting from an international treaty are contained in a
separate protocol. The Convention on the Law of the Sea is unique in that the mechanism for the
settlement of disputes is incorporated into the document, making it obligatory for parties to the
Convention to go through the settlement procedure in case of a dispute with another party. Thus,
inherent in the Convention is the vision that it is a dispute-resolution mechanism. During negotiations
many countries were opposed to the idea of a binding settlement being decided by third party judges
and insisted that issues could be resolved by way of direct negotiations between claimant parties.
Others pointed to failed negotiations and long-standing disputes leading to armed conflict and argued
that the only way to insure peaceful settlements was to insure that states bind themselves in advance to
accept the rulings of judicial bodies. A compromise was settled upon. If direct negotiations fail, a
choice of four other procedures are available: “submission of the dispute to the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea, adjudication by the International Court of Justice, submission to binding
international arbitration procedures or submission to special arbitration tribunals with expertise in
specific types of disputes” (The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [A historical
perspective], 1998). So at its heart, UNCLOS is a regime instrument designed to obviate the very types
of disputes that are at present emergent in the Arctic. The question, then, is will this attempt at dispute
resolution and mediation prove successful, or will so-called “realist” visions of power-seeking
international behavior emerge as dominant?
The US does not have a legitimate claim to any Arctic territory because they have
failed to ratify the UNCLOS
Carlson, Jon D.., Hubach, Chris., Long, Joe., Minteer, Kellen. and Young, Shane. 2009 (April 02
The Scramble for the Arctic: The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Extending
National Seabed Claims) http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p363540_index.html
However, by not being a signatory state to the UNCLOS, the US does not have access to the forum in
which their claim could be protected. Despite being deeply involved in the initial actions that led to the
creation of UNCLOS, the United States has yet to ratify the treaty. The treaty was attacked by President
Reagan as, “socialism run amok” and a “third world giveaway” (Salvaging the Law of the Sea, 1994).
Conservatives strongly dissent with the claim made by the Convention that seabed wealth beyond
territorial limits is the world’s common heritage. Their basic position is, “if that wealth belongs to
everybody, why is anybody’s permission needed to reap it?” (cf. Salvaging the Law of the Sea, 1994). Yet
there is significant area north of current holdings off the Alaskan North Slope that could be solidified,
and claimed as within American territorial limits. And this seems to be at the heart of the shift away
from such a hard-line Republican position: other countries are extending the delineation of their
territory, and less is being left as ‘common heritage’.
Ratification of UNCLOS would benefit the US more than any other country, promoting
heg
NRC et al 07 (National Research Council , Polar Research Board,Marine Board (MB)Earth and Life
Studies (DELS)Transportation Research Board, Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard , “
Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World:An Assessment of U.S. Needs.” Online PDF at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11753#orgs )
UNCLOS was crafted to manage and protect the natural resources of the world’s oceans and outline
unifying provisions concerning rights of maritime navigation, transit regimes, continental shelf
jurisdiction, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and seabed mining. Exactly 149 countries have ratified
the convention, including almost every industrialized nation except the United States. 5 When first
proposed in 1982, President Ronald Reagan had objections to the convention’s provisions on seabed
mining. This part of the convention was rectified in the 1994 Agreement on Part XI. President Clinton
signed the treaty and sent it to Congress where it still awaits accession. It is clear that accession to the
treaty by Congress has been supported by more than one administration with the concurrence of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, the Pew Commission, the
U.S. Navy, and others. Because the United States is the world’s largest maritime power with the
longest coastline and largest continental shelves in the world, the country is poised to benefit the
most from ratification. This far-reaching framework is consistent with our national security, economic,
and environmental interests in the oceans while promoting international approaches to dispute
settlements and means of managing open sea resources.
Obama will push to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty
Bruce Jones 6/15 (June 15, 2012, senior fellow and the director of the Managing Global Order project
and director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University “Arctic Issues Reinforce
Case for Senate to Ratify Law of the Sea Treaty” http://www.brookings.edu/research/expertqa/2012/06/15-law-of-the-seajones?rssid=energy+and+environment&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=F
eed%3A+BrookingsRSS%2Ftopics%2Fenergyandenvironment+%28Brookings+Topics++Energy+and+Environment%29) DG
President Obama is urging the Senate to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, an accord that governs
international waterways and helps countries manage maritime disputes. The U.S. is the only major
country that hasn’t ratified the treaty, which administration official say would bolster national
security, help create jobs and facilitate oil exploration. Opponents argue that the treaty would require
the U.S. to forfeit certain royalties and would undermine the nation’s sovereignty in waterways around
the world. Senior Fellow Bruce Jones, director of the Managing Global Order project, says it’s time
that the U.S. Senate ratify the accord.
Russia expanding, Lost solves disputes.Cohen & Khomenk 11 (Ariel, Ph.D., Anatoliy, a Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian
Studies and International Energy Policy & a Intern, Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The
Heritage Foundation December 2, 2011 ‘Reversing U.S. Retreat from the Arctic’
http://blog.heritage.org/2011/12/02/reversing-u-s-retreat-from-the-arcticb/ BHS)
Another reason is that the U.S. is behind countries like Russia and Canada in naval assets and technologies necessary
for Arctic exploration and development. Compared to Russia’s flotilla of 18 icebreakers, including seven nuclear-powered ones,
the U.S. only has three, two of which are nearing the end of their service lives. Russia is developing new models of nuclear ice
breakers, anticipating demand for their services, but unlike Russia, the U.S. government and the private sector are hesitant to commit more
funds to building and developing new icebreakers given the current economic situation. Weitz
believes that the Arctic “is not
fated to become an arena of international conflict” and that most of the disputes will be resolved with international cooperation or
negotiations through intergovernmental organizations. However, Russia’s increasingly aggressive posture in the Arctic
suggests otherwise. As we wrote, Russia “is increasingly relying on power, not international law, to settle its
claims.” To support its Arctic claims, Moscow not only deployed civilian research expeditions; it also resumed military navy and air patrols of
the region for the first time since the end of the Cold War. And unlike the U.S., Russia has a number of elite military units
trained specifically for combat in the Arctic. We further concluded that that such an aggressive stance and “the current
rush to dominate the Arctic Ocean and everything under it indicates that greed and aggression characterize the
new Russian polar bear.” Under these circumstances, it remains to be seen whether Russia will use diplomacy, as Weitz outlines. Even
if they do, at this point in time it is Russia, not the U.S., who is able to negotiate from a position of strength in the Arctic. Finally,
Weitz, mentions that the Arctic countries may use the U.N. Law of the Seas Treaty (LOST) to make resolve disputes. The
U.S. is not a party to LOST and thus cannot use the same international legal mechanisms, which he believes
somehow may put the U.S. at a disadvantage, as Washington would not be able to use the same international legal mechanisms to enforce its
claims as the other Arctic countries. Still, as we wrote before, the claims may still be legally enforceable using President Harry Truman’s
Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, which declares that “any hydrocarbon or other resources discovered beneath the U.S. continental shelf are
the property of the United States.”
Arctic Task Force CP
CP Text: The United States federal government should coordinate with Russia to
develop the Multinational Artic Task Force.
The CP solves conflict over the Artic by increasing cooperation with other countries
and creating better relations, that spills over to solve global issues
Smith, Colonel U.S. Air Force, 10 (Reginald R. Smith , Oct 27, 2010
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-62/JFQ62_117-124_Smith.pdf “The Arctic: A New Partnership
Paradigm or the Next Cold War?”) DG
Using SAR—a nonthreatening and apolitical issue of interest to all Arctic and other user nations—as the means to open the “partnership door,”
the United States, in coordination with Russia, should develop the Multinational Arctic Task Force
(MNATF). Foundational support for development of the organization will be facilitated through a joint
U.S.- and Russia-sponsored multinational SAR exercise involving all the Arctic nations, notionally
entitled Operation Arctic Light (OAL). Through the planning and execution of OAL, Arctic nations will
build trust, exchange ideas, build relationships, and see and experience the benefits of collaboration.
The natural progression over time can be shaped toward formalizing the exercise into an overarching
coordination organization that perpetuates OAL, along the lines of the North Atlantic and North
Pacific Coast Guard Forums, which evolves into the desired MNATF construct. MNATF would initially
be comprised of the military representatives of the Arctic Five plus the additionally recognized Arctic
nations of Iceland, Sweden, and Finland. The mandate of the organization would be the regional
coordination, synchronization, and combination of member countries’ SAR activities, resources, and
capabilities to meet the needs of the region. The initial operational capability concept is a regional SAR organization that
leverages the contributions of each member country into a synergistic operational command capable of responding rapidly to SAR crises in the
Arctic region. Building on a model similar to the “Shiprider” program, MNATF
may expand mission sets commensurate
with perceived regional needs and the desires of member nations to include rule of law enforcement
on the high seas, resource protection, and antipiracy/antiterrorism. The outgrowth of this construct
will be the improved safety, security, and stability of the region to the benefit of not only member
nations, but also the world at large. Corollary benefits of this new Arctic paradigm will include the partnerships formed and
cooperation of nations through information sharing and capability integration. Finally, for the United States, MNATF
effectively fills a critical capability gap, adds credible action to the NSPD 66 Arctic Region Policy
directives, and supports the preservation of U.S. vital interests in the Arctic region.
Jones Act CP
Exemption from The Jones Act would provide a strong incentive
Carafano and Dean ’11 (Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom, Deputy Director,
Foreign, Defense, Trade, and HSP in the Gov. Relations Department at Heritage, James, James, States
News Service, “Breaking an Ice-Bound U.S. Policy: A Proposal for Operating in the Arctic”, Heritage
Foundation, Accessed through Lexis Nexis , DOA:7/10)
To aid commercial ice-breaking, Congress should exempt U.S. firms from the requirement to comply
with the Jones Act. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also known as the Jones Act, was meant to save
the merchant marine industry by requiring that ships that traveled American waters be built in the
United States and manned by American crews. Like many other protectionist policies, the premises of
the Jones Act seem plausible: Require goods moving from one U.S. port to another to travel on U.S.-built
ships, with U.S. crews, and you will protect U.S. maritime and shipbuilding jobs. The last serious review
of the Jones Act (a series of congressional hearings in the 1990s) revealed that more than 40,000
American merchant seamen and 40,000 longshoremen had lost their jobs despite Jones Act
protectionism. Over the first 76 years of the act, more than 60 U.S. shipyards had gone out of
business, eliminating 200,000 jobs. If the intent of the Jones Act was to save U.S. jobs, it failed. As a
result, state-of-the-art ice-breakers can be built over-seas today at far less expense. Exempting U.S.
contractors from having to comply with an outdated law that has brought more damage than benefit
to the U.S. maritime industry would provide a strong incentive for future ice-breaker operators.