An International Research Symposium
The Global Katrina Effect, 2005-2015:
Hurricane Katrina’s Impact on Disaster Management Systems Worldwide
Symposium PRESENTATION ABSTRACTS
Center for Disaster Research and Education
Millersville University of Pennsylvania
The Effects of Katrina on Forecasting and Managing the Risk Associated with Storm Surge
Bill Read, Kenneth Graham and Alan Gerard
On 29 August 2005, Katrina made landfall as a large, major hurricane on the Gulf Coast of Mississippi
near its border with Louisiana. The catastrophic loss of life and damage caused by the massive storm
surge flooding from Katrina exposed serious flaws in the way the U.S. deals with the hurricane threat.
According to the National Hurricane Center's storm summary report on Katrina, Katrina produced a
surge of 15 to 28 feet on the coast of Mississippi, and a surge of 12 to 18 feet in southeast Louisiana.
With most of the New Orleans metropolitan area lying near (or even below) sea level, it relies upon an
intricate system of levees and canals to protect it from storm surge. The large surge produced by
Katrina strained this system, and in many areas overtopped or breached the levees. Coastal Mississippi
has no levee system, and thus it was completely vulnerable to the onslaught produced by Katrina's
surge. In the end, 1577 fatalities were reported in Louisiana and 238 in Mississippi, and the
overwhelming majority of these deaths resulted from storm surge flooding. The first part of this
presentation will document the storm surge catastrophe produced by Katrina.
In the wake of the catastrophe produced by Katrina's surge, as well as other more recent significant
surge disasters related to hurricanes Ike, Isaac, and Sandy, the United States has been examining new
methodologies for preparedness, forecasting, and communicating the hazards associated with storm
surge. These include improved forecasting techniques, revised evacuation policies, enhanced
preparedness campaigns, and new storm surge warnings and geospatial maps. What has not happened
since Katrina is the development of robust land use and building codes in at risk coastal counties. This
section of the presentation will summarize these efforts.
Many parts of the world are vulnerable to the impacts of tropical cyclones and associated storm surge
flooding. This was recently demonstrated by Supertyphoon Haiyan, which produced a massive storm
surge that was likely responsible for a large majority of the more than 6,000 fatalities the storm caused
in the Philippines. In spite of this threat, storm surge preparedness and forecasting is much less
developed in most areas of the world outside of the United States. There are a few exceptions, though,
and this last section of our presentation will focus on global improvements made since Katrina. This will
include a discussion of projects in Bangladesh, a country where in the past hundreds of thousands have
died in surge catastrophes, but where great strides have been made in managing the storm surge risk.
Technical capabilities to forecast and warn for storm surge show promise for greatly reducing loss of life
in the coming decades.
The Hurricane Katrina Global Influence on Disaster Case Management Programs and Process
Scott Manning and Jane Kushma
Among the many influences Hurricane Katrina had on emergency management, the influence on
disaster case management policy, program management, and practice was significant. By disaster case
management, we mean the process used to assist disaster survivors to identify needs, locate and
arrange services to assist in meeting those needs, and provide coordination among multiple service
providers. We investigate Katrina influences on disaster case management philosophy and approach on
a global basis through the systematic review of studies, reports, and other materials focusing on policies,
procedures, and practices that have occurred in the post-Katrina environment. Prior to Hurricane
Katrina, disaster case management in the U.S. was almost exclusively delivered by the voluntary and
faith-based communities, often as an extension of disaster relief services provided by these groups. In
response to overwhelming human needs generated by Hurricane Katrina and a strained disaster service
delivery system, the U.S. government funded a number of disaster case management programs
designed to improve access to services for disaster survivors. We are interested to see the extent of
similar government involvement that has occurred outside the United States. Experiences with delivery
of the early pilot programs in the U.S. led to the development of a federal Disaster Case Management
Program (DCMP) under FEMA auspices. This specialized program was authorized by the 2006 PostKatrina Emergency Management Reform Act, and has since been implemented for a number of large
disasters, including a DCMP the authors helped to evaluate in 2013 (Alabama 2011 Tornadoes). In
addition to government policy and programmatic changes, the disaster voluntary agency and faithbased communities also implemented changes to established approaches and procedures for delivery of
disaster case management services and coordination mechanisms. For example, the National Voluntary
Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) modified standards and developed points of consensus among
stakeholder organizations following Hurricane Katrina. Have similar changes occurred in the
humanitarian assistance domain? We examine international disaster case management in the aftermath
of disaster and systematically review key guidance and standards documents, published reports and
studies, and scholarly journal articles to discern changes to service delivery strategy and
implementation. Implications for disaster management theory and practice, including policy
recommendations, will be discussed.
Can local government reduce social vulnerability to climate related extreme events? – A critical
assessment of capacity in the context of climate and disaster law and policy.
Paul J Govind
This paper is concerned with how social vulnerability is reflected in law and policy aimed at reducing
both climate and disaster risk in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. It focuses in particular upon the
capacity of local government to reduce social vulnerability in the context of a tiered federated politicolegal system. The paper is divided into two distinct yet interrelated parts – the first critically examines
the capacity of local government in the United States to reduce social vulnerability, while the second
compares the emerging role of local government in Australia and what lessons can be learnt from the
experience in the United States.
Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath have a substantial and diverse legacy. The devastating impacts had
powerful economic, environmental and social implications. It also highlighted the need to reflect the
linkages between these effects when formulating and implementing effective disaster law and policy in
a future constrained by climate change.
Whilst much valuable research exists in terms of the effectiveness of immediate and long-term recovery
measures ex post, this paper focuses upon the relevance of Katrina in promoting the importance of ex
ante measures as part of disaster management not only in the United States but internationally and
indirectly other domestic jurisdictions. Two related factors harshly exposed through Katrina were
vulnerability and the influence of climate change in determining vulnerability – especially social
vulnerability. The promotion of ex ante measures affords an opportunity for greater integration
between disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in reducing social vulnerability.
Vulnerability is a key component of the disaster/environmental risk matrix. Areas and populations
within an exposed area will exhibit different levels of social vulnerability due to a variety of underlying
factors such as relative poverty. Katrina revealed that vulnerability in exposed areas varies as the
enduring humanitarian cost of Katrina was most heavily felt in lower socio-economic areas that
exhibited high social vulnerability and low adaptive capacity. The US Federal Government acknowledged
in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy that climate change is accelerating sea level rise and the conditions
that can result in more severe extreme events and will alter levels of vulnerability proportionate to the
capacity of areas and populations to adapt.
Law and policy that is aimed at reducing vulnerability in terms of both disaster and climate change must
provide for greater adaptive capacity by factoring social vulnerability into the identification and
understanding of risk. In the wake of Hurricane Sandy local governments across the United States have
assumed a major role in taking action to manage climate and disaster risk. However in a federated
system it is necessary that the tiers of government at both state and federal level support the
assumption of political and legal responsibility by local government through changes to capacity to
manage climate and disaster risk and reduce social vulnerability. The issue of local government capacity
across the United States is an extremely important issue and critical analysis will help assess the efficacy
of policy concerning climate and disaster risk in the United States and the current state of play in
Australia.
Despite a high level of exposure to climate related extreme events Australia has been slower to respond
to the need to reduce social vulnerability in the context of climate and disaster risk. Recent legislative
reforms in the state of New South Wales have devolved the responsibility of managing sea level rise to
local government prompting questions about capacity and effectively identifying and managing the
underlying factors of social vulnerability in an uncertain and likely volatile future.
Animals in Disaster: From Katrina to the Canterbury Earthquakes
Steve Glassey
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of the United States of America. In its wake, it
left US$110 billion in damage and 1,836 people dead making it the third deadliest disaster in US history.
This disaster also highlighted the importance of companion animal emergency management with over
50,000 pets being left behind during the evacuation of New Orleans and 80-90% of these pets perishing.
What was anticipated to be over within a few days turned into a disaster beyond comprehension and
triggered the largest animal rescue operation in US history – an operation that rescued approximately
15,000 pets supported by some 5,000 volunteers. Following Katrina, in reaction to public outcry over the
thousands of pets that died, Congress passed the Pet Evacuation & Transportation Standards (PETS) Act
of 2006, which included the requirement for local and state emergency management agencies to have
companion animal emergency management measures in place.
In contrast, New Zealand has very few mechanisms to protect companion animals during a disaster. In
jest, some emergency managers believe shooting pets is the solution. But with no funding or evidence
based advice available to emergency managers and animal care professionals the opportunity to protect
companion animals and by doing so, protecting the human population is lost or simply put in the too
hard basket.
When the September 2010 earthquake struck Canterbury (Darfield) over 3,000 animals were killed,
however there was no loss of human life. In the following devastating February 2011 Canterbury
earthquake there was over 185 people killed in New Zealand's first national state of emergency. The
impact on animal welfare from the February 2011 earthquake was equally devastating. This research
project is aimed at identifying and filling the research gaps pertaining to the impact on animal welfare as
a result of the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence and through a linked case study analysis,
draw learnings to better protect animals in future disasters and by doing so reducing the associated
trauma, cost and risks to humans as well.
Lessons From the Katrina Experience in New Orleans La. to Better Anticipate and Manage the Issue of
Crime During and After Disasters
Pauline Cotelle
When Hurricane Katrina made landfall in New Orleans, city officials were underprepared to manage the
issue of looting that turned out to be one, if not the main obstacle, in handling the crisis efficiently after
the levees broke and the city was submerged underwater. During the days after the hurricane struck the
Gulf Coast, New Orleans became the “eye of the media” because of the propagation of looting and
violence throughout the city. The media coverage of Katrina became a second disaster for the city since
the stories of rampant violence and “out of control looting” that turned out to be untrue for the most
part, literally paralyzed the missions of rescuers and prompted city officials to concentrate resources on
the restoration of the “law and order” in the streets of New Orleans. The lack of preparation regarding
the issue of looting led many residents in New Orleans to stay instead of evacuating because of their
unwillingness to leave their properties. This led to violent conflicts between the so called “vigilantes”
and residents presumed to be looters. This violence could have been prevented if all the residents would
have followed the mandatory evacuation order or if the Army would have been deployed before
Hurricane Katrina struck. After citizens finally were evacuated from New Orleans, stories of “crime
waves” started to emerge as a result of the displacement of Katrina evacuees to cities like Dallas. The
analysis of crime data from the Dallas local police shows that not only did the crime wave not occur but
the crime rate actually dropped after Katrina. In cities like Dallas, the anticipation of a sudden increase in
the population could have helped city officials to better handle the risk of the increase in crime but also
it could have helped to prevent the propagation of fear among the local population that often led to the
creation of a hostile environment for the evacuees.
In 2008, when Hurricane Gustav made land fall in Louisiana, the city of New Orleans applied an “antilooting campaign” created in order to anticipate and prevent looting from occurring. The anticipation of
looting, directly related to the “Katrina experience” three year earlier, turned out to be a success since
only a couple of looting events were reported by the authorities. Besides that, the evacuation of the city
was greatly facilitated by the deployment of the National Guard before the hurricane hit because the
residents knew someone was there to watch out for their properties.
In France, the city of Orléans, exposed to flood risk, has developed an evacuation plan that considers the
risk of looting and its potential impact on a successful evacuation. It has indeed anticipated several
issues like the evacuation by train of the prison and the surveillance of residents’ properties by the Army
and the National Police in order to ease the evacuation process. Besides that case, cities like Los Angeles
or Miami could greatly benefit from the Katrina experience since they are exposed to major risks
(earthquakes, hurricanes) and are also confronted by many social issues like crime. Those cities should
adapt their emergency management plans by integrating the issue of crime. Moreover the potential
impact of evacuee displacements on crime incidents in host cities also needs to be anticipated.
Wealthy Countries as International Aid Recipients: The United States and the Lessons of Katrina
Kirsten Nakjavani Bookmiller and Robert J. Bookmiller
Conventional wisdom about international humanitarian assistance in the wake of a disaster was highly
bifurcated in its nature through the 2000s. In short, the widely-held view was that poorer countries
always receive aid while richer countries always donate it. Two major changes have occurred in recent
years to challenge this conventional wisdom. The first is that countries which have been traditionally
classified as economically lesser developed are in fact becoming aid players in their own right for a
variety of reasons and motivations. The second major challenge to commonly held views about aid—
and the one most relevant to the presentation here -- is that wealthier, disaster-affected countries can
also be recipients of transnational humanitarian assistance. And while this dynamic existed before
2005— such as the international response following devastating earthquakes in Japan (1995) and
Taiwan (1999) -- it was the sight of the United States as humanitarian aid recipient after Hurricane
Katrina that pivotally and irrevocably turned this traditionally held notion about who gets international
assistance upside down.
On the one hand, there was the extraordinary image of arguably the most powerful, prosperous country
in the world incapable of managing its domestic response capacities to the Katrina disaster. But there
was another compelling and troubling picture too. For reasons as diverse as the countries themselves,
there was an unprecedented global outpouring of offers of international aid from over 130 countries as
well as numerous intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. The United States, so
unaccustomed to playing the role of aid recipient, was largely incapacitated legally, politically and
administratively to handle such an influx, which-- despite President George W. Bush’s initial statements
to the contrary—US federal officials believed would in fact be advantageous to accept in some
instances. There was simply no real infrastructure in place within the United States (aside from a
handful of bilateral arrangements) geared toward domestic facilitation of external humanitarian
assistance.
This study will therefore discuss the watershed case of the US as large-scale aid recipient following
Hurricane Katrina, explore what changes have been made on the legislative, policy and bureaucratic
fronts within the United States since 2005 and identify areas still requiring further attention. The latter
half of the presentation will employ a wider lens and will reflect upon the experiences of other
economically developed countries following significant disasters, such as Japan’s 2011 trifold
catastrophe caused by an earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident and New Zealand’s 2011
Christchurch earthquake. And while the paper will highlight how Katrina may have advanced the
conversation regarding wealthier countries as international aid recipients, it will assert that in the end
this binary approach is essentially irrelevant today and that all countries—no matter their place on the
global wealth rankings—need to be pro-active in developing sound legal and policy frameworks in
receiving humanitarian assistance from abroad.