*Afghan Stability Advantage*
1ac Afghan Instability
International crackdowns have failed – production is on the rise in Afghanistan
CIS Newswire, 5/8/13 (Russia’s military newswire, “Foreign military force in Afghanistan fails to make anti-terrorism
breakthrough, drug trafficking grows – Putin”, Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 5/8/2013, Proquest, JKahn)
MOSCOW. May 8 (Interfax) - Russian President Vladimir Putin forecasts a possibility of exacerbation
in
Afghanistan and says the international forces have failed to make a breakthrough in fighting
terrorism and drug trafficking in that country. "There are all grounds to believe we may face an exacerbated
situation in Afghanistan in the near future ," Putinsaid at a meeting of the Russian Security Council on Wednesday.
"The foreign military contingent, whose backbone is American forces, has not achieved a breakthrough in
the fight against terrorist and radical groups as yet; on the contrary, their activity has intensified lately," he
stated. "Besides, there has been a drastic increase in drug production in Afghanistan and formation
of stable drug trafficking routes to other countries; unfortunately, Russia is amongst them ," the
president remarked. "International terrorist and radical groups do not conceal their plans to export instability ,"
Putin said. "They are trying to spread subversive activity into the territories of neighboring Central Asian countries and Russia," the
president said. "Such
developments are fraught with serious risks to us: an increase in drug trafficking
and transboundary crime, uncontrolled flows of refugees, migrants, and fundamentalism," he stressed.
The international forces "have done practically nothing to eradicate drug production in Afghanistan," the president
said. "Alas, Russian proposals to the effect have been neglected," he said. Meanwhile, the 2014 will be difficult for Afghanistan, Putin
said. He said that the country would have presidential and provincial elections and, "what is especially important, the bulk of the
foreign military contingent will be pulled out next year."
Drugs cause Afghan instability – fund the Taliban
Inkster, 12 (Nigel, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, “Drugs: A war lost in Afghanistan”, Foreign Policy, 5/29/2012,
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/29/drugs_a_war_lost_in_afghanistan, JKahn)
The May 20 NATO summit in Chicago was dominated by the issue of Afghanistan. Amidst all the talk about
withdrawing international combat troops by 2014, funding the Afghan National Security Forces beyond 2014, and a doubtful
political settlement with the Taliban, one
subject was absent from the formal agenda: drugs . Yet in few
other countries is the drugs trade so entrenched as it is in Afghanistan. Accounting for between
one-quarter and one-third of the national economy, it is an integral part of the insecurity blighting
Afghan life for the past 30 years. Debate may continue for years as to whether the Western intervention in Afghanistan has
made the world safer or more insecure in the post-9/11 era. But it has not only done nothing to reduce global
supplies of illicit opium; rather, it has made the problem worse . The international drugs-control regime, in place
since the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs came into effect, rests on prohibiting use in consumer countries and reducing
supply in producer states. In Afghanistan, the source of around 60 per cent of the planet's illicit opium and 85
per cent of heroin, the latter objective may never be achieved to any meaningful degree. The boom years for
Afghan poppy cultivation began in the 1970s, thanks to political instability in Southeast Asia's fertile 'Golden Triangle' and bans on
the crop in neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. The Soviet invasion in late 1979 gave local warlords an incentive to plant opium poppies
to fund their insurgency against Moscow. In the three decades since, with few other sources of income, opium production has come
to provide for up to half a million Afghan households. The poppy is a hardy, drought-resistant plant, much easier for farmers to grow
than saffron and more profitable than wheat. Both have been offered as alternative crops, but with only limited take-up. The
criminal networks that have sprung up around the drugs trade provide farmers with seeds, fertiliser and cash loans; in short they
offer an alternative welfare system. The principal growing regions, the southern Pashtun-dominated provinces of Helmand
and Kandahar,
are also Taliban strongholds . For all these reasons, NATO efforts to eradicate opium - either
by aerial spraying or manually- have alienated the population . Indeed, they have often had to be abandoned in the face of
popular resistance. Crop disease did more to reduce opium production in 2010 than NATO's counter-narcotics strategy. The United
Nations recently reported there had been a 61 percent rebound in opium production in 2011, and prices were soaring. This is a
worrying trend, which seems set to continue after NATO troops leave. Drug seizures, while rising, still account for less than 5% of
opium produced. As a general rule, the United Nations estimates, law-enforcement agencies need to interdict about 70% of supplies
to make the drugs trade less financially attractive to traffickers and dealers. In any circumstances, this is an extremely challenging
objective. In the large swathes of Afghanistan where the central government and security forces wield no control, it is completely
unrealistic. Meanwhile, no major trafficker has yet successfully been prosecuted due to a widespread culture of impunity. Alternative
approaches have been proposed. Most recently, in May 2012, Tajik Interior Minister Ramazon Rakhimov proposed that opium
should be purchased directly from Afghan farmers to either be used in the pharmaceutical industry or to be destroyed. He also called
on other countries to do the same in a move he deemed essential to fight drug trafficking and narcotics-fuelled terrorism. But this
option was tried in 2002 when the United Kingdom had the lead on narcotics reduction, and had to be abandoned in the face of
evidence that the purchasing programme constituted a perverse incentive to increase production. Licit production of opium for
medical purposes may be a long-term option for Afghanistan, but not while current conditions of high insecurity and pervasive
corruption persist. In the West, the drugs scourge is mostly thought about in terms of the lives lost, opportunities wasted and the
social disruption created through addiction. In fragile and impoverished nations such as Afghanistan, drugs
create a shadow state, fuelling institutional corruption, instability, violence and human misery.
The Taliban, which banned the planting of opium in 2001, was deriving an estimated U.S. $125
million per year from the business by 2009. It has been an equally important revenue stream for
former warlords whose inclusion in the administration of President Hamid Karzai NATO's International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) has done little to oppose. Such individuals have a powerful vested interest in state weakness to
the obvious detriment of good governance and institution-building. And all these actors are likely to maximise
revenues from opium production in the run-up to the 2014 NATO/ISAF drawdown to hedge against an uncertain future.
A trade in which so many have vested interests will never be unwound simply or swiftly. What drives it is its huge
profitability, a consequence of continuing Western demand . No-one can confidently predict the consequences
of changing the drugs prohibition regime. The current approach has not achieved the 1961 Single Convention's objectives. But has
had the unintended consequence of perpetuating and increasing corruption and instability in parts of the world
least equipped to deal with the consequences. Perhaps our collective experience in Afghanistan should serve as the basis for a serious
rethink of global drugs policy? This would involve a cost/benefit analysis of current policies , scenario
planning of the impact of alternative approaches and a much greater focus on demand reduction in consumer states. The issue of
narcotics needs to be taken out of the silo it currently inhabits and looked at in the wider context of
international security and development.
Instability in Afghanistan creates a nuclear crisis
Rubin, 11 (Joel, Director of Policy and Government Affairs, Ploughshares Fund, former congressional aide and diplomat, fellow
at the State Department in both Near Eastern Affairs and Political-Military Affairs, Master’s degree in Public Policy and Business
Administration from Carnegie Mellon University and a Bachelor’s degree in Politics from Brandeis University, Huffington Post,
77/2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joel-rubin/middle-east-nuclear-threat_b_891178.html, JKahn)
The national security calculus of keeping U.S. forces in Afghanistan has shifted. Any gains that we made from keeping 100,000
American soldiers in harm's way are now questionable, especially since al Qaeda has been dealt a significant blow with the killing of
Osama bin Laden. President Obama's decision to end the surge by late next year only reinforces this reality. Yet many of the
underlying sources of conflict and tension in South and Central Asia will remain after an American withdrawal.
In a region that has deep experience on nuclear matters -- with nuclear aspirant Iran bordering
Afghanistan on one side and nuclear-armed Pakistan and India on the other -- the United States must
take into account the potential for regional nuclear insecurity caused by a poorly executed drawdown in Afghanistan. As much as we
may like to, we can't just cut and run. So as the United States draws down its forces, we must take care to leave stable systems and
relationships in place; failure to do so could exacerbate historic regional tensions and potentially create new national security risks.
It is therefore essential that Washington policymakers create a comprehensive nuclear security strategy for the region as part of its
Afghanistan withdrawal plans that lays the groundwork for regional stability. We have only to look to our recent history in the region
to understand the importance of this approach. In the 1980s, the U.S. supported the Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union. When
that conflict ended, we withdrew, only to see the rise of al Qaeda -- and its resultant international terrorism -- in the 1990s because
we didn't pull out responsibly from Afghanistan. Our choices now in Afghanistan will determine the shape of our
security challenges in the region for the foreseeable future. And we can't afford for nuclear weapons to
become to South and Central Asia in the 21st century what al Qaeda was in the 1990s to Afghanistan. To avoid such an outcome,
several key objectives must be included in any Afghanistan withdrawal plan. First, current levels of regional insecurity -- which
already are extremely high -- will continue to drive tensions, and quite possibly conflict, amongst the regional powers. Therefore, we
must ensure the implementation of a regional approach to military withdrawal. These efforts must bring all relevant regional players
to the table, particularly the nuclear and potentially nuclear states. Iran and all the countries bordering Afghanistan must be part of
this discussion. Second, the United States must be mindful to not leave a governance vacuum inside Afghanistan. While it is clear
that the current counter-insurgency policy being pursued in Afghanistan is not working at a pace that meets either Western or
Afghan aspirations, it is still essential that Afghanistan not be allowed to implode. We do not need 100,000 troops to do this, and as
the Afghanistan Study Group has recommended, credible political negotiations that emphasize power-sharing and political
reconciliation must take place to keep the country intact while the United States moves out. Third, while the rationale for our
presence in Afghanistan -- to defeat al Qaeda -- has dissipated, a major security concern justifying our continued involvement in the
region -- potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan -- will remain and may actually rise in
importance. It is crucial that we keep a particularly close eye on these programs to ensure that all is done to prevent the illicit
transfer or ill-use of nuclear weapons. Regardless of American troop levels in Afghanistan, the U.S. must maximize its military and
intelligence relationships with these countries to continue to both understand their nuclear intentions and help prevent potential
conflict. We must avoid a situation where any minor misunderstanding or even terrorist act, as happened in Mumbai in 2008, does
not set off escalating tensions that lead to a nuclear exchange. Ultimately, the U.S. will one day leave Afghanistan -- and it may be
sooner than anyone expects. The
key here is to leave in a way that promotes regional stability and
cooperation, not a power vacuum that could foster proxy conflicts. To ensure that our security interests are protected
and that the region does not get sucked in to a new level of insecurity and tension, a comprehensive strategy to enhance regional
security, maintain a stable Afghanistan, and keep a watchful eye on Pakistan and India is essential. Taking such steps will
help us to depart Afghanistan in a responsible manner that protects our security interests, while not exacerbating the deep strategic
insecurities of a region that has the greatest risk of arms races and nuclear conflict in the world.
1ac Heroin
Afghan heroin exports to North America are trafficked through Mexico
Gómora, 11 – special reports journalist for El Universal, citing Edgardo Buscaglia, a fellow at the Autonomous Technological
Institute of Mexico (Doris, “Mexican Cartels Buying Afghan Heroin,” Borderland Beat, 5 January 2011,
http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/01/mexican-cartels-buying-afghan-heroin.html)//BI
Mexican cartels have established business alliances with gangs operating in places like
Afganistán and Turkey, in order to obtain and smuggle drugs to supply Europe and North
America, according to investigator Edgardo Buscaglia, a fellow at the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico (ITAM). In
an interview with EL UNIVERSAL, Buscaglia confirmed that Mexican narcotraffickers operate like multinational
emissaries "to establish contacts and place operatives that can deal with the Turkish and Indian criminal
organizations in order to facilitate the production and sale of drugs," specifically heroin. Buscaglia
says that according to his investigation, these criminal groups operate on an international level, and their
bases of operations are located in México. “It is in the interest of these Mexican groups (specifically the Sinaloa
alliance) that they open smuggling routes for the distribution of heroin to the U.S. market. Furthermore, they are not only
focusing on the movement of Afghan heroin through Mexico; they are also taking positions of
power as major players in the international world of the heroin trade," according to Buscaglia, who is also
the director the International Center of Legal and Economic Development. Strategic Global Alliances According to Buscaglia, the
strategic alliances between the cartels of México and the Middle Eastern group becomes potentially
closer to being a fact with each passing rumor. “It is not as if (Joaquín) El Chapo Guzmán (Loera) himself travels to
Turkey, it is up to his emissaries to maintain good relations in that country. They keep the flow of heroin packages and money that
belongs to the Sinaloa cartel moving to their appropriate destinations. Money and heroin make its way to Chicago, or New York. It is
like the concept of outsourcing labor: the Mexican cartels receive the product from their overseas
suppliers and they distribute the merchandise locally," Edgardo Buscaglia explained to his interview with El
Universal. The shipments that arrived to Canadá and the U.S. are very profitable to the criminal
groups of the southern hemisphere, but the product itself is produced in Afganistán, where 90% of
the worlds heroin supply comes from, says Buscaglia. “The Mexican groups arrive to the Turkish and Afghan
markets with contacts established by emissaries or companies where cartel members hold minor
positions. Often, the exporters themselves come with the credentials of being overseas suppliers and representatives of people in
the business of illicit services,” he explained.
<insert solvency>
Drugs cause Afghan instability – fund the Taliban
Inkster, 12 (Nigel, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, “Drugs: A war lost in Afghanistan”, Foreign Policy, 5/29/2012,
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/29/drugs_a_war_lost_in_afghanistan, JKahn)
The May 20 NATO summit in Chicago was dominated by the issue of Afghanistan. Amidst all the talk about
withdrawing international combat troops by 2014, funding the Afghan National Security Forces beyond 2014, and a doubtful
political settlement with the Taliban, one
subject was absent from the formal agenda: drugs . Yet in few
other countries is the drugs trade so entrenched as it is in Afghanistan. Accounting for between
one-quarter and one-third of the national economy, it is an integral part of the insecurity blighting
Afghan life for the past 30 years. Debate may continue for years as to whether the Western intervention in Afghanistan has
made the world safer or more insecure in the post-9/11 era. But it has not only done nothing to reduce global
supplies of illicit opium; rather, it has made the problem worse . The international drugs-control regime, in place
since the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs came into effect, rests on prohibiting use in consumer countries and reducing
supply in producer states. In Afghanistan, the source of around 60 per cent of the planet's illicit opium and 85
per cent of heroin, the latter objective may never be achieved to any meaningful degree. The boom years for
Afghan poppy cultivation began in the 1970s, thanks to political instability in Southeast Asia's fertile 'Golden Triangle' and bans on
the crop in neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. The Soviet invasion in late 1979 gave local warlords an incentive to plant opium poppies
to fund their insurgency against Moscow. In the three decades since, with few other sources of income, opium production has come
to provide for up to half a million Afghan households. The poppy is a hardy, drought-resistant plant, much easier for farmers to grow
than saffron and more profitable than wheat. Both have been offered as alternative crops, but with only limited take-up. The
criminal networks that have sprung up around the drugs trade provide farmers with seeds, fertiliser and cash loans; in short they
offer an alternative welfare system. The principal growing regions, the southern Pashtun-dominated provinces of Helmand
and Kandahar,
are also Taliban strongholds . For all these reasons, NATO efforts to eradicate opium - either
by aerial spraying or manually- have alienated the population . Indeed, they have often had to be abandoned in the face of
popular resistance. Crop disease did more to reduce opium production in 2010 than NATO's counter-narcotics strategy. The United
Nations recently reported there had been a 61 percent rebound in opium production in 2011, and prices were soaring. This is a
worrying trend, which seems set to continue after NATO troops leave. Drug seizures, while rising, still account for less than 5% of
opium produced. As a general rule, the United Nations estimates, law-enforcement agencies need to interdict about 70% of supplies
to make the drugs trade less financially attractive to traffickers and dealers. In any circumstances, this is an extremely challenging
objective. In the large swathes of Afghanistan where the central government and security forces wield no control, it is completely
unrealistic. Meanwhile, no major trafficker has yet successfully been prosecuted due to a widespread culture of impunity. Alternative
approaches have been proposed. Most recently, in May 2012, Tajik Interior Minister Ramazon Rakhimov proposed that opium
should be purchased directly from Afghan farmers to either be used in the pharmaceutical industry or to be destroyed. He also called
on other countries to do the same in a move he deemed essential to fight drug trafficking and narcotics-fuelled terrorism. But this
option was tried in 2002 when the United Kingdom had the lead on narcotics reduction, and had to be abandoned in the face of
evidence that the purchasing programme constituted a perverse incentive to increase production. Licit production of opium for
medical purposes may be a long-term option for Afghanistan, but not while current conditions of high insecurity and pervasive
corruption persist. In the West, the drugs scourge is mostly thought about in terms of the lives lost, opportunities wasted and the
social disruption created through addiction. In fragile and impoverished nations such as Afghanistan, drugs
create a shadow state, fuelling institutional corruption, instability, violence and human misery.
The Taliban, which banned the planting of opium in 2001, was deriving an estimated U.S. $125
million per year from the business by 2009. It has been an equally important revenue stream for
former warlords whose inclusion in the administration of President Hamid Karzai NATO's International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) has done little to oppose. Such individuals have a powerful vested interest in state weakness to
the obvious detriment of good governance and institution-building. And all these actors are likely to maximise
revenues from opium production in the run-up to the 2014 NATO/ISAF drawdown to hedge against an uncertain future.
A trade in which so many have vested interests will never be unwound simply or swiftly. What drives it is its huge
profitability, a consequence of continuing Western demand . No-one can confidently predict the consequences
of changing the drugs prohibition regime. The current approach has not achieved the 1961 Single Convention's objectives. But has
had the unintended consequence of perpetuating and increasing corruption and instability in parts of the world
least equipped to deal with the consequences. Perhaps our collective experience in Afghanistan should serve as the basis for a serious
rethink of global drugs policy? This would involve a cost/benefit analysis of current policies , scenario
planning of the impact of alternative approaches and a much greater focus on demand reduction in consumer states. The issue of
narcotics needs to be taken out of the silo it currently inhabits and looked at in the wider context of
international security and development.
Instability in Afghanistan creates a nuclear crisis
Rubin, 11 (Joel, Director of Policy and Government Affairs, Ploughshares Fund, former congressional aide and diplomat, fellow
at the State Department in both Near Eastern Affairs and Political-Military Affairs, Master’s degree in Public Policy and Business
Administration from Carnegie Mellon University and a Bachelor’s degree in Politics from Brandeis University, Huffington Post,
77/2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joel-rubin/middle-east-nuclear-threat_b_891178.html, JKahn)
The national security calculus of keeping U.S. forces in Afghanistan has shifted. Any gains that we made from keeping 100,000
American soldiers in harm's way are now questionable, especially since al Qaeda has been dealt a significant blow with the killing of
Osama bin Laden. President Obama's decision to end the surge by late next year only reinforces this reality. Yet many of the
underlying sources of conflict and tension in South and Central Asia will remain after an American withdrawal.
In a region that has deep experience on nuclear matters -- with nuclear aspirant Iran bordering
Afghanistan on one side and nuclear-armed Pakistan and India on the other -- the United States must
take into account the potential for regional nuclear insecurity caused by a poorly executed drawdown in Afghanistan. As much as we
may like to, we can't just cut and run. So as the United States draws down its forces, we must take care to leave stable systems and
relationships in place; failure to do so could exacerbate historic regional tensions and potentially create new national security risks.
It is therefore essential that Washington policymakers create a comprehensive nuclear security strategy for the region as part of its
Afghanistan withdrawal plans that lays the groundwork for regional stability. We have only to look to our recent history in the region
to understand the importance of this approach. In the 1980s, the U.S. supported the Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union. When
that conflict ended, we withdrew, only to see the rise of al Qaeda -- and its resultant international terrorism -- in the 1990s because
we didn't pull out responsibly from Afghanistan. Our choices now in Afghanistan will determine the shape of our
security challenges in the region for the foreseeable future. And we can't afford for nuclear weapons to
become to South and Central Asia in the 21st century what al Qaeda was in the 1990s to Afghanistan. To avoid such an outcome,
several key objectives must be included in any Afghanistan withdrawal plan. First, current levels of regional insecurity -- which
already are extremely high -- will continue to drive tensions, and quite possibly conflict, amongst the regional powers. Therefore, we
must ensure the implementation of a regional approach to military withdrawal. These efforts must bring all relevant regional players
to the table, particularly the nuclear and potentially nuclear states. Iran and all the countries bordering Afghanistan must be part of
this discussion. Second, the United States must be mindful to not leave a governance vacuum inside Afghanistan. While it is clear
that the current counter-insurgency policy being pursued in Afghanistan is not working at a pace that meets either Western or
Afghan aspirations, it is still essential that Afghanistan not be allowed to implode. We do not need 100,000 troops to do this, and as
the Afghanistan Study Group has recommended, credible political negotiations that emphasize power-sharing and political
reconciliation must take place to keep the country intact while the United States moves out. Third, while the rationale for our
presence in Afghanistan -- to defeat al Qaeda -- has dissipated, a major security concern justifying our continued involvement in the
region -- potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan -- will remain and may actually rise in
importance. It is crucial that we keep a particularly close eye on these programs to ensure that all is done to prevent the illicit
transfer or ill-use of nuclear weapons. Regardless of American troop levels in Afghanistan, the U.S. must maximize its military and
intelligence relationships with these countries to continue to both understand their nuclear intentions and help prevent potential
conflict. We must avoid a situation where any minor misunderstanding or even terrorist act, as happened in Mumbai in 2008, does
not set off escalating tensions that lead to a nuclear exchange. Ultimately, the U.S. will one day leave Afghanistan -- and it may be
sooner than anyone expects. The
key here is to leave in a way that promotes regional stability and
cooperation, not a power vacuum that could foster proxy conflicts. To ensure that our security interests are protected
and that the region does not get sucked in to a new level of insecurity and tension, a comprehensive strategy to enhance regional
security, maintain a stable Afghanistan, and keep a watchful eye on Pakistan and India is essential. Taking such steps will
help us to depart Afghanistan in a responsible manner that protects our security interests, while not exacerbating the deep strategic
insecurities of a region that has the greatest risk of arms races and nuclear conflict in the world.
Drugs Kills Stability
Drug trafficking destroys stability and funds the insurgency
Blanchard, 09 (Chris, analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs for the Congressional Research
Service, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 4/21/2009,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32686.pdf, JKahn)
Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have eroded Afghanistan’s fragile political and ¶
economic order over the last 30 years. In spite of ongoing counternarcotics efforts by the Afghan ¶ government, the United
States, and their partners, Afghanistan remains the source of over 90% of ¶ the world’s illicit opium. Since
2001, efforts to provide viable economic alternatives to poppy ¶ cultivation and to disrupt drug trafficking and related corruption
have succeeded in some areas. ¶ However, insecurity , particularly in the southern province of Helmand, and
widespread
corruption ¶ fueled a surge in cultivation in 2006 and 2007, pushing opium output to all-time highs. In
2008, ¶ poppy cultivation decreased in north-central and eastern Afghanistan, while drug activity became ¶ more concentrated in the
south and west. National poppy cultivation and opium production totals ¶ dropped slightly in 2008, as pressure from provincial
officials, higher wheat prices, drought, and ¶ lower opium prices altered the cultivation decisions of some Afghan poppy farmers.
Some experts ¶ have questioned the sustainability of rapid changes in cultivation patterns and recommend ¶
reinforcing recent reductions to replace poppy cultivation over time. ¶ Across Afghanistan, insurgents,
criminal
organizations, and corrupt officials exploit narcotics as a ¶ reliable source of revenue and
patronage, which has perpetuated the threat these groups pose to ¶ the country’s fragile internal
security and the legitimacy of its democratic government. United ¶ Nations officials estimated that the export value
of the 2008 opium poppy crop and its derived ¶ opiates reached over $3 billion, sustaining fears that Afghanistan’s economic
recovery continues ¶ to be underwritten by drug profits. The trafficking of Afghan drugs also appears to provide ¶
financial and logistical support to a range of extremist groups that continue to operate in and ¶ around
Afghanistan, including resurgent Taliban fighters and some Al Qaeda operatives . Although ¶ coalition
forces may be less frequently relying on figures involved with narcotics for intelligence ¶ and security support, many observers have
warned that drug-related
corruption among appointed ¶ and elected Afghan officials creates political
obstacles to progress. ¶ President Obama stated in March 2009 that Afghanistan’s “economy is undercut by a
booming ¶ narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency .” Afghan President
Hamid ¶ Karzai has identified the opium economy as “the single greatest challenge to the long-term
¶ security, development, and effective governance of Afghanistan.” Congress appropriated ¶ approximately
$2.9 billion in regular and supplemental counternarcotics foreign assistance and ¶ defense funding for Afghanistan programs from
FY2001 through FY2009. In March 2009, ¶ Obama Administration Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
Ambassador Richard ¶ Holbrooke called U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan to date “the most wasteful and ¶ ineffective
program I have seen in 40 years in and out of the government.” The Obama ¶ Administration and Members of the 111th Congress
may consider options for reorganizing ¶ counternarcotics efforts as part of new efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.
Drugs are a threat to overall stability
Blanchard, 09 (Chris, analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs for the Congressional Research
Service, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 4/21/2009,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32686.pdf, JKahn)
In spite of ongoing international efforts to combat Afghanistan’s narcotics trade, U.N. officials ¶
estimate that Afghanistan supplies over 90% of the world’s illicit opium.1¶ Afghan, U.S., and ¶ international
officials have stated that opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking constitute ¶ serious strategic
threats to the security and stability of Afghanistan and jeopardize the success of ¶ post-9/11
counterterrorism and reconstruction efforts . Since 2001, counternarcotics policy has ¶ emerged as a focal point in broader,
recurring debates in the executive branch and in Congress ¶ about the United States’ strategic objectives and policies in Afghanistan.
¶ Relevant concerns include the role of U.S. military personnel and strategies for continuing the ¶ simultaneous pursuit of
counterterrorism and counternarcotics goals, which may be complicated ¶ by practical necessities and political realities. Coalition
forces pursuing regional security and ¶ counterterrorism objectives may rely on the cooperation of security commanders, tribal
leaders, ¶ and local officials who may be involved in the narcotics trade. Similarly, U.S. officials and many ¶ observers believe
that the
introduction of a democratic system of government to Afghanistan has ¶ been
accompanied by the election and appointment of narcotics-associated individuals to ¶ positions of public
office. ¶ Efforts to combat the opium trade in Afghanistan face the challenge of ending a highly-
profitable ¶ enterprise fueled by international demand that has become deeply interwoven with
the economic, ¶ political, and social fabric of a war-torn country. Afghan, U.S., and international authorities are ¶
engaged in a campaign to reverse the unprecedented upsurge of opium poppy cultivation and ¶ heroin production that occurred
following the fall of the Taliban. U.S. officials continue to ¶ implement a multifaceted counternarcotics initiative that includes public
awareness campaigns, ¶ judicial reform measures, economic and agricultural development assistance, drug interdiction ¶ operations,
and more robust poppy eradication. The Obama Administration and the 111th¶ Congress may consider options for modifying U.S.
counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in ¶ order to meet the challenges posed by the Afghan opium economy to the security of
Afghanistan ¶ and the international community. Questions regarding the likely effectiveness, resource ¶ requirements, and
implications of new counternarcotics strategies in Afghanistan may arise ¶ during the first session of the 111th Congress as such
options are debated.
The drug trade undermines security and the Afghan rule of law
Blanchard, 09 (Chris, analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs for the Congressional Research
Service, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 4/21/2009,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32686.pdf, JKahn)
Breaking the Narcotics-Insecurity Cycle ¶ Narcotics trafficking and political instability remain intimately
linked in Afghanistan . U.S. ¶ officials have identified narcotics trafficking as a primary barrier to the
establishment of security ¶ and consider insecurity to be a primary barrier to successful counternarcotics operations. The ¶
narcotics-trade fuels three corrosive trends that have undermined the stability of Afghan society ¶ and limited progress toward
reconstruction since 2001. First, narcotics proceeds can corrupt ¶ police, judges, and government officials and
prevent the establishment of basic rule of law in ¶ many areas. Second, the narcotics trade can provide
the Taliban and other insurgents with funding ¶ and arms that support their violent activities . Third,
corruption and violence can prevent reform ¶ and development necessary for the renewal of
legitimate economic activity. In the most conflictprone areas, symbiotic relationships between narcotics producers,
traffickers, insurgents, and ¶ corrupt officials can create self-reinforcing cycles of violence and criminality (see
Figure 4) ¶ Across Afghanistan, the persistence of these trends undermines Afghan civilians’ confidence in ¶ their local,
provincial, and national government institutions. ¶
Opium – Afghanistan key
Opium production has shifted to Afghanistan
Fuller, 07 (Thomas, Southeast Asia Correspondent for The New York Times, “No Blowing Smoke: Poppies Fade in Southeast
Asia:”, 9/16/2007, New York Times, Proquest, JKahn)
As a result, the Golden Triangle has been eclipsed
by the Golden Crescent -- the poppy-growing area
in and around Afghanistan that is now the source of an estimated 92 percent of the world's opium ,
according to the United Nations. Much of the growth in opium production there is in areas controlled by the
Taliban, which United States officials say uses revenue from opium and heroin to finance itself. This
shift to Afghanistan has had major consequences for the global heroin market: a near doubling of
opium production worldwide in less than two decades. Poppies grown in the fertile valleys of southern Afghanistan yield on average
four times more opium than those grown in upland Southeast Asia. A striking aspect of the decline of the Golden Triangle is the role
China has played in pressing opium-growing regions to eradicate poppy crops. A major market for Golden Triangle heroin, China
has seen a spike in addicts and H.I.V. infections from contaminated needles. The area of Myanmar along the Chinese
border, which once produced about 30 percent of the country's opium, was declared opium-free last year by the United
Nations. Local authorities, who are from the Wa tribe and are autonomous from Myanmar's central government, have
banned poppy cultivation and welcomed Chinese investmentin rubber, sugar cane and tea plantations, casinos and other
businesses. "China has had an underestimated role," said Martin Jelsma, a Dutch researcher who has written extensively on the
illicit drug trade in Asia. "Their main leverage is economic: These border areas of Burma are by now economically
much more connected
to China than the rest of Burma," he said, using the former name for Myanmar. "For local authorities
it's quite clear that, for any investments they want to attract, cooperation with China is a necessity."
Myanmar remains the world's second-leading source of opium but is a distant second; its production declined by 80 percent over the
last decade. Insurgents have long used opium to help finance civil wars in the Golden Triangle. But some are now working to
destroy the crop. At least one faction of the Shan State Army, a group that long had ties to the heroin business, says it is
leading eradication efforts. Kon Jern, a military commander for the group, which is based along Myanmar's border with northern
Thailand, says he is cracking down because government militias and corrupt officials profit from opium. " They sell the drugs,
they buy weapons, and they use those weapons to attack us," he said. The United Nations credits Myanmar's
central government with leading the eradication effort in Shan areas. In Laos, where the political situation is more stable, the
government began a crackdown in the 1990s to increase its international credibility and because officials realized their own children
were at risk, said Leik Boonwaat, the representative in Laos for the U.N.'s Office on Drugs and Crime. Laos finally outlawed opium in
1996. The government, Mr. Boonwaat said, also saw that opium did little to help poor farmers who grew poppies. "It's mostly the
organized crime syndicates that made most of the profits," he said. The amount of land cultivated in Laos for opium has fallen 94
percent since 1998. The country now produces so little opium that it may now be a net importer of the drug, the United Nations says.
Yet experts warn that the reductions may not hold unless farmers develop other ways to make a living. Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, an
opium specialist at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris, says it took Thailand 30 years to wean opium farmers from
poppy production, a transition led by the Thai royal family, which encouraged opium-growing hill tribes to use their cooler climate
to produce coffee, macadamia nuts and green vegetables. But, he said, "In Laos and Burma, we've had a very quick decrease." He
asked, "Is it going to last?" Four years ago farmers in Banna Sala, an isolated Laotian hamlet of several hundred ethnic Hmong, grew
opiumpoppies with impunity. No longer. And some farmers are angry. "They stopped me from growing opium, so I don't have
money to send my children to school," said one villager, Jeryeh Singya, 34, who has seven children. She once bartered the opium she
grew for soap, salt and clothing. "If they let me grow it I would," she said. Mr. Kon, the rebel commander in Myanmar, says farmers
are finding it difficult to switch crops. "If they change and grow other kinds of plants nobody comes to buy their products -- the
transportation is not good," he said. Experts say that to stay free of opium, isolated villages that depended on it will need assistance
and investment for better roads, schools and clinics. But Myanmar, which is run by a military junta, poses a dilemma for Western
countries. The United States has an embargo on trade with Myanmar. The European Union has suspended trade privileges and
defense cooperation, limiting its aid to humanitarian assistance. "This policy of boycott and isolation has, of course, meant that only
very little development aid and humanitarian assistance is flowing into the country," said Mr. Jelsma, the Dutch expert on drugs.
"That makes the chances of the sustainability of this decline very questionable."
Opium – Russia HIV
High opium production in Afghanistan drives a surge in Russian drug use—this
causes a rapid explosion of HIV infection
Transatlantic Partners Against Aids 2003 (“10 Percent Russian Adults May Have AIDS By 2010” Sept 16,
http://www.rense.com/general41/10p.htm)
Since the early-1990s, drug use in Russia has exploded. Russia's Ministry of Health estimates that drug use soared by 400 percent
between 1992 and 2002. According to numerous studies, drug users in Russia represent a larger share of the total population when compared to other
countries. There
is a direct connection between injecting drug use and HIV. Given the widespread use of shared
has spread swiftly through Russia's drug subculture in the past five to seven years,
representing over 80 percent of all reported cases of HIV infection with a known mode of transmission. HIV has already
begun moving rapidly from that sub-culture to people who have no direct contact to drugs, often
through unprotected sex. Russia is wedged between opium-producing Afghanistan and major drug
markets in Western Europe, making heroin and other opiates easily accessible. Russia's long and porous
needles and other equipment, HIV
southern border, manned by underpaid and overworked customs inspectors, border guards, and Interior Ministry officers, is especially susceptible to
drug trafficking and transport of illicit goods. The demand for illegal drugs has increased over the past decade, driven by a
combination of factors, including the difficulties of Russia's ongoing economic and political transition, deteriorating education and healthcare systems,
and a nationwide shortage of social services and recovery programs for drug users. Illegal drug use is especially rife among Russia's youth. In May
2003, Russia's Minister of Education reported that 4 million young people between the ages of 11 and 24 were using illicit drugs, and that about a
million of them were drug dependent; around the same time, an Education Ministry survey reported that 8 percent of Russian youths bought illegal
drugs every day. Both
statistical and anecdotal evidence indicate that drug use among young people in
Russia continues to climb. This trend, together with a shortage of high-quality condoms and a lack of information about safer sex,
suggests that conditions are ripe for the virus to spread rapidly among Russia's non-drug using youth.
Opium – Russia AIDs
Afghan opium reinforces AIDs in Russia and Central Asia
Abdullah 7 (Khalil, New American Media, April 19,
http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=bb9928f1b2c847b4485
b957df8aef2b4)
Intravenous drug use (IDU) is emerging as a significant driver for the “second wave” of the international
HIV/AIDS pandemic, according to Dr. Chris Beyrer, a leading authority on the disease. This wave is driven, in part, by
record world levels of opium production, particularly in Afghanistan , and is compounded by the virtual absence of
effective HIV/AIDS treatment programs in public health systems. Beyrer, a leading epidemiologist at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
School of Public Health, presented his findings to a group of ethnic media journalists who were co-hosted by New America Media
and the Open Society Institute’s Washington, D.C. office. The “good news,” Beyrer said, is that “there is evidence of the slowing and
decline of new infection rates” in sub-Saharan Africa and South America. However, Iran, Nepal, Indonesia, Central Asia, Vietnam,
North Korea, Russia, and the Ukraine are among those countries that are almost certain to experience an
epidemic that will overwhelm their current capacity to adequately cope or contain the disease . Beyrer noted
that, while HIV/AIDS is most often associated in the American public’s mind with sexual activity, intravenous drug use adds another
unique set of challenges to public health systems, particularly where those systems are relatively fragile or, as in some developing
countries, virtually non-existent. Data gathered in 2004 on Russia, for instance, showed that 87 percent of registered HIV
cases were the result of intravenous drug use. Nine countries within the former Soviet Union’s orbit typically showed well
over 50 percent of registered cases attributable to IV drug use. Beyrer pointed out that well-known drug trafficking land routes
correlate with projected second wave epidemics, but countries in the path of drug shipping are also at risk. Thus, in West Africa,
Ghana and Nigeria are potential “second wave” countries, while the island of Mauritius off of Africa’s east coast, is suffering an
alarming increase in IV drug use-driven HIV cases as smuggled drugs head toward Tanzania and Kenya, two countries that also
made the list as emerging epicenters. Quite simply, the flood of heroin through a country – whether it is the eventual
destination or not – tends to increase the number of users there who quickly determine that needle
injection is the best method to derive the desired effects of the drug. Beyrer also emphasized that, in some
countries, the spread of HIV/AIDS is accelerated by needle sharing among prison populations. Iran is a prime example. Beyrer cited
2005 data that showed only 10,000 cases of HIV/AIDS being reported to the Iranian ministry while the estimated drug user
population ranged between two to four million people. Yet, there was a 15.2 percent prevalence of HIV “among male intravenous
drug users attending drug treatment in Tehran in 2005” and the disease was “strongly associated with a history of shared drug use
injection in prison rather than sharing outside of prison.” Additional evidence showed that IV drug use was responsible for 85
percent HIV/AIDS transmission among drug users in Iran.
Opium – Afghan stability
Opium trade undermines Afghan stability
ZUNES 2006 (Stephen, Middle East editor for the Foreign Policy In Focus Project. He is a professor of politics, Foreign Policy in Focus, Oct
13, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3597)
Aside from the impact of increased opium production on addicts and their societies worldwide, this resumption of large-scale
Afghan
opium production is a significant threat to Afghanistan's stability, since it is one of the major
sources of the warlordism that has wreaked such havoc on the country. And, despite cracking down on opium
production while in power, the Taliban are now taxing poppy growers to finance as much as 70% of their
renewed military operations. As in Colombia, the ongoing violence since the United States launched its war five years ago
has resulted in all sides taking advantage of the drug trade to advance their power and influence.
Opium – Key Drug
Opium supply is key—crop shift solves
AVERT.ORG 2007 (“HIV prevention, Harm Reduction and Injecting Drug Use,” July 16, http://www.avert.org/injecting.htm)
Supply Reduction This method of prevention is practised globally against all forms of illegal drug use. It focuses on halting the
drug supply routes by: * Seizing illegal drugs through customs operations. * Arresting drug trafficking groups to break up supply routes
through law enforcement. * Encouraging producers of drug crops, such as opium poppies, to grow alternative
crops. When used alongside the other two approaches supply reduction can be effective in limiting the drugs
available on the street. This results in higher street prices, which may dissuade some people from
drug use.
AIDS – Russian military
AIDS will destroy Russian conventional readiness by reducing draft quality
FROLOV 2004 (Vladimir, deputy staff director of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Russian State Duma, “Reversing the Epidemic:
Facts and Policy Options,” http://europeandcis.undp.org/hiv/?english)
The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Russia could further lower the already poor quality of the per-sonnel
currently entering the Russian army and other uniformed services. During the 2002 draft only 11 percent of those drafted were
deemed fully fit for military duty.The rest had service limitations due to health reasons.One in five draftees had just basic pri-mary school education
217. During the spring
2003 draft, every fourth new serviceman had finished less than nine years of
school,and thus could not be sent for the advanced military training required for operating modern combat
equipment.The draft was able to fill only 96 percent of the available positions in combat units 218. Demographic trends through 2045 do
not augur well for maintaining a large Russian army, as AIDS will further decrease the available
pool of young healthy male inductees. The social impact of the epidemic, including the destruction of families and growing
numbers of orphans,must also be taken into account. From this perspective,the decre-asing quality of human resources
available to the Russian military could undermine mili-tary discipline and combat cohesiveness.
AIDS kills the best personnel—that’s key to conventional power
FROLOV 2004 (Vladimir, deputy staff director of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Russian State Duma, “Reversing the Epidemic:
Facts and Policy Options,” http://europeandcis.undp.org/hiv/?english)
AIDS will reduce combat readiness for units through expedited retirement of experien-ced and
well trained personnel, additional spending on training replacements,and ine-vitably lowered
standards of combat training. A generally less combat ready and less operationally effective
force will result. These trends will be inconsistent with the Russi-an government’s plans to
significantly improve the combat training of the Russian Armed Forces and raise overall levels
of combat readiness of the fully equipped and deployed units.
Russia military – nuclear war
Reducing Russian conventional power causes nuclear reliance—this causes
nuclear war
LAMBERT AND MILLER 1997 (Stephen and David, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, “Russia’s Crumbling Tactical
Nuclear Weapons Complex: An Opportunity for Arms Control” April www.usafa.af.mil/inss/OCP/ocp12.pdf)
To compensate for Russia’s current conventional weakness, Russian strategists have explicitly sought
to “extend the threshold for escalation downward,”28 thereby increasing the likelihood of tactical
nuclear release in the face of hostilities. Thus there are two distinct concepts at work: (1) the procedure of pre-delegating the launch codes; and
(2) the operational doctrine of lowering the nuclear threshold. These trends are corroborated by interviews with Russian officials familiar with nuclear
weapons strategies. Dr. Nikolai Sokov, an expert on the Soviet delegation to START I as well as other US-Soviet summit meetings, affirms that with
such a doctrine in place, one “cannot rule out that a
local commander could individually take the authority to
launch a weapon.”29 The assumption that the Russian weapons control system is more stable during peace-time is also suspect. Due to
the lack of technical safeguards, especially on air-delivered weapons (cruise missiles and gravity bombs), individual attempts
to acquire these weapons even during times of peace are possible. Moreover, the lack of adequate
locking mechanisms on these weapons would then make them deliverable, with a full nuclear
yield, even without launch authorization. Media attention has been overwhelmingly dedicated to the apex of the control system; this focus seems to
be at least partially misplaced. While it is largely true that the absence of a stable political system and the reliance on a control system with the potential
for sudden shifts in allegiances could cause a breakdown of control, the most important dangers of misuse of Russia’s nuclear weapons are not to be
pre-delegation carries with it the
dangers of a premature weapons release or the employment of a nuclear weapon because of the
judgment of a local military commander.
found at the apex, but at the lower echelons of the command system. The Russian practice of
The impact is state collapse, economic decline, genocide, and nuclear war
Ambrosio 2005 (Thomas, “The Geopolitics of Demographic Decay: HIV/AIDS and Russia’s
Great Power Status,” Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual
Conference in Honolulu, March 2005)
Russia’s staggering drug use, endemic poverty, and collapsing health care system make it a prime candidate for an
HIV/AIDS explosion, one with serious socioeconomic and strategic implications. When coupled with
Russia’s already declining population (especially amongst ethnic Russians), HIV/AIDS has the potential to
further weaken Moscow on the world stage and alter the demographic balance within the country, thus
fueling fears of further ethnic conflicts on Russian soil. At worst, HIV/AIDS could lead to a social and
demographic disaster, threatening any political and economic progress in the coming decades. At best,
HIV/AIDS will be an accelerator of Russia’s already serious socioeconomic problems. The importance of HIV/AIDS in Russia to American
policymakers is quite serious. According to the Clinton administration’s National Security Council, the spread of HIV/AIDS was deemed an indirect
threat to U.S. national interests. In a January 2000 report released by the National Intelligence Council, which usually represents a consensus amongst
American intelligence officials, some of the social consequences of HIV /AIDS
have a ‘strong correlation with the likelihood of
state failure in partial democracies’ and the rise of ‘instability’. Russia’s strategic location at the heart of
Eurasia, not to mention its thousands of nuclear weapons, makes the prospects of Russian ‘instability’ -defined in the report as ‘revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, genocides, and disruptive regime transitions’ -- a
disturbing prospect.
Afghan Stability – NATO
Afghan instability will crush NATO
DALE 2007 (Helle, director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation, “Afghanistan a
True Test for NATO,” Feb 22, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed022207a.cfm)
While the attention of Washington is focused on Iraq, the other military front in the struggle against militant Islam is warming up. Afghanistan has
until now shown better promise of success than Iraq. Yet there are clear signs that this spring will be an intensely challenging time for the Afghan
government and for the NATO coalition forces operating to support it. We are being warned that a Taliban spring offensive is in the works, and how
NATO responds will be crucial, both for the future of Afghanistan and for NATO as well. The
demise of the NATO alliance has been pronounced any number of times since the end of the
Cold War (and before for that matter), and the search for reasons for its continued relevance has been on ever
since the disappearance of the Soviet Union. As Europe and the United States have found growing areas of disagreement,
particularly in public opinion, the cohesive tissue represented by NATO has become at once both more
important and harder to protect. Furthermore, in the context of growing EU ambitions to have its own foreign policy and its military
chain of command and missions, as distinct from those of NATO, it is an alliance that is under strain. Here, Afghanistan takes on
crucial importance. It really is a test case for NATO's future out of area operations, a fact that no NATO
member would dispute. It is, therefore, a matter of considerable puzzlement and concern that NATO allies that have contributed to the roughly 35,000
strong NATO stabilization in Afghanistan have also taken steps to undermine the mission. (The United Sates has 13,000 troops, of which 9,000 are not
operating under NATO command.) This is not very much compared the 162,000 troops in Iraq and certainly not in comparison with the size of
Afghanistan. In addition the Taliban, al Qaeda and their various allies have sanctuaries in Waziristan across the Pakistani border. Their activities have
doubled in 2006 as compared to the year before. The brunt of the fighting in the dangerous areas of Afghanistan is borne in addition to the Americans
by the British, the Canadians, the Danes, the Dutch and the Poles. Though many other NATO countries have contributed, this in no way looks today like
an alliance built on the "three musketeers principle," a fact that is of considerable frustration to those who have stepped up to the plate. As President
Bush stated last week in a speech at the American Enterprise Institute, "For NATO to succeed, member nations must provide commanders on the
ground with the troops and the equipment they need to do their jobs... As well allies must lift restrictions on the forces they do provide so NATO
commanders have the flexibility they need to defeat the enemy wherever the enemy may take a stand. The alliance was founded on this principle: An
attack on one is an attack on all. That principle holds true whether the attack is on the home soil of a NATO nation, or on allied forces deployed on a
NATO mission abroad. By standing together in Afghanistan, NATO forces protect our own people, and they must have the flexibility to be able to do
their job." A similarly strong message was delivered by Sen. John McCain in Munich the week before, as he challenged NATO members to lift the
caveats on their troop deployments that are preventing them from acting effectively and cohesively. He also agitated for more troops, at least matching
the projected U.S. troop increase of 3,000. Both speakers noted that we need this to provide stability to increase the size of the Afghan military standing
currently at 30,000, less than half of what is needed. Mr. McCain was explicit about the meaning of Afghanistan for the future of NATO, and his
analysis is spot on. "Failure
in Afghanistan risks reversion to its pre-9/11 role as a sanctuary for al
Qaeda terrorists with global reach, a defeat that would embolden Islamic extremists, and the rise of an
unencumbered narcostate... If NATO does not prevail in Afghanistan, it is difficult to imagine the alliance
undertaking another "hard security" operation -- in or out of area and its credibility would suffer a
grievous blow." In the world of the 21st century with its less predictable international
environment and its asymmetrical threats, preserving alliances is as important as ever, for the United
States and Europe alike.
Afghan Stability – Pakistan
Afghan instability creates Pakistan instability
Foust, 09 (Joshua, fellow at the American Security Project, security editor for the Atlantic, senior intelligence analyst for the
U.S. military, civilian military adviser in Afghanistan, futurist for the Army Intelligence and Security Command, 8/27/2009,
Registan, http://registan.net/2009/08/27/the-case-for-afghanistan-strategic-considerations/, JKahn)
It is possible that scaling back American influence in the country merely to that of an advisory and arms dealing role—much as the
Soviet Union did post-1989—might be effective. Indeed, it very well might… for a little bit. But this is where it becomes impossible to
ignore Pakistan (and not just for the shallow reason that al Qaeda is hiding in an ungoverned space in the Northwest). Pakistan
has not lost its fundamental strategic rationale for supporting the original Taliban: a hedge
against Iran, “strategic depth” against India, and a training ground for Kashmiri insurgents. In fact, it could be easily argued
that a big reason Kashmir has calmed down is that all the crazies were too busy fighting in Miram Shah and Kandahar and Khost and
Ghazni to go plant bombs in Srinagar. And lest anyone think it is appropriate to write off the India-Pakistan conflict as somebody
else’s problem, it is never somebody else’s problem when nuclear weapons are involved. As Jari Lindholm reminded, India and
Pakistan have come a hair’s breadth from nuclear conflict twice over Kashmir. And like it or not, it is a compelling and vital
American interest to prevent nuclear conflict in South Asia—which makes “fixing” Afghanistan in
some way also a vital American interest. Regional security is one of those topics that gets
mentioned casually by many pundits but never really articulated. It is by far Ahmed Rashid’s most
convincing argument, that supporting stability in Central and South Asia is a compelling interest not just for the U.S., but for
the West in general. When it comes to Pakistan, the big danger is not in a Taliban takeover, or even in the Taliban
seizure of nuclear weapons—I have never believed that the ISI could be that monumentally stupid (though they are
incredibly stupid for letting things get this far out of hand). The big danger, as it has been since 1999, is that insurgents, bored
or underutilized in Afghanistan, will spark another confrontation between India and Pakistan, and that that
confrontation will spillover into nuclear conflict. That is worth blood and treasure to prevent. When
Afghanistan was a sanctuary for destabilizing elements—whether Chechens training to go fight Russia, Juma
Namangani training to go fight Tashkent, or even Osama bin Laden training his men to go fight America—the region as a
whole was a serious security concern. The reason why so many books and articles condemning the Clinton
administration’s stand-offish attitude have been so popular is because that message resonates—how could you not have seen this
coming? While things have undoubtedly become more violent, they are also, in a way, more ordered. The insurgency in
Afghanistan is a difficult and frustrating enemy to fight, more so the insurgency in Pakistan. But both are identifiable, and
are capable therefore of being defeated or delegitimized. The fact that the U.S. has chosen not to do this is the topic for another post
(and the source of the tremendous frustration and borderline burnout I’ve been struggling with the last few months). But right now,
the major security concerns are compelling, they are fairly clear to me at least, and I am completely baffled as to why even the war
supporters cannot articulate them. So, let us summarize the strategic goals of the Afghanistan War: A basic minimal stability
in Afghanistan, such that neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda is likely to develop a staging ground
for international attacks, whether against neighboring countries or the United States and Europe; The permanent
delegitimization of Pakistan’s insurgents, such that they can no longer push Pakistan and India toward nuclear conflict; I find both
of those convincing reasons to stay and do things right.
Afghan instability brings in Pakistan
Gregorian, 01 (Vartan, Ph.D. in history and humanities from Stanford University, Tarzian Professor of Armenian and
Caucasian History and Professor of South Asian History at the University of Pennsylvania, president of Brown University, fellow at
the Institute of Advanced Study, Brandeis University, Phi Beta Kappa Ford Foundation Foreign fellow, fellow at the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences, “The Yearnings of the Pashtuns”, the New York Times, 11/15/2001,
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/15/opinion/the-yearnings-of-the-pashtuns.html, JKahn)
As the Taliban's position in Afghanistan continues to crumble, the political future of the
Pashtuns -- a plurality of Afghans and a majority within the Taliban -- has become a crucial issue. All sides recognize that it
must be resolved if reconstruction of Afghanistan is to begin. To develop an effective strategy, the United States will need to
understand some of the Pashtuns' past and aspirations, and in particular how these have affected Afghan-Pakistani relations. About
13 percent of Pakistan's population speaks a version of Pashto, the Pashtun language. The Pakistan-Afghanistan border -- the
Durand line -- was drawn by the British more than a century ago but Pakistan's Pashtuns feel little separates them from their Afghan
cousins. The border was considered by the British as binding, by successive Afghan governments as imposed and by Pashtuns as ''a
line drawn on water.'' Negotiations today with Afghanistan's Pashtun leaders have been taking place on both sides of the line. Based
on its objections to the Durand border, Afghanistan cast the sole vote against Pakistan's entry into the United Nations. From 1893
on, British India's and later Pakistan's policies toward Afghanistan have been greatly influenced by anxiety over the Afghans' claim
to a ''Pashtunistan'' that would unite the Pashtuns of both countries and give Afghanistan easier access to the Indian Ocean. In the
1950's, the Soviets supported Afghanistan as it constantly agitated Pakistan on the question of Pashtun self-determination. In 1971,
when East Pakistan broke away and became Bangladesh, Pakistani strategists faced the grim prospect of their shrinking country
being squeezed between a hostile India and an expansionist, Soviet-backed Afghanistan. The insecurity of Pakistan -- a very young
state -- reached alarming heights. It only got worse with the Soviet Union's increasing involvement in Afghanistan. The Iranian
revolution of 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided Pakistan with a unique opportunity to assert leadership in the
region and neutralize the Pashtunistan issue. It did so by backing the resistance to Soviet rule and doing so in the name of Islam.
Having artfully gathered the right list of enemies, Pakistan was able to count on the political, financial and military help of the
United States, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states and the Islamist mujahedeen. Pakistan's turn to Islamization was meant to
stabilize Pakistan itself as much as to redirect Pashtun militancy and undermine the Soviet Union's exploitation of it. Pakistan
envisioned itself as a bulwark of Sunni Islam against Iran's Shiite fundamentalism, India's policies in Kashmir and Soviet atheism to
the north in Central Asia. Saudi Arabia was Pakistan's great backer in this effort, which brought fundamentalist Wahhabism
forcefully to the area; Pakistan's other backers, like the United States, went along with it for reasons of their own. After the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan aided various Pashtun factions in the Afghan civil war, finally supporting the Taliban -- a
movement emanating primarily from Pakistan's religious schools, established under President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq and his
successors, and guided by Pakistan's intelligence services. By supporting the Taliban, Pakistan thought to solidify its position as the
dominant foreign power in Afghanistan. The country provided a training ground for Pakistani surrogates to prepare for their war in
Kashmir and a safety valve for draining the energies of Pakistan's own fundamentalists. The Islamist, explicitly antitribal appeal of
the Taliban also had the great benefit of neutralizing the Pashtunistan issue. The Taliban, however, were restive protégés -- and Al
Qaeda offered backing without all the Pakistani strings attached. The Taliban thrived not only in Afghanistan but in Pakistan,
especially through their ideological cohorts (again, mostly Pashtun) in the cities of Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi. These remain vital
centers of Pashtun activism. After Sept. 11, with options and allies in short supply, Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf agreed to
cooperate with the United States against the Taliban. Both countries now face the thorny issue of the Pashtuns. Wiping out the
Taliban won't end the prospect of Pashtunistan -- it may even energize it . If a government dominated by the
Northern Alliance denies the Pashtuns power in Afghanistan proper, they will exert power elsewhere. Taliban forces could retreat
into Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and form alliances with their Pashtun cousins. If, on the other hand, Pashtuns
were to become a dominant power in Afghanistan in the post-Taliban era, Pakistan could face a
revival of Afghan interest in expanding into Pakistani territory. Pakistan cannot afford any
movement that threatens to fragment it, and it cannot withstand simultaneous challenges in
Kashmir and Afghanistan. Nor can it afford a civil war between disappointed fundamentalists and
disappointed nationalists -- particularly given its possession of nuclear weapons .
NATO – nuclear
NATO collapse causes nuclear war
DUFFIELD 1994 (John Duffield, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, POLITICAL
SCIENCE QUARTERLY 109, 1994, p. 766-7)
Initial analyses of NATO's future prospects overlooked at least three important factors that have helped to ensure the alliance's enduring relevance.
First, they underestimated the extent to which external
threats sufficient to help justify the preservation of the alliance would
continue to exist. In fact, NATO still serves to secure its members against a number of actual or
potential dangers emanating from outside their territory. These include not only the residual threat posed by Russian
military power, but also the relatively new concerns raised by conflicts in neighboring regions. Second, the pessimists
failed to consider NATO's capacity for institutional adaptation. Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has begun to develop two important new
functions. NATO
is increasingly seen as having a significant role to play in containing and controlling
militarized conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. And, at a deeper level, it works to prevent such
conflicts from arising at all by actively promoting stability within the former Soviet bloc. Above all,
NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance has always performed and that remain relevant after the cold war.
Most importantly, NATO
has helped stabilize Western Europe, whose states had often been bitter rivals
in the past. By damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies,
NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region
virtually inconceivable. In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a
significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American
economic interests in Europe— as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable
direct foreign investment by American companies — remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the United States
could easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely
be even more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons.
US key
Afghan government intervention has failed
Blanchard, 09 (Chris, analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs for the Congressional Research
Service, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 4/21/2009,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32686.pdf, JKahn)
The January 2009 UNODC winter opium assessment predicts further consolidation of poppy cultivation in the southern and
western provinces of ¶ Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Farah, Dai Kundi, Uruzgan, and Zabol. Over 90% of Afghanistan’s opium will
likely be produced in these seven ¶ provinces, according to UNODC. Nevertheless, UNODC expects “some decrease” in overall
cultivation and suggests that four provinces, Herat, ¶ Baghlan, Faryab, and Badakhshan, could become “poppy-free” in 2009. Higher
prices for crops such as wheat, lower opium prices, pressure from ¶ government officials, and the persistence of drought are credited
as encouraging farmers to concentrate limited resources into the cultivation of ¶ non-poppy crops. Survey data suggests that
government intervention remains less influential in southern and western provinces, although Afghan ¶ media
reports suggest that eradication and interdiction operations were taking place across southern Afghanistan in early 2009. Farmers
surveyed ¶ also suggested that the effectiveness of alternative development programs varies across the
country, and many reportedly emphasized the need for ¶ programs to extend beyond district centers to more remote or
“grass roots” areas. ¶ The 2009 State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for Afghanistan states that: ¶
“the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) generally cooperates with the international community in
implementing its ¶ national counternarcotics strategy. However, more political will and effort, at the central and
provincial levels, is
required to decrease cultivation in ¶ the south, maintain cultivation reductions in the rest of the country, and
Afghan government has been unwilling or
unable to fully implement [its National Drug Control Strategy] and ¶ has, in some cases, failed to
provide adequate support to provincial leaders who have shown greater willingness to take serious steps to combat
narcotics cultivation, production, and trafficking in their provinces.” In April 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called
corruption in ¶ Afghanistan “a cancer” that “eats away at the confidence and the trust of the people in their government.”¶ 8¶
The 2009 INCSR report concludes that ¶ “many Afghan government officials are believed to profit from the drug
trade,” and “narcotics-related corruption is particularly pervasive at the ¶ provincial and district levels of government.
combat trafficking in coming years.” ¶ The report also concludes that “the
Solvency – Afghan Heroin
The Afghan heroin market is massive --- bigger efforts have the potential to bring it
down
Naím, 9 (Moíses, Senior Associate in the International Economics Program at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, pg. ix-x, Potomac
Books Inc., Tashma)
The fact that drugs rule the war in Afghanistan is an interesting paradox that says much about our times.
The paradox is that while the situation in Afghanistan should be a drug warrior’s dream, the drug
trade creates a nightmare for the world’s mightiest military machine. In the pages ahead, Dr. Paul Kan
expertly dissects this paradox and in the process unveils a situation that needs urgent attention and innovative thinking.
He starts f1·om the obvious notion that to successfully tackle drug production it is indispensable to have a detailed knowledge of the
geography and other characteristics of the producing region as well as a deep understanding of the trade logistics that link the producing area with consumer markets often located continents away That is the case of Afghanistan, a country that produces
over 90 percent of the poppies that feed the world’s heroin market. We know how difficult it is to do
business in a rugged, landlocked, war-tom, and very poor country with paltry infrastructure like Afghanistan. This is especially true
of any business whose success rests on complex transportation and distribution logistics. Yet, Afghanistan is home to
some of the world’s most imaginative, audacious, ruthless, and profitable export business
organizations: drug traders. Hence another paradox: Developing any kind of profitable, exportoriented business in Afghanistan is close to impossible. Unless it is the drug business.
In Afghanistan, the source country is not only well known, but has a large external military presence that
could arguably do something about the poppy crop. Indeed, it has been mandated to do so. Furthermore, it is
an international military presence composed by the armies of countries that adhere to the global
anti-narcotics regime. However there isn’t a nation in NATO with forces in Afghanistan that seeks to overturn the
international ban on illicit drug trafficking. These forces have been there for years and they will likely be an abiding
feature of the Afghan institutional landscape for the foreseeable future. This confluence of
circumstances could not be more conducive to eradicating a major supplier of the global drug trade—a
sustained international military presence, backed by nations opposed to drug trafhcking, that operates freely inside the borders of a
country that grows the overwhelming majority of crops used to produce a dangerous narcotic. Yet—and here is the paradox—the
trade thrives, and may very well contribute to the defeat of one history’s largest and most successful military alliances.
Afghan Heroin – US Key
US international drug leadership is critical to resolve conflict with Iran—solves
proliferation and Afghan heroin
Bommer 2006
(Ashley, Chief of Staff to Richard Holbrooke, Vice-Chairman of Perseus LLC and former US chief
representative at the United Nations, International Herald Tribune, June 20)
In the growing confrontation between the United States and Iran, there is one area which has been overlooked
and could provide an area of mutual cooperation: the fight against drugs. The Afghanistan-Iranian border
has become the narco- gateway to much of the world. It is an open door to up to 90 percent of the world's $65-billion
opium trade. That is at once a threat to the West, and, until now, an unseized opportunity for real dialogue with Tehran.
Approximately 4,100 metric tons of poppy grown in Afghanistan is refined in factories throughout the country that turn the raw gum
into heroin, morphine and opium. Then it is driven across the Iranian border and smuggled to South Asia, Central Asia, Europe and
North America. The United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) lists Iran as the world's fastest growing opium addiction
state. With 4 million regular users, its society is being crippled. In an interview in The Washington Post last September, the director
of the Iranian National Center for Addiction Studies said that 20 percent of the adult population is "somehow involved in drug
abuse." Iran has spent more than $900 million building trenches, drug posts and watch towers on its side of the Afghan border. But
not much has been done on the Afghan side. According to Major Michael Adelberg of the U.S. Army, from the Office of Security
Cooperation-Afghanistan, the only physical barriers on the border are 69 mud huts! Drug smugglers and the Taliban are taking
advantage of this nonexistent security. UNODC estimates that gross annual profits to Afghan traffickers now range up to $2.14
billion. The security forces responsible are the Afghan National Police. Stationed in those mud huts without boots and uniforms,
many have not been paid since last summer. Seventy percent are illiterate. With just five weeks of training by U.S. advisors, they are
incapable of ground-air coordination. They are, an American adviser told me, "just out there eating rice." More disturbing, their
commanders appear to be involved in the drug trade. Last week, President Hamid Karzai promoted 85 men to the rank of one- and
two-star police generals. These positions include provincial police chiefs who are the most powerful government officials in the
provinces. According to an American official in Kabul, at least 13 of these have poor human rights and criminal records. Yet all have
been asked to head the police in drug-producing or drug-trading areas. Many of the border towns are off-limits. In Nimroz, which
members of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Forces call "Mars" (no one goes there, and those who do are shot),
cultivation of poppies increased last year more than a thousand-fold. In the neighboring province of Farah, it has increased by
almost 350 percent. The opium produced and transformed into morphine and heroin in western Afghanistan leaves the country via
Iran. Because prices are high along the western border, northern Afghan opium is being routed towards markets in the southern
Helmand province and elsewhere along the Iranian border for export. Helmand province has the highest levels of opium poppy
cultivation in all of Afghanistan. It is also the most significant province in terms of heroin processing and trafficking. Without
improved security, the drug problem will continue to escalate . Thus the incentives offered to Tehran to halt
its nuclear program should include an aggressive antinarcotics campaign along the Iranian-Afghan border
- new border posts, fences, watchtowers and trenches. In addition, the United States must adequately train the Afghan National
Police and provide support for it with ISAF or coalition troops; it must provide equipment for the border posts, including vehicles; it
must not allow the police to be led by thugs. The West and Iran do have a common interest, to eradicate the drug
trade along the Afghan-Iranian border.
Spillover
Drug cooperation is a form of moderate engagement that would spill over to
enhance future cooperation
TALWAR 2001
(Puneet, served on the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, joined staff of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Foreign Affairs, July/August)
Given this uncertainty, the United States must avoid appearing to take sides in the oNGOing power struggle. But this does not mean
that Washington has no range of movement. In fact, the Bush administration has a choice of three broad options to follow in its Iran
policy. One path would be either to simply continue with the Clinton approach (that is, basic containment but with some limited
exceptions) or to try to reinvigorate it. A second option could be called "moderate engagement" and would involve
helping Iran form better international ties while leaving key portions of the U.S. sanctions regime intact.
This track could eventually lead Iran to moderate its more objectionable behavior and thus clear the way for
improved U.S.-Iranian relations and the elimination of sanctions. A third option would be for Washington to take
significant steps toward dismantling the sanctions regime now, with the hope that this preemptive move would jump-start a rapid
rapprochement. Maintaining the status quo might seem appealing to Bush officials, given the unpredictable and politically risky
situation. But more of the same is unlikely to yield any progress with Iran in the foreseeable future. After eight years, there is no
evidence that the current approach will ever convince Iran to modify its behavior. In fact, by limiting the
potentially positive impact of outside influences, containment is likely to do more harm than good.
Persisting with this unpopular policy will generate significant friction with American allies in Japan and Europe. But without their
support, the attempt to isolate Iran will never succeed. If the administration chooses to move away from
containment and pursue moderate engagement, it could do so in a number of ways. The United States could seek
cooperation with Iran on one of several limited issues, such as the effort to stop narcotics trafficking . In the
last decade, Iran has taken several thousand casualties in battles with drug traffickers along its eastern frontier and has
requested assistance from the international community. Even without creating formal diplomatic ties, the
United States could help out indirectly through the United Nations Drug Control Program. In addition, Washington could
support American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that could provide humanitarian assistance to the two million Afghan
and Iraqi refugees now living in Iran. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Iran today hosts the largest refugee
population in the world. This large influx has strained Iran's resources and created social tensions that U.S. aid could help alleviate.
Moderate engagement is critical—US-Iran relations must start small to eventually
spill over into effective cooperation
TALWAR 2001 (Puneet, served on the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, joined staff of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Foreign Affairs, July/August)
In light of these many factors -- U.S. domestic
political constraints, the uncertainties surrounding the pace of
political evolution in Iran, and the international unpopularity of containment -- moderate engagement
emerges as the most sensible policy. Washington should make important but limited gestures toward Iran
while offering to go much further if Iran reciprocates. Even if the Bush administration does decide to pursue this policy, however, it
should have realistic expectations about the troubles ahead. Both sides have already suffered too much from frustrated expectations
of the other. Washington should not expect Tehran to end its more objectionable policies anytime soon -- certainly not as a direct
response to U.S. overtures. Even with the international community pressuring Iran, it is unlikely to moderate its stance unless its
national interests compel it to. Thus Iran is unlikely to withdraw its support for terrorist groups such as Hezbollah or Hamas, which
oppose peace in the Middle East, until a comprehensive settlement is struck that sidelines Palestinian radicals and causes Syria to
ask Iran to withdraw from the scene. Likewise, Tehran is unlikely to rein in its WMD programs without broad regional talks on the
subject and the promise of a safer neighborhood. After all, Iran has had good reason to fear one of its neighbors in particular: Iraq,
which has used chemical weapons against Iran in the past. Given these realities, the Bush administration must separate
the question of restoring political ties from the objective of encouraging Iran's moderation and integration
as a responsible member of the international community. The latter can be achieved without the former and is so important to U.S.
interests that it is worth pursuing on its own. Moderate engagement would encourage Iran's collaboration with multilateral
institutions, help its integration with the global trading system, and give it far stronger incentives to improve its
behavior than has the containment policy. Moderate engagement would also bring the United States into
closer alignment with its allies, decreasing friction and improving the chances for a more effective
common approach. Meanwhile, moderate engagement would begin a gradual process of laying the
groundwork for an eventual rapprochement once Iran's domestic political situation permits it to move
forward. Many Iranians now recognize that the best way to secure their country's future is by making a
positive contribution to international peace and security. A new U.S. policy would strengthen their hand,
helping them do just that.
Iran cooperation solves
U.S.-Iranian cooperation is both feasible and effective—both countries have a
strong incentive to fight the drug trade in Afghanistan
LEE 2006 (Rensselaer Lee is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and president of Global Advisory Services,
Baltimore Sun, July 6)
¶ Though increasingly at odds on nuclear proliferation and other issues, the
United States and Iran have strong
incentives to cooperate in one area of mutual concern: containment of Afghanistan's $2.8 billion
opium and heroin business, the world's largest.¶ Iran's interest in the matter is obvious: About 60
percent of Afghan opiate exports (opium, morphine and heroin) cross into Iran each year en
route to consumers in Russia, Europe and Iran itself. An estimated 3 million Iranians, 4 percent to 5 percent of
the entire population, consume opiates, the largest percentage of any country. Accordingly, Iran has to spend as much as
$800 million each year, or 1.3 percent of its budget, on drug control, about twice as much in relative
terms as the United States.¶ The U.S. interest relates largely to its nation-building objectives in
Afghanistan, which are under constant threat from the centrifugal forces unleashed by the drug
trade. As many observers have noted, access to drug-related funds supports the pretensions of assorted regional warlords and
renascent Taliban insurgents, hampering the central government's ability to extend its writ beyond Kabul.¶ Additionally,.¶ Because
of Afghanistan's difficulties in suppressing the drug traffic, which now accounts for an estimated one-third of the country's total (licit
and illicit Afghanistan's role as pre-eminent supplier of heroin to the European market heightens
the interest of Washington's coalition partners in containing Afghan drug flows) gross domestic
product, U.S. officials see stepped-up enforcement on the borders of neighboring states as a near-term necessity. Washington
provides some law enforcement assistance to Pakistan and to Central Asian states.¶ But a containment strategy is
unlikely to work effectively unless coordinated with Iran, which is the transit country of choice
for Afghan drug smugglers. Iran also might be brought into a long-term partnership with the
coalition in scaling back Afghan poppy cultivation, the source of more than 90 percent of the world's opiates - for
example, by contributing to underfunded crop substitution and alternative programs for poppy farmers.¶ Some currents of
U.S. official opinion might welcome direct engagement with Iran on drugs. This year, the State
Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs issued a glowing report on Iran's anti-drug
performance.¶ The report cited "overwhelming evidence" of Iran's commitment to ensure that drugs leaving Afghanistan don't reach
its citizens and its "sustained national political will" in combating drug production and trafficking. Of course, the United States lacks
direct diplomatic ties with Iran and maintains no counter narcotics presence or initiatives in that country.¶ Yet the absence of
such ties does not preclude a relationship on drugs. For example, the U.S. Interests Section in Havana includes a
Coast Guard "drug information specialist"; Cuba and the United States cooperate in maritime interdiction operations; and agents of
the Drug Enforcement Administration visit the island to interview and extract information from foreign drug traffickers held in
Cuban prisons.¶ A U.S.-Iranian dialogue on drugs wouldn't necessarily solve Iran's drug abuse problems or mitigate the burgeoning
authority crisis in Afghanistan. Also, Iran and the United States might differ in their expectations of the type of political order that
should take shape in that country.¶ Yet even a modicum of cooperation in an area of significant
international concern would be a major step forward. Unlike the Cuban case, in which diplomacy is hostage to
entrenched domestic interests, such cooperation might lay the groundwork for improved relations in
other areas, or at least create a better atmosphere for more consequential exchanges on nuclearstrategic issues.
Iran And Afghanistan Are Key To The World Heroin Market
SAMII AND TARZI 2004 (Bill and Amin, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 6-24-2004,
http://www.payvand.com/news/04/jun/1166.html)
The international community will mark the International Day Against Drug Abuse on 26 June. Global
opium cultivation is
down, but increased cultivation in Afghanistan and higher opium yields led to a 5 percent
increase in illicit global opium production between 2002 and 2003. Indeed, Afghanistan leads
the world in opium production, and Iran leads the world in seizures of opiates, according to the "World
Drug Report 2004" released on 25 June (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/world_drug_report.html). Therefore, the fate of the world
heroin market depends on events in Southwest Asia.
Supply reduction solves
Reducing the supply of drugs solves—it drives up street prices and dissuades users
from shooting up
AVERT.ORG 2007
(“HIV prevention, Harm Reduction and Injecting Drug Use,” July 16,
http://www.avert.org/injecting.htm)
¶ Supply Reduction¶ This method of prevention is practised globally against all forms of illegal drug use. It focuses on halting the drug supply routes by:¶
drugs through customs operations.¶
* Arresting drug trafficking groups to break up supply routes through law enforcement.¶
* Seizing illegal
* Encouraging producers of drug crops, such as opium poppies, to grow
When used alongside the other two approaches supply reduction can be effective in limiting the
drugs available on the street. This results in higher street prices, which may dissuade some people from drug
use.
alternative crops.¶
Iran key to Afghanistan
Iran is the key avenue for afghan drugs to reach eastern Europe
CHOUVY 2003
(Pierre-Arnaud, research fellow at the CNRS, France. He studies the geopolitics of illicit activities especially illicit drugs - and conflicts in Asia, Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 1, http://www.pachouvy.org/JIR3.htm)
Iran is arguably the main route for Afghan opiates trafficking, across Khorasan or Baluchestan va Sistan provinces. In
Khorasan in 1998, opiate seizures by Iranian authorities accounted for about 40% of all such seizures worldwide, with
the country as a whole accounting for 85% of worldwide opiate seizures. Iran shares borders with both Afghanistan and
Pakistan and is a strategic outlet for Afghan opiates on their way to the main consumer market, Europe. A
2,440km-long coastline also makes Iran a natural springboard for maritime drug trafficking, towards the
United Arab Emirates and east Africa. Along Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iranian borders are manned by 30,000 law enforcement
personnel, equipped with elaborate countertrafficking infrastructures such as patrol roads, concrete dam constructions, ditches,
sentry points, observation towers, barbed wire, electrified fences and even electronic surveillance devices. Iran says it spends
US$400m annually on anti-drug operations and has so far invested $800m in efforts to increase control over the Afghan border. In
Iran, as well as in Pakistan, anti-drug trafficking operations are characterised by their extreme violence: drug traffickers are typically
armed with weapons such as rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and large-scale battles are regularly waged with Iranian law
enforcement authorities. In Khorasan alone, in 1999, 285 drug traffickers and 33 members of the Iranian armed forces were killed
during such engagements. In November 1999, 35 policemen were killed in Baluchestan va Sistan while making an assault on
Pakistani drug traffickers. During 20 years of anti-drugs operations Iran has lost 2,700 men on active duty. Iran's anti-trafficking
efforts have been subsidised by the UK, Germany and Switzerland. The USA, in a 1999 report, recognised that, although Iran was "a
major transit route for opiates smuggled from Afghanistan and Pakistan", it was pursuing "an aggressive border interdiction effort".
Despite its efforts, Iranian authorities claim that 65% of the trafficking in Afghan opiates goes through its territory. As opium
production is concentrated in southern Afghanistan, the Iranian route remains the major route through to
Turkey and eastern Europe, where heroin laboratories are known to operate, and thence to the EU.
Mexico internal link
Mexican drug cartels buy Afghan heroin
Holt, 11 – staff writer at the New American, citing Edgardo Buscaglia, investigator and fellow at the Autonomous Technological
Institute of Mexico (Kelly, “Mexican Cartels Buy Afghan Heroin — Drug Wars Claim 507 in 14 Days,” The New American,” 18
January 2011, http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/north-america/item/10622-mexican-cartels-buy-afghan-heroin%E2%80%94-drug-wars-claim-507-in-14-days)//BI
According to Borderland Beat (BB) Jan. 5, Mexican drug cartels have formed elaborate and strategic
alliances with Middle Eastern drug traffickers, and those supply chains are also being used for arms trade and
money laundering. BB obtained the report from El Universal, a major Mexican newspaper, and added that Mexican groups are also
making inroads into European Union markets. Ninety percent of the world's heroin supply comes from
Afghanistan, and the shipments destined for Canada and the U.S. are very profitable to criminal
groups in Mexico. Edgardo Buscaglia, investigator and fellow at the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico, told El
Universal that Mexican drug traffickers establish business alliances with gangs in places such as
Afghanistan and Turkey and operate like multinational emissaries. With bases of operation in Mexico, the
groups work on an international level "to establish contacts and place operatives that can deal with the Turkish and Indian criminal
organizations in order to facilitate the production and sale of drugs," specifically heroin. Buscaglia explained, It is in the
interest of these Mexican groups (specifically the Sinaloa alliance) that they open smuggling routes for
the distribution of heroin to the U.S. market. Furthermore, they are not only focusing on the movement of Afghan
heroin through Mexico; they are also taking positions of power as major players in the international world of the heroin trade. It is
not as if [Joaquín] El Chapo Guzmán [Loera] himself travels to Turkey; it is up to his emissaries to maintain good relations in that
country. They keep the flow of heroin packages and money that belongs to the Sinaloa cartel moving to their appropriate
destinations. Money and heroin make [sic] its way to Chicago, or New York. It is like the concept of outsourcing labor: the Mexican
cartels receive the product from their overseas suppliers and they distribute the merchandise locally. Joaquin Guzman-Loera, known
as El Chapo (Shorty), heads the international drug trafficking organization known as the Sinaloa cartel, named after the Mexican
State of Sinaloa on the country’s west coast. Rated by Forbes as one of the richest and most powerful people in the world, El Chapo is
Mexico’s top drug kingpin. Buscaglia continued, The Mexican groups arrive to the Turkish and Afghan markets
with contacts established by emissaries or companies where cartel members hold minor
positions. Often, the exporters themselves come with the credentials of being overseas suppliers and representatives of people in
the business of illicit services. When the heroin bound for the North and Central American markets
arrives, these emissaries often exchange drugs for arms, or for other items. Nothing is out of the
question, it really just depends on the region.
AT: Afghan Instability Adv
Afghan Instability – No impact
NATO forces insure Afghan stability
Sediqi, 12 (Rafi; 10/16/12; http://tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/7967-nato-says-new-framework-assures-afghan-stabilityafter-2014-) KD
Some Nato forces
will remain in Afghanistan after 2014, assuring ongoing stability as the alliance
moves from a combat role to a training mission, Nato-led Isaf spokesman Brig. Gen. Gunter Katz said in Kabul on
Monday.¶ Addressing fears of rising insecurity once foreign forces leave in 2014, Katz emphasised the ongoing support
of the international community towards Afghan security forces.¶ "Afghanistan will stay stable
after 2014. The commitment from the international community at the Chicago and Tokyo summit shows
that Afghanistan will be supported in the future as well," Katz said at a briefing in Kabul.¶ Nato civilian
spokesman Dominic Medley made similar remarks, saying that the framework for Nato's post-2014 engagement
in Afghanistan was decided on last week in Brussels. "Nato defence ministers and the ministers from potential
operational partners concluded the first stage of planning for that new mission. This will guide the military experts as
they take the planning process forward. It is expected to agree on a detailed outline early next year, and to
complete the plan well before the end of 2013," Medley said Monday in Kabul. "This new mission will not be a
combat mission. It will be a mission to train, advise and assist," he added. He pointed out that Afghan security
forces are already responsible for security of 75 percent of the Afghan people and that they will
lead all the military operations by the first half of 2013. "International community and Nato are committed
towards Afghanistan and promised billions of dollars to the country. Afghan forces will be supported in the future
and their training mission will continue," Medley added.¶
Alt causes to instability
Tadjdeh, 13 (Yasmin; 6/18/13; http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1184) KD
While major military operations may be coming to an end in Afghanistan, the forces remaining
there will face an uphill battle piecing the country back together, analysts said June 17. U.S. military
units tasked with rebuilding infrastructure and countering insurgencies face myriad hurdles, from
tighter budgets, to a lack of national policy to growing tensions within the populace. "Stability is in the
eyes of the locals. The only stability definition that matters is what locals perceive. In rural and tribal lands … the definition of
stability very often changes dramatically from village to village, from tribe to tribe," said Howard Clark, a
senior intelligence officer at the Department of Homeland Security and advisor to Special Operations Command. Even in noncombat situations, troops stationed on foreign soil can be destabilizing, Clark said during a discussion at
the American Security Project, a Washington, D.C.-based national security think tank. "Our very presence in Muslim
lands causes instability, bringing insurgent attacks on local populace and materializing violent
extremism," Clark said. "Even when we're defending the lives of civilians or providing humanitarian
aid, this narrative recruits, this narrative grows … [and] motivates most violent extremists ."
Another major issue is the money that the United States brings in to fund stability operations, Clark said. Taliban militants
often shake down local businesses for money earned from development contracts, he said. While
insurgents also raise cash by selling narcotics — making Afghanistan one of the largest producers of illicit drugs in the world — the
money raised by skimming off of stability operations funds is greater, he said. " The money the Taliban actually
squeezes from our contracts eclipses even their funds made from opium and heroin," said Clark.
Furthermore, Afghanistan's government is rife with corruption. Citizens are disillusioned that money is funneled into failed or
corrupt programs. Their disappointment can lead them to seek refuge with insurgents, he said.
Multiple obstacles to Afghan instability
DOA, 13 (Daily Outlook Afghanistan – great news service specific to Middle East issues; 4/17/13;
http://outlookafghanistan.net/national_detail.php?post_id=7124) KD
WASHINGTON - A top American general based in Kabul on Tuesday said
Afghanistan's stability was
threatened by militant safe havens in Pakistan and corruption and weak institutional capability
of the Afghan government.¶ “Insurgency’s sanctuaries in Pakistan, the limited institutional capacity
of the Afghan government and endemic corruption remain the greatest impediments to long-
term stability and sustainable security in Afghanistan,” General Joseph Dunford, Commander of US and NATO forces in
Afghanistan, told US lawmakers.¶ Testifying before the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee on the current situation in
Afghanistan, Dunford said the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) would continue to work
with the Afghan government to address Afghanistan's challenges in order to deliver effective governance to
its people.¶ Dunford said even as Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) was developing its capabilities, but it would require
support from the US and the international community in foreseeable future.¶ However, he called the worst worried the continuation
of safe havens inside Pakistan. “Despite this degradation, safe havens in Afghanistan and sanctuaries in
Pakistan continue to provide Taliban senior leadership some freedom of movement and freedom
of action, facilitating the training of fighters, and the planning of operations,” he said.¶ “The Afghan
Taliban and all its sub-groups, including the Haqqani Network, remain capable of conducting high profile
attacks, though counterterrorism pressure has degraded this ability,” he said.¶ However, the Taliban remain firm in their
conviction that ISAF’s drawdown and perceived ANSF weakness, especially when supplemented with continued external support
and with sanctuary in Pakistan that the Taliban exploit, will translate into a restoration of their pre-surge military capabilities and
influence, he added.¶ Dunford said the majority of ISAF bases have been transferred to the ANSF or closed, and construction is
complete on the majority of ANSF bases. “The US will redeploy 34,000 troops by February 2014, and the ANSF
have grown to nearly 352,000 personnel. Afghanistan’s populated areas are increasingly secure, and the ANSF have successfully
maintained security gains in areas that have already been transitioned,” he said.¶ “Still, the ANSF will continue to need
training, advising, and key combat support from ISAF, including close air support, logistics, and
intelligence, through the end of the ISAF combat mission in December 2014,” he told the lawmakers.¶ In
his remarks Senator James M Inhofe alleged President Barack Obama was making a mistake by deciding on troop levels without
defining the underlying objectives, strategy, and mission. “This is backwards,” he said.¶ “Strategy drives troop requirements; not the
other way around. Decisions on objectives should depend on our objectives. Without some
continuing level of US and international support, civil war and fragmentation are likely to engulf
Afghanistan and destabilize the region providing a breeding ground for extremism and
threatening the security of Pakistan and its nuclear weapons,” he said. (Pajhwok)
No impact to Afghan instability — it’s inevitable but empirically doesn’t escalate
Finel, 9 (Dr. Bernard I. Finel, Atlantic Council contributing editor, is a senior fellow at the
American Security Project, “Afghanistan is Irrelevant,” Apr 27
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/afghanistan-irrelevant)
It is now a deeply entrenched conventional wisdom that the decision to “abandon” Afghanistan after the Cold War was a tragic
mistake. In the oft-told story, our “abandonment” led to civil war, state collapse, the rise of the Taliban, and inevitably terrorist
attacks on American soil. This
narrative is now reinforced by dire warnings about the risks to Pakistan from instability
in Afghanistan. Taken all together, critics of the Afghan commitment now find themselves facing a nearly unshakable
consensus in continuing and deepen our involvement in Afghanistan. The problem with the consensus is that virtually every part of
it is wrong. Abandonment did not cause the collapse of the state. Failed states are not always a threat to
U.S. national security. And Pakistan’s problems have little to do with the situation across the border. First, the
collapse of
the Afghan state after the Soviet withdrawal had little to do with Western abandonment.
Afghanistan has always been beset by powerful centrifugal forces. The country is poor, the terrain
rough, the population divided into several ethnic groups. Because of this, the country has rarely been
unified even nominally and has never really had a strong central government. The dominant historical political system
in Afghan is warlordism. This is not a consequence of Western involvement or lack thereof. It is a function of geography,
economics, and demography. Second, there is no straight-line between state failure and threats to the United States.
Indeed, the problem with Afghanistan was not that it failed but rather that it “unfailed” and
becameruled by the Taliban. Congo/Zaire is a failed state. Somalia is a failed state. There are many parts of the
globe that are essentially ungoverned. Clearly criminality, human rights abuses, and other global ills flourish in these spaces.
But the notion that any and all ungoverned space represents a core national security threat to the United
States is simply unsustainable. Third, the problem was the Taliban regime was not that it existed. It was that it was allowed to
fester without any significant response or intervention. We largely sought to ignore the regime — refusing to recognize it despite its
control of 90% of Afghan territory. Aside from occasional tut-tutting about human rights violations and destruction of cultural sites,
the only real interaction the United States sought with the regime was in trying to control drugs. Counter-drug initiatives are not a
sound foundation for a productive relationship for reasons too numerous to enumerate here. Had we recognized the Taliban and
sought to engage the regime, it is possible that we could have managed to communicate red lines to them over a period of years.
Their failure to turn over bin Laden immediately after 9/11 does not necessarily imply an
absolute inability to drive a wedge between the Taliban and al Qaeda over time. Fourth, we are
now told that defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan is imperative in order to help stabilize
Pakistan. But, most observers seem to think that Pakistan is in worse shape now — with the
Taliban out of power and American forces in Afghanistan — than it was when the Taliban was
dominant in Afghanistan. For five years from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban ruled Afghanistan and the Islamist threat to
Pakistan then was unquestionably lower. This is not surprising actually. Insurgencies are at their most dangerous — in terms of
threat of contagion — when they are fighting for power. The number of insurgencies that actually manage to sponsor
insurgencies elsewhere after taking power is surprising low. The domino theory is as dubious in the case of
Islamist movements as it was in the case of Communist expansion. There is a notion that “everything changed on 9/11.” We are
backing away as a nation from that concept in the case of torture. Perhaps we should also come to realize that our pre-9/11
assessment of the strategic value and importance of Afghanistan was closer to the mark that our current obsession with it. We clearly
made some mistakes in dealing with the Taliban regime. But addressing those mistakes through better intelligence, use of special
forces raids, and, yes, diplomacy is likely a better solution than trying to build and sustain a reliable, pro-Western government in
Kabul with control over the entire country.
Here are seven alt causes to Afghani stability
Kjærnet and Torjesen, 8 (Heidi, Department of Russian and Eurasian Studies @ Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs, *AND Stina, Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs, 2008, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs,
“Afghanistan and regional instability: A risk assessment,”
http://www.nupi.no/content/download/3781/57112/version/2/file/Report-Kj%C3%A6rnetTorjesen.pdf)
The regional context of Afghanistan poses a range of challenges for the country’s stabilisation process:
Pakistan Pakistan’s central government has lacked control of developments in the areas
bordering Afghanistan (Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North-West Frontier Province),
making President Musharraf unable to implement the US-encouraged crackdown on Pakistani Taleban supporters. The Pakistani
border areas have become a key source of weapons, equipment and new recruits for antigovernment militant groups in Afghanistan, while Pakistan–Afghanistan bilateral relations remain, as so often
before, strained. The Pakistani election results from February 18 2008 give grounds for cautious optimism. Nevertheless, the serious
challenges stemming from Pakistan will continue in the short to medium term for Afghanistan. Iran–US tensions The
standoff between Iran and the USA over Iran’s nuclear programme has introduced difficulties in
Iran–Afghan relations. Iran remains an important supporter of the Westernbacked Hamid Karzai government.
Nevertheless, in the face of US pressure, Iran is beginning to demonstrate, according to some reports, its
ability to destabilise Afghanistan and derail Washington’s Afghan campaign, as a means of enhancing its
overall leverage regarding the USA.1 Geopolitical rivalries Geopolitical rivalries in the region preclude any optimal coordination of support to Afghanistan by neighbours and great powers . These tensions include the longstanding conflict between India and Pakistan as well as the serious Russian and Chinese unease over the US and NATO military
presence in the region. Regional trade difficulties Security concerns and post-Soviet bureaucratic inertia prevent
Afghanistan’s northern neighbours from fully endorsing the vision, promoted by the USA and other
nations, of Afghanistan’s economic recovery being facilitated by denser integration into regional trade and
communication links. Uzbekistan The government of Uzbekistan is highly authoritarian and deeply unpopular.
Large-scale political and social upheaval remains one likely future scenario for the country.
Upheaval in Uzbekistan would pose a serious challenge to the stability of Afghanistan’s northern and
western territories, including Mazar-e-sharif and possibly Meymaneh, where Norwegian troops are stationed. The German-run ISAF
base located in Termez in Uzbekistan near the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan border, and Mazar-e-sharif would be particularly vulnerable
in case of upheaval in Uzbekistan. Drugs Drugs production and trafficking constitute one of Afghanistan’s
central domestic challenges, but drugs trafficking can also be seen as a regional problem. The large-scale criminal
activities and incomes associated with regional drug flows are undermining the states of the
region: in this way Afghanistan’s neighbours – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular – are becoming weaker, more criminalised,
more unstable and less able to act as constructive partners for Afghanistan. Water Afghanistan’s northern neighbours
have a lengthy history of water disputes. If Afghanistan in the medium or long term decides to claim its legitimate
share of the region’s water resources – as it may well do in order to further its economic development – then watersharing in
the region will become even more difficult. Bilateral and multilateral relations between and among
the Central Asian states have been severely strained at times, although fully fledged ‘water wars’ have remained a
remote prospect.
Afghan collapse won’t spill over
Silverman 9 (Jerry Mary, Ph.D. in International Relations and Project Specialist – Ford
Foundatoin, “Sturdy Dominoes”, The National Interest, 11-19,
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22512)
Many advocates of continuing or racheting up our presence in Afghanistan are cut from the same domino-theory cloth as those of
the Vietnam era. They posit that losing in Afghanistan would almost certainly lead to the further “loss”
of the entire South and central Asian region. Although avoiding explicit reference to “falling
dominos,” recent examples include S. Frederick Starr (School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University); Sir David Richards (the UK’s relatively new Chief of the General Staff); and, in The National Interest, Ahmed Rashid.
The fear that Pakistan and central Asian governments are too weak to withstand the Taliban leads logically to the proposition—just
as it did forty years ago—that only the United States can defend the region from its own extremist groups and, therefore, that any
loss of faith in America will result in a net gain for pan-Islamist movements in a zero-sum global competition for power.
Unfortunately, the resurrection of “falling dominos” as a metaphor for predicted consequences
of an American military withdrawal reflects a profound inability to re-envision the nature of
today’s global political environment and America’s place in it. The current worry is that Pakistan will revive support for
the Taliban and return to its historically rooted policy of noninterference in local governance or security arrangements along the
frontier. This fear is compounded by a vision of radical Islamists gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Those concerns are
fueled by the judgment that Pakistan’s new democratically elected civilian government is too weak to withstand pressures by its most
senior military officers to keep its pro-Afghan Taliban option open. From that perspective, any sign of American “dithering” would
reinforce that historically-rooted preference, even as the imperative would remain to separate the Pakistani-Taliban from the Afghan
insurgents. Further, any significant increase in terrorist violence, especially within major Pakistani urban centers, would likely lead
to the imposition of martial law and return to an authoritarian military regime, weakening American influence even further. At its
most extreme, that scenario ends with the most frightening outcome of all—the overthrow of relatively secular senior Pakistani
generals by a pro-Islamist and anti-Western group of second-tier officers with access to that country’s nuclear weapons. Beyond
Pakistan, advocates of today’s domino theory point to the Taliban’s links to both the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the
Islamic Jihad Union, and conclude that a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would encourage similar radical Islamist movements in
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In the face of a scenario of increasing radicalization along Russia’s relatively
new, southern borders, domino theorists argue that a NATO retreat from Afghanistan would spur the projection of its own military
and political power into the resulting “vacuum” there. The primary problem with the worst-case scenarios
predicted by the domino theorists is that no analyst is really prescient enough to accurately
predict how decisions made by the United States today will affect future outcomes in the South
and central Asian region. Their forecasts might occur whether or not the United States withdraws or, alternatively,
increases its forces in Afghanistan. Worse, it is entirely possible that the most dreaded consequences will occur only as the result of a
decision to stay. With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the earlier domino theory falsely represented
interstate and domestic political realities throughout most of Southeast Asia in 1975. Although it is
true that American influence throughout much of Southeast Asia suffered for a few years following Communist victories in
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, we now know that while we viewed the Vietnam War as part of a larger conflict, our opponent’s focus
was limited to the unification of their own country. Although border disputes erupted between Vietnam and
Cambodia, China and the Philippines, actual military conflicts occurred only between the
supposedly fraternal Communist governments of Vietnam, China and Cambodia. Neither of the
two competing Communist regimes in Cambodia survived. Further, no serious threats to install
Communist regimes were initiated outside of Indochina, and, most importantly, the current
political situation in Southeast Asia now conforms closely to what Washington had hoped to
achieve in the first place. It is, of course, unfortunate that the transition from military conflict in Vietnam to the welcome
situation in Southeast Asia today was initially violent, messy, bloody, and fraught with revenge and violations of human rights. But
as the perpetrators, magnitude, and victims of violence changed, the level of violence eventually declined.
Regional cooperation will prevent escalation
Innocent and Carpenter 9 (Malou, Foreign Policy Analyst – Cato Institute and Ted Galen,
Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, “Escaping the Graveyard
of Empires: A Strategy to Exist Afghanistan”, http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escapinggraveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf)
Additionally, regional stakeholders, especially Russia and Iran, have an interest in a stable
Afghanistan. Both countries possess the capacity to facilitate development in the country and may
even be willing to assist Western forces. In July, leaders in Moscow allowed the United States to use Russian airspace to
transport troops and lethal military equipment into Afghanistan. Yet another relevant regional player is the Collective Security
Treaty Organization, made up of Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Belarus. At the moment,
CSTO appears amenable to forging a security partnership with NATO. CSTO secretary general Nikolai Bordyuzha told journalists in
March 2009 of his bloc’s intention to cooperate. “The united position of the CSTO is that we should give every kind of aid to the antiterror coalition operating in Afghanistan. . . . The interests of NATO and the CSTO countries regarding Afghanistan conform
unequivocally.”83 Mutual interests between Western forces and Afghanistan’s surrounding neighbors can
converge on issues of transnational terrorism, the Caspian and Central Asia region’s abundant energy resources, crossborder organized crime, and weapons smuggling. Enhanced cooperation alone will not stabilize
Afghanistan, but engaging stakeholders may lead to tighter regional security.
Afghan stability resilient
Robichaud 7 (Carl, Program Officer – The Century Foundation, “Buying Time in Afghanistan”,
World Policy Journal, 11-8,
http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/RobichaudWPJ.pdf)
Afghanistan is increasingly seen as Iraq in slow motion. It is not. The headlines of car bombs
and casualty tolls echo each other, but mask deep differences in each society and in the
dynamics of each insurgency. As Iraq has descended into civil war, Afghanistan’s center has
held. The government remains weak, but power holders and the public show no appetite for a
return to internecine fighting. The insurgency remains solvent because of safe havens across the
border in Pakistan, but has been unable to expand upon its toehold in Afghanistan or offer a
compelling alternative to the status quo. In the short-run, the only way Afghanistan could
capsize is if the ballast of international support is withdrawn. Unfortunately, this scenario seems
increasingly likely. The Taliban are fond of saying that “the Americans have watches, but we
have time.” A quarter of the United States public now favors a pullout from Afghanistan in the
next year if things do not improve, and an additional 40 percent believes troops should be
withdrawn “as quickly as possible,” if a basic level of stability is achieved. Polls in Canada,
Britain, and the Netherlands— the NATO countries which are shouldering the alliance’s military
burden in the volatile South—suggest about half of those surveyed want troops withdrawn
within a year. In Germany, two thirds of the public now opposes its military contribution, and in
February a dispute over Afghanistan collapsed the center-left Prodi government in Italy.
National leaders continue to assert that “we cannot afford to lose” in Afghanistan, but many of
their constituents believe they already have.
1
2
Afghanistan is stable – no collapse
Boot 9 (Max, Fellow in National Security Studies – Council on Foreign Relations, “Yes We
Can”, The Weekly Standard, 3-23,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/274efbdb.asp)
Fears of impending disaster are hard to sustain, however, if you actually spend some time in Afghanistan, as
we did recently at the invitation of General David Petraeus, chief of U.S. Central Command. Using helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft,
and bone-jarring armored vehicles, we spent eight days traveling from the snow-capped peaks of Kunar province near the border
with Pakistan in the east to the wind-blown deserts of Farah province in the west near the border with Iran. Along the way we talked
with countless coalition soldiers, ranging from privates to a four-star general. We also attended a tribal shura or council-a fantastic
affair straight out of an earlier century-to sample opinion among bearded Afghan elders. What we found is a situation that is
cause for concern but far
short of catastrophe-and one that is likely to improve before long. To start with,
north, center, and west remains relatively secure. Attacks have increased in those areas but are still
extremely low. Figures showing large increases are deceptive because the total numbers to begin
with were so small and because most of the attacks produced few if any casualties. For instance, the Brookings Afghanistan
much of the
Index shows a 48 percent increase in attacks last year in Regional Command-Capital, which encompasses Kabul and its environs and
has a population of more than 4 million people. But the total (157 attacks in 2008) would have represented just four days of violence
in Baghdad in the summer of 2006. (Overall civilian casualties in Afghanistan, while rising, are still 16 times lower than the
comparable figure for Iraq in the pre-surge year of 2006.) As these figures suggest, while the capital of Iraq was a war zone, the
capital of Afghanistan is remarkably peaceful. Entire weeks go by without an insurgent attack, and
the streets bustle with cars and pedestrians. Coalition officials drive around in lightly armored SUVs, something that would have
been unthinkable in Baghdad. We asked officers at NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters in the
middle of Kabul whether they took any incoming rocket or mortar fire. Such attacks were an almost daily occurrence in the Green
Zone in Baghdad for years, with numerous personnel being killed only yards away from the U.S. ambassador's office. But at ISAF
they could remember only a single ineffectual attack back in September 2008. The idea that Kabul is under siege is a
figment of the news media's imagination based on hyped reporting of a few isolated attacks. ISAF officers
suggested to us that the recent insurgent raids on three government buildings, which generated so much negative publicity, were
actually good news, because Afghan security forces, who have assumed lead responsibility for operations in much of the capital, were
able to handle the crisis on their own. Commandos from the Afghan National Police Crisis Response Team stormed into the Justice
Ministry within hours and killed all the attackers, who had hoped to carry out a protracted Mumbai-style siege. Other would-be
suicide bombers were rounded up before they could set off their explosives. Equally impressive progress is being made in Jalalabad,
a city of perhaps 400,000 in eastern Afghanistan's Nangarhar Province. Violence is low; U.S. troops don't even patrol the city,
leaving that job to the Afghan National Security Forces. The Afghan army, police, and border police coordinate their activities
through a "fusion" center which responds to an emergency phone number that residents can call in case of trouble. Economic
development is booming, spurred by "Nangarhar Inc.," a development plan overseen by a U.S.-run Provincial Reconstruction Team
in cooperation with local officials. "Nangarhar has progressed light years in the last six or seven years," says Lieutenant Colonel
Patrick Daniel, who commands a battalion based in Jalalabad.
NATO – No Impact
NATO strong and resilient
Trueblood 4 (Tad, National Security Analyst and Fmr Military Officer with 20 Years
Experience, “Not Your Father’s NATO”, 4-1,
http://www.southernutah.com/Articles/World_Affairs/Document.2004-04-01.2317)
Not your father's NATO Last Updated: 2004-04-01 10:34:15 March 31, 2004 -- A wimpy,
eleven-syllable organization with longhaired troops and a Madison Avenue logo has proved
more resilient than it seemed. The authoritarian Warsaw Pact crumbled and was swept into
history’s dustbin, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has expanded its membership
and mission. Remember the Warsaw Pact? What a cool name, “pact”. Nobody has pacts
anymore. The western world prefers multisyllabic constructs like “coalition” and “organization”.
Lots of room for bureaucracy and politics in a multisyllabic outfit. But what could be more solid
than a pact? Surely not some wimpy, eleven-syllable organization with longhaired troops and a
Madison Avenue logo. Well, turns out those multisyllabic bureaucracies are more resilient than
they seem. The authoritarian Warsaw Pact crumbled and was swept into history’s dustbin, while
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has expanded its membership and mission.
Pact, schmact! Looks like acronyms come out on top. The transformation of NATO didn’t
happen overnight, however, and for several years in the 1990s it looked like the alliance had lost
its way and was headed towards stodgy irrelevance. There was much debate and consternation
over NATO’s post-Cold War role, or if it even had a role. Formed under U.S. leadership in 1949
to counter the looming military threat the Soviet bloc posed to Western Europe, the
quintessential free-world alliance didn’t seem so essential after the Soviet Union evaporated.
What’s an alliance to do after its adversaries go away? Two things, actually. First, figure out a
way to co-opt your old adversaries. Second, find some new adversaries. In that first area, NATO
has been amazingly successful. On Monday, NATO announced the accession of 7 new
members--all of which used to be communist countries. Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia were once Warsaw Pact members, while
Slovenia was part of Yugoslavia. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were actually part of the USSR itself. These new members join Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which
became NATO members in 1999. Though largely underappreciated, this is a geopolitical shift of monumental proportions. Since the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991,
NATO has expanded eastward (preceded by free enterprise, economic reform, and democracy) to include all the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe and now some former
Soviet Republics. In finding new adversaries--by which I really mean finding valid missions--NATO has had mixed success. Of course there were the Serbs and their aggressive
aims in the Balkans, which kept NATO busy on peacekeeping and peacemaking missions in Bosnia, then in Kosovo. But containing a tinhorn dictator like Milosevic can’t really
provide the raison ‘de etre for a grand, multi-spectral alliance. Working against instability and terrorism in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa seems to fit the bill. In the
old NATO, it was inconceivable to think that military units under NATO command might be deployed out of Europe for actual operations. In the new NATO, it’s becoming the
central mission. European governments, and their NATO representatives, realize that the more trouble brews out-of-area, the more likely the trouble will come home to roost
.
Afghanistan is NATO’s first major out-of-area operation. The NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (how’s that for multisyllabic?), or ISAF, has 6,500 troops from 35 NATO and
non-NATO nations. ISAF’s main objective is to promote stability and security in the war-torn
country, and mainly leaves the Taliban and al-Qaida hunting to the U.S. forces. However, ISAF
troops have been in clashes and suffered casualties there. In fact, German soldiers, who make up
the core of the ISAF, have seen their first combat outside Europe since WWII. And it’s likely
there will be more NATO operations in strange places. The possibility of NATO taking on large
chunks of the security mission in Iraq is being actively discussed--with U.S. support. There have
even been suggestions that a NATO presence in Israel might be the only way to enforce a peace
plan there. No, it’s sure not your father’s NATO anymore.
NATO collapse doesn’t cause war
Conry 95 (Barbara, Foreign Policy Analyst – Cato, Cato Policy Analysis, “The Western
European Union as NATO’s Successor”, 9-18, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-239.html)
Europe after NATO: Bogus Nightmare Scenarios It is inaccurate to suggest, as NATO
partisans often do, that the only alternative to Atlanticism is a return to the dark ages of the
interwar era: nationalized European defenses, American isolationism, xenophobia,
demagoguery, and the other evils associated with the rise of Hitler and World War II. Former
U.S. senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) warns that weakening NATO will have dire
consequences. "As we have thrice before in this dreadful century, [we will] set in motion an
instability that can only lead to war, shed blood, and lost treasure. Pray that we are wiser."(4)
Lawrence di Rita of the Heritage Foundation similarly defends NATO as an "insurance policy"
against a future world war. "If keeping 65,000 young Americans in Europe will prevent 10 times
that many new headstones in Arlington cemetery once the Europeans turn on themselves again-as they have twice this century--then it's a small price to pay."(5) Such alarmism
underestimates the significance of 50 years of economic and political cooperation among the
West European powers and the role of pan-European institutions such as the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe. It also ignores the fact that a viable institutional alternative
to NATO--the Western European Union--already exists. With the proper resources and
recognition on the part of Washington and the Europeans that an independent European
defense is essential in the post-Cold War era, the WEU is a promising alternative to Atlanticism.
Far from being a lame second choice to NATO or defense on the cheap, a robust WEU would be
superior to NATO in many ways, better suited in the long run to protecting European and,
indirectly, American interests.
U.S. will remain in Europe without NATO
Menon 3 (Rajan, Professor of International Relations – Lehigh University and Senior Fellow –
Council on Foreign Relations, “The End of Alliances”, World Policy Journal, 2(20), 6-22)
Nor will the lack of alliances require the United States to disengage from parts of the world
where it was entrenched militarily. America can be involved in Europe and Japan and on the
Korean peninsula in a variety of ways without being bound by formal defense treaties. Think of
the Marshall Plan or the Truman Doctrine, neither of which required us to enter into long-term
military alliances. Or consider Israel, which is invariably referred to as an ally, even though
there is no formal alliance between it and the United States. Yet it is hard to think of a country
with which we have ties that are as extensive and deep. The commonly heard argument that the
end of NATO will inevitably erode the American position in Europe is hardly persuasive. To
return to Lord Ismay, the Germans are "down" (in the sense that they are integrated into the EU
and have used cooperation as the watchword for dealings with their neighbors for over 50
years); the Russians are "out" (the idea that Russia, mired in innumerable domestic problems,
poses a threat to the Baltic states or the states of East-Central Europe is farfetched, as evidenced
by the very small proportion of their budgets that these states have devoted to defense spending
since 1991); and the United States can remain "in" Europe and contribute to its stability in many
ways without stationing thousands of troops there. As for Japan and South Korea (or a reunified
Korea), they too can pursue their interests and protect their territory through many means
without maintaining formal military alliances with the United States. These are the wealthy
centers of global capitalism. They have the resources to do more for their own defense and,
when independent efforts do not suffice, they can form alignments and even alliances with their
neighbors, just as states have done for centuries. What they lack is willpower and confidence,
which have been diminished by 50 years of dependence on the United States and supplanted by
strategic solipsism. While the claim that the end of American-led alliances will promote German
hegemony or Japanese militarism is so commonplace as to be seemingly beyond challenge, it
ignores the changes that have occurred within Germany and Japan, and in Europe and East Asia
over the past half-century. It consigns the United States to maintaining obligations that are now
of questionable worth in a world of new challenges. And it smacks of hubris in implying that
without an American presence that takes the form of military pacts, these regions will be
consumed by upheaval because the countries within them are incapable of managing their own
affairs. The end of America's alliances with its present partners need not--indeed, will not-culminate in estrangement, let alone enmity, between us and them. The ties,
interconnections, and dependencies that have developed over the decades on multiple
fronts are too numerous and substantial for that to happen. The conclusion that our Cold War
alliances will fade away is emphatically not a call for isolationism, which is neither desirable nor
possible in an interdependent world.
Alt causes –
A) Macedonia
Greenberg 1 (Robert, “NATO’s Credibility in Macedonia”, Foreign Policy in Focus, 8-1,
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/297)
Macedonia has received little in return for its support of NATO. Government officials in Skopje
have accused NATO of failing to protect Macedonia's northern border with Kosovo, repeatedly
providing NATO with documents on the flow of arms and Albanian militants from Kosovo.
NATO has countered that the protection of the Macedonian border with Kosovo is not part of
the alliance's mandate in Kosovo. Nevertheless, NATO maintains that it has beefed up patrols
along the Kosovo-Macedonia border. But NATO, which has a massive presence in Kosovo,
contends that it is virtually impossible to prevent infiltration of the border, given the area's
rugged terrain. NATO now promises to collect the same weapons that it let slip through from
Kosovo into Macedonia. The cynics would argue that it is in NATO's best interest to underreport the number of Albanian arms in Macedonia. After all, admitting the possibility that as
many as 85,000 arms have been smuggled into Macedonia would further damage NATO's
reputation and credibility.
B) NATO expansion
Menon 3 (Rajan, Professor of International Relations – Lehigh University and Senior Fellow –
Council on Foreign Relations, “The End of Alliances”, World Policy Journal, 2(20), 6-22)
To some, this verdict may seem odd. NATO, after all, has been expanding. Already an alliance of
16 states in 1991, it added the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1997; and in November
2002, it approved the entry of 7 other states: the 3 Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania), plus Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Alas, expansion--not all that
uncommon as an organizational response to uncertainty of purpose--promises to make NATO
less coherent without making it much more powerful or relevant. (9) The admission of many
new members of diverse backgrounds will make decisionmaking, which NATO's unanimity rule
already makes cumbersome, even more complicated. Furthermore, the new members from EastCentral Europe, the Baltic region, and the Balkans do not appreciably increase the alliance's
military clout or reduce its major deficiencies, such as an anemic power-projection capability.
Nor will expansion be a cure for NATO'S decreasing utility for American security needs.
Burma Turn – 1NC Shell
Afghanistan opium shifts production away from Burma
Fuller, 07 (Thomas, Southeast Asia Correspondent for The New York Times, “No Blowing Smoke: Poppies Fade in Southeast
Asia:”, 9/16/2007, New York Times, Proquest, JKahn)
As a result, the Golden Triangle has been eclipsed
by the Golden Crescent -- the poppy-growing area
in and around Afghanistan that is now the source of an estimated 92 percent of the world's opium ,
according to the United Nations. Much of the growth in opium production there is in areas controlled by the
Taliban, which United States officials say uses revenue from opium and heroin to finance itself. This
shift to Afghanistan has had major consequences for the global heroin market: a near doubling of
opium production worldwide in less than two decades. Poppies grown in the fertile valleys of southern Afghanistan yield on average
four times more opium than those grown in upland Southeast Asia. A striking aspect of the decline of the Golden Triangle is the role
China has played in pressing opium-growing regions to eradicate poppy crops. A major market for Golden Triangle heroin, China
has seen a spike in addicts and H.I.V. infections from contaminated needles. The area of Myanmar along the Chinese
border, which once produced about 30 percent of the country's opium, was declared opium-free last year by the United
Nations. Local authorities, who are from the Wa tribe and are autonomous from Myanmar's central government, have
banned poppy cultivation and welcomed Chinese investmentin rubber, sugar cane and tea plantations, casinos and other
businesses. "China has had an underestimated role," said Martin Jelsma, a Dutch researcher who has written extensively on the
illicit drug trade in Asia. "Their main leverage is economic: These border areas of Burma are by now economically
much more connected
to China than the rest of Burma," he said, using the former name for Myanmar. "For local authorities
it's quite clear that, for any investments they want to attract, cooperation with China is a necessity."
Myanmar remains the world's second-leading source of opium but is a distant second; its production declined by 80 percent over the
last decade. Insurgents have long used opium to help finance civil wars in the Golden Triangle. But some are now working to
destroy the crop. At least one faction of the Shan State Army, a group that long had ties to the heroin business, says it is
leading eradication efforts. Kon Jern, a military commander for the group, which is based along Myanmar's border with northern
Thailand, says he is cracking down because government militias and corrupt officials profit from opium. "They sell the drugs,
they buy weapons, and they use those weapons to attack us," he said. The United Nations credits Myanmar's
central government with leading the eradication effort in Shan areas. In Laos, where the political situation is more stable, the
government began a crackdown in the 1990s to increase its international credibility and because officials realized their own children
were at risk, said Leik Boonwaat, the representative in Laos for the U.N.'s Office on Drugs and Crime. Laos finally outlawed opium in
1996. The government, Mr. Boonwaat said, also saw that opium did little to help poor farmers who grew poppies. "It's mostly the
organized crime syndicates that made most of the profits," he said. The amount of land cultivated in Laos for opium has fallen 94
percent since 1998. The country now produces so little opium that it may now be a net importer of the drug, the United Nations says.
Yet experts warn that the reductions may not hold unless farmers develop other ways to make a living. Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, an
opium specialist at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris, says it took Thailand 30 years to wean opium farmers from
poppy production, a transition led by the Thai royal family, which encouraged opium-growing hill tribes to use their cooler climate
to produce coffee, macadamia nuts and green vegetables. But, he said, "In Laos and Burma, we've had a very quick decrease." He
asked, "Is it going to last?" Four years ago farmers in Banna Sala, an isolated Laotian hamlet of several hundred ethnic Hmong, grew
opiumpoppies with impunity. No longer. And some farmers are angry. "They stopped me from growing opium, so I don't have
money to send my children to school," said one villager, Jeryeh Singya, 34, who has seven children. She once bartered the opium she
grew for soap, salt and clothing. "If they let me grow it I would," she said. Mr. Kon, the rebel commander in Myanmar, says farmers
are finding it difficult to switch crops. "If they change and grow other kinds of plants nobody comes to buy their products -- the
transportation is not good," he said. Experts say that to stay free of opium, isolated villages that depended on it will need assistance
and investment for better roads, schools and clinics. But Myanmar, which is run by a military junta, poses a dilemma for Western
countries. The United States has an embargo on trade with Myanmar. The European Union has suspended trade privileges and
defense cooperation, limiting its aid to humanitarian assistance. "This policy of boycott and isolation has, of course, meant that only
very little development aid and humanitarian assistance is flowing into the country," said Mr. Jelsma, the Dutch expert on drugs.
"That makes the chances of the sustainability of this decline very questionable."
Sustained drop in heroin revenue is key to regime change in Burma
ISMI, 1
(Asad, Ph.D. in War Studies from the University of London, CCPA Monitor, March,
http://www.asadismi.ws/burma.html)
Friedland and the
Burmese junta form a powerful combination. Here is a Canadian mining investor linked to major
10,000 people in 1988 (to crush a
student uprising) and has turned Burma into a vast slave labour camp, as well as the world's leading heroin
environmental disasters and mercenaries joining with a military junta that killed
exporter. The SPDC refused to hand over power to Aung San Suu Kyi when her party won the 1990 elections and has held her under
house arrest since then. According to the United Nations, torture,
summary executions, slave labour, rape,
forced displacement, and oppression of minorities are commonplace in Burma. The junta has
incorporated drug trafficking into the country's permanent economy, so that Burma now supplies 60% of
the world's heroin and 80% of that drug sold in Canada. Under the SPDC, Burma has more than doubled drug exports. Foreign
investment is used to launder profits from the junta's drug trafficking. The money generated by heroin, foreign investment and
tourism finances
the SPDC's arms purchases (mainly from China) with which it maintains its iron-fisted
rule.
Survival of the current Burmese government will eventually result in prolif
and nuclear war
Selth, 7 (Andrew, Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, ‘Burma and Nuclear Proliferation: Policies and perceptions’,
Regional Outlook Paper No. 12, 2007, www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/18240/regional-outlook-volume-12.pdf)
The regime has long been subject to harsh criticism from Western leaders. Implicit in most of these comments has
been a demand for regime change. In 2003, for example, US Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to ‘the thugs who
now rule Burma’ and his successor has labelled Burma ‘an outpost of tyranny’ to which the US must help bring freedom. In 2005,
President Bush told an international audience that the Burmese people ‘want their liberty – and one day they shall have it’. In his
2006 State of the Union speech, immediately after references to the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, Burma was ranked
alongside Syria, Iran and North Korea as places where ‘the demands of justice, and the peace of the world, require their freedom’. In
the UK, Prime Minister Blair has been reported as saying that the SPDC was a ‘loathsome regime’ that he would ‘love to destroy’.
Also, senior members of Congress have repeatedly characterised the SPDC as ‘repressive and illegitimate’ and in 2007 a leading UK
parliamentarian told a visiting Burmese minister that Burma was a ‘pariah state’ ruled by ‘a wicked regime’. In stark contrast, public
comments about Burmese opposition figures like Aung San Suu Kyi have been uniformly complimentary and supportive. To an
isolated, insecure and fearful group of military officers in Burma, all these statements could be
interpreted as evidence of an intention to impose political change on Burma, against which they
needed to prepare. Also, global developments over the past few decades have sharpened Burma’s
concerns that it might fall victim to a larger, more powerful state. In the past, this fear was focused on China but the worry is
now that, in a post-Cold War world dominated by the US, the Western democracies will be able to impose their
liberal, democratic and humanitarian agenda on Burma. Since 2002, there have been numerous calls for Burma to be
included in President Bush’s ‘axis of evil’. The armed interventions in Haiti, Panama, Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq
(twice) are all viewed as examples of the US’s determination, unilaterally if necessary, to intervene in the affairs of other states and
overthrow regimes whose policies are inimical to Washington. The 1999 multinational operation in East Timor, where a separatist
movement was able to win independence from its parent state, is cited by members of Burma’s military hierarchy as another
example of the way in which the US and its allies are forcibly reshaping the world order. In this process, the UN is seen as unwilling
or unable to defend the interests of its smaller and weaker members. It is always difficult to determine what Burma’s military
leadership is thinking, particularly with regard to matters of national security. However, faced with these perceived threats, the
regime’s strategic planners seem to have fallen back on Burma’s traditional strengths – both real and imagined. These include
Burma’s armed forces, its highly varied geography and the patriotism of its people. Developments in Burmese military doctrine
suggest that, faced with an invasion by modern armed forces, the regime would attempt first to deter an assault with the threat of
high casualties. It would next mount a conventional defence of Burma’s borders, followed by a prolonged guerrilla war conducted by
the population at large. Large numbers of Burmese citizens would be mobilised as militia units, to sap the will of an invader until a
counter-offensive could be organised or external assistance arrived. The regime clearly recognises that it could not win a direct forceon-force confrontation with a coalition like that which attacked Afghanistan or Iraq, but it seems to feel that it could force an enemy
to think twice about invading, and then buy time until the international community forced a ceasefire. This doctrine, however, has
two major flaws, which must be recognised by the SPDC’s more honest and clear-sighted strategic planners. The first is that the
support of the Burmese people cannot be relied upon. The majority are intensely patriotic, but they owe their
loyalty to the country – not necessarily to the military government. There are many, both ethnic Burmans and members of the
minority races, who would welcome the downfall of the current regime. Also, the SPDC’s plan to appeal to the
international community must now be looking very weak. The Bush Administration and its allies have demonstrated a preparedness
to invade another country despite the lack of an immediate or obvious threat, and in the face of strong opposition from both their
critics and traditional partners, including in the UN. Also, in 2007 a move to censure Burma in the UNSC was only prevented by the
SPDC’s new allies, China and Russia. Any faith that the regime might have had in support from that institution must now be severely
undermined. Direct assistance from China is possible but, given the regime’s suspicion of Beijing’s long terms aims, any help from
that quarter would be a mixed blessing. It is in these circumstances that a nuclear deterrent could have some
appeal to Burma’s leaders. Of concern to strategic analysts is the possibility that the SPDC may have drawn the
same conclusions from the 2003 Iraq War that North Korea seems to have done, and will seek to acquire a
nuclear weapon as a bargaining chip to protect itself against the US and its allies. According to one report, some Burmese
generals ‘admire the North Koreans for standing up to the United States and wish they could do
the same’. The SPDC could argue that North Korea’s possession of a nuclear retaliatory capability has been the main reason why
the US and its allies, or the UN, have not taken tougher action against Pyongyang, despite its long record of provocative behaviour.
Viewed from this perspective, the possession of nuclear weapons has given North Korea a higher international profile, a stronger
position at the negotiating table and the proven ability to win concessions (including funds, food aid, fuel oil and technical
assistance) from the international community. Iran’s nuclear weapons program may have a different outcome, but there are
reportedly a few generals in Burma who feel that the SPDC should at least consider the benefits of such an approach. Possession
of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles would be more than symbolic. If Burma’s military
government ever felt seriously threatened, it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which it might actually consider
using them. For example, faced with an imminent invasion, and with Kuwait’s role in the Iraq war in mind, any ballistic missiles
acquired from Pyongyang could be aimed at Thailand, a US ally and Burma’s ‘nearest enemy’. This might help dissuade the Thai
government from allowing its territory to be used as the launching pad for a major ground and air assault against its western
neighbour. SRBMs may not be very accurate but, if launched from a Burmese site near the Thai border, they could easily
reach greater Bangkok, a city of nearly nine million people. Even if armed only with a conventional warhead, such a
threat would certainly concentrate the minds of Thai leaders. If it possessed WMD, Burma would have the option
of visiting even greater destruction upon its neighbour.
Uniqueness
Shan rebels have cracked down – production is decreasing
Asia News Monitor, 12 (citing Myanmar authorities, “Myanmar (Burma): Myanmar claims progress on fighting drugs”,
7/12/2012, Asia News, Monitor, Proquest, JKahn)
Myanmar authorities on Monday hailed progress in their war on drugs after an unprecedented
multi-million dollar seizure at an narcotics factory in eastern Shan state, the Bangkok Post reports. Suspects lined
up behind drugs and drug making equipment in Laukkai. Police detained nine suspects with 73 kilograms (161 pounds) of
"ice" crystal methamphetamine and 274 kilos of liquid meth along with drug-making equipment and a pistol during a
raid on a house in Laukkai on July 9, state media reported. Officials said the haul was worth an estimated $3.7 million. " It's our
biggest ice seizure in history. It's a part of our crackdown on the chemical ingredients and factories," a senior official at
the home affairs ministry, who did not want to be named, told AFP. Synthetic drug production and poppy
cultivation for opium is prevalent in Myanmar's remote border areas, where armed ethnic minority rebels
have used the profits from narcotics to fund their operations. President Thein Sein's reformist government has signed peace accords
with a number of armed groups as part of sweeping reforms since taking power last year. Myanmar has said it aims to
eradicate illegal drugs by 2014. The country, which is slowly emerging from decades of military rule, is
the world's second-largest opium poppy grower after Afghanistan. Shan state is a major source of methamphetamine tablets,
according to the UN, which estimates that global seizures of amphetamine-type stimulants nearly tripled between between 1998 and
2010, reflecting fast-growing demand. In May the government and Shan rebels together agreed to wipe out drug
production in the vast northeastern state. A drug control official said the recent raid had posed "many difficulties and risks". He
added: "We have no experience like this in the past raiding a factory which produces ice and other stimulants."
Resettlement efforts have disincentivized production
Brunnstrom, 2k (David, Correspondent, EU foreign affairs and NATO for Reuters, “Army moves out opium growers to
beat skeptics: Myanmar committed”, 1/17/2000, National Post, Proquest, JKahn)
WAN HUNG, Myanmar - An ethnic army in Myanmar battling skepticism
about its commitment to
stamp out the narcotics trade says it is relocating 50,000 opium growers to force them to kick
their drug- producing habit. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) said hill farmers and their dependents were being
trucked 160 km south from homes on the Chinese border to an area of Myanmar's Shan state near Thailand to grow longans, a
tropical fruit. Myanmar's military government, which organized a weekend visit for journalists to opium growing areas of Shan state,
said the program, which started in November, showed that the UWSA was serious about its vow to eradicate opium by 2005. "We
intend to move 50,000 people in a three-year period," Kyin Maung Myint, a UWSA liaison officer , told reporters. He said 10,000
had already been moved and the number would rise to 20,000 by March. Officials of the Myanmar government and the UWSA
admitted that not all those being trucked south were happy to go, but said each family would be allocated two hectares to farm. Wan
Hung, where they are being resettled, was once controlled by Khun Sa, a notorious drug lord wanted in the United States for heroin
trafficking who surrendered to the government in 1996. Narcotics experts outside Myanmar say the UWSA, which has 20,000
armed troops and agreed to a ceasefire with Yangon in 1989, has stepped
into Khun Sa's shoes to become the main
producer of opium, heroin and amphetamines in the "Golden Triangle" narcotics region where
Myanmar, Laos and Thailand join. According to the U.S. State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports, the
drug-trafficking armies, such as the UWSA, with whom the government has negotiated ceasefires but not permanent peace accords,
remain heavily into the heroin trade. Myanmar officials said global organizations such as the United Nations should help fund their
initiative to move families. "We have told the people of the Wa area that poppy growing will be banned and they can no longer grow
poppy," said Khin Maung Myint. "Once you have an alternative crop, they have to move down south here," he said. "They have been
persuaded and some we have urged to move, but with some we have to insist." He said about 600 families were arriving in Wan
Hung each day and have built homes in a temporary resettlement area. Colonel Kyaw Thein, of Myanmar's counter-narcotics agency,
said those being moved were mostly ethnic Wa, but included members of other hill tribes also living in the region,
which is suitable
for few crops except opium. Yangon, which rejects allegations by the United States and other
project. "I think it will result in a very
significant reduction in production," said Kyaw Thein. "It will be a very big achievement." He said Myanmar's estimates
countries that it is doing too little to eradicate drugs, was pleased with the
for opium production for the season to April, 1999, were slightly less than U.S. intelligence estimates of just over 1,000 tons. The UN
Drug Control Program estimates 1,200 tons. Ten tons ofopium can be processed into one ton of heroin. Myanmar officials have
complained that U.S. experts blamed overly dry weather for a sharp 38% fall in output last year and insist their eradication efforts
should be given more credit. In an effort to prove their point on Saturday, they flew journalists by helicopter to watch ethnic Lahu
tribes people and soldiers use bamboo sticks to slash down opium poppies. Leaders of the UWSA themselves, who narcotics experts
outside Myanmar say have diversified into mass-production of methamphetamines now flooding into Thailand, said their anti-drug
pledge should be taken at face value and supported financially by the international community.
Prolif Possible
Burma could seek nuclear weapons—recent policy changes increase the risk
Selth, 7
(Andrew, Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, ‘Burma and Nuclear Proliferation: Policies and
perceptions’, Regional Outlook Paper No. 12, 2007,
www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/18240/regional-outlook-volume-12.pdf)
Before 2000, the idea that Burma might one day become a nuclear power was considered fanciful.
Indeed, so unlikely was it seen to be that major military institutions in two Western countries used such a scenario as the basis for
classroom training exercises. As a test of strategic analytical skills, these institutions asked their students – military officers and
civilians from a wide range of countries – to consider the implications of Burma, supplied with nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles by another pariah state, precipitating an international crisis. In one case, the threat was
immediate, with the notional nuclear-armed missiles aimed at a neighbouring country allied with the United States (US). In the
other case the threat was less direct, and formed the basis of an attempt by Burma’s military government to exercise leverage over
other countries, mainly through the United Nations (UN). In both exercises, the students were asked to assess the dangers posed by
Burma’s actions and to consider how the international community might respond. After 2000, however, these fictional
scenarios seemed to be coming true. That year, Burma announced that it planned to purchase a
nuclear reactor from Russia. Given Burma’s instability and low level of technical development, this was itself a cause for
concern. When the Russian deal appeared to break down in 2003, there were fears that Burma had
turned to North Korea to acquire nuclear technology and possibly also nuclear weapons. At the same time there was
speculation that, even if Burma did not want its own nuclear weapons, it could be enlisted to support North Korea’s nuclear program
and perhaps even to hide a few North Korean weapons from the US and international monitoring agencies. These stories, which
were given wide circulation in the news media, followed reports that the Rangoon regime was trying to purchase some ballistic
missiles from Pyongyang. The Burmese government strongly denied that it was seeking to acquire any strategic weapon systems, but
suspicions clearly remain. As with so many issues relating to Burma’s security, and security policies, the real picture is
difficult to discover and interpret. There is very little hard, verifiable information available to test perceptions, and to
put the rumours and sensationalist press reporting into a clear perspective. This problem is compounded by the
highly charged atmosphere that often surrounds consideration of Burma-related issues. The public
debate tends to be dominated by Burmese expatriates, foreign activists and specialist academics, many of who have strong personal
views and specific policy agendas. Yet Burma’s approach to global disarmament, its plans for a research reactor and
its possible interest in acquiring nuclear weapons (and the missiles to deliver them) all demand
careful and objective analysis. For, if the news reports are true and Burma does indeed pose a nuclear proliferation risk,
there would appear to be little that the international community can do to dissuade Burma’s
military leadership from its present course.
Burma is seeking nuclear weapons now
Green & Mitchell, 7
(Michael Green is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown
University and a Senior Adviser and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Derek Mitchell is a Senior
Fellow and Director for Asia Strategy at CSIS, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec)
Worse, the SPDC appears to have been taking an even more threatening turn recently. Western
intelligence officials have suspected for several years that the regime has had an interest in following
the model of North Korea and achieving military autarky by developing ballistic missiles and nuclear
weapons. Last spring, the junta normalized relations and initiated conventional weapons trade with North Korea in violation of
UN sanctions against Pyongyang. And despite Burma's ample reserves of oil and gas, it signed an agreement
with Russia to develop what it says will be peaceful nuclear capabilities. For these reasons, despite urgent problems
elsewhere in the world, all responsible members of the international community should be concerned
about the course Burma is taking.
Impact – BioD
Burmese drug trade causes deforestation and destroys biodiversity
Huang, 98
(Cheng-Chia, American University Trade and Environment Database, TED Case Studies, Vol. 8 No. 1,
http://www.american.edu/ted/opium.htm)
Other environmental problems include deforestation and pollution. In order
to satisfy the huge
demand for heroin in the world, Burma has increasingly cut its forests year by year. The deforestation
has resulted in soil erosion, wildlife loss, and will also increase global temperature. Moreover, the process of
opium into heroin did a serious ecological destruction in the Burma border. For example, it has been found that
rivers across the Burma border carried many chemical elements and soil resulting from dumping of chemicals and deforestation. It
is estimated that there were 870 bird species and 263 mammals, including 94 species of bats in the Burma
border, particularly the Shan State. Recently, the number of species are decreasing because of deforestation.
For example, the tiger population is estimated to be fewer than 500. Species closer to extinction include the Thai crocodile, the
mouse deer and the Kouprey, a large herbivore similar to the elk, of which fewer than 200 remain. [3] The Sarus crane, another
native in this area, has not been sighted for 20 years. [4] Therefore, forest destruction has by no means been the sole cause of
wildlife loss in the Shan State.
It’s a key biodiversity hotspot
Conservation International, 7
(“Biodiversity Hotspots: Indo-Burma,” http://www.biodiversityhotspots.org/xp/hotspots/indo_burma/Pages/default.aspx)
Encompassing more than 2 million km² of tropical Asia, Indo-Burma is still revealing its biological treasures.
Six large mammal species have been discovered in the last 12 years: the large-antlered muntjac, the Annamite
muntjac, the grey-shanked douc, the Annamite striped rabbit, the leaf deer, and the saola. This hotspot also holds
remarkable endemism in freshwater turtle species, most of which are threatened with extinction, due to overharvesting and extensive habitat loss. Bird life in Indo-Burma is also incredibly diverse, holding almost 1,300
different bird species, including the threatened white-eared night-heron, the grey-crowned crocias, and the orange-necked
partridge.
Deforestation causes extinction
Watson, 6
(Captain Paul, Founder and President of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, has a show on Animal Planet, Last Mod 9-17,
http://www.eco-action.org/dt/beerswil.html)
The facts are clear. More plant and animal species will go through extinction within our generation than have been lost
thorough natural causes over the past two hundred million years. Our single human generation, that is, all people born between
1930 and 2010 will witness the complete obliteration of one third to one half of all the Earth's life forms, each and every one of them
the product of more than two billion years of evolution. This is biological meltdown, and what this really means is the
end to vertebrate evolution on planet Earth. Nature is under siege on a global scale. Biotopes, i.e., environmentally
distinct regions, from tropical and temperate rainforests to coral reefs and coastal estuaries, are disintegrating in the wake of human
onslaught. The destruction of forests and the proliferation of human activity will remove more than 20 percent of all terrestrial plant
species over the next fifty years. Because plants form the foundation for entire biotic communities, their
demise will carry with it the extinction of an exponentially greater number of animal species -perhaps ten times as many faunal species for each type of plant eliminated. Sixty-five million years ago, a natural cataclysmic
event resulted in extinction of the dinosaurs. Even with a plant foundation intact, it took more than 100,000 years for faunal
biological diversity to re-establish itself. More importantly, the resurrection of biological diversity assumes an intact zone of tropical
forests to provide for new speciation after extinction. Today, the tropical rain forests are disappearing more rapidly
after the age of humans, the Earth will remain a biological, if not a
literal desert for eons to come. The present course of civilization points to ecocide -- the death of nature. Like a run-athan any other bio-region, ensuring that
way train, civilization is speeding along tracks of our own manufacture towards the stone wall of extinction. The human passengers
sitting comfortably in their seats, laughing, partying, and choosing to not look out the window. Environmentalists are those
perceptive few who have their faces pressed against the glass, watching the hurling bodies of plants and animals go screaming by.
Environmental activists are those even fewer people who are trying desperately to break into the fortified engine of greed that
propels this destructive specicidal juggernaut. Others are desperately throwing out anchors in an attempt to slow the monster down
while all the while, the authorities, blind to their own impending destruction, are clubbing, shooting and jailing those who would
save us all. SHORT MEMORIES Civilized humans have for ten thousand years been marching across the face of the Earth leaving
deserts in their footprints. Because we have such short memories, we forgot the wonder and splendor of a virgin nature. We revise
history and make it fit into our present perceptions. For instance, are you aware that only two thousand years ago, the coast of North
Africa was a mighty forest? The Phoenicians and the Carthaginians built powerful ships from the strong timbers of the region. Rome
was a major exporter of timber to Europe. The temple of Jerusalem was built with titanic cedar logs, one image of which adorns the
flag of Lebanon today. Jesus Christ did not live in a desert, he was a man of the forest. The Sumerians were renowned for clearing
the forests of Mesopotamia for agriculture. But the destruction of the coastal swath of the North African forest stopped the rain from
advancing into the interior. Without the rain, the trees died and thus was born the mighty Sahara, sired by man and continued to
grow southward at a rate of ten miles per year, advancing down the length of the continent of Africa. And so will go Brazil. The
precipitation off the Atlantic strikes the coastal rain forest and is absorbed and sent skyward again by the trees, falling further into
the interior. Twelve times the moisture falls and twelve times it is returned to the sky -- all the way to the Andes mountains. Destroy
the coastal swath and desertify Amazonia -- it is as simple as that. Create a swath anywhere between the coast and the mountains
and the rains will be stopped. We did it before while relatively primitive. We learned nothing. We forgot. So too, have we forgotten
that walrus once mated and bred along the coast of Nova Scotia, that sixty million bison once roamed the North American plains.
One hundred years ago, the white bear once roamed the forests of New England and the Canadian Maritime provinces. Now it is
called the polar bear because that is where it now makes its last stand. EXTINCTION IS DIFFICULT TO APPRECIATE Gone forever
are the European elephant, lion and tiger. The Labrador duck, gint auk, Carolina parakeet will never again grace this planet of ours.
Lost for all time are the Atlantic grey whales, the Biscayan right whales and the Stellar sea cow. Our children will never look upon the
California condor in the wild or watch the Palos Verde blue butterfly dart from flower to flower. Extinction is a difficult concept
to fully appreciate. What has been is no more and never shall be again. It would take another creation and billions of years to
recreate the passenger pigeon. It is the loss of billions of years of evolutionary programming. It is the destruction of beauty, the
obliteration of truth, the removal of uniqueness, the scarring of the sacred web of life To be responsible for an extinction is to
commit blasphemy against the divine. It is the greatest of all possible crimes, more evil than murder, more
appalling than genocide, more monstrous than even the apparent unlimited perversities of the human mind. To be
responsible for the complete and utter destruction of a unique and sacred life form is arrogance that seethes with evil, for the very
opposite of evil is live. It is no accident that these two words spell out each other in reverse. And yet, a reporter in California recently
told me that "all the redwoods in California are not worth the life on one human being." What incredible arrogance. The rights a
species, any species, must take precedence over the life of an individual or another species. This is a basic ecological law. It is not to
be tampered with by primates who have molded themselves into divine legends in their own mind. For each and every one of the
thirty million plus species that grace this beautiful planet are essential for the continued well-being of which we are all a part, the
planet Earth -- the divine entity which brought us forth from the fertility of her sacred womb. As a sea-captain I like to compare the
structural integrity of the biosphere to that of a ship's hull. Each species is a rivet that keeps the hull intact. If I were to go into my
engine room and find my engineers busily popping rivets from the hull, I would be upset and naturally I would ask them what they
were doing. If they told me that they discovered that they could make a dollar each from the rivets, I could do one of three things. I
could ignore them. I could ask them to cut me in for a share of the profits, or I could kick their asses out of the engine room and off
my ship. If I was a responsible captain, I would do the latter. If I did not, I would soon find the ocean pouring through the holes left
by the stolen rivets and very shortly after, my ship, my crew and myself would disappear beneath the waves. And that is the state of
the world today. The political leaders, i.e., the captains at the helms of their nation states, are ignoring the rivet poppers or they are
cutting themselves in for the profits. There are very few asses being kicked out of the engine room of spaceship Earth. With the
rivet poppers in command, it will not be long until the biospheric integrity of the Earth collapses
under the weight of ecological strain and tides of death come pouring in. And that will be the price of
progress -- ecological collapse, the death of nature, and with it the horrendous and mind numbing specter of massive human
destruction.
*Uniqueness*
Cocaine Solved now
Pannunzi’s arrest dramatically solves the cocaine issue – the most powerful drug
broker in the world!
Nine News, 7/6/13 global news network (“'World's biggest cocaine dealer' deported”
http://news.ninemsn.com.au/world/2013/07/06/14/24/italian-mafia-boss-caught-in-colombia) // czhang
Roberto Pannunzi was detained in Bogota with a fake Venezuelan identity card in a joint operation
by
Colombian police together with the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). ¶ "He is the
biggest cocaine importer in the world," said Nicola Gratteri, deputy chief prosecutor in Reggio Calabria in southern
Italy.¶ "He is the only one who can organise purchases and sales of cocaine shipments of 3000
kilos and up."¶ "Pannunzi is the only one who can sell both to the 'Ndrangheta and to Cosa Nostra. He is definitely the
most powerful drug broker in the world," he said.¶ The 'Ndrangheta is based in Calabria and is a major
player in international drug trafficking. The Sicilian mafia is known as Cosa Nostra.¶ Gratteri said Pannunzi was being
deported since "an extradition order would have taken several months".¶ He is expected to land at Rome's Fiumicino airport later on
Saturday.¶ In April, Colombia captured another suspected top mafioso, Domenico Trimboli, alleged to
be a lynchpin between the Medellin drug cartel and the 'Ndrangheta.
Columbia Drugs Low
Columbia cracking down now
Gallahue, 12 (Patrick, contributor to the International Centre on Human Rights and Drug
Policy, B.A. in East Asian Studies from Long Island University, LL.M. in International Human
Rights Law from the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the National University of Ireland,
“Narco-Terror: Conflating the Wars on Drugs and Terror”, University of Essex, 2012,
http://projects.essex.ac.uk/ehrr/V8N1/Gallahue.pdf, JKahn)
If Afghanistan represents an attempt to incorporate the war on drugs‘ into an ongoing armed
conflict, then Colombia moved in the opposite direction . The Colombian government recast its
internal armed conflict (with armed groups who profited from the drug trade) as a war on terror ‘. In fact, Álvaro
Uribe, President from 2002 to 2010, denied the existence of an armed conflict at all in his country, instead
referring to the crisis as a matter of terrorism.82 As the emphasis shifted from armed conflict to terrorism, 83
President Uribe put drug control under the purview of the military and Plan Colombia —a multi-billion dollar
anti-drug aid package from the United States— branched out from counter-narcotics to embrace
counter-terrorism: After the 9/11 attacks the US, for the first time, allowed the Colombian government to use all past and
present counterdrug aid to wage war against the insurgents. Colombian guerrilla groups and paramilitaries alike
were being referred to in the same breath as international terrorist organisations linked to Al
Qaeda.
Demand Inevitable
Demand for drugs is inevitably going to be high and global
Carpenter, 9 vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the
author of eight books, including Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in
Latin America (Ted Galen, “Troubled Neighbor: Mexico’s Drug Violence Poses a Threat to the United States” February 2, 2009
Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/troubled-neighbor-mexicos-drug-violence-poses-threat-unitedstates) // czhang
Drug warriors in both Mexico and the¶ United States repeatedly rationalize unpleasant revelations regarding corruption. For¶
example, when Noé Ramírez was arrested,¶ Thomas Schweich, former deputy assistant¶ secretary of state for international law
enforcement, stated: “I find the whole situation¶ encouraging. If you are a corrupt official, you¶ are no longer immune to prosecution
no matter how high up you are. It shows a lot of political will on the part of Calderón.”¶ 61¶ The bizarre¶ logic that the worse things
get, the better they¶ really are is not confined to the corruption¶ issue; it extends to the surging violence as well.¶ A recent article in
the Economist noted that at¶ least 4,000 people had been murdered in 2008¶ in incidents involving traffickers. “Officials say¶ that is
a sign that government pressure [on the¶ drug gangs] is having an effect.”¶ 62¶ The reality is¶ that bad developments are
usually just bad¶ developments, and they point
to a deteriorating—not an improving—situation.¶ It is not
antidrug initiatives have failed in Colombia and¶ other countries and are
now failing in Mexico.¶ The global trade in illegal drugs is a vast,¶ extremely lucrative enterprise,
surprising that supply-side
estimated at¶ $320 billion a year, with Mexico’s share of that¶ trade generally thought to be about $25–35¶ billion.¶ 63¶ The
United States is the largest single¶ retail market, but U.S. demand is not the only¶ relevant factor.
The American market is actually relatively mature, with overall consumption not substantially different from what it¶ was a decade
or two decades ago. The main¶ areas of demand growth are in Eastern¶ Europe, the successor states of
the former¶ Soviet Union, and some portions of the¶ Middle East and Latin America. According to¶
the United Nations, there has been a noticeable increase in the consumption of opiates¶ throughout Eastern Europe and Central
Asia,¶ especially the former Soviet states. In Western¶ Europe, the principal increase has been in the¶ use of
cocaine.¶ 64¶ In the Middle East, even such¶ a politically authoritarian and religiously conservative society as Iran is
witnessing a surge in¶ both drug trafficking and drug use, especially¶ of heroin. That problem has
reached the point¶ that the Supreme Leader’s representative in¶ one province has labeled drug abuse and trafficking to be the
Iranian society’s “thorniest¶ problem.”¶ 65¶ The bottom line is that the demand for illegal drugs on a global basis
is¶ robust and is likely to remain so.¶
Victory impossible – high consumer demand and empirical proof
Carpenter, 9 vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books, including
Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America (Ted Galen, “Troubled Neighbor: Mexico’s Drug Violence
Poses a Threat to the United States” February 2, 2009 Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/troubledneighbor-mexicos-drug-violence-poses-threat-united-states) // czhang
Robust Consumer Demand Makes¶ Victory Impossible¶ That sobering reality has ominous implications for the
strategy that advocates of a “war¶ on drugs” continue to push. Their strategy has¶ long had two major
components. The first is¶ to shut off the flow of drugs coming from¶ drug-source countries, through
various methods of drug crop eradication, developmental¶ aid to promote alternative economic opportunities, interdiction of drug
shipments, and¶ suppression of money-laundering activities.¶ The second component is to significantly¶ reduce
demand in the United States through a¶ combination of criminal sanctions, drug treatment
programs, and anti-drug educational¶ campaigns.¶ At best, efforts at domestic demand reduction
have achieved only modest results, and¶ the supply-side campaign has been even less¶ effective.
Moreover, with global demand continuing to increase, even if drug warriors succeeded in their goal of more
substantially¶ reducing consumption in the United States, it¶ would have little adverse impact on trafficking¶
organizations. There is more than enough¶ demand globally to attract and sustain traffickers who are
willing to take the risks to satisfy that demand. And since the illegality of the¶ trade creates a huge black market premium¶
(depending on the drug, 90 percent or more of¶ the retail price), the potential profits to drug¶ trafficking
organizations are huge.¶ 66¶ Thus, the¶ supply-side strategy attempts to defy the basic¶ laws of economics, with predictable
results. It¶ is a fatally flawed strategy, and Washington’s¶ insistence on continuing it causes serious¶
problems of corruption and violence for a key¶ drug-source and drug-transiting country such¶ as
Mexico.¶ Thus, the notion that the solution to the¶ violence in Mexico is to win the war on drugs¶ is as much a chimera as the
other two so-called¶ solutions. Given the healthy state of global¶ demand, there
is no prospect of ending—or¶ even
substantially reducing—the trade in illegal drugs. There is only one policy change that¶ would have a meaningful
impact.
Heroin High Now
Columbian heroin production high now --- they dominate the U.S. market
Forero, 3 (Juan, and Tim Weiner, “Latin American Poppy Fields Undermine U.S. Drug Battle,” The New York Times, 6/8/03,
proquest, Tashma)
After steadily expanding its market in recent years, white Colombian heroin now
dominates east of the Mississippi ; brown Mexican heroin rules to the west. The pattern signals an
alliance between Colombian and Mexican traffickers, one American official said.¶ With improving
purity and lower costs has come increasing use. The number of hard-core users in the United States rose to
nearly a million last year, from 600,000 a decade ago, said the Drug Enforcement Administration. In New York
State, 32,000 people were admitted to state-licensed drug treatment centers for heroin addictions last year, up from 29,000 in 1997.
The government's National Household Survey on Drug Abuse also determined that the number of 18- to 25-year-olds who had used
heroin in the last month rose to 67,000 in 2001 from 26,000 in 2000, which some experts say shows more young people are
finding the new, high-power heroin more palatable.¶ A peasant in San Roque, Colombia, harvests
poppies to refine into heroin, a drug that is finding a new class of users in the United States. (Marcelo
Salinas for The New York Times)(pg. 1); An extract from poppy buttons, which are increasingly cultivated in Latin
America from Peru to Mexico, is the basic ingredient for heroin.; In the Colombian province of Tolima,
[Fernay Lugo], 29, harvested poppies for a heroin industry that sends most of its product to the United
States. (Photographs by Marcelo Salinas for The New York Times)(pg. 16)
Myanmar Drugs High
Myanmar’s drug trade is at the highest volume in years
AP, 3/25/13, (Associated Press, published in Indian Express, “Rising drug trade threatens Myanmar's aspirations”,
3/25/2013, Indian Express, Proquest, JKahn)
Deep in the lawless mountains of the Golden Triangle, sloping
fields of illegal poppies have just been scraped dry
for opium . This is the peak season for producing drugs here, and in Myanmar's nascent era of democratic change, the haul has
only gotten bigger. Opium, its derivative heroin and methamphetamines are surging across Myanmar's
borders in quantities that the United Nations and police in neighboring countries say are the highest levels in
years . Two years after replacing a long-ruling military junta, the civilian government is still struggling to get a
foothold in its war against drugs. The trade is centered in a remote, impoverished area where the government has little control and
where ethnic armies have waged civil wars for decades wars financed with drug money. The Associated Press was granted rare access
to Myanmar's drug-producing hub in the vast, jungle-clad mountain region of northeastern Shan state, deep in a cease-fire zone that
was closed to foreigners for decades. It's a land dotted with makeshift methamphetamine labs and tiny, poor villages where
growing opium is the only real industry. The trip was part of a U.N. mission allowed only under armed police escort.
President Thein Sein has signed cease-fire agreements with a patchwork of rebel groups in the region, but the
peace is
extremely fragile and sporadic fighting continues . Cracking down on drug syndicates or arresting poor opium
farmers risks alienating the ethnic groups he is courting for peace talks. "To stop the drug problem, we need peace. And that is what
the government is trying to achieve now,'' said police Col. Myint Thein, head of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse and Control,
which controls the country's drugpolicy. "But that is just one of so many challenges. This is a very difficult task. It will take time.''
Foreign aid that could help combat drugs is just beginning to trickle back into the area, which is rife with corruption. But the
toughest task may be transforming the destitute rural economy, filled with poor farmers who view growing opium
as the best way to provide for their families. Dozens of those farmers live in Thon Min Yar, a village in southern Shan state that is far
in every sense fromMyanmar's postcard-perfect pagodas and colonial relics. So obscure it does not appear on maps, it is an image of
dirt-road squalor and government neglect. Its 73 bamboo huts have no electricity or running water. Its people have no access to
health care, no job prospects, not enough food and no aspirations other than survival. Toddlers and teens get a one-sized-fits-all
education in a one-room schoolhouse. Almost everyone in Thon Min Yar is an opium farmer. My father and my grandfather grew
opium. I have no other way to make money,'' said 28-year-old Peter Ar Loo, a father of two. He does not smoke opium, but
sometimes he envies the life of an addict. They seem more carefree, he said. But he added, "Using opium only benefits one person.
Selling it helps my whole family.'' Opium farmers like Ar Loo are not the people getting rich from the drug trade. They are among the
poorest people in one of the world's least-developed countries. In a good year, Ar Loo makes about $1,000 from an acre-sized field of
poppies. That doesn't include business expenses which he calls ``paying respects'' _ a roughly 15 percent opium tax doled out to
local authorities who turn a blind eye in exchange. Police control the towns, government soldiers patrol the roads and ethnic armies
rule the mountains. All of them get a cut. "We give to the Shan militia, the police and the army,'' Ar Loo said. There is a law that bans
growing opium poppies, but he said no one in his village has ever been arrested. ``We get permission from the local authorities,
explaining that we need to do this to feed our children.'' The government says it wants farmers to grow corn and other legal crops,
but many poppy farmers say the terrible mountain roads mean getting legal crops to market is almost impossible. Opium is
different: The buyers come straight to your fields. Ar Loo's poppy field is a 30-mile trek into the jungle, an inconvenient location he
chose after police launched an anti-narcotics campaign a year ago and warned farmers to switch to legal crops _ or face arrest. "The
farmers are just finding fields deeper in the mountains,'' shrugged Ar War, chief of a nearby community called
Yar Thar Yar, or Beautiful View Village. Pointing at mist-shrouded jungles controlled by ethnic armies, he added, ``It's harder for
police to find them there.'' And even with the campaign, part of the central government's new anti-narcotics effort, police may not be
looking that hard. The payoffs continue. The Golden Triangle is defined by the area where Shan state meets the borders of Thailand
and Laos. It was the world's top opium-growing region for years, but in the 1990s, Afghanistan became the top
producer and drug syndicates here began
focusing more on methamphetamines. Now heroin and
methamphetamines are both on the rise. In Thailand, authorities last year seized a record 82.2 million
methamphetamine tablets, a 66 percent increase from the year before. "These drugs are not produced in Thailand. They are from
Myanmar,'' said Thailand's Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yubumrung, who has vocally called on Myanmar to step up its policing
efforts. `` If Myanmar cooperates, that's the end of the drug story . It's better than it used to be, but still far from
perfect.'' Authorities in Singapore, Laos and elsewhere in Southeast Asia also reported record hauls that the U.N. says are
predominantly from Myanmar. Myanmar's poppy cultivation, meanwhile, has more than doubled since 2006, according
to the U.N. Office on Drugsand Crime. Myanmar produced an estimated 690 tons of opium in 2012, a 17 percent jump from the year
before. No one can say for sure what is driving the overall increase in Myanmar's drug production, but Ar Loo, who doubled his
poppy production last year, said his motivation was inflation. "Food prices are going up. Gasoline is more expensive,'' he said. ``If
the military or police force us to stop immediately, there will be problems. Because people will not have enough to eat.'' Experts offer
other explanations _ notably that cash-strapped ethnic armies are planning for the future. Many rebels are resisting a government
demand to form a joint patrol force with the army by 2015 but need more strength and leverage at the negotiating table. "It's an
uneasy cease-fire, and most of the groups are jostling to be in a better bargaining position,'' said Leik Boonwaat, the UNODC deputy
regional director for East Asia and the Pacific. "In order to be in a better bargaining position, you need money, you need more
soldiers, and the best way to do that is drugs.'' Drugs could also offer traffickers a path to greater riches once trade barriers are lifted.
Thailand's intelligence indicates that the rebel-controlled drug syndicates are planning for when 10 Southeast Asian countries lift
tradebarriers to become a single market in 2015." In 2015, these drug dealers will want to invest in legitimate businesses. So right
now they are trying to boost their capital, and pumping out large amounts of drugs can help them achieve their goal,'' said Narong
Rattananugul, acting head of Thailand's Office of Narcotics Control Board. Most of Myanmar's drugs are trafficked through its
porous 1,100-kilometer (680-mile) border with Thailand. Narong said his country seizes drugs almost daily and added, "The
problem cannot really be solved.'' The drugs that exit the Golden Triangle ripple across all of Asia, which is why
Myanmar is seeking the world's help. "This is not just Myanmar's concern. The whole international community should
cooperate in eliminating the drug problem,'' said Myint Thein, the anti-drug official. ``We cannot afford it alone.''
Foreign funding has been trickling back into the country, now that most sanctions imposed during military rule have been lifted. The
United States just reactivated a poppy yield survey in Shan state that was discontinued in 2004. The European Union and Germany
have contributed $7 million for U.N. anti-drug projects over the next two years. But that is a tiny fraction of the money needed.
Earlier this month, Myanmar sent a high-level delegation to the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs in Vienna for the first time to
highlight the link between drugs, poverty and conflict, and to ask for financial help. In October, Myanmar quietly revised a deadline
the ex-junta set in 1999 to wipe out illicit drugs by 2014. It changed the date to 2019 and set a more realistic target. "Our objective is
to reduce opium poppy cultivation as much as we can.'' said Myint Thein. There is no country where you have zero drugs.'' For years,
soldiers with sickles were sent to destroy poppy crops, which was easy but ineffective. The government now realizes
eradication
doesn't work ,'' said Jason Eligh, the UNODC representative in Myanmar who is leading a U.N. pilot project to help farmers
switch to legal crops. ``The government is starting to understand the value in admitting mistakes and admitting failure. These are
small steps, but this is progress.'' After being unable to access the drug-and-conflict zone for decades, the U.N. agency was allowed to
enter southern Shan state for the first time in January 2012. The breakthrough came a month after the government signed cease-fire
agreements with different factions of the Shan State Army. Convincing farmers to try planting new crops is one of many challenges
ahead, Eligh says. The farmers don't just want to eat. They need to make money,'' he said, adding that the government needs to offer
farmers a path to a better life, with better roads, new schools and health centers and, most of all, peace and security. "A process has
begun. Will a process continue? I don't know,'' said Eligh. "These are groups that have been killing each other for decades. We've
only been talking a few months. I would say this is a fragile relationship.'' Eligh's pilot project has already persuaded some farmers to
switch, but they may end up switching right back. A middle-aged farmer named Awa Wadaa grew opium for 20 years and was
pulling in $3,500 a year in the five-month poppy season when the U.N. offered him a way out. In 2012, he worked year-round
rotating crops of corn, potatoes and sunflowers, and earned just $500. "I don't want to grow poppies. I understand it is illegal and
that drugs hurt our children,'' Awa Wadaa said. But the father of five added that without his poppy-farming income, he can't afford
to keep his children in school. "If I can't find a way to make more money,'' he said, "I will definitely go back to growing poppies.''
NarcoTerror now
Narcoterrorism is at an all time high – thefts of explosives, failed government
attempts
Thompson, 10 writer for Open Democracy, an online magazine discussing the importance of
human rights and democracy (Barnard R. Thompson, “The Mexican Drug War: Is it "Narcoterrorism?"” Aug 17 2010
http://www.opendemocracy.net/barnard-r-thompson/mexican-drug-war-is-it-narcoterrorism) // czhang
While the Mexican government has done all it can to impart an encouraging national image abroad, and to
keep the struggle against drug cartels, organized crime and other perpetrators of violence from being categorized as a
war versus terrorism, said efforts would seem to have gone up in smoke. ¶ This insofar as car bombings by drug
lords, their henchmen or others, like the two that have been committed in recent weeks, are hard to depict as anything less than
terrorism. Especially when coupled with Mexico's broader narcoterrorist violence, mayhem and deaths
that have reached record levels. ¶ Details on the most recent car bombing, which took place in Ciudad Victoria,
Tamaulipas, on August 5, at this writing have yet to be determined or made public, albeit for a police bulletin and news reports that
for the most part included information from the preliminary police report. Yet the explosion that destroyed one vehicle, and
damaged two adjacent patrol cars parked in a state police compound — fortunately with no harm to police or bystanders, is being
ascribed by authorities to a coche-bomba, a car bomb.¶ The July 15 car bombing in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, that shares the border
with El Paso, Texas, was far more publicized and sensationalized, this of course because of where it occurred and due to the fact that
it targeted federal police, killed three people and wounded nine. Plus it was said to be the first car bombing against Mexican security
forces in their fight against drug lords and narcotraffickers.¶ With respect to the car bombing count, the fact is since 1992 there
have been at least five "vehicle born improvised explosive devices" that exploded, three of which
appeared to be part of cartel infighting that unsuccessfully targeted Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada García,
a drug kingpin of the Sinaloa Cartel. The others, one in Chiapas and another in Acapulco, Guerrero, against nearby
quasi-government and military installations, were thought to be by small guerrilla groups for supposed social causes. ¶ Blame for the
July 15, 2010 attack has been attributed to hit men for the Juárez Cartel, with the bomb reportedly triggered by means of a cell
phone. And the explosives are thought to have been Tovex, not C-4 as reported by some.¶ Regarding C-4 plastic explosives,
spokesmen for the office of Mexico's Attorney General were adamant that it was not used. This maybe based on evidence, but too
with a dose of political sensitivity related to the possibility that military-type plastic explosives, those often
associated with terrorist bombings, covert actions and foreign intrigue, were utilized in Mexico.¶
Tovex is a water gel explosive that has replaced dynamite almost entirely in mining, construction, oil seismic exploration, and a
number of other industrial uses. And over the past decade there have been several known thefts of Tovex in Mexico. [1] ¶ Fingers
in most of the theft cases of the aforementioned industrial use explosives have been pointed at so-called
Mexican insurgents, especially those associated with the small Popular Revolutionary Army, the
EPR, and its splinter groups. Said explosives were apparently those used by the EPR in well publicized bombings of
central Mexico's natural gas pipelines in 2007.¶ Writing on the issue in 2007, I reported: "The explosives used, which are apparently
in the hands of EPR associates, were stolen in two known robberies of mining and construction firms, the first in San Luis Potosí in
2003, and the second in Oaxaca in 2006. According to Mexico’s Office of the Attorney General (PGR), approximately 1,900 of the
stolen 'RXL-788 emulsion explosive' devices are in the hands of two EPR splinter groups, the “Comando Jaramillista Morelense 23
de Mayo,” and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (FARP)."[2]¶ Yet with the stolen devices, organized crime and
drug lords too may be — and/or have been — involved. Furthermore, this is to say nothing of other explosives quite
possibly acquired since, by hook or by crook. Any of which may be in use today — and no matter what, in the hearts and minds of
people their use is terrifying.¶ And yes today it is "narcoterrorism."
SE Asia Drugs High
The overall trends suggest production is on the rise
Fuller, 09 (Thomas, New York Times and International Herald Tribune Correspondent for Southeast Asia, “UN reports
Myanmar's output of opium is up”, International Herald Tribune, 2/3/2009, Proquest, JKahn)
Opium poppy cultivation inched up by 3 percent last year in Myanmar, according to a United Nations report
released Monday, the
second consecutive annual increase that appears to signal a reversal of years of
declining opium production in the so-called Golden Triangle. "Containment of the problem is under threat," Gary Lewis,
the representative for East Asia of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, said at a news conference Monday. "Opium prices are
rising in this region," he said. "It's going to be an incentive for farmers to plant more." The Golden Triangle,
the area where the borders of Thailand, Laos and Myanmar meet, once produced two-thirds ofthe world's opium, most of it refined
into heroin. But pressure by the Chinese government to eradicate opium in Myanmar helped lead to steep declines, with a low point
of 21,500 hectares, or 53,000 acres, of poppies planted in Myanmar in 2006. Since then, opium cultivation has bounced back by
around 33 percent, to 28,500 hectares last year. UN officials warn that the global economic crisis may fuel an increase in poppy
production because falling prices for other crops may persuade farmers to switch to opium. Leik Boonwaat, the representative in
Laos for the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, said corn prices had fallen by half over the past year. The price of opium, by contrast,
has increased 26 percent in Laos and 15 percent in Myanmar over the same period. Farmers in the isolated highlands of the
Golden Triangle are also hampered by bad roads and difficulties getting their crops to market. They often find
that small
parcels of opium are easier to carry across the rough terrain. Although opium is still grown in parts of Laos,
Vietnam and Thailand, UN officials say about 94 percent of the region's opium comes from Myanmar. Most of the Golden Triangle
heroin is sold within the region, Boonwaat said, but small amounts also reach the United States and Australia. Recent seizures of
heroin thought to come from the Golden Triangle have been made on the Thai resort island of Phuket in Ho Chi Minh City and
Yangon, Myanmar's commercial capital.
The alarming spread of HIV by heroin users in southern China
several years ago persuaded the authorities to crack down on opium and heroin trafficking. Western
intelligence officials say Chinese spies are active in anti-narcotics operations in Myanmar, especially in northern areas where central
government control is weak. "There's strong collaboration with Chinese intelligence," Boonwaat said. The UN report on opium
poppy cultivation is based on surveys taken from helicopters and on the ground. The United States relies more heavily on satellite
images to calculate opium cultivation, and its reports are sometimes at odds with those of the United Nations. The UN report did not
cover methamphetamine production and distribution, which among some criminal syndicates has displaced opium and heroin in the
region. In Thailand, methamphetamines remain a problem, but longstanding efforts by the royal family to
substitute vegetable, coffee and macadamia nut production for opium have virtually wiped out opium production among the
northern hill tribes. Afghanistan remains the world's premier source of opium, producing more than
90 percent of global supply . Afghan soil is also remarkably more fertile than the rocky, unirrigated opium fields in the
Golden Triangle. The UN estimates in its 2008 report that one hectare of land yielded an average of 14.4 kilograms, or 31.7 pounds,
of opium in Myanmar but 48.8 kilograms in Afghanistan.
Military intervention has restarted drug violence
Hindustan, 07 (The Hindustan Times, an HT Syndacate, Indo-Asian News Service affiliate, “Instability fuels comeback
opium poppies in Myanmar”, The Hindustan Times, 10/11/2007, Proquest, JKahn)
Bangkok, Oct. 11 -- Instability, poor law enforcement and corruption
have paved the way for a 29-percent
jump in opium poppy cultivation in Myanmar this year, UN experts said Thursday. After six years of successive decline
in production, opium cultivation rose this year to 27,700 hectares with yield estimated at 460 tonnes, up 46 percent compared with
2006 figures, according to the 2007 opium poppy survey by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. The lion's share of the illicit crop
was being grown in the southern part of Shan State, which borders Thailand. This year, opium production has increased
in both Myanmar and Thailand, two nations in the so-called Golden Triangle, but it declined 40 percent in
Laos, the triangle's third country, where the international aid community is pouring in money for crop-substitution programmes.
Although the region's total output accounts for a mere five percent of the world's total and is dwarfed by Afghanistan's crop, experts
said they are worried by the upward trend, especially as the increased production is taking place in Myanmar's most unstable region.
"The opium-producing area is focused now in the south Shan State, where sometimes it's hard to know who controls what," said
Shariq Bin Raza, the UN office's Myanmar country official. South Shan State, situated just east of the ruling junta's new capital in
Naypyidaw, 350 km north of Yangon, is a patchwork of armed ethnic groups, many of which have "returned to the government fold"
after signing ceasefires with the junta. "In this particular area, you also have government troops," said Xavier Bouan, the
regional illicit crop-monitoring expert for the UN agency. There have been persistent reports of collusion between
Myanmar's military regime and the crime organizations controlling both the opium and much
larger methamphetamine trade in the country's much-contested northeastern region. "It's a combination of corruption,
law enforcement, border control, ... any weaknesses in those areas that contribute to an increase in opium cultivation," Raza said in
Bangkok. The increase has also been driven by a doubling of opium prices in neighbouring Thailand and Laos, where opiumnow
fetches about 1,000 dollars per kg. Thailand's opium cultivation, although small compared with Myanmar's, shot up 31
percent this year. The increase was blamed primarily on lax law enforcement in the aftermath of the excesses of the "war on drugs"
launched by the previous government of deposed premier Thaksin Shinawatra. As a result of Thaksin's war, which left 2,500 people
dead from extra-judicial slayings, opium cultivation in northern Thailand declined from 800 hectares to less than 100, said Pipop
Chamnirkaipong, director of the narcotics crop survey institute under Thailand's office of narcotics control board. Thaksin was
overthrown by a military coup last year and is now under investigation for human rights abuses committed in his war on drugs. "It
seems the new government doesn't care or doesn't direct its eye on the problem of opium because it is
quite recent," Pipop said. "There are now some teenagers who have gone back to their homes and try to grow opium." He noted that
opium cultivation was occurring mainly in the remote Um Koi district of Chiang Mai in northern Thailand, and a government
eradication programme was already under way in the area.
SE Asia Drugs Low
The Golden Triangle is a thing of the past – Southeast Asia is moving away from
drug cultivation
Fuller, 07 (Thomas, Southeast Asia Correspondent for The New York Times, “No Blowing Smoke: Poppies Fade in Southeast
Asia:”, 9/16/2007, New York Times, Proquest, JKahn)
THE enduring image of Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle is of brightly
colored poppy fields, opium-smoking
heroin labs hidden in the jungle. But the reality is that after years of producing the lion's share of the
world's opium, the Golden Triangle is now only a bit player in the global heroin trade. "The mystique may remain,
hill tribes and
and the geography will be celebrated in the future by novelists," said Antonio Maria Costa, executive director of the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime. "But from our vantage point, we
see a region that is rapidly moving toward an
opium-free status ." The decline of the Golden Triangle is a major , if little noticed, milestone in the
war on drugs. The question now is whether that success can be sustained. Three decades ago, the northernmost reaches of Laos,
Thailand and Myanmar produced more than 70 percent of all the opium sold worldwide, most of which was refined into heroin.
Today the area produces about 5 percent of the world total, says Mr. Costa's agency. What happened? Economic pressure
from China, crackdowns on opium farmers , and a switch by criminal syndicates to methamphetamine production, appear to
have had the biggest impact. At the same time, some insurgent groups that once were financed with drug money
now say they are urging farmers to eradicate their poppy fields.
Shan rebels have cracked down – production is decreasing
Asia News Monitor, 12 (citing Myanmar authorities, “Myanmar (Burma): Myanmar claims progress on fighting drugs”,
7/12/2012, Asia News, Monitor, Proquest, JKahn)
Myanmar authorities on Monday hailed progress in their war on drugs after an unprecedented
multi-million dollar seizure at an narcotics factory in eastern Shan state, the Bangkok Post reports. Suspects lined
up behind drugs and drug making equipment in Laukkai. Police detained nine suspects with 73 kilograms (161 pounds) of
"ice" crystal methamphetamine and 274 kilos of liquid meth along with drug-making equipment and a pistol during a
raid on a house in Laukkai on July 9, state media reported. Officials said the haul was worth an estimated $3.7 million. " It's our
biggest ice seizure in history. It's a part of our crackdown on the chemical ingredients and factories," a senior official at
the home affairs ministry, who did not want to be named, told AFP. Synthetic drug production and poppy
cultivation for opium is prevalent in Myanmar's remote border areas, where armed ethnic minority rebels
have used the profits from narcotics to fund their operations. President Thein Sein's reformist government has signed peace accords
with a number of armed groups as part of sweeping reforms since taking power last year. Myanmar has said it aims to
eradicate illegal drugs by 2014. The country, which is slowly emerging from decades of military rule, is
the world's second-largest opium poppy grower after Afghanistan. Shan state is a major source of methamphetamine tablets,
according to the UN, which estimates that global seizures of amphetamine-type stimulants nearly tripled between between 1998 and
2010, reflecting fast-growing demand. In May the government and Shan rebels together agreed to wipe out drug
production in the vast northeastern state. A drug control official said the recent raid had posed "many difficulties and risks". He
added: "We have no experience like this in the past raiding a factory which produces ice and other stimulants."
Chinese crackdown efforts have been successful
Xinhua News, 04 (the Center for Emerging and Innovative Sciences, Rochester University, “China strives to replace opium
poppies with safe plants”, Xinhua News, 6/26/2004, Proquest, JKahn)
BEIJING, June 26 (Xinhua) -- Planting
rice, sugarcane and rubber is being pushed as a good alternative
to growing opium poppies , and in the Golden Triangle of Myanmar, Thailand and Lao, more and more opium
planters have accepted this new concept proposed by the Chinese government. Replacement
planting is considered a great breakthrough by the United Nations in the anti-drug fight, which has become an
important aspect of China's cooperation with neighboring Asian countries in drug control. China has rooted out opium poppies on
more than 620,000 mu ( over 41,300 ha) in the Golden Triangle and helped local farmers to plant safe commercial crops, said Wang
Qianrong, an official with the drug enforcement department of the Ministry of Public Security. The replacement scheme for the first
time brought the poor farmers in the Golden Triangle stable income and made them capable of feeding themselves, said Wang. Some
farmers who became addicted to the drug while poppy harvesting have started a new life. Even though the Chinese
government has dealt harsh blows to drug taking and trafficking, the number of drug-related crimes is still
on the rise. Latest statistics show the number of drug- taking people has reached 1.05 million in China and 90 percent of the heroin
brought into China came from the Golden Triangle area bordering southwest China. In the 1990s, with support from the central
government, southwest China's Yunnan Province, a major channel of drugs from the Golden Triangle area, began to implement the
Green Drug Prevention Plan by replacing opium poppies with safe plants in major opium planting areas of neighboring countries.
"China teaches local farmers how to plant other crops and provide seedlings," said Wang. The action is aimed to let local
farmers know that they would benefit more from replacement planting than from planting poppies. Yunnan Lubao Industrial
Development Co. Ltd. signed a contract on replacement planting involving 200,000 mu (over 13,300 ha) with Myanmar to help local
farmers plant rice, corn, bananas and lemons and also purchase their products. The output of bananas every mu could reach 2.5 to 3
tons and the farmers could earn 400 to 500 yuan (48-60 US dollars) each mu, said Han Zheng, board director of the company. The
output of lemons each mu could reach 2.5-4 tons and the average income of farmers is above 2,000 yuan (nearly 242 US dollars). By
contrast, opium poppy planting is affected by the market and the income is unstable and unsafe. "The huge profit of drugs is
monopolized by drug traders, and farmers who live on this could not even earn enough for food," said Han. More and more
farmers have turned from opium poppy to safe crops. The area of poppy planting has reduced from more than
100, 000 ha in 2001 to 62,000 ha in 2003. Officials with the United States spoke highly of Yunnan's practice, saying that it
has proved that replacement planting can be very successful and has become a convincing evidence that the
global anti-drug strategy made by the United Nations is effective. China has invested heavily in replacement
planting. It has cost 500 million yuan (60 million US dollars) in Yunnan Province alone. The replacement planting in some regions
is developing towards replacement construction. More investment has gone to improvement of road and traffic, water facilities,
tourism, culture and education, said Zhang Huimin, an official from Yunnan provincial department of public security. "But opium
poppies are still the dominating plant in the Golden Triangle area and the fight against drugs will still take time to win," said Zhang.
Resettlement efforts have disincentivized production
Brunnstrom, 2k (David, Correspondent, EU foreign affairs and NATO for Reuters, “Army moves out opium growers to
beat skeptics: Myanmar committed”, 1/17/2000, National Post, Proquest, JKahn)
WAN HUNG, Myanmar - An ethnic army in Myanmar battling skepticism
about its commitment to
stamp out the narcotics trade says it is relocating 50,000 opium growers to force them to kick
their drug- producing habit. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) said hill farmers and their dependents were being
trucked 160 km south from homes on the Chinese border to an area of Myanmar's Shan state near Thailand to grow longans, a
tropical fruit. Myanmar's military government, which organized a weekend visit for journalists to opium growing areas of Shan state,
said the program, which started in November, showed that the UWSA was serious about its vow to eradicate opium by 2005. "We
intend to move 50,000 people in a three-year period," Kyin Maung Myint, a UWSA liaison officer , told reporters. He said 10,000
had already been moved and the number would rise to 20,000 by March. Officials of the Myanmar government and the UWSA
admitted that not all those being trucked south were happy to go, but said each family would be allocated two hectares to farm. Wan
Hung, where they are being resettled, was once controlled by Khun Sa, a notorious drug lord wanted in the United States for heroin
trafficking who surrendered to the government in 1996. Narcotics experts outside Myanmar say the UWSA, which has 20,000
armed troops and agreed to a ceasefire with Yangon in 1989, has stepped
into Khun Sa's shoes to become the main
producer of opium, heroin and amphetamines in the "Golden Triangle" narcotics region where
Myanmar, Laos and Thailand join. According to the U.S. State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports, the
drug-trafficking armies, such as the UWSA, with whom the government has negotiated ceasefires but not permanent peace accords,
remain heavily into the heroin trade. Myanmar officials said global organizations such as the United Nations should help fund their
initiative to move families. "We have told the people of the Wa area that poppy growing will be banned and they can no longer grow
poppy," said Khin Maung Myint. "Once you have an alternative crop, they have to move down south here," he said. "They have been
persuaded and some we have urged to move, but with some we have to insist." He said about 600 families were arriving in Wan
Hung each day and have built homes in a temporary resettlement area. Colonel Kyaw Thein, of Myanmar's counternarcotics agency, said those being moved were mostly ethnic Wa, but included members of other hill tribes also living in the region,
which is suitable for few crops except opium. Yangon, which rejects allegations by the United States and other
countries that it is doing too little to eradicate drugs, was pleased with the project. "I think it
will result in a very
significant reduction in production," said Kyaw Thein. "It will be a very big achievement." He said Myanmar's estimates
for opium production for the season to April, 1999, were slightly less than U.S. intelligence estimates of just over 1,000 tons. The UN
Drug Control Program estimates 1,200 tons. Ten tons ofopium can be processed into one ton of heroin. Myanmar officials have
complained that U.S. experts blamed overly dry weather for a sharp 38% fall in output last year and insist their eradication efforts
should be given more credit. In an effort to prove their point on Saturday, they flew journalists by helicopter to watch ethnic Lahu
tribes people and soldiers use bamboo sticks to slash down opium poppies. Leaders of the UWSA themselves, who narcotics experts
outside Myanmar say have diversified into mass-production of methamphetamines now flooding into Thailand, said their anti-drug
pledge should be taken at face value and supported financially by the international community.
Generic – Alt Cause
Alt cause to surge in illegal drug trade – struggling economies
Wigglesworth, 13 Gulf correspondent for FT (Robin, “Debt-ridden Caribbean unable to resist drug traffickers”
July 14, 2013 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/260d6b9e-eadf-11e2-bfdb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Z9LXFLZ2) // czhang
The Caribbean is again becoming an increasingly important transit route for drug-trafficking into
the US as South American and Mexican drug cartels take advantage of the region’s economic problems to
re-establish their operations.¶ About 9 per cent of all illegal drugs that entered the US came through the Caribbean last
year, about twice the rate in 2011, William Brownfield, the US assistant secretary of state, estimated last month. ¶ Experts say the
surge in drug smuggling is largely caused by the region’s economic and financial problems, which
has left a power vacuum for drug smugglers to exploit even as Mexico has cracked down on its own cartels and
increased security on the US border.¶ “The trend in recent years is that the Caribbean has re-emerged as a
key drug-trafficking transit route,” said Daniel Sachs, an analyst at Control Risks, a consultancy. “The security
forces in these islands are woefully unprepared to respond to this evolving threat, particularly in the
current debt climate.Ӧ Many Caribbean countries are struggling under large and swelling debt
burdens, deep budget deficits and anaemic economic growth, forcing several to default in recent years. As a result,
governments have slashed budgets, causing unemployment and crime to rise.¶ International drug cartels
have either set up their own operations in the Caribbean or paid local gangs to support them. This has
triggered a rise in violent crime, as guns and drugs flow into countries ill-equipped to deal with hardened gangs and
cartels.¶ “It’s a very big problem,” said Sir Ronald Sanders, a former diplomat from Antigua and Barbuda and commentator on the
region.¶ The Caribbean was an important transit route for South American drug traffickers in the 1980s and 1990s, but security
improvements, more maritime patrols and better radars shifted smuggling to Central America and Mexico. That trend is reversing.¶
Central America remains the main transit route for drugs going to the US, but Trinidad and Tobago, Puerto Rico and even some
small statelets such as St Kitts and Nevis have become important transshipment points.¶ Mr Sachs compares it to a “balloon
effect” where a squeeze on drug smuggling in Mexico has led to a swelling problem in the
Caribbean. “Essentially, cartels are forever probing for weaknesses and evolving with the times,” he said.¶ Government
efforts to clamp down have been dramatic but ineffective. A surge in violent crime in 2011 spurred Trinidad and Tobago to
declare a state of emergency, but it only led to a temporary decline.¶ Under US pressure, Jamaica launched a bloody military
operation against drug lord Christopher “Dudus” Coke in 2010, arresting and extraditing him to the US, but the local murder rate
has kept increasing.¶ “Governments are incapable and unwilling to tackle the root causes of the
problem – lack of job opportunities, socio-economic inequalities and so on,” Mr Sachs said. “Because
of the debt situation, even if they wanted to do something, they couldn’t.”
Mex - US Coop Now
Mexico-US cooperation over the “war on drugs” in the status quo
Astorga and Shirk, 10 (Luis Astorga is a researcher at the Institute of Social Research at the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM). He is also coordinator of the UNESCO Chair on Economic and Social Transformations Connected
with the International Drug Problem; David A. Shirk, PhD, joined the University of San Diego in July 2003. Shirk’s teaching covers
a wide range of subject areas, mainly concentrated in comparative politics, international political economy, Latin American studies,
and U.S.-Latin American relations, with a concentration in Mexico and border politics. He conducts research on Mexican politics,
U.S.-Mexican relations, and law enforcement and security along the U.S.-Mexican border. Shirk also directs the Trans-Border
Institute, which works to promote greater analysis and understanding of Mexico, U.S.-Mexico relations, and the U.S.-Mexico border
region; 1/1/10; “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context”;
http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/024/11632.pdf) KD
In recent years, however, Mexico and the United States have engaged in much closer collaboration
in counter-drug efforts. Cooperation has advanced significantly on the extradition of criminals,
exchange of information, police and legal training, and the sharing of equipment and
technology, thanks in large part to high-level diplomacy. During U.S. President George Bush’s 2007 goodwill
tour of Latin America, conversations with Guatemalan President Oscar Berguer and Felipe Calderón laid the groundwork for
the development of a regional security plan to control immigration and combat drugs, arms
trafficking, and transnational gangs.55 Some elements of this plan developed into what became known as the
Mérida Initiative, a three-year agreement to provide U.S. support for Mexican security
measures. In 2008, the U.S. Congress released the first installment of $400 million to Mexico, and though U.S. legislators
initially delayed the second installment in 2009 due to concerns about Mexican human rights violations, the Obama administration
remained supportive of the policy.
Mex – Drugs Low
Capture of the head of the Zetas – the most terrifying cartel – is the first step of
Nieto’s plan to reduce drug trafficking
AP, 13 (“US federal official: Top leader of Mexico’s brutal Zetas drug cartel captured” Associated Press, Monday, July 15
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-federal-official-leader-of-mexicos-zetas-drug-cartelcaptured/2013/07/15/85376a4c-edab-11e2-bb32-725c8351a69e_story.html) // czhang
MEXICO CITY — Miguel Angel Trevino Morales, the notoriously brutal leader of the feared Zetas drug cartel, has
been captured in the first major blow against an organized crime leader by a Mexican
administration struggling to drive down persistently high levels of violence, a U.S. federal official
confirmed.¶ Trevino Morales, known as “Z-40,” was captured by Mexican Marines in Nuevo Laredo, the Mexican
media reported. The U.S. official who confirmed the media reports was not authorized to speak to the press and asked not to be
identified.¶ Trevino’s capture removes the leader of a corps of special forces defectors who
splintered off into their own cartel and spread across Mexico, expanding from drug dealing into
extortion and human trafficking.¶ Along the way, the Zetas authored some of the worst atrocities of
Mexico’s drug war, slaughtering dozens, leaving their bodies on display and gaining a reputation as perhaps the
most terrifying of the country’s numerous ruthless cartels.¶ The capture of Trevino Morales is a
public-relations victory for President Enrique Pena Nieto, who came into office promising to drive down levels of
homicide, extortion and kidnapping but has struggled to make a credible dent in crime figures.
Mexico is no longer the global hotspot for drugs – Honduras and Central America
Tico Times, 12 Central America's leading English-language news source (“Central America replaces
Mexico as front line for drug trafficking, UN says” http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-Briefs/Central-America-replacesMexico-as-front-line-for-drug-trafficking-UN-says_Sunday-September-30-2012 Tico Times) // czhang
Central America is replacing Mexico as the top front for drug trafficking from South America to
the United States. The change is inciting an increase in regional violence, according to a report by the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime.¶ "The implementation of the Mexican security strategy (beginning in 2006)
increased the importance of Central American links (with the traffickers) that had begun many
years ago," said the study released last week. The study cites an increase of direct major drug shipments from Central¶
America to the United States and a decrease in shipments from Mexico to the United States. ¶ Drug trafficking
has undoubtedly contributed to the increase of violence in Central America, which has reached "extreme" levels, the study said.¶
However it notes that gangs or "maras" remain a major cause of violent deaths in urban parts of the region.¶ Honduras
maintains the highest homicide rate in the world with 92 killed per 100,000 in 2011. El Salvador has
a homicide rate of 69 per 100,000 citizens and Guatemala has a rate of 39 murders per 100,000. Costa Rica has the lowest homicide
rate on the isthmus with 10.3 murders per 100,000. For comparison, the United States homicide rate was 4.2 per 100,000 in 2010,
according to the most recent statistics.¶ According to the UNODC, Central American countries play a key role in the transit of
cocaine from South America, but "Honduras is now the most popular entry point for cocaine." ¶
"Approximately 65 of the 80 tons transported by air toward the United States lands in Honduras,"
where authorities found 62 secret airstrips between February and March 2012.¶ The activity of drug trafficking in that country
increased "dramatically" after the 2009 coup against former President Manuel Zelaya, as "law enforcement fell into disarray,
resources were diverted to maintaining order, and counternarcotics assistance from the United States was suspended," the report
adds.¶ The Mexican drug cartel Los Zetas has expanded its presence into Guatemala, by operating in local cells made up
of ex-members of elite military corps.¶ "It is said that Los Zetas traveled
to Guatemala and created a local faction around
2008. Since then, the group has played a prominent role in the violence in that country," the UNODC
report said.¶ In 2010, 330 tons of cocaine entered Guatemala for the United States, according to official U.S. figures cited in the
report.¶ As for El Salvador, authorities say minimal cocaine passes through the country, which is confirmed by "radar data
suggesting very few shipments go directly from South America to El Salvador."¶ However, the official figures could be
underestimating the size of the cocaine flow, the report added.¶ Drug trafficking from Costa Rica, Nicaragua and
Panama, while still minor compared to Honduras or Guatemala, also has increased "significantly" in the past
years, the document said.
Mex – Drugs High
Mexican drug abuse is soaring
Villagran, 13 correspondent for CS Monitor (Laura, Jan 25, 2013, “As Mexico's traffickers ship drugs north, they
leave addicts in their wake” http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0125/As-Mexico-s-traffickers-ship-drugs-norththey-leave-addicts-in-their-wake) // czhang
Exponential growth in the trafficking of drugs through Mexico – destined for the large consumer market to
the north – is
leaving a growing number of addicts in its wake.¶ Heroin, crack cocaine, and methamphetamines
the top supplier of illegal
drugs to the US has made Mexico a consumer nation, too, as cartels have sought to expand the
local market over the past decade.¶ Illegal drug use in Mexico – still well below levels in the United States –
rose 87 percent between 2002 and 2011, according to the latest national survey of addictions. In the survey, 1.5
were once unheard of in Mexico, but today rehabilitation centers are filled with addicts. Being
percent of respondents reported having consumed illegal substances in the previous year, compared with 0.8 percent in 2002. And
drug rehabilitation professionals caution that higher levels of use may exist, given that the data is self-
reported. They also note that an alarming increase in drug use among women and adolescents between 2002 and 2008 has
persisted, although the survey suggests overall illegal drug use has plateaued since 2008. “The reality is that … in the organizations
and institutions that work directly with this population, we see that [addiction] is on the rise, and that the adolescents who come
here are younger and younger,” says Blanca Ferreyra, who coordinates addiction treatments at the Love Life Foundation, a Mexico
City nonprofit. “By 14 years old, they’ve got a two- or three-year-old addiction.”¶
At: Crime Rates Prove
Crime rate does not correlate with illegal drug trade – no incentive for violence but
still high rates
Flannery, 13 writer for Forbes Magazine, about Latin American companies and political risk
(Nathaniel Parish, “Investor Insight: Is Mexico's Drug War Doomed To Failure? 6/24/13
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/2013/06/24/investor-insight-is-mexicos-drugwar-doomed-to-failure/) //
czhang
Overall, crime rates have fallen even though the retail market for drugs such as marijuana,
amphetamines, and cocaine continues to function. Local authorities appear to tolerate the presence
of drug dealers in certain areas as long as they stay out of the protected neighborhoods and avoid violence. In fact,
according to Guerrero, one of the reasons for the relatively low level of violence in Mexico City, “is the high competition in
the drug sale market.” The retail market for drugs in Mexico City is highly atomized—a collection of
individuals rather than an oligopoly controlled by a few organized crime groups. Small-time operators have little
incentive to use violence in order to gain an additional sliver of the market. Unlike in cities in other parts
of the country where cartels are fighting viciously to gain control of lucrative smuggling routes, at least until the start of 2013,
Mexico City’s retail drug market has functioned with a comparatively low amount of violence. In
2013 Mexico City has experienced a slight jump in violent crime, but the overall pattern of effective policing remains the same.
Ven – Drugs High
Venezuela is a growing site for drug trafficking to the US, Europe, and West Africa
State Department, 10 (“Venezuela,” International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, U.S. Department of State, 2010,
Academic OneFile)//BI
I. Summary Venezuela
is a major drug-transit country; flows of drugs to the United States, Europe and
West Africa via Venezuela increased sharply in 2009. Venezuela continues to suffer from high levels of corruption
and a weak judicial system. Inconsistent international counternarcotics cooperation and an increase in
trafficking patterns through Venezuela enable a growing illicit drug transshipment industry.
Venezuela has not signed the addendum to the 1978 U.S.-Government of Venezuela (GOV) Bilateral Counternarcotics Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) that was negotiated in 2005. Nevertheless, Venezuela continues some minimal bilateral counternarcotics
cooperation with the United States. The decision by the United States and the GOV to exchange ambassadors in July 2009, following
the September 2008 expulsion of the U.S. Ambassador from Venezuela, presents an opportunity to improve bilateral cooperation on
counternarcotics and other issues that have been hindered by continuing tensions in the bilateral relationship. The President
determined in 2009, as in 2008, 2007, 2006, and 2005, that Venezuela failed demonstrably to adhere to its
obligations under international counternarcotics agreements. Venezuela is a party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention. II. Status of Country A permissive and corrupt environment in Venezuela, coupled with increased
drug interdiction efforts in the Caribbean, Central America and Mexico, has made Venezuela one of the preferred
routes for trafficking illicit narcotics out of South America. While the majority of narcotics transiting Venezuela
move directly to the United States and Europe, a growing portion also flows through western Africa and then
onwards to Europe. The trafficking of drugs has increased the level of corruption, crime, and violence in
Venezuela.
Despite government claims, Venezuela remains a major transit point in the illegal
drug trade
Neuman, 12 – Andes region correspondent for the New York Times (William, “Cocaine’s Flow Is Unchecked in Venezuela,”
New York Times, 26 July 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/27/world/americas/venezuela-is-cocaine-hub-despite-itsclaims.html?pagewanted=all)//BI
The Venezuelan government has trumpeted one major blow after another against drug traffickers,
showing off barrels of liquid cocaine seized, drug planes recovered, cocaine labs raided and airstrips destroyed. But
a visit this
a remote region of Venezuela’s vast western plains, which a Colombian guerrilla group
has turned into one of the world’s busiest transit hubs for the movement of cocaine to the United States,
has shown that the government’s triumphant claims are vastly overstated. Deep in the broad savanna, one
remote airstrip the government said it had disabled in a recent army raid appeared to be back in
business. The remains of two small aircraft set on fire by the army had been cleared away. Traffickers working with the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, which operates with surprising latitude on this side of the border,
month to
appeared to have reclaimed the strip to continue their secret drug flights shuttling Colombian cocaine toward users in the United
States. There were no signs that soldiers had blasted holes in the runway or taken other steps to prevent it from being used again.
For years, the United States has been working with friendly governments in Colombia, Mexico, Honduras,
Guatemala and other countries in Latin
America, spending billions of dollars to disrupt the flow of drugs
northward. But because of antagonistic relations with President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, the reach of
American drug agents, and the aid that comes with them, does not extend here. “Our airspace has been taken over,” said Luis Lippa,
a former governor of Apure State who plans to run again as an opposition candidate in elections in December. Referring to the grip
of traffickers on the border region, he said, “Our national territory has been reduced.” A map of flight tracks made by a United States
government task force using data from long-range radar makes the point vividly: a thick tangle of squiggly lines, representing drug
flights, originates in Apure, on Venezuela’s border with Colombia; heads north to the Caribbean; and then takes a sharp left toward
Central America. From there, the drugs are moved north by Mexico’s well-established traffickers. President Obama signed a
memorandum in September that designated Venezuela, for the seventh time, as a country that failed to
meet international obligations to fight drug trafficking. He cited a federal report that concluded that
the country was “one of the preferred trafficking routes out of South America” and had a “generally
permissive and corrupt environment.” Venezuela says that it is caught in the middle — Colombia produces the drugs and the United
States consumes them — and that it is doing all it can to fight back. In May, the government announced that the number of illicit
flights it detected had been cut in half this year, although it declined to provide data to back up the claim. “We are hitting drug
trafficking hard all the time,” said Ramón Carrizalez, the governor of Apure, the border state where the drug flights originate,
speaking in May at a news conference to announce the destruction of 36 hidden airfields. “Very few countries are carrying out a
policy like ours.” But the United States says Venezuela’s efforts are deeply hobbled by corruption,
particularly by ties between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as the
FARC, which controls much of the cocaine traffic in the region. Since 2008, the Treasury Department has
accused at least seven high-level military officers and current and former officials in Mr. Chávez’s government of aiding the FARC,
and sometimes exchanging weapons for drugs. Defense Minister Henry Rangel Silva was one of those singled out by Treasury
officials. Venezuela dismissed the accusations as imperialist meddling. The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy
estimates that as much as 24 percent of the cocaine shipped out of South America in 2010 passed
through Venezuela, accounting for more than 200 tons. More than half of that left from the hidden airfields in Apure,
analysts say. They say that Venezuela’s central role as a transit point for drug shipments began after Mr. Chávez halted cooperation
with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration in 2005, accusing its agents of spying. Around the same time, Colombia,
with assistance from the United States, began to tighten control of its airspace. As a result, the traffickers jumped across the border
to Apure, where an airstrip can be fashioned on the flat prairie in a few hours by dragging a log behind a pickup truck to smooth the
ground. “You can blow up an airfield here and it doesn’t matter,” said one resident, standing beside an eight-foot-deep hole that
soldiers had blown in a runway near the Cinaruco River, the plains stretching out for miles. “They can make another one right next
to it.” But perhaps the main attraction for traffickers is that the federal government’s hold on large
parts of Apure, the poorest state in the country, is
tentative at best.
Ven – Drugs Low
Venezuela is improving anti-drug trafficking efforts
AVN, 13 – Agencia Venezolana de Noticias, a Venezuelan state-run news agency (“Over 25 Tons of Drugs Seized by Venezuela in
2013,” Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 27 June 2013, http://venezuela-us.org/2013/06/27/over-25-tons-of-drugsseized-by-venezuela-in-2013)//BI
The president of Venezuela’s National Anti-Drug Office (ONA), Alejandro Keleris, announced Wednesday
that a total of 25.168
metric tons of illegal drugs have been seized by authorities so far this year,
is seven tons more than during the same period in 2012, Keleris said
Wednesday in a live broadcast on Venezolana de Televisión. He also indicated that 4,470 arrests have been made so far
this year involving drug trafficking. “This shows that we have achieved cohesion among all
institutions through the Anti-Drug Plan and activated the social intelligence that also helps us in
combating the illicit trafficking and consumption of drugs,” he said. Keleris noted that average annual drug
seizures up until 2004 was 34.9 tons. However, after the suspension in 2005 of the agreement between
Venezuela and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the rate of seizures increased to over 57 tons
per year. “This means that the public policies of the Bolivarian Government have yielded positive results,” he said. He explained
that this year through the Strategic Operational Command (CEO), 21 illicit laboratories and 17 airstrips have
been destroyed, which were used to psychotropic substances trafficking. Similarly, since 2006, Venezuela
mostly cocaine and marijuana. This
has captured 102 drug traffickers who were sought Interpol and extradited them to other countries. National Anti-Drug Plan 20132019 During the interview, Keleris also referred to the National Anti-Drug Plan for 2013-2019. He said that it is still
being developed through popular consultations held throughout the country and that the final product should be
ready in late July. “We went through a number of phases since October 2012 and are now in the final phase, which is collecting input
from people and integrating it into the National Plan, which will fulfill the instructions given by President Hugo Chávez regarding
shared responsibility,” he said. Keleris highlighted the good results of the first National Anti-Drug Plan for 2009-2013 from the
point of view of comprehensive drug prevention through the National Addiction Care and Family Guidance Centers (COF), which
currently has 36 offices. “Venezuela is one of the few countries in Latin America that has a free drug
addiction treatment center. We have 36 COFs, 10 Specialized Centers for Prevention and Comprehensive Care, as well as
therapeutic centers,” he said.
Venezuela recently launched surveillance drones to combat drug trafficking
AP, 13 – Associated Press (“Venezuela launches drones to fight drug smuggling,” News Daily, 30 May 2013,
http://www.newsdaily.com/article/cf3663533e05b4b1c230552378d8c82a/venezuela-launches-drones-to-fight-drugsmuggling)//BI
Venezuela's government has launched three surveillance drones equipped with small cameras as
part of
an initiative to curb drug trafficking. President Nicolas Maduro says the drones were built with help from Iran
and will be used to monitor Venezuela's borders. Venezuela is a major drug trafficking hub . During a
speech on state television Thursday, Maduro said the drones also will be used to help fight crime, which is one
of the country's most pressing domestic problems.
Venezuela is actively combatting the drug trade – empirics prove they are more
successful without US involvement
Suggett, 10 – Melman Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, graduate of the University of Southern California – San Diego,
lived and worked in Venezuela since August 2005, when he was a delegate at the World Festival of Youth and Students in Caracas
(James, “Venezuela Deports Two Drug Kingpins, Calls US Drug Blacklist “‘Abusive and Interventionist,’” venezuelaanalysis.com, 21
September 2010, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/5651)//BI
In the days following the release of a White House memorandum that placed Venezuela on a list
of illicit drug transit and producing countries, Venezuela deported two suspected drug traffickers,
confiscated 3,260 kilograms of illegal drugs, and seized four airplanes used for drug trafficking. Venezuela’s National
Anti-Drugs Office (ONA) and Penal, Criminal, and Scientific Investigative Unit (CICPC) worked in a
team to capture Jaime Alberto “Beto” Marín, the chief of the Colombian Norte del Valle cartel, and Omar
Guzmán Martínez, a Dominican cocaine trafficking suspect, on September 16th and August 25th, respectively. In a
nationally televised event, Venezuelan authorities escorted the two men to an airplane in Caracas to be deported to the US. Both
suspects were wanted by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Minister for Justice and the Interior Tarek El
Aissami said the US government had offered $5 million for information leading to Marín’s arrest. Meanwhile, in
separate
operations, the ONA and the CICPC seized four airplanes that had been altered to avoid tracking
and were being used for international drug operations from a clandestine location in Portuguesa state. The National Guard
also confiscated 2.7 metric tons of marijuana and 600 kilograms of cocaine that were being transported
through Venezuela from Colombia. The deportations and confiscations all occurred since the release last Wednesday of a White
House memorandum that designated Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela as “major
illicit drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries for the fiscal year 2011.” “A country’s presence on the Majors List is not
necessarily an adverse reflection of its government’s counternarcotics efforts or level of cooperation with the United States,” the
memorandum said, citing “geographic, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to transit or be produced despite the
concerned government’s most assiduous enforcement measures.” The memorandum highlighted the anti-drug
efforts of governments that collaborate with the US and allow a US military presence in their
territory, including Afghanistan, Mexico, and Colombia. It designated Bolivia and Venezuela, countries which
oppose the US’s free trade polices and its military presence in Latin America, “as countries that
have failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to adhere to their obligations under international
counternarcotics agreements.” Venezuelan authorities have confiscated a total of 46.7 metric tons of illegal
drugs, seized 30 airplanes used for drug trafficking, and arrested 16 drug traffickers wanted by INTERPOL so
far this year, according to the ONA. Justice Minister Tarek El-Aissami said Venezuela’s record of anti-drug efforts
contradict the memorandum, which he called “abusive and interventionist.” He accused the US government of using such
reports as diplomatic attacks against countries that do not adhere to Washington-approved policies. “In an irresponsible, arbitrary
and unilateral way, the Government of the United States tries to set itself up as the judge of other countries’ policies on drug
trafficking,” El Aissami said. “We do not accept blackmails or pressures from any empire,” he added. President Hugo Chavez
suggested the timing of the memorandum, which was released a week and a half before Venezuela’s National Assembly elections,
had the purpose of swaying voter opinion against Chavez’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela. The US’s reports presented
Venezuela’s anti-drug efforts in a positive light during the early years of the Chavez administration, when
Venezuela was collaborating with the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). But since Venezuela severed
ties with the DEA in 2005 on suspicion that the agency was spying, the US government has repeatedly classified
the Venezuelan government’s anti-drug program as a failure. Venezuela, however, says its anti-drug
efforts have improved since breaking ties with the DEA. According to ONA statistics, between the years 2002 and
2005, when Venezuela was collaborating with the DEA, a total of 6,836 people were arrested on
drug-related charges and 202,562 kilograms of illegal drugs were interdicted; between the years 2006
and 2009, after Venezuela severed ties with the DEA, a total of 22,833 people were arrested on drug-related
charges and 233,326 kilograms of illegal drugs were interdicted. The government also reported the
destruction of dozens of drug laboratories and hundreds of clandestine airplane landing strips as well as
the setup of security checkpoints in major airports since 2006. Last year, the ONA launched a national program to
prevent drug consumption by programming educational and recreational activities with local communities, and launched
a program to assist business owners in avoiding the diversion of chemical substances into the hands of drug producers. Despite
having severed ties with the DEA, Venezuela has endorsed more than 52 anti-drug cooperation
agreements with 38 countries.
Cuba – Drugs Low
Cuba will not become a hotspot for drugs – multiple reasons
Ramsey, 12 writer at Insight Crime, Research analysis and investigations on organized crime in Latin America and the
Caribbean (Geoffrey, 2/2/12 “Drug Fight Builds US-Cuba Bridges” http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/drug-fight-buildsus-cuba-bridges) // czhang
Ultimately, it should be noted that the amount of drugs that pass through Cuba on their way to
the United States pales in comparison to the country’s Caribbean neighbors, such as Jamaica
and the Dominican Republic. For one thing, the 50-year-old embargo makes it very difficult for
drug smugglers to bring their product into the US. Additionally, drug trafficking is one of the
rare issues in which Cuban and American officials cooperate. As InSight Crime has reported, the
US Interests Section in Havana has a Coast Guard representative in Havana, and leaked
diplomatic cables reveal a level of engagement between the official and his counterparts in the
Cuban Ministry of Interior (MININT) on the issue of drug flights from Jamaica.
This cooperation seems to be having an effect on US-Cuba relations, at least as they relate to
crime. While State Department officials under President Ronald Reagan publicly accused Fidel
Castro of attempting to traffic drugs in order to boost the Cuban economy, the State
Department’s 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) acknowledges that
the Cuban authorities have made major inroads against the drug trade. In a rare note of praise
for the Castro government, it notes that “Cuba’s counternarcotics efforts have prevented illegal
narcotics trafficking from having a significant impact on the island.”
Cuban drug cooperation is unnecessary – status quo governments solve
BBC, 12 (Sarah Rainsford, BBC correspondent in Havanah, “Cuba and US find common ground
in war on drugs”, 9/8/2012, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19528416,
JKahn))
Cuba sits right between the world's major narcotics producers in South America and the biggest
market for those drugs, the United States. The island has served as a bridge for traffickers in the past but
in recent years it has been a barrier to the illegal trade. "We used to see a lot of suspicious boats here," Ardoldo
Cisneros Pena recalls of the 1990s. He is chief border guard in Cayo Cruz, where we were recently given rare access. "There were
almost daily drops into the sea," he says. Small planes would bombard Cuban waters with packets of drugs, for speedboats to whisk
to the US. Today, the scene is tranquil. A young border guard scans the horizon from a mint-green watchtower. A stone slab below
reads "They shall not pass!" and "Viva Fidel!". 'Mortal venom' It was Fidel Castro, then president, who acknowledged a surge in the
use of Cuban waters by drug-traffickers in 1999. There was a nascent narcotics market too, as smugglers' packages began washing up
on the coast. The government was compelled to act against what Mr Castro calls a "mortal venom". "We have
more resources now, there is a helicopter for the border guards and more commitment from the interior ministry, the military and
the Cuban people too," Lt-Col Cisneros explains. Operation Ache, as the crackdown was known, also installed a new
radar and recruited hundreds of unpaid "collaborators", trained to keep their eyes peeled for suspicious parcels along the
shore. The drugs planes have now gone and the main threat today is from speed-boat smugglers attempting
to traffic marijuana north. "They try to escape us but if they can't, they try to dump the drugs because they know this activity is very
heavily penalised here," explains Lt-Col Mago Llanez Fernandez, who heads the team responsible for intercepting the smugglers at
sea. He admits that up to 60% get away. Securing any abandoned narcotics is the priority here. But as the boats flee, Cuba
now passes real-time data to the US coastguard so they can pick up the pursuit. It is rare teamwork for
two old, ideological enemies. "I think this is important for Cuba, because we're preventing the drugs reaching here, but it's also very
important for the US and other countries in the area," Lt-Col Llanez points out. With its very heavily policed society, it is no surprise
Communist Cuba is not a big drugs market itself. Scarce supply means even a joint of marijuana can cost up to a week's wage ($5)
for a state worker. But some smugglers have begun to see potential here. "We've seen a rise in attempts by Cuban Americans to bring
drugs in, especially marijuana, because the prices are high here," says police investigator Yoandrys Gonzalez Garcia. "It's not a huge
amount but it concerns us and we're increasing our efforts to fight this." 'Effective' Between January and June this year, 24 attempts
to traffic narcotics through the island's airports were foiled, and these figures put Cuba on course to double the interdiction rates of
2010 and 2011. The drugs were mostly destined for sale in Cuba. Police point to a surge in air traffic with the US since President
Barack Obama removed travel restrictions for Cuban-Americans. Lifting limits on remittances has also given some Cubans on the
island greater spending power. But the US is not the only smuggling source. Boris Adolfo Busto was arrested at Havana airport for
drug-trafficking. His group was bringing in drug "mules" from Ecuador, with up to a kilo of cocaine in their stomachs. "There was a
Cuban guy involved and he said he could sell everything here, he said it'd be easy," Busto recalls when we meet at Havana's Condesa
prison. He is serving a 23-year sentence. "I think the authorities are very efficient," he says forlornly, adding that "dozens and
dozens" of other smugglers have since joined him behind bars. Cuba has called for a formal co-operation agreement with the US to
help stamp out smuggling in both directions. It already shares intelligence with European governments, and receives funding and
training. "Our communication at sea gets good results but sadly we can't say the same about air traffic," Mr Gonzalez police
investigator complains of the Americans. The US and Cuba severed diplomatic ties more than five decades ago. But officials on the
ground acknowledge Cuba's contribution to the common war on drugs. "[Without] a strong counter-drug stance,
Cuba would be a prime area for drug smugglers, but its efforts are very effective ," says Louis Orsini of the US
coastguard, adding that the US would find it "really challenging" if Cuba became a direct conduit for illicit narcotics. Today, though,
the policy is zero tolerance and the interior ministry says nine tonnes of drugs were seized from traffickers last year and incinerated.
Most were destined for the US market and beyond.
Cuba’s a regional leader in the war on drugs – accusations of trafficking are
unfounded
Amuchastegui, 12 – graduate of the University of Havana, Florida International University, and the University of Miami,
chief analyst in the field of Cuba's foreign policy for CubaNews since 1994, citing the State Department’s 2012 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) (Domingo, “Is Castro's Cuba a budding narcostate? U.S. officials clearly suggest
otherwise,” CubaNews, April 2012, Informe)//BI
For years, certain Cuban-American lawmakers, so-called "sources" in Miami and officials of
Florida's judicial system have repeatedly accused the Cuban government and its leaders of being
involved in drug trafficking. It didn't matter that Cuba's highest-ranking defector, Brig. Gen. Rafael del Pino, denied
it. Nor did it matter when top officials of the Drug Enforcement Administration, including Gen. Barry
McCaffrey, spoke favorably of Cuba's cooperation with the DEA over the years. And it didn't matter that
key officials at Interpol have praised Cuba's efforts at drug interdiction. The fabrication keeps
getting repeated. More recently, during a Feb. 1 hearing of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Sen. Dianne
Feinstein singled out Cuba as a potential Caribbean drug smuggling leader. "I would be remiss not to
mention Cuba," declared the Democrat from California. "Just 90 miles from Florida, Cuba has the potential to be a major
transshipment point for illicit drugs." Evidence? None. Primary or secondary sources to support this assertion?
None at all. Imagination? A great deal of it. A few days later, University of Nebraska political science professor
Jonathan C. Benjamin-Alvarado questioned Feinstein's statement. "It's really irresponsible for her to say that," he said. "It sets in
motion that the Cuban government is doing nothing, which is absolutely not true, and it insinuates that it is descending into some
sort of narcostate." A U.S. senator lying? Impossible. But perhaps this professor is a leftist or a Castro sympathizer, as some folks in
Miami might suggest. Look then at the U.S. government's most recent assessment: the 2012 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), submitted by the State Department. Recognition and praise for
Cuba's policies against illicit drugs and trafficking can be found in every single paragraph of the
466-page report's three pages devoted to Cuba. "Bilateral interdiction efforts and GOC [Government of Cuba]
intensive police presence on the ground have limited the opportunities in or around Cuba for
regional traffickers," it says. "Cuba's domestic drug production remains negligible. Its counternarcotics
efforts have prevented illegal narcotics traffickers from having a significant impact on the island." According to the report, in 2011
the Cuban government interdicted 9.01 metric tons of illegal narcotics, including 8.3 metric tons in "wash-up events." That's a 360%
increase from the previous year's 2.5 metric tons. In addition, government anti-drug forces reported disrupting three smuggling
events and captured six traffickers (three from the Bahamas and three from Jamaica). Statistics on arrests or prosecutions were not
made available, but by the U.S. government's own admission, last year Cuba reported 45 real-time reports of "go-fast" narcotics
trafficking events to the U.S. Coast Guard. It said the Cuban border guard's email and phone notifications of
maritime smuggling to the United States "have increased in quantity and quality, and have
occasionally included photographs of the vessels suspected of narcotrafficking while being pursued." INCSR PRAISES 'CONTINUED
COOPERATION' To combat the limited domestic production of marijuana, says the INCSR, Cuba set up
Operation Popular Shield in 2003. Efforts to prevent any domestic development of narcotics consumption remained in
effect and in 2011 and netted 9,830 marijuana plants and 1.5 kg of cocaine, compared to 9,000 marijuana plants and 26 kg of
cocaine in 2010. Elsewhere, the INCSR asserts that "Cuba continues to demonstrate commitment to fulfilling
its responsibilities as a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention [and all previous agreements in this field]."
Furthermore, it says, the Cuban government "continues to exhibit counternarcotics cooperation with
partner nations" such as the U.S., Mexico, Jamaica and the Bahamas. In addition, the INCSR notes that "the Cuban
government presented the United States with a draft bilateral accord for continued cooperation, which is still under review." It
concludes with the following paragraphs: "Cuba continues to dedicate significant resources to preventing
illegal drugs and illegal drug use from spreading on the island, so far successfully. The technical skill of
Cuba's Border Guard, Armed Forces and police give Cuba a marked advantage against drug
trafficking organizations attempting to gain access to the Caribbean's largest island in both size and population. "Greater
communication and cooperation among the U.S., its international partners and Cuba, particularly in
the area of real-time tactical information-sharing and improved tactics, techniques and procedures," says the INCSR, "would likely
lead to increased interdictions and disruptions of illegal trafficking."
The status quo solves – Cuban enforcement efforts have been enormously
successful – cooperation is unnecessary
Lee, 09 (Renssaler, fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Testimony before the House
of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee of
National Security and Foreign Affairs, “Cuba, Drugs, and U.S.-Cuban Relations”, 4/29/2009,
https://www.fpri.org/docs/alt/testimony.20090429.lee_.cubadrugs.pdf, JKahn)
The policies adopted by the Castro regime to counteract the perceived drug threat to Cuban society took several
forms. One was to strengthen counter-narcotics legislation . Between 1988 and 1999 maximum penalties for drug
dealing in Cuba’s criminal code increased from 7-15 years imprisonment to 20 years to death. Money laundering was made
a crime punishable by up to 12 years in jail, and Cuban banks were compelled to adopt “know your customer" rules
and to maintain records of transactions of more than 10,000 pesos (roughly $10,000 equivalent) for five years. In 2003, the
government tightened the screws further with a decree prescribing the confiscation of business and
residential property where drugs were produced, sold, stored, or consumed , a step that precipitated
nationwide house-to-house searches to root out evidence of drug crimes. Drug interdiction efforts were expanded to deny Cuban
airspace and territorial waters to traffickers. Much of the emphasis here was on clearing Cuba’s coast of recalos of cocaine and
marijuana and to this end the regime mobilized various social organizations – youth brigades, Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution, fishing collectives, tourism workers, et. al. – to cooperate with the Cuban Border Guard in patrolling the island’s shores.
Also, to facilitate information-sharing on suspected drug shipments crossing Cuban territory, in
1999 Havana allowed the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard officer in the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.
On the demand-reduction front Cuba set up a vast network of nearly 200 mental health centers, staffed by psychologists and family
physicians, which were charged with preventing the spread of drug abuse within the Cuban population. Some of these facilities
provided in-house treatment and rehabilitation for cocaine and marijuana addicts. The regime mounted an extensive education and
prevention campaign targeting schools and youth organizations, evidently aiming to insulate the younger generation from the
scourge of drugs. By some indications, the regime’s draconian drug policies seem to have worked , at least up to
a point. My contacts within the Cuban public health system have told me that the average price of a gram of cocaine increased from
about $15-20 in the 1999-2003 period to $90 in mid-2008, and the price for a joint of imported marijuana from $1 to $10 over the
same years. Also, admissions of the numbers of new entrants into drug treatment facilities in the Havana
area have dwindled significantly since the 1990s. Now on the foreign policy front: looking back in time, narcotics-trafficking
was a focal point of conflict in U.S.-Cuban relations for most of the pre-1990 years, except for a brief period during the Carter
administration. The focus gradually shifted to cooperation in the 1990s, as the Cuban leadership ostensibly severed connections to
the international drug trade. Cooperation and information-sharing between the two countries have
netted a few high profile seizures, arrests, and extraditions, but all of this has occurred rather
episodically , without an umbrella agreement on counter-narcotics cooperation, (although Cuba has concluded such agreements
with many other countries inside and outside the hemisphere). Such an agreed framework could set the stage for a more substantive
level of engagement on drugs.
Cuba – Drugs High
Increasing international pressures mean Cuba could become a trafficking hub
Dominican Today, 12 (“Cuba could become a hub for illegal drugs entering US,” 11 February 2012,
http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/world/2012/2/11/42634/Cuba-could-become-a-hub-for-illegal-drugs-entering-US)//BI
Cuba could become a significant hub for illegal drugs entering the United States in the near
future, warned a California senator who chairs a congressional caucus on international drug trafficking. According to
hispanicbusiness.com, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., made the remarks while leading a hearing on what
several observers consider the growing possibility that the Caribbean could become an even larger
transit zone for illegal drugs. If the trend happens or is happening, it is likely because of increased
pressure international law enforcement is placing on violent drug cartels in Mexico and elsewhere in
Central America, these observers say. While mentioning the growing drug violence throughout the Caribbean during opening
statements of the Feb. 1 hearing of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Feinstein said Cuba should not
be considered immune from the problem. "I would be remiss not to mention Cuba. Just 90 miles from Florida,
Cuba has the potential to be a major trans-shipment point for illicit drugs," she said.
Cuba’s proximity makes it likely to be a major hub for illegal drugs
Antigua Observer, 12 newspaper from St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda (“Senator singles out Cuba as potential drug
smuggling point” February 12th, 2012 http://www.antiguaobserver.com/senator-singles-out-cuba-as-potential-drug-smugglingpoint/) // czhang
WASHINGTON, CMC – A leading United States senator has warned that Cuba could become a
potentially significant hub for illegal drugs entering the United States.¶ Dianne Feinstein, Democrat of
California, who chairs the US Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, issued the caveat while conducting a Senate hearing
on international drug trafficking.¶ “I would be remiss not to mention Cuba. Just 90 miles from Florida, Cuba has the
potential to be a major trans-shipment point for illicit drugs,” she said.¶ Her statement comes just weeks after
Cuba’s state-run newspaper, Granma, reported that the country last year confiscated more foreign-borne drugs
than in any time during the past seven years.¶ On Thursday, a senior University of the West Indies (UWI) fellow
warned about the impact of heightened crime on the Caribbean.¶ In participating in an Organization of American States (OAS)
Policy Round Table on “Public Security in the Hemisphere”, Anthony T. Bryan, of UWI’s Institute of International Relations,
cautioned that without the implementation of adequate measures, “it won’t be long before the
Caribbean is deeply enmeshed in what you see going on in Central America.Ӧ Bryan underscored the
growing drug problem in the Caribbean, though he specified that it is fundamentally of marijuana. ¶ “Despite the gravity of the
situation, as it seems to us, I do not classify any of our countries as being narco-states,” he told the OAS’40th Policy Round Table.¶
“They are not there yet and, hopefully, they won’t ever be there” he added.¶ A major United Nations (UN) report on citizen security
within the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) warned that violent crime linked to gangs has risen to threaten
economies and livelihoods, and has left most Caribbean people feeling unsafe.¶ But the UN Development Programme
(UNDP) report, released on Tuesday, has also outlined a number of recommendations that regional governments, law enforcement
agencies, civil society and non-governmental organisations can pursue to bring about a change in the situation.¶ The report
found that less than half of the region’s people felt secure, reaching as low as one in four people
in Trinidad and Tobago alone. The study said two out of three Caribbean people felt confident in
their police forces to control crime.
Cuba could become the global hotspot for drugs
Dominican Today, 12 The first and only english language online news publication in the Dominican Republic. Providing
local and international news (“Cuba could become a hub for illegal drugs entering US” 11 February 2012
http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/world/2012/2/11/42634/Cuba-could-become-a-hub-for-illegal-drugs-entering-US) // czhang
Los Angeles.– Cuba could become a significant hub for illegal drugs entering the United States in
the near future, warned a California senator who chairs a congressional caucus on international
drug trafficking.¶ According to hispanicbusiness.com, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., made the remarks while leading a
hearing on what several observers consider the growing possibility that the Caribbean could become an even larger
transit zone for illegal drugs. ¶ If the trend happens or is happening, it is likely because of increased pressure
international law enforcement is placing on violent drug cartels in Mexico and elsewhere in
Central America, these observers say.¶ While mentioning the growing drug violence throughout the Caribbean during opening
statements of the Feb. 1 hearing of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Feinstein said Cuba should not be
considered immune from the problem.¶ "I would be remiss not to mention Cuba. Just 90 miles
from Florida, Cuba has the potential to be a major trans-shipment point for illicit drugs," she said.
The U.S. has shied away from engaging Cuba on drug enforcement – this
precipitates trafficking
Lee, 09 (Renssaler, fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Testimony before the House
of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee of
National Security and Foreign Affairs, “Cuba, Drugs, and U.S.-Cuban Relations”, 4/29/2009,
https://www.fpri.org/docs/alt/testimony.20090429.lee_.cubadrugs.pdf, JKahn)
Yet they have not entered into a formal agreement to fight drugs – even though Havana maintains such
agreements with at least 32 other countries – and what cooperation exists occurs episodically, on a case-by-case
basis. Washington and Havana need to engage more fully on the issue, deploying intelligence and
interdiction assets to disrupt smuggling networks through and around Cuba. Washington
hitherto has shied away from a deeper relationship, fearing that it would lead to a political
opening and confer a measure of legitimacy on the Castro regime. Yet current strategic realities in the region and
Havana's own willingness to engage in such a relationship, as well as impending leadership changes in Cuba, argue for
rethinking these concerns, even in the absence of formal diplomatic ties. .
Cuba - Squo Solves
Squo solves Cuban efforts – two successful anti-drug operations
Fernandez, 13 writer for the Granma, English language edition of the newspaper of Cuba's Communist Party (Francisco
Arias, February 14, 2013 Cuba’s anti-drug strategy strengthened as global challenges intensify http://www.granma.cu/ingles/cubai/14feb-anti-drug.html) // czhang
DESPITE growing international challenges and the complexity of the region’s drug trafficking
problem, 10 years after Cuba implemented two anti-drug operations: Coraza Popular and Aché
III, the country’s strategy continues to demonstrate its effectiveness. In 2012 a minimal presence of such
illegal substances was detected internally (25kg); no suspicious flights were noted; the interception of drug-trafficking boats declined
from 52 in 2011 to 24, and practically all drugs thrown overboard along the country’s coastline were collected by, or turned over to
authorities (2,961kg).¶ These outcomes reflect the success of the two operations begun in 2003 - Coraza Popular in January and
Aché III in March of that year. The first was designed for the Ministry of the Interior (MINIT) and other institutions, with the
support of the population, to take action against delinquent elements linked to drug trafficking and sales across the country. Aché III
was directed at controlling suspicious speed boats and aircraft passing through Cuban territorial waters and airspace; confronting
individuals searching for washed up parcels of drugs; the systematic inspection of uninhabited cays and coastlines determined to be
at risk for illegal activity; as well as the destruction of marijuana plantings.¶ Preventative and enforcement activities
by a variety of social and political organizations and institutions, under the direction of the National Drugs
Commission, allowed the country to mitigate the impact of international drug-trafficking in
neighboring waters; to frustrate attempts - fundamentally by Cubans resident abroad - to introduce drugs by air for internal
distribution; to cut short the introduction of ‘designer’ drugs from Europe and North America ; to
address the illicit use of prescription drugs and alcohol abuse; as well as to prevent the development of marijuana
cultivation.¶ As a result of enforcement and preventative efforts, in 2012, 3,045 kilograms of drugs were confiscated (2,997kg of
marijuana, 43kg of cocaine, 2kg of hashish and small quantities of other illicit drugs).¶ Most of these drugs were found in parcels
washed up on the country’s coastline. Some 2,961kg of marijuana were discovered this way, significantly less than the 8,508kg found
in 2011.¶ Nine attempted offshore drug drops were frustrated and one speedboat was detained in waters off the northern coast of
Camagüey, with four Bahamian citizens aboard who had thrown a cache of drugs into the sea to be subsequently collected by
accomplices in the provinces of Villa Clara, Ciego de Avila and Camagüey.¶ As tourism and travel abroad has increased, an increase
has been noted in the number of international trafficking operations frustrated by airport customs personnel. The total number of
incidents amounted to 42 in 2012, with 69 persons arrested (48 Cubans and 21 foreigners); 42 kilograms of drugs were confiscated
(33.6kg of cocaine, 7.4kg of marijuana and one kilo of synthetic drugs known as cannabimimetics).¶ Enforcement efforts
undertaken at the country’s borders have had an impact on internal drug-dealing. As previously
mentioned, only 25kg of drugs were seized in 2012 from individuals attempting sales within the
country - significantly less than the 67kg confiscated in 2011.¶ Over the course of the year, 628 persons were
convicted of drug-related crimes,¶ 273 (43 %) were given sentences ranging from six 6-10 years in prison, based on the severity of
infractions as defined in relevant legislation.¶ A number of organizations have collaborated closely with
institutions involved in drug abuse prevention and law enforcement. The Federation of Cuban Women¶
(FMC), Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), the National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP), the University
Students Federation (FEU) and the High School Students Federation (FEEM), have played an important role in various efforts to
strengthen the systems in place to confront domestic and international challenges.¶ For example, the 7th joint CDR-MINIT Border
patrol operation reinforced the work of 306 Mirando al Mar (Watching the Sea) brigades. The Ministry of Public Health
– in conjunction with CDR and the FMC – continued its active monitoring efforts to identify drug users and
offer timely help and treatment. As the Ministry has focused on reorganization and consolidation of health care services,
emphasis has been placed on the maintenance of multidisciplinary teams in Community and Regional Mental Health Centers which
serve drug abusers and of the existing community based systems which assure needed assistance.¶ Likewise, the confidential drug
abuse telephone line, 103, offered nationally 24 hours a day, continued to provide help and advice, serving 12,285 callers in 2012.
The majority of those calling sought help in stopping smoking (4,074) and dealing with alcoholism (3,820), while 1,426 callers were
concerned about illicit drug use. An indication of the confidence the service has gained is that the vast majority of callers are seeking
help for themselves personally.¶ National Prevention, Detection and Enforcement Exercises focused on marijuana cultivation and
other illegalities continue to take place twice a year, with the participation of the Ministries of Agriculture, Interior, Public Health,
Education, Higher Education, Culture, the National Sports Institute, the Association of Small Farmers, the sugar industry, and
agricultural units of the FAR and MININT, in conjunction with local government bodies, such as neighborhood Popular Councils. ¶
During the April 2012 exercises, 1,453 Popular Councils participated and in October, 2,693 were involved. Conducted were a total of
67,669 land inspections; 11,653 surprise visits to farms and plots held in usufruct or personally owned; 250,632 self-inspections;
6,451 reviews of prevention plans and 46,915 efforts to inform, train and alert the population.¶ As part of Cuba’s
commitment to join with other nations in fighting drug-trafficking, agreements have been
established with 33 countries and two memoranda of understanding which are yielding positive
results. Regular cooperative police contact has been maintained with 27 nations. Alerts, modes
of operation, current information and valuable experiences are shared.¶ Noteworthy 2012
accomplishments include an inter-ministerial accord with Russia’s Drug Trafficking Control Federal
Service and the beginning of negotiations to establish similar agreements with other Latin
American and European countries.¶ In 2012, Cuba received a delegation from the International
Narcotics Control Board which met with representatives from various organizations collaborating via the National Drug
Commission in preventing and confronting illicit drug use and trafficking. The group confirmed the positive situation in the
country.¶ In March of 2012, a U.S. State Department report on illegal drugs control during 2011 was released. The
document acknowledged
efforts Cuba has made to prevent drug traffickers from making inroads on
the island; that the production of narcotics is minimal, and that drug use is not widespread
within the country. It also recalled that the Cuban government has proposed to the U.S. an agreement to facilitate
cooperation in drug-fighting efforts, which if established could support the work of both countries.
New Cuban tech upgrade solves drug trafficking
Cadena Gramonte, 13 (Radio Cadena Agramonte, news of Camagüey, Cuba and the World July 10, 2013 “Cuba Raises
Effectiveness in Protecting Borders” http://www.cadenagramonte.cu/english/index.php/show/articles/14895:cuba-raiseseffectiveness-in-protecting-borders) // czhang
Havana, Jul 10.- The General Custom House of the Republic of Cuba (AGR) raised its preparedness
and effectiveness in fighting drug trafficking, ensuring the protection of the society from air and
sea borders.¶ Moraima Rodriguez, head of the Research Department of the Directorate of Combat at the AGR, said the
increasing number of Cuban and foreign travelers, and the flexibilization of recent customs
regulations implemented, demand more staff training.¶ Until June 25, about 18 cases of drug trafficking were
detected in air border, seizing 17.22 kilograms of drugs, 12.54 of cocaine, 0.91 kilograms of marijuana, and 3,77 of cannabis, and
synthetic or design drugs, Rodriguez said.¶ The AGR currently has videoprotección cameras, modern X-ray
equipment, Ionscan, with which we have no need to disturb the passenger, and Bodyscan, recently acquired,
which allows the detection of intra and extra-physical smuggling actions.¶ The Customs' Dog
technical units, trained in many specialties, are also involved in the confrontation.
Current Cuban efforts enough to solve the effects of drug trafficking
State Department, 12 (2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 2012 INCSR: Country Reports -
Croatia through Haiti BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/vol1/184099.htm March 7, 2012) // czhang
2. Supply Reduction¶ Major transshipment trends did not change from 2010. During calendar year 2011, the GOC reported a total of
9.01 metric tons of illegal narcotics interdicted (including 8.3 MT in wash-up events), a 360% increase from the previous year’s 2.5
(MT). Government anti-drug forces reported disrupting three smuggling events and captured six traffickers (3 from the Bahamas
and 3 from Jamaica). Statistics on arrests or prosecutions were not made available.¶ There were no significant changes in Cuba’s
overall counternarcotics strategy or operations in 2011. Domestic production and consumption of illegal drugs
remained very limited, and Cuba concentrated its counternarcotics supply reduction efforts by
preventing illegal smuggling through Cuban territorial waters, rapidly collecting reported narcotic wash-ups, and preventing tourists
from smuggling smaller amounts of narcotics into the country. The Ministry of Armed Forces and Ministry of
Interior’s combination of fixed and mobile radars, coupled with visual and coastal vessel reporting procedures make up
an effective network for detecting illegal incursions of territorial air and sea by narcotics
traffickers. The Cuban government attempts to interdict vessels or aircraft suspected of narcotics trafficking with Cuban assets.
At sea, Cuba has had increasing success. Cuba continues to share go-fast vessel information with
neighboring countries, including the United States, and has had increasing success in
interdicting go-fast vessels. In 2011, Cuba reported 45 real-time reports of “go-fast” narcotics trafficking events to the U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG). TGF’s email and phone notifications of maritime smuggling to the U.S. have increased in quantity and quality,
and have occasionally included photographs of the vessels suspected of narcotrafficking while being pursued. ¶ Overseas arrivals
continue to bring in small quantities of illegal drugs mostly for personal use, although the extent of this problem remains unknown.
The Ministry of Interior conducts thorough entry searches using x-rays and trained
counternarcotics detection canines at major airports. Government officials detained 20 tourists, compared to 123
in 2010, for attempting to smuggle small quantities of narcotics into Cuba.¶ To combat the limited domestic production of
marihuana, Cuba set up “Operation Popular Shield” in 2003 to prevent any domestic development of narcotics consumption or
distribution of drugs, remained in effect and netted over 9,830 marijuana plants and 1.5 kilograms of cocaine, compared to 9,000
marijuana plants and 26 kilograms of cocaine in 2010.¶ 3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment¶ The
combination of extensive policing, low incomes, low supply, and strict drug laws (involving up to 15-
year prison sentences) have
resulted in very low illicit drug use in Cuba. There are nationwide
campaigns aimed at preventing drug abuse, and the quantity of existing programs for the general population
appears adequate given the very low estimated numbers of persons addicted to drugs in Cuba. The National Drug Commission,
headed by the Minister of Justice, with representatives from the Attorney General’s office and National Sports Institute, remains
responsible for drug abuse prevention, rehabilitation and drug policy issues in Cuba.¶ According to the Cuban government, the
Ministry of Health operates special drug clinics, offering services ranging from emergency care to psychological evaluation and
counseling to treat individuals with drug dependencies. There are no programs specializing in drug addiction for women and
children. The Government runs three substance abuse clinics that cater to foreigners, and the Catholic Church runs a center to treat
addiction in Havana.¶ The Cuban government occasionally broadcasts anti-drug messages on state run media and operates an
anonymous 24-hour helpline. In addition, Cuba reports the dangers of drug abuse are a part of the educational curriculum at all
levels of primary and secondary schools.¶ 4. Corruption¶ Cuba has strong policies in place against illicit
production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, and
laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. Cuba reports a zero tolerance for
narcotics-related corruption by government officials and claims there have been no such
corruption occurrences in 2011.¶
*Drug Trade Bad*
Africa Instability
Drug trade fuels African instability --- finances conflict
Arnold, 5 (Guy, specialist in north-south relations who writes mainly in the areas of African history and politics, and
international affairs, former Director of the Africa Bureau, The International Drugs Trade, pg. 182-183, Routledge, Tashma)
The generally weak structure of African states has meant that the deregulation of trade and the
financial markets, coupled with the growing pressures of globalization on their sovereignty and capacities,
have led to an increase in corruption, violent conflict , the plunder of natural resources, and growing
involvement in the drugs business. The international antinarcotics institu- tions see Sub-Saharan Africa principally as a
transit territory for drugs, al- though the cultivation of cannabis for local consumption has been a traditional activity subject to
controls. By the esnly 1980s, however, there was a rapid spread of illicit cannabis crops. These were produced to
supply the expanding home markets and for the intemational trade, and from the 1980s such crops have been grown extensively,
especially in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa. Experiments in growing the opium poppy and the coca leaf have also been
carried out in Benin, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Togo in West Africa, and Kenya and Tanzania in East Africa.
By the end of the twentieth century, large quantities of the major drugs were known to transit
through Africa, and most of them were destined for the huge European market. The scale of the
African trade demonstrates just how quickly drugs have come to play a lead role in funding the continent’s
various conflicts. The growth of drug trafficking mirrors the continent’s problems of poverty, economic
failure, and debt and its inability to break this pattern except by resorting to illegal means. In the Ivory
Coast the cocoa crisis of 1988- 1989 acted as the stimulus to desperate farmers who switched to producing cannabis. The attractions
of the crop are obvious: The output of 0.1 hectares (0.2 acres) of cannabis in value is equivalent to 16 tonnes (15.7 tons) of cocoa
grown on 30 hectares (74.1 acres) by an owner employing l0 workers. So far, only cannabis is produced on any scale in Africa and
most of this is still des- tined for domestic markets and cross-border trading rather than for export outside the continent? In the
early 1990s, however, African production of cannabis escalated and much of it was for the European market. In 1993 cus- toms
seizures of African cannabis only represented 1.5 percent of world seizures and a tiny share of the European consumer market. By
the end of the twentieth century South Africa, Kenya, Benin, and Ghana were producing cannabis and exporting it as marijuana to
Europe. Nigeria and Ghana are the main cannabis producers in West Africa, although little information, as yet, is available as far as
Nigerian production is concemed. In Ghana the cannabis crop is grown throughout the country and known as "the Devil`s tobacco"
or "wee," and a ganja farm may be as large as three hectares (7.4 acres) and re- ceive protection from the local police.
Instability escalates to global nuclear war
Deutsch 1 (Dr. Jeffery, Founder – Rabid Tiger Project, Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 7,
11-18, http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html)
The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the
country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other
countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn
into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button
rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is
open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this
respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily
find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the
countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can
attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each
other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested
in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc.
Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.
Africa’s key --- they’re a hotspot for drug cultivation
Arnold, 5 (Guy, specialist in north-south relations who writes mainly in the areas of African
history and politics, and international affairs, former Director of the Africa Bureau, The
International Drugs Trade, pg. 184-185, Routledge, Tashma)
Africa is now a major source of cannabis for both local consumption and export to Europe. According
to the Vienna-based INCB, Nigeria, Morocco, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast are the
leading African producers of marijuana. Vast tracts of forest make it easy to hide marijuana
plantations, The U.S. DEA has opened offices in Pretoria and Lagos, although political corruption acts to protect
many of the traffickers. At the same time many Africans who see the damage that drugs do to their citizens are becom- ing
more vociferous in demanding that their own couritemarcotics agencies do their jobs properly.
Amazon
Trafficking destroys the amazon
Barraca 10 — Dialogo News, Drug Trafficking Damaging Amazon Basin, Diálogo is a professional military magazine
published quarterly by the Commander of the United States Southern Command as an international forum for military personnel in
Latin America, (Sara, 3/12, Dialogo, www.dialogoamericas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2010/12/03/feature-01, JKahn)
Drug trafficking organizations are causing significant damage to the Amazon rain forest and
watershed in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela, endangering the region’s diverse flora and fauna and
threatening the planet’s “green lungs .”¶ In addition, the production of staple crops such as potatoes and
corn has suffered as farmers have been forced to grow coca plants.¶ Dialogo recently interviewed
environmental officials in some of the affected countries about the damage caused by illicit drug production. ¶ Colombia¶ “Illicit crop
growers have started to develop mechanisms to avoid the state’s eradication efforts," said Víctor Nieto, a researcher for Colombia’s
National Forest Research and Development Corporation (CONIF).¶ "Initially, this type of crop grew in open fields, so they were
easily identifiable on satellite images, and police planes could fumigate and eliminate those crops," he said. Illicit crop growers
attempted strong counter-measures, Nieto said. "They sought ways to halt the advance of crop dusters and even went so far as to
string high-tension aerial cables from one hill to another, so the planes would run into them and crash."¶ But eventually farmers
settled on a different approach: cutting back natural forests , and leaving only trees that provided greater
aerial coverage.¶ "This allowed the crops to blend in with the tree canopy, making the crops more difficult to
eradicate by crop dusting from the air," Nieto said. "The success of this approach encouraged the clearing of
natural forests in patches or lots resulting in serious loss of forested areas, a decline in the quality of
remaining forests, and interference with flora and fauna naturally found in ecological corridors associated
with these forests."¶ "Needless to say, the waste created by the processing camps – residue from chemicals used to
extract the active drug components – is dumped into streams and rivers in the heart of the rain forest. The cans, plastic
containers and other waste are randomly discarded in rain forest.”¶ “It is very difficult for other crops to compete against a business
as profitable as coca production, so the community devotes is time to that," he said.¶ Market pressures tend to foster dependence on
illicit farming once it has begun, Nieto said.¶ "Everything is affected by the market. Profitable crops increase the value of consumer
products in the region and, therefore, the community near the production area has no choice but to enter the supply chain or be left
out of the consumer market.”¶ "In 2009, at the Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen in 2009, then-president of Colombia Álvaro
Uribe called on participating countries to strengthen their commitment against the production, consumption and trafficking of
narcotics. That commitment could involve even more meetings than were originally contemplated," Nieto said.¶ Illegal armed groups
have taken a financial stake in illicit crops, Nieto said, complicated the issue even further.¶ "Years ago, guerrilla groups like the FARC
and ELN were destroying oil pipelines as a tactic to attack the government and the interests of multinational capitalists," Nieto said,
and "recent governments have invested heavily in the elimination of armed groups."¶ A few years ago, the guerrillas undertook
“visibility” projects, he said. Their goal was to create instability and unrest with actions such as destroying pipelines.¶ "These ideas
are no longer used, and today the armed groups only seek economic benefits for financing the war (or leaders). This, for the
community, seems to be the current lesson.Ӧ The international community has responded to the environmental hazards of illicit
farming with programs like the UN's "Familias Guardabosques," Nieto said. The UN program develops sources of income for rural
communities as an alternative to cultivating narcotics.¶ "Then, the question was one of sustainability from a financial standpoint," he
said. "It was argued that once the financial resources ran out, families would return to non-legal businesses. State resources were
dedicated to the program, along with international cooperation."¶ A new approach has gained support, Nieto said: paying
communities for preserving forestland the same amount that they would gain for cutting it down.¶ "It started with the analysis of
how much money communities near forests could be earning if they harvested timber from the forests, and the data showed that
after felling, removing and selling the timber, the profits were not worth the effort put into it, or the value of the existing forests," he
said.¶ The idea has been successful and implemented with great transparency, Nieto said.¶ "Continual monitoring, which allows for
assurance of conservation and new bids for mitigation of climate change and reducing emissions from deforestation and
degradation, seems to be the way to create sustainability of the project over time. The plan is still new and in a transitional phase,
but is an excellent way to simultaneously solve several of the community’s problems.”¶ All of these programs are only playing
environmental defense, however, and none have found a way to restore the damage already done according to Nieto.¶ "There are no
serious forest restoration or recovery programs, and we can only possible eradicate [illegal] crops and wait for nature to do the rest.
Castro Regime
Cooperation is key to broader Central American drug enforcement and f regime
Lee, 09 (Renssaler, fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Testimony before the House
of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee of
National Security and Foreign Affairs, “Cuba, Drugs, and U.S.-Cuban Relations”, 4/29/2009,
https://www.fpri.org/docs/alt/testimony.20090429.lee_.cubadrugs.pdf, JKahn)
For example, we could train and equip Cuban Border Guards and Interior Ministry operatives, we could conduct joint naval patrols
with Cuba in the western Caribbean, we could coordinate investigation of regional trafficking networks and suspicious financial
transactions through Cuban banks and commercial entities, and we could station DEA and FBI contingents in the U.S. Interests
Section in Havana. We could also negotiate a ship-rider agreement with the Cuban authorities, and
possibly even the right to pursue drug-laden vessels and aircraft seeking safe haven in Cuban territory. How far Havana and
Washington would be willing to proceed in these directions is unclear, since the political barriers on both sides are formidable. Yet
the prospects for more productive collaboration against the hemispheric drug threat seem a lot more promising today than in the
past. In any event, failure to exploit Cuba's
law enforcement and intelligence assets to good advantage leaves a major
gap in U.S. defenses against drug trafficking through the Caribbean. Interdiction successes in
Mexico seem likely to augment this flow down the road, a further reason to closely monitor trafficking trends in a
Caribbean country only 90 miles from U.S. shores. The drug threat from Cuba seems destined to increase as
the Castro regime's revolutionary order loses its hold and appeal, as the island's economic ties with the outside world
continue to expand, and as criminally-inclined Cuban nationals seek alliances with South American and Mexican drug kingpins.
Such an outcome is hardly in the best interests of the United States and other countries in the hemisphere.
Columbian Instability
Causes Colombian instability --- a FARC rise would end democracy in Colombia
Wynne, 3 (Charles E., Lt Col, "COLOMBIA: MORE THAN JUST A DRUG PROBLEM,”
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE,
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA442515,
Tashma)
The “Unholy Alliance”
Many naively thought the extinction of the Cali and Medellin drug cartels in the early 1990’s
would put an end to the lucrative illegal narcotics industry in Colombia. But that has not been the case.
Instead, drug trafficking experts estimate more than 150 smaller, less visible, harder-to-find
narcotics organizations are doing business in Colombia today.11 Exacerbating the problem, U.S.-sponsored
coca plant eradication programs in Peru and Bolivia have been so successful Colombia is now the world’s leading grower of the plant
from which cocaine is derived (302,500 hectares in 1999, more than double the acreage of 1995).12 In addition, since the early
1990s, these groups have become the largest
similar operations in Ecuador, Brazil, and Venezuela.13
supplier of heroin to the eastern United States and are running
Drug money has financed FARC growth from less than 2,000 members in 1982 to more than 20,000
members in 2001 and they now have a presence in more than 60 percent of the Colombian
municipalities. Their stated goal is to raise and equip an army of 30,000 members capable of
overthrowing the democratic government.14 The FARC, combined with the smaller National Liberation
Army (ELN), control or very nearly control 40 percent of the country. In addition to exorbitant drug profits, the ELN has found
kidnapping and attacks on the Cano- Limon-Covenas oil pipeline to be very profitable.15
The paramilitaries are regional with a central organization to coordinate national level strategy in their fight against the insurgents.
Making huge profits off illegal drugs, they have up to 8,000 armed combatants and a presence in 40 percent of Colombian
municipalities. The AUC is the largest, most well known paramilitary group. 16
Shortly after September 11, the European Union joined the United States in officially designating the FARC, ELN, and AUC as
foreign terrorist organizations stating they use “terror as a tactic to keep the money flowing and the population and politicians in
line.”17 All have been accused of engaging in “massacres, kidnappings, attacks on key infrastructures” and being “involved in every
facet of narcotics trafficking, including cultivation, processing and transportation.”18
Flat organizations without any democratic checks and balances, these nonstate actors are far
more effective and nimble than the governments they oppose and are perfectly positioned to align
themselves with international terrorist organizations. The current situation in Colombia is
reminiscent of Afghanistan under Taliban control when the terrorist organization al-Qaeda used poppy cultivation
and heroin production to fill its coffers. Similarities include weak central governments, lack of sovereignty over their own territories,
large-scale criminal and political violence, persistent corruption, lax banking regulations, and a lucrative renewable source of
income. With more and more research showing “easy access to cash” being the best predictor of political violence, no matter what
the motivation for the conflict, it is easy to see why international terrorists would have an interest in Colombia.19 The apprehension
of two Irish Republican Army terrorists in Colombia to train the FARC indicates the insurgents have already established a working
arrangement with at least one international terrorist organization. The latest U.S. national security strategy acknowledges the
potential terrorist threat in Colombia when it states “poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to
terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”20
Taken together, the “unholy alliance” has become a major political, economic and military force that appears
to be getting stronger at the expense of the government in Bogota. What is important to note is the
challenges presented by these illegal groups are not a low-level law enforcement issue that one country alone can solve.
Drug trade destabilizes Columbia --- cocaine profits aid anti-state groups that
prolong civil conflict
Lee, 2 (Rensselaer W., contract researcher for the Congressional Research Service and a senior
fellow at FPRI, “Perverse Effects of Andean Counternarcotics Policy,” Orbis, Volume 46, Issue 3,
Summer 2012, pg. 537-554, sciencedirect, Tashma)
Unfortunately, the story does not end here. In international drug control, small enforcement successes often mask larger policy
failures. The supposed achievements of the Andean drug war, in fact, have spawned an array of unanticipated problems for the
United States, Colombia, and other countries in this hemisphere. Recent statistics show, for example, that cultivation of coca has
ballooned in Colombia, largely negating the eradication achievements elsewhere in the Andes. Colombian syndicates have reportedly
also succeeded in compensating for lost Peruvian and Bolivian supplies by improving leaf yields and alkaloid content. The
consequences to Colombia’s internal stability have been terrible: the increased concentration of
upstream coca production has vastly increased the resources available to antistate groups, fueling
the country’s ongoing civil conflict. The disintegration of the cartel structure has had a similar result, if for different
reasons. The cartels provided a degree of order and control in the industry, but their demise has emboldened
Colombia’s various guerrilla organizations to enter the business of refining, trading, and exporting
drugs.5 Since these groups seem to contemplate the violent overthrow of the government or (minimally) a permanent partition of
the country, they may represent a greater threat to Colombia’s survival than did the
“classic” criminal coalitions of the 1980s and 1990s.
Destroys Latin American democracy
Wilhelm, 2k (General Charles E., FDCH, US Marine Corp Commander in Chief, USSC before
House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Crim. Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources,
“STRATEGY AND LONG RANGE PLAN TO ASSIST COLOMBIA WITH ITS CD EFFORTS,”
February 15, 2000)
Personal Assessment As I stated earlier, as Colombia's problems spill over into neighboring countries,
they threaten the regional stability that is essential to the growth and sustainment of strong
democracies and free market economies throughout the region. Drug trafficking is a major
contributing factor to Colombia's internal problems.
Key to global democracy
Hillman, 2 – Ph.D., Professor and Director, Institute for the Study of Democracy and Human
Rights, St. John Fisher College (Richard S., Democracy and Human Rights in Latin Americai,
Preface, p. vii) //SP
Latin American experiences, especially in the areas of democratization and human rights protection, are
particularly relevant for developing countries that are attempting to build stable political and
economic systems in order to provide a decent standard of living and incorporate previously
excluded populations into the national mainstream. The past record, of course, is far from acceptable. The
advent of the twenty-first century, however, appears to be a time of great potential progress for the
institutionalization of democratic human rights regimes that would reduce human pain and
suffering. The number of countries in Latin America and elsewhere that are experimenting with
democracy has never been greater. Clearly, the path toward fulfilling the expectations raised by these experiments is
not an easy one; it is fraught with difficult obstacles deriving from the historical legacy as well as contemporary challenges.
Nevertheless, democracy and human rights have definitively entered the political lexicon and discourse throughout the world.
Extinction
Diamond 95 (Larry, Senior Fellow – Hoover Institution, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s”,
December, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)
On any list of the most important potential threats to world order and national security in the coming decade, these six should figure
prominently: a hostile, expansionist Russia; a hostile, expansionist China; the spread of fundamentalist Islamic, anti-Western
regimes; the spread of political terrorism from all sources; sharply increased immigration pressures; and ethnic conflict that
escalates into large-scale violence, civil war, refugee flows, state collapse, and general anarchy. Some of these potential threats
interact in significant ways with one another, but they all share a common underlying connection. In each instance, the development
of democracy is an important prophylactic, and in some cases the only long- term protection, against disaster. A HOSTILE,
EXPANSIONIST RUSSIA Chief among the threats to the security of Europe, the United States, and Japan would be the reversion of
Russia--with its still very substantial nuclear, scientific, and military prowess--to a hostile posture toward the West. Today, the
Russian state (insofar as it continues to exist) appears perched on the precipice of capture by
ultranationalist, anti-Semitic, neo-imperialist forces seeking a new era of pogroms, conquest, and "greatness." These forces
feed on the weakness of democratic institutions, the divisions among democratic forces, and the generally dismal economic and
political state of the country under civilian, constitutional rule. Numerous observers speak of "Weimar Russia." As in Germany in the
1920s, the only alternative to a triumph of fascism (or some related "ism" deeply hostile to freedom and to the West) is the
development of an effective democratic order. Now, as then, this project must struggle against great historical and political odds,
and it seems feasible only with international economic aid and support for democratic forces and institutions. A HOSTILE,
EXPANSIONIST CHINA In China, the threat to the West emanates from success rather than failure and is less amenable to explicit
international assistance and inducement. Still, a China moving toward democracy--gradually constructing a real constitutional
order, with established ground rules for political competition and succession and civilian control over the military--seems a much
better prospect to be a responsible player on the regional and international stage. Unfair trade practices, naval power projection,
territorial expansion, subversion of neighboring regimes, and bullying of democratic forces in Hong Kong and Taiwan are all more
likely the more China resists political liberalization. So is a political succession crisis that could disrupt incremental patterns of
reform and induce competing power players to take risks internationally to advance their power positions at home. A China that is
building an effective rule of law seems a much better prospect to respect international trading rules that mandate protection for
intellectual property and forbid the use of prison labor. And on these matters of legal, electoral, and institutional development,
international actors can help. THE SPREAD OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM Increasingly, Europeans and Americans worry
about the threat from fundamentalist Islam. But fundamentalist movements do not mobilize righteous anger and absolute
commitment in a vacuum. They feed on the utter failure of decadent political systems to meet the most elementary expectations for
material progress and social justice. Some say the West must choose between corrupt, repressive regimes that are at least secular
and pro-Western and Islamic fundamentalist regimes that will be no less repressive, but anti-Western. That is a false choice in Egypt
today, as it was in Iran or Algeria--at least until their societies became so polarized as to virtually obliterate the liberal center. It is
precisely the corruption, arrogance, oppression, and gross inefficacy of ruling regimes like the current one in Egypt that stimulate
the Islamic fundamentalist alternative. Though force may be needed--and legitimate--to meet an armed challenge, history teaches
that decadent regimes cannot hang on forever through force alone. In the long run, the only reliable bulwark against revolution or
anarchy is good governance--and that requires far-reaching political reform. In Egypt and some other Arab countries, such reform
would entail a gradual program of political liberalization that counters corruption, reduces state interference in the economy,
responds to social needs, and gives space for moderate forces in civil society to build public support and understanding for further
liberalizing reforms. In Pakistan and Turkey, it would mean making democracy work: stamping out corruption, reforming the
economy, mobilizing state resources efficiently to address social needs, devolving power, guaranteeing the rights of ethnic and
religious minorities, and--not least-- reasserting civilian control over the military. In either case, the fundamentalist
challenge can be met only by moving (at varying speeds) toward, not away from, democracy. POLITICAL
TERRORISM Terrorism and immigration pressures also commonly have their origins in political exclusion, social injustice, and bad,
abusive, or tyrannical governance. Overwhelmingly, the sponsors of international terrorism are among the world's most
authoritarian regimes: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan. And locally within countries, the agents of terrorism tend to be either the
fanatics of antidemocratic, ideological movements or aggrieved ethnic and regional minorities who have felt themselves socially
marginalized and politically excluded and insecure: Sri Lanka's Tamils, Turkey's Kurds, India's Sikhs and Kashmiris. To be sure,
democracies must vigorously mobilize their legitimate instruments of law enforcement to counter this growing threat to their
security. But a more fundamental and enduring assault on international terrorism requires political change to bring down zealous,
paranoiac dictatorships and to allow aggrieved groups in all countries to pursue their interests through open, peaceful, and
constitutional means. As for immigration, it is true that people everywhere are drawn to prosperous, open, dynamic societies like
those of the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. But the sources of large (and rapid) immigration flows to the West
increasingly tend to be countries in the grip of civil war, political turmoil, economic disarray, and poor governance: Vietnam, Cuba,
Haiti, Central America, Algeria. And in Mexico, authoritarianism, corruption, and social injustice have held back human
development in ways that have spawned the largest sustained flow of immigrants to any Western country--a flow that threatens to
become a floodtide if the Zedillo government cannot rebuild Mexico's economy and societal consensus around authentic democatic
reform. In other cases--Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, Afghanistan--immigration to the West has been modest only because of the greater
logistical and political difficulties. However, in impoverished areas of Africa and Asia more remote from the West, disarray is felt in
the flows of refugees across borders, hardly a benign development for world order. Of course, population growth also heavily drives
these pressures. But a common factor underlying all of these crisis-ridden emigration points is the absence of democracy. And,
strikingly, populations grow faster in authoritarian than democratic regimes.4ETHNIC CONFLICT Apologists for authoritarian
rule--as in Kenya and Indonesia--are wont to argue that multiparty electoral competition breeds ethnic rivalry and polarization,
while strong central control keeps the lid on conflict. But when multiple ethnic and national identities are forcibly suppressed, the lid
may violently pop when the regime falls apart. The fate of Yugoslavia, or of Rwanda, dramatically refutes the canard that
authoritarian rule is a better means for containing ethnic conflict. Indeed, so does the recent experience of Kenya, where ethnic
hatred, land grabs, and violence have been deliberately fostered by the regime of President Daniel arap Moi in a desperate bid to
divide the people and thereby cling to power. Overwhelmingly, theory and evidence show that the path to peaceful management of
ethnic pluralism lies not through suppressing ethnic identities and superimposing the hegemony of one group over others.
Eventually, such a formula is bound to crumble or be challenged violently. Rather, sustained interethnic moderation
and peace follow from the frank recognition of plural identities, legal protection for group and
individual rights, devolution of power to various localities and regions, and political institutions that encourage bargaining
and accommodation at the center. Such institutional provisions and protections are not only significantly more likely under
democracy, they are only possible with some considerable degree of democracy.5 OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts
the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression
tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful
international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions
of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of
life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional
threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its
provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic
fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or
glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face
ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass
destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring
trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are
more
environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the
destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because
their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they
respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation
on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
Cocaine profits specifically fuel the FARC --- they’re hungry for political influence
Lee, 2 (Rensselaer W., contract researcher for the Congressional Research Service and a senior
fellow at FPRI, “Perverse Effects of Andean Counternarcotics Policy,” Orbis, Volume 46, Issue 3,
Summer 2012, pg. 537-554, sciencedirect, Tashma)
The shifting pattern of coca cultivation in the Andes turned out to be a windfall for Colombia’s various outlaw groups, especially for
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armedas Revolutionarias de Colombia—FARC), the country’s oldest and
largest insurgent group. As a 2001 State Department report notes, “The Colombian syndicates, witnessing the
vulnerability of Peruvian and Bolivian coca supply to joint interdiction operations in the late
1990s, decided to move most of the cultivation to Colombia’s southwest corner, an area
controlled by the FARC.”9 The resultant expansion of drug revenues benefited other outlaw
organizations such as the Army of National Liberation and the rightist United Self Defense Forces of Colombia; however,
the FARC appeared to be the biggest winner. As former Colombian defense minister Rafael Pardo
observed, “FARC is both a narcotrafficking operation and an insurgent group seeking
political power. Its strongholds are the areas that grow 90 percent of the country’s cocaine.”10
Drug trade fuels a Colombian civil war
Chalk, 11 (Peter, Senior Political Scientist at RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in political science,
University of British Columbia, M.A. in political studies and international relations, University
of Aberdeen, “The Latin American Drug Trade Scope, Dimensions, Impact, and Response,”
RAND Project Air Force,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf,
Tashma)
South America and Central America
The Latin American drug trade has had a pervasive and insidious impact that has affected a wide
spectrum of national, regional, and even international security interests. In Colombia, revenue from the
production and trafficking of heroin and cocaine has provided FARC with sufficient
operational capital to maintain an active war footing in its ongoing conflict against
Bogotá. Although the organization does not pose a strategic threat to the central government, its activities have
undermined popular confidence in the administration’s ability to project a concerted territorial
presence, guarantee public security, and maintain a (legitimate) monopoly of violence—all key
components of sovereign statehood. There is little question that, without access to the enormous profits availed
by the drug trade, FARC’s ability to “achieve” these debilitating effects would have been greatly
curtailed.1
Compounding the situation in Colombia are the activities of reemerging paramilitary gangs. In
particular, fighting and competition between these groups has contributed to an increasingly serious
humanitarian crisis. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 27,000 internal refugees
were registered in the state during 2008, more than double the figure for 2007.2 These numbers make up a major proportion of the
overall national displacement picture, which currently remains among the world’s worst.3
Cuba Relations
Stemming drug trafficking solves relations
Lee, 09 (Renssaler, fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Testimony before the House
of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee of
National Security and Foreign Affairs, “Cuba, Drugs, and U.S.-Cuban Relations”, 4/29/2009,
https://www.fpri.org/docs/alt/testimony.20090429.lee_.cubadrugs.pdf, JKahn)
This is the story of a Caribbean state that at one time was deeply (if selectively) involved in the
international drug trade , becoming now a state for which suppressing the drug traffic seems to be a
foremost national priority. This apparent transformation and accompanying tectonic shifts in the
international security environment, have some important implications for U.S.-Cuban relations
The United States and Cuba have a strong mutual interest in closing off trafficking routes in the
western Caribbean and in preventing attempts by Mexican and South American cocaine mafias to set up shop in Cuba proper.
Drugs Kill People
Illegal drug use kills tens of thousands in the US per year and it’s on the rise
Muhuri & Gfroerer, 11 – PhD and BA, Division of Population Surveys, Center for Behavioral
Health Statistics and Quality, Substance Abuse & Mental Health Services Administration (Pradip
K. & Joseph C., “Mortality associated with illegal drug use among adults in the United States,” The American Journal of Drug and
Alcohol Abuse, Vol. 37 No. 3, pg. 155-164, May 2011, Informa Healthcare)//BI
Illegal drug use can produce numerous adverse health effects. These include unintentional death
by drug poisoning, injury, and suicide; infectious diseases (e.g., vital hepatitis B & C and human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV)) from injecting drugs; cardiovascular disease due to cocaine use, mental and behavioral disorders due to use of
psychoactive substances; pregnancy complications, low birth weight, and short gestation due to maternal use of drugs (1,2).
Globally, illegal drug use accounts for .8% of the burden in disability-adjusted life years and .4% in mortality (2). The use of
amphetamines, cocaine, and opioids has been shown to cause premature mortality in many countries and regions (3–7). Metaanalysis of published results has revealed that illegal drug use is one of the seven modifiable behavioral risk
factors contributing to mortality in the United States (8,9). Approximately 95% of all unintentional
poisoning deaths that occur annually in the United States are attributed to drugs (10). Analyses of the
data from the National Vital Statistics System have shown that unintentional drug-poisoning or overdose death
rates have increased steadily since 1970. In 2007, 27,658 overdose deaths occurred in the United
States, and the age-adjusted rate of drug overdose death was 9.2 per 100,000; the major drug categories involved in
these deaths were cocaine, heroin, and opioid pain medication (such as oxycodone, hydrocodone, and
methadone) (11). Although overdoses are the major cause of drug-related mortality, certain types of drugs
including opioids are involved in large and increasing numbers of deaths (12). In recent years, poisoning deaths involving
opioid analgesics increased considerably, but deaths involving methadone increased more rapidly than those relating to
other opioid analgesics, cocaine, or heroin (13). Overall, opioid analgesics accounted for much of the increase in the number of drugpoisoning deaths, surpassing heroin as well as cocaine in their involvement in those deaths (11,14). Analysis of the data from the
Drug Abuse Warning Network has suggested similar patterns (15). Some of these studies have referred to the possibility of medical
examiners’ increased search for opioids in poisoning deaths resulting from publicity concerning fatal poisonings involving
prescription medication and their improvements in toxicological test procedures for opioids (13–15). However, such reporting
artefacts are considered unlikely explanations for recent increases in poisoning deaths in the United States, particularly those
involving synthetic opioids (14). One study has reported a positive correlation between drug-poisoning
mortality and overall availability of opioid analgesics, particularly the sales of oxycodone and methadone, among states
in the United States in 2002 (16). However, population-based epidemiological studies examining mortality in relation to illegal drug
use have been rare.
Drug usage stemming from drug trade is a systemic killer – cocaine alone kills tens
of thousands per year
UNODC, 10 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “The global cocaine market,” World
Drug Report 2010,
https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/1.3_The_globa_cocaine_market.pdf,
Tashma)
Global impact
The use of cocaine constitutes, first of all, a major health problem. Cocaine use results in
tens of thousands of deaths each year worldwide. After the opiates, cocaine is the most problematic
drug globally, and it is indisputably the main problem drug in the Americas. Out of the 5.3 million
people who used cocaine at least once in the United States during 2008, 1.9 million also used cocaine in the
previous month, of which almost 1 million were found to have been dependent on cocaine.10 In other words, out of the people
who used cocaine in the previous year at least once, 18% were dependent on it. This is a higher
proportion than for any other drug except heroin. Figures for the year 2007 showed that out of 1,000 people who
used crack cocaine in the previous 12 months, 116 entered treatment for substance abuse, a slightly higher proportion than for
methamphetamine (102) and a significantly higher proportion than for drug use in general (30) or for the use of alcohol (6).13
Structural violence outweighs
HINTJENS 2007 [Helen Hintjens is Lecturer in the Centre for Development Studies,
University of Wales, “MDF Understanding Development Better”]
From Johan Galtung, famous Norwegian peace ‘guru’, still alive and heads up TRANSCEND University on-line, has been
working since 1960s on showing that violence is not OK. His Ghandian approach is designed to convince those who advocate
violent means to restore social justice to the poor, that he as a pacifist does not turn a blind eye to social injustices and
inequality. He extended therefore our understanding of what is violent, coercion, force, to include
the economic and social system’s avoidable
injustices, deaths, inequalities. Negative peace is the absence of justice, even
Injustice causes structural violence to health, bodies, minds, damages people, and must
therefore be resisted (non-violently). Positive peace is different from negative (unjust and hence violent) peace. Positive
if there is no war.
peace requires actively combating (struggling peacefully against) social injustices that underpin structural violence. Economic
and social, political justice have to be part of peacebuilding. This is the mantra of most NGOs and even some agencies (we will
look later at NGO Action Aid and DFID as examples). Discrimination has to end, so does the blatant rule of money,
greater equality is vital wherever possible. All of this is the opposite of neo-liberal recipes for
success, which in Holland as in Indonesia, tolerate higher and higher levels of social
inequality in the name of efficiency. Structural violence kills far more people than warfare –
for example one estimate in DRC is that 4 million people have been killed in war since 1998, but NGOs
estimate that an additional 6 million people have died in DRC since then, from disease,
displacement and hunger, bringing the total to an unthinkable 10 million of 90 million est.
population. “Since there exists far more wealth in the world than is necessary to address the main economic causes of
structural violence, the real problem is one of priorities”…p. 307 “Structural violence…is neither
natural nor inevitable”, p. 301 (Prontzos).
Economy
Drug trade destroys the U.S. economy --- direct and indirect effects
Chalk, 11 (Peter, Senior Political Scientist at RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in political science,
University of British Columbia, M.A. in political studies and international relations, University
of Aberdeen, “The Latin American Drug Trade Scope, Dimensions, Impact, and Response,”
RAND Project Air Force,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf,
Tashma)
The narcotics trade has also significantly impeded fiscal growth and stability by diverting scarce
resources away from more-productive uses. Between 1981 and 2008, federal, state, and local
governments are estimated to have spent at least $600 billion (adjusted for inflation) on drug
interdiction and related law enforcement efforts; factoring in costs associated with treatment and
rehabilitation, the overall total rises to around $800 billion.34 If one were to also add in
“invisible” losses brought about by curtailed job opportunities and reduced workplace
productivity, the true cost would be far higher. As ONDCP has observed, this financial burden is one that
is shared by all of society, either directly or indirectly through higher tax dollars.35
Drags down the global economy
Naim, 5 (Moises, editor of Foreign Policy magazine, “Broken Borders; Trafficking:
Globalization has lowered barriers to illegal as well as legal commerce, and international
smuggling now threatens to derail the world economy,” Newsweek, 10/24/25, proquest,
Tashma)
Last week a British sting operation code-named Bluesky busted a Pan-European ring that, according to Scotland Yard, was allegedly
responsible for smuggling as many as 200,000 people into the United Kingdom during the last few years. In August U.S. officials
dismantled a gang they accused of trafficking everything from drugs to forged postal stamps to millions of "supernotes"--almostperfect fake currency--as well as rocket launchers and counterfeit cigarettes into the United States. Two weeks ago a diverse group of
CEOs of major multinationals including Nestle, Microsoft and GlaxoSmithKline announced that they were pooling efforts to
combat the illegal trade in counterfeit goods, which costs the world economy an estimated $630
billion per year.¶ Yet what each bust or high-profile initiative really speaks to is the exponential growth in illicit trade
across the world. While governments have spent billions since 9/11 to fortify their borders against
everything from potential terrorists to illegal drugs and nuclear materials, the size and sophistication of those
trafficking operations that have been rolled up has continued to increase. A study released earlier this
year by the Washington-based Institute for International Economics found that despite the cumbersome laws that many
governments enacted after September 11, money launderers face only a 5 percent chance of being convicted in any given year. (Asked
recently how much harder it was to move $50 million secretly now than 10 years ago, a Swiss banker smiled and replied: "The main
difference is that now I charge more.") A report last month from the Pew Hispanic Center estimated that the number of illegal
immigrants entering the United States since 9/11 has stayed roughly the same since the 1990s--about half a million per year. The
trade in small arms has grown into a $4 billion-a-year industry, fueling insurgencies and guerrilla wars from Iraq to Congo.¶ This is
more than a security issue: the dark trades, driven by the same globalizing forces responsible for the surge in international
commerce over the last two decades, now
threaten the smooth functioning of the legitimate world.
Smuggling revenues are spectacular. From 1992 to 2002 the total size of the global drug trade
more than doubled to $900 billion annually. Fifteen years ago the trade in counterfeit goods was almost
insignificant; today the bootleg-CD business alone is worth $4.6 billion a year. The illicit arms trade accounts for an additional $10
billion. So does cross-border human trafficking. Stolen art is worth $3 billion each year. An illegal trade in toxic waste is estimated at
$12 billion.¶ Money laundering offers perhaps the best glimpse of the total size of the world's illicit economy. While global trade has
roughly doubled since 1990, from the $5 trillion to the $10 trillion range, the amount of money being laundered worldwide has
grown at least tenfold --to nearly $1.5 trillion in some estimates. Since illicit trades can thrive only with government complicity, this
means that traffickers are investing huge sums to gain political influence, and not just in their home countries. Their operations have
become truly multinational, weaving together global networks of political allies and generating profits on an unprecedented scale.
Indeed, the sheer size of the problem is forcing entire industries--from shipping to software, banking to movies--to rethink their
operations.¶ Like those businesses, the trafficking boom owes much to globalization. In the last decade
revolutionary changes in technology and politics have reduced the obstacles that distance,
borders and government policies had imposed on the movement of goods, money and people. In
the 1990s the Internet made international coordination almost costless, and the only price that dropped faster than shipping a cargo
container from Shanghai to Los Angeles was the cost of a phone call across the world. Meanwhile, governments everywhere lowered
tariffs, eliminated currency controls and opened their economies to foreign traders and investors. All this has not only made the
traffickers' job easier, but allowed them to internationalize. Chinese counterfeiters now contract with Cameroonian peoplesmugglers to have illegal migrants sell fake Gucci bags in Paris or New York. Ukrainian criminals trade guns to their counterparts in
Colombia in exchange for cocaine.¶ Meanwhile as the revenues of the traffickers have soared, the law-
enforcement agencies fighting them have seen their budgets dwindle as a result of widespread
attempts to downsize government. In 2004 Interpol's entire budget was only $50 million--the cost of just one of the fast
ships or planes routinely used and abandoned by traffickers. And other priorities have complicated efforts to combat smuggling. Last
week an audit showed that the number of criminal investigations opened by the FBI has dropped by nearly half in the last five years,
a reflection of the bureau's shift toward stopping terrorism. In 2004 the agency assigned more than 2,000 fewer agents to criminal
matters than the year before.¶ All these changes have made more acute a longstanding asymmetry: national borders are a boon for
traffickers and a nightmare for law-enforcement agencies. Borders allow for the price differences that yield rich profits to smugglers
with the ability to transport goods across them. (While in 2004 the average annual income of a poppy farmer in Afghanistan was just
$1,700, a kilo of heroin fetched more than $39,000 in the United Kingdom.) Borders also provide a convenient legal shield for
smugglers once they cross over to another jurisdiction. Governments have a very hard time collaborating with other governments;
their natural habitat is inside their national borders. In contrast, traffickers are most effective when operating across borders--which
makes them in many ways better suited to today's world.¶ Indeed, while some smugglers still deal in only one product--cocaine, say,
or human kidneys--much of the power to dispatch goods and set prices now rests with agents, brokers, transporters and those who
control the bottlenecks where profits are highest. Crime organizations in northern Mexico have long since expanded their activities
from drug trafficking (which they frequently subcontract to smaller players) into new "profit centers." Their business model involves
opportunistic arrangements whereby they support Ukrainian, Chinese or Middle Eastern traffickers in the smuggling of various
items (including human beings), using their routes into the United States. Drugs remain a large part of the picture, but the real
prize--the core competitive advantage--is the ability to sneak goods and people across the border.¶ Of course, smuggling and
international crime have always existed. But three things make this new breed of trafficking far more dangerous than ever before.
First, the threat posed by the goods being smuggled has increased exponentially: think only of the black market in nuclear know-how
run by Pakistani scientist AQ Khan, which stretched from North Korea to Libya, or the estimated 300 tons of unsecured nuclear
material in the former Soviet Union. The movement of people is one area where authorities have recognized a threat and taken
strong measures to confront it--yet hardly made a dent in the flood of migrants (accompanying story).¶ Second, companies are
not only losing revenues to smugglers, copycats and fraudsters but also facing added costs--from protecting intellectual
property to complying with cumbersome new regulations for shipping or international fund transfers. According to one estimate,
adhering to new money-laundering laws now accounts for 10 percent of private banks' costs. And as the criminals reinvest
their profits in legitimate companies, businesses confront them aboveground, as it were--as
competitors, suppliers, distributors, bankers and perhaps even partners.¶ Finally, along with diversifying,
illicit traders have cultivated political ties--and the more unstable and dysfunctional the country
the better. Attempts by criminals to infiltrate governments are as old as governments themselves, of course. But never have they
had as many riches with which to buy cooperation, distraction and shelter. Last year the Lithuanian Parliament impeached President
Ronaldas Paksas for taking funds from a Russian businessman with alleged ties to Russian organized crime; provincial officials from
Afghanistan to Mexico have been implicated in the drug trade. It is no longer possible to understand some of the
current behaviors of China
or Russia or anticipate their likely evolution without considering the
enormous influence that illicit traders have gained at the highest levels of their central and provincial
governments. Beijing, for instance, is not likely to crack down on the country's massive counterfeiting industry as long as
military and Party officials continue to have a hand in the trade. The same is true of many countries in Africa, the
Balkans, Eastern Europe and Latin America.
Drug trafficking is a global security threat – destroys a country’s ability to compete
in the international economy – the US is the largest target
Durbin, 13 professor of the School of Graduate and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy at
Norwich University (Kirk J. Durbin “International Narco-Terrorism and Non-State Actors: The Drug Cartel Global Threat”
Global Security Studies, Winter 2013, Volume 4, Issue 1 http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Durbin%20Narcotics.pdf) // czhang
Conclusion¶ Narcotics and drug trafficking have become a tremendous national and international
¶
security threat globally. A number of opinions for legalizing drugs argue it will make many of ¶ society’s problems
disappear. The ideas are lofty and seem to work under the best conditions in ¶ the human mind, but fail miserably in reality.
Drugs are simply an addicting habit that has ¶ ensnared a number of people worldwide. The ramifications are immense
in every society. It ¶ destroys self-discipline and removes one’s moral compass. The evidence is over
whelming. For ¶ example, The Dutch Netherlands has reconsidered its relaxing enforcement on the use
of¶ cannabis. Tourists traveling to the Netherlands to visit Amsterdam’s coffee shops for its hybrid ¶ cannabis have
caused an economic impact on Amsterdam’s more traditional business in its red ¶ light district
(Associated Press, 2011, para. 11). The Netherlands has been producing hybrid¶ cannabis that has increased in higher concentrations
of Tetrahydrocannabino (THC) over the past ¶ three decades. According to the Associated Press (2011), the Dutch government has
announced ¶ it will classify the hybrid cannabis as a hard drug within the same category as cocaine, and ¶ ecstasy, reporting that the
hybrid weed has contributed to an increase breakdown in public health ¶ (para, 1, 5). The Dutch government is
concerned about a generation of citizens who’s public ¶ health could affect the Netherlands
ability to be competitive in the European Union and the ¶ global economy. The “leafy green substance”
has become such a tourist favorite that the Dutch ¶ government is moving to ban sales to the tourists. The Associated Press (2011)
mentions the Trimbos Institute findings that the average amount of THC in Dutch marijuana is currently ¶ around 17.8 percent. It
has been declining since 2004 after increasing steadily from 4 percent or ¶ so in the 1970s (para. 16). The Dutch have move beyond
tobacco cigars and have become known ¶ for its hybrid cannabis. The Dutch government policies of tolerance of its use have now ¶
reconsidered its negative impact on the country. ¶ The United States is the largest market for illegal drug
consumption resulting in violence ¶ and mayhem. To the Mexican drug cartels, this country by
its drug consumption finances their ¶ drug empires. Once a less violent activity of Mexico’s society, trafficking
marijuana has in the ¶ last thirty years become a violent war resulting in the loss of thousands of innocent lives. Who ¶ can the people
trust if not their governments? Activities with the mass slaughter of women, ¶ children, and government
officials have raised the violence to a level of terrorism. Because ¶ narcotics are the central reason
for the fighting, and massive corruption, the label of narcoterrorism fits. ¶
Failed States
Drug trade violence turns Mexico and Pakistan into failed states and destabilizes
the US
Broder, 9 senior editor for defense and foreign policy at Roll Call. Before joining Congressional Quarterly in 2002, he worked
as an editor at National Public Radio in Washington and as a foreign correspondent for the Associated Press, NBC News and the
Chicago Tribune, based in Jerusalem, Beirut and Beijing. graduate of the University of Virginia and studied international relations at
Harvard University. (Jonathan, “Mexico's Drug War: Violence Too Close to Home” 3/9/09
http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-000003069323.) // czhang
With an approving nod from the United States, Mexican President Felipe Calderon has thrown his army into the fight against the
cartels, but the well-armed gangs are fighting back. And according to some U.S. officials and experts, the Drug barons
are winning.¶ In Washington, where policy debates involving Mexico have been confined mostly to trade and immigration for
the past two decades, sudden awareness of the Drug war has produced some alarming assessments. Retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey,
who was the Drug czar in the Clinton White House, warned recently that unless the Mexican government gains
control of the Drug gangs, the United States could, within a decade, be confronting on its
southern border a “narco-state” — meaning an area controlled by Drug cartels. The Pentagon envisions
an even worse scenario: Mexico and Pakistan, it says, are the countries most at risk of swiftly collapsing
into “failed states” — those whose central governments are so weak they have little practical
control over most of their territory.¶ Beset as he is at home by the credit crisis and plunging economy, President
Obama’s response to the chaos in Mexico has so far been to continue some George W. Bush administration policies while beginning
a search for others. He is expected to focus on possible regional approaches when he attends a Summit of the Americas in Trinidad
and Tobago next month.¶ Experts on the region, though, say the magnitude of the Drug war in Mexico and its
danger to the United States far exceed the reach of existing federal policies, perhaps even the
policies the new administration is considering, such as stepped-up military aid and regional
cooperation.¶ Uncontrolled Drug violence in Mexico, these experts say, might result in tens of
thousands of refugees surging across the border, adding to the estimated 12 million immigrants already in the
country illegally. U.S. Drug officials say that a narco-state in Mexico could turn the ungoverned territory
along the border into a permanent springboard for Mexican Drug traffickers smuggling their
goods north into California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas. And economic analysts say that should the
Mexican government completely collapse, it would jeopardize oil exports from Mexico, from
which the United States receives a third of its supply.¶ “Any descent by Mexico into chaos,” the Pentagon’s Joint
Forces Command wrote in November, “would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland
security alone.”
Drug cartel causes democratic instability that turns Mexico into a failed state
O’Neil, 9 senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, a
nonpartisan foreign-policy think tank and membership organization. (Shannon, “The Real War in Mexico:
How Democracy Can Defeat the Drug Cartels” Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 4 (July/August 2009), pp. 63-77 JSTOR) //
czhang
The actual risk of the violence today is that it will undermine ¶ democracy tomorrow. What has
changed in Mexico in recent years is ¶ not the drug trade but that a
fledgling market-based democracy has ¶ arisen.
power ¶ now comes ¶ from the ballot box. This transformation has
coincided with the rise ¶ of Mexico's middle class, which, now nearly 30 million strong, has ¶ supported more ¶
open politics and markets. ¶ But Mexico's democratic system is still fragile . And by disrupting
¶ established payoff systems between drug traffickers and government ¶ officials, democratization unwittingly
exacerbated drug-related violence. ¶ The first two freely elected governments have struggled to respond,
¶ hampered by electoral competition and the decentralization of political ¶ power. Yet in the long run,
only through true democratic governance ¶ will Mexico successfully conquer, rather than just paper over,
its security ¶ challenges. For the safety and prosperity of Mexico and the United ¶ States, Washington
must go beyond its current focus on border control to a more ambitious goal: supporting
Mexico’s democracy.
Although an authoritarian legacy persists,
Drug instability risks Mexican failed state
Thoumi, Manaut, Sain, and Jácome, 10 (*Francisco E., expert at the Wilson Center, Ph.D.,
professor of economics and the director of the Research and Minotiring Center on Drugs and
Crime at Universidad el Rosario, former research coordinator at the United National Office of
Drug Control and Crime Prevention, **Raúl Benitez, public policy scholar at the Wilson Center,
researcher at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research in Science and Humanities, professor
and researcher at the North America Rsearch Center of UNAM-Mexico, CNAS Senior Fellow,
Distinguished Scholar-in-Residence, School of Public Affairs and Washington College of Law,
Ph.D in Latin American Studies at UNAM, Master of International Affairs from the Centro de
Investigacion y Docencia Economica, ***professor at the University of San Andrés, Ph.D.,
University of Salvador, political science, Francine, professor of anthropology at the Central
University of Venezuela, political science degree, Friedrich, Ebert, and Stiftung Research, “The
impact of organized crime on Democratic Governance in Latin America”,
Organized crime in Colombia is today more complex, diversified and sophisticated than when the cocaine industry started. Indeed,
the illegal industry has been a cata- lyst that aggravated many of the main social conflicts of the country and encouraged the growth
of organized crime. Organized crime has become a great obstacle to democratic governance in Colombia. n We can say that the
Mexican state is losing the war against drug trafficking and that therefore it must radically change its strategy
because of the following: the spike in executions, the exponential increase in U.S. aid, the increased presence
of the armed forces in the fight against drug trafficking and in public security in high risk cities, the
transformation of Juárez into the most dangerous city in the world, increasing cocaine consumption and the
sentiments that Mexico could become a failed state . n The management, administration and overall control of
public security matters and, amongst these, combating organized crime, as well as the organization and running of the police system
remain in the hands of the police themselves, generating a sort of »police-ification« of public security. In Brazil, Paraguay and to a
lesser extent in Uruguay this process has also included a strong tendency to incorporate the Armed Forces in the »war on organized
crime«, all prompted by the failings of the police system in tackling the problem.
Drug crime decreases legitimacy of Mexican government – risks collapse
Thoumi, Manaut, Sain, and Jácome, 10 (*Francisco E., expert at the Wilson Center, Ph.D.,
professor of economics and the director of the Research and Minotiring Center on Drugs and
Crime at Universidad el Rosario, former research coordinator at the United National Office of
Drug Control and Crime Prevention, **Raúl Benitez, public policy scholar at the Wilson Center,
researcher at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research in Science and Humanities, professor
and researcher at the North America Rsearch Center of UNAM-Mexico, CNAS Senior Fellow,
Distinguished Scholar-in-Residence, School of Public Affairs and Washington College of Law,
Ph.D in Latin American Studies at UNAM, Master of International Affairs from the Centro de
Investigacion y Docencia Economica, ***professor at the University of San Andrés, Ph.D.,
University of Salvador, political science, Francine, professor of anthropology at the Central
University of Venezuela, political science degree, Friedrich, Ebert, and Stiftung Research, “The
impact of organized crime on Democratic Governance in Latin America”,
Organized crime is a growing problem worldwide. In Latin America and the Caribbean groups of organized
crime are undermining the states capacity to govern . In- stitutions of the political system are
undercut by the so called » Narcos « or other non state actors. It is obvious that organized crime has adopted mechanisms of
the globalized economy such as a high degree of flexibility, the ability to quickly adjust to market changes and the use of socially
weak segments of society for their means. While organized crime gets more access to and through politics,
weakened states in Latin America are put under serious pressure. The impact on recently
democratized states like Mexico is severe . The role of or- ganized crime in the erosion of democratic governance is
already
marked by zones of fragile statehood, the undermin- ing of political institutions, the replacement of social pol- icies by non state
actors, the bribing of political actors and the illicit financing of political campaigns. But not only has the existence of
criminal activities cre- ated a threat to democratic governance . The repressive politics that often
respond to organized crime activities further create a spiral of mistrust, corruption and vio- lent reactions.
High levels of violence and public inse- curity often justify the popularity of zero tolerance ap- proaches: Politics of the »hard hand«
such as in Mexico and Colombia where the military is fighting in »a war on drugs«. These politics often produce human rights abus-
es and thus further undermine democratic forms of gov- ernance. The involvement of politicians and police forces or the military in
illegal businesses further undermine the trust of civil society into institutions of the state.
Human Rights
Drug trade leads to human rights violations
Kan, 9 (Paul R., Associate Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry L. Stimson
Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, pg.
70, Potomac Books Inc., Tashma)
As chapters 2 and 5 demonstrate, access to drug resources also increases the likelihood that warring
groups will abuse the human rights of civilians uninvolved in open hostilities. Widespread drug
abuse, child soldier recruitment, and atrocities against civilians breakdown informal social
controls that restrict behaviors that are detrimental to civil society like drug abuse and criminality/ Such effects
during conflicts mean that dealing with the aftermath of widespread human suffering serves as an
additional complication for governments and outside agencies that are involved in implementing the conditions of
conflict- resolution agreements. Without coming to grips with atrocities, criminality and the brea.kdown in social norms,
governments may find that popular discontent will affect newly gained but fragile political stability.
Human rights violations cause nuclear war and extinction
HR Web 94 (Human Rights Web, “An Introduction to the Human Rights Movement”, 7-20,
http://www.hrweb.org/intro.html)
The United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and UN Human Rights convenants were written and
implemented in the aftermath of the Holocaust, revelations coming from the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the Bataan Death March,
the atomic bomb, and other horrors smaller in magnitude but not in impact on the individuals they affected. A whole lot of people in
a number of countries had a crisis of conscience and found they could no longer look the other way while tyrants jailed, tortured, and
killed their neighbors. Many also realized that advances in technology and changes in social structures had rendered war a threat to
the continued existence of the human race. Large numbers of people in many countries lived under the control
of tyrants,
having no recourse but war to relieve often intolerable living conditions. Unless some way
could revolt and become the catalyst for another wide-scale
and possibly nuclear war. For perhaps the first time, representatives from the majority of governments in the world came to the
conclusion that basic human rights must be protected, not only for the sake of the individuals and countries involved,
but to preserve the human race.
was found to relieve the lot of these people, they
Illegal drugs are utilized as weapons --- attackers intoxicate their enemies --- that
equates to extreme human rights violations
Kan, 9 (Paul R., Associate Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry L. Stimson
Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, pg.
3, Potomac Books Inc., Tashma)
The presence of drugs in today’s conflicts has contributed to the volatile nature of inter- national
and regional security in the post-Cold War era. Drug trafficking contributes to prolonged
intrastate conflicts and high levels of arms trafficking and cross border migra- tions. Intoxicated
combatants have committed gross violations of human rights, adding to humanitarian
catastrophes that the international community has felt compelled to limit through military
intervention. Additionally, when irregular forces use the drug economy it can contribute to
higher casualty figures for professional rnilitaries—in September 2006, with the resurgent
Taliban funded by drug profits, it became statistically as dangerous for American service
members to serve in Afghanistan as in Iraq.‘“
Human Trafficking
Winning the war on drugs is key to combat human trafficking
Cota, 7/4/13 writer for the Guardian (Isabella, “Central America's drug cartels turn their attention to trafficking
people” The Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2013/jul/04/central-america-drug-cartels-traffickingpeople) // czhang
Across the region, a deadly combination of mass undocumented migration, poverty, and the breakdown of law
and order are proving fertile ground for a thriving and increasingly unbreakable trade in
people.¶ "We are a region in which migration is a part of the mental landscape, where leaving the country for work always is, and
always has been, an option," says Ana Hidalgo, regional counter-trafficking project manager at the International Organisation for
Migration.¶ "Human trafficking, in any of its manifestations, responds to the laws of economics worldwide, to the supply and
demand in the labour market … and it is amid these uncontrollable forces that the trafficker appears." ¶ Asahac, an NGO based in
northern Mexico, estimates that more than half of Central American migrants trying to cross into the US
fall into the hands of trafficking or smuggling rings, or end up in sexual or forced labour.¶ In the
past decade, Central America has become one of the most dangerous regions in the world. Mexico's widely reported drug war has left
about 70,000 people dead. Honduras has a murder rate of 86 per 100,000 inhabitants – San Pedro Sula is the most dangerous city
in the world, with 173 murders per 100,000 people.¶ This rise in violence has been attributed largely to the
growing power of drug cartels, who are expanding their business from trafficking drugs to
trafficking people, says Marcela Chacón, Costa Rica's deputy minister of interior and police.¶ "Why? Because a dose of drugs
can be bought and consumed only once, but the same human being can be exploited in many forms over and
over again throughout a lifetime," says Chacón.¶ In 2010, 72 Central Americans were found murdered in northern
Mexico, allegedly by the hands of the Zetas cartel. The Mexican army recently rescued 165 people who had been travelling as
undocumented migrants when they were kidnapped by a drug cartel near the US border.¶ In a report on Latin America and the
Caribbean (pdf) last year, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime warned that human trafficking was likely to become
an
increasingly lucrative revenue stream for Central America's drug cartels.¶ Teresa Ulloa, director of the
Coalition Against Trafficking in Women and Girls in Latin America and the Caribbean, says her organisation believes that
Mexican drug cartels made $10bn last year from the enforced sexual exploitation and slavery of
thousands of girls and women.¶ "The Latin American convention remains that women are to be used for men's pleasure.
This means that if they can't access our bodies through force, they can do so with money, creating a demand for women and girls,"
says Ulloa.¶ "If we could create policy on human trafficking that has gender equality at its core, then
we would be tackling demand. If there was no demand for slaves, there would be no supply."¶
While governments across Central America have revised anti-trafficking legislation in recent years, they continue
to be outpaced and outgunned by the increasing power of the cartels in controlling people
trafficking across the region.¶ "[Cartels] are organisations that have no limits," says Hidalgo. "They
have amassed such power that they bend and violate the rules with reliable impunity … and also,
they have millions [of dollars] in resources."¶ "It's easy to see how they can remain one step ahead of
any police, especially in these countries where police forces usually lack resources and have to follow many bureaucratic steps
and rules. If these organised networks didn't exist, we would have many poor, excluded people here but we wouldn't have slaves."
Drug trafficking allows increased sex trafficking
Lehti, 6 a researcher in the National Research Institute of Legal Policy in Helsinki, Finland and
a Aromaa was a criminologist and the leader of the European Institute for Crime (HEUNI) – a
degree in political science and was previously the Institute of Legal Policy Director (Martti and Kauko
Aromaa, “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation” Crime and Justice , Vol. 34, No. 1 (2006), pp. 133-227 JSTOR) // czhang
Prostitution and related trafficking have historically been closely linked to organized crime. Both
are lucrative enterprises with relatively high profits and low risks. Many criminal activities, for example,
drug trafficking and human smuggling, are easy to combine with them. For international drug trafficking
networks, pandering is an alluring side business, in which profits equal those from the wholesale trade in mild drugs,
but the risks are almost nonexistent. Trafficking, pandering, and retail sale of drugs complement
one another well. Drug distribution can be concentrated on the premises where prostitutes
work, and prostitutes can be used as dealers and couriers. At the same time prostitutes can effectively
be brought under the control of pimps as accomplices and through drug abuse. All kinds of smuggling
enterprises can easily be combined with trafficking in prostitutes (NCIS 2002, pp. 35, 38–39; see also
Junninen 2005).
LA Instability
Trafficking turns stability – makes suppressing violence impossible
Kleiman, 4 (Mark, B.A. magna cum laude, Haverford College, M.P.P., Harvard Kennedy School, Ph.D., Harvard, Professor of
Public Policy in the UCLA School of Public Affairs, “Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist Threat: Causal Links and Implications for
Domestic Drug Control Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 4/20/2004, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32334.pdf, JKahn)
Drug dealing can generate chaos and instability in source and transit countries by sustaining
violence , both within and among groups of traffickers and between traffickers on the one hand and ordinary citizens and public
authorities on the other. The growth of a criminal economy is also a potentially destabilizing factor . Drug
law enforcement can create friction between law enforcement and military authorities on the one
hand and ordinary citizens, including small farmers who illicitly grow drug crops, on the other. The secretive techniques
of drug investigation can become entangled with the practice of authoritarian rule , as appears to have
happened under the Fujimori16 government in Peru. In addition, traffickers can deliberately create chaos in order to
weaken the ability of the institutions of government and civil society to interfere with their illegal business. In
Colombia, for example, the Medellin Cartel attempted to use terror to deter the Colombian government
from proceeding with vigorous law enforcement measures.17 The same effects can also take place in consumer countries. The retail
drug traffic, especially when it grows violent, can be a powerful source of chaos, as many American neighborhoods discovered as the
crack trade spread in the 1980s and early 1990s. It has been suggested, though not demonstrated, that drug trafficking has
been used as a form of low-intensity conflict .18 The theory is that forces hostile to a given country might
attempt to introduce or aggravate drug addiction problems there as a means of attack.
NarcoTerrorism
Trafficking will result in narco-terrorism which causes bioweapons attacks
Flynn and Bryan, 01 (*Stephen E., Founding Co-Director of the George J. Kostas Research Institute for Homeland
Security and Professor of Political Science at Northeastern University, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, **Anthony,
director of the North-South Center’s Caribbean Program, “Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.Caribbean Cooperation”, Council on Foreign Relations, 10/21/2001, http://www.cfr.org/border-and-port-security/terrorismporous-borders-homeland-security-case-us-caribbean-cooperation/p4844)
Caribbean Regional Security¶ Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception.
Already the linkages
between drug trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and
such connections have similar potential in the Caribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some
Caribbean countries is vital. Petroleum refineries and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100 companies that
produce the majority of the world’s methanol, ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG),
are vulnerable targets . Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, terrorists
are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries.¶ Security issues become
even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the
United States. An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over
South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves
a Caribbean port. Moreover, terrorists
with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to
move easily through passport controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some
countries have suspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted
such citizenship.) Again, Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine
manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders .¶ Over the years, there have
been efforts to strengthen the region’s security systems, particularly in countries of the English-speaking
Caribbean. The stimulus has often been directed at pursuing drug traffickers and their money. However, despite the
"third border" concept, the United States has paid little policy attention to the Caribbean countries as an
integral part of its perimeter defence structure. Such neglect on the part of the United States, at this time, would be
irresponsible. Caribbean countries should be encouraged to join an international consensus and genuine partnership to
guarantee as far as possible the security of the United States and bordering countries. (In this context, the United States will have to
consider even closer collaboration with Cuba in global security considerations, despite current policy that brands Cuba as a terrorist
state.) This collaboration, which is in the Caribbean’s best interest, will force a review of the current policy which allows the
unimpeded flow of illegal small arms to Caribbean countries, exacerbating serious crime problems, as well as the "repatriation" of
sophisticated criminals who might have only the most tenuous claim to birthright or citizenship in a Caribbean country. Ironically,
U.S. Customs officials have in the past argued that more vigilance in attempting to detect guns leaving their shores would slow trade.
The tragedy of September 11 has illustrated that it may be worthwhile to spend time and effort intercepting the flow of small arms.¶
Caribbean governments are taking steps to tighten security at airports and other vulnerable locales, but terrorism
is a global
problem , and the region will have to decide on the right kind of approach to the issue. Many Caribbean citizens may feel that the
United States is once more trying to assert its own agenda, but the recent attacks (and those that could follow) require a sea change
in Caribbean thinking about regional security. National borders are porous to terrorism — no one need claim
responsibility for attacks — and globalization and technology have opened up new possibilities for
terrorists.¶ The Necessity for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation¶ As cross-border trade has grown, security and those responsible for
providing it have been shoved aside. For example, despite trade more than tripling between the United States and Canada since the
inception of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the number of customs and immigration inspectors along the
border remain at pre-NAFTA levels. The U.S. Coast Guard, which is essential to port security, is at its lowest personnel level since
1964. The United States is now experiencing the dark side of a transport system in which efficiency has trumped public security. As
the country mobilizes for a long struggle against terrorism, it must face some basic realities. There will continue to be
anti-American terrorists with global reach who have the capability to carry out catastrophic
attacks .
Patriarchy
Women are subject to horrible conditions when drug trafficking is high – they face
violence and sexism
Campbell 8 Professor of Anthropology at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Texas (Howard,
“Female Drug Smugglers on the U-S.-Mexico Border: Gender, Crime, and Empowerment” Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 81, No. 1
(Winter, 2008), pp. 233-267 Published by: The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic Research
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30052745) // czhang
The growing feminization of drug smuggling has complex and contra- ¶ dictory impacts on women's lives. On the negative side,
women are sub- ¶ ject to drug violence and some male drug traffickers coerce or manipulate ¶
lovers, spouses, and relatives into collaborating in the business as mules,11 ¶ drivers, and keepers
of drug stashes (Fleetwood nd.:20). Women also may ¶ be forced to conceal their husband's activities
or pay off drug debts ¶ incurred by their husbands. In these instances, women take on consider- ¶ able riskincluding arrest, imprisonment (and loss of contact with chil- ¶ dren), and physical harm-yet
often enjoy few of the profits of the trade. ¶ In other cases, women may be left with children and no
income or emo- ¶ tional support after a husband or significant other is arrested. Inevitably, ¶ a drug trafficking
lifestyle produces violence, stress and anxiety, though ¶ there are a wide range of male and
female experiences that vary by ¶ race/ethnicity, class and age (on the great diversity of experience that ¶
binary gender and other categories elide, see Butler 1990).
Any liberating aspects of illegal drug trade are overshadowed by the larger
patriarchal structures
Campbell 8 Professor of Anthropology at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the
University of Texas (Howard, “Female Drug Smugglers on the U-S.-Mexico Border: Gender, Crime, and Empowerment” Anthropological
Quarterly, Vol. 81, No. 1 (Winter, 2008), pp. 233-267 Published by: The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic Research
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30052745) // czhang
Although women may suffer disproportionately from the effects of drug ¶ trafficking, there are other scenarios in which engaging
in drug smuggling ¶ or creating a distribution organization is a vehicle for a degree of female¶
empowerment and liberation from forms of male control and a source of ¶ excitement and adventure
(Fleetwood nd.:21-22). Such women can- ¶ though not all do-adopt stylized capo roles or macho postures
but use ¶ them for their own ends as women. Individual female "liberation" through ¶ trafficking,
however, does little to transform a larger patriarchal cultural ¶ economy, and may even reinforce it
through the promulgation of macho/a ¶ symbolism. Ultimately, women's social class position and place within
drug ¶ smuggling organizations shapes the relative benefits they receive from ¶ drug trafficking
such that drug smuggling frequently often leads to female ¶ victimization, especially at the lowest
and middle levels of drug trafficking ¶ organizations. However, it is also, in the case of high-level and some low- ¶
level and middle-level smugglers, a vehicle for female empowerment.
Peru Instability
Drug trade empowers Peruvian guerillas --- risks instability
Chalk, 11 (Peter, Senior Political Scientist at RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in political science,
University of British Columbia, M.A. in political studies and international relations, University
of Aberdeen, “The Latin American Drug Trade Scope, Dimensions, Impact, and Response,”
RAND Project Air Force,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf,
Tashma)
Beyond Colombia, the drug trade is helping to reenergize the SL guerrilla war in Peru, which supposedly
ended in 2000. According to analysts with the Catholic University in Lima, at least two factions of the organization
are currently seeking to entrench themselves in the country’s cocaine trade by acting as security
subcontractors for indigenous farmers.4 These blocs allegedly employ about 350 combatants to
protect farmers and their fields and, in 2008, were linked to the deaths of at least 26 people
(including 22 soldiers and police), making it the bloodiest year in almost a decade. As Antezana of the
Catholic University remarks, “the guerrillas are now able to operate with the efficiency and
deadliness of an elite drug trafficking organization.”5
That destroys the Amazon rainforest --- empirically civil unrest erodes the climate
Piltz, 9 (Rick, “A deadly conflict in Peru over a rush to drill for oil in Amazon rainforest: how
culpable is the US?,” Climate Science Watch, 6/8/09,
http://www.climatesciencewatch.org/2009/06/08/a-deadly-conflict-in-peru-over-a-rush-todrill-for-oil-in-amazon-rainforest-how-culpable-is-the-us/, Tashma)
A clash between indigenous peoples of the Amazon rainforest in Peru and government police has broken
out in deadly violence , leaving more than 40 indigenous people and nearly two dozen police dead. At issue is
whether multinational oil companies will have access to explore and drill for oil and minerals on
ancestral lands under a “free trade” agreement forged between the Bush administration and Peru.
Thousands of indigenous people desperate to save their ancestral lands and way of life began protesting in April. On June 5 the
president of Peru ordered 650 police to use tear gas and guns on the ground and from helicopters on crowds of peaceful protesters
The conflict illustrates the economics and geopolitics of oil and minerals, versus the urgent
need for better stewardship over Earth’s natural systems. President Obama should reconsider
this agreement in terms of the tradeoff between a short-term economic boon for some Peruvians at the
expense of others and the US thirst for oil and minerals, versus the longer-term damage to the Amazon
rainforest and the life it supports, its vast ability to sequester and store carbon, and Earth’s climate system.
blocking a main highway.
Amazon destruction ensures extinction
Takacs, 96 (David, THE IDEA OF DIVERSITY: PHILOSOPHIES OF PARADISE, pg. 200-201)
So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us
to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs’ rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by
eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: “It is likely that
destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global
climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain
heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin
could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings per-ished. And if our species is very unlucky,
the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.” Elsewhere Ehrlich
uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues?
Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion, loss of
dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to
wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates
will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn
from Earth's well¬stocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As
ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will
lower life expectancies to the point where can¬cer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will
bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it
appears that civilization will disappear some time before the end of the next century - not with a bang but a
whimper.
Resource Wars
Drug trade fuels resource conflicts over other commodities
Kan, 9 (Paul R., Associate Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry L. Stimson
Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, pg.
4-6, Potomac Books Inc., Tashma)
Coming to grips with the influence of drugs in contemporary warfare is long overdue. Unique to the post-Cold War era is the
proportion of wars occurring within states to wars occurring between states·—fr0m 1990-2004, only four out of fifty-seven conflicts
were traditional interstate conflicts." ln the rrtid-1990s an important debate centered on why some long-standing civil wars that
began during the Cold War in Latin America, Central Asia, and Africa continued long after its end, while other conflicts in these
areas were sparked and seemed to be both protracted and bloody One explanation is that economic agendas linked to the
accessibility of natural resources, "greed," have supplanted ideologi- cal and political sources, "grievance," as causes for the outbreak
and protraction of intr- astate war. Greed is a particularly persuasive argument—even though war brings
depravation to significant segments of a society in conflict, warring
parties often commit acts of predation to
extract licit and illicit resources that are then funneled into legitimate and illegitimate global commerce.
Armed conflicts present many participants opportunities to exploit commercial resources to pay
for military operations and gain private profit." This linkage suggests one cause of prolonged conf|icts—there is
little economic incentive for a group to relinquish the profits they receive from illegal trade. Although numerous civil wars
begin with a political agenda, many transform into profit-motivated violence. Paul Collier notes that "to get started, a
rebellion needs a grievance, whereas to be sustained, it needs greed.""*
The greed argument is even more compelling when looking at the influence of drug trafficking on warfare because drugs have not
been a cause of war since the Opium Wars during the nineteenth century Drugs have not provided the basis for any grievance that
has led to widespread social, political, or economic movements that were grounds for orga- nized violence. Because of their
profitability and ease of distribution, drugs have also supported other greed-related struggles. In
some cases, drugs are bartered for other illegally traded commodities, such as diamonds and
timber, that are part of other resource-driven conflicts. Nonetheless, by providing funding and intoxication, drugs
also support conflicts where grievance issues, such as land distribution, resource allocation, and political rights, are at the center of
the disputes. For example, drug funding and use were components of conflicts in Angola, Liberia, and Sri Lanka, but were not the
central issue of the fighting.
Terrorism
Trafficking revenues fund terrorists
Kleiman, 4 (Mark, B.A. magna cum laude, Haverford College, M.P.P., Harvard Kennedy School, Ph.D., Harvard, Professor of
Public Policy in the UCLA School of Public Affairs, “Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist Threat: Causal Links and Implications for
Domestic Drug Control Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 4/20/2004, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32334.pdf, JKahn)
Drug trafficking — in source countries, transit countries, and consumer countries, including the United States — could
contribute to the problems of terror in at least five distinct ways: Supplying cash for terrorist operations ;
Creating chaos in countries where drugs are produced, through which they pass, or in which they are sold at retail and
consumed — chaos sometimes deliberately cultivated by drug traffickers — which may provide an
environment conducive to terrorist activity ; Generating corruption in law enforcement, military, and
other governmental and civil-society institutions in ways that either build public support for terrorist-linked groups or
weaken the capacity of the society to combat terrorist organizations and actions; Providing services also
useful for terrorist actions and movements of terrorist personnel and materiel, and supporting a common infrastructure, such as
smuggling capabilities, illicit arms acquisition, money laundering, or the production of false identification or other
documents, capable of serving both drug-trafficking and terrorist purposes; and Competing for law enforcement and intelligence
attention. In principle, any of these might be important.
War
Drug trade fuels conflict --- profitable production areas become conflict hotspots --empirics prove
Kan, 9 (Paul R., Associate Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies at the US
Army War College, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, pg. 1, Potomac Books Inc., Tashma)
Warfare and drugs share many characteristics—they prolong human suffering, bedevil political leaders, and enrich a select few.
Further, they have been intertwined at vari- ous times throughout history However, the pernicious role of drugs in
organized political violence is often overlooked. Drugs have caused wars, funded military operations,
been used by combatants, and have been part of the postwar political landscape by financing some
legitimate political actors and parties. Drugs have corrupted militaries, toppled governments,
prompted interventions, and taken thousands of lives. The insidious nature of drugs is especially visible in
t0day’s wars.
Contemporary wars generally involve sharp asymmetries where one party wields a superior
conventional military against the irregular forces of a militarily weaker party; they are by their very
nature fertile environments for a variety of drug-related activities. Today’s wars are structured differently from traditional, largescale interstate wars of the past. The military dimension of current conflicts is generally overshadowed by political, social, economic, and psychological concerns} These
concerns are where the influence of drugs is most acutely felt
by societies in conflict. It is no coincidence that some of the most persistent wars, from the
Balkans to the Hindu Kush and from the Andes to the Golden Triangle, occur in areas of
widespread drug production and well—traveled distribution routes. ln fact, the rate at which civil wars occur is much
higher among drug producing countries than non-drug producing countries? Astonishingly, 95 percent of the world’s
production of hard drugs takes place in contexts of armed conflict?
Drugs are responsible for guerilla conflict --- drug profits enable wartime
operations and drugs can be used as strategic psychological weapons
Kan, 9 (Paul R., Associate Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies at the US
Army War College, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, pg. 1-3, Potomac Books Inc., Tashma)
In many of the wars in the post-Cold War world, such as the Colombian governments ongoing struggle against the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas, drugs
are so deeply embedded in the politics,
society, economy and daily life of a country that it is often difficult to separate counternarcotics
operations from counterinsurgency campaigns. As the director of the Colombian national police declared, "one
does not know if the drug trafficker is a guerrilla or if the guerrilla is a drug trafficker. The line is
now blurred ; it is a brotherhood community"‘* Other brotherhood communities threaten the conventional military successes of
recent U.S, interventions. The 2007 poppy season in Afghanistan produced 92 percent of the world’s heroin and lined the pockets of
Taliban loyalists and other warlords who opposed the American presence in the countrys
Meanwhile in Iraq drug trafficking sharply increased and Iraqi drug abuse rose by 75 percent between February 2003 and july 2003.
Both activities subvert efforts to build a stable nation? In some conflict situations, along with troops and
bullets, drugs have the potential to alter the course of conflicts.
Following the Cold War, numerous civil wars erupted, creating new demands for funds. Without
the ideological competition of the Cold War, newly armed groups and many former clients of the superpowers have become more
entrepreneurial in their quests to keep their political movements or governments viable. A variety of warring groups, such
as insurgents, guerrillas, paramilitaries, militias, terrorists, and professional armies, have
found wider opportunities to
generate support from illicit activities to meet varying goals, including carving out a new ethnic homeland,
overthrowing an established authority, changing the course of state’s domestic or foreign policy; and defeating an urban or rural
insurgency.
Drugs are especially attractive to those engaged in violent conflicts for many reasons. First, drug
trafficking is a highly profitable business. Estimates of the illicit global trade in narcotics are between $150 billion
and $500 billion in annual sales.7 By the year 2000, drug trafficking already accounted for 2 percent of the
world’s economy“ Drug profits can be used to pay for arms, equipment, and training, bribe
governmental officials, and recruit sympathizers. Because of its participation in the cocaine trade, the FARC is the
worlds richest insurgent group with assets believed to be approximately $600 million? Second, unlike the illicit trade in diamonds,
copper, and oil, commodities with a sometimes irregr- la.r availability; drug
crops are a reliable means of
generating income for they can be regularly harvested in the proper conditions. Third, illegal
narcotics are appealing during vio- lent conflicts because they are easy to manufacture, transport, and conceal,
which allows for greater distribution and larger profits. Trade in oil, alluvial gems, and timber requires the use
of skilled labor and sophisticated technology whereas drug trafficking requires unskilled labor and limited teclmology. Most drugs
are lightweight, high value commodi- ties, making profitable quantities relatively easy to move. Fourth, drugs have an
additional benefit that other commodities do not—combatants consume them for battle. Individual
Hghters can use drugs to alter their behavior ir1 ways that may seem beneficial to them in combat. Finally drugs can be a means to
attack an adversary’s military and society in the belief that this will lead to battlefield or ideological victory. Encouraging drug
use within the enemy’s military or the enemy’s society provides a warring group with one more
weapon against its enemy. As a result of these qualities, drugs are the most fungible commodity in some of
the most persistent conflicts.
No checks to escalation --- drug-fueled conflicts are distinct from conventional
warfare
Kan, 9 (Paul R., Associate Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies at the US
Army War College, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, pg. 5, Potomac Books Inc., Tashma)
Battlefield intoxication is also an important element when discussing the role of drugs in
warfare. With civil wars now comprising the vast majority of violent clashes, very few wars are
between professional militaries. account for the majority of lighting forces. As a result of diminished
professionalism, narcotic usage allows for "combat narcosis," which alters a person’s fear, stress,
and inhibition. Drug abuse by combatants not only presents professional militaries with
operational and tactical challenges, but it has a range of effects as well—from public health issues to
human rights abuses as well as post-conllict settlement a.t1d nation—building.
Terms like "narcoterrorist" and "narcoguerrilla" reveal the degree to which antago- nists involved in contemporary
wa.rs combine narcotraffickers activities with techniques of political violence.`These new actors have led many to argue
that the nature and character of modern warfare is changing.
Martin Vw Creveld argues that war has become "transformed" as we enter a "new era, not of peaceful
competition between trading blocks, but of warfare between ethnic and religious groups" waged "not by
armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers." Barbara Ehrenriech,
too, points to a "new kind of wan" one "less disciplined and more spontaneous than the old," and "one often fought by ill-clad bands
more resembling gangs than armies." In a similar vein, Mary Kaldor writes about "new wars" ones centrally about "identity politics,"
fought in a context of globalization by “a disparate range of different types of groups such as paramilitary units, local warlords,
criminal gangs, police forces, mercenary groups and also regular armies including breakaway units of regular armies.""
In response to such changes, some argue that the West should place greater focus on ongoing conflicts that "involve limited
engagements and attrition, guerrilla warfare, terror- ism and other types of low intensity cont]icts."“ In many cases, the
widespread violence created by the actors involved in these types of conflicts is fueled by their
active links to the drug trade.
AT: Democracy Checks
Democracy efforts fail --- and if they succeed, they’ll inevitably backfire
Kan, 9 (Paul R., Associate Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies at the US
Army War College, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, pg. 105-106, Potomac Books Inc., Tashma)
Democracy Is Not an Antidote
Just as ideology has not served as a barrier to a group’s participation in the drug trade, the
promotion of democracy in countries that have experienced drug-fueled conflicts has not
resolved the violence or ended participation in the drug trade. In fact, new democracies have proven to be
highly susceptible to the infiltration of drug barons. New interest groups, which were previously
locked out of power or gained power from drug activities, often become part of the political process and
manipulate the government apparatus to protect their drug interests. Treasuries that are depleted by years of
war need to be Hlled in order to fund needed economic, social, and political programs designed to revive the nation. Financial
institutions often lack transparency and government ministers have been largely unaccountable.
For example, many local politicians in new African democracies sec cannabis revenues as useful to
boost their countries’ balance of payments. Ravaged by years of war; citizens of newly formed
democracies carve out their livelihoods through participating in the black market. In nations where
autocratic rule has been replaced by democratic institutions, there is often a reduced role for the military As a result, it often suffers
budget cuts and reduced pay which create conditions for corruption. All of these elements combine to undermine new democratic
institutions and practices and set the stage for the return ofthe conflict.
In fact, instituting
democratic practices too quickly may worsen the drug economy. To be inclusive and
resolution and nation-building efforts may force golden-parachute
scenarios on a country. The insistence on quick transitions to democracy also comes with
development and economic-restructuring pro- grams that often involve massive social transformation.
Wide-ranging and far-reaching economic, political, and social programs may disempower locals who, as a
result, resent (and perhaps resist) new modes of governance, creating opportunities for warlords and
drug barons to exploit.
gain maximum consensus, conflict
*Mex – Afghan Stability
Mex – Economy (Trade)
Drug trade destroys the Mexican economy --- consensus of experts
Gray, 10 (Colin, “The Hidden Cost of the War on Drugs,” Stanford Progressive, May 2010,
http://www.stanford.edu/group/progressive/cgi-bin/?p=521, Tashma)
As a net effect, most
experts would agree that the illicit drug trade adversely affects the
Mexican economy. Cartels undermine the rule of law. Instability alienates current investors
and deters potential investors or business-owners. Government revenues fall, as taxable
commodities are replaced in the economy by illegal goods that are not taxed by the government.
Tourism, one of Mexico’s most important exports, suffers: the U.S. military has officially discouraged
travelers from vacationing in many parts of Mexico. Drug cartels often intervene in economies
directly, further discouraging investment. According to the L.A. Times, the Zetas (the military arm of the Gulf Cartel)
“have proved to be ruthless overlords. They have kidnapped businessmen, demanded protection money
from merchants, taken over sales of pirated CDs and DVDs and muscled into the liquor trade by forcing
restaurant and bar owners to buy from them.” Viridiana Rios of the Harvard Department of Government estimates that “the
cost of violence is equivalent to 1.07 billion dollars, investment losses accounts for other 1.3 billion, drug abuse generates a
loss of 0.68 billion dollars, and other costs may have an impact as high as 1.5 billion dollars.”
Drug trade eviscerates foreign direct investment into Mexico --- acts as a brake on
growth
Caldwell, 12 (Deborah, senior editor for Enterprise, “Crime Explodes — But an Economy Booms,” CNBC, 9/18/12,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/49037775, Tashma)
And that is the paradox of Mexico. On one hand, the
country’s well-publicized drug killings would appear to
be a clear disincentive to foreign investment. On the other hand, the economy has become an under-the-radar
economic juggernaut. “It’s like the Mexican economy is driving with the emergency brake on ,” Selee said.
“You can only imagine if the violence weren’t going on, its growth could be extraordinary.
You can’t help think they could sustain 5 to 6 percent growth in one year.” (Mexico is expected to grow at a
rate of about 4 percent this year.) Violence is a key factor in Mexico's low -to-middling competitiveness
ranking among the nations of the world. According to the World Economic Forum, Mexico ranked 58 out of 142 of
the world’s countries in its 2010-2012 Global Competitive Index. Not surprisingly, the “most problematic factors for
doing business” are crime, theft, corruption, and inefficient government bureaucracy. To put the
ranking in context: The United States ranks number five out of 142; but Brazil — generally considered the darling of Latin American
foreign investment — ranks 53 out of 142 countries. Violence related to Mexico’s drug trade increased dramatically after President
Felipe Calderon took office in 2006 and launched a war on the cartels.Almost immediately, killings in Mexico rose as the cartels
fought back. More than 47,000 people have been killed in drug violence since the start of the war on
drugs through September 2011, the last time the government released official figures. Calderon leaves office in
December after his six-year term is complete. This month he acknowledged crime is a deterrent to
foreign direct investment.
The illegal drug industry is a negative externality for the Mexican economy –
promotes violence, corruption, and drug abuse
Rios, 8 – PhD candidate in Government and a doctoral fellow in Inequality and Criminal
Justice at the Harvard Kennedy School, studying drug trafficking, violence and corruption in
Mexico (Viridiana, “Evaluating the economic impact of Mexico’s drug trafficking industry,”
Graduate Students Political Economy Workshop, Institute for Quantitative Social Sciences,
Harvard University, Spring 2008,
http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios2008_MexicanDrugMarket.pdf)//BI
In general, industries are perceived to be positive externalities for the economy for two reasons.
First, increasing the number of industries reduces the risk of sharp economic declines (Kalemil-
Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha 2003). Second,
firms look for - and promote- a stable investment environment.
drug traffic certainly satisfies the first condition –it is helpful to
diversify the economy- what differentiates drug industry from other legal industries, and what makes it a negative
externality for the economy, is the type of critical resources that it needs to succeed (Beltrán and SalcedoAlbarán 2007). Instead of requiring strong political institutions and promoting a peaceful investment environment, drug traffic
benefits from government corruption and tends to promote violence and public demand for drugs. This set
(Beltrán and Salcedo-Albarán 2007). Although
of externalities can be classified in three main categories: the generation of violence, the promotion of corruption and the creation of
local drug markets. The negative impact that violence has on economic stability has been well
documented. Actually, there are a number of ways in which violence results in direct and indirect financial costs: the loss of
productivity associated with death or injury, the loss of human capital investments and the costs
of medical care and legal services (UNODC 2007a). In addition, the psychological harm associated with
violent experiences has a significant impact on the economy. Fear of violence can cause people to withdraw
from social interaction in order to protect themselves. This manifests itself in some very concrete ways. There are many opportunity
costs involved in living a life designed around avoiding criminal vulnerability. Some people simply refuse to go out at night or to
make use of public transportation, which may limit access to productive and educational activities. Violence also fosters
migration. Studies of Sinaloa’s migration flows -one of the major centers of drug trafficking in Mexico- has shown that drug-
related violence has generated the migration of at least 360,000 inhabitants, leaving ghost towns all around the region (Lopez
2007). Tamaulipas has experienced the same phenomenon. Residents and local business constantly leave Tamaulipas’ capital, tired
of trafficker’s extortions. In the last few years, more than a dozen businesses have relocated to the US (Corchado 2007). This is
particularly hazardous for the Mexican economy because violence discourages investment.
Transnational corporations do not want to invest personnel in an environment in which they may be in jeopardy or in which they
would have to pay hazardous-duty salaries (WB 2004). Although it is difficult to calculate how violence is impacting economic
development, a good proxy is the study by Londoño and Guerrero (2002) which measures the economic costs of violence
and crime in Mexico12. According to the authors, total economic losses are 12.3% of the total Mexican GDP
(Londoño and Guerrero 2000, WB 2004). Of course, not all violence and crime are related to the drug business. Assuming that only
a proportion of the crimes are drug related, the total cost of drug traffic goes from 0.43 to 1.43 billion dollars annually13. Second,
drug traffic can also be considered a negative externality because it fosters corruption. Drug traffic is
well known for corrupting authorities from all levels in the government hierarchy. The links
between traffickers and
Mexican police, prosecutors, judges and politicians are not a secret (Sarmiento 1991, Blancornaleras 2002,
Fernández Menendez 1999, Fernández Menendez and Ronquillo 2006, Shelley 2001, and Chabat 2006). In fact, it has been
documented that a significant part of drug revenues goes into the hands of corrupted politicians (Corchado 2005). Even president
Calderon himself has accepted that organized crime has tried to extend its power to the political arena, either by funding,
intimidating or impugning the electoral processes. The corruption of Mexican institutions by the drug industry
imposes severe economic costs. To begin with, a corrupted judicial system reduces competitiveness.
Corruption increases the cost of making business because contract compliance becomes less credible. This high uncertainty acts as a
constraint for business implementation, reducing the investment attractiveness of the country and its ability to compete in the global
markets. Indeed, the impact of corruption in competitiveness has proven to be very significant (Kaufmann 2005). Therefore, it is not
surprising that corruption is negatively correlated with the level of aggregate investments and
economic growth. As Mauro’s (1995) influential paper discovered, aggregate investment is 5% lower in countries identified as
being corrupt. Assuming this estimate is correct, the perception of Mexico as a corrupt country translates into loses that go from
0.01 to 1.66 billion dollars annually (See appendix A). Corruption also generates additional negative externalities such as a
vicious cycle of increasing criminality (Beltrán and Salcedo-Albarán 2007), a reduction in free press (Kauffman 2000,
Corchado 2007), a curtailment in government productivity (Kaufmann 1997), and even distortions on governmental
social spending (Mauro 1995). Finally, there is still a third way in which drug traffic is negatively
influencing Mexican economy: the creation of local drug demand. The negative impact of drug abuse
becomes especially clear when the inevitable spillover effect of rising consumption is taken into account (ONDCP 1998). This
increase is related to the fact that drug smugglers are prone to pay their employees in kind (ONDCP 1994). Paying with merchandise
not only opens the possibility to expand demand, but also avoids the difficult process of having to clean the money to bring it back
from the US. Wherever drug industry is located, it promotes drug use. Mexico is no exception. Cocaine consumption has risen
sharply during the last decade. The Mexican Minister of Health estimated that, from 1988 to 2002, consumption increased 375%
(SSA, 2002) – one of the largest prevalence increases in the world. About 3.5 million Mexicans have consumed some type of illegal
drug at least once in their lives, and 16.2% of these are frequent consumers14. Considering the whole population, 3.5% have
consumed marijuana, 1.4% cocaine and 0.6% inhaled drugs (SSA 2002). Drug abuse has direct economic costs in
terms of productivity and human capital losses, health care (both treatment and prevention), and
government expenditure (policies to prevent or treat drug consumption). Productivity losses are related to spending time in
prison, and death or permanent lesions induced by drug consumption. The subjectivity of this type of cost makes it difficult to
measure, but there have been several fairly good attempts. For example, a study of Egypt, Mexico, Namibia, Poland and Sri Lanka
found that substance abusers have 2 to 4 times more accidents at work than other employees, and are absent 2 to 3 times more often
(ONDCP 1998). Much more evident and identifiable are the health care costs. They involve the prevention and the treatment of drug
addicts by private and public hospitals. Finally, there are also costs associated with operating policies to prevent and control drug
consumption. The best estimate of total costs of drug abuse in Mexico is the one calculated by CIDAC (2003). The latest figures
available estimate drug costs to be around 0.68 billion dollars annually (CIDAC 2003). The larger share of this cost is attributed to
productivity and human capital losses. In 2003 alone, productivity losses due to incarceration cost 124.63 million dollars annually,
equivalent to the budget of the whole Mexican Presidential office. Moreover, the Mexican government spent 14.6 million dollars just
in policies to control drug demand, money that otherwise could be spent on much needed poverty and housing relief.
Mex – Economy (Violence)
Drug violence dampens Mexican economic recovery
Guerrero, 11 – contributor to Global Finance, citing Shelly Shetty, head of Latin American
sovereigns at Fitch Ratings (Antonio, “Mexico: Drug War Dents Economic Recovery,” Global Finance, February 2011,
http://www.gfmag.com/archives/134-february-2011/11078-mexico-drug-war-dents-economic-recovery.html#axzz2Z2vFxqW1)//BI
While Mexico's economy is recovering from its worst recession in 80 years, the spread of drug-related
violence is hindering a more dynamic rebound. The drug war has claimed more than 30,000 victims since
president Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006. Last year alone, more than 15,000 people were killed, a 70% increase over
2009 deaths. "The rising wave of drug-related violence appears to be dampening confidence, retail
and commercial activities, possibly weighing on a more robust investment and economic
outlook," said Shelley Shetty, head of Latin American sovereigns at Fitch Ratings, when the agency
affirmed Mexico's ratings in January. Its foreign and local currency issuer default ratings are BBB and BBB+, respectively, with a
stable outlook. Shetty noted that, while the economy has been aided by favorable external trade performance, namely a gradual
recovery in the US, which buys 80% of Mexican exports, domestic demand remains weak amid eroding investor
and consumer confidence. Electrolux and Whirlpool cited violence among the factors influencing their decisions not to
expand local operations. Tourism could also be affected, with 15 beheadings in Acapulco and another beheading and
homicide in Cancun, all within the first week of the year, raising concerns and sparking travel warnings. According to a poll of
private analysts conducted by the nation's central bank in December, the government has to find a way to improve public safety in
order to boost private sector spending. When asked which factors would limit economic growth this year, analysts cited "problems of
public insecurity" alongside domestic and global market weakness. The same poll predicts Mexico's economy will
grow 3.6% this year, while Mexican government forecasts suggest it will top 4%. The economy expanded 5% in
2010, after plunging 6.5% in 2009. Fitch says the five-year GDP growth average was 1.5%, below the median for Mexico's ratings
peers. Violence is expected to rise further, however, as drug kingpins seek to influence state elections this year, and
the 2012 presidential race. Meanwhile, some US legislators are calling for an expansion of the Mérida Initiative, a three-year, $1.3
billion US program to help Mexico tackle the drug trade because, they contend, it also poses a threat to US security.
Drug violence negatively impacts Mexican labor markets, employment,
investments and income – causes significant economic contraction
Robles et al., 13 – fourth year PhD student in Political Science with specialization in the fields
of Political Methodology and Comparative Politics; with Gabriela Calderón, Ph.D. in Economics
from Stanford University researching violence in Latin America and evaluation of public policy
programs in Mexico; and Beatriz Magaloni, Associate Professor of Political Science & Senior
Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (Gustavo, “The Economic Consequences of Drug
Trafficking Violence in Mexico,” Poverty and Governance, Stanford University, 19 April 2013, http://iisdb.stanford.edu/pubs/24014/RoblesCalderonMagaloni_EconCosts5.pdf)//BI
One of the greatest challenges for governments in Latin America is to ensure order
and provide
security. The levels of violence and crime in the region have increased in the last years with Mexico as
one of the most affected countries by this crime wave. The dramatic change in the patterns of violence,
especially the increased murder rate, is clearly related to structural changes in the drug trafficking
business since 2006. External factors such as the increased flow of trade with the United States, the greater availability of
weapons, and the reduced cocaine supply from Colombia increased profitability substantially and attracted new competitors and
suppliers into the drug trade. The increase in the market size also changed the operation and internal
organization of drug trafficking organizations from being family businesses to hierarchical organizations stratified
into regional units. The interaction of the DTOs with local and national governments has also changed with the liberalization of
politics in the country and the entry of multiple political actors and several parties, making more complex the operation of the
business. Finally, the intense policies of President Calderón to combat and contain organized crime have fragmented the cohesion
and organization of the narco-trafficking groups. As a result of profound domestic and structural changes, the
number of people involved in drug trafficking has grown. However, unlike the market of other products
that operate in a legal arena, drug cartels do not compete for prices but instead compete directly to
monopolize the means of distribution into the United States through the use of force. The growing
rivalries between drug trafficking factions have resulted in an unprecedented increase in the levels of violence in the country. To
estimate the impact of the increasing levels of violence on economic activity is a complex activity
because the drug related violence is different in nature than common crime. Most killings correspond to strategic assassinations of
members of rival organizations or clashes with authorities. Besides being focused, the drug-related violence is sporadic and has a
higher volatility than common criminal violence. Moreover, there is an identification problem as this type of violence is not seen in
all municipalities with drug production, distribution, or trafficking ties. This makes it difficult to isolate the economic effect of
increased levels of violence on the business activities of drug trafficking organizations. This study argues that the violent
competition between rival drug organizations has a negative effect on the economy. To understand
the mechanism, we use the analogy of Olson (2001) to imagine the cartels as “stationary” or “roving bandits” depending on how they
decide to integrate themselves into society. “Stationary bandits,” or benefactors, have the ability to maintain control over their
territories over the long term and therefore have incentives to reduce predatory behavior as they look towards greater long-term
gains. “Roving bandits” have temporary or uncertain control over their territory, which induces them to extract rents and resources
from the community at the highest rate possible through extortion, robbery, and other crimes, to maximize short-term gain. The
main argument of this study is that the war between cartels for control over certain trafficking routes has
been matched by a substantial increase in violence and petty crime, including theft, extortion,
and kidnapping. Faced with increased competition, cartels have incentives to turn against
society due to the need for greater resources to maintain their armed conflicts, and because of a need to intimidate or punish
members of rival organizations, as well as to exploit new opportunities for opportunistic crime. Following the above argument, and
due to the nature of drug-related violence, we can assume that this type of violence has no linear effect on
economic performance, but instead that there is a threshold after which violence causes economic
activity to significantly shrink. Below this turf-war threshold, many individuals and companies can
internalize any increased costs resulting from the need for enhanced security and protection depending on their
economic size and capacity. However, said adjustments have effects on the labor market, both in the
supply and demand, and we can expect to find a marginal effect of violence on this area. Once the violence levels
have passed into the war threshold, companies and individuals begin to change their actions in
both the medium and long term, including their location, investments, and production, in the case of commercial
enterprises, and their participation in the labor market and choice of profession, in the case of individuals. We can expect a
significant contraction in economic activity in this range of violence that might not be adequately captured
with a linear relationship model between economic activity and violence. In our study we used two empirical strategies to estimate
both the marginal effects and the “threshold” effects of violence on economic activity and labor. To estimate the marginal effects, we
did an instrumental variable regression utilizing exogenous variation of cocaine seizures in Colombia to instrument for violence.
This variable was interacted with the distance of a municipality from principle points of entry. We found substantial
negative effects on labor market participation, unemployment, decision to start a company, and
income. To estimate the short-term and medium-term effects of crossing the turf-war threshold on the economy, we made use of
synthetic control group methodology consisting of building counterfactual scenarios by creating optimal weighted units of control.
We used the close correlation between GDP and electricity consumption to estimate the effect of
violence on economic activity at the municipal level. We found that those municipalities that saw
dramatic increases in violence between 2006 and 2010 significantly reduced their energy
consumption in the years after treatment. By analyzing the “threshold” effect, rather than a linear effect of violence on
economic activity, the present study provides a baseline for future research to model and estimate in a more sophisticated way the
relationship between violence and economic performance, in particular when we study drug-related violence
Mex – Failed State
Continued trade will collapse Mexican civil and governmental systems – causes a
failed state
Kurtzman, 09 (Joel, Senior Fellow; Executive Director, Senior Fellows Program; Publisher, The Milken Institute Review,
business editor and columnist at The New York Times, member of the editorial board of Harvard Business School, AB at the
University of California, Recipient of the Eisner Memorial Award, master's at the University of Houston, recipient of a Moody
Foundation Fellowship, “Mexico's Instability Is a Real Problem”, the Wall Street Journal, 1/16/2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123206674721488169.html)
Don't discount the possibility of a failed state next door. Mexico is now in the midst of a vicious
drug war. Police officers are being bribed and, especially near the United States border, gunned down.
Kidnappings and extortion are common place. And, most alarming of all, a new Pentagon study concludes that
Mexico is at risk of becoming a failed state . Defense planners liken the situation to that of Pakistan, where
wholesale collapse of civil government is possible.¶ One center of the violence is Tijuana, where last year more
than 600 people were killed in drug violence. Many were shot with assault rifles in the streets and left there to die. Some were killed
in dance clubs in front of witnesses too scared to talk.¶ It may only be a matter of time before the drug war
spills across the border and into the U.S. To meet that threat, Michael Chertoff, the outgoing secretary for Homeland
Security, recently announced that the U.S. has a plan to "surge" civilian and possibly military law-enforcement personnel to the
border should that be necessary.¶
Unchecked drug violence threatens Mexican government stability
Chase, 12 (Colonel David Chase of the US Army, graduated from the Army War College, in charge of strategy research on the
Southern border; “Military Police: Assisting in Securing the United States Southern Border”; 12/3/12; http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA561048) KD
In addition to negative economic effects the drug war has an even more serious consequence – the direct
threat to the legitimacy of the Mexican government. Violence has created a condition of lawlessness in some
parts of the country leading to deteriorating social conditions and an inability for Mexico to police their side of the border. There is
no doubt that DTO ideology is all about profit; however their activities are successfully challenging the Mexican
government and has raised serious concerns about Mexico’s stability and ability to exercise
sovereignty. President Calderon himself stated that DTO initiated violence presented, “a challenge
to the state, an attempt to replace the state.”13 This lack of control is highlighted by several facts. One is that cartels are
imposing their influence on local governments throughout the country. A study prepared for the Mexican Senate
entitled, “Municipal Government and Organized Crime” released in August 2010 found that 8% of all municipalities are completely
under control of organized crime while a further 63% are infiltrated and influenced by organized crime.14 Shockingly the study
found these criminal organizations often operated with logistical support from corrupt municipal
police and politicians.15 The same report also declared that DTOs have also exerted control over local
businesses. A further indication of the erosion of government legitimacy are recent opinion polls showing that
public support for the current Mexican government war on drugs is declining.
Mex – Instability
Drug trade fuels a Mexican civil conflict and the worst forms of dehumanization
Chalk, 11 (Peter, Senior Political Scientist at RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in political science,
University of British Columbia, M.A. in political studies and international relations, University
of Aberdeen, “The Latin American Drug Trade Scope, Dimensions, Impact, and Response,”
RAND Project Air Force,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf,
Tashma)
It is in Mexico, however, that the pernicious societal impact of the Latin American cocaine and heroin
trade has been greatest, contributing to what amounts to the wholesale breakdown of basic
civility across the country—something that has been particularly evident in the northern
border states.8 According to Guillermo Valdés Castellanos, director of the National Security and Intelligence Center (Centro de
Investigación y Seguridad Nacional, or CISEN), more than 28,000 drug-related murders have occurred since
Felipe Calderón launched an all-out offensive on the country’s cartels in 2006.9 To put these figures in
perspective, note that fewer than 4,300 U.S. soldiers lost their lives in Iraq between 2003 and 2008. The enormous human toll has
triggered the formation of various self-defense forces across the border provinces. In January 2009, for instance, a group calling
itself the Juárez Citizens Command announced that it was preparing to take the law into its own hands and would execute a criminal
every 24 hours to bring order to the city.10¶ Most
killings are the work of syndicate-controlled paramilitary
cells, some with professional training. Notable groups include Los Negros, Los Gueritos, Los Pelones, Los Números,
Los Chachos, Los Lobos, Los Sinaloa, and Los Nuevos Zetas.11 Ensuing fatalities have been linked to
intersyndicate warfare, the silencing of suspected informers, the assassination of high-ranking
officials, and the systematic targeting of law enforcement personnel. The latter has become increasingly
evident in line with Calderón’s antidrug push since 2006. In many cases, police either quit (certain towns have seen entire forces
abandon the job) or cooperate with syndicates out of straight fear. Although it is lower- and mid-ranking officers who have been
mostly affected, traffickers have been prepared to direct their intimidation to the highest levels. In 2009, for instance, the police
chief of Cuidad Juárez, Roberto Orduña Cruz, fled the city after his deputy, operations director Sacramento Pérez Serrano, was shot.
The assassination was in keeping with a cartel ultimatum that a senior official would be killed every 48 hours until he resigned.12¶
The specific character of drug-related murders has also become progressively more barbaric. It is
not unusual for victims to be dismembered, beheaded, boiled in giant pots filled with
lye (a process known as pozole after the Mexican word for stew), or even skinned.13 As one official in Tijuana candidly
remarked,¶ Criminals earn respect and credibility with creative killing methods. Your status is
based on your capacity to commit the most sadistic acts. Burning corpses, using acid, beheading victims. . . .
This generation is setting a new standard for savagery.14¶ The extent of cartel violence has begun to take on a
disturbing new dimension with the deliberate targeting of ordinary civilians. A particularly bloody
attack took place in September 2008, when two fragmentation grenades were hurled into a crowd celebrating Mexico’s
Independence Day at the Plaza Melchor Ocampo in Morelia, Michoacán state. The atrocity, which was originally blamed on La
Familia but ultimately tied to Los Zetas, resulted in eight deaths and more than 100 injuries.15 Commenting on the incident and
what it might herald, Jane’s Homeland Security Review remarks,¶ [The Morelia bombing] indicated that there is a disturbing
evolution towards indiscriminate attacks on a large-scale using a methodology . . . which seems to be inspired more by terrorist
techniques than by traditional cartel activity. . . . A new chapter in Mexico’s drugs war has now opened and future attacks on this
scale must now be considered a reality of security risk.16 ¶ This assessment was borne out in February 2010, when drug traffickers
stormed a party packed with teenagers in Cuidad Juárez and indiscriminately killed 14 people, eight of whom were under 20.
According to the daily El Diario, one of the victims had been a witness to a multiple homicide and was due to have testified in an
upcoming trial.17¶ Apart from fostering extreme violence, the narcotics trade has decisively undermined political stability in Mexico
by feeding pervasive corruption throughout the police and administrative bureaucracy.18 Although the overall extent of the problem
is unknown, its seriousness can be gauged by the following statistics:¶ One-fifth of Mexico’s entire federal police force was under
investigation for corruption as of 2005.19¶ • Between 2006 and 2008, 11,500 public servants were fined or suspended from their
jobs for corruption.20¶ • In April 2007, the Monterrey state government arrested an unprecedented 141 police officers for
collaborating with the Gulf cartel and accepting kickbacks in exchange for intelligence or ignoring trafficking activities taking place
in their respective jurisdictions.21¶ • In 2008, more than 35 high-ranking security officials were detained, notably including Noe
Ramírez, a former head of the anti–organized crime unit in the attorney general’s office, and Ricardo Gutiérrez Vargas, director for
International Police Affairs at the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA).22¶ • In 2010, nearly one-tenth of the officers in the federal
police force were dismissed for failing to pass anticorruption tests.23¶ Evidence suggests that corruption among
police and immigration officials who are stationed in the northern border provinces is especially
acute where many are offered cash payments to cooperate with drug syndicates and threatened
with physical harm if bribes are not accepted.24 This method, known as plata o plomo (“silver or lead”), has been
used repeatedly to avail cocaine and heroin (as well as marijuana)25 shipments into the United States, casting considerable doubt on
the overall veracity and credibility of the counterdrug offensive that was initiated in 2006.26¶
Leads to narco terrorism
Yager, 9 (Jordy, “Border lawmakers fear drug-terrorism link,” The Hill, 3/7/09,
http://thehill.com/homenews/news/18629-border-lawmakers-fear-drug-terrorism-link)
Members of Congress are raising the alarm that war-like conditions on the Mexican border could lead to
Mexican drug cartels helping terrorists attack the U.S. “When you have…gangs and they have
loose ties with al Qaeda and then you have Iran not too far away from building a nuclear
capability, nuclear terrorism may not be far off,” said Rep. Trent Franks (R- Ariz.), a member of the House Armed
Services committee. The Mexican drug cartels’ violence accounted for more than 6,000 deaths last year, and in recent months it has
begun spilling over into the districts of lawmakers from the southwest region, even as far north as Phoenix, Ariz. -- which has
become, Franks noted, the “kidnap capital of the U.S.” Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-Texas), whose district borders Mexico, said that
while the situation is bad, it could easily get worse. “The goal of the cartels is to make money,” said
Cuellar, who sits on the House Homeland Security committee. “If
they can smuggle in drugs and human cargo,
then certainly they can smuggle other things in, other devices to cause us harm.” “We have not heard
of any associations, but is there the possibility? I’ll be the first to say, yeah. They have the routes, they can very easily smuggle in
other things. If I was a bad guy in another country, I would go into Central America because the U.S. is not paying the proper
attention.” Violence reached new levels last week when the mayor of Juarez, a Mexican city with 1.6 million people
that serves as a major transit point for drug smugglers, moved his family to El Paso, Texas, after receiving threats against his and
their lives. The move corresponded with the resignation of the city’s police chief after a drug cartel promised to kill a police officer
every 48 hours if he did not step down. The city’s police director of operations, a police officer and a prison guard were killed by the
cartels in days prior. “That was a mistake in my judgment,” Franks said of the chief’s resignation. “The federal government should
have come in and said listen, we’re going to put a Marine division there to help you out if that’s what’s necessary, but narco-
terrorists are not going to tell America who to elect and who resigns.”
That results in WMD terrorist attacks
Anderson, 8 (10/8/2008, Curt, AP, “US officials fear terrorist links with drug lords,”
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-10-08-805146709_x.htm)
MIAMI — There is real danger that Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaida and Hezbollah could
form alliances with wealthy and powerful Latin American drug lords to launch new terrorist
attacks, U.S. officials said Wednesday.
Extremist group operatives have already been identified in several Latin American countries,
mostly involved in fundraising and finding logistical support. But Charles Allen, chief of intelligence analysis
at the Homeland Security Department, said they could use well-established smuggling routes and drug
profits to bring people or even weapons of mass destruction to the U.S.
"The presence of these people in the region leaves open the possibility that they will attempt to
attack the U nited S tates," said Allen, a veteran CIA analyst. "The threats in this hemisphere are
real. We cannot ignore them."
Added U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration operations chief Michael Braun: "It is not in our interest to let that potpourri of scum
to come together."
Extinction
Corsi, 5 [Jerome. PhD in Poli Sci from Harvard, Expert in Politically-Motivated Violence.
Atomic Iran, Pg 176-8//JVOSS]
The combination of horror and outrage that will surge upon the nation will demand that the
president retaliate for the incomprehensible damage done by the attack. The problem will be
that the president will not immediately know how to respond or against whom. The perpetrators will
have been incinerated by the explosion that destroyed New York City. Unlike 9-11, there will have been no interval during the attack
when those hijacked could make phone calls to loved ones telling them before they died that the hijackers were radical Islamic
extremists. There will be no such phone calls when the attack will not have been anticipated until the instant the terrorists detonate
their improvised nuclear device inside the truck parked on a curb at the Empire State Building. Nor will there be any
possibility of finding any clues, which either were vaporized instantly or are now lying physically
inaccessible under tons of radioactive rubble. Still, the president, members of Congress, the military, and
the public at large will suspect another attack by our known enemy –Islamic terrorists. The first
impulse will be to launch a nuclear strike on Mecca, to destroy the whole religion of Islam. Medina
could possibly be added to the target list just to make the point with crystal clarity. Yet what would we gain? The moment Mecca and
Medina were wiped off the map, the Islamic world – more than 1 billion human beings in countless different nations –
would feel attacked. Nothing would emerge intact after a war between the United States and
Islam. The apocalypse would be upon us. [CONTINUES} Or the president might decide simply to launch a limited
nuclear strike on Tehran itself. This might be the most rational option in the attempt to retaliate but still communicate restraint. The
problem is that a strike on Tehran would add more nuclear devastation to the world calculation. Muslims around the
world would still see the retaliation as an attack on Islam, especially when the United States had
no positive proof that the destruction of New York City had been triggered by radical Islamic
extremists with assistance from Iran. But for the president not to retaliate might be unacceptable to the American
people. So weakened by the loss of New York, Americans would feel vulnerable in every city in the nation. "Who is going to be next?"
would be the question on everyone's mind. For this there would be no effective answer. That the president might think
politically at this instant seems almost petty, yet every president is by nature a politician. The
political party in power at the time of the attack would be destroyed unless the president
retaliated with a nuclear strike against somebody. The American people would feel a price had to
be paid while the country was still capable of exacting revenge.
Mex – NarcoTerrorism
Unchecked drug violence leads to DTO terrorism
Chase, 12 (Colonel David Chase of the US Army, graduated from the Army War College, in charge of strategy research on the
Southern border; “Military Police: Assisting in Securing the United States Southern Border”; 12/3/12; http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA561048) KD
Violence is generated by competition among Mexico’s seven different, major drug cartels. At its core this
violence is created by inter
of the drug trade. Another
and intra cartel fighting for control of drug trafficking routes and greater shares
element that contributes is the attempts being made by authorities to combat
the DTOs. Drug related violence is largely directed at people with ties to DTOs however persons not related to DTOs are also
suffering such as migrants who refused to act as drug carrying “mules”, members of the press, innocent bystanders and anyone who
refuses to cooperate with a DTO for any reason. Many deaths are brutal killings conducted to intimidate and in retaliation for
disobedience or resistance to DTO rule. Violence is also used as a tool within organizations to strengthen leadership and impose
discipline. Violence has taken the form of massacres, the killing and disappearance of Mexican journalists, the use
of torture and even car bombings which has raised concerns that DTOs may be adopting
techniques used by insurgents and terrorists.5 Alarmingly DTOs are believed to be also targeting
Mexican government officials. This included, in 2010, 12 Mexican mayors and a gubernatorial candidate in July of 2010.6
Since 2006 when President Calderon declared war on DTOs until the middle of 2011 an estimated 30,000 plus Mexicans have lost
their lives to drug related violence.7 In addition to the killings and torture, kidnappings by DTOs are also becoming common with
over one thousand kidnappings now reported annually with many times that number suspected.
Narco terrorism leads to regional violence and instability
Minteh, 13 (Binneh, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at New Jersey City University and
Public Policy at the Graduate School of Public Affairs, Rutgers University Newark, “NarcoTerrorism- A Risk Assessment of Global Terrorist Linkages to the International Drug Trade,”
http://academia.edu/3425556/NarcoTerrorism_A_Risk_Assesment_of_Global_Terrorist_Linkages_to_the_International_Drug_T
rade, Tashma)
Implications and Threats
The implications and threats of narco-terror and criminal syndicate groups on contemporary society are not conflicting at all. This is
evident with experiences of Latin American nations vulnerable to these groups. In the case of FARC in Colombia, there were
trends of rising cocaine consumption and the proliferation of violence driven by
organized criminal groups. A very interesting paradigm attributed to such a trend was the pattern of distribution
and periods of interdictions by law enforcement agencies. It came to light that changes in marketing strategy in lower
income neighborhoods, given new forms of competition, has triggered the growth of violence in most
vulnerable communities (Leon and Zubillaga, 2002).
In Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Brazil, terrorist and organized criminal groups have distributed
weapons to interest groups as part of an agreement to defend themselves from government
forces. Colombia’s FARC provides some of the most interesting narco-terror operational dynamics. Over the years FARC operated
along a global strategic evolutionary trajectory that has given it the leverage to maintain sustained supply of weapons through its
affiliations and global networks, hence these
capabilities allowed it to unleash violence and terror
across most of Colombia and other neighboring Latin American nations.
Another daunting implication is the fear in consumption of cocaine and other illicit drugs may
increase levels of violence due to convergence in global transformation. According to a United Nations
report, regional consumption of heroin, cocaine, cannabis and amphetamine type drugs is increasing, as a side
effect of West Africa’s growing role in the global illicit drug trade. A disturbing trend that has been reported over the
years was the high rates of consumption among members of the Security and Armed Forces. This was evident, when reports
allegedly attributed the deadly violent political instability in Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea-Conakry, to both involvement in the trade,
and consumption by members of the security forces.
Mex – Relations
Drug violence will collapse relations
Kurtzman, 09 (Joel, Senior Fellow; Executive Director, Senior Fellows Program; Publisher, The Milken Institute Review,
business editor and columnist at The New York Times, member of the editorial board of Harvard Business School, AB at the
University of California, Recipient of the Eisner Memorial Award, master's at the University of Houston, recipient of a Moody
Foundation Fellowship, “Mexico's Instability Is a Real Problem”, the Wall Street Journal, 1/16/2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123206674721488169.html)
My colleague, Glenn Yago, and I calculate that if Mexico were to reduce corruption and bring its legal, economic,
accounting and regulatory standards up to U.S. levels (the U.S. ranks 13th and Finland ranks first), Mexico's nominal
per
capital GDP would increase by about $18,000 to roughly $28,000 a year. And it would also receive a lot more direct
foreign investment that would create jobs.¶ And this impacts the U.S. Thanks to Mexico's retarded economic growth, millions of
Mexicans have illegally moved to the U.S. to find work. Unless the violence can be reversed, the U.S. can anticipate that
the flow across the border will continue .¶ To his credit, Mexico's President Felipe Calderón has deployed 45,000
members of his military and 5,000 federal police to fight drug traffickers. This suggests that he is taking the violence and the threat
to civil government seriously.¶ But the path forward will be a difficult one. Not only must Mexico fight its drug lords, it
must do so while putting its institutional house in order. That means firing government employees who are either corrupt or not
willing to do the job required to root out corruption. It will also likely require putting hundreds, or even thousands, of police officers
in jail.¶ For
more than a century, Mexico and the U.S. have enjoyed friendly relations and some
integration. But if Mexico's epidemic of violence continues, that relationship
could end if the U.S. is forced to surge personnel to the border.¶
degree of economic
Ven – Iran Relations
Drug trafficking solidifies the relationship between Iran and Venezuela
Shinkman, 13 – National Security Reporter at U.S. News & World Report (Paul D., “Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism in
Venezuela: How Will Maduro Respond?,” U.S. News & World Report, 24 April 2013,
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsored-narco-terrorism-in-venezuela-how-will-madurorespond)//BI
At a conference earlier this month, top U.S. military officers identified what they thought would be the
top
threats to the U.S. as it draws down from protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Gen. James Amos, commandant of the
Marine Corps, was unequivocal about a largely unreported danger: "Narco-terrorism just on our south border: [it is]
yet to be seen just how that is going to play out in our own nation, but it is an issue and it is something that our nation is
going to have to deal with." "Colombia is doing particularly well, but there is an insurgency growing," Amos continued.
"They have been fighting it, probably the greatest success story in this part of the world." The commandant's remarks came a
week before the April 14 election where Venezuelans chose a successor to the wildly popular and
charismatic Hugo Chavez, who died March 5. Amos indicated the outcome of this election would define much of future relations
between the U.S. and Venezuela, located on a continent that has rarely appeared on America's foreign policy radar in the last decade.
Experts, analysts and pundits could not have predicted the election outcome: The establishment's Nicolas Maduro beat reformer
Henrique Capriles by a margin of roughly 1 percent. Chavez's hand-picked successor inherited the presidency, but he would not
enjoy a broad public mandate to get a teetering Venezuela back on track. The situation in the South American nation
remains dire amid skyrocketing inflation, largely due to Chavez's efforts to nationalize private industry and increase social
benefits. Maduro's immediate attention after claiming victory was drawn to remedying widespread blackouts and food shortages.
One expert on the region says the new leader may need to tap into a shadow world of transnational
crime to maintain the stability his countrymen expect. "Venezuela is a really nice bar, and anybody can go in
there and pick up anybody else," says Doug Farah, an expert on narco-terrorism and Latin American crime. He compares the
country to the kind of establishment where nefarious actors can find solutions to a problem. Anti-American groups can
find freelance cyber terrorists, for example, or potential drug runners can make connections with
the FARC, the Colombian guerilla organization, he says. "Sometimes it creates a long-term relationship, and sometimes it creates
a one-night stand," says Farah, a former Washington Post investigative reporter who is now a senior fellow at the Virginia-based
International Assessment and Strategy Center. Under Chavez, Venezuela also created strong ties with Cuba, which for decades has
navigated treacherous financial waters and desperate economic straits, all while dodging U.S. influence. But the help Venezuela
receives is not limited to its own hemisphere. Farah produced a research paper for the U.S. Army War College in
August 2012 about the "growing alliance" between state-sponsored Iranian agents and other
anti-American groups in Latin America, including the governments of Venezuela and Cuba. This
alliance with Iran uses established drug trade routes from countries in South and Central
America to penetrate North American borders, all under a banner of mutual malevolence toward the U.S. The
results of this access are largely secret, though security experts who spoke with U.S. News believe the attempted assassination of the
Saudi Arabian ambassador in Washington, D.C.'s Georgetown neighborhood was carried out by Iranian intelligence operatives.
"Each of the Bolivarian states has lifted visa requirements for Iranian citizens, thereby erasing any public record of the Iranian
citizens that come and go to these countries," wrote Farah of countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia and Panama. He also
cited Venezuelan Foreign Minister David Velasquez who said, while speaking at a press conference in Tehran in
2010, "We
are confident that Iran can give a crushing response to the threats and sanctions
imposed by the West and imperialism." These relationships are controlled by a group of military elites within
Venezuela, Farah tells U.S. News. He wonders whether the 50.8 percent of the vote Maduro won in the April 14 election gives him
enough support to keep the country – and its shadow commerce – stable enough to continue its usual business. "[Maduro] has been
and will continue to be forced to take all the unpopular macroeconomic steps and corrections that are painful, but Chavez never
took," Farah says. "There is going to be, I would guess, a great temptation to turn to [the elites] for money." "Most criminalized
elements of the Boliavarian structure will gain more power because he needs them," he says, adding "it won't be as chummy a
relationship" as they enjoyed with the ever-charismatic Chavez. U.S. officials might try to engage the new
Venezuelan president first in the hopes of improving the strained ties between the two countries. But Maduro has
never been close with the senior military class in his home country, and will likely adopt a more confrontational
approach to the United States to prove his credentials to these Bolivarian elites. "Maybe if he were operating in different
circumstances, he could be a pragmatist," Farah says. "I don't think he can be a pragmatist right now."
Ven - Narco-State
The Venezuela narco-democracy continues to pose a threat to US national security
– Chavez’s death only creates more uncertainty
Rava, 13 – graduate of Saint Louis University with a B.A. in both Latin American and
International Studies, worked at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, in Washington, DC,
on topics related to Western Hemispheric security, with an emphasis on counter-narcotics and
border security issues (Max, “Hugo Chávez's Death Means Greater Uncertainty for Venezuela,” Truth About Bills, 5 March
2013, http://truthaboutbills.com/hugo-chavezs-death-means-greater-uncertainty-for-venezuela)//BI
I don’t always see eye to eye with Roger F. Noriega, visiting fellow at the American Enterprise
Institute,
when it comes to matters regarding Latin America. However, when I saw him speak a year and a half ago about
Venezuela’s role in Latin America, especially regarding it posing a threat to the United States as
a narco-democracy, it was almost like looking in the mirror. I became more of a believer as his remarks continued throughout
the panel discussion and during the Q & A session. Since that time I have taken an even more keen interest in Venezuela’s role in the
War on Drugs, the War on Terror, and the effects this has on hemispheric stability. Now that Hugo Chávez is deceased
we will see that while his regime posed a threat to US national security interests, the current
uncertainty could be even more threatening. The majority of Venezuelan expats and many of those that still live
there are probably dancing in the streets tonight if they do not fear violent reprisals from Chavista loyalists. However, they have not
yet been fully liberated. It might be the end off an oppressive era for many, but they are entering a period of uncertainty. My hope is
that the opposition coalition can gather its bearings quickly and be ready for the special election that Venezuelan law mandates must
be held within the next 30 days. However, they face a tough campaign against a successor handpicked by Hugo Chávez. After a
crushing defeat during this past October’s election, can the opposition come together? What if they come together and again taste
the sourness of defeat? There is also the concern of the rule of law in the country. Will there be protections for the freedom of speech
and expression that were curtailed under the Chávez government? The people of Venezuela must proceed in an organized and
cautious fashion if they wish to move on from an era of limited liberty and oppression. I wish them the best of luck. While it is well
known within some circles that corruption, drug trafficking, and collaboration with US enemies was
commonplace during the Chávez years, the full extent of these activities will probably soon come to light. As president,
he was very involved with the Venezuelan state oil company (PDVSA), which provided the majority of the revenue for his socialist
agenda. Venezuela has the world’s largest proven oil reserves and PDVSA has deep coffers. There have been many allegations of
corruption made against this state entity and its relationship with the government and the powerful armed forces branch. The
Venezuelan armed forces are rumored to be the power behind the Venezuelan narco-state.
Numerous allegations have been made against past and present ranking officers for their roles
in drug trafficking activities. The allegations and rumors about these activities are not likely to die with Chávez.
Conflicts often erupt over money and power, and from all indications the state oil company and armed forces
could very well find themselves embroiled in various power struggles. In the international arena the
bombastic leftist firebrand showed his provocative nature by pursuing lines of credit with Russia and China. Furthermore, he
publicly displayed his hatred for Israel and the Jewish people, threw his support behind Libyan dictator Mohammad Kaddafi, made
public and private alliances with Iran, and, most recently, supported Syria’s Bashar Al Assad. This was in addition to his consistent
and unrelenting anti-American rhetoric that spared no US President, Democrat or Republican. While presiding over a
corrupt, narco-state, Hugo Chavez also made threats of war against America’s strongest ally in
South America – my native Colombia. It has also been documented that he enjoyed close ties with the
Colombian rebel group, FARC, who are in part responsible for the continuation of Colombia’s ongoing civil conflict.
Under his rule, there were even rumblings of a relationship between the Venezuelan armed forces and the infamous Iranian Quds
Force and Hezbollah. Even more troubling are the reports that these terrorist organizations are cultivating
relationships with the notoriously violent Latin American TCOs and other global crime
syndicates, all just to the south of the United States. This poses a very clear threat to US national
security. Venezuela has also been an integral part of keeping multiple leftist governments throughout Latin America afloat. The
first that comes to mind is Cuba, which Venezuela very generously provided with oil, but it is not only them. Nicaragua and Bolivia
have also received aid through similar programs. These already poor countries could see their economies take a nosedive; this would
result in government coffers drying up quickly and could cause these countries to become hotbeds of civil unrest. Hugo Chávez
effectively built a narco-democracy during his reign over Venezuela and he handpicked his
successor, but the election of his handpicked successor, Venezuelan Vice President Nicolas Maduro, is far from certain. Now
that Chávez and his charisma have been lost, some of the rats will abandon the ship. There will also be many power struggles within
the state oil company, the military, and among other former Chávez allies. The upcoming election will tell us much about the future
of Venezuela, but there is no longer anyone powerful enough to handle all of the “special” relationships that Chávez once managed
and I find that very worrisome.
A Venezuelan narco-state risks civil war
Toro, 12 – Venezuelan journalist and political scientist, BA from Reed College, MSc from the London School of Economics,
current a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of Maastricht in The Netherlands (Francisco, “Venezuela's
narcostate,” Foreign Policy, 10 May 2012,
http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/10/venezuela_s_growing_drug_problem)//BI
Another day, another deeply damaging whistle-blowing by a former Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal
magistrate. Soon after Magistrate Eladio Aponte fled the country last month and aired a terrifying amount of dirty chavista
laundry on TV, his one-time colleague Luis Velásquez Alvaray (above) did him one better, releasing detailed evidence
about a court system that looks more and more like a criminal conspiracy. To paraphrase Oscar Wilde:
To lose one Supreme Tribunal magistrate may be regarded as a misfortune; to lose two looks like carelessness. Together, the backto-back interviews (broadcast by the Miami-based, Venezuelan-exile owned TV channel SOiTV) paint a picture of a
criminal justice system deep in bed with the Colombian Rebel Armed Forces (FARC) guerrillas, where
political interference, crooked rulings, collusion with drug traffickers, and occasional contract
killings, are entirely routine. The cocaine route out of Colombia, through Venezuela, and on to the
U.S. and Western Europe is simply too profitable -- and the tentacles of the trade's millions have
seeped into every corner of the system. Coming from one-time trusted Chávez confidants in a position to know, these
interviews strip away whatever veneer of legitimacy the chavista justice system might have enjoyed. But while Aponte's allegations
were impressionistic though largely unsupported by documents, Velásquez Alvaray has had plenty of time to organize the evidence
to back his allegations: He has been in exile since 2006, having fled the country after being tipped off about a plot to murder him.
Two years after his defection, his top clerk at the Supreme Tribunal was found dead under strange circumstances. The mounting
revelations paint Venezuela as a budding narcostate -- a country where big-time drug trafficking
money has not just bought this and that judge, or this and that prosecutor, but has taken control of the state as a
whole. Large-scale drug trafficking is a business that invariably leaves a trail of blood on its wake,
and a spate of recent contract killings of army officers alleged to be deep in the business raises the possibility of a Mexican-style drug
war to come. Alas, the analogy isn't really accurate. In Mexico, the drug war pits the armed forces against the
drug cartels. In Venezuela, if the former magistrates are to be believed, the drug cartels operate from within
the Armed Forces. And what do you call it when one part of a country's armed forces goes to war
against another? That's right: a civil war .
Ven – Terrorism
Trafficking in Venezuela is linked to Middle East terrorist organizations
Grassley, 12 – Iowa senator (Chuck, “Drug Trafficking in West Africa Fuels Instability,” Congressional Documents
and Publications, 16 May 2012, ProQuest)//BI
Another area of concern that links West Africa to our past work is the involvement of Venezuela. We have
previously heard
at hearings and briefings about the use of Venezuela as a transshipment point for
cocaine destined for Central America and the Caribbean. There are even allegations that the current defense
minister of Venezuela is involved in drug trafficking. So, I'm interested in the links between Venezuela and West Africa as it seems to
be a repeat offender in fueling the drug trade. In fact, Venezuela is becoming such a repeat offender at all our
hearings we ought to hold a hearing on Venezuela's role in facilitating global drug trafficking. If we look for common links between
different regions, we'll keep coming up with Venezuela. So, we should hold a hearing specific to the problem posed by Venezuela.
More importantly, we can't ignore the growing links between Hezbollah, Iran, and Venezuela. For
example, following his 2010 arrest in Colombia, Venezuelan drug
kingpin Walid Makled was asked if Hezbollah is
operating in Venezuela. He replied, "...they [Hezbollah] work in Venezuela...and all of that money
they send to the Middle East."
*Drug Trade Good*
Cuban Violence
Mexico crackdown -> cuba violence
Dominacan Today, 12 (citing Senator Dianne Feinstein, “Cuba could become a hub for illegal
drugs entering US”, 2/11/2012,
http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/world/2012/2/11/42634/Cuba-could-become-a-hub-forillegal-drugs-entering-US0, JKahn)
Los Angeles.– Cuba could become a significant hub for illegal drugs entering the United States in
the near future, warned a California senator who chairs a congressional caucus on international drug trafficking. According to
hispanicbusiness.com, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., made the remarks while leading a hearing on what several
observers consider the growing possibility that the Caribbean could become an even larger transit
zone for illegal drugs. If the trend happens or is happening, it is likely because of increased pressure
international law enforcement is placing on violent drug cartels in Mexico and elsewhere in Central
America, these observers say. While mentioning the growing drug violence throughout the Caribbean during opening statements of
the Feb. 1 hearing of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Feinstein said Cuba should not be considered immune
from the problem. "I would be remiss not to mention Cuba. Just 90 miles from Florida, Cuba has the potential to be a major transshipment point for illicit drugs," she said.
Mex - Economy
Loss of drug trafficking revenue collapses Mexican economy and government
Daily Telegraph 97
Lord of the Skies, stuff.mit.edu/people/aaelenes/sinaloa/narco/amado/amado12.html
Eavesdropping on a cocaine cowboy in an Italian restaurant, I hear, 'Ten killings in a week is nothing! This is El Seor settling
accounts as usual, for the load that got seized last week.' According to the DEA, the killings are evidence of a battle for succession
within the Jugrez cartel - or, possibly, the breakup of the Federation. This is a much more obvious explanation - and, for
precisely that reason, most people in Jugrez just don't believe it. There is one certainty among all this conjecture. So
long as
the great white nostril to the north keeps on sucking, the drugs will continue to
flow. 'It's just like when Henry Ford died,' says the former head of DEA intelligence, Phil Jordan. 'The cars keep rolling out of
the factory.' Narcotics trafficking is a $ 30 billion-a-year industry in Mexico, equivalent
to the rest of the nation's GNP put together. Oil, the second biggest industry,
earns $ 10 billion a year, the annual income of Amado Carrillo Fuentes. The government can't afford
to stamp out drug trafficking, even if it could. Without narco-dollars, the Mexican
economy would likely collapse and the government along with it . Which explains why
the United States, for all its drug war rhetoric, tolerated Carrillo for so long. Which explains a letter Carrillo wrote to the
Mexican President, Ernesto Zedillo, on January 14 this year, subsequently leaked to the press: 'Leave me alone to run my
business. Otherwise I'll withdraw its benefits from the nation.' Note the slightly impatient tone: Look Ernesto, just don't you
forget who's paying the bills around here.
Drug cartels are key to the Mexican economy – generates valuable liquidity in the
banking system
Lange, 10 – Washington Correspondent for Reuters, citing US officials in Mexico; additional reporting by Lizbeth
Diaz in Tijuana (Jason, “From spas to banks, Mexico economy rides on drugs,” Reuters, 22 January 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/22/us-drugs-mexico-economy-idUSTRE60L0X120100122)//BI
Mexican cartels, which control most of the cocaine and methamphetamine smuggled into the United States, bring an
estimated $25 billion to $40 billion into Mexico from their global operations every year. To put that
in perspective: Mexico probably made more money in 2009 moving drugs than it did exporting oil,
its single biggest legitimate foreign currency earner. From the white Caribbean beaches of Cancun to violent
towns on the U.S. border and the beauty parlors of Mexico City's wealthy suburbs, drug cash is everywhere in Mexico.
It has even propped up the country's banking system, helping it ride out the financial crisis and
aiding the country's economy. Smuggled into Mexico mostly from the United States in $100 bills, narco money
finds its way onto the books of restaurants, construction firms and bars as drug lords try to
legitimize their cash and prevent police from tracing it. "Mexico is saturated with this money," said George
Friedman, who heads geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor. In western Mexico, drug money started pouring into Zapopan and nearby
Guadalajara in the 1980s as the Sinaloa cartel bought hospitals and real estate, said Martin Barron, a researcher at the institute that
trains Mexico's organized crime prosecutors. Now residents in the region known in Mexico for its piety say drug smugglers barely
make an effort to disguise themselves. A strip of fancy boutiques in Zapopan was financed with drug money, says Jaime Ramirez, a
local newspaper columnist who has been reporting on the drug world for two decades. As well as the Grupo Collins factory in
Zapopan, a nearby car wash is also on the U.S. Treasury's black list. A local cemetery draws relatives of traffickers who were among
the 17,000 people killed in the drug war in Mexico since 2006. "A lot of narcos are buried there. You should see it on Fathers' Day,"
Ramirez said, as a black pick-up truck with tinted windows pulled in. Zapopan residents just shrug their shoulders when a wealthy
neighbor displays traits seen as typical of a drug trafficker -- wearing cowboy gear, playing loud "norteno" music from the country's
north or holding lavish parties attended by guests who arrive in pick-up trucks or SUVs. "Living alongside them is normal," Ramirez
said. "Everybody knows when a neighbor is on the shady side." One of those neighbors was Sandra Avila, a glamorous trafficker
known as the "Queen of the Pacific," who lived in Zapopan before being arrested in Mexico City in 2007. On a typical day in Zapopan
recently, men unloaded boxes from vans in the Grupo Collins compound, near the company's private chapel and soccer field. From
behind the factory's high walls, there was little to suggest it could have ties to a cartel. "It has always been really calm," said Genaro
Rangel, who sells tacos every morning to factory workers from a stall across the street. The plant was advertising a job opening on
the company web site for a machine room technician. Washington's accusation, filed under a U.S. sanctions program, makes it illegal
for Americans to do business with Grupo Collins and freezes any assets it might have in U.S. accounts. In a 2006 report, Mexican
authorities named Grupo Collins' owner Telesforo Tirado as an operator of the Colima cartel. The U.S. Treasury and Mexico's
Attorney General's office both declined to provide further details on the case and Grupo Collins executives also refused to comment.
But Tirado has previously denied the charges in the Mexican media. CASHING IN ON THE DRUG TRADE What's going on in
Zapopan is happening all over Mexico. A well-known Mexico City restaurant specializing in the spicy cuisine of the Yucatan
peninsula was added to the U.S. list of front companies in December. Months earlier, one of Mexico's top food critics had
recommended it. Drug money has also fueled part of a real estate boom around tourist resorts such as
Cancun, said a senior U.S. law enforcement official in Mexico City. "We've had cases where traffickers
purchased large
tracts of land in areas where any investor would buy," he said, asking not to be named because of concerns about
his safety. An architect in the city of Tijuana did well out of designing buildings that cartels would build and rent out to legitimate
local businesses. "The pay was enough for me to build a house for myself, as well as to buy a lot a tools," he said. He was once hired
to design a tunnel that led to the street from a secret door in a drug gang member's closet. Craving acceptance, the drug gangs
even throw their money at acquaintances to get them on the social scene. A drug trafficker pays his friend
Roberto, who declined to give his last name, to keep him connected in Tijuana and introduce him to women. "I take him to parties,"
Roberto said. In the wealthy shopping areas of Interlomas, near Mexico City, the Perfect Silhouette spa offers breast implants.
Staffed by young women in loose-fitting white suits, the spa also sells weight-loss creams and offers massages. The U.S. Treasury
recently said it was part of the financial network of the Beltran Leyva cartel, whose leader was gunned down by elite Mexican
marines in December. The salon's manager, Teresa Delgado, appeared baffled by the U.S. accusations. "We haven't seen anything
strange here," she said. A woman Delgado identified as the owner did not return a phone call requesting an interview.
Businesses enlisted to launder drug money typically get a cut worth 3 percent to 8 percent of the
funds passing through their books, the U.S. law enforcement official said. "SMURFING" AROUND THE LAWS Much
of the cartels' profits eventually ends up in Mexico's banking system, the U.S. official said. During the
global financial crisis last year, those assets provided valuable liquidity, says economist Guillermo Ibarra of the
Autonomous University of Sinaloa. "They had a cushion from drug trafficking money that to a certain extent helped the banks,"
Ibarra said. Indeed, drug money in banks is a global phenomenon, not just in Mexico. A United Nations report on the global drug
trade in 2009 said that "at a time of major bank failures, money doesn't smell, bankers seem to believe." Drug gangs in Mexico have
their associates make thousands of tiny deposits in their bank accounts to avoid raising suspicion from banking authorities, a
practice known as "smurfing," said the U.S. official. Mexico's banking association and the finance ministry's anti-money laundering
unit declined to comment for this story. While Mexico is confiscating more drugs and assets than ever under President Felipe
Calderon, forfeitures of money are still minuscule compared to even low-ball estimates of the amount of drug money that flows into
Mexico. Under Calderon, authorities have confiscated about $400 million, almost none of which was seized from banks, said
Ricardo Najera, a spokesman for the Attorney General's Office. Mexican bank secrecy laws make it particularly difficult to go after
drug money in financial institutions, Najera said. "We can't just go in there and say 'OK, let's have a look,'" he said. "We have to trace
the illicit origin of that money before we can get at those bank accounts." The U.S. Treasury has blocked only about $16 million in
suspected Mexican drug assets since June 2000, a Treasury official in Washington said. The official, who asked not to be named,
said the sanctions program aims to hit drug lords by breaking "their commercial and financial backbones." But freezing assets is not
"the principal objective nor the key measure of success." MAFIA CAPITALISM Data on Mexican banking provides a
novel way for calculating the size of the drug economy. Ibarra crunched numbers on monetary aggregates across
different Mexican states and concluded that more money sits in Sinaloan banks than its legitimate economy
should be generating. "It's as if two people had the same job and the same level of seniority, but one of them has twice as
much savings," he said, talking about comparisons between Sinaloa and other states. Ibarra estimates cartels have
laundered more than $680 million in the banks of Sinaloa -- which is a financial services backwater -- and that
drug money is driving nearly 20 percent of the state's economy. Edgardo Buscaglia, an academic at Columbia
University, recently scoured judicial case files and financial intelligence reports, some of which were provided by Mexican
authorities. His research found organized crime's involvement in Mexican businesses had expanded
sharply in the five years through 2008, with gangs now involved in most sectors of the economy.
Drug trafficking is key to Mexico’s economy
Morris, 12 (Stephen D. Morris is professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at Middle Tennessee State
University. He is the author of Corruption and Politics in Contemporary Mexico (1991), Political Reformism in
Mexico (1995), Gringolandia: Mexican Identity and Perceptions of the United States(2005), and Political Corruption in Mexico: The
Impact of Democratization (2009); and coeditor of Corruption and Democracy in Latin America (2009) andCorruption and Politics
in Latin America: National and Regional Dynamics (2010). His articles have appeared in Bulletin of Latin American Research,
Comparative Political Studies, Journal of Latin American Studies, and Third World Quarterly, among other journals; 2012;
http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/latin_american_research_review/v047/47.2.morris.html) KD
The linkages attending drug trafficking are many; their impacts hauntingly far reaching. The illicit trade in
drugs has become an integral part of Mexico’s economy. Operating through vast networks of street and prison
gangs, police, customs officials, front companies, banks, and many others, Mexican cartels employ an estimated
450,000 people; have operations throughout the United States and in parts of Central and
South America, as well as Europe; and take in between $25 billion and $30 billion a year. Robert J.
Bunker and John P. Sullivan estimate that the livelihood of some 3.2 million people in Mexico depends on
the illicit trade in narcotics, a figure that does not include the thousands of people and billions of
dollars involved in combating it (Bunker, 41). Indeed, DTOs provide financial opportunities where few others exist and
pump needed funds into local economies. Drug traffickers pay for “schools and hospitals, pour[ing] money
into churches and homes” (Beith, 87). They provide “gifts to children, assist victims of natural disasters, [and] generate
employment in poor areas” (Grayson, 122). Overall, Charles Bowden estimates that between 30 percent and 60 percent of the Juárez
economy runs on laundered drug money (45).
The drug trade is key to the Mexican economy
Gray, 10 – Economic Analyst at U.S. Government Accountability Office, Research Assistant at National Bureau of Economic
Research (Colin, “The Hidden Cost of the War on Drugs,” Stanford Progressive, May 2010,
http://www.stanford.edu/group/progressive/cgi-bin/?p=521)//BI
While violence is escalating and some are calling Mexico a failed state, the Mexican effort has certainly disrupted the
drug trade. Officials point to evidence of criminal organizations diversifying as drug revenues begin to dry up and to the rising
price of cocaine. As early as the second quarter of 2007, the White House reported cocaine shortages
in 37 U.S. cities and a 24% increase in the drug’s retail price. Yet, such disruption of the trade has
revealed a new issue: the dependence on the drug trade by many parts of the Mexican economy. In
considering how to fight illicit drugs in Mexico, it is crucial to consider how a blow to drugs may damage other sectors and
industries. As a net effect, most experts would agree that the illicit drug trade adversely affects the Mexican economy. Cartels
undermine the rule of law. Instability alienates current investors and deters potential investors or business-owners. Government
revenues fall, as taxable commodities are replaced in the economy by illegal goods that are not taxed by the government. Tourism,
one of Mexico’s most important exports, suffers: the U.S. military has officially discouraged travelers from vacationing in many parts
of Mexico. Drug cartels often intervene in economies directly, further discouraging investment. According to the L.A. Times, the
Zetas (the military arm of the Gulf Cartel) “have proved to be ruthless overlords. They have kidnapped businessmen, demanded
protection money from merchants, taken over sales of pirated CDs and DVDs and muscled into the liquor trade by forcing restaurant
and bar owners to buy from them.” Viridiana Rios of the Harvard Department of Government estimates that “the cost of violence is
equivalent to 1.07 billion dollars, investment losses accounts for other 1.3 billion, drug abuse generates a loss of 0.68 billion dollars,
and other costs may have an impact as high as 1.5 billion dollars.” Despite the net damage that such cartels create in the
Mexican economy, the
issue is not as homogenous as it initially appears. In fact, the Mexican
economy is, in many ways, dependent on this industry. Economists estimate that the industry brings in
between U$25 billion and U$50 billion every year. In 2009, Mexico probably made more money in
the drug trade than it did in its single largest export industry: oil. One study, noted by Global Envision, reported that
“the loss of the drug business would shrink Mexico’s economy by 63 percent. ” Others attribute as much
as 20% of Mexico’s GDP to this industry. Mexican journalist Carlos Loret de Mola claims that cartels make three times as
many profits as Mexico’s 500 largest companies combined. Furthermore, the effects of a blow to drugs would
not be uniformly felt in Mexico. Certain legal industries would be hit harder. Luxury goods, for example, have thrived in
Mexico due to the lavish tastes of drug dealers, smugglers, and organizers. These include cars, flight schools,
yachts, and the like. While drug lords do not single-handedly keep such industries afloat, they do provide significant
business. Some argue that banks are inadvertently dependent on drug money, and may have stayed
afloat during the crisis partly due to this money. While deposits are usually made into thousands of different
accounts, the money flowing through the banking system provided valuable liquidity during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. By far,
the people most hurt by a blow to the drug cartels would be the rural poor in certain areas of Mexico.
According to Ms. Rios: “drug
traffic cash flows are in fact helping some Mexican communities to somehow
alleviate a grinding stage of poverty and underdevelopment. In fact, for almost all drug-producing
communities, the drug traffic industry seems to be the only source of income.” This is partly due to the nature of drug cultivation,
which, in many ways, is similar to farming. As of the late 1990′s, roughly 300,000 peasants were employed in drug production. The
National Farm Workers’ Union (UNTA) estimates a number around 600,000. The importance of drugs in the area is nothing new.
The earliest documented poppy production in the state of Sinaloa, called “the heart of Mexican drug country” by Newsweek, was in
1886. The extent of this dependence was illustrated in 1976, when a joint operation by the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency and the Mexican government was organized. Called “Operacion Condor”, it involved
helicopters that would spray (and ruin) poppy and marijuana fields. The operation caused such
immediate economic destabilization in the region that the Mexican government indefinitely halted the project. This
dependence on drug cultivation, especially on the labor-intensive process of processing poppy gum, still exists today.
Drug trafficking props up the Mexican economy – without it, it will collapse
Lange, 10 writer at Reuters (Jason, “From spas to banks, Mexico economy rides on drugs” Jan 22, 2010
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/22/us-drugs-mexico-economy-idUSTRE60L0X120100122) // czhang
(Reuters) - At a modern factory in a city whose main claim to fame is an image of the Virgin Mary revered for granting miracles,
Mexican pharmaceuticals firm Grupo Collins churns out antibiotics and other medicines.¶ But the United States contends that the
company in Zapopan is not what it seems. The U.S. Treasury put Grupo Collins on a black list in 2008, saying the firm supplies a
small drug cartel in western Mexico with chemicals needed to make methamphetamines.¶ Grupo Collins, which has denied any
connection to organized crime, is one of dozens under suspicion of laundering money for the nation's booming drug business, whose
growing economic impact now pervades just about every level of Mexican life.¶ Mexican cartels, which control most of the
cocaine and methamphetamine smuggled into the United States, bring
an estimated $25 billion to $40 billion into
Mexico from their global operations every year.¶ To put that in perspective: Mexico probably made more
money in 2009 moving drugs than it did exporting oil, its single biggest legitimate foreign
currency earner.¶ From the white Caribbean beaches of Cancun to violent towns on the U.S. border and the beauty parlors of
Mexico City's wealthy suburbs, drug cash is everywhere in Mexico. It has even propped up the country's
banking system, helping it ride out the financial crisis and aiding the country's economy.¶ Smuggled
into Mexico mostly from the United States in $100 bills, narco money finds its way onto the books of restaurants, construction firms
and bars as drug lords try to legitimize their cash and prevent police from tracing it.¶ "Mexico is saturated with this money," said
George Friedman, who heads geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor.¶ In western Mexico, drug money started pouring into Zapopan and
nearby Guadalajara in the 1980s as the Sinaloa cartel bought hospitals and real estate, said Martin Barron, a researcher at the
institute that trains Mexico's organized crime prosecutors.¶ Now residents in the region known in Mexico for its piety say drug
smugglers barely make an effort to disguise themselves.¶ A strip of fancy boutiques in Zapopan was financed with drug money, says
Jaime Ramirez, a local newspaper columnist who has been reporting on the drug world for two decades. As well as the Grupo Collins
factory in Zapopan, a nearby car wash is also on the U.S. Treasury's black list.¶ A local cemetery draws relatives of traffickers who
were among the 17,000 people killed in the drug war in Mexico since 2006. "A lot of narcos are buried there. You should see it on
Fathers' Day," Ramirez said, as a black pick-up truck with tinted windows pulled in.¶ Zapopan residents just shrug their shoulders
when a wealthy neighbor displays traits seen as typical of a drug trafficker -- wearing cowboy gear, playing loud "norteno" music
from the country's north or holding lavish parties attended by guests who arrive in pick-up trucks or SUVs.¶ "Living alongside them
is normal," Ramirez said. "Everybody knows when a neighbor is on the shady side."¶ One of those neighbors was Sandra Avila, a
glamorous trafficker known as the "Queen of the Pacific," who lived in Zapopan before being arrested in Mexico City in 2007. ¶ On a
typical day in Zapopan recently, men unloaded boxes from vans in the Grupo Collins compound, near the company's private chapel
and soccer field. From behind the factory's high walls, there was little to suggest it could have ties to a cartel.¶ "It has always been
really calm," said Genaro Rangel, who sells tacos every morning to factory workers from a stall across the street.¶ The plant was
advertising a job opening on the company web site for a machine room technician.¶ Washington's accusation, filed under a U.S.
sanctions program, makes it illegal for Americans to do business with Grupo Collins and freezes any assets it might have in U.S.
accounts. In a 2006 report, Mexican authorities named Grupo Collins' owner Telesforo Tirado as an operator of the Colima cartel.¶
The U.S. Treasury and Mexico's Attorney General's office both declined to provide further details on the case and Grupo Collins
executives also refused to comment. But Tirado has previously denied the charges in the Mexican media.¶ CASHING IN ON THE
DRUG TRADE¶ What's going on in Zapopan is happening all over Mexico.¶ A well-known Mexico City restaurant specializing in the
spicy cuisine of the Yucatan peninsula was added to the U.S. list of front companies in December. Months earlier, one of Mexico's
top food critics had recommended it.¶ Drug money has also fueled part of a real estate boom around tourist resorts such as Cancun,
said a senior U.S. law enforcement official in Mexico City.¶ "We've had cases where traffickers purchased large tracts of land in areas
where any investor would buy," he said, asking not to be named because of concerns about his safety.¶ An architect in the city of
Tijuana did well out of designing buildings that cartels would build and rent out to legitimate local businesses. ¶ "The pay was enough
for me to build a house for myself, as well as to buy a lot a tools," he said. He was once hired to design a tunnel that led to the street
from a secret door in a drug gang member's closet.¶ Craving acceptance, the drug gangs even throw their money at acquaintances to
get them on the social scene.¶ A drug trafficker pays his friend Roberto, who declined to give his last name, to keep him connected in
Tijuana and introduce him to women. "I take him to parties," Roberto said.¶ In the wealthy shopping areas of Interlomas, near
Mexico City, the Perfect Silhouette spa offers breast implants.¶ Staffed by young women in loose-fitting white suits, the spa also sells
weight-loss creams and offers massages. The U.S. Treasury recently said it was part of the financial network of the Beltran Leyva
cartel, whose leader was gunned down by elite Mexican marines in December.¶ The salon's manager, Teresa Delgado, appeared
baffled by the U.S. accusations. "We haven't seen anything strange here," she said. A woman Delgado identified as the owner did not
return a phone call requesting an interview.¶ Businesses enlisted to launder drug money typically get a cut worth 3 percent to 8
percent of the funds passing through their books, the U.S. law enforcement official said.¶ "SMURFING" AROUND THE LAWS¶
Much of the cartels' profits eventually ends up in Mexico's banking system, the U.S. official said.
During the global financial crisis last year, those assets provided valuable liquidity, says economist
Guillermo Ibarra of the Autonomous University of Sinaloa.¶ "They had a cushion from drug trafficking money
that to a certain extent helped the banks," Ibarra said.¶ Indeed, drug money in banks is a global
phenomenon, not just in Mexico. A United Nations report on the global drug trade in 2009 said
that "at a time of major bank failures, money doesn't smell, bankers seem to believe."¶ Drug gangs in
Mexico have their associates make thousands of tiny deposits in their bank accounts to avoid raising suspicion from banking
authorities, a practice known as "smurfing," said the U.S. official.¶ Mexico's banking association and the finance ministry's antimoney laundering unit declined to comment for this story.¶ While Mexico is confiscating more drugs and assets
than ever under President Felipe Calderon, forfeitures of money are still minuscule compared to
even low-ball estimates of the amount of drug money that flows into Mexico.¶ Under Calderon,
authorities have confiscated about $400 million, almost none of which was seized from banks, said Ricardo Najera, a spokesman for
the Attorney General's Office.¶ Mexican bank secrecy laws make it particularly difficult to go after drug money in financial
institutions, Najera said.¶ "We can't just go in there and say 'OK, let's have a look,'" he said. "We have to trace the illicit origin of that
money before we can get at those bank accounts."¶ The U.S. Treasury has blocked only about $16 million in suspected Mexican drug
assets since June 2000, a Treasury official in Washington said.¶ The official, who asked not to be named, said the sanctions program
aims to hit drug lords by breaking "their commercial and financial backbones." But freezing assets is not "the principal objective nor
the key measure of success."¶ MAFIA CAPITALISM¶ Data on Mexican banking provides a novel way for
calculating the size of the drug economy. Ibarra crunched numbers on monetary aggregates
across different Mexican states and concluded that more money sits in Sinaloan banks than its
legitimate economy should be generating.¶ "It's as if two people had the same job and the same level of seniority, but
one of them has twice as much savings," he said, talking about comparisons between Sinaloa and other states.¶ Ibarra estimates
cartels have laundered more than $680 million in the banks of Sinaloa -- which is a financial services
backwater -- and that drug money is driving nearly 20 percent of the state's economy.¶ Edgardo Buscaglia,
an academic at Columbia University, recently scoured judicial case files and financial intelligence reports, some of which were
provided by Mexican authorities.¶ His research found organized crime's involvement in Mexican businesses had expanded sharply in
the five years through 2008, with gangs now involved in most sectors of the economy.¶ Buscaglia thinks Mexico's lackluster
effort to confiscate dirty money is allowing drug gangs and other mafias to flourish.¶
Drug trade has a net positive effect on the Mexican economy --- key to a bunch of
sectors
Gray, 10 (Colin, “The Hidden Cost of the War on Drugs,” Stanford Progressive, May 2010,
http://www.stanford.edu/group/progressive/cgi-bin/?p=521, Tashma)
Despite the net damage that such cartels create in the Mexican economy, the
issue is not as homogenous as it
initially appears. In fact, the Mexican economy is, in many ways, dependent on this
industry. Economists estimate that the industry brings in between U$25 billion and U $50 billion
every year. In 2009, Mexico probably made more money in the drug trade than it did in its
single largest export industry: oil. One study, noted by Global Envision, reported that “the loss of the drug
business would shrink Mexico’s economy by 63 percent.” Others attribute as much as 20% of
Mexico’s GDP to this industry. Mexican journalist Carlos Loret de Mola claims that cartels make three times as
many profits as Mexico’s 500 largest companies combined.¶ Furthermore, the effects of a blow to
drugs would not be uniformly felt in Mexico. Certain legal industries would be hit harder. Luxury
goods, for example, have thrived in Mexico due to the lavish tastes of drug dealers, smugglers, and
organizers. These include cars, flight schools, yachts, and the like. While drug lords do not single-handedly keep such
industries afloat, they do provide significant business. Some argue that banks are inadvertently dependent on
drug money, and may have stayed afloat during the crisis partly due to this money. While deposits
are usually made into thousands of different accounts, the money flowing through the banking system provided
valuable liquidity during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.¶ By far, the people most hurt by a blow to
the drug cartels would be the rural poor in certain areas of Mexico. According to Ms. Rios: “drug traffic
cash flows are in fact helping some Mexican communities to somehow alleviate a grinding stage of
poverty and underdevelopment. In fact, for almost all drug-producing communities, the drug
traffic industry seems to be the only source of income.” This is partly due to the nature of drug
cultivation, which, in many ways, is similar to farming. As of the late 1990′s, roughly 300,000 peasants were employed in drug
production. The National Farm Workers’ Union (UNTA) estimates a number around 600,000. The importance of drugs in the area
is nothing new. The earliest documented poppy production in the state of Sinaloa, called “the heart of Mexican drug country” by
Newsweek, was in 1886. The extent of this dependence was illustrated in 1976, when a joint operation by the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency and the Mexican government was organized. Called “Operacion Condor”, it involved helicopters that would spray (and ruin)
poppy and marijuana fields. The operation caused such immediate economic destabilization in the region that the Mexican
government indefinitely halted the project. This dependence on drug cultivation, especially on the labor-intensive process of
processing poppy gum, still exists today.
The drug trade generates a large flow of money into the Mexican economy
Friedman, 10 – Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University, founder of Stratfor, geopolitical intelligence firm that provides
strategic analysis and forecasting to individuals and organizations around the world (George, “Mexico and the Failed State
Revisited,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, 6 April 2010,
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100405_mexico_and_failed_state_revisited)//BI
Indeed, what the wars are being fought over in some ways benefits Mexico. The amount of
money pouring into Mexico annually is stunning. It is estimated to be about $35 billion to $40
billion each year. The massive profit margins involved make these sums even more significant.
Assume that the manufacturing sector produces revenues of $40 billion a year through exports.
Assuming a generous 10 percent profit margin, actual profits would be $4 billion a year. In the
case of narcotics, however, profit margins are conservatively estimated to stand at around 80
percent. The net from $40 billion would be $32 billion; to produce equivalent income in
manufacturing, exports would have to total $320 billion. In estimating the impact of drug
money on Mexico, it must therefore be borne in mind that drugs cannot be compared to any
conventional export. The drug trade's tremendously high profit margins mean its total impact
on Mexico vastly outstrips even the estimated total sales, even if the margins shifted
substantially. On the whole, Mexico is a tremendous beneficiary of the drug trade. Even if some
of the profits are invested overseas, the pool of remaining money flowing into Mexico creates
tremendous liquidity in the Mexican economy at a time of global recession. It is difficult to trace
where the drug money is going, which follows from its illegality. Certainly, drug dealers would
want their money in a jurisdiction where it could not be easily seized even if tracked. U.S. asset
seizure laws for drug trafficking make the United States an unlikely haven. Though money
clearly flows out of Mexico, the ability of the smugglers to influence the behavior of the Mexican
government by investing some of it makes Mexico a likely destination for a substantial portion
of such funds. The money does not, however, flow back into the hands of the gunmen shooting it
out on the border; even their bosses couldn't manage funds of that magnitude. And while money
can be -- and often is -- baled up and hidden, the value of money is in its use. As with illegal
money everywhere, the goal is to wash it and invest it in legitimate enterprises where it can
produce more money. That means it has to enter the economy through legitimate institutions -banks and other financial entities -- and then be redeployed into the economy. This is no
different from the American Mafia's practice during and after Prohibition. The Drug War and
Mexican National Interests From Mexico's point of view, interrupting the flow of drugs to the
United States is not clearly in the national interest or in that of the economic elite. Observers
often dwell on the warfare between smuggling organizations in the northern borderland but
rarely on the flow of American money into Mexico. Certainly, that money could corrupt the
Mexican state, but it also behaves as money does. It is accumulated and invested, where it
generates wealth and jobs. For the Mexican government to become willing to shut off this flow of
money, the violence would have to become far more geographically widespread. And given the
difficulty of ending the traffic anyway -- and that many in the state security and military
apparatus benefit from it -- an obvious conclusion can be drawn: Namely, it is difficult to foresee
scenarios in which the Mexican government could or would stop the drug trade. Instead, Mexico
will accept both the pain and the benefits of the drug trade.
Money Laundering
Drug producers rely on money laundering --- the War on Drugs would reverse this
Arnold, 5 (Guy, specialist in north-south relations who writes mainly in the areas of African history and politics, and
international affairs, former Director of the Africa Bureau, The International Drugs Trade, pg. 209, Routledge, Tashma)
Profits from drug trafficking can only be usefully employed by the criminal underworld when the
money has been legitimized. Drug traffickers must convert their illicit gains into acceptable, respectable
money before it can be used and before they can branch out into legitimate occupations that
allow them to enjoy their wealth without fear of investigation. The major end process in drug
trafficking, therefore, is money laundering. Consequently, one of the principal tasks of the UNDCP is to tackle this
problem. Thus, to deprive drug traffickers of their illicit power and influence, UNDCP assists governments in efforts to counter
money laundering and confiscate assets gained from drug trafficking. It is supporting a $4.3 million global program to improve the
capacity of legal and law enforcement systems, which in- cludes the creation of financial intelligence units to reduce the vulnerability
of financial systems}¶ The
end objective of all drug trafficking is to make money; and the way to curtail
successful drug trafficking, therefore, is to make the legitimization of drug-trafficking profits
increasingly difficult, if not impossible. The task is a daunting one since there are always crooked
bankers and businessmen who will turn a blind eye to the source of finances that come their way
provided they themselves are able to make a profit out of handling such money.
That destroys big banks --- they rely on money laundering for profits
Arnold, 5 (Guy, specialist in north-south relations who writes mainly in the areas of African history and politics, and
international affairs, former Director of the Africa Bureau, The International Drugs Trade, pg. 217, Routledge, Tashma)
However, attitudes to problems, once established, remain in place for a long time before any significant change takes place. For
example, following the assassination of the Colombian presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan Sarmiento in 1989, his brother
Alberto commented on the approach to the drugs war by the new Bush administration (George H. W. Bush had been President
Reagan’s “drugs czar") and pointed out that Washington’s
strategy avoided "the core of the problem"—"the
economic ties between the legal and illegal worlds," the "large financial corporations" that
handle the drug money. According to Noam Chomsky, George Bush had been instrumental in terminating the main thrust
of the real "war on drugs." Thus, officials in the enforcement section of the Treasury Department monitored the sharp in- crease in
cash inflow to Florida (later Los Angeles) banks as the cocaine trade boomed in the 1970s, and “connected it to the large-scale
laundering of drug receipts." They brought detailed information about these matters to the DEA and the Justice Department. After
some public exposés, the govern- ment launched Operation Greenback in 1979 to prosecute money laundercrs. It soon foundered;
the banking industry is not a proper target for the drug war. The Reagan administration reduced the limited
monitoring, and Bush "wasn’t really too interested in financial prosecution," the chief prosecutor in Operation Greenback recalls.‘“
In other words, then as later, money laundering through U.S., British, or other European banks is too
valuable a business to be curtailed; and the fact that these countries have not seen fit to tackle
this problem properly makes nonsense of the rest of the war on drugs.
That destroys clean tech leadership
Cogan, 8 (Doug, leader of RiskMetrics’ Climate Change Research Team and expert in investment responses to climate change,
“Corporate Governance and Climate Change: The Banking Sector”, Ceres, January 2008,
http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/corporate-governance-banking-sector)
Banks are the backbone of the global economy, providing capital for innovation, infrastructure, job creation and overall prosperity. Banks also
play an integral role in society, affecting not only spending by individual consumers, but also the growth of entire
industries. As the impacts of global warming from the heat-trapping gases released by power plants, vehicles and other sources take
root in everyday life, banks have never been more important to chart the future. The companies that banks decide to finance will be a linchpin
in slowing Earth’s warming and moving the world economy away from fossil fuels and into
clean er tech nologies. There is now overwhelming scientific evidence that worldwide temperatures are rising, glaciers are
melting, and drought and wildfires are becoming more severe. Scientists believe most of the warming in the last 50 years is humaninduced. This confluence of evidence has galvanized public attention and governments worldwide to take action to avert a possible
climate catastrophe. With nearly $6 trillion in market capitalization, the global financial
sector will play a vital role
in supporting timely, cost-effective solutions to reduce U.S. and global greenhouse gas emissions. As risk management
experts, it is essential that banks begin now to consider the financial risk implications of continued investment in carbon-intensive
energy technologies.
Extinction
Klarevas, 9 — professor at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University (Louis, “Securing American Primacy While
Tackling Climate Change: Toward a National Strategy of Greengemony”, 12/15/2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/louisklarevas/securing-american-primacy_b_393223.html)
***gendered language modified
As national leaders from around the world are gathering in Copenhagen, Denmark, to attend the United Nations Climate Change
Conference, the time is ripe to re-assess America's current energy policies - but within the larger framework of how a new
approach on the environment will stave off global warming and shore up American primacy. By
not addressing climate change more aggressively and creatively, the United States is squandering an opportunity
to secure its global primacy for the next few generations to come. To do this, though, the U.S. must rely on
innovation to help the world escape the coming environmental meltdown. Developing the key
technologies that will save the planet from global warming will allow the U.S. to outmaneuver
potential great power rivals seeking to replace it as the international system's hegemon. But the greening of
American strategy must occur soon. The U.S., however, seems to be stuck in time, unable to move
beyond oil-centric geo-politics in any meaningful way. Often, the gridlock is portrayed as a partisan difference, with
Republicans resisting action and Democrats pleading for action. This, though, is an unfair characterization as there are numerous
proactive Republicans and quite a few reticent Democrats. The real divide is instead one between realists and liberals. Students of
realpolitik, which still heavily guides American foreign policy, largely discount environmental issues as they are not seen as
advancing national interests in a way that generates relative power advantages vis-à-vis the other major powers in the system:
Russia, China, Japan, India, and the European Union. Liberals, on the other hand, have recognized that global warming might
very well become the greatest challenge ever faced by (hu)mankind. As such, their thinking often eschews
narrowly defined national interests for the greater global good. This, though, ruffles elected officials whose sworn obligation is,
above all, to protect and promote American national interests. What both sides need to understand is that by becoming a lean, mean,
green fighting machine, the U.S. can actually bring together liberals and realists to advance a collective interest which benefits every
nation, while at the same time, securing America's global primacy well into the future. To do so, the U.S. must re-invent itself as not
just your traditional hegemon, but as history's first ever green hegemon. Hegemons are countries that dominate the international
system - bailing out other countries in times of global crisis, establishing and maintaining the most important international
institutions, and covering the costs that result from free-riding and cheating global obligations. Since 1945, that role has been the
purview of the United States. Immediately after World War II, Europe and Asia laid in ruin, the global economy required
resuscitation, the countries of the free world needed security guarantees, and the entire system longed for a multilateral forum
where global concerns could be addressed. The U.S., emerging the least scathed by the systemic crisis of fascism's rise, stepped up to
the challenge and established the postwar (and current) liberal order. But don't let the world "liberal" fool you. While many nations
benefited from America's new-found hegemony, the U.S. was driven largely by "realist" selfish national interests. The liberal order
first and foremost benefited the U.S. With the U.S. becoming bogged down in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, running a record
national debt, and failing to shore up the dollar, the future of American hegemony now seems to be facing a serious contest:
potential rivals - acting like sharks smelling blood in the water - wish to challenge the U.S. on a variety of fronts. This has led
numerous commentators to forecast the U.S.'s imminent fall from grace. Not all hope is lost however. With the impending systemic
crisis of global warming on the horizon, the U.S. again finds itself in a position to address a transnational problem in a way that will
benefit both the international community collectively and the U.S. selfishly. The current problem is two-fold. First, the competition
for oil is fueling animosities between the major powers. The geopolitics of oil has already emboldened
Russia in its 'near abroad' and China in far-off places like Africa and Latin America. As oil is a limited natural resource, a nasty
zero-sum contest could be looming on the horizon for the U.S. and its major power rivals - a contest which threatens
American primacy and global stability. Second, converting fossil fuels like oil to run national economies is producing
irreversible harm in the form of carbon dioxide emissions. So long as the global economy remains oil-dependent, greenhouse gases
will continue to rise. Experts are predicting as much as a 60% increase in carbon dioxide emissions in the
next twenty-five years. That likely means more devastating water
shortages, droughts, forest fires, floods, and
storms. In other words, if global competition for access to energy resources does not undermine
international security, global warming will. And in either case, oil will be a culprit for the instability. Oil arguably has
been the most precious energy resource of the last half-century. But "black gold" is so 20th century. The key resource for this century
will be green gold - clean, environmentally-friendly energy like wind, solar, and hydrogen power. Climate change leaves no
alternative. And the sooner we realize this, the better off we will be. What Washington must do in order to avoid the traps of
petropolitics is to convert the U.S. into the world's first-ever green hegemon. For starters, the federal government must
drastically increase investment in energy and environmental research and development (E&E
R&D). This will require a serious sacrifice, committing upwards of $40 billion annually to E&E R&D - a far cry from the few billion
dollars currently being spent. By promoting a new national project, the U.S. could develop new technologies that will assure it does
not drown in a pool of oil. Some solutions are already well known, such as raising fuel standards for automobiles; improving public
transportation networks; and expanding nuclear and wind power sources. Others, however, have not progressed much beyond the
drawing board: batteries that can store massive amounts of solar (and possibly even wind) power; efficient and cost-effective
photovoltaic cells, crop-fuels, and hydrogen-based fuels; and even fusion. Such innovations will not only provide alternatives to oil,
they will also give the U.S. an edge in the global competition for hegemony. If the U.S. is able to produce technologies that allow
modern, globalized societies to escape the oil trap, those nations will eventually have
no choice but to adopt such
technologies. And this will give the U.S. a tremendous economic boom, while simultaneously
providing it with means of leverage that can be employed to keep potential foes in check. The bottomline is that the U.S. needs to become green energy dominant as opposed to black energy
independent - and the best approach for achieving this is to promote a national strategy of
greengemony.
Banks are quintessential to money laundering --- they secretly partner up with drug
producers
Arnold, 5 (Guy, specialist in north-south relations who writes mainly in the areas of African history and politics, and
international affairs, former Director of the Africa Bureau, The International Drugs Trade, pg. 210-211, Routledge, Tashma)
People who commit crimes need to disguise the origin of their criminal money so that they can
use it more easily. This fact is the basis for all money laundering, whether that of the drug trafficker, organized
criminal, terrorist, arms trafticker, blackmailer, or credit card swindler. Money laun- dering generally involves a series of multiple
transactions used to disguise the source of financial assets so that those assets may be used without com- promising the criminals
who are seeking to use the funds. Through money laundering, t.he criminal tries to transform the monetary proceeds derived from
illicit activities into funds with an apparently legal source}¶ Huge profits from drug trafficking remain largely
worthless unless these can be moved into legitimate financial and commercial activities. This is not
easy to do and, at the very least, requires legitimate organizations to cooperate in the process,
passively by turning a blind eye to any questions about the source of such funds or, more actively, by
becoming partners in the money laundering venture. Given the size of the funds seeking legitimate outlets, it is
not surprising that major financial institutions, such as banks, as well as countries, have been
prepared to accept large inputs of what they must have known to be the profits of crime without
asking any questions.¶ Money laundering is a growing part of the global "black economy " in which
more and more countries are involved. Financial speculations are an increasingly important aspect of shadow economies, and
market deregula- tion has led to huge increases in Western speculative financial transactions; Of the trillions of dollars that daily
flow around the global marketplace, less than 10 percent are connected with the real economy. The remainder are largely concerned
with gambling on the future performance of stocks and markets. While its magnitude is unloiown, it has been argued that money
laundering by criminal networks has become part of such huge speculative flows. Indeed, given its willingness to take risks, it has
proba- bly amplihed the turbulence and volatility of such movements?
Narco-Terrorism
Narco terrorism is beneficial --- countries are more willing to cooperate on
cracking down crime than terrorism --- allowing terrorists and cartels to cooperate
sparks global efforts to curtail terrorism and destroys the legitimacy of terrorist
organizations
Jacobson, 10 (Michael, senior fellow in the Stein Program at The Washington Institute, former Treasury Department official,
and Matthew Levitt, director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute, former
Treasury Department official, “Tracking Narco-Terrorist Networks: The Money Trail,” 34 Fletcher F. World Aff. 117, Winter 2010,
lexis, Tashma)
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE GROWING CRIME-TERRORISM NEXUS¶ All things considered, the growing nexus
between international terrorism and organized crime may actually be a positive
development. For one, tracking terrorists for their illicit activities, rather than their terrorismbased endeavors, is less complicated. Also, while countries may adhere to dissimilar definitions of
terrorism or hold divergent lists of designated terrorist organizations, there is more of a consensus on the need
to fight crime.¶ [*120] Some countries are more willing to coordinate with the United States on
criminal law enforcement than on counterterrorism efforts, for a variety of reasons. Many
countries do not want to acknowledge that they have a terrorist problem that they are not
dealing with effectively. Others are reluctant to be seen cooperating with the United States in the
unpopular "War on Terror." The governments in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina,
Paraguay, and Brazil, where Hizbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations have had a
long-standing presence, is a good example of the former. For instance, in December 2006, the U.S. Treasury
designated several prominent Lebanese expatriates in the TBA as terrorists because of their Hizbollah ties. In response, the
Argentine, Paraguayan, and Brazilian governments issued a joint statement exonerating these individuals and rejecting American
claims of terrorist activity in the TBA.¶ However, the 2007 State Department annual report on terrorism reveals that these three
governments take a markedly more aggressive approach to other criminal activities: "The governments of the TBA have long been
concerned with arms and drugs smuggling, document fraud, money laundering, and the manufacture and movement of contraband
goods through this region." 3 Thus, the United States would be wise to work with the TBA governments
through crime enforcement and drug-related channels rather than by ineffectively promoting
collaboration on counterterrorism measures.¶ This approach is appealing because it would
require neither changes to domestic legal structures nor a reorganization of government bodies or
legal, administrative, and regulatory authorities. Drug laws are comprehensive and ubiquitous; governments must
simply enforce existing laws and hold terrorists accountable for their transgressions. Enforcing
domestic laws is not a political statement, but merely a function of law and order and of national sovereignty. ¶ Kenya vividly
illustrates the potential of the law enforcement approach. Kenya lacks stringent counterterrorism laws, but could effectively combat
terrorism by enforcing domestic criminal legislation. Although Kenyan authorities continue to battle Islamic terrorist networks
along its unstable border regions, the perception of counterterrorism legislation as "anti-Muslim" has prevented the legislation's
development. U.S. authorities [*121] commenting on terrorism in Kenya have drawn negative responses from Kenyan officials; the
Kenyan government views such public statements as "unfriendly act[s] and threat[s] to the country's vital tourism industry." ¶ It is
also easier to prosecute terrorists for criminal activity than for crimes of terrorism. In terrorismrelated procedures, evidence often comes from intelligence sources, which can pose significant
challenges in prosecuting a suspect. The evidence may be inadmissible, its use may compromise a valuable source or
method, or the evidence may have been supplied by a foreign government unwilling to publicly acknowledge its cooperation with the
United States. Evidence in criminal prosecution is more fluidly utilized and has fewer gray areas.
Zacarias Moussaoui's prosecution on terrorism-related grounds provides a paradigmatic example of the difficulties in trying
suspected terrorists. Although the "20th hijacker" ultimately pleaded guilty, the trial persisted for more than three and a half years
as a result of disputed intelligence.¶ Beyond the legal benefits, disclosing terrorists' criminal activities conveys a
positive public relations externality. Redefining terrorists as criminals sullies the upright
reputation they seek to portray among their followers, be it as "freedom fighters" or principled religious activists.
Publicly pursuing terrorists through the criminal activity track taints the political, religious, or
practical legitimacy so critical to building financial support and recruiting operatives for
terrorism. The 2006 Federal Narco-Terrorism statute, which has been used in several cases already, is likely to play an
increasingly important role, not only in terms of enforcement, but in highlighting terrorist groups' hypocritical involvement in
criminal activity.
Terrorism leads to great power warfare --- only scenario for escalation
Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies – Victoria University of
Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33(7), July,
InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not
necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism
should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global
catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these
weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance
alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as
long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their
disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by
state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic
interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist
attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive
exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and
tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small
nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by
third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the socalled n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of
nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the
United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because
they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far
too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily
threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if
it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for
some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular
country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a
nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and
collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and,
most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism
came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or
responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally
countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would
be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and
possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high
stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a
backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had
already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst?
Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited
armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these
developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or
China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the
pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?
Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an
unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation
with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and
confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place
the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense
environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China
might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In
that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption
would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed
earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack
against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the
location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as
an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario
might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere
such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things
nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree
of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of
how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably
be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy
and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a
slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would
happen if
the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some
found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or
against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again
perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in
reason, Washington
Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or
Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If
Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia
and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They
might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and
demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state
actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the
international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what
options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades,
the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this
simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which
possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important
trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very
visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state
supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons,
including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington
have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind,
would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear
terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The
phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a
tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.
International cooperation on stopping narco terrorism is uniquely key to stop
Hezbollah
Jacobson, 10 (Michael, senior fellow in the Stein Program at The Washington Institute, former Treasury Department official,
and Matthew Levitt, director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute, former
Treasury Department official, “Tracking Narco-Terrorist Networks: The Money Trail,” 34 Fletcher F. World Aff. 117, Winter 2010,
lexis, Tashma)
THE CASE OF HIZBOLLAH¶ This approach of targeting terrorist organizations for their criminal
activity could pay especially large dividends when it comes to Hizbollah. The United States and many
of its allies, particularly the Europeans, disagree on whether or not Hizbollah is a terrorist organization.
There is far more agreement, however, that Hizbollah's global criminal activities and infrastructure pose
a serious problem and need to be addressed.¶ To date, the European Union has not designated any
part of Hizbollah as a terrorist organization, although the EU included Hizbollah members involved in specific acts
of terrorism, such as Imad Mughniyeh, on its terrorism list. Even the United States' closest ally, the United Kingdom, has been
reluctant to treat Hizbollah as a terrorist group. In March 2009, the United Kingdom announced that it was reviving dialogue with
the [*122] political wing of Hizbollah. Unlike the United States, which has blacklisted the entire Hizbollah organization, the United
Kingdom has banned only Hizbollah's terrorist (External Security Organization) and military wings. The ban on the terrorist wing
began in 2000, while the ban on the military wing followed Hizbollah's June 2008 decision to increase its support to Iraqi and
Palestinian militants.¶ The inherent challenge in developing an international consensus on the
definition of terrorism is highlighted by enduring debates at the United Nations, which tend to
devolve into semantic arguments over the distinction between "terrorist" and "freedom fighter."
Even the United States and its European allies encounter disagreement. For example, Europe has yet to designate Hizbollah as a
terrorist group because of the organization's activity in the Lebanese political arena. Many European officials argue that Hizbollah,
which is a part of the Lebanese government, is now on the path to becoming a legitimate political party, and that the designation
would backfire and reverse this progress.¶ Despite the differences between U.S. and European perceptions of and policies toward
Hizbollah, there
is one critical area where all parties' interests converge: law enforcement. The
United States and its European counterparts have a particularly strong interest in combating
Hizbollah's burgeoning role in illicit drug trafficking. Regardless of divergent political considerations or varying
definitions of terrorism, combating crime and enforcing sovereign laws are straight-forward issues. Of
all Islamic groups, Hizbollah has the longest record of engaging in criminal activity to support its activities. While Hizbollah is
involved in a wide variety of criminal activities, its role in the production and trafficking of narcotics is
particularly salient. Hizbollah has capitalized on the vast Lebanese Shi'a expatriate population, mainly located in South
America and Africa. With its strong presence in Africa, Hizbollah has been able to utilize the continent as a strategic location from
which to raise and transfer funds and to engage in such criminal enterprises as diamond smuggling.¶ In early 2009, Admiral James
G. Stavridis, the supreme allied commander, Europe, testified before the House Armed Services Committee about the nexus of illicit
drug trafficking. He testified that in August 2008, the U.S. Southern Command and the DEA coordinated with host nations [*123] to
target a Hizbollah drug trafficking ring in the TBA of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. According to Michael Braun, the former
assistant administrator and chief of operations at the DEA, "both Hamas and Hizbollah are active in this [Tri-Border] region, where
it is possible to make a profit of 1 million dollars from the sale of fourteen or fifteen kilos of drugs, an amount that could be
transported in a single suitcase." 4 As discussed above, in late 2008, U.S. and Colombian investigators identified and dismantled an
international cocaine smuggling and money-laundering ring based in Colombia. This operation, which was composed of a
Colombian drug cartel and Lebanese members of Hizbollah, used portions of its profits--allegedly hundreds of millions of dollars per
year--to finance Hizbollah.¶ Such revelations should not be surprising. In December 2006, the U.S. Treasury listed Hizbollah
operative Sobhi Fayad as a Specially Designated Terrorist. Treasury officials stated that Fayad served as a liaison between the
Iranian embassy and the Hizbollah community in the TBA and also traveled back to Lebanon and Iran to meet with senior Hizbollah
officials. According to Treasury, Fayad was also involved in a variety of illicit activities including trafficking drugs and counterfeiting
U.S. dollars.¶ While the Europeans may not consider Hizbollah to be a terrorist group, Europeans
unequivocally oppose efforts by Hizbollah to establish criminal enterprises within their borders.
For example, although there is no consensus between the United States and the United Kingdom on whether or how to engage
Hizbollah, or even how to classify Hizbollah and its various component parts, the countries agree that drug trafficking
is illegal. The United Kingdom and other European nations are as eager as the United States to stop the flow of drugs into their
countries and to prevent Hizbollah from operating criminal enterprises within their territories. Therefore, while officials may
openly describe these actions as targeting criminals, not Hizbollah, the end result will be
much the same.
Poverty
Drug trade solves widespread poverty --- small farmers cultivate drugs to stay
afloat
Keefer, 8 (Philip and Norman V. Loazya, The World Bank, Rodrigo R. Soares, University of Maryland and PUC-Rio, “The
Development Impact of the Illegality of Drug Trade,” The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper, March 2008, WPS4543,
Tashma)
4.1. The Distribution of Rents
Repression of the drug trade naturally reduces the wealth of agriculture workers in poor
countries that grow poppy seeds (Afghanistan) and coca leaves (Bolivia, Colombia, Peru). Their welfare
losses are usually considered insignificant relevant to evaluations of prohibition, precisely
because their farming activity is either criminal in and of itself, or contributes to criminal activity in other countries.
There are four reasons to take these welfare losses more seriously. First, the cultivation of poppy seeds and coca has not been
historically criminalized, nor is it everywhere criminalized; these farmers are therefore not criminals in the usual sense nor in their
own perception. Second, they are poor and the welfare losses caused by economic setbacks are
proportionally greater. Third, the benefits of prohibition seem to be scant, such that even the lightly-weighted welfare losses
that prohibition imposes on cultivators may be relatively large. The fourth reason is perhaps the most important: the losses
that farmers incur may arise in part because criminalization leads to a transfer of rents from
them to drug traffickers.
Poverty makes violence inevitable --- outweighs nuclear war
Gilligan 96 (James, Professor of Psychiatry – Harvard Medical School, Director of the Center for the Study of Violence,
Member – Academic Advisory Council of the National Campaign Against Youth Violence, “Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and its
Causes”, pg. 191-196)
***We do not endorse the use of Holocaust rhetoric which this card has been edited to remove
The deadliest form of violence is poverty. You cannot work for one day with the violent people who fill our prisons
and mental hospitals for the criminally insane without being forcible and constantly reminded of the extreme poverty and
discrimination that characterizes their lives. Hearing about their lives, and about their families and friends, you are forced to
recognize the truth in Gandhi’s observation that the deadliest form of violence is poverty. Not a day goes by without realizing that
trying to understand them and their violent behavior in purely individual terms is impossible and wrong-headed. Any theory of
violence, especially a psychological theory, that evolves from the experience of men in maximum security prisons and hospitals for
the criminally insane must begin with the recognition that these institutions are only microcosms. They are not where the major
violence in our society takes place, and the perpetrators who fill them are far from being the main causes of most violent deaths. Any
approach to a theory of violence needs to begin with a look at the structural violence in this country. Focusing merely on those
relatively few men who commit what we define as murder could distract us from examining and learning from those structural
causes of violent death that are far more significant from a numerical or public health, or human, standpoint. By “structural
violence” I mean the increased rates of death, and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted
with the relatively lower death rates experienced by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large
proportion of them) are a function of class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society’s collective human choices,
concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting “structural” with
“behavioral violence,” by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of
individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so
on. Structural violence differs from behavioral violence in at least three major respects. *The lethal effects
of structural violence operate continuously, rather than sporadically, whereas murders, suicides,
executions, wars, and other forms of behavioral violence occur one at a time. *Structural violence operates more or less
independently of individual acts; independent of individuals and groups (politicians, political parties, voters) whose decisions may
nevertheless have lethal consequences for others. *Structural violence is normally invisible, because it may
appear to have had other (natural or violent) causes. The finding that structural violence causes far
more deaths than behavioral violence does is not limited to this country. Kohler and Alcock attempted to arrive at the
number of excess deaths caused by socioeconomic inequities on a worldwide basis. Sweden was their model of the nation that had
come closes to eliminating structural violence. It had the least inequity in income and living standards, and the lowest discrepancies
in death rates and life expectancy; and the highest overall life expectancy in the world. When they compared the life expectancies of
those living in the other socioeconomic systems against Sweden, they found that 18 million deaths a year could be
attributed to the “structural violence” to which the citizens of all the other nations were being subjected. During the past
decade, the discrepancies between the rich and poor nations have increased dramatically and alarmingly. The 14 to 18 million deaths
a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict.
Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military and political
violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those by genocide—or about eight
million per year, 1939-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000) deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million,
1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (232 million), it was clear that even war
cannot begin to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year. In other words,
every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews
over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating,
thermonuclear [war], or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the
world. Structural violence is also the main cause of behavioral violence on a socially and epidemiologically significant
scale (from homicide and suicide to war and genocide). The question as to which of the two forms of violence—
structural or behavioral—is more important, dangerous, or lethal is moot, for they are
inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect.
*War on Drugs Fails*
General
US can never solve drug trafficking in Central America – in a bind
Carpenter, 12 (Ted Galen Carpenter is senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Dr.
Carpenter served as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for defense and foreign policy
studies from 1995 to 2011. He is the author of nine and the editor of 10 books on international affairs; 1/4/12; “Drug Mayhem Moves
South”; http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/drug-mayhem-moves-south) KD
The U.S. government is caught in a bind. Clearly, Washington does not want to see Central
America become a region of narco-states in which the drug cartels are the political powers that really matter. And
Central American leaders have a point when they argue that their countries are at risk largely
because of their geographic location along the route between drug-source countries and the insatiable U.S.
drug market. According to the 2011 United Nations World Drug Report, the U.S. market accounts for approximately 36 percent
of world consumption of cocaine, and the figures for other drugs are similar.¶ At the same time, U.S. leaders need to
guard against letting excessive guilt make them receptive to what amounts to a financial
shakedown from Central American regimes. Murder rates in those countries were already among the highest in the
world before the Mexican cartels moved in. The drug gangs have certainly exacerbated security problems in
Central America, but they did not create them.
The War on Drugs is a massive waste of money --- hasn’t curtailed illegal drug
trade
Boesler, 12 (Matthew, reporter for Business Insider's markets desk, and Ashley Lutz, writer for
Business Insider's retail section, “32 Reasons Why We Need To End The War On Drugs,”
Business Insider, 7/12/12, http://www.businessinsider.com/32-reasons-why-we-need-to-endthe-war-on-drugs-2012-7?op=1, Tashma)
The 'war on drugs' is insanely expensive In the past 40 years, The US has spent more than $1 trillion
enforcing drug laws. Annually, the US spends at least $15 billion a year on drug law enforcement. Globally, over $100
billion is spent fighting the war on drugs every single year. All that money is in practice a
complete and total waste United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Since the global war on drugs
began, drug use has expanded steadily, the exact opposite outcome the war is meant to effect.
There have been nearly no official cost benefit analyses of the war on drugs, leaving the door
wide open for all kinds of unexpected harm caused and little accountability.
Ending illegal drug activity is impossible --- the necessary resources don’t exist
Kan, 9 (Paul R., Associate Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry L. Stimson
Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, pg.
67-68, Potomac Books Inc., Tashma)
For example, there are not enough resources that could be dedicated to capture and hold an entire
area where drugs are grown or manufactured and where violent groups operate. Identifying where
drug crops are grown is daunting enough. Attacking portions of a drug network infrastructure,
including processing labs, transportation nodes, or inter- chcting shipments, has had minimal impact as a counternarcotics
strategy and, therefore, has not been a useful part of any potent coercive military operations. At the wholesale and retail
level of distribution, police agencies are overwhelmed by the drug activities and crimes carried out by
individuals and groups. Drugs have low obstructability. They can only be blocked with many
soldiers and heavy equipment .... Resources that have a lower value-to-weight ratio that must be transported by truck or
train—lil<e minerals and timber—are moderately obstructable if they must cross long distances. Resources that are transported in
liquid form and travel long distances through aboveground pipelines (i.e., oil and natural gas) are highly obstructable.5
Impossible to stop drug organizations --- their motives are unknown
Kan, 9 (Paul R., Associate Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry L. Stimson
Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, pg.
69, Potomac Books Inc., Tashma)
Far from cohesive political movements, many groups are now more akin to armed business
ventures. They are now known as much for their activities, such as kidnapping, extortion,
assassinations and drug running, as for the political causes espoused by their founders. The FARC, for example, is now often
referred to as the "third cartel,“ after Cali and Medellin.° Similar groups, including the IMU, SL, the Taliban, and the United Wa
State Army (UWSA), no longer appear to be ideologically inspired, yet they do not state that their
goals are to turn their respective countries into full-blown "narco-states" or possess an autonomous
region for the sole purpose of producing drugs. This ambiguity over the central direction or goal of their
violence makes these groups difficult to defeat in combat or to be persuaded into good faith negotiations."’
State-based policies to combat drugs structurally fail
Freeman and Luis Sierra, 05 (*Laurie, Director for Yemen at the National Security Council, former State
Department Official, fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America, writer for the Washington Post Mexico Bureau, M.A. in
International Politics from Princeton University, degree from Duke in Latin American Studies, **Jorge, Knight International
Journalism Fellow, degree in International Journalism from the University of Southern California, defense policy and economics
fellow at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, “Mexico: The Militarization Traip”, 2005, part of
“Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The impact of U.S. Policy”, Rienner, Google Books, JKahn)
U.S. drug control policy toward the Caribbean has failed to achieve even minimal objectives. Not only
is the drug trade as deepy rooted as ever in the area; related violence and illicit drug consumption
are on the rise . Changing U.S. priorities could, however, provide an opportunity for new policy approaches across the region.
As the United States turns its attention elsewhere, the Caribbean and other countries may be given
the flexibility they need to develop integrated alternative policies that take into account the complex
socioeconomic challenges they face. It is vital that the spectrum of public debate be broadened, that is, democratized.
Government resources should not be used to delegitimize alternative to critical positions, as has
been the practice of the U.S. drug control bureaucracy.
Balloon Effect
The balloon effect precludes stopping trafficking – drug trade will just be displaced
elsewhere
Globe and Mail, 12 (“The drug war spreads instability; Narco-trade corridors undermine
governance”, the Globe and Mail, 4/26/2012, Lexis, JKahn)
The war on drugs doesn't just cause human misery. It contributes to the political instability of
many parts of the world, including Mexico, Central America and now West Africa. The transnational
criminal groups in control of the drug trade have successfully destabilized transit countries that stand
between production and the market in Europe and North America. This underscores the unintended
consequences of prohibition: the growth of a huge criminal black market financed by the profits of supplying
demand for illegal drugs, and the "balloon" effect , whereby drug production and transit corridors shift location to avoid law
enforcement. The war on drugs is inherently unwinnable , as the recent report from the Global Commission on Drug
Policy concludes. Central America has emerged as the new epicentre in the illicit trade, as Mexican cartels
are increasingly squeezed by President Felipe Calderon's military initiative against them. There has been an
extraordinary surge in crime in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, including kidnapping, drug trafficking and
migrant smuggling. The drug economy in Guatemala is equal to twice the country's officially recognized GDP. No wonder Central
American leaders are demanding reforms to global drug policy. Drug money is also perverting weak economies in
West Africa, which has become a major transit repackaging hub for South American cocaine destined for Europe. There are fears it
could next become a transit zone for cannabis.
Crackdowns will only cause ballooning displacement
Youngers and Rosin, 05 (*Coletta, Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America,
consultant with the International Drug Policy Consortium, B.A. from the University of the South
in Political Science, M.A. from Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, researcher at Oxford University, **Eileen, researcher at WOLA, “The U.S.
“War on Drugs”: Its Impact in Latin America and the Caribbean, “Drugs and Democracy in Latin
America”, Rienner, 2005, Google Books, JKahn)
A significant gap exists in U.S. drug control programs between expansive goals and limited
achievements. U.S. officials routinely assert that international counterdrug programs are successful.
Short-term tactical successes are indeed evident – coca crops are eradicated, traffickers are arrested, and shipments
are intercepted. Nonetheless, total coca production has remained remarkably steady (Figure 1.2). There is
no evidence demonstrating a significant reduction in the supply of illicit drugs on U.S. city streets. To
the contrary, the stability of price and purity levels of drugs points to their continued accessibility.
Winning the drug war is as elusive today as it was when the effort was first launched. The drug trade, it seems, is
more like a balloon than a battlefield. When one part of a balloon is squeezed, its contents are
displaced to another. Similarly, when coca production is suppressed in one area, it quickly pops up
somewhere else , disregarding national borders. Arrested drug lords are quickly replaced by others who move up
the ranks; dismantled cartels are replaced by smaller, leaner operations that are harder to detect and
deter. When drug-trafficking routes are disrupted by intensive interdiction campaigns, they are simply
shifted elsewhere 5.
Bribes
And they can’t win offense --- even if large-scale cartels are caught, they’ll bribe or
murder their way out of trouble
Becker, 13 (Gary S., professor of economics and sociology at the University of Chicago, Nobel
laureate, and Kevin M. Murphy, professor of economics at the University of Chicago Booth
School of Business, “Have We Lost the War on Drugs?,” Wall Street Journal, 1/4/13,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324374004578217682305605070.html,
Tashma)
The large profits for drug dealers who avoid being caught and punished encourage them to try to
bribe and intimidate police, politicians, the military and anyone else involved in the war against
drugs. If police and officials resist bribes and try to enforce antidrug laws, they are threatened with
violence and often begin to fear for their lives and those of their families.
Mexico offers a well-documented example of some of the costs involved in drug wars. Probably more than 50,000 people
have died since Mexico's antidrug campaign started in 2006. For perspective, about 150,000 deaths would
result if the same fraction of Americans were killed. This number of deaths is many magnitudes greater than American losses in the
Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined, and is about three times the number of American deaths in the Vietnam War. Many of
those killed were innocent civilians and the army personnel, police officers and local
government officials involved in the antidrug effort.
Designer Drugs Alt Cause
War on drugs is futile – designer drugs is a huge alt cause
Bell, 6/15/13 writer at the Guardian (Vaughan “Why the war on drugs has been made redundant” The Observer
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2013/jun/16/designer-drugs-legal-highs) // czhang
The term "designer drug" became popular with the acid house and ecstasy boom in the 1990s, but it was never really accurate. The
main ingredient in ecstasy pills – MDMA – was first synthesised in 1912 and began its life as a recreational drug in 70s California,
years before it became notorious on the rave scene. The drug was never created for the party crowd, but the " designer
drug"
label stuck as the perfect phrase both to glamorise and demonise the fashionable new high. ¶ There
have been some genuine attempts at designer drugs through the years – where people have attempted to create new
recreational substances to evade drug laws – but most have been abject failures. In the most notorious example, chemistry
student Barry Kidston tried to create a synthetic heroin-like high in 1976 and ended up creating MPTP, a substance so neurotoxic
that it gave him Parkinson's disease days after he injected it. As a grim consolation, Kidston's only legacy was to create a drug that is
still used today in lab experiments to try and understand this debilitating neurological disorder.¶ But something has
changed on the street drug scene in recent years. For the first time, we can use the term "designer drug" with
confidence because we are in the midst of an unnerving scientific revolution in the use and supply of
mind-altering substances.¶ These drugs have hit the headlines under names such as Spice, K2, mephedrone and MCat, but there are hundreds more. They are sold euphemistically as "bath salts", "incense" or "research chemicals", and don't get
regulated, at least not at first, because they are labelled as "not for human consumption". Unlike previous generations of legal highs
that were about as recreational as a slap in the face, they actually work. They get you high.¶ The two most popular types
are synthetic, cannabis-like drugs, sold as smokable plant material, and stimulants, similar to ecstasy and amphetamines. But
what makes this a revolution, rather than simply a market innovation, is the scale and speed of
drug development. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Addiction reported 73 new substances last year, meaning
new highs were hitting the market at a rate of more than one a week. This wave of new drugs
only began five years ago and since then more than 200 previously unknown substances have
been found in circulation.¶ This upsurge in new highs has some serious science behind it. It is worth
noting that most traditional drugs of abuse – speed, cocaine, heroin, ecstasy and so on – can be synthesised fairly easily. You need
someone with a bit of knowledge and the right ingredients, not always easy to find, but you can complete the process in a back room,
basement or jungle. Not so with the new generation of synthetic highs. While most university chemists would sneer at the
suggestion that the synthesis was difficult, it still
needs a professional laboratory, more so for the constant
production of new substances.¶ It is this constant innovation that is driving the market and
making it possible to evade the law. Take the synthetic cannabis drugs, for example. All include variations of the
tetrahydrocannabinol or THC molecule, the main active ingredient in cannabis. Hundreds of these variations were created for
research purposes and described, often only once or twice, in the pages of obscure scientific journals. They were mostly created in
the lab as an exercise in exploring the limits of the cannabinoid molecules but were never used commercially and never tested on
humans.¶ When the legal highs market exploded in 2008, drug researchers started to analyse what was being sold. They found inert
plant material, sprayed with obscure substances that were barely known outside the small world of cannabis neurochemistry. It was
like finding the new iPhone worked on antimatter.¶ When Germany identified the substances and banned
them in early 2009, new cannabinoids, again never before seen outside the lab, had replaced
them within weeks and this is what has been happening ever since. One gets banned and
another novel substance takes its place almost immediately. Professional but clandestine labs are rifling the
scientific literature for new psychoactive drugs and synthesising them as fast as the law changes. In one of the most interesting
developments, a cannabinoid detected in 2012, named XLR-11, was not only new to the drug market but completely new to science.
Several previously unknown substances have turned up since. The grey market labs are not only pushing new
substances on to the drug market, they are actually innovating drug design. The human testers select
themselves of course, unaware of what they're taking, sometimes leading to disastrous results. Information about the dangers of new
substances is usually nonexistent.¶ The whole process has also been an unwitting experiment in drug
policy. Despite the free availability of substances as pleasurable as already banned drugs, we have not seen a massive increase in
problem users and drug mortality rates have been falling. Furthermore, even with the newly introduced "instant bans", drug laws
are simply not able to keep up.¶ Currently, it is barely possible to detect new drugs at the rate they
appear. It has long been clear that the drug war approach of criminalising possession rather than
treating problem drug-users has been futile. The revolution in the recreational drug market is a
stark reminder of this reality. The war on drugs has not been lost, it has been made obsolete.
Fill In
The aff fails to resolve drug trade – groups will just consolidate networks
Youngers and Rosin, 05 (*Coletta, Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America, consultant with the
International Drug Policy Consortium, B.A. from the University of the South in Political Science, M.A. from Princeton University,
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, researcher at Oxford University, **Eileen, researcher at WOLA, “The
U.S. “War on Drugs”: Its Impact in Latin America and the Caribbean, “Drugs and Democracy in Latin America”, Rienner, 2005,
Google Books, JKahn)
A similar phenomenon happens with arrests of traffickers. Removing one set of international drug
dealers has often simply cleared the way for rivals and new entrants to the drug trade, rather than
reducing the size of the drug market. Smashing the large Mexican and Columbian cartels led to
the formation of groups that are smaller and harder to detect. Larger and more frequent drug seizures, often
offered as evidence of policy success are in fact inherently ambiguous indicators. They may instead reflect increased drug
production and trafficking, as traffickers seed to compensate for their anticipated losses.
FAA Spec.
The strict nature of the War on Drugs backfires – double bind: EITHER countries
comply and are forced to grow unprofitable crops OR countries don’t comply and
face economic decline --- both scenarios result in more drug trade
Swanson, 6 (Joe, J.D., The George Washington University Law School, “DRUG TRAFFICKING
IN THE AMERICAS: REFORMING UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY,” 38 Geo. Wash. Int'l L.
Rev. 779, lexis, Tashma)
2. Non-Trade Based Mechanisms
The FAA has received numerous criticisms. Under
the FAA system of "aid leveraging," the United States grants
or withholds assistance depending on a country's compliance with U.S. conditions. 122 While providing for
a system of rewards, "aid leveraging" [*794] also provides for punishment; withholding of U.S. assistance can
further depress the economies of already struggling countries, which in turn may force
individuals into the drug trade. 123 Even the system of rewards can produce negative results ;
for example, providing crop substitution assistance only for those crops that would not compete
with U.S. commodities on the open market may in fact lead to an increase in drug
cultivation by discouraging the cultivation of alternative, profitable crops. 124 Additionally,
crop eradication efforts work to the detriment of poorer farming families rather than those responsible for pushing drugs into the
international "pipeline"; in the case of coca, crop eradication eliminates an otherwise legal and culturally important plant. 125
Finally, some commentators note that provision of United States aid may not always be motivated entirely by concerns about
narcotics production. 126
Increases Profits
The War on Drugs backfires --- it increases cartel profits because they can justify
jacking up prices to compensate for risk of punishment
Becker, 13 (Gary S., professor of economics and sociology at the University of Chicago, Nobel
laureate, and Kevin M. Murphy, professor of economics at the University of Chicago Booth
School of Business, “Have We Lost the War on Drugs?,” Wall Street Journal, 1/4/13,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324374004578217682305605070.html,
Tashma)
Prices of illegal drugs are pushed up whenever many drug traffickers are caught and punished
harshly. The higher prices they get for drugs help compensate traffickers for the risks of being
apprehended. Higher prices can discourage the demand for drugs, but they also enable some traffickers to
make a lot of money if they avoid being caught, if they operate on a large enough scale, and if they
can reduce competition from other traffickers. This explains why large-scale drug gangs and cartels are
so profitable in the U.S., Mexico, Colombia, Brazil and other countries.
Boosting drug prices just increases black market profits --- no serious reduction in
demand
Williams, 11 (Ray B., “Why ‘The War on Drugs’ Has Failed,” Psychology Today, 6/6/11,
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/wired-success/201106/why-the-war-drugs-has-failed,
Tashma)
At least 500 economists, including Nobel prize winners Milton Friedman, George Akerlof and Vernon Smith
have concluded that reducing the supply of marijuana though interdiction without reducing the
public demand, causes the price and therefore the profits of drug cartels to rise. Despite over $7 billion spent annually
towards arresting and prosecuting nearly 800,000 people for marijuana offenses in the U.S. in 2005, according to the FBI, the
federally-funded Monitoring the Future Study reported that 85% of high school seniors found marijuana "easy to obtain."
Numerous experts have criticized The War on Drugs as the wrong approach to deal with the
problem. They argue that by favoring domestic law endorsement in instead of treatment, the government has
focused on enforcement instead of dealing with treatment as a social problem. In addition, by
making drugs illegal rather than regulating them, The War on Drugs creates a highly
profitable black market , and increasing levels of violent crime.
Prohibitionist policies based on eradication, interdiction and criminalization of consumption
simply have not worked. Violence and the organized crime associated with the drug trade are getting worse, not better,
despite the current policies. The alarming power of the drug cartels leads to a criminalization of politics and a politicization of
crime. And the corruption of the judicial and political system is undermining the foundations of democracy in several Latin
American countries.
And higher prices reinforces the same crime that they seek to prevent
Boesler, 12 (Matthew, reporter for Business Insider's markets desk, and Ashley Lutz, writer for
Business Insider's retail section, “32 Reasons Why We Need To End The War On Drugs,”
Business Insider, 7/12/12, http://www.businessinsider.com/32-reasons-why-we-need-to-endthe-war-on-drugs-2012-7?op=1, Tashma)
Expensive drugs cause more people to commit crimes in order to fund their
habits. For example, cigarette smokers typically don't have to commit felonies just to fund their
lifestyles. However, due to insane mark-ups of unsafe, unregulated, and therefore highly addicting
products, many users of illegal drugs often do. A comparison of illegal drug users with medicinal users of the same
drugs shows dramatic decreases in the level of crime being committed to fund drug addictions.
Increasing prices causes an eruption of black markets within the U.S.
Swanson, 6 (Joe, J.D., The George Washington University Law School, “DRUG TRAFFICKING
IN THE AMERICAS: REFORMING UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY,” 38 Geo. Wash. Int'l L.
Rev. 779, lexis, Tashma)
A. Failures of the Present Regime of International Drug Control
1. Criticisms of America's "Supply-Side" and "Prohibitionist" Regimes
Critics of the United States' supply-side narcotics control
efforts argue that due to the profitability
of drug production, the United States' policies of crop eradication and substitution merely displace drug
producers to other countries. 113 Moreover, critics claim that heavy U.S. involvement in drugproducing regions exerts upward pressure on drug prices, making drug production even more
economically attractive. 114 Some fear that effective control of illegal drug supplies, which
inevitably increases drug prices, will create black markets in the United States and increase crime
rates. 115 Finally, many urge that the United States' focus should be on its [*793] own drug demand problem rather than the
supply created by that demand. 116
Other commentators argue that the
United States' prohibitionist attitude, under which resources are
allocated to preventing the production and importation of illegal drugs, has contributed to the
failure of its drug control efforts in the Western hemisphere. 117 Instead of taking an "all or nothing" approach to drug
production in other countries, these commentators argue that U.S. policy should allow its neighbors leeway to ease internal
restrictions on drug production and use, 118 reasoning that a legitimate and regulated drug production industry would provide
employment opportunities. 119 Moreover, careful and deliberate legalization would reduce or eliminate many of the social and
political effects of black market drug operations, such as corruption of public officials, violence, organized crime, and international
arms trafficking. 120 Finally, legalization would allow countries to more easily track drugs as they moved from legitimate markets to
illicit ones; these countries could then share this information with the United States and assist substantially in interdiction and
seizure efforts. 121
Small Scale Focus
The War on Drugs targets small-scale cartels --- allows for large-scale cartels to
remain invisible and reap enormous profits
Becker, 13 (Gary S., professor of economics and sociology at the University of Chicago, Nobel
laureate, and Kevin M. Murphy, professor of economics at the University of Chicago Booth
School of Business, “Have We Lost the War on Drugs?,” Wall Street Journal, 1/4/13,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324374004578217682305605070.html,
Tashma)
The paradox of the war on drugs is that the harder governments push the fight, the higher drug
prices become to compensate for the greater risks. That leads to larger profits for traffickers who avoid being
punished. This is why larger drug gangs often benefit from a tougher war on drugs, especially if
the war mainly targets small-fry dealers and not the major drug gangs. Moreover, to the
extent that a more aggressive war on drugs leads dealers to respond with higher levels of violence and corruption, an increase in
enforcement can exacerbate the costs imposed on society.
US Strategy
Current US strategy is inefficient
Bagley, 13 (Bruce Bagley, holds a PhD. in Political Science from the University of California, Los Angeles. His research
interests are in U.S.-Latin American relations, with an emphasis on drug trafficking and security issues, 2013,
http://www.scielo.gpeari.mctes.pt/pdf/spp/n71/n71a06.pdf) KD
While the United States has managed to stabilize or even reduce demand for most illicit drugs at home, it
most certainly
has not eliminated American demand for illicit drugs or the profits associated with supplying
the huge US market. Demand control has routinely been underfunded by Washington while primary
emphasis has almost automatically been accorded to expensive, but ultimately ineffective, supply-side control strategies. There have
been some efforts since 2009 undertaken by the Obama administration, and his Drug Czar Gil Kerlikowske, to redress this longstanding imbalance in US drug policy, although prevention and treatment remain woefully underfunded.
Analysis of the reasons behind the US insistence on supply over demand control strategies lies beyond the scope of this essay. The
consequences of Washington’s strategic choices are, however, obvious. Washington has demanded that the
countries of the region follow its lead in the war on drugs and, as in previous years, upheld a
formal “certification” process that often sanctioned those nations that did not “fully
cooperate”.US insistence on such a policy approach has not only led to overall failure in the war
on drugs over the last twenty five years plus, it has been counterproductive for both US and
individual Latin American country interests. The price that Colombia has paid for its role in the war on drugs has
been high in both blood and treasure. The price that Mexico is being asked to pay today is as high or higher. The high costs
associated with failure have generated a reaction to the US strategy both at home and abroad and produced a new debate over
alternatives to American prohibitionist approaches such as harm reduction, decriminalization, and legalization (Bagley and
Tokatlian, 2007; Bagley, 2009b; 1988).
AT: Borders
Border enforcement will ultimately fail – smugglers were utilize the Carribean
Freeman and Luis Sierra, 05 (*Laurie, Director for Yemen at the National Security Council,
former State Department Official, fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America, writer for
the Washington Post Mexico Bureau, M.A. in International Politics from Princeton University,
degree from Duke in Latin American Studies, **Jorge, Knight International Journalism Fellow,
degree in International Journalism from the University of Southern California, defense policy
and economics fellow at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense
University, “Mexico: The Militarization Traip”, 2005, part of “Drugs and Democracy in Latin
America: The impact of U.S. Policy”, Rienner, Google Books, JKahn)
The U.S. government’s antidrug strategy defines the Caribbean region as a “transit zone,” an
extensive and problematic border that must be controlled to keep drugs away from U.S. shores. The notion of a
transit zone implies that dugs pass directly through the region from the production zone to the
consumption zone and that the flow of drugs could be stopped by turning the border into a kind of
shield . At its most extreme, this would involve the impossible task of building a “Caribbean barrier”
against illicit dugs, using police and military controls.
AT: Economic Sanctions
Economic sanctions fail
Kan, 9 (Paul R., Associate Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry L. Stimson
Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, pg.
68, Potomac Books Inc., Tashma)
Economic sanctions against a country to curtail the drug trade’s influence on a conflict are
counterproductive . If sanctions are not targeted, social and economic conditions may deteriorate within
a country forcing more people into the drug trade or into participating in the ongoing violence.
The imposition of trade restrictions on an illegal commodity is also unfeasible, for drugs do not have to
face tariffs. Moreover; targeting sanctions against irregular groups is exceptionally difficult. Efforts
at "naming and shaming" groups by exposing leaders’ connections to the illicit economy in
hopes of eroding their support among their followers, are rarely effective. Many followers either already
know about the connections (and even benefit from them) or do not care since the means are secondary to the objective.
AT: Empirics
The War on Drugs has evolved --- past successes are no longer possible
Kan, 9 (Paul R., Associate Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry L. Stimson
Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, pg.
67, Potomac Books Inc., Tashma)
Today, the twin phenomena of drug-financed violence and drugged combatants pose special challenges for
opponents of the drug trade who seek conflict resolution. Drug-financed combatant groups and drugged
combatants increase the difficulty of promoting sustainable peace in war-torn societies by reducing
many of the familiar dampening forces that have been present in other conflicts while diminishing the effectiveness of
measures aimed to reduce ongoing violence. As a result, the face of war is becoming less familiar in many contexts,
affecting traditional approaches to conflict resolution. Although agreements have been reached to limit or end several violent
conflicts, the drug trade has limited the power of many commitments made by the warring parties.
Combatant access to legal commodities in other resource-driven conflicts, such as oil, timber, diamonds,
and gas, can
be more easily curtailed through traditional military, diplomatic, and economic
actions designed to bring pressure on the parties involved} The three prevailing approaches that have been used in other
resource-driven conflicts are to capture resource areas from belligerents, broker an agreement to share revenues between parties,
and impose economic sanctions? The diffuse and complex nature of the drug trade, however, makes many
contemporary conflicts uniquely resistant to these time-honored conflict resolution measures. They
are largely infeasible given the illicit status of narcotics, the ways that drug crops are grown and amphetaminetype stimulants (ATS) are manufactured, the multifaceted manner in which they are transported to market, and the vastness
of the international trafficking network that now exists.
Empirics are irrelevant --- the nature of drug producers has changed
Kan, 9 (Paul R., Associate Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry L. Stimson
Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, pg.
71, Potomac Books Inc., Tashma)
In many of todays conflicts, traditional attempts to manufacture political solutions to end the violence
are tenuous or completely untenable from the beginning. Drug-financed warring groups combined
with drug-fueled violence lessen the ability of policymakers and military leaders to control the
magnitude and duration of war. In previous eras, empires or commercial surrogates almost exclusively
controlled the drug trade, which meant drat governments could more easily manipulate the role
of drugs in warfare; their role was more tightly controlled and more closely tied to clear political objectives for war: While the
Opium Wars may stand out as a contrary example, they were nonetheless wars whose underpin- nings were the commercial interests
of the states involved.“Although Britain wanted China to open its market, China did not want to cede any sovereignty to European
powers. Contrary to many of today‘s wars, the Opium Wars were not protracted, unrestrained,
fought by irregulars, or involved shifting strategic objectives owing to the presence of drugs. In
fact, despite the central issue of dispute being the trade of a narcotic, the British and Chinese governments were
able to manage the levels of violence in hopes of bringing about their respective political
objectives, a quality that many current warring groups do not share."’
AT: Firearm Laws
Tightening fire arm laws fails – there’s no correlation in the evidence
Carpenter, 9 vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the
author of eight books, including Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in
Latin America (Ted Galen, “Troubled Neighbor: Mexico’s Drug Violence Poses a Threat to the United States” February 2, 2009
Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/troubled-neighbor-mexicos-drug-violence-poses-threat-unitedstates) // czhang
The Mexican government has responded to Washington’s complaints about the surging violence
by blaming supposedly lax U.S.¶ gun laws. Mexico’s attorney general, Eduardo¶ Medina Mora, typified that view,
saying: “I¶ think American [gun] laws are absurd” because “they make it very easy for citizens to¶ acquire guns.”¶ 37¶ Gun control
advocates in the United States¶ have taken up the same theme. A New York¶ Times editorial encapsulated the logic of¶ strengthening
the restrictions on firearms as a¶ way to more effectively wage the war on drugs¶ south of the border. “Mexico has no hope of¶
defeating the traffickers unless this country is¶ also willing to do more to fight the drug war at¶ home—starting with a clear
commitment to¶ stop the weapons smugglers.”¶ 38¶ University of¶ Southern California scholar Pamela Starr goes¶ even further,
arguing that U.S. leaders should¶ focus “on the southward flow of arms and¶ ammunition that is fueling an explosion of¶ drugrelated violence in Mexico.” She stresses¶ that “anestimated97percentofthe arms used¶ by the Mexican cartels—including military
grade grenade launchers and assault weapons—¶ are purchased at sporting goods stores and gun¶ shows on the U.S. side of the
border and then¶ smuggled
south,accordingtotheMexicangovernment.”Herproposedsolutionisa“Cabinetlevelinitiativetoattacktheillicitguntrade.The¶
departments of Homeland Security, Justice,¶ State, Defense, and Treasury all need to be¶ involved.” Echoing the arguments of
Mexican¶ political leaders, Starr asserts: “The United¶ States is enabling the bloodshed in Mexico. We¶ have a moral responsibility to
stop arming the¶ murderers and kidnappers—our national security demands it.”¶ 39¶ Even some U.S. political leaders have accepted
the Mexican government’s explanation for¶ the surging violence. In June 2008,the Bush and¶ Calderón administrations announced a
new¶ program, the Armas Cruzadas (Crossed Arms),to¶ stem the flow of guns from the United States to¶ Mexico. Sen. Charles
Grassley (R-IA) defended¶ the initiative, saying: “As drugs come into our¶ country, money and illegal firearms go out. We¶ owe it to
our neighbors to help cut down on outbound smuggling.”¶ 40¶ The notion that the violence in Mexico¶ would
subside if the United States had more¶ restrictive laws on firearms is devoid of logic¶ and
evidence. Mexican drug gangs would have¶ little trouble obtaining all the guns they desire¶ from
black market sources in Mexico and elsewhere. After all, the traffickers make their fortunes operating in a black
market involving¶ another product, and they have vast financial¶ resources to purchase whatever they need
to¶ conduct their business. Even assuming that the¶ Mexican government’s estimate that 97 percent of the weapons used by
the cartels come¶ from stores and gun shows in the United¶ States—and Mexican officials are not exactly¶ objective sources for such
statistics—the traffickers rely on those outlets simply because¶ they are easier and more convenient, not¶ because there are no other
options. One could¶ close every sporting goods store in the southwestern states, and the measure would not disarm the drug gangs.
If Washington and the¶ various state governments adopted the fire- arms “reforms” that Mexico City is demanding,¶ the principal
result would be to inconvenience¶ law-abiding American gun owners and merchants.¶ Moreover, the research on restrictive
gun¶ laws in both U.S. and foreign jurisdictions¶ shows no correlation between tough laws and¶ a
decline in homicides and other crimes.¶ 41¶ Attempts to lay the blame for Mexico’s chaos at¶ the
door of U.S. gun laws are either naive or a¶ cynical effort to find a scapegoat. Tightening¶ fire
arms laws in the United States (even if that¶ were politically feasible) is not a solution to the¶ violence in
Mexico.
AT: Prohibition
Prohibition enforcement fails – reducing demand is key
Globe and Mail, 12 (“The drug war spreads instability; Narco-trade corridors undermine
governance”, the Globe and Mail, 4/26/2012, Lexis, JKahn)
Decriminalizing marijuana would substantially reduce the drug cartels' power and wealth;
cannabis accounts for 25 per cent to 40 per cent of cartels' revenues. The resources of law
enforcement should be reserved to battle the organized criminals who control the trade, and not wasted on
individual drug users who cause harm only to themselves. Countries such as Mali, Guinea Bissau and Liberia are ill-
equipped to confront drug traffickers, and the judiciary and police are vulnerable to corruption. Cocaine seizures are worth more
than some countries' entire security budgets. "Narco-traffic threatens to metastasize into broader policy and
security challenges," notes the commission's report. Why should fragile states continue to bear the brunt of a futile antinarcotics crusade? Instead, the world should strengthen the defences of states under attack, and help
them build alternatives to the drug trade. Consumer countries should focus on reducing demand.
Prohibition is far from being an adequate answer.
AT: Reduces Usage
High prices don’t deter illegal drug usage --- their evidence overlooks several
factors
Becker, 13 (Gary S., professor of economics and sociology at the University of Chicago, Nobel
laureate, and Kevin M. Murphy, professor of economics at the University of Chicago Booth
School of Business, “Have We Lost the War on Drugs?,” Wall Street Journal, 1/4/13,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324374004578217682305605070.html,
Tashma)
The main gain from the war on drugs claimed by advocates of continuing the war is a lower
incidence of drug use and drug addiction. Basic economics does imply that, under given conditions,
higher prices for a good leads to reduced demand for that good. The magnitude of the response depends on
the availability of substitutes for the higher priced good. For example, many drug users might find alcohol a good substitute for
drugs as drugs become more expensive.
The conclusion that higher prices reduce demand only "under given conditions" is especially important in considering the effects of
higher drug prices due to the war on drugs. Making the selling and consumption of drugs illegal not only
raises drug prices but also has other important effects. For example, while some consumers are
reluctant to buy illegal goods, drugs may be an exception because drug use usually starts while
people are teenagers or young adults. A rebellious streak may lead them to use and sell drugs
precisely because those activities are illegal.
More important, some drugs, such as crack or heroin, are highly addictive. Many people addicted to
smoking and to drinking alcohol manage to break their addictions when they get married or find good jobs, or as a result of other
life-cycle events. They also often get help from groups like Alcoholics Anonymous, or by using patches and "fake" cigarettes that
gradually wean them from their addiction to nicotine.
It is generally harder to break an addiction to illegal goods, like drugs. Drug addicts may be leery
of going to clinics or to nonprofit "drugs anonymous" groups for help. They fear they will be reported for
consuming illegal substances. Since the consumption of illegal drugs must be hidden to avoid arrest and conviction,
many drug consumers must alter their lives in order to avoid detection.
Usually overlooked in discussions of the effects of the war on drugs is that the illegality of drugs stunts the development of ways to
help drug addicts, such as the drug equivalent of nicotine patches. Thus, though the war on drugs may well have induced lower drug
use through higher prices, it has likely also increased the rate of addiction. The
illegality of drugs makes it harder for
get help in breaking their addictions. It leads them to associate more with other addicts
and less with people who might help them quit.
addicts to
AT: Solves Cultivation
Any successes translate to larger failures --- the shift in cocaine cultivation from
Peru and Bolivia to Columbia proves
Lee, 2 (Rensselaer W., contract researcher for the Congressional Research Service and a senior
fellow at FPRI, “Perverse Effects of Andean Counternarcotics Policy,” Orbis, Volume 46, Issue 3,
Summer 2012, pg. 537-554, sciencedirect, Tashma)
Unfortunately, the story does not end here. In international drug control, small enforcement successes often
mask larger policy failures. The supposed achievements of the Andean drug war, in fact, have
spawned an array of unanticipated problems for the United States, Colombia, and other countries in
this hemisphere. Recent statistics show, for example, that cultivation of coca has ballooned in Colombia,
largely negating the eradication achievements elsewhere in the Andes. Colombian syndicates
have reportedly also succeeded in compensating for lost Peruvian and Bolivian supplies by
improving leaf yields and alkaloid content. The consequences to Colombia’s internal stability have been terrible: the
increased concentration of upstream coca production has vastly increased the resources available to antistate groups, fueling the
country’s ongoing civil conflict. The disintegration of the cartel structure has had a similar result, if for different reasons. The cartels
provided a degree of order and control in the industry, but their demise has emboldened Colombia’s various guerrilla organizations
to enter the business of refining, trading, and exporting drugs.5 Since these groups seem to contemplate the violent overthrow of the
government or (minimally) a permanent partition of the country, they may represent a greater threat to Colombia’s survival than did
the “classic” criminal coalitions of the 1980s and 1990s.
More evidence --- statistics and government estimates
Lee, 2 (Rensselaer W., contract researcher for the Congressional Research Service and a senior
fellow at FPRI, “Perverse Effects of Andean Counternarcotics Policy,” Orbis, Volume 46, Issue 3,
Summer 2012, pg. 537-554, sciencedirect, Tashma)
The Crop Reduction Debacle
U.S. cocaine control efforts in source countries in the 1990s effectively redrew the map of coca
cultivation in the Andes. Bolivia and Peru accounted for more than three-quarters of the
extensions of coca in the region in 1995 and Colombia for less than a fourth. By 2001 those
proportions had been reversed and the total cultivated area devoted to coca had increased somewhat. Similarly,
the U.S. government estimate of potential production of cocaine from Colombian leaf was only 10
percent of combined Andean production in 1995, but was more than 75 percent in 2001. Total potential
Andean production of cocaine reached a record high of 930 tons in 2001.8
AT: Spraying
Spraying strategy fails --- forces drug producers to relocate --- destroys rural
populations and poses a biological threat
Lee, 2 (Rensselaer W., contract researcher for the Congressional Research Service and a senior
fellow at FPRI, “Perverse Effects of Andean Counternarcotics Policy,” Orbis, Volume 46, Issue 3,
Summer 2012, pg. 537-554, sciencedirect, Tashma)
America’s international drug problems have produced a difficult legacy. More than a quarter-century of struggle against the Andean
cocaine industry has done almost nothing to reduce the availability of cocaine in U.S. markets, while at the same time feeding the
insurgency in Colombia (which threatens to metastasize to neighboring countries), stimulating the South American heroin industry,
and accelerating the “Colombianization” of criminal and political structures in drug transit states.40 Such adverse consequences
raise the obvious question of whether the benefits of international drug control are commensurate with the costs. Certainly the goal
of supply-reduction has been elusive. As we have seen, eradication of drug crops merely shifts the locus of upstream production from
region to region and country to country. Another unanticipated consequence has been unwanted crop diversification—the expanded
cultivation of opium poppy in Colombia and (according to recent reports) in Peru, as well.41 Even the intensified aerial
spraying envisaged under Plan Colombia is unlikely to succeed, since farmers will probably push
the coca frontier (and the attendant polluting effects of the cocaine industry) further into the Amazonian jungle
with little or no decrease in net cultivation. Indeed, recent reports from Colombia suggest that this
is already happening.
More importantly, the spraying campaign exacerbates the government’s problems of political control
in coca-growing areas, alienating large rural populations who stand to lose their main source of
income. In the southern department of Putumayo, according to a recent RAND Corporation study, 135,000 of the department’s
314,000 inhabitants depend directly on coca growing for a livelihood.42 Since the FARC poses as an advocate for
growers, spraying widens its base of support, contradicting the objectives of the government’s
counterinsurgency efforts in Putumayo and other affected zones. In addition, allegations abound that the
spray mixture used causes extensive harm to humans, other crops, and livestock.43 The United States
and Colombia clearly need to rethink the logic of the spraying program. Perhaps they could learn from the example of Peru, which
suspended eradication of coca altogether at the end of the 1980s to counteract the influence of the revolutionary Sendero Luminoso
(Shining Path) movement and to improve the image of the Peruvian government locally. Possibly Colombia’s enforcement priorities
should shift to targeting critical nodes in transportation and refining and (to the extent possible) sealing off traffic routes to and
from the main coca-producing zones. Interdiction can disrupt internal markets for coca derivatives, and compared to eradication it
imposes fewer direct costs on peasant producers and generates less political unrest.
Mex - Corruption
Mexico can’t combat drug trafficking alone – corruption and inability
Morris, 12 (Stephen D. Morris is professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at Middle Tennessee State
University. He is the author of Corruption and Politics in Contemporary Mexico (1991), Political Reformism in
Mexico (1995), Gringolandia: Mexican Identity and Perceptions of the United States(2005), and Political Corruption in Mexico: The
Impact of Democratization (2009); and coeditor of Corruption and Democracy in Latin America (2009) andCorruption and Politics
in Latin America: National and Regional Dynamics (2010). His articles have appeared in Bulletin of Latin American Research,
Comparative Political Studies, Journal of Latin American Studies, and Third World Quarterly, among other journals; 2012;
http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/latin_american_research_review/v047/47.2.morris.html) KD
The contrasting forces of corruption and coercion in turn link the drug trade to the state . Considered the sine
qua non of the drug trade, corruption is a major focus of all the works under review. They all address how governors,
mayors,
high-ranking officials in federal law enforcement, and military officers provide DTOs with access
to the transportation routes needed to move their merchandise; how cartels buy the loyalty and protection
of district commanders of the federal police and military; how police at all levels of government affiliated
with drug cartels intimidate, kidnap, and murder their opponents, provide inside information to
cartel leaders, and warn them via pitazos (tips) of antidrug operations; how seized drugs often seem to disappear; how
bribes to customs officials at airports facilitate the transportation of merchandise; and how bribes to
prison officials allow capos either to continue to run their operations from behind bars or to escape, as in the case of “El Chapo”
Guzmán.¶ The degree of integration of drug traffickers and state officials is extensive institutionally
and geographically, as well as long-standing. Bowden notes: “In over a half century of fighting drugs, Mexico has never
created a police unit that did not join the traffickers. Or die” (109). Bunker and Sullivan estimate that 1,500
cities have been infiltrated by cartels (Bunker, 41). Malcolm Beith summarizes the situation quite simply: “Anyone could be
bought” (68). Some see infiltration to extend beyond merely buying protection to actually challenging the state itself. According to
the municipal president of Durango, from the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), as summarized by George W. Grayson, DTOs have
begun to erect a “parallel state” and to carry out “traditional government functions such as collecting taxes (in the form of extortion)
and providing security (in return for payments)” (124). This political danger is perhaps the major concern behind the collection of
essays edited by Bunker.¶ Efforts to confront and defeat drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico are
severely handicapped not only by corruption but also by the state’s inability [End Page 217] to
enforce the rule of law, by society’s lack of trust in government and the law itself, and by the fear
spread by high-profile violence and insecurity. Nevertheless, the state has unleashed a massive crackdown marked
by the militarization of vast portions of the country, daily raids, and a record number of arrests. This campaign has resulted in more
than forty-five thousand violent deaths since 2006: police and military officers have killed those engaged in criminal activities;
criminals (including corrupt police and military officers, and civilians disguised as them) have killed government officials and
criminal rivals; and state officials and criminals alike have threatened, terrorized, and killed
journalists, political activists, and citizens. Contesting the government’s claim that drug cartels are simply fighting
and killing one another, Bowden contends that the “only certain thing is that various groups—gangs, the army, the city police, the
state police, the federal police—are killing people in Juárez as a part of a war for drug profits” (23). Indeed, it is whispered in the city
that the army is doing the killing (114). This view is partially reinforced by reports by human rights organizations and citizen
complaints.
Alt cause – corruption is huge
Carpenter, 9 vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the
author of eight books, including Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in
Latin America (Ted Galen, “Troubled Neighbor: Mexico’s Drug Violence Poses a Threat to the United States” February 2, 2009
Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/troubled-neighbor-mexicos-drug-violence-poses-threat-unitedstates) // czhang
The Problem of Corruption¶ ¶ ¶ The corruption factor makes it especially¶ unlikely that Calderón
will make any more lasting progress than previous administrations¶ against the drug trade. Several
¶¶
major scandals¶ have surfaced in just the past year. In April 2008,¶ authorities arrested the police chief of Reynosa¶ for allegedly protecting members of the Gulf¶ cartel.¶ 52¶ In October, prosecutors charged
Two top employees of the organized¶ crime unit
and at least three federal police¶ agents assigned to it were allegedly passing¶ information to the
cartel regarding surveillance¶ targets and potential raids. They supposedly¶ received payments of between $150,000 and¶ $450,000 per month
that¶ employees of the federal Attorney General’s¶ office were working for a subunit of the Sinaloa¶ cartel.
for their information.¶ 53¶ Less¶ than two weeks later, prosecutors announced¶ that Rodolfo de la Guardia Garcia, the number two official in Mexico’s Federal Bureau of¶ Investigation from 2003 to 2005, had
been¶ placed under house arrest pending an investigation into allegations that he, too, had leaked¶ information to the Sinaloa cartel.¶ 54¶ The scandals continued in late November, when the government
announced the arrest of Noé Ramírez,¶ who, until July 2008, was the chief of the Special¶ Organized Crime Investigation Division, for¶ allegedly taking bribes from traffickers.¶ 55¶ Ramírez had been President
Mexican law enforcement
personnel are so susceptible to corruption by the¶ cartels. By cooperating with the drug trafficking syndicates, those individuals can earn¶
more—often far more—in a single month¶ than they could ever hope to earn in their¶ legal jobs in years—and in some cases, more¶ than they could earn in decades.¶ 56¶ Such¶ temptation is
hard to resist. According to a¶ former mid-level Tijuana policeman: “There¶ is barely a Mexican police officer along the¶ U.S. border who isn’t involved in the drug¶ trade. Even if you try to resist,
Calderón’s highly¶ regarded drug policy czar and the chief liaison¶ with U.S. anti-drug officials.¶ ¶ ¶ The size of the alleged payoffs underscores why
your superiors¶ pressure you into it or sideline you.”¶ 57¶ He had¶ resigned from the force after personally witnessing his commander receive a $5,000¶ bribe to ignore drug smuggling in his sector.¶ ¶ ¶ Not
surprisingly,
drug-related corruption,¶ ranging from low-echelon police officers to¶ the highest-level officials, has had a long history in Mexico.
During the 1990s, the¶ National Police Commander was caught with¶ $2.4 million in the trunk of his car. Later he¶ was convicted of giving more than $20 million¶ to another government official to buy
protection for one of Mexico’s most notorious drug¶ lords.¶ 58¶ Perhaps the most embarrassing incident prior to the recent Ramírez arrest ¶ occurred in the mid-1990s when President¶ Ernesto Zedillo appointed
General José de¶ Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo to be Mexico’s new¶ drug czar. The general seemed to have excellent drug-fighting credentials, having personally led a much-publicized raid against the¶ head ofthe
Sinaloa cartel. U.S. officials greeted Gutiérrez Rebollo’s appointment enthusiastically. U.S. drug czar Barry McCaffrey ¶ gushed: “He has a reputation for impeccable¶ integrity....He’s a deadly serious guy.”¶ 59¶
Three¶ months later, the Mexican government announced that its new drug czar was in a maximum-security prison, charged with taking¶ bribes and protecting the nation’s largest drug¶ trafficker. The general
had indeed been tough¶ on drug trafficking—tough, that is, on organizations that competed with his patron’s cartel.¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The latest scandal in Mexico’s Attorney¶ General’s office, though, suggests that
drug related corruption may not be confined to¶ Mexican government agencies. One of the¶ suspects in that
episode has reportedly told¶ investigators that he paid a spy in the U.S. ¶ embassy for information on the U.S.
Drug¶ Enforcement Administration operations in¶ Mexico.¶ 60¶ ¶
Mexican corruption precludes effective enforcement
Kurtzman, 09 (Joel, Senior Fellow; Executive Director, Senior Fellows Program; Publisher, The Milken Institute Review,
business editor and columnist at The New York Times, member of the editorial board of Harvard Business School, AB at the
University of California, Recipient of the Eisner Memorial Award, master's at the University of Houston, recipient of a Moody
Foundation Fellowship, “Mexico's Instability Is a Real Problem”, the Wall Street Journal, 1/16/2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123206674721488169.html)
The problem is that in Mexico's latest eruption of violence, it's difficult to tell the good guys from the
bad. Mexico's antidrug czar, Noe Ramirez Mandujano was recently charged with accepting $450,000 from drug lords he was
supposed to be hunting down. This was the second time in recent years that one of Mexico's antidrug chiefs was
arrested for taking possible payoffs from drug kingpins. Suspicions that police chiefs, mayors and
members of the military are also on the take are rampant.¶ In the past, the way Mexico dealt with corruption was with
eyes wide shut. Everyone knew a large number of government officials were taking bribes, but no one did anything about it.
Transparency commissioners were set up, but given no teeth.¶ And Mexico's drug traffickers used the lax law
enforcement their bribes bought them to grow into highly organized gangs. Once organized, they have been able to fill a
vacuum in underworld power created by Colombian President Álvaro Uribe's successful crackdown on his country's drug cartels.¶
The result is that drug traffickers are getting rich, while Mexico pays a heavy price in lost human lives and in
economic activity that might otherwise bring a modicum of prosperity to the country.¶ In 2008, Mexico ranked 31st out of 60
countries studied in the Milken Institute/Kurtzman Group Opacity Index. The cost to ordinary Mexicans from poorly functioning
institutions has been huge.
U.S. policies promote Mexican corruption in drug enforcement
Freeman and Luis Sierra, 05 (*Laurie, Director for Yemen at the National Security Council, former State
Department Official, fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America, writer for the Washington Post Mexico Bureau, M.A. in
International Politics from Princeton University, degree from Duke in Latin American Studies, **Jorge, Knight International
Journalism Fellow, degree in International Journalism from the University of Southern California, defense policy and economics
fellow at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, “Mexico: The Militarization Traip”, 2005, part of
“Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The impact of U.S. Policy”, Rienner, Google Books, JKahn)
Mexico’s growing importance in the drug trade triggered a number of U.S. policies toward
Mexico intended to invigorate that country’s ability to disrupt and to dismantle drug-trafficking
organizations. Although these policies have not had a discernible impact on the amount of drugs
entering the United States via Mexico, they have become obstacles to consolidating democracy,
protecting human rights, and establishing civilian oversight of the military in Mexico. The
United States supported the creates of the elite and “corruption-free” antidrug units in Mexico’s
security forces, but so far the track record of these units suggests that they cannot be completely inoculate
against corruption . Their creation has diverted effort and attention from more comprehensive reform.
Mex - Empirics
Investment and personnel can’t solve – empirics
Astorga and Shirk, 10 (Luis Astorga is a researcher at the Institute of Social Research at the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM). He is also coordinator of the UNESCO Chair on Economic and Social Transformations Connected
with the International Drug Problem; David A. Shirk, PhD, joined the University of San Diego in July 2003. Shirk’s teaching covers
a wide range of subject areas, mainly concentrated in comparative politics, international political economy, Latin American studies,
and U.S.-Latin American relations, with a concentration in Mexico and border politics. He conducts research on Mexican politics,
U.S.-Mexican relations, and law enforcement and security along the U.S.-Mexican border. Shirk also directs the Trans-Border
Institute, which works to promote greater analysis and understanding of Mexico, U.S.-Mexico relations, and the U.S.-Mexico border
region; 1/1/10; “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context”;
http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/024/11632.pdf) KD
For its part, the United States has sought to assist Mexico by channeling aid, in the form of training
and equipment, through the Mérida Initiative. The Mérida Initiative will provide Mexico with $1.4 billion in U.S.
equipment, training and other assistance from 2008 through 2012, on top of the more than 4 billion that Mexico
spends annually combating drug trafficking.4 In parallel, the United States has also deployed
additional manpower and money to its southwest border in an attempt to stave off a possible
cross-border overflow of violence from Mexican organizations. Thus far, the major successes of these efforts
include a steady stream of arrests and extraditions targeting organized crime, as well as record seizures
of drugs, guns, and cash. However, progress on the metrics that really matter —reducing the
availability, consumption, or psychotropic potency of drugs— has remained illusive for both
countries.5 Indeed, by some accounts, despite a nearly forty year effort to wage the “war on drugs,”
drugs are more accessible, more widely utilized, and more potent than ever before.6
Winning the war on drugs is impossible – empirical proof from the Calderón
administration
Carpenter, 9 vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the
author of eight books, including Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in
Latin America (Ted Galen, “Troubled Neighbor: Mexico’s Drug Violence Poses a Threat to the United States” February 2, 2009
Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/troubled-neighbor-mexicos-drug-violence-poses-threat-unitedstates) // czhang
¶ Since Calderón took office in 2006, the¶ Mexican government has for the first time given the military a
lead role in combating the¶ traffickers. Approximately 36,000 troops are¶ now involved in that effort, in addition to
several thousand federal police officers. The principal outcome of that strategy, however, has¶ been an even
greater level of violence, with military personnel increasingly becoming targets.¶ The military
also has now been exposed to the¶ temptation of financial corruption that had¶ previously
compromised Mexico’s local and¶ federal police forces so thoroughly.¶¶ ¶ Decapitation Strategies Don’t Work¶ ¶ ¶
The belief that neutralizing Mexican drug¶ kingpins will achieve a lasting reduction in¶ drug
trafficking is the same assumption that¶ U.S. officials made with respect to the crackdown on the Medellín and Cali cartels in¶
Colombia during the 1990s. Subsequent developments have shown that assumption to be¶ erroneous. Indeed, an October 2008
report by¶ the Government Accountability Office found that while opium poppy cultivation and heroin
production in Colombia had declined since¶ the start of Plan Colombia, coca cultivation¶ and
cocaine production (the country’s principal drug export) had actually increased by 15¶ percent and 4
percent, respectively.¶ 51¶ The elimination of the Medellín and Cali cartels merely¶ decentralized the Colombian drug trade.¶
Instead of two large organizations controlling¶ the trade, today some 300 smaller, loosely
organized groups do so.¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ More to the point, the arrests and killings¶ of numerous top drug
lords in both Colombia¶ and Mexico over the years have not had a¶ meaningful impact on the
quantity of drugs¶ entering the United States. Cutting off one¶ head of the drug-smuggling Hydra
merely¶ results in more heads taking its place.¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ Indeed, one might wonder how serious¶ Mexico’s anti-drug
campaign will be in the¶ long run. U.S. leaders held out hopes that¶ Calderón’s predecessor, Vicente Fox, would¶ disrupt the trade.
Similar hopes were invested in earlier Mexican administrations, but a¶ noticeable pattern emerged in all of those¶ cases. Early on,
new Mexican presidents typically went out of their way to impress on U.S.¶ policymakers that
they were serious about¶ cooperating with Washington and taking on¶ the drug lords. Then, within
a few years, the¶ efforts dwindled into futility marked by official corruption.¶¶
Mex - Enforcement
Mexican law enforcement fails
Astorga and Shirk, 10 (Luis Astorga is a researcher at the Institute of Social Research at the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM). He is also coordinator of the UNESCO Chair on Economic and Social Transformations Connected
with the International Drug Problem; David A. Shirk, PhD, joined the University of San Diego in July 2003. Shirk’s teaching covers
a wide range of subject areas, mainly concentrated in comparative politics, international political economy, Latin American studies,
and U.S.-Latin American relations, with a concentration in Mexico and border politics. He conducts research on Mexican politics,
U.S.-Mexican relations, and law enforcement and security along the U.S.-Mexican border. Shirk also directs the Trans-Border
Institute, which works to promote greater analysis and understanding of Mexico, U.S.-Mexico relations, and the U.S.-Mexico border
region; 1/1/10; “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context”;
http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/024/11632.pdf) KD
In Mexico, law enforcement and judicial institutions suffer significant limitations in capacity —
and, in some cases, troubling dysfunctions— that
reduce their effectiveness in combating even ordinary
forms of crime, sophisticated transnational organized crime syndicates. Local and state law enforcement
agencies, in particular, suffer a lack of institutional capacity and, in any event, most drug-related crimes pertain to
federal jurisdiction. Most Mexican police officers have had few opportunities for educational development, and lead lives that are
terribly impoverished. Operationally, local law enforcement officers —who represent the vast majority of Mexican
police— are
not authorized to receive crime reports from citizens, are not equipped to conduct
criminal investigations, and are not properly prepared to preserve crime scenes and evidence.
Even at the federal level there have been obstacles and troubling breaches of institutional
integrity, including corruption at the highest levels. All of this impedes effective law enforcement, hinders
international security cooperation, and results in low public confidence in the Mexican justice
sector as a whole. The imperfections of Mexico’s domestic police forces have paved the way for the “militarization” of public
security, as Mexican public officials have encouraged ever deeper military involvement in counter drug efforts and other aspects of
public safety.59
Mexican military enforcement fails
Astorga and Shirk, 10 (Luis Astorga is a researcher at the Institute of Social Research at the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM). He is also coordinator of the UNESCO Chair on Economic and Social Transformations Connected
with the International Drug Problem; David A. Shirk, PhD, joined the University of San Diego in July 2003. Shirk’s teaching covers
a wide range of subject areas, mainly concentrated in comparative politics, international political economy, Latin American studies,
and U.S.-Latin American relations, with a concentration in Mexico and border politics. He conducts research on Mexican politics,
U.S.-Mexican relations, and law enforcement and security along the U.S.-Mexican border. Shirk also directs the Trans-Border
Institute, which works to promote greater analysis and understanding of Mexico, U.S.-Mexico relations, and the U.S.-Mexico border
region; 1/1/10; “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context”;
http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/024/11632.pdf) KD
Meanwhile, there are several hazards to military participation in domestic public security since it
lacks the proper mandate and training for law enforcement and criminal investigations, and its
involvement has been accompanied by significant allegations of human rights abuses.62 Moreover,
there are major questions about whether the military is truly immune from the kind of
corruption found in Mexican police agencies, and whether its integrity can be sustained over an extended period.
Indeed, there have been important examples of military corruption, as noted above. Also, as Moloeznik points out, there have
been disturbingly high levels of defection by Mexican military personnel, with at least some
developing ties to organized crime (Moloeznik 2009). Indeed, organized crime groups have brazenly
recruited military personnel to join their ranks, with promises of higher pay, better food, and a more glamorous
lifestyle. In some cases the defection of military forces —such as the Zetas— to work with DTOs has led to more
extreme use of violence; indeed, in addition to the Zetas, the Sinaloa DTO developed its own elite enforcer groups (Los
Negros, Los Pelones, and La Gente Nueva), as has the Carrillo Fuentes organization (La Linea and Los Aztecas). Also concerning is
that, while its overall popularity remains high, the military has become a target of popular protest. In February
2009, protestors demonstrated in Monterrey, Ciudad Juárez, Nuevo Laredo, and Reynosa, criticizing the military’s involvement and
blocking roadways and ports of entry. The fact that these protests were likely instigated by drug traffickers offers
little comfort, since it suggests
a troubling capacity for such groups to manipulate certain sectors of
society and public opinion at large (Emmott 2009; Gutiérez 2009; López Velasco 2009; Reforma 2009; Tapía 2009).
Mex - Laundry List
Mexican war on drugs failing – 5 reasons
Chase, 12 (Colonel David Chase of the US Army, graduated from the Army War College, in charge of strategy research on the
Southern border; “Military Police: Assisting in Securing the United States Southern Border”; 12/3/12; http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA561048) KD
These efforts by the Mexican government have met with some success especially with the targeting, capturing and killing of DTO
leadership. However, there are fears that little real positive effect has been achieved and some belief that Mexico’s war on drugs is
proving to be futile altogether. Critics claim that any attempts at progress has been slowed and
hampered by several problems. First, the strong response from the Mexican government is one
factor in the increased violence as DTOs fight back in response. Second, even as DTO leadership has
been arrested or killed the organizations themselves have proven very resilient by becoming more adaptive,
less vertical in organizational structure and by becoming multi-nodal. Other problems cited include the fact that the Police are
generally viewed as corrupt, brutal and susceptible to bribes despite purges of senior police
leadership and intensive retraining efforts. As recently as August 2010 a purge of the federal police force was
conducted and resulted in more than 3,000 officers being fired for being corrupt. Even the Mexican military is facing
problems. Ever since becoming involved in the crackdown on DTOs the Mexican Army has been continually
charged with human rights violations to include rape, killings, disappearances and torture. As
recently as 2010 there were over 1,200 human rights complaints against the Army.28 Another
problem that the Army faces is a very high desertion rate, particularly among soldiers sent to fight the
DTOs. 29 Exacerbating the problems with the security forces is the lack of effective rule of law
highlighted by a judicial system that is ineffective and corrupt itself. A recent study has found that of all the
numerous cases brought before Mexican courts the conviction rate is only around one percent with known
criminals routinely being released.30
Mex - Sinaloa Cartel
Sinaloa is the largest drug cartel – impossible to win because they are structurally
engrained in society and have international influence
Hootsen 13 writer for the Global Post (Jan-Albert 2/28/13 “How the Sinaloa cartel won Mexico’s drug war”
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/mexico/130227/sinaloa-cartel-mexico-drug-war-US-globaleconomy-conflict-zones) // czhang
For well over a century, local farmers have harvested marijuana and opium in the rugged mountains surrounding Badiraguato. Since
the 1980s, the Sinaloa cartel has acted as their Wal-Mart, transporting the mind-bending cargo north with quasi-corporate
efficiency, and distributing it to a narcotics-craving United States market.¶ Ever since former President Felipe Calderon
deployed thousands of soldiers and federal police to combat organized crime in 2006, the
country has been ravaged by violence. An estimated 70,000 people have been killed in often brutal territorial warfare.¶
Yes, there have been victories for the government: In March 2009 the attorney general’s office published a most-wanted list of 37
high profile drug lords. As of February 2013, two-thirds of them are either dead or in custody. By now, the majority of the seven
major drug trafficking cartels battling for dominance have been crippled. Most have partially or completely fractured into smaller
groups. Even the infamous Los Zetas, whose leader Heriberto Lazcano was killed last fall, have recently suffered severe blows.¶ Only
the Sinaloa cartel seems to have survived the onslaught relatively intact.¶ In fact, some critics of the
government even claim Sinaloa has “won” the drug war.¶ El Chapo is still at large, after his spectacular escape
from prison in 2001.* In mid-February Guatemalan authorities investigated rumors that he had been gunned down, but the
president’s spokesman later told GlobalPost they found no evidence of this. His inner circle cronies Juan Jose Esparragoza and
Ismael Zambada also still operate freely.¶ And while they succesfully evade capture, the cartel has made substantial
territorial advances, and has amassed extravagant wealth.¶ “El Chapo is going to get stronger if he is not
arrested in the next year and a half,” a senior official of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) told Forbes in a June 2011
interview.¶ Since then, the Sinaloa cartel ousted its rivals in the lucrative smuggling corridors of
Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez. El Chapo himself is now the most wanted man on the globe, with US
authorities offering a $5 million reward for any information leading to his capture. ¶ In a business as opaque as the drug trade, it’s
hard to get reliable figures on the size of a crime group’s territory, the breadth of its wealth or the extent of its market share. Court
documents, arrests and drug seizures, however, paint a picture of the Sinaloa cartel as a
multinational, highly flexible organization, quick to adapt to new circumstances and showing a
resilience unlike any of its rivals.¶ Compared to its humble beginnings in the 1980s, when it controlled only a single
Pacific trafficking route into Arizona, the cartel’s territorial expansion has been staggering. Key areas it
now controls include most of Mexico’s Pacific coast states and parts of central Mexico.¶ Even more
impressive is its global reach. Sinaloa operatives have been arrested from Egypt to Argentina and from
Europe to Malaysia. Properties attributed to El Chapo Guzman have been seized in Europe and South America. US law
enforcement reports that the group is now present in all major American cities. Recent US court
documents involving the case of Vicente Zambada-Niebla, Mayo Zambada's son, even suggest the Sinaloa cartel now
controls the cocaine trade in Australia.¶ Earlier this month, Chicago named El Chapo Guzman public enemy No. 1, the
first to receive that title since the city’s legendary crime boss, Al Capone.¶ Sinaloa's share in the drug market is titanic. Even by the
most sober estimates, Mexican drug trafficking amounts to over $6 billion per year, with El Chapo's Sinaloa cartel controlling an
estimated half of that market, raking in billions each year.¶ No wonder Forbes has listed El Chapo Guzman on its annual list of
billionaires since 2009.¶ “The Sinaloa cartel certainly has the upper hand now,” says Javier Valdez, co-founder of
Rio Doce, a Sinaloa-based weekly magazine covering the drug war. “It’s
the only cartel that has grown over the
years, extending its reach into Europe, Africa and South America, while all others have lost.Ӧ
Some have accused the Calderon administration of collusion with El Chapo, claiming the government struck a deal by taking out its
rivals. And last October, leaked emails from security analysis firm STRATFOR suggested that even the US government facilitated
them.¶ Accusations of government collusion, however, are rejected by Malcolm Beith, a British-American journalist and author of
"The Last Narco," a book about El Chapo Guzman. “Since 2009, the Sinaloa cartel has been hit very hard too, completely obliterating
those criticisms,” he contends.¶ Beith points out that Sinaloa's survival and recalcitrant power should instead
be attributed to the way it operates.¶ “There is a level-headedness about the leadership that the other groups lack,” he
says. “To the authorities, first priority always has to be quelling violence. When other groups throw grenades into a crowd of
innocents or behead[s] people, it's obvious what needs to be done. Sinaloa has perpetrated its share of violence,
but by and large it did not cause disruption to the general well-being of the population."¶ The
Sinaloa cartel’s relatively low profile in terms of violence is partly due to its relatively long history — it’s been around for
25 years. In Sinaloa itself the group is deeply rooted in society. Not only do its senior leaders hail from the region,
but the cartel reputedly funds hospitals and schools, thus winning support from locals who aid the "capos" in their never-ending
struggle to escape arrest.¶ El Chapo and his cronies have also perfected the strategy of “bribe over bullet,” preferring
to corrupt
authorities rather than fighting them into submission. Government officials on all levels in Mexico
have been accused of being on Sinaloa’s take, as have some of their US counterparts.¶ “El Chapo has an apparent ability
to [allegedly] corrupt and infiltrate elements of law enforcement on both sides of the border and
seemingly play the authorities' every move to his advantage,” Beith says. “When the Mexican army moved into
Juarez, so did El Chapo, seizing an opportunity. When the authorities took down the Arellano-Felix cartel, El Chapo was already
poised to take Tijuana.Ӧ All things considered, El Chapo Guzman and his Sinaloa cartel seem to have been
profiting rather than suffering from the drug war, Javier Valdez argues. “The drug war has helped them
stay on top. While they continue to keep the heat away from their home turf, their rivals have
been weakened.Ӧ The most recent National Drug Threat Assessment of the Justice Department (2011) suggests the same, by
stating that overall drug availability in the US is increasing, as are production of marijuana, heroin
and synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine. Those are all businesses in which El Chapo Guzman and
his Sinaloa cartel have a large stake.¶ “The organization is particularly dominant because it is one of the few
that can obtain multi-ton quantities of cocaine from South America, as well as produce large
quantities of heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine,” the report claims.¶ Felipe Calderen left office in
December. His succesor Enrique Peña Nieto promises to cut the murder rate in half in the next six years, but
most Mexicans doubt he is able to; during his first two months in office at least 1,500 people are estimated to have died
in gangland violence.¶ All the while El Chapo Guzman continues to make a mockery of the drug war with every day he remains
at large. His Sinaloa cartel has been around longer than any other crime group in Mexico, and it
may just outlast everybody else.
Venez – Fails
Cooperation fails – deteriorating relations precludes effective drug cooperation
Smith, 12 (Phillip, professor of Sociology at Yale, “Bolivia and Venezuela Scoff at Obama's Drug
War Criticism, Tell US to Look in the Mirror”, Alternet, 9/19/2012,
http://www.alternet.org/drugs/bolivia-and-venezuela-scoff-obamas-drug-war-criticism-tell-uslook-mirror?paging=off, JKahn
Obama's singling out of Bolivia and Venezuela as countries that have failed to comply with US drug policy
demands has sparked sharp reactions. Last Thursday, the White House released its annual
determination of major drug trafficking or producing countries, singling out Bolivia, Burma, and
Venezuela as countries that have failed to comply with US drug policy demands. That has sparked
sharp and pointed reactions from Bolivia and Venezuela. "I hereby designate Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela as countries that have
failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to make substantial efforts to adhere to their obligations under international
counternarcotics agreements," President Obama said in the determination. That marks the fourth year in a row the US has singled
out Bolivia and Venezuela, which are left-leaning regional allies highly critical of US influence in Latin America. But while the US has
once again put the two countries on its drug policy black list, it is not blocking foreign assistance to them because "support for
programs to aid Bolivia and Venezuela are vital to the national interests of the United States." Despite that caveat, Bolivia and
Venezuela were having none of it. "Venezuela deplores the United States government's insistence on
undermining bilateral relations by publishing this kind of document, with no respect for the sovereignty
and dignity of the Venezuelan people," the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry said in a communique Friday. Venezuela "rejects in the
most decided manner the accusations of the government of the United States," the communique said, adding that the presidential
determination is "plagued with false statements, political preconceptions and veiled threats," which only repeat its "permanent line
of aggression against independent sovereign governments." Venezuela also counterpunched, accusing the US of
allowing "a fluid transit" of drugs across its borders" and "the laundering of capital from drug trafficking through
the financial system."
Anti-Americanism precludes cooperation efforts
Smith, 12 (Phillip, professor of Sociology at Yale, “Bolivia and Venezuela Scoff at Obama's Drug
War Criticism, Tell US to Look in the Mirror”, Alternet, 9/19/2012,
http://www.alternet.org/drugs/bolivia-and-venezuela-scoff-obamas-drug-war-criticism-tell-uslook-mirror?paging=off, JKahn
"The government of the United States has become principally responsible for this plague that is the
scourge of the entire world," it said. The foreign ministry added that Venezuela's anti-drug efforts improved after it kicked out the
DEA in 2005, that it has been free of illegal drug crops since 2006, and that it has actively pursued leading drug traffickers,
including 19 it had extradited to the US since 2006. Bolivian President Evo Morales, for his part, said the US, home of the
world's largest drug consumer market, had
no grounds on which to criticize other countries about its war
on drugs. "The United States has no morality, authority or ethics that would allow it to speak about the war on
drugs. Do you know why? Because the biggest market for cocaine and other drugs is the United States ,"
Morales said in a Saturday speech. "They should tell us by what percentage they have reduced the internal (drug) market. The
internal market keeps growing and in some states of the United States they're even legalizing the sale of cocaine under
medical control," the Bolivian president said. It's unclear what Morales was trying to say with that latter remark. Although as a
Schedule II drug, cocaine can and occasionally is used medically in the United States, there are no current moves by any US state to
take that further. Some 17 US states and the District of Columbia have, however, moved to legalize the sale of marijuana under
medical control. "I'm convinced that the drug trade is no less than the United States' best business ," Morales
added, noting that since the first international drug control treaties were signed in 1961, drug trafficking has blossomed, not
declined. He said he has suggested to South American leaders that they form a commission to report on how well Washington is
doing in its war on drugs. Morales also took the occasion to lambaste the US for opposing Bolivia's request before the United Nations
to modify that 1961 treaty to acknowledge that chewing coca leaf is "an ancestral cultural practice" in the Andes. Like Venezuela,
Bolivia protested that it, too, has been fighting drug trafficking. The Bolivian government said that it had seized 182 tons of cocaine
since Morales took power in 2006, compared to only 49 tons confiscated in the previous five years. Bolivia has seized 31 tons of
cocaine so far this year, most of it from Peru, the government said. The US presidential determination named the following countries
as major illicit drug producing or trafficking countries: Afghanistan, the Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan,
Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
*War on Drugs Good*
Drug Use Deterrence
The War on Drugs drives up drug prices --- transport and secrecy make illegal
drugs ridiculously expensive --- giving up drives down drug prices and makes
drugs affordable for everyone --- causes extreme drug usage
Calukins, 12 (Jonathan P., Stever Professor of Operations Research at Carnegie Mellon
University's Heinz College and a consultant with RAND's Drug Policy Research Center, and
Michael A. C. Lee, drug-policy researcher at Carnegie Mellon University's Heinz College, “The
Drug-Policy Roulette,” National Affairs, Number 12, Summer 2012,
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-drug-policy-roulette, Tashma)
To understand the consequences of legalization, it is essential to start with a crucial factor too often
ignored: prohibition's effects on production costs.
Today, illegal drugs are shockingly expensive. Even run-of-the-mill "commercial grade" marijuana sells for $100 per
ounce. Cocaine and crack, heroin, and methamphetamine all sell for $100 or more per pure gram,
making them more valuable than gold. (If cigarettes cost that much, a standard pack of 20 would carry a
price tag of roughly $2,000.) There is no physical reason why drugs need to be so expensive: Drug "labs"
are rudimentary affairs; with a few exceptions (such as lysergic acid diethylamide, or LSD), they employ at
most undergraduate-level chemistry. And the associated crops — coca, cannabis, poppy — are neither
difficult to grow nor resource-intensive; they are in fact often produced in some of the least-developed nations of the
world.
What makes illegal drugs so expensive is precisely the fact that their production is prohibited, and
that this prohibition is often strictly enforced. One factor is what economists call "compensating wage differentials,"
or compensation for taking risks. Suppliers of illegal drugs court real dangers, including arrest,
imprisonment, physical injury, even death. Thus, in addition to seeking wages that compensate for their time and
allow for normal profits, people employed in drug distribution also seek compensation for assuming
these risks — much as coal miners and deep-sea divers typically earn higher wages than people performing similar jobs under
less hazardous circumstances.
Another factor is the inefficiency that stems from having to operate covertly. The
precautions required to evade
detection make the production of drugs very labor intensive. Grocery-store cashiers, for instance, are more
than 100 times as productive as retail drug sellers in terms of items sold per labor hour. Similarly, hired hands working for crack
dealers can fill about 100 vials per hour, whereas even older-model sugar-packing machines can fill between 500 and 1,000 sugar
packets per minute. This labor intensity of drug production, combined with the high wages demanded
for that labor, are what drive up the costs of drugs; by comparison, materials and supplies — glassine bags, gram
balances, and even guns — are relatively cheap.
How would these dynamics — and, with them, drug prices — be altered if drugs were legalized? To begin, legalization
would
cut production costs in source countries. Cultivators and preparers would no longer fear crop
eradication; the need to employ only manual labor would disappear. Production could expand
and mechanize, becoming more efficient and therefore less expensive.
The real reductions, however, would come in the area of transport. To estimate transport costs most
conservatively, one would assume no decrease in in-country production costs, and instead use current illegal prices. In its 2010
World Drug Report, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime put the price of cocaine in Colombia at roughly $2,300 per
kilogram and that of heroin in Afghanistan at roughly $2,400 per kilogram. Current wholesale prices in the United States,
meanwhile, can range from $10,000 to $43,000 per kilogram for cocaine and from $40,000 to $100,000 per kilogram for heroin.
Even at the low ends of these ranges, the markup that occurs between the site of production and the site of
wholesale — in other words, the cost of international transport under the current prohibition regime — is enormous. If
cocaine and heroin were legal, distributors would be able to ship them by any of the various means now used to transport other legal
goods. FedEx, for instance, charges about $65 to send a one-kilogram package from Colombia to the U.S. and about $200 to send a
one-kilogram package from Afghanistan. Those rates are less than 1% of the lowest figures for current transportation costs for
cocaine and heroin.
As substantial as the price decline would be at wholesale, retail price declines would be even
greater. To understand why, one must recall that the free-market retail price for a good equals the good's wholesale price plus a
markup to account for distribution and retail costs (including taxes). In the case of drugs, there is every reason to believe that this
markup would be small.
Some have argued that if drugs were legal, the distribution markup would, as a percentage, parallel the markups for other legal
agricultural goods. But distribution costs depend mainly on a good's weight and hence its value-to-weight ratio (how much the good
is worth per unit of weight). No major legal agricultural product comes close to having a value-to-weight ratio of more than $2,000
per kilogram; cocaine and heroin, then, are not likely to have distribution markups comparable to those of legal agricultural
products. Moreover, the large markups for legal crops emerge from processing: For instance, the wholesale cost of wheat accounts
for a small proportion of the price of bread. But the prices quoted above for drugs in Colombia and Afghanistan are for finished
products that are ready to be consumed without further processing. So the percentage markups for legal agricultural products are
not appropriate parallels.
To anticipate what might happen to retail prices of drugs following legalization, a more useful comparison would be with a product
that has a similar value-to-weight ratio, and one that requires very little processing. Here, the best analogue may be silver, which has
a value-to-weight ratio within a factor of two of those of wholesale cocaine and heroin. Typically, the difference between the
commodity-exchange price for an ounce of silver and the retail price (for, say, a one-ounce silver round at a coin shop) is a few
dollars. If one takes into account that wholesale-to-retail markup, makes adjustments for the fact that drugs (unlike silver) are
diluted between the wholesale and retail purchase points, and considers the effects of sales taxes, one might expect free-market retail
prices for cocaine and heroin (at current retail purities) of roughly $2.50 and $2.00 per gram, respectively. According to the U.N. ,
illegal cocaine currently retails for between $10 and $350 per gram and heroin between $55 and $150 per gram; relative to the
midpoints of those ranges, the price declines one might expect to see as a result of legalization are in the range of 95%. Calculations
for methamphetamine are broadly similar.
As for marijuana, the 2010 RAND Corporation study Altered State? — which examined California's Proposition 19, an initiative to
legalize recreational marijuana use and cultivation — included the authors' calculations of marijuana's likely legal price. Even with
ongoing federal prohibition of outright farming, the study estimated that grow-house based production, distribution, and retailing
that avoided federal law enforcement's traditional targeting levels could profitably produce at a price of $38 per ounce of sinsemilla
(high-potency) marijuana — a decline of more than 80% from today's prices, which range from $300 to $450 per ounce.
Moreover, were nationwide legalization to allow for the large-scale farming (instead of mere gardening) of
marijuana, yields would be on the order of 500 to 2,000 pounds per acre, suggesting production costs ranging from a few dollars
to a few tens of dollars per pound (not per ounce). And it would take fewer than 10,000 acres — or 0.0025% of the 400
million acres of cropland in the United States — to supply the entire current U.S. market for marijuana. It is
difficult to imagine such mass cultivation exerting anything but dramatic downward pressure on
marijuana prices. And it is impossible to imagine that such steep price declines for marijuana — as well as for
cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines — would not significantly increase the rates of drug use.
At: Liberty
The War on Drugs is net better for individual liberties --- the alternative is a drugfilled society that ensures higher taxes and stricter laws
Hawkins, 7 (John, “IN DEFENSE OF THE DRUG WAR,” Human Events, 1/25/07,
http://www.humanevents.com/2007/01/25/in-defense-of-the-drug-war/, Tashma)
Libertarians often attack the war on drugs as a waste of tax dollars and an infringement on personal
liberties. That is misguided thinking that comes from trying to apply unworkable
theoretical concepts in the real world.
For example, you often hear advocates of drug legalization say that we’re never going to win the war on drugs and that it would free
up space in our prisons if we simply legalized drugs. While it’s true that we may not ever win the war against drugs —
i.e. never entirely eradicate the use of illegal drugs — we’re
not ever going to win the war against murder,
robbery and rape either. But our moral code rejects each of them, so none — including drugs —
can be legalized if we still adhere to that code.
If we legalized drugs, we’d be able to tax them and bring in more revenue for the state. But, how is that working out with alcohol and
cigarettes? In 2004 and 2005, 39% of all traffic-related deaths was related to alcohol consumption and 36% of convicted offenders
“had been drinking alcohol when they committed their conviction offense.” When it comes to cigarettes, adult smokers “die 14 years
earlier than nonsmokers.” But, will we ever get rid of tobacco or alcohol? No, both products are too societally accepted for that and
perhaps more importantly, the government makes enormous amounts of revenue from their sale. Do we really want to be sitting
around 10 or 15 years from now saying, “Gee, we’d like to get rid of heroin, but how could we replace the revenue we make from
taxing it at an exorbitant rate?”
Of course, the number of people using what are currently illegal drugs would skyrocket if they were legalized, so we’d see a new wave
of drug-addled burglars if we “legalized it.” Now, maybe you think that’s not the case. Some people certainly argue that if illicit drugs
were legalized, their usage would drop. However, the fact that drugs are illegal is certainly holding down their usage. Just look at
what happened during prohibition. Per Ann Coulter in her book, “How to Talk to a Liberal (If You Must)“:
“Prohibition resulted in startling reductions in alcohol consumption (over 50 percent), cirrhosis of the liver (63 percent),
admissions to mental health clinics for alcohol psychosis (60 percent), and arrests for drunk and disorderly conduct (50 percent).” —
p.311
That’s what happened when alcohol was made illegal. However, on the other hand, if we make drugs legal, safer, easier
to obtain, more societally accepted, and some people say even cheaper as well, there would almost
have to be an enormous spike in usage.
Certainly that’s what happened in the Netherlands where “consumption of marijuana…nearly tripled from 15 to 44% among 18-20
year olds” after the drug was legalized.
But, some people may say, “so what if drug usage does explode? They’re not hurting anyone but themselves.”
That might be true in a purely capitalistic society, but in
the sort of welfare state that we have in this country,
the rest of us would end up paying a significant share of the bills of people who don’t hold jobs
or end up strung out in the hospital without jobs — and that’s even if you forget about the thugs who’d end up
robbing our houses to get things to pawn to buy more drugs. Even setting that aside, we make laws that prevent
people from harming themselves all the time in our society. In many states there are helmet laws, laws that
require us to wear seatbelts, laws against prostitution, and it’s even illegal to commit suicide. So banning harmful drugs is just par
for the course.
Cuba – Government
Reformists movements destroy the Castro regime
Lee, 09 (Renssaler, fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Testimony before the House
of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee of
National Security and Foreign Affairs, “Cuba, Drugs, and U.S.-Cuban Relations”, 4/29/2009,
https://www.fpri.org/docs/alt/testimony.20090429.lee_.cubadrugs.pdf, JKahn)
This policy shift was attributable to three main factors: 1. First, the corruption scandals of the late 1980s brought home to Cuba’s
leaders the reality that in Cuba – as elsewhere in Latin America – the illegal drug trade could spawn
independent centers of power, posing potential challenges to the existing political order . Generally
speaking, the Ochoa-de la Guardia conspirators tended to favor the liberalizing tendencies that at the time were occurring elsewhere
in the Soviet bloc, and Castro must have wanted to prevent the emergence of a narco-funded reformist movement that
could weaken the totalitarian underpinnings of the Cuban system . 2. Second, the disintegration of the
Soviet Union and the socialist bloc eliminated the protective mantle of Soviet patronage that had sustained Cuba for years, and thus
forced Cuba to reorient its entire foreign economic posture to seek vastly improved trade, investment, and tourism ties with the
West. To do this, Cuba needed to burnish its international image and to project an aura of respectability. This meant taking visible
domestic and foreign policy steps to try to erase the drug stigma acquired in earlier years. 3. The third factor was the emergence
in the 1990s of a domestic consumer market for cocaine, crack, and marijuana, which was propelled
by the increasing inflow of dollars from the tourist economy and by remittances sent from Cuban
communities abroad to their relatives on the island. In what appeared to be a replay of the 1950s, drugs circulated freely in Havana’s
nightclubs, bordellos, streets, and hotels. The internal drug market was never large, at least in relation to what we see here in the
United States, but it alarmed Cuban authorities because it pre-supposed the development of a sphere of criminality outside the
regime’s effective control. An interesting question is: Where did all of these drugs come from? The main source, at least according to
Cuban official statistics, were so-called “recalos,” bulk packages of cocaine and marijuana that are dumped at sea, and then carried
by wind and tides to Cuba’s shores – the detritus of failed rendezvous between Colombian planes or Jamaican marijuana carriers
and go-fast boats based in Florida. Drugs are also brought to the island by foreign tourists , usually for their own
use, but sometimes with the intent of introducing them into the Cuban market. A third source is domestic marijuana cultivation,
which yields a relatively low-quality leaf, mainly in Cuba’s eastern provinces (Granma, Santiago de Cuba). Finally, there was cocaine
that leaked into the domestic Cuban market from the trafficking pipeline that Interior Ministry officials set up through Cuba in the
late 1980s. This pipeline, I suspect, carried a lot more than the six tons officially acknowledged by the Cuban regime.
Mex - Economy
Costs of the illegal drug industry to the Mexican economy outweigh the benefits –
the war on drugs should continue
Rios, 8 – PhD candidate in Government and a doctoral fellow in Inequality and Criminal Justice at the Harvard Kennedy School,
studying drug trafficking, violence and corruption in Mexico (Viridiana, “Evaluating the economic impact of Mexico’s drug
trafficking industry,” Graduate Students Political Economy Workshop, Institute for Quantitative Social Sciences, Harvard
University, Spring 2008, http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios2008_MexicanDrugMarket.pdf)//BI
Previously, I discussed the positive and negative economic effects of drug trafficking. In section II, I talked about the economic
benefits of the drug industry. Drug trafficking is economically beneficial because it generates employment, consumption and
investment. First, almost half a million people receive a monthly salary from the drug industry, and out of these, 300,000 are
peasants who have few other feasible sources of income. Second, according to the latest estimates, drug traffic generates around 2.78
billion dollars that are distributed among the people involved in the industry (specially favoring drug cartel leaders). A share of this
profit is reinvested into the Mexican legal economy, principally in housing and cattle. Although the exact amount of reinvestment
cannot be calculated, I estimated that about 50% of all drug cartel leaders’ profits come back to the country. This accounts for a
return rate of 90% and real cash flows of 2.5 billion dollars annually. In section III, I discussed the economic costs of drug industry.
In general, drug traffic brings negative consequences to the economy because it increases violence,
corruption and local drug abuse. Drug violence has forced the migration of thousands of families
and businesses out of drug traffic states, and has reduced the productivity and created
psychological damage to those who have stayed. The most recent estimated cost of violence is 1.07 billion
dollars annually. Additionally, corruption has generated an investment loss of about 1.3 billion dollars
annually. Finally, drug abuse generates an annual loss of 680 million dollars due to losses of productivity and
addiction treatment. Other negative consequences of drug traffic cannot be measured. Adding up, the costs of the drug
industry exceed the benefits. As Figure 3 shows, in 2004 the costs of drug traffic were almost 2 billion
dollars higher that the benefits. However, this has not always been the case. Before 1999, drug cash flows and investments
generated more benefits than the costs associated with this illegal industry. As stated in sections II and III, the growth of the costs
and the reduction in the benefits can be satisfactorily explained. On one hand, the negative costs of drug traffic for
Mexico have increased over the years because the number of crimes related to drugs, and the
number of Mexicans that consume illegal drugs have increased. On the other hand, the benefits of the illegal-drug industry have
been decreasing due to a decrease in the price of drugs and a decrease in the share of the marijuana
market that is dominated by Mexicans. (Figure 3 about here) This finding yields a very important practical conclusion:
Mexico’s war on drugs must continue because diminishing drug traffic will be
economically beneficial for the country as a whole. By fighting drug traffic, the Mexican government is not only
fighting against illegality and corruption, but against a negative economic externality that is affecting all other markets.
*War on Drugs Bad*
Columbian Instability
The War on Drugs causes Columbian instability --- U.S. efforts backfire
Arnold, 5 (Guy, specialist in north-south relations who writes mainly in the areas of African
history and politics, and international affairs, former Director of the Africa Bureau, The
International Drugs Trade, pg. 118-120, Routledge, Tashma)
The Role of the United States
The U.S. role in Colombia has become the key to what develops over the next few years. The
injection of more than $1
billion of U.S. aid, mainly destined for the police or military, under President Clinton’s Plan Colombia at the
beginning of the century added a new dimension to a level of ongoing violence that is the worst in the Americas
and possibly the worst in the world. Colombia has now suffered a civil war for more than 30 years,
and there is no resolution in sight. The principal groups involved in confrontation and lighting are the two insurgent
groups—the ELN and FARC; the army and the police; the right-wing death squads, often working closely with the army; and the
drug traffickers, There are other subsidiary groups involved in the violence as well. And as usual, as in any such violent situation,
the majority of the country’s peasants keep their heads down and try to survive. They do so by growing the
coca leaf to sell to the drug cartels. The shopkeepers pay weekly protection money to the insurgents; and the insurgents
fund their campaigns with the proceeds of cocaine. In Barrancabermeja, 322 kilometers (200 miles) north of Bogota, which is in the
center of a region where the rebels are fighting for control, there are on average three violent deaths a day. Many of the people are
too frightened to do anything; they are afraid of being taken either for sympathizers with the rebels, in which case they are liable to
be targets of the police, the army, or the death squads; or of being taken for informers, in which case they become targets for the
rebels. Barrancabermeja lies on the edge of the area occupied by the ELN, which President Pastrana has promised to make a no-go
zone. The refinery in Barrancabermeja produces 70 percent of the country’s petrol and though the claimed in 2000; "Any ideology is
long lost. The revolution is dead, and it is all economics. It is about who controls the black market gasoline concession and all the
cocaine.”‘°
The United States, which in any case has been exerting increasing pressures on Colombia for two decades, decided at the
end of Clinton’s presidency to increase its involvement in Colombia. That decision, the launch of Plan
Colombia, may well come to be seen in retrospect as comparable to President Kennedy’s decision to increase the U.S. military
presence in Vietnam in the form of military advisers. There is little doubt that Plan Colombia and the implication
of
much greater U.S. involvement on the ground in the anti-drugs war have raised many doubts and
fears about the ultimate impact on Colombia and its neighbors. Supporters of Plan Colombia argue that the
additional U.S. backing will enable President Pastrana to force through his peace proposals with the ELN and FARC, since the
destruction of the coca fields will deprive the rebels of their principal source of income, which is derived from taxing the drug
cultivators. This is an optimistic view and must be tempered by evidence from other jungle wars. Neither the drug barons nor the
rebels are going to be defeated easily; they have existed in parallel harness… the rebels to change the political system, the drug
cartels to make fortunes for more than 30 years. Experience from Vietnam and, more recently, from disintegrating
Yugoslavia would
suggest that the U.S. involvement will have to be much greater than that
envisaged under Plan Colombia if success in the drugs war is to be achieved. Opponents of Plan
Colombia first attack the waiving of human rights conditions that the U,S. Congress initially attached to the plan for the Colombian
security forces, whose record in this respect has been abysmal. More importantly, they believe that U.S. military advisers
will simply become mired in an unwinnable war, although their presence and the arms and other
equipment that will come with them will no doubt escalate the violence and spread it across Colombia`s borders. Suggested
parallels with Vietnam have been discounted by U.S. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger; he insisted (in August 2000) that the
U.S, presence will be restricted to 500 soldiers and 300 contracted employees at any given time and that U.S. personnel must not
become involved in combat. Furthermore, the destruction of coca and poppy crops and the seizure of cocaine or heroin will be left—
largely—to the Colombians. Colombia”s neighbors—Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela—have each expressed concern at
the growing U.S. presence in Colombia and believe that it will simply force refugees and drug traffickers across the borders into their
countries. Environmentalists fear that the defoliants being used to spray the coca crops will blight the rain forest and, despite Sandy
Berger’s denial of any comparison, many
U.S. legislators warn of another Vietnam. Alfonso Cano of PARC said of
United States needs an excuse to continue to play the role of the world‘s policeman
and now that excuse is drug trafficking." He went on to deride the new U.S.-backed drug offensive, which he described
Plan Colombia: "The
as a disguised counterinsurgency effort. When he visited Cartagena at the end of August 2000, President Clinton said, ‘“We will not
get involved in the internal conflict of Colombia, nor is this about Yankee imperialism," but his remarks did not convince his South
American audience. At the Brazil summit, which was being held at that time and was attended by the presidents of Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, and Chile, plans for a multinational military force that would intervene in the Colombian
conflict were rejected. Brazilian Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lanipreia spokefor the region when he said: "Brazil will not participate
in any such international force. What’s more, Brazil stands iirmly against the idea of any foreign military force in C0lombia." The
message to the United States was clear enough. Its urgency was enhanced when Vladimjro Montesinos Torres, the right-hand aide of
President Alberto Fujimori of Peru, revealed that the United States had drawn up plans for a "multilateral invasion force to help the
struggle against subversion? The increased U.S. concern about Colombia appeared to date from a January 1998 article in the
Washington Post, which quoted State Department officials who had suggested that the left-wing rebels could seize power in
Colombia within five years. The multilateral force envisaged by the United States for intervention in Colombia was concerned with
"subversion" rather than drugs.
Any examination of the events in Colombia during the 1990s suggests a country that is virtually
uncontrollable and close to disintegration. Despite the fact that it is the world’s largest source of cocaine, drugs are
only a part of Colombia’s problem; the civil war had been continuing for more than a decade when the huge escalation in demand for
drugs from the United States led to a rapid growth of cocaine production in the mid-1970s. A massively increased U.S. involvement
in Colombia, whether to assist in fighting the drugs war or in reality to prevent left-wing insurgents taking control of the country, is
less likely to resolve Colombia’s many problems than to exacerbate them. Indeed, the
war on drugs exacerbates the very
instability that acts as the breeding ground for drug trafficking groups.
Destroys Latin American democracy
Wilhelm, 2k (General Charles E., FDCH, US Marine Corp Commander in Chief, USSC before
House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Crim. Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources,
“STRATEGY AND LONG RANGE PLAN TO ASSIST COLOMBIA WITH ITS CD EFFORTS,”
February 15, 2000)
Personal Assessment As I stated earlier, as Colombia's problems spill over into neighboring countries,
they threaten the regional stability that is essential to the growth and sustainment of strong
democracies and free market economies throughout the region. Drug trafficking is a major
contributing factor to Colombia's internal problems.
Key to global democracy
Hillman, 2 – Ph.D., Professor and Director, Institute for the Study of Democracy and Human
Rights, St. John Fisher College (Richard S., Democracy and Human Rights in Latin Americai,
Preface, p. vii) //SP
Latin American experiences, especially in the areas of democratization and human rights protection, are
particularly relevant for developing countries that are attempting to build stable political and
economic systems in order to provide a decent standard of living and incorporate previously
excluded populations into the national mainstream. The past record, of course, is far from acceptable. The
advent of the twenty-first century, however, appears to be a time of great potential progress for the
institutionalization of democratic human rights regimes that would reduce human pain and
suffering. The number of countries in Latin America and elsewhere that are experimenting with
democracy has never been greater. Clearly, the path toward fulfilling the expectations raised by these experiments is
not an easy one; it is fraught with difficult obstacles deriving from the historical legacy as well as contemporary challenges.
Nevertheless, democracy and human rights have definitively entered the political lexicon and discourse throughout the world.
Extinction
Diamond 95 (Larry, Senior Fellow – Hoover Institution, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s”,
December, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)
On any list of the most important potential threats to world order and national security in the coming decade, these six should figure
prominently: a hostile, expansionist Russia; a hostile, expansionist China; the spread of fundamentalist Islamic, anti-Western
regimes; the spread of political terrorism from all sources; sharply increased immigration pressures; and ethnic conflict that
escalates into large-scale violence, civil war, refugee flows, state collapse, and general anarchy. Some of these potential threats
interact in significant ways with one another, but they all share a common underlying connection. In each instance, the development
of democracy is an important prophylactic, and in some cases the only long- term protection, against disaster. A HOSTILE,
EXPANSIONIST RUSSIA Chief among the threats to the security of Europe, the United States, and Japan would be the reversion of
Russia--with its still very substantial nuclear, scientific, and military prowess--to a hostile posture toward the West. Today, the
Russian state (insofar as it continues to exist) appears perched on the precipice of capture by
ultranationalist, anti-Semitic, neo-imperialist forces seeking a new era of pogroms, conquest, and "greatness." These forces
feed on the weakness of democratic institutions, the divisions among democratic forces, and the generally dismal economic and
political state of the country under civilian, constitutional rule. Numerous observers speak of "Weimar Russia." As in Germany in the
1920s, the only alternative to a triumph of fascism (or some related "ism" deeply hostile to freedom and to the West) is the
development of an effective democratic order. Now, as then, this project must struggle against great historical and political odds,
and it seems feasible only with international economic aid and support for democratic forces and institutions. A HOSTILE,
EXPANSIONIST CHINA In China, the threat to the West emanates from success rather than failure and is less amenable to explicit
international assistance and inducement. Still, a China moving toward democracy--gradually constructing a real constitutional
order, with established ground rules for political competition and succession and civilian control over the military--seems a much
better prospect to be a responsible player on the regional and international stage. Unfair trade practices, naval power projection,
territorial expansion, subversion of neighboring regimes, and bullying of democratic forces in Hong Kong and Taiwan are all more
likely the more China resists political liberalization. So is a political succession crisis that could disrupt incremental patterns of
reform and induce competing power players to take risks internationally to advance their power positions at home. A China that is
building an effective rule of law seems a much better prospect to respect international trading rules that mandate protection for
intellectual property and forbid the use of prison labor. And on these matters of legal, electoral, and institutional development,
international actors can help. THE SPREAD OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM Increasingly, Europeans and Americans worry
about the threat from fundamentalist Islam. But fundamentalist movements do not mobilize righteous anger and absolute
commitment in a vacuum. They feed on the utter failure of decadent political systems to meet the most elementary expectations for
material progress and social justice. Some say the West must choose between corrupt, repressive regimes that are at least secular
and pro-Western and Islamic fundamentalist regimes that will be no less repressive, but anti-Western. That is a false choice in Egypt
today, as it was in Iran or Algeria--at least until their societies became so polarized as to virtually obliterate the liberal center. It is
precisely the corruption, arrogance, oppression, and gross inefficacy of ruling regimes like the current one in Egypt that stimulate
the Islamic fundamentalist alternative. Though force may be needed--and legitimate--to meet an armed challenge, history teaches
that decadent regimes cannot hang on forever through force alone. In the long run, the only reliable bulwark against revolution or
anarchy is good governance--and that requires far-reaching political reform. In Egypt and some other Arab countries, such reform
would entail a gradual program of political liberalization that counters corruption, reduces state interference in the economy,
responds to social needs, and gives space for moderate forces in civil society to build public support and understanding for further
liberalizing reforms. In Pakistan and Turkey, it would mean making democracy work: stamping out corruption, reforming the
economy, mobilizing state resources efficiently to address social needs, devolving power, guaranteeing the rights of ethnic and
religious minorities, and--not least-- reasserting civilian control over the military. In either case, the fundamentalist
challenge can be met only by moving (at varying speeds) toward, not away from, democracy. POLITICAL
TERRORISM Terrorism and immigration pressures also commonly have their origins in political exclusion, social injustice, and bad,
abusive, or tyrannical governance. Overwhelmingly, the sponsors of international terrorism are among the world's most
authoritarian regimes: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan. And locally within countries, the agents of terrorism tend to be either the
fanatics of antidemocratic, ideological movements or aggrieved ethnic and regional minorities who have felt themselves socially
marginalized and politically excluded and insecure: Sri Lanka's Tamils, Turkey's Kurds, India's Sikhs and Kashmiris. To be sure,
democracies must vigorously mobilize their legitimate instruments of law enforcement to counter this growing threat to their
security. But a more fundamental and enduring assault on international terrorism requires political change to bring down zealous,
paranoiac dictatorships and to allow aggrieved groups in all countries to pursue their interests through open, peaceful, and
constitutional means. As for immigration, it is true that people everywhere are drawn to prosperous, open, dynamic societies like
those of the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. But the sources of large (and rapid) immigration flows to the West
increasingly tend to be countries in the grip of civil war, political turmoil, economic disarray, and poor governance: Vietnam, Cuba,
Haiti, Central America, Algeria. And in Mexico, authoritarianism, corruption, and social injustice have held back human
development in ways that have spawned the largest sustained flow of immigrants to any Western country--a flow that threatens to
become a floodtide if the Zedillo government cannot rebuild Mexico's economy and societal consensus around authentic democatic
reform. In other cases--Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, Afghanistan--immigration to the West has been modest only because of the greater
logistical and political difficulties. However, in impoverished areas of Africa and Asia more remote from the West, disarray is felt in
the flows of refugees across borders, hardly a benign development for world order. Of course, population growth also heavily drives
these pressures. But a common factor underlying all of these crisis-ridden emigration points is the absence of democracy. And,
strikingly, populations grow faster in authoritarian than democratic regimes.4ETHNIC CONFLICT Apologists for authoritarian
rule--as in Kenya and Indonesia--are wont to argue that multiparty electoral competition breeds ethnic rivalry and polarization,
while strong central control keeps the lid on conflict. But when multiple ethnic and national identities are forcibly suppressed, the lid
may violently pop when the regime falls apart. The fate of Yugoslavia, or of Rwanda, dramatically refutes the canard that
authoritarian rule is a better means for containing ethnic conflict. Indeed, so does the recent experience of Kenya, where ethnic
hatred, land grabs, and violence have been deliberately fostered by the regime of President Daniel arap Moi in a desperate bid to
divide the people and thereby cling to power. Overwhelmingly, theory and evidence show that the path to peaceful management of
ethnic pluralism lies not through suppressing ethnic identities and superimposing the hegemony of one group over others.
Eventually, such a formula is bound to crumble or be challenged violently. Rather, sustained interethnic moderation
and peace follow from the frank recognition of plural identities, legal protection for group and
individual rights, devolution of power to various localities and regions, and political institutions that encourage bargaining
and accommodation at the center. Such institutional provisions and protections are not only significantly more likely under
democracy, they are only possible with some considerable degree of democracy.5 OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts
the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression
tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful
international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions
of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of
life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional
threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its
provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic
fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or
glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face
ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass
destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring
trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more
environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the
destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because
their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they
respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation
on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
And no offense --- the War on Drugs just causes drug organizations to produce
other illegal drugs
a) Heroin
Lee, 2 (Rensselaer W., contract researcher for the Congressional Research Service and a senior
fellow at FPRI, “Perverse Effects of Andean Counternarcotics Policy,” Orbis, Volume 46, Issue 3,
Summer 2012, pg. 537-554, sciencedirect, Tashma)
Still More Unintended Effects
U.S. supply-reduction and counterorganization
policies in the Andes have thus transformed the
Andean cocaine industry in ways that strengthen Colombia’s various insurgent groups and worsen the country’s
internal crisis. But still other consequences of the assault on the cartels may be cited. One of these is the
growing economic significance of the heroin industry in Colombia and the increased penetration of
Colombian heroin into the U.S. market. A second, reflecting the diminished strategic reach of successor organizations to the cartels,
is the changing dynamic of drug smuggling in the Western hemisphere; this has meant a greater participation of trafficking groups
in transit countries in the value-added from Colombian narcotics exports.
Heroin is not a new industry in Colombia. Small-scale opium cultivation and heroin processing have been taking
place in Colombia for upward of 30 years. However, marijuana and later cocaine (the dominant drug export) were the commercially
significant narcotics products. By the early 1990s, though, Colombian traffickers—especially those associated with the
Cali coalition—began
to view heroin as an alternative source of income to the established cocaine
trade. One Cali faction—the Ivan Urdinola group—acquired a measure of control over cultivation and processing, and the
dominant Rodriguez–Orejuela organization within the cartel undertook to distribute heroin to the United States.29
Law enforcement pressure on the cartels seems to have increased traffickers’ propensity to
diversify into heroin. It is not hard to see why; the per-gram price of the drug averaged almost ten times that for cocaine
during the 1990s.30 For independent trafficking enterprises—those that succeeded the cartels—the drug offered
exceptionally attractive commercial possibilities. Storage and handling of large quantities of heroin is not an issue
as it is with large cocaine loads. Transport by human couriers, or “mules,” the preferred pre-cartel mode of smuggling (at a time
when cocaine prices were several times higher) again allowed the small operator to realize a substantial return.31 For these reasons,
the heroin business took off in Colombia during the 1990s. Estimated “repatriable” heroin revenues increased from $45 million per
year in 1991 to $323 million in 1998, according to a 2000 U.N.-sponsored study, making heroin Colombia’s second most important
narcotics export.32 According to DEA’s Heroin Signature Program, in 2001 approximately 59 percent of the heroin seized in the
United States by federal authorities originated in Colombia, compared to none a decade earlier.33
b) Opium
Lee, 2 (Rensselaer W., contract researcher for the Congressional Research Service and a senior
fellow at FPRI, “Perverse Effects of Andean Counternarcotics Policy,” Orbis, Volume 46, Issue 3,
Summer 2012, pg. 537-554, sciencedirect, Tashma)
Pros and Cons of Counternarcotics Strategies
America’s international drug problems have produced a difficult legacy. More than a quarter-century of
struggle against the Andean cocaine industry has done almost nothing to reduce the availability of cocaine in U.S. markets, while at
the same time feeding the insurgency in Colombia (which threatens to metastasize to neighboring countries), stimulating the South
American heroin industry, and accelerating the “Colombianization” of criminal and political structures in drug transit states.40 Such
adverse consequences raise the obvious question of whether the benefits of international drug control are commensurate with the
costs. Certainly the goal of supply-reduction has been elusive. As we have seen, eradication of drug crops merely
shifts the locus of upstream production from region to region and country to country. Another
unanticipated consequence has been unwanted crop diversification—the expanded cultivation of
opium poppy in Colombia and (according to recent reports) in Peru, as well.41 Even the intensified aerial spraying
envisaged under Plan Colombia is unlikely to succeed, since farmers will probably push the coca frontier (and the attendant
polluting effects of the cocaine industry) further into the Amazonian jungle with little or no decrease in net cultivation. Indeed,
recent reports from Colombia suggest that this is already happening.
Human Rights – Health
War on drugs denies people their human right to health
Rolles et al, 12 a writer for the Guardian, Martin is Head of Campaigns and Communications
at Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Danny Kushlick is a British political activist and founder
of the Transform Drug Policy Foundation. Jane Slater is Head of Operations and Fundraising at
Transform Drug Policy Foundation (Steve, George Murkin, Martin Powell, Danny Kushlick, Jane Slater 26 June 2012
“The Alternative World Drug Report: Counting the Costs of the War on Drugs”
http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/AWDR.pdf) // czhang
The right to health¶ The “right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable ¶ standard of physical and mental health”
is a
fundamental ¶ right first articulated in the 1946 Constitution of the ¶ World Health Organization, and included in many ¶
subsequent international human rights treaties, ¶ including the International Covenant on Economic Social ¶ and Cultural Rights
and the UN Convention on the Rights ¶ of the Child.¶ The right to health includes access to health-related ¶
education and information; the right to be free from non- ¶ consensual medical treatment39; the right to prevention, ¶
treatment and control of diseases; access to essential ¶ medicines, including those controlled under drug control ¶
systems; and participation in health-related decision ¶ making at the national, community and individual ¶ levels.
Good quality health provision should be available, ¶ accessible, and acceptable without discrimination – ¶
specifically including on the grounds of physical or ¶ mental disability, or health status.40 In country after ¶ country around the
world, however, the right to health is ¶ denied to people who use illegal drugs.¶ Punitive drug law enforcement
often runs contrary ¶ to the right to health when dealing with drug using ¶ populations, most prominently by denying
access to
treatment and harm reduction services, and creating¶ practical and political obstacles to getting
essential ¶ medicines. This creates serious health costs, particularly ¶ for vulnerable populations of
problematic drug users, ¶ including people who inject drugs – an estimated 15.9 ¶ million people41 in at least 158 countries
and territories ¶ around the world.¶ Injecting drug use causes one in ten new HIV infections ¶ globally, and
up to 90% of infections in regions such as ¶ Eastern Europe and Central Asia.42¶ Despite this, in many of these areas, access to
proven ¶ harm reduction measures – including needle and syringe ¶ exchanges programmes (NSP) and opioid
substitution ¶ therapy (OST) – is extremely limited or entirely ¶ unavailable. Yet these interventions are
recognised by ¶ UN human rights monitors as a requirement of the right ¶ to health for people
who inject drugs,43 while methadone ¶ and buprenorphine for OST are on the World Health ¶ Organization’s essential
¶
medicines list. (For more detail/¶ discussion see Chapter 5, pp. 64-65.)¶ Enforcement activities themselves can create direct ¶ health
harms, for example through aerial drug crop ¶ fumigations (which can cause damage to eyes and skin, ¶ and lead to miscarriages44),
as well as interfering with ¶ access to health services.¶ Criminalisation of use, and the stigma and ¶
discrimination that often accompany it, contribute to the ¶ reluctance of people who inject drugs
to utilise treatment ¶ and harm reduction services (see Chapter 7, p. 89). This ¶ is especially the case when laws
against the carrying ¶ of injecting paraphernalia are in place (contrary to the ¶ UN’s International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and
Human ¶ Rights45), or when police have a high presence near ¶ service providers.46¶ Global drug control efforts aimed
at non-medical use ¶ of opiates have had a chilling effect on medical use ¶ for pain control and
palliative care. Unduly restrictive ¶ regulations and policies, such as those limiting doses ¶ and prescribing, or banning
particular preparations, ¶ have been imposed in the name of controlling the illicit ¶ diversion of narcotic drugs.47¶ Instead, according
to the World Health Organization, ¶ these measures simply result in 5.5 billion people – ¶ including 5.5 million with terminal cancer
– having ¶ low to nonexistent access to opiate medicines.48 More ¶ powerful opiate preparations, such as morphine, are ¶
unattainable in over 150 countries in the world.
Intervention
The drug war is used as a justification for intervention which fuels more conflict
and causes more corruption
Newstext, 12 (Newstex, citing President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos, “The US War on Communism, Drugs, and
Terrorism in Colombia”, 10/31/2012, Newstex, Lexis, JKahn)
The effect of the militarised strategy has been a marked increase in drug related violence wherever it is initiated and there is not a
more clear-cut example of this than Mexico. Before Calderon militarised Mexico s drug war the violent crime rate was actually
falling. Since this approach has been adopted, with avid U.S. support including the allocation of 1.4 billion dollars over a three year
period (2008-2010) through the Mérida Initiative, the homicide rate has more than doubled, the violent crime rate has increased by
more than 200% and the number of human rights abuses committed by the military in their attempts to reign in the drugs cartels
have increased six-fold.11 In terms of preventing the flow of drugs into the U.S. the militarised approach has one simple economic
paradox at its core: by disproportionally tackling production and distribution (the supply side of the equation) without equally
tackling consumption (the demand side of the equation), the price of the product is increased thus providing a greater profit
incentive for people to take the involved risks in trafficking and producing illicit drugs. War on Narcoguerrillas? As previously
stated, Plan Colombia s original objective was the eradication of coca plantations by targeting left-wing narcoguerrillas (FARC) who,
it was explicitly claimed, were directly involved in the drug trade. Evidence of a direct link between the FARC and the illicit drug
trade, however, did not emerge until the early 2000 s after Plan Colombia had been instigated. In fact, into the late 1990s, there
was little evidence to suggest that the FARC s involvement in the production and distribution of
drugs extended beyond the taxation of coca cultivation in the regions it controlled. In 1997 Donnie Marshall, Chief of Operations
for the Drug Enforcement Administration admitted this in a DEA congressional testimony stating that there is little
to indicate the insurgent groups are trafficking in cocaine themselves, either by producing cocaine HCL and
selling it to Mexican syndicates, or by establishing their own distribution networks in the United States. 12 Plan Colombia, while
stating the pursuit of left-wing narcoguerrillas as an objective, did not equally target right-wing Colombian paramilitaries. While a
few high profile cases of paramilitaries being tried and convicted on drug trafficking charges have occurred, on the whole, the
focus remains principally on the FARC. This is despite the fact that at least as early as 1997 the DEA were aware of their
involvement in narcotics trafficking. In the same congressional testimony quoted above Marshal stated that the AUC (United SelfDefence Forces of Colombia), the largest Colombian right-wing paramilitary group, has been closely linked to the Henao Montoya
organisation; the most powerful of the various independent trafficking groups that comprise the North Valle drug mafia and that the
AUC s leader, Carlos Castano, is a major cocaine trafficker in his own right. Fumigation too has been concentrated
mainly in FARC strongholds in the South East despite the fact that right-wing paramilitaries are known to be
involved in cocaine production and trafficking in the north of the country. Suspicions have thus emerged that the
real aim of the fumigation campaign is to remove one of the FARC s key revenue streams (the taxation of coca cultivation in areas
they control) rather than coca cultivation in general. The disparity in treatment between right and left-wing groups has also led
many critics to suggest that the U.S. tolerate and even support right-wing paramilitary activities due to their ideological alliance with
U.S. economic interests in the country. In 2001 an investigation by Amnesty International led to a lawsuit to obtain CIA records of
Los Pepes , a vigilante organisation set up by Carlos Castano. Its findings
revealed an extremely suspect
relationship between the U.S. government and the Castano family at a time when the U.S. Government was
well aware of that family s involvement with paramilitary violence and narcotics trafficking. 13 War on Drugs/War on Terror
Colombia was one of the largest recipients of U.S. military aid and training throughout the Cold War. In the Cold War era
the communist threat was used to justify counterinsurgency operations against the FARC rebels
whose communist/socialist roots posed a particular threat to U.S. economic interests due to Colombia s
extensive natural resources and strategic geographical location. Today, even if the idea of the FARC gaining control over the
Colombian state has diminished in credibility, the rebels regularly attack U.S. interests including the infrastructure (railways,
pipelines etc.) of U.S. energy and mining multinationals in Colombia. As Marc Grossman, former U.S. undersecretary of state for
political affairs put it; [Colombian insurgents] represent a danger to the $4.3 billion in direct U.S. investment in Colombia .
Colombia supplied three per cent of U.S. oil imports in 2001, and possesses substantial potential oil and natural gas reserves. 14
After the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union the communist threat no longer justified U.S. counterinsurgency operations in
Colombia or elsewhere in Latin America. The US Military s Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) therefore welcomed
the
drug war as a new justification for maintaining the same levels of military spending and
counterinsurgency training of Latin American militaries and low intensity warfare strategies employed in
Central America were easily adopted to fight a war on drugs. 15 In Colombia, the FARC, previously labelled Communist became
narcoguerrillas and, post-9/11, this morphed again into terrorists. President Bush utilised the war on terror to
redefine the Colombian conflict and continue counter-insurgency operations against the FARC. Again,
the target of this campaign remained the FARC despite the fact that the Colombian Army and closely linked armed right-wing
paramilitary groups have been responsible for countless grave human rights abuses.16 The Historic Importance of Military Training
to U.S. Foreign Policy Military training and the cultivation of allied militaries whose interests and ideologies would reflect those of
Washington has, historically, been one of the main methods of U.S. control in Latin America. Several Spanish language schools were
established specifically for training Latin American officers including the notorious School of the Americas (SOA) which trained
nearly every officer involved in the 1973 Chilean coup and where many members of the Colombian Army continue to train today. As
well as training these officers in counter-insurgency, counter terrorism and unconventional warfare (among other forms of attack)
the SOA intentionally cultivates a glorified image of privileged capitalist modernity and a strong belief in the right-wing capitalist
model. 15 What resulted from such instruction in the past was the creation of highly politicised right-wing military entities which
remained allied to the state only insofar as the government in power reflected a similar ideology. Throughout the 1970 s and 1980 s
this resulted in military coups overthrowing left-wing governments throughout Latin American and the Caribbean. As Latin
American states transitioned to democracy the strength of these staunchly right-wing militaries (as well as well-
grounded fears of U.S. military intervention) led to the establishment of pacted democracies whereby elite and military support for
the democratic transition was conditioned on the formation of certain economic parameters to be enshrined into the constitution.
Despite the fact that many democratic movements mobilised on the basis of wealth redistribution these
pacts generally guaranteed the continued presence of foreign multinationals in the extractive industries as well
as ruling out the nationalisation of resources and the socialisation of land as policy options regardless of electoral outcomes.17
Where specific pacts did not exist left leaning elected governments remained very wary of their right-wing militaries when making
policy decisions. In Chile, one of the more modern examples, even though the Concertación (Chile s democratic movement) opposed
neoliberalism, the intimidating power of the right-wing military caused them to accept a moderately reformed version of Pinochet s
1980 constitution which enshrined the neoliberal model as well as a number of authoritarian enclaves with a bias to the political
right.18 This is also the reason why very few Latin American countries, with the notable exception of Argentina, have managed to
hold military personal accountable for atrocities of the past. Indeed, in many places, army personal who took part in
grave atrocities continue to hold high ranking positions in the military. In Colombia this is particularly so and,
as military abuses continue to this day, a culture of impunity has been created which remains a hindering factor to any potential for
peace and reconciliation.19 What s more, many high ranking members of the Colombian military trained in the U.S. as counterinsurgents during the Cold War and were then thought by their U.S. instructors to define a number activities normally associated
with a healthy democracy as Insurgent Activity Indicators. Such indicators listed in Manuals used by U.S. trainers included;
Characterization of the armed forces as the enemy of the people Increased unrest amongst labourers
Increased number of articles or advertisements in newspapers criticizing the government. Strikes or work stoppages Increase of
petitions demanding government redress of grievance and Initiation of letter-writing campaigns to newspapers and government
officials deploring undesirable conditions and blaming individuals in power. 14 The more recent move to the left in Latin
America has been a success, in part, because the new generation of left wing leaders are acutely aware of the dangers the
military pose. In Bolivia one of Morales acts as President was to raise military wages and the recent police strikes (so severe some
called them a police mutiny) were partly based on the fact that police wages were roughly half those received by similar ranking
military officers. In Venezuela, Chavez holds tight to his military image and many critics have used this to claim he is merely another
generalissimo. This criticism fails to realise, however, the great political importance in Chavez s realignment of the Venezuelan
military with the democratically elected government of the state rather than outside forces and ideologies. His success in this
endeavour was demonstrated when soldiers loyal to him reversed a military coup that displaced him briefly from power in 2002.
Both Chavez and Morales, due to their opposition to drug war policies and the imperialist undertones they carry, have driven the
DEA out of their respective countries. The stability of instability It is clear that the war on drugs and the subsequent
war on terror in Colombia have been used as fronts to justify the continued counterinsurgency
war against the FARC. Or, as Stan Goff a retired US Army Special Forces officer for counterinsurgency operations and former
military advisor to Colombia put it: the war on drugs is simply a propaganda ploy We were briefed by the Public Affairs Officers that
counter-narcotics was a cover story that our mission, in fact, was to further develop Colombians capacity for counterinsurgency
operations. 20 U.S. and Colombian government anti-terror and anti-drug policy, however, has actually
swelled the ranks of the FARC. Peasant farmers who depend on coca for their livelihoods are forced to rely on
the armed guerrillas to protect their crop from planes spraying chemicals. The displacement and terrorisation of people and
the destruction of subsistence crops in rural areas due to fumigation and military and paramilitary activity have created a large
amount of unemployed, disenfranchised and angry young people who gravitate towards the guerrilla movement due to the impunity
of the armed forces and the perceived inability of the Colombian justice and democratic political systems to hear their grievances or
reflect their interests.
Liberty
The War on Drugs is often framed as a quest to protect morality --- that is a ruse
perpetuated by the government --- it sustains extreme losses of civil liberties
Fukumi, 8 (Sayaka, PhD student in International Relations at the University of Nottingham,
Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America, Ashgate Publishing Company, pg. 94-97, Tashma)
The Limitation of Civil Liberties
The United States has a reputation
for widely accepted civil liberties and protected civil rights.
However, Americans have much less personal autonomy in comparison to during the period
before the War on Drugs.118 The war on drugs is regarded as a means to protect American values
and morals.119 This is because the cocaine situation in the late 1980s was regarded as an opportunity for institutionalising the
judgements and tactics through public support during the 1990s. The cocaine epidemic in the 1980s was driven by the fear of
disruption to the American social structure by the mass fl ow and use of cocaine.120 Politicians kept appealing to citizens to preserve
morals and values in American society, and made them believe that tolerance to cocaine, such as legalisation, is equal to the
‘advocacy of international narco-terrorism’.121 The government claimed to be committed to ‘America’s moral regeneration’.122
The willingness of the US to limit its own freedoms for the sake of drug control appeared to be a
consequence of the claim by the government: ‘[Americans] should be extremely reluctant to restrict [drug enforcement offi cers]
within formal and arbitrary lines.’123 At the height of the War on Drugs, Americans were willing to
sacrifice their own civil liberties. Opinion polls revealed that they even approved of extreme
measures , such as: giving up some freedoms (62%), using the military to control the domestic drug trade (82%), letting police
search homes of suspected drug dealers without a warrant (52%), and reporting drug users to the police (83%).124 Not only the
public but also the Supreme Court is supportive of limiting civil rights in exchange for fighting the
war on drugs. The Supreme Court ruled that ‘government agencies can evict tenants in public
housing even when the resident is unaware that a visiting family member or relative is using drugs’.125
Zimring and Hawkins claim that: ‘Public support for extreme governmental responses to drugs is higher
than for authoritarian countermeasures to any other social problem.’126 It is considered that ‘Americans
have opposed drug use and feared drug experiences because they seemed to threaten a generally accepted set of values and
aspirations that dated from the beginnings of the national experience.’127
The restrictions on freedom for the fight against drugs are understood: as drugs
forced the United States ‘to strike a
new balance between order and individual liberties.’128 To some extent, the end has come to justify the means in
the War on Drugs. The beginning of America’s sacrifi ce of civil rights was marked by an executive order for urine-tests to be
conducted on all civilian federal workers to ensure they were not drug users.129 Some private companies followed the government
direction, and requested their employees take the test. Although the urine test was eventually withdrawn from the drug control
policy, it seemed that there was little opposition to such a test among Americans. As a consequence, drug testing of students
has been operated consistently, and Supreme Court Justice A.M. Kennedy did not accept the challenge of a high school
student against urine testing in 2002.130
In respect to legislation, the punishments for cocaine and crack offences are decided by the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.131 These laws impose mandatory minimum
imprisonment 132 on the offenders and prohibit parole.133 At trial, according to Sterling, the President of Criminal Justice
Policy Foundation, it is unnecessary for the police, federal agents, and prosecutors to present hard
evidence against a suspect for prosecution.134 The testimony of ‘co-operating individuals’, the ‘snitch’, against the
suspect will be enough to convict.135 The only way for drug offenders to receive a reduced sentence is to assist the government as an
informant.136 Considering the desperation of the convict to minimise the sentence, the information provided to the government
could be unreliable. Gray maintains that: ‘[the] War on Drugs has made [the United States] and its institutions so desperate that our
judgement and our reason have been seriously clouded.’137
The war on drugs and the claim of moral regeneration brings the risk of tighter government control on individuals,
the loss of civil liberties, and injustice under the uniform mandatory minimum sentencing.
The information provided through such policies could lead to limited understanding of the cocaine trade and the nature of
substances.
The War on Drugs causes massive violations of liberty --- you have a moral
obligation to rebel against it
Moran, 12 (Andrew, “Op-Ed: In Defense of Liberty – Ending the drug war to protect freedom,”
Digital Journal, 12/11/12, http://digitaljournal.com/article/338812, Tashma)
Since the egregious war on drugs was declared, there have been enormous economic, social,
criminal and personal liberty derelictions. If there were a cost-benefit analysis of how much
taxpayer dollars that federal, state (provincial) and local governments used, it would show that there has
been very little success in this failed war. For some reason or another, the populace concluded that the
government knows best and it can impose moral behavior on the people, even if there would be
massive unintended consequences that would incite enhanced immorality. The case for drug laws is that if it were legal
then our society would become chaotic, everyone would start shooting up on heroine and the nation as we know it would crumble
because drug users wouldn’t contribute to society. Before I continue, I have a question: how many people reading this article who are
not drug users would immediately sniff a line of cocaine, insert a needle into your arm for a shot of heroine and take ecstasy? It can
be safe to say that not a whole lot of you would do it. As with any other government policy that has good
intentions – the road to hell is paved with good intentions – this one has unintended
consequences. By prohibiting the use of drugs, it has created an underground economy where
prices have soared, users have resorted to prostitution just to pay for it and taxpayers are forced to pay
for law enforcement, whose time could be better spent chasing rapists and pedophiles, just to crack down on this shadow
economy. If drugs were legalized, the marketplace would immediately adapt, which would lead to the extinction of the drug cartels
and the drug dealers would be out of business – of course, once government bans something else there would already be criminal
activity. Remember, the government creates criminals with victimless laws and crimes. If I want to
smoke marijuana or start using heroin, isn’t that my choice? Whatever happened to personal
responsibility? During a Fox News Republican primary debate, retiring Texas Republican Congressman Ron Paul made
an excellent point when he mocked the establishment thinking the American people yearn for
the federal government to take care of them and tell them how to live. Whether it’s eating a dozen
doughnuts in one sitting, living in atrophy or not wearing a helmet while riding a bicycle, humans have free will and
free choice and must take responsibility for their actions, even if these decisions are reckless to their own
lives. These reasons alone, and many others, identify that the war on drugs must be ceased either immediately or
gradually and to permit the people to make their own choices in their lives as long as they don’t coerce
others to adopt their lifestyle. Since drugs are deemed bad for you, why not resort to the failed policies of prohibition? Why don’t we
completely ban junk food, compel others to purchase a gym membership and forbid individuals from smoking cigarettes, cigars and
pipes? Wait nevermind. Let’s not give the government anymore failing ideas. If you adore liberty and abhor the state controlling
every facet of your life, you would endorse the principles of drug legalization.
Decision rule – reject every instance
Petro 74 (Sylvester, Professor of Law at NYU, Toledo Law Review, Spring, p. 480,
http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200304/0783.html)
However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway - "I believe in only one thing: liberty." And it is always well to bear in mind
David Hume's observation: "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." Thus, it is unacceptable
to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no importance because there have been
invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of
all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Dijas. In sum, if one believed in freedom as a
supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual
and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and
resisted with undying spirit.
LA Instability
The War on Drugs backfires --- it destabilizes the target region and destroys
democratic structures and ideals
Fukumi, 8 (Sayaka, PhD student in International Relations at the University of Nottingham,
Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America, Ashgate Publishing Company, pg. 173-174, Tashma)
Conclusion
Through the Andean Strategy, the United States has been tackling the cocaine trade from various
angles, eradication of coca bushes, interdiction of cocaine loads, demolishing criminal groups and providing alternative crops and
social infrastructures. Law enforcement operations (interdiction and eradication) are also expected to function as a deterrent,
causing coca growers to withdraw from coca cultivation, and an incentive to shift their production to alternative crops provided by
the alternative development projects. The logic is that the United States three- prong strategy may have the
potential to reduce the Andean cocaine industry despite the fact that so far it has posed a
danger of instability to the region. According to Beers, the three-prong strategy of the United States contributed
to a reduction in coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia ‘dramatically’.228 Success in eradicating coca in Bolivia and Peru was the result
of the combined effects of alternative development, re-establishing government control over the region as well as forceful eradication
efforts supported by the United States.
American policy, in rhetoric and in legislation, denied that drugs are a permanent problem that needs to
be managed rather than eliminated. Such an approach to drugs has worsened the situation
in various ways, and affects the community and the state.22° Bolivia, in particular, has destroyed 80% of illicit
coca with large economic sacrifices. The statistics of seizures and eradication do not indicate success because those eradicated fields
tend to be replaced in remote areas and other states, such as Colombia. Consequently, total coca flow to the United States remains
steady. The third element of the three-prong strategy, alternative development, used to be affected by the sanctions to the Andean
countries, and did not fulfil its role as a ‘safety net’ for farmers who eradicated coca from their fields. Therefore, the US approach
could not gain popular support or credibility in the Andes. The Andean governments, however, supported the US policy for the sake
of economic support attached to the drug control aid.
The militarisation of the drug war has undermined civilian control of the militaries in the Andes
and spread human rights violations through torture, disappearance and extrajudicial
executions.23° The military extended its authority to the private trial of those suspected of participation in the cocaine trade,
and thereby some citizens were convicted without lawful trial in some states.23‘ Instead of supporting democracy and
protecting human rights, the US aid to counter-narcotics operations increased human rights
violations through aerial spraying, military involvement and undermining democratic political systems in
the Andes.232 In this sense, US anti-drug operations may be more harmful to the Andean countries and their society than the
cocaine trade per se.233
Poisons People
Anti-narcotics efforts poison populations which only intensifies fighting
Newstext, 12 (Newstex, citing President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos, “The US War on Communism, Drugs, and
Terrorism in Colombia”, 10/31/2012, Newstex, Lexis, JKahn)
Biological warfare One major part of both Plan Colombia and the Merida initiative has been the destruction of coca fields by
aerial chemical fumigation thus impacting the cocaine trade at it s source. Glyphosate, the chemical substance used to fumigate illicit
crops and known by its brand name Roundup, was originally patented and produced by the most notorious of US agricultural
corporations; Monsanto. Glyphosate is classified by Monsanto as a mild herbicide but by the World Health Organisation as
extremely poisonous. 5 Roundup is sold over the counter in the US as a herbicide and there it carries these warnings: Roundup will
kill almost any green plant that is actively growing. Roundup should not be applied to bodies of water such as ponds, lakes or
streams . After an area has been sprayed with Roundup, people and pets (such as cats and dogs) should stay out of the area until it is
thoroughly dry If Roundup is used to control undesirable plants around fruit or nut trees, or grapevines, allow twenty-one days
before eating the fruits or nuts. 6 In Colombia however, two additives Cosmo-Flux 411 and Cosmo InD are added
increasing the toxicity four-fold and producing what is known as Roundup Ultra, or as some call it;
Colombia’s Agent Orange. 6,7 In addition, the concentrations in the mixtures prepared by the Colombian
military (under the guidance of their US colleagues) are five times higher than is recognised as safe for aerial
application by the US Environmental Protection Agency.6 This product is regularly sprayed over inhabited areas, farmland, livestock
and areas of invaluable biodiversity.8 The National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, a Federal Advisory Committee to the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, issued a letter on July 19 2001 stating that; Aerial spraying of the herbicide has
caused eye, respiratory, skin and digestive ailments; destroyed subsistence crops; sickened domestic animals;
and contaminated water supplies.8 Even anti-drug development projects, including ones funded by U.S. Aid, the UN,
the Colombian government and international NGOs, have been destroyed by fumigation. One of many examples is that of
CORCUSA, an organic coffee cooperative founded to provide peasant farmers with an alternative to coca cultivation. CORCUSA was
fumigated in 2005 and again in 2007 destroying the coffee crop and the project s organic certification for future crops.9 As well as
the clear human health, food security and environmental risks involved in the fumigation campaign, it has also been a massive
failure in achieving its stated goal; the eradication of the coca crop. Coca, unlike most other food crops, is actually quite resistant to
aerial spraying of glyphosate. Many farmers who have their food crops destroyed are left with few options when coca is all that will
grow on their land after the spraying of glyphosate so the result of the fumigation campaign has been a marked increase in coca
cultivation.9 Militarisation of the War on Drugs The militaristic approach to fighting the drug war has
intensified the conflict in Colombia. The result has been mass displacement and disenfranchisement of
people which, in turn, has pushed more people into some area of the drug trade. What’s more, numerous
studies dating back to the 1980 s have mutually concluded that militarising the drug war would have
little to no effect on the consumption of illicit drugs in the United States .10
Human Rights K
1NC
Not only are current counter-narcotics strategies ineffective but they lead to social
instability and a crackdown on personal liberties
Rao, 12 (Kumar, attorney at The Bronx Defenders in New York City and a fellow at the Center for American Progress Leadership
Institute in Washington, D.C., “Kumar Rao: The War on Drugs: A Shake-down, Not a Fair Shake for the Middle Class”, Newstex,
12/18/2012, Lexis, JKahn)
In the wake of President Obama's re-election and the fervor around "fiscal cliff" negotiations, issues related to middle class
empowerment and fairness are rightfully at the center of our national policy agenda[1]. Decisions related to tax burden allocations
and spending priorities are being made that have the potential to affect the middle class for a generation. It
is a watershed
moment for our nation to end policies that have unfairly kept people from entering or remaining in
the middle class. The "war on drugs" is one such policy. It has become the longest standing war[2] in
American history -- spanning half a century, while being waged mostly within our borders and against our own
people. President Obama stated[3] that his re-election gave him a mandate "to help middle-class families and families that are
working hard to try and get into the middle class." The president spoke inspiringly throughout his campaign about the idea that
everyone is entitled to a fair shake[4]. And he continues to speak specifically about economic policies to bring about
this progress.
The war on drugs is an impediment to realizing that vision. Instead of giving people a fair
shake, we are giving them a shake-down . In New York City, for example, marijuana possession remains the most
common arrest charge[5] within the criminal justice system. Indeed, the vast bulk of all charges pending in the system are drug
related and a byproduct of the aggressive, almost hysterical policing of residents[6] (overwhelmingly of color) within our cities.
Beyond the short-term humiliation that people must endure while being stopped and frisked[7], or booked and jailed, the longer
term effects for both individuals and communities can be disastrous. A recent FBI report[8], for example, found that there were 1.5
million drug arrests across the country in 2011. Through punitive enforcement and ever expanding legal and social penalties,
these arrests have
devastated individuals[9], families and whole communities in its wake -- all without actually
addressing or rectifying the real damage drug addiction can actually have on people. And quite expectedly,
they represent impassable roadblocks for families hoping to stay in the middle class or those with aspirations to join it. The war
on drugs has prevented and continues to preclude mass groups of people from upward mobility -keeping them locked into legal limbo, economic stagnation and state-sponsored social
instability . At The Bronx Defenders[10], we see firsthand and try to fight against the catastrophic fallout on families from the
endless prosecutions of non-violent drug-related offenses. For a primary breadwinner of a household such as a utility worker or
building janitor, the mere fact of an arrest can mean the loss of a job. For a teen with aspirations of going onto college[11], marijuana
possession conviction can bar financial aid for a year. For mothers and fathers, a drug arrest can mean the removal of
their children[12] from their homes and the placement of the kids with a foster family or in a group home. For those of limited
financial means, mandatory court fees and fines[13] related to minor arrests can snowball, damage credit scores and trigger
collection agency actions. For a non-citizen lawful resident, simple marijuana possession convictions alone can result in deportation
to a foreign country[14] that they know no one in and nothing about. For whole families, it can mean temporary or even permanent
exile from public housing, or eviction from their private apartment. When multiplied by the thousands in a city like
New York, and by millions across the nation, the
consequences become increasingly clear, and increasingly
dire: a cycle of individual, family and community destabilization with permanent scarring for
everyone involved. But this is a solvable crisis and one ripe for our re-consideration at the national level. A GQ Article[15] from this
past summer suggested that President Obama was considering focusing his attention to the war on drugs in a possible second term.
Let's hope he does. Beyond the moral impetus of treating our fellow countrymen with dignity and equal justice, increasingly highprofile appeals[16] for significant reforms to the country's drug laws from a diverse pool of fiscal, libertarian, and macroeconomic
perspectives are emerging. What many across the political spectrum[17] are finally realizing is that the war on drugs costs
too much, impinges on our personal liberties and unnecessarily prevents people from fully
contributing to the economy. We can end draconian policing, move towards decriminalization of marijuana, treat
substance abuse as a public health problem and not a criminal one, and invest in our youth and adults by supporting, not targeting,
our communities. We can spend our resources developing the middle class, not shrinking it. To do so, we must eliminate the
crushing collateral consequences of our extreme and arcane drug policies. Federal, state and local policymakers all
have a responsibility and role to end this so-called war on drugs, and to allow our fellow
residents to live in dignity and with equal opportunity for real middle class advancement. It's the
fair thing to do. It's the smart thing to do. And the timing, more than ever, is right.
“Terrorists” - Link
Tagging traffickers as terrorists is a justification for human rights abuses
Isacson, 05 (Adam, Senior Associate for Regional Security Policy, the Washington Office on Latin America, M.A. from Yale
University in International Relations, B.A. Hampshire College, Social Science, “The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs”, Part of
“Drugs and Democracy in Latin America”, Youngers and Rosin, 2005, Rienner, Google Books, JKahn)
Human rights defenders in Latin America, echoing debates over the civil liberties impact of the USA Patriot Act in the United States,
highlight the potential dangers in giving governments such enormous latitude to define who is a terrorist. This
inherently vague
term , any rightly fear, may become a catch-all to describe any internal political
opposition. The regional crusade against communists during the Cold War gives abundant
precedent for concern. The war on terror – layered over the war on drugs – may similarly serve as a
rationale for security forces to crack down on peaceful reformers and proponents of existing regimes.
Labor and peasant leaders, human rights monitors, independent journalists, neighborhood activists, and
members of opposition political parties may find themselves subject to surveillance, harassment , or
worse from U.S.-funded, U.S.-trained security units. With disturbing frequency, regional leaders are already referring to
their peaceful opponents – Bolivian coca growers, Columbian human rights groups, Honduran environmental activists – as
terrorists or allies of terrorists.
Drug traffickers and insurgents are fundamentally different – confusion destroys
policy effectiveness
Gallahue, 12 (Patrick, contributor to the International Centre on Human Rights and Drug Policy, B.A. in East Asian Studies
from Long Island University, LL.M. in International Human Rights Law from the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the National
University of Ireland, “Narco-Terror: Conflating the Wars on Drugs and Terror”, University of Essex, 2012,
http://projects.essex.ac.uk/ehrr/V8N1/Gallahue.pdf, JKahn)
It must have been a confusing experience for alleged drug trafficker and informer, Haji Juma Khan, to be taken into custody in
2008. For years, the illiterate kingpin‘2 had reportedly met with and provided intelligence to the US Central Intelligence Agency and
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) about the Taliban and other traffickers.3 Though he is believed to have supplied
money to the Taliban for protection,4 it has also been suggested that he worked with provincial council chief and Afghan President
Hamid Karzai‘s late half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai (an accusation Mr. Wali Karzai strongly denied).5 Yet in late 2008, Juma Khan
was taken off the US payroll and into the custody of federal prosecutors.6 Instead of his customary shopping trips in Manhattan,
Juma Khan was brought to jail to be charged under a 2006 narco-terrorism law, which the prior year had been included in an
amendment to the Patriot Act.7 The law makes it possible to prosecute and impose escalated sanctions against international drug
traffickers who support terrorism. The case illustrates the unpredictable role that drugs play vis-à-vis terrorists and other armed
groups. Insurgencies frequently turn to drugs to fund operations8 and/or reap the political capital that may come with controlling
local economies.9 This is very much the case with the Taliban now. However,
that does not mean that drug
trafficking is synonymous with terrorism, nor are all drug-related crimes linked to insurgencies.
Confusing them can lead to policies and proposals which are not only politically problematic ,10
but contravene international law . Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), the US government has
found itself in conflict with an enemy that heavily exploits the drug trade, yet drug traffickers and insurgents
are hardly identical enemies with indistinguishable goals. The case of Juma Khan reflects the fluid role of drugs in a
conflict situation.
Mexico Link
The U.S. government has turned a blind eye towards egregious Mexican
enforcement offenses
Freeman and Luis Sierra, 05 (*Laurie, Director for Yemen at the National Security Council, former State
Department Official, fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America, writer for the Washington Post Mexico Bureau, M.A. in
International Politics from Princeton University, degree from Duke in Latin American Studies, **Jorge, Knight International
Journalism Fellow, degree in International Journalism from the University of Southern California, defense policy and economics
fellow at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, “Mexico: The Militarization Traip”, 2005, part of
“Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The impact of U.S. Policy”, Rienner, Google Books, JKahn)
Mexican police and soldiers have committed grave human rights violations during dug control
efforts, and few are ever prosecuted for these crimes. In some cases, abusive soldiers or police have been
the beneficiaries of U.S. training or other assistance. In other cases, the U.S. government has turned a
blind eye toward human rights violations in the interest of obtaining drug-related information.
US Policy Link
U.S. drug enforcement policy fuels Mexican militarism that causes atrocities and
human rights violations
Freeman and Luis Sierra, 05 (*Laurie, Director for Yemen at the National Security Council, former State
Department Official, fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America, writer for the Washington Post Mexico Bureau, M.A. in
International Politics from Princeton University, degree from Duke in Latin American Studies, **Jorge, Knight International
Journalism Fellow, degree in International Journalism from the University of Southern California, defense policy and economics
fellow at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, “Mexico: The Militarization Traip”, 2005, part of
“Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The impact of U.S. Policy”, Rienner, Google Books, JKahn)
The links between U.S. counterdrug policy and Mexico’s human rights problems and fragile
democracy are difficult to disentangle . Mexico had a dismal human rights record long before U.S. drug control policy
took hold, and Mexican presidents have frequently experimented with militarizing policy and law
enforcement institutions, often in response to their own citizens’ clamor for a tough-on-crime approach. Yet by
fueling the Mexican military’s intrusion into policy work, by supporting policy units and forces
that are not transparent or accountable , and by applying a scorecard approach to drug control, U.S. drug
control policies have adversely affected Mexico’s human rights situation. The State Department itself has
recognized that “the police and military were accused of committing serious human rights violations
as they carried out the Government’s efforts to combat dug cartels.”86
Impact - HR
Drug-war rhetoric and militarization violate human rights
Gallahue, 12 (Patrick, contributor to the International Centre on Human Rights and Drug Policy, B.A. in East Asian Studies
from Long Island University, LL.M. in International Human Rights Law from the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the National
University of Ireland, “Narco-Terror: Conflating the Wars on Drugs and Terror”, University of Essex, 2012,
http://projects.essex.ac.uk/ehrr/V8N1/Gallahue.pdf, JKahn)
This paper examines the conflation of the wars on drugs and terror, particularly since 9/11, and the risks
that merging wars‘12 pose to human rights . Section one presents the rhetoric that has emerged since
9/11 linking drugs and terror. States have since attempted to use the United Nations as a vessel for
classifying drugs as a threat to international security‘, which raised alarms with some governments who
expressed concern about further militarisation of drug policy . Nowhere is this form of militarisation more
evident than in actual armed conflict situations where the wars on terror and drugs are being waged. Section two focuses on
Afghanistan, where the United States argued that drug traffickers with links to the Taliban were
legitimate targets. This paper contends that such a strategy violates international humanitarian law . As
section three will demonstrate, even in peacetime situations, drugs have been dealt with as a security
threat – through the engagement of militaries or the use of emergency laws – which have a disastrous impact on
human rights . Such examples illustrate the human rights risks associated with conflating terrorism and drugs.
Impact – Error Replication
Militarized approaches to drug policy lead to error replication that continuously
destroys rights
Gallahue, 12 (Patrick, contributor to the International Centre on Human Rights and Drug Policy, B.A. in East Asian Studies
from Long Island University, LL.M. in International Human Rights Law from the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the National
University of Ireland, “Narco-Terror: Conflating the Wars on Drugs and Terror”, University of Essex, 2012,
http://projects.essex.ac.uk/ehrr/V8N1/Gallahue.pdf, JKahn)
The increasing link, in some cases, between drug trafficking and the financing of terrorism, is also a
source of growing concern.‘23 The classification of drugs as a threat to international security also raises concerns. The
Security Council is empowered under Chapter VII to maintain or restore international peace and security.‘24 Chapter VII actions
can include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations‘ and could give rise to 'demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations'.25 During the debate, the Venezuelan representative warned that [Drug
trafficking] should be dealt with under the General Assembly and other relevant organs of the United
Nations. In particular, foreign military bases should not be part of the solution .‘26 Several months later,
Venezuela repeated a similar statement at the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs.27 A Presidential Statement linking drugs and
terror is still a long way from formally permitting armed action against States in the name of the war on drugs‘. However, post-
9/11 there have been persistent attempts 'to apply the existing laws of war to a global war on
terrorism‘ including rules governing the legitimate use of force.28 There is far more that can be said on this
subject,29 but it is clear that the war on terror‘ tested many experts‘ conceptions of armed conflict, including when force can be
lawfully used. Thus if counter-narcotics objectives are subsumed under the need to suppress global
terrorism, there would seem to be a risk of extending the nebulous limits of the war on terror‘ to
something even more diffuse . Might some States argue that they have a right to carry out air strikes, aerial fumigation or
other counter-narcotics activities in the territory of another if they suspect profits (no matter how far removed from the target State)
could be used to fund terrorist activities?30
AT: Perm
No
Gallahue, 12 (Patrick, contributor to the International Centre on Human Rights and Drug Policy, B.A. in East Asian Studies
from Long Island University, LL.M. in International Human Rights Law from the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the National
University of Ireland, “Narco-Terror: Conflating the Wars on Drugs and Terror”, University of Essex, 2012,
http://projects.essex.ac.uk/ehrr/V8N1/Gallahue.pdf, JKahn)
The war on terror‘ has been fraught with human rights concerns, such as challenges to fair trial
norms, the right to liberty and security of person and the right to life. Even before 9/11, many governments had
restricted the enjoyment of similar rights of drug offenders using emergency laws. Capital drug laws exist in many
States and drug suspects have been subject to unfair trials in specialised courts or detention without due process guarantees by
numerous governments, despite the forceful criticism of human rights advocates. As the nexus between the rhetoric and tactics of
the wars on drugs and terror narrows, a number of troubling proposals have emerged that are
incompatible with international human rights and humanitarian law. In conflict situations, drug
offenders—even those that provide financial support to insurgencies—are not legitimate targets. Engaging
military forces in law enforcement functions is not always appropriate94 and applying specialised systems of justice to
people accused of drug crimes is immensely problematic to due process norms and other international human rights obligations.
Introducing the death penalty for drug traffickers, as has occurred in Iraq for instance, is at odds with
interpretations of the right to life by numerous human rights bodies, including the UN Human Rights Committee.95 It
seems fairly obvious that drugs and terror are distinct phenomena. Though the two may be linked, they should not be treated as
identical. To do otherwise is to tread into dangerous territory for fair trial norms, the right to liberty and security of person and the
right to life, among other human rights and humanitarian law protections.
Otherization K
1NC
Their approach to drug violence sustains the securitized inferno behind the War
on Drugs --- frames the “other” as an enemy and enables widespread racism --causes the worst forms of human rights violations --- also turns the case: their
approach destroys necessary cooperation and corruption dooms it to failure
Fukumi, 8 (Sayaka, PhD student in International Relations at the University of Nottingham,
Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America, Ashgate Publishing Company, pg. 106-108, Tashma)
The United States considers cocaine trafficking as a national security threat. This is because it sees cocaine
trafficking as a potential harm to the US national economy and moral values, as well as potential
support to international terrorism and regional instability. In the United States, cocaine traffi cking is
experienced in a combination of direct and indirect harms. Although the supply and consumption of cocaine affect various aspects of
national life, the impact of counter-narcotics measures cannot be disregarded. This is because the activities of criminal organisations
and law enforcement agencies are, to some extent, inter-related, and the impact of these two different activities are part of the threat
posed by cocaine traffi cking. The criminal activities and law enforcement operations, however, affect the
state in different ways. Tandy, the chief of the DEA, expresses the threat posed by cocaine traffi cking as: ‘Drug traffi cking
organizations attack the soul and fabric of America in pursuit of … money.’189 On the other hand, Reinarman and Levine claim that
US drug control policies have caused more damage through racism, poverty and misinformation.190
The impact of the cocaine trade in the United States is more closely linked to the
consequences of law enforcement than the nature of trafficking organisations. Although the
US government justifi es the signifi cance of strict legislation against cocaine and crack,191 Brownstein maintains that the
‘crack crisis’ and ‘crack epidemic’ were inventions to justify ‘the massive expansion of the
criminal justice system and the loosening of restrictions on law enforcement that were central to
the justice juggernaut’.192
The US government regards cocaine as a ‘foreign’ enemy to its economy and society due to
its origin and the fact that those actively involved in the cocaine trade are likely to be Latin
Americans and other ethnic minorities. The large sums of narco-dollars laundered into the US national economy
support ethnic minorities and illegal immigrants, allowing them to survive and enrich themselves in the United States. At the same
time, the social and economic costs from the increasing number of cocaine addicts are expanding. In the cocaine trade, the United
States is losing both financial and human resources. In addition, there is a fear in the US government
that narco-dollars can fuel regional instability in Latin America, particularly in Colombia. The terrorist
groups in Latin America might be able to expand their activities from the domestic to the international level supported by narcodollars. Such regional instability will cause damage to the United States both politically and economically.
Drug control in general, therefore, is regarded as a policy that alienates some minority groups.
The image attached to each drug remains vivid to the Americans: it is believed to be a rampant
substance in black and Hispanic communities although the majority of users are white. The cocaine
trade is dominated by Hispanic populations because most cocaine is produced in Latin America and distributed through immigrant
communities in the United States. The law enforcers, therefore, target particular communities for cocaine
arrests, and in doing so, the disregard for human rights has created tension with local
communities. As a result, some communities in inner cities are ruled by the cocaine traffickers – the emergence of ‘states
within a state’. Law enforcement targeting often depends on profiling such things as ethnicity and the assets of
suspects.
The law enforcement agencies can earn their operational funding from seizures of assets and
arrests of cocaine traffickers. This system of providing seized assets as rewards to the law enforcement
agencies spawned injustice and corruption among the agents. Law enforcement officers steal
confiscated assets and make illegal arrests and house searches, as well as receiving cash from the traffickers. At the
higher levels, investigations are neglected. These cases could be concealed from the public , but
when they are exposed, it leads to distrust of the authorities. As a result of the War on Drugs, ‘the entire criminal
justice system has been losing credibility’.193
Turning to the diplomatic impact, the United States fears regional instability fuelled by narco-dollars, as well as the massive fl ow of
cocaine from Latin America. In order to reduce cocaine production, the United States is actively involved in extradition and bilateral
efforts to control cocaine from source countries. The US approach to drug control, however, sometimes
disregards the sovereignty of other states and international law. Narcotics Certifi cation can develop
negative responses from Latin American states because US foreign narcotics policies towards Latin America have been insensitive to
sovereignty issues. This can trigger discord, and make bilateral cooperation difficult , even though Latin
American states heavily depend on the United States for economic support.
Overall, cocaine traffi cking to the United State has been perceived as a threat, which directly and indirectly affected the economic
and public order of its domain. The War on Drugs is supposed to protect America from danger, but ironically, it
creates more danger to the society and eventually to the state. Fierce law enforcement practices have
brought more violence than the cocaine trade originally did, and restricted the liberty of citizens in the name of protection and
justice. Furthermore, aggressive and coercive drug control policy towards Latin America has been making co-operation with other
states more difficult.
The alternative is to reject the affirmative in favor of a cooperative approach
towards drug trafficking --- failure to engage with the “other” turns the case
Fukumi, 8 (Sayaka, PhD student in International Relations at the University of Nottingham,
Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America, Ashgate Publishing Company, pg. 225-226, Tashma)
A Possibility for Multinational Supply Reduction Project
Drug control policies adopted by the EU and the United States have
not achieved their goal to reduce
cocaine production in the Andes, although they are making some progress. The EU’s alternative development
programmes have introduced legal crops to substitute coca cultivation, and strengthened local government. However, it is
questionable whether coca growers give up cultivation when their incomes reach a certain level. Generating income from legal crops
is more difhcult than obtaining an income from cocaine because of` the competition in the market. Therefore, a USAID official
claims that the coca growers continue coca cultivation in order to spread risks. 'S In order to eliminate poverty by altemative crops,
the Andean farmers need protected markets until they become competitive in the global economy. This, however, conflicts with the
interests of EU domestic producers and those who have already been granted trade preference.'° After contributing substantial sums
to development projects, states may refuse further ‘sacrifices’ for Andean states. The weakness of alternative development projects is
the lack of an income guarantee, and the lack of power to impose legal crop cultivation.
On the other hand, US law enforcement operations weaken cocaine trafhcking networks and encourage people to uphold law and
order in the community. Law enforcement has two aims: one is to punish cocaine trafhckers and make seizures of cocaine, and the
other is to deter people from entering the cocaine trade. However, in order to pursue punishment and deterrence, law enforcement
agents and govemment authorities need to be prepared for the risks of`attacks from armed cocaine trafhckers. In addition, law
enforcement operations can show the consequences of becoming involved in cocaine trafhcking to the community, but it does not
provide any alternative way of living, unlike economic projects.
Considering these facts, supply
reduction in the Andean states requires a large programme of wideranging projects that need to be followed in parallel. This is because of the very nature of the cocaine
problem in the Andes. Firstly, coca leaves (but not cocaine) are in the life ofindigenous people, and policies should be supported to
turn the coca leaves into legal products, such as teas.'7 Secondly, the cocaine industry impacts deeply on the economic, political and
social spheres, and has partly grown from the weakness of the govemment authorities. In order to weaken the cocaine industry, a
drug control scheme should tackle two elements simultaneously: one is the cocaine trafficking network and the other is the
strengthening of the govemment. This is the equivalent of balancing law enforcement operations and alternative development
programmes.
However, tackling
multiple problems related to cocaine trafficking in one project is impossible to
achieve by bilateral co-operation due to the costs involved. In order to conduct such an operation, it is
necessary to divide tasks among the capable members of the international community through
multinational co-operation , as the Colombian govemment attempted in Plan Colombia. In this manner, each participant
of the project can pursue its prioritised policy with co-ordination and co-operation with other participants. For example, the EU
conducts altemative development whilst the United States operates law enforcement.
This division of tasks is possible because of various perceptions of threats posed by cocaine
trafficking. Cocaine trafhcking affects the weakest point of each state, and every state experiences the impact in various
degrees.'8 Therefore, the elements each actor regards as threats and problems posed by cocaine trafficking
are equally important to the control of the flow of cocaine. The analysis of EU and US drug control policy leads
to the fact that these actors employ solutions that they can operate most comfortably. In other words, participants playing to
their strengths in a co-ordinated manner can achieve a common goal to reduce cocaine
production.
The difficulty in multinational co-operation against cocaine trafficking is that each participant has a different perception of the
threat posed by cocaine trafficking. Therefore, they may not agree to co-operate with each other, as was the case with the EU and the
United States in Plan Colombia. A drug control programme consisting of various components to cover several aspects ofthe problem
may be possible because of the various ways actors securitise cocaine trafficking. But, such programmes are difficult to realise
because ofthe differences in how the actors see the threat. The actors can refuse to co-operate because they do not share the other
side’s understanding of cocaine trafhcking. If the participants of a multinational drug control co-
operation could commit themselves to controlling drugs and accept working with those who
have different points of view, a project like Plan Colombia might work.
Epistemology – 2NC
Their epistemology is flawed --- the benefits of War on Drugs constitute a
hyperbolic ruse perpetuated by the government --- drug trade is only violent
because it’s a reaction to the War on Drugs and health effects have been overstated
Fukumi, 8 (Sayaka, PhD student in International Relations at the University of Nottingham,
Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America, Ashgate Publishing Company, pg. 90-94, Tashma)
Crime and Violence related to Cocaine
The use of violence by traffickers and dealers is a common feature in the cocaine trade. However, some argue that violence
in
cocaine trafficking is not as high as it is reported by the media. Brownstein maintains that cocainerelated violence is a social construction of politicians, policy-makers and law enforcers through
the media in order to promote a drug scare and to encourage public support for the expansion of
law enforcement and the contraction of civil liberties.87 Also, Zimring and Hawkins maintain that the cocaine
trade may play a substantial role in predatory crime in the United States, yet there is not enough evidence to prove causality.88
Violence seems to play a significant role in the cocaine trade, although some facts reported
by
the government could have been exaggerated. MacCoun and Reuter identify the potential causes of violence
at drug scenes, particularly crack and cocaine, as: the youthfulness of participants; the value of the drugs themselves; the intensity of
law enforcement; and the indirect consequence of drug use.89 For the dealers and traffi ckers, violence is a necessary means to
protect their business because of its illegal nature.90
In respect to the use of violence in the cocaine trade, according to Goldstein et al, between 1984 and 1988 drug and alcohol-related
homicides increased by 11%.91 Among the homicide cases, systemic homicides tripled in 1988 in comparison to 1984, and 88% were
related to either cocaine or crack dealings.92 The increase of systemic homicides related to the cocaine trade could result from the
expansion of the cocaine market as well as the Colombian distribution networks. At the higher levels of the cocaine distribution
system, the cell managers of the Colombian cartels apply violence as punishment and as warnings. Fuentes believes that: ‘A
respected manager with the effective use of violence tends to have less betrayal by both customers and workers.’93 For the cell
managers, violence is a tool to keep order and enforce the rules to operate their transaction successfully.
The individual dealers at the lower levels of the cocaine distribution system use violence in the same manner to ensure payment
from customers and to protect their own turf. At the street level dealings of cocaine, dealers purchase the drug on either a ‘cash’ or
‘consignment’ basis through their own networks.94 Making deals in this manner often is a cause of violent disputes over the
payment because the customers fail to return with the rest of the payment by the agreed date. This kind of operation through loose
individual connections with weak hierarchical structures is known as the ‘freelance model’.95 Curtis and Wendel describe the
characteristics of cocaine dealing in this manner as:
Freelancing tends to be the most visible, disruptive, and violent form of market organization. Socially bonded organizations are
based on social ties, such as kinship, ethnicity, and neighborhood. They are held together by personal relationships, are often
discreet about their sales practices (for example, they tend not to advertise drugs openly in the street), and are often less violent and
disruptive to their communities than are other types of drug-dealing organizations.96
The lack of ties between individual dealers and the community to which they belong made them indifferent to others, and apply
violence frequently. Therefore, Goldstein concludes that homicides in the drug scene are more likely to be a result of ‘illicit drug
market disputes rather than psychopharmacological effects of crack’.97
Turning to the relationship between law enforcers and some local communities, there are conflicts
between them, particularly within inner-cities. This is because the local people have felt abused
by the law enforcers. It relates to the anti-loitering laws that give the law enforcement agents the right
to arrest suspected drugrelated offenders based solely on profiles. Impressions from the profi les can be
largely infl uenced by personal beliefs and values. As Glasser and Siegel point out, this operation contains the danger of
twisting the facts with prejudice residing in officials.98 It creates the risks of cocaine related arrests being the
result of prejudice in the law enforcement agents.99
For example, since there is a perception that
the cocaine trade is largely controlled by the Hispanic
and black population, there is prejudice against these minority groups. The prejudice has shaped
particular trends that do not fi t the profi le of American cocaine use. The controversy in the trends is that the majority of cocaine
users are white middle-class suburbanites and the majority of cocaine arrests are unemployed black males.100 Due to such prejudice
in the law enforcers, in some inner cities, such as Baltimore, more than 50% of the black male population between the ages of 18 and
35 were imprisoned.101 Furthermore, in 1989, black and Hispanics constitute 92% of all those arrested as drug offenders, although
government statistics show that blacks constitute only 15–20% of US drug users.102
Arrest without warrant based on police suspicion of cocaine dealing may be effective to capture
people, but at the same time, it can increase distrust of law enforcement enforcers. Such
sentiment can increase hostility toward law enforcers. McCoun and Reuter argue that the dispute between the
communities and law enforcers is evident because the ways in which some police officers treat cocaine
offenders were so inhumane that conflict between inner-city citizens and the police emerged.103
It is likely that the cocaine scene is associated with violence by the traffi ckers to protect their deals, although the frequency and level
of violence could vary. McKenan reports that hostility
and violence against the police is so fierce that no
police officers can enter some areas.104 Following the absence of offi cial law enforcement mechanisms, the areas tend
to be ruled by the drug traffi ckers. Under such circumstances, there are possibilities that bystanders will be the
victims of shootings between cocaine traffickers.105
Although there are cases of violence in some areas, it usually targets particular people, such as traitors to the traffi cking
organisations, and politicians and law enforcers acting against traffi ckers’ interests. The possibility of cocaine users
getting involved in violent crime, such as homicide, is low , but usually they are more likely to be involved in property
crime and theft in order to obtain fi nancial resources to use drugs.106 The neighbourhood of the areas with large numbers of
cocaine users suffer from higher rates of petty crime, such as burglary and theft. The police are reluctant to answer non-drug related
cases when they are called. As a consequence, statistics released by the Los Angeles Times state that ‘only about 47% of all slayings
from 1990 and 1994 were even prosecuted in Los Angeles County, compared with about 80% in the late 1960s.’107 This approach
appears to be over emphasising the drug related cases and neglecting other criminal cases.
In addition to the insecurity arising from the increase of violence associated with cocaine traffi cking, the government has been
seriously concerned about the harm to health posed by the use of cocaine. The number of cocaine users peaked in the 1990s, and
then started to decline.108 Following the trend of decline, according to reports from the DEA and ONDCP, the statistics indicate that
cocaine users (including both heavy and casual) remain about 2.4% of the total population.109 The health problems related to the
cocaine trade are more likely to be caused by the related activities of the cocaine addicts, such as prostitution. Therefore, the high
HIV positive rates among US cocaine users have been regarded as a consequence of needle sharing since other developed countries
in which the government offers harm reduction programmes110 register lower rates.111Some cocaine addicts tend to engage in
prostitution to support their habit.112 Through these, the cocaine addicts may spread infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and
other sexual diseases to the community. For example, Colorado Springs, which is known for high infection rates of HIV in the
community, has a large number of prostitutes and injecting drug users.113 According to the research by Neaiguset al., the sample of
injecting drug users contained 40% HIV seropositive, a disease that is transmitted by syringe sharing and sexual behaviours.114
These studies indicate that the existence of a large community (network) can trigger the rapid spread of HIV.
There are also dangers to health associated with cocaine use. However, the harm of actual cocaine use (such as instant
addiction and death), according to Baum, has been exaggerated by the government.115 There are certainly health
problems caused by the frequent use of cocaine. Those consuming cocaine excessively over long periods of time may experience
paranoia, hallucinations and physical damages, and also tend to become aggressive.116 Cocaine
is not a physically addictive
substance like opium, and normally death is caused by an overdose. The media has sensationalised
information related to cocaine and crack by showing ‘crack babies’ being ‘addicted’ to cocaine in their
mother’s womb.117 In reality, the infl uence of cocaine on unborn babies has yet to be proved.
Uniqueness – 2NC
We don’t have to win the alternative or framework --- the War on Drugs is
inherently unsustainable --- it’ll decline absent the plan
Fukumi, 8 (Sayaka, PhD student in International Relations at the University of Nottingham,
Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America, Ashgate Publishing Company, pg. 174-175, Tashma)
Also, the US war on drugs increased the dependency of Andean states on the US with
certification, threatening the continuation of US aid. As Gerber and Jensen maintain: ‘Drug control
policy is simply another area in which the United States tries to force other nations to adopt its
ideology.’23" Hostile reactions from some concerned states and the increased tension between the Latin
American states and the United States stemmed from the coercive manner of the United States to
pursue its interests.235
It is said that the United States has transferred the costs of war on drugs to the producer side foreseeing social disruption and
political and economic pressures at home.236 The intention of the United States, however, is not as it appears
the rest of the world. The Americans believe they are pursuing their policy not only for their own
interests, but also for others interests.2" The impression that the United States is coercive may come from the use of
to
certification and sanctions as well as the way in which the United States handles the execution of policies. According to Bagley,
‘One of the most glaring deficiencies of the US strategy is the tendency toward nonconsultative,
unilateral decision-making in bilateral or multilateral affairsfm The United States aims at its policy without
any concern or warning to the host governments, particularly ‘during electoral campaigns or
after dramatic incidents’.239
Security Link – 2NC
Their discourse is tainted with a flawed securitizing mindset --- they conceptualize
drugs as a threat that must be eradicated
Fukumi, 8 (Sayaka, PhD student in International Relations at the University of Nottingham,
Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America, Ashgate Publishing Company, pg. 222-223, Tashma)
The United States: A National Security Threat and Law Enforcement
In the United States, cocaine trafficking is treated as a foreign threat that undermines the
economy and the country’s moral values. From the US perspective, cocaine trafficking is a
national security threat from Latin America that affects its values and identity. Cocaine is perceived as
a foreign enemy invading the United States. In addition, the US distrusts the ability of Andean countries to control
drugs and this has partlyjustified its interventionist approach. For the United States, it could be said that cocaine trafficking is a
hybrid of traditional and non—traditional security threats because cocaine trafficking affects both its identity and the quality of its
functions as a state, but it is a harm caused by a foreign enemy. In this sense, supply reduction for the United States is
equal to waging a war against Latin American cocaine cartels. The difference between the EU and US perceptions
of cocaine trafficking is that the US emphasises the foreign origin of cocaine whilst the EU emphasises domestic consumption of
cocaine.
The US regards cocaine as a social ‘evil’ that harms the nation."‘ Cocaine spreads sexual diseases, such as
HIV/AIDS, it costs the US economy an estimated $100 billion and affects the social fabric and America’s moral values. Americans
have a zero-tolerance attitude to the harm cocaine causes in their community." Drug traffickers and addicts are referred to as
‘enemies’ in the war on drugs, and need to be captured and punished. The war on drugs targets ethnic minorities, particularly black
people who use crack and Hispanics who deal in crack cocaine. The US is concerned about traffickers bringing cocaine into its
territory, as well as the instability of the Andean region caused by narco-dollars. The Andean region is regarded as particularly
vulnerable to the spread of insurgency conflicts from one country to another. The US is concerned because of its proximity,
dominance in the region, and close relationships with many Latin American states.‘2
In the war on drugs, the way the United States protects its homeland is to try to prevent the
‘enemy’ entering its territory. This is the concept behind supply reduction by eradicating coca fields and the interdiction
of cocaine supply. The capitalist economy is based on the interactions of supply and demand. However, the United States has taken
the view that if there were no supply there would be no demand. This reverses the idea of capitalism: which holds that where there is
demand, supply will arise to meet it. Therefore, the US government has emphasized law enforcement operations and supply
reduction in the source countries." Law enforcement operations are executed with expanded authority, and less attention than
Europe pays to human rights. This is because human rights and sovereignty of Andean states are a secondary concem for the United
States in a ‘war situation’. Coca bushes were eradicated in the Andean countries and cocaine was interdicted in the transit states,
both measures were intended to reduce the cocaine reaching US territory.
K Stuff
The War on Drugs is often framed as a quest to protect morality --- that is a ruse
perpetuated by the government --- it sustains extreme losses of civil liberties
Fukumi, 8 (Sayaka, PhD student in International Relations at the University of Nottingham,
Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America, Ashgate Publishing Company, pg. 94-97, Tashma)
The Limitation of Civil Liberties
The United States has a reputation
for widely accepted civil liberties and protected civil rights.
However, Americans have much less personal autonomy in comparison to during the period
before the War on Drugs.118 The war on drugs is regarded as a means to protect American values
and morals.119 This is because the cocaine situation in the late 1980s was regarded as an opportunity for institutionalising the
judgements and tactics through public support during the 1990s. The cocaine epidemic in the 1980s was driven by the fear of
disruption to the American social structure by the mass fl ow and use of cocaine.120 Politicians kept appealing to citizens to preserve
morals and values in American society, and made them believe that tolerance to cocaine, such as legalisation, is equal to the
‘advocacy of international narco-terrorism’.121 The government claimed to be committed to ‘America’s moral regeneration’.122
The willingness of the US to limit its own freedoms for the sake of drug control appeared to be a
consequence of the claim by the government: ‘[Americans] should be extremely reluctant to restrict [drug enforcement offi cers]
within formal and arbitrary lines.’123 At the height of the War on Drugs, Americans were willing to
sacrifice their own civil liberties. Opinion polls revealed that they even approved of extreme
measures , such as: giving up some freedoms (62%), using the military to control the domestic drug trade (82%), letting police
search homes of suspected drug dealers without a warrant (52%), and reporting drug users to the police (83%).124 Not only the
public but also the Supreme Court is supportive of limiting civil rights in exchange for fighting the
war on drugs. The Supreme Court ruled that ‘government agencies can evict tenants in public
housing even when the resident is unaware that a visiting family member or relative is using drugs’.125
Zimring and Hawkins claim that: ‘Public support for extreme governmental responses to drugs is higher
than for authoritarian countermeasures to any other social problem.’126 It is considered that ‘Americans
have opposed drug use and feared drug experiences because they seemed to threaten a generally accepted set of values and
aspirations that dated from the beginnings of the national experience.’127
The restrictions on freedom for the fight against drugs are understood: as drugs
forced the United States ‘to strike a
new balance between order and individual liberties.’128 To some extent, the end has come to justify the means in
the War on Drugs. The beginning of America’s sacrifi ce of civil rights was marked by an executive order for urine-tests to be
conducted on all civilian federal workers to ensure they were not drug users.129 Some private companies followed the government
direction, and requested their employees take the test. Although the urine test was eventually withdrawn from the drug control
policy, it seemed that there was little opposition to such a test among Americans. As a consequence, drug testing of students
has been operated consistently, and Supreme Court Justice A.M. Kennedy did not accept the challenge of a high school
student against urine testing in 2002.130
In respect to legislation, the punishments for cocaine and crack offences are decided by the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.131 These laws impose mandatory minimum
imprisonment 132 on the offenders and prohibit parole.133 At trial, according to Sterling, the President of Criminal Justice
Policy Foundation, it is unnecessary for the police, federal agents, and prosecutors to present hard
evidence against a suspect for prosecution.134 The testimony of ‘co-operating individuals’, the ‘snitch’, against the
suspect will be enough to convict.135 The only way for drug offenders to receive a reduced sentence is to assist the government as an
informant.136 Considering the desperation of the convict to minimise the sentence, the information provided to the government
could be unreliable. Gray maintains that: ‘[the] War on Drugs has made [the United States] and its institutions so desperate that our
judgement and our reason have been seriously clouded.’137
The war on drugs and the claim of moral regeneration brings the risk of tighter government control on individuals, the
loss of civil liberties, and injustice under the uniform mandatory minimum sentencing. The information
provided through such policies could lead to limited understanding of the cocaine trade and the nature of substances.
Decision rule – reject every instance
Petro 74 (Sylvester, Professor of Law at NYU, Toledo Law Review, Spring, p. 480,
http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200304/0783.html)
However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway - "I believe in only one thing: liberty." And it is always well to bear in mind
David Hume's observation: "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." Thus, it is unacceptable
to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no importance because there have been
invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all
human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Dijas. In sum, if one believed in freedom as a supreme
value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and
material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with
undying spirit.
The war on drugs is patriarchal, violent, essentialist, racist, capitalist, and
biopolitical
Luff, 92 – board member of Marylanders for Drug Policy Reform, has served as an ACLU panel attorney in
challenging First Amendment violations in drug / alcohol treatment programs (Ellen, “The Drug War and
Patriarchy,” Off Our Backs, Vol. 22 No. 6, June 1992 http://www.jstor.org/stable/20834097)//BI
The War on Drugs bears all the hallmarks of the patriarchy: it relies primarily on force (arrest and
incarceration) as a means of social control; it
promotes violence and death; it takes as complex social
problem and scapegoats one group (drug users and sellers); it prefers fear to compassion; it is racist
and classist in its application; it has the effect of promoting processed, manufactured products
which are the result of a corporate industry (prescription tranquilizers, alcohol, cigarettes) over low tech natural
products which could be the product of decentralized production (marijuana); and it is increasing the control and
surveillance of the state over its citizens. By means of propaganda and force, the War on Drugs has
reshaped peoples' perception of reality and diverted economic and psychic resources away from
constructive solutions to social problems. And the War is proceeding and escalating virtually unchallenged in the political
arena. The Drug War has even enlisted the help of many well-meaning women who, sub scribing to the Drug War's premise that
drug use is the principle cause of many of society's problems, genuinely believe that all drug use must be stamped out at all costs.
After all: it is a war.
The war on drugs is part of the “disaster capitalism complex” whereby war
becomes a business and those conducting it have a vested interest in its
perpetuation
Schack, 11 – Assistant Professor, Department of Journalism at Ithaca College, PhD in Media Studies from the
University of Colorado (Todd, “Twenty-first-century drug warriors: the press, privateers and the for-profit
waging of the war on drugs,” Media, War & Conflict, Vol. 4 No. 2, pg. 142-161, August 2011, Sage Journals)//BI
The fact that there has been a radical, concerted effort to privatize various aspects of war-making is
both widely reported and accepted, especially since the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Avant, 2007; Klein, 2007; Scahill, 2007b; Singer,
2003). The names of private military firms (PMFs) like Halliburton, KBR (Kellog, Brown and Root) and private
security contractors (PSCs) such as Blackwater (recently renamed Xe) and DynCorp, have entered common
parlance, and the public has grown accustomed to hearing about fraudulent expenditures and graft, abuses of power, and even
violent criminal acts, such as the Nissour Square incident in which 17 unarmed Iraqi civilians were killed by Blackwater security
contractors. The cultural saturation of the concept of for-profit war-making is codified by the fact that it has been the subject of a
major Hollywood movie, Joshua Seftel’s War, Inc. (2008). The political economy of this concept has best been outlined by Naomi
Klein’s The Shock Doctrine (2007), and I will be maintaining that the increased outsourcing of waging the drug war
to PSCs represents
a clear case of what she has termed the ‘disaster capitalism complex’. Similar to Eisenhower’s
disaster capitalism complex is a ‘global
war fought on every level by private companies whose involvement is paid for with public
money, with the unending mandate of protecting the United States homeland in perpetuity while
eliminating all ‘evil’ abroad’ (p. 14). The key notion as it relates to the war on drugs is the fact that the drug war provides
just the sort of perpetual ‘evil’ that fuels the complex. As such, it is an exciting area of opportunity – or in
business parlance, an emerging market – for the PSC industry. Other such emerging markets include the
‘homeland security’ industry, which includes interrogating prisoners, covert intelligence gathering, surveillance and
data mining, and ‘peace-keeping’ missions, not to mention the overall waging of the war on
terror, which has become the best example to date of a nearly fully-privatized war as private contractors outnumber soldiers in
military-industrial complex, yet with ‘much further reaching tentacles’, the
both Iraq and Afghanistan (Avant, 2007; Klein, 2007; Pelton, 2007; Scahill, 2007b; Singer, 2003). Further areas of opportunity are
crisis and environmental disaster response, privatized prisons, fire and police departments. All this has grown to the extent that:
‘Now wars and disaster responses are so fully privatized that they are themselves the new
market; there is no need to wait until after the war for the boom – the medium is the message’ (Klein, 2007: 16). The issue at
stake here is not whether this is occurring – that has long since been established, and one merely has to look into the enormous
growth of PSCs as an industry over the last decade, as well as the rise in government contract expenditures, to understand the
economic extent of the growth in this industry (Avant, 2007; Klein, 2007; Pelton, 2007; Singer, 2003; Wedel, 2009). Rather, with
regard to the war on drugs, at the very moment that the militarized response to the ‘drug
problem’ is being deemed a failure by both governmental and independent bodies worldwide (Government
Accountability Office: GAO, the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy),1 a new private industry is being
contracted to continue that same militarized policy, an industry that is financially self-interested
in perpetuating the problem rather than solving it, and further, one that operates with near total impunity and
unaccountability. As such, the drug war has become a for-profit endeavor, something to invest in, to seek
expansion of both markets and ‘solutions’, and to realize returns for shareholders on those investments. As for
the press, they have a role to play as well: drug wars have long proved profitable to both print and broadcast media, as scholars have
shown for quite some time (Gitlin, 1989; Marez, 2004; Reeves and Campbell, 1994). The media also stand to gain from this new
complex: The creeping expansion of the disaster capitalism complex into media may prove to be a
new kind of corporate synergy, one building on the vertical integration so popular in the nineties. It certainly makes
sound business sense. The more panicked our societies become, convinced that there are terrorists lurking in every
mosque, the higher the news ratings soar. (Klein, 2007: 541) In place of ‘terrorists’ one can easily
substitute ‘drug cartels’ and the point is the same. In fact, this is invoking classic moral panic theory, which plays a critical
role in the media’s framing of the issue, and is discussed in section IV. Overall, I am interested in investigating four main issues: the
extent of drug war privatization; the structural limitations of media investigations into PSCs; the complicity of the press with drug
war narratives; and finally the implications of re-conceptualizing the drug war as a for-profit endeavor.
The US uses the war on drugs as an excuse to expand military presence in Latin
America to enforce unpopular neoliberal reforms
Mercille, 11 – lecturer in the School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Policy at Univeristy College
Dublin, PhD from UCLA (Julien, “Violent Narco-Cartels or US Hegemony? The political economyof the ‘war on
drugs’ in Mexico,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 32 No. 9, 2011, pp 1637–1653, Taylor & Francis Online)//BI
But Washington has for decades prioritised the expansion of its hegemony in Latin America—a task
which has often involved military force to keep opposition groups under control—over fighting
corruption or defending human rights. As a Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) report reviewing trends in
US military programmes with the continent concluded: ‘Too often in Latin America, when armies have focused on an internal
enemy, the definition of enemies has included political opponents of the regime in power, even those working within the political
system such as activists, independent journalists, labor organizers, or opposition politicalparty leaders’.28 The war on drugs—
just like the ‘war on terror’—has
served as one pretext to deepen bilateral military relations with Latin
American countries and has proved useful to contain popular opposition to neoliberal reforms.
The White House’s Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has stated that one success of the drugs war was that the US and
Mexico ‘went from a ‘‘virtually non-existent’’ military-to-military relationship to the formation of a bilateral military working group’.
And as two experienced analysts have noted, ‘The US military took advantage of the counterdrug mission to promote closer relations
with the Mexican military’.29 As narco-corruption increased from the 1980s onwards, the Pentagon and the
CIA often looked the other way and solidified their links with the Mexican military, as in 1986, when
President Reagan called for the militarisation of the drugs war in both Mexico and the US. Indeed, between 1981 and 1995,
1488 Mexicans went to US military academies, with over 2000 Grupos Aeromóviles de Fuerzas Especiales (air-mobile special
forces— GAFEs) doing so in 1997–98. The GAFEs were supervised by the Pentagon to attack drug traffickers,
but eventually some of their members joined the Zetas cartel—an example of the negative unintended
consequences of militarising the drug war. The US priority was to assert its hegemony over
Mexico, which since the 1980s has meant implementing neoliberal reforms. As such, Phil Jordan, the head of
the DEA’s Dallas office from 1984 to 1994, has said that ‘the intelligence on corruption, especially by drug traffickers, has always
been there [but] we were under instructions not to say anything negative about Mexico. It was a no-no since NAFTA was a hot
political football.’30 Over the past decade the US–Mexico military bilateral relationship has been
preserved and upgraded, first through the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) (discussed by
officials from 2005 to 2009 but never formally implemented) and then through the Mérida Initiative, the programme
that has been in place since 2008 and has delivered $1.5 billion to Mexico. The bulk of it is dedicated to training and equipping
military and police forces officially involved in counter-drug operations. In March 2010 the US State Department released a ‘Beyond
Mérida’ strategy, which essentially continues the Mérida Initiative. For example, 26 armoured vehicles were delivered to Mexico,
seven Bell helicopters valued at $88 million have been provided to the Mexican Army and three UH-60 helicopters valued at $76.5
million have been delivered to the Federal Police. The fact that much equipment is bought from US weapons
makers keeps the military–industrial complex humming, and the Mérida Initiative can be rightly seen as a gift
to the US arms industry.31 Although often justified as ‘fight[ing] criminal organizations . . . disrupt[ing] drugtrafficking . . . weapons trafficking, illicit financial activities and currency smuggling, and human trafficking’ these claims do
not stand up to scrutiny.32 As will be seen below, the Mexican military has a bleak human rights record, weapons
trafficking and money laundering has never been regulated seriously by the US and drug trafficking has actually
increased in Mexico over the past three decades, just like migratory flows across the border. Rather, following a
historical pattern, Washington has built links with the Mexican military to protect its hegemonic
projects, most recently NAFTA and neoliberal reforms. This was in fact candidly stated by Thomas Shannon, the US assistant
secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs, in a 2008 speech explaining the importance of the Mérida Initiative. He said
NAFTA needed to be implemented in a way that ‘creates a space for economic reform to take root’ over ‘this $15 trillion economy’
comprised of Mexico, the US and Canada, and he specified that the SPP, on which the Mérida Initiative builds, ‘understands North
America as a shared economic space and that as a shared economic space we need to protect it . . . To a certain extent, we’re
armoring NAFTA’.33 More recently, the New York Times reported that US intervention in Mexico is not letting up: ‘American
Predator and Global Hawk drones now fly deep over Mexico to capture video of drug production facilities and smuggling routes.
Manned American aircraft fly over Mexican targets to eavesdrop on cellphone communications. And the DEA has set up an
intelligence outpost—staffed by Central Intelligence Agency operatives and retired American military personnel—on a Mexican
military base.’34 It is understandable that NAFTA and neoliberal reforms need to be protected by force if
necessary, because they have caused much popular resentment, being geared towards meeting
elites’ interests. As Jorge Castañeda wrote in 1995, shortly before he was to become Mexico’s foreign secretary under Vicente
Fox, NAFTA was ‘an accord among magnates and potentates: an agreement for the rich and powerful in the United States, Mexico
and Canada, an agreement effectively excluding ordinary people in all three societies’.35
The drug war has historically been used to cover ulterior motives, justifying the
repression of marginalized groups
Mercille, 11 – lecturer in the School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Policy at Univeristy College
Dublin, PhD from UCLA (Julien, “Violent Narco-Cartels or US Hegemony? The political economyof the ‘war on
drugs’ in Mexico,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 32 No. 9, 2011, pp 1637–1653, Taylor & Francis Online)//BI
As outlined early on by now declassified national security planning documents, US objectives in Latin America
throughout the post-World War II period have
revolved around ensuring ‘Adequate production in Latin America of, and
access by the United States to, raw materials essential to US security’, which in Mexico’s case applies particularly
to its vast oil reserves. Another goal is the ‘standardization of Latin American military organization ,
training, doctrine and equipment along US lines’, which has been accomplished through numerous training and security assistance
programs with Mexico. Moreover, Latin American countries should be encouraged ‘to base their
economies on a system of private enterprise and, as essential thereto, to create a political and economic climate
conducive to private investment, of both domestic and foreign capital, including . . . opportunity to earn and in the case of foreign
capital to repatriate a reasonable return’.15 It is argued that it is these objectives which have shaped US policy
towards Mexico, not a desire to address drug problems. Conversely, the drugs war has
repeatedly been used as a pretext for intervention in support of these fundamental goals.
Whereas mainstream analyses depict a Mexican state infiltrated by drug traffickers, in fact the
Mexican state has historically set the rules of the game in drug trafficking, while receiving strong support
from the US. During its seven decades in power the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), until it lost power to the Partido
Acció n Nacional (PAN) in 2000, oversaw an informal system whereby every relevant actor, from the military,
police, traffickers and local and national political officials, took a cut from drug trafficking.16 Narco-violence was
kept to relatively low levels and every group had an incentive to conduct it’s business in a relatively
predictable and stable manner. Mexico’s Federal Security Directorate (DFS) was partially responsible for anti-drugs policy, but
it was itself involved in the narcotics trade, a fact well known to the US. But Washington closed its eyes on this and to repeated
electoral fraud that kept the PRI in power because the Mexican government and DFS were anti-communist allies during the Cold
War. Today, as will be seen below, the state does not preside over a smoothly regulated drugs trade
anymore—hence the violence—but significant sectors of the Mexican government and security forces are still associated
with it.17 When political groups could not be co-opted by the PRI, it sometimes resorted to violent
repression, which it sometimes justified by a purported concern to fight drugs—obviously a pretext since the
Mexican state itself was regulating the drugs traffic nationally. For example, from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the Mexican
military, police and intelligence services— backed by the US—waged a ‘dirty war’ on dissidents and leftist guerrillas. The Mexican
military was responsible for the majority of abuses committed during that time, ‘including the torture and enforced disappearance of
hundreds of civilians’.18 The 1970s saw increased rural and labour militancy—there were at least 300 strikes in 1977—as a result of
deteriorating economic conditions and a budgetary programme of austerity. The agricultural sector was barely growing, pushing
many desperate campesinos to seize haciendas, execute local caciques (strongmen), migrate to the cities or the US, or become drugs
entrepreneurs. At the same time Mexico increased the intensity of its war on drugs in 1975, when it decided to
eradicate opium and marijuana fields with herbicides and to conduct anti-drugs military operations. Operation
Condor, the
core of the campaign, sent 7000 soldiers, aided by 226 DEA advisers, to the northern states of
Durango, Chihuahua and Sinaloa—a region faced with poverty and which had been the scene of many militant peasant
land occupations for two years.19 Officially operations targeted narcotics, but the fact that not a single big drug
trafficker was arrested, while hundreds of peasants were arrested, tortured and jailed, led some
contemporary analysts to conclude that Mexico’s military and counternarcotics campaigns in the
countryside should have been more accurately described as a war against peasants, marginalised
groups and the (real or imagined) guerrillas of the sierras rather than against drug trafficking— setting a precedent for
the current situation.20
Mex – Biodiversity
War on drugs releases chemicals that threaten biodiversity unique to Latin
America, which are crucial to global balance
Rolles et al, 12 a writer for the Guardian, Martin is Head of Campaigns and Communications
at Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Danny Kushlick is a British political activist and founder
of the Transform Drug Policy Foundation. Jane Slater is Head of Operations and Fundraising at
Transform Drug Policy Foundation (Steve, George Murkin, Martin Powell, Danny Kushlick, Jane Slater 26 June 2012
“The Alternative World Drug Report: Counting the Costs of the War on Drugs”
http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/AWDR.pdf) // czhang
The environmental costs of ¶ the war on drugs¶ 1. How chemical eradications threaten ¶ biodiversity¶ Concerns
over human and environmental health have ¶ led Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and Thailand to all ban the ¶ use of chemical agents in
eradication efforts. But despite ¶ these concerns, the world’s second most biodiverse ¶ country, Colombia, still
permits aerial fumigations ¶ of drug crops using a chemical mixture primarily ¶ consisting of the herbicide glyphosate.¶ RoundupTM:
Colombia’s “poison rain”¶ Roundup is a commercial glyphosate-based herbicide, ¶ and is the main component of the mixture used ¶
in Colombia’s US-funded fumigation programme. ¶ Glyphosate is a non-selective herbicide, meaning any ¶
plant exposed to a sufficient amount of the chemical¶ will be killed. In the mixture sprayed in Colombia, the
toxicity of glyphosate is enhanced by the inclusion of ¶ a surfactant, an additive that enables it to penetrate ¶ further through leaves,
increasing its lethality.¶ The particular surfactant used in Colombia is not ¶ approved for use in the US
¶
and its ingredients are ¶ considered trade secrets,6 rendering
any independent ¶ evaluation of its effects all the
more difficult to conduct.¶ The destruction of plant life¶ The spraying of a herbicide designed to kill flora ¶ indiscriminately,
across millions of acres of land, is ¶ concerning no matter what country it takes place in. ¶ But in this case it is especially
alarming, given Colombia’s ¶ approximately 55,000 species of plants, a third of which ¶ are
unique to the country.¶ The imprecise nature of aerial spraying maximises this ¶ threat to
biodiversity, because rather than being applied ¶ directly, from close range (as instructions for the use of ¶ herbicides state),
herbicides are sprayed from planes. ¶ This increases the likelihood of the wrong field being ¶
sprayed due to human error, and in windy conditions ¶ causes herbicide to be blown over non-target
areas. ¶ Consequently, drug crop eradications often wipe out licit ¶ crops, forests and rare plants.¶ In
addition to the short-term loss of vegetation they ¶ cause, aerial fumigations can have a more long-lasting ¶ impact on plant life.
The Amazon has a fragile soil ¶ ecosystem, and farmers report that areas which have ¶ been
repeatedly fumigated are either less productive or ¶ yield crops that fail to mature fully.9¶ The
contamination of national parks ¶ The inadvertent environmental damage caused by ¶ chemical eradications is exacerbated by the
proximity ¶ of a number of Colombia’s national parks to illicit coca ¶ plantations. In effect, this means that some of the areas
¶
most frequently targeted by aerial fumigations are also ¶ among the country’s most biodiverse
and ecologically ¶ irreplaceable.10 As more than 17 million people depend ¶ on the fresh water that
flows from these protected ¶ areas,11 this undoubtedly represents a threat to human ¶ health. It
also further threatens Colombia’s more than ¶ 200 endangered species of amphibians that live in
these ¶ aquatic environments and are particularly sensitive to ¶ herbicides such as Roundup.12¶ The danger to animal
health¶ While the US State Department denies the chemical ¶ agents used in Colombia have any severe effects on ¶ fauna, evidence
suggests that animal health can be ¶ seriously impacted by their use. Cattle have lost hair ¶ after eating
fumigated pastures, and chickens
and ¶ fish have been killed as a result of drinking water ¶
contaminated with the fumigation spray.13¶ More significantly, by eradicating large areas of ¶ vegetation, aerial fumigations
destroy many animals’ ¶ habitats and deprive them of essential food sources. ¶ With numerous bird, animal and insect
species unique to ¶ Colombia, this poses a real risk of triggering extinctions, ¶ particularly given the wider
pressure on natural habitats ¶ in the region.
Destroys Latin American ecosystems
Rolles et al, 12 a writer for the Guardian, Martin is Head of Campaigns and Communications
at Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Danny Kushlick is a British political activist and founder
of the Transform Drug Policy Foundation. Jane Slater is Head of Operations and Fundraising at
Transform Drug Policy Foundation (Steve, George Murkin, Martin Powell, Danny Kushlick, Jane Slater 26 June 2012
“The Alternative World Drug Report: Counting the Costs of the War on Drugs”
http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/AWDR.pdf) // czhang
2. Deforestation¶ While eradications
necessarily cause localized ¶ deforestation in the areas in which they are
also have a multiplier effect, because once an area ¶ has been chemically or manually eradicated,
drug crop ¶ producers simply deforest new areas for cultivation. ¶ And in their search for new growing sites,
producers ¶ move into increasingly remote or secluded locations as ¶ a means of evading
eradication efforts. Exacerbating ¶ the environmental cost of this balloon effect, they ¶ therefore often target national
parks or other protected, ¶ ecologically significant areas where fumigation is ¶ banned.¶ Mexico’s
Sierra Madre Occidental mountain range, for ¶ instance, is one of the most ecologically diverse
regions ¶ in North America, yet is also now one of the most prolific ¶ opium and cannabis
producing regions in the world. ¶ The displacement of drug producers to this area has ¶ fuelled widespread deforestation,
conducted, ¶ they
jeopardising the 200 ¶ species of oak tree and the habitats of numerous rare ¶ bird species – such as the thick-billed parrot – found
in ¶ the region.¶ Such deforestation is not limited to the area cultivated ¶ for illicit crops. Rather, in addition to this land, drug ¶
producers also clear forest for subsistence crops, cattle ¶ pastures, housing, transport routes and
in some cases, ¶ for airstrips. As a result of this, several acres of forest are ¶ often clear-cut to produce just one acre of drug
crop.¶ • In 2008 the UN reported that, for the fourth ¶ consecutive year, the Alto Huallaga region of Peru – ¶ which is
located in tropical and subtropical forests – ¶ was the country’s largest coca cultivating area21¶ •
The growing of opium poppy in countries such as ¶ Thailand and Myanmar depletes thin forest
soils ¶ and their nutrients so quickly that slash-and-burn ¶ growers, after harvesting as few as two or three ¶
crop cycles, clear new forest plots. The cumulative ¶ effect of this has compounded the environmental ¶ destruction
taking place in the Golden Triangle ¶ region22¶ • Significant areas of US national parks in California, ¶ Texas and
Arkansas have been taken over by ¶ Mexican drug cartels growing cannabis23¶ 3. Pollution from
unregulated, illicit drug ¶ production methods¶ Responsibility for the production of potentially ¶ dangerous substances has defaulted
to unscrupulous ¶ criminal profiteers. One of the many negative ¶ consequences of this is the creation of an unregulated ¶
system of chemically processing drug crops (primarily ¶ coca and opium, into cocaine and heroin). ¶ To avoid
unnecessary costs and contact with authorities, ¶ drug producers must dispose of waste chemicals¶ secretively,
which in many cases means pouring ¶ toxic waste into waterways or onto the ground. This ¶ leads
to soil degradation, destruction of vegetation, ¶ contamination of water sources and loss of
aquatic life.¶ The production of the synthetic stimulant ¶ methamphetamine is also notorious for the ¶
environmental harm it causes, due to the large number ¶ of dangerous chemicals used in its
manufacture,28 ¶ which include sulphuric acid, ether, toluene, anhydrous ¶ ammonia and acetone.¶ As a
result, the production of one kilo of ¶ methamphetamine can yield five or six kilos of toxic ¶ waste, which
is sometimes dumped directly into water ¶ wells, contaminating domestic water and farm
irrigation ¶ systems in the US.29¶ The environmental consequences of improper chemical ¶
disposal are arguably more pronounced in South ¶ American countries, where this waste is
deposited in ¶ the jungles and forests used by drug producers to hide ¶ their operations from law enforcement and
eradication ¶ attempts.¶ • In Colombia, cocaine producers discard more than ¶ 370,000 tons of
chemicals into the environment ¶ every year30¶ • Thousands of tons of chemical waste are
dumped ¶ into the rivers located in the Peruvian Amazon ¶ region annually31
Mex - Economy
War on Drugs hurts Mexico’s economy
Chase, 12 (Colonel David Chase of the US Army, graduated from the Army War College, in charge of strategy research on the
Southern border; “Military Police: Assisting in Securing the United States Southern Border”; 12/3/12; http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA561048) KD
The effects of the violence on Mexican society are widespread and serious. One of the more serious problems is the
negative effect on the Mexican economy. Violence along the border creates instability which has
a direct economic impact to Mexico not only through the cost of trying to fight DTOs but also the loss
of potential industry and jobs along the border and direct investment to grow industry. According to the
investment firm Bulltick Capital Markets, between 2006 and 2011 the war against drugs has cost Mexico 120
billion dollars in security spending and lost investments.10 DTOs are also using violence against Mexican
industry. As an example the state-owned petroleum company, Pemex has reportedly been a repeated target of kidnappings and
theft by DTOs.11 Despite these problems the Mexican economy actually grew by 5.1% in 2011 and there has not been a flood of
companies fleeing Mexico for safety reasons. However, security is a significant concern. Most experts who are monitoring the
Mexican economy are seeing no immediate signs that large companies are going to pull out of Mexico. However some
investments have been put on hold and prior to investing in Mexico many companies are
looking harder and harder at their exposure to risk.12
War on drugs is disastrous for Mexican long term economic growth and trades off
with international poverty and humanitarian aid
Rolles et al, 12 a writer for the Guardian, Martin is Head of Campaigns and Communications
at Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Danny Kushlick is a British political activist and founder
of the Transform Drug Policy Foundation. Jane Slater is Head of Operations and Fundraising at
Transform Drug Policy Foundation (Steve, George Murkin, Martin Powell, Danny Kushlick, Jane Slater 26 June 2012
“The Alternative World Drug Report: Counting the Costs of the War on Drugs”
http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/AWDR.pdf) // czhang
3. Huge economic and opportunity costs¶ The consequences
and vulnerablities of a country ¶
relying economically on the export of a single product ¶ are well understood for legitimate
commodities like oil. ¶ Similar problems can arise from illicit exports as well, ¶ with the potential threats to
development made worse ¶ by the lack of taxation and the isolation from legitimate ¶ economic
and social activity of illicit drug production. ¶ The related problem, a shift of labour and capital to the ¶
unregulated criminal sector, may also undermine longterm development and economic growth.¶ As the
economy and institutions of a country become ¶ progressively more criminalised, other illegal businesses ¶ under the
ownership or protection of criminal cartels ¶ can gain preferential treatment, making it more
dificult ¶ for legal enterprises to compete, and forcing them to ¶ bear a greater burden of taxation
and regulation.¶ The more a region becomes destabilised, the more it:¶ • Deters inward investment by indigenous or ¶ external
businesses¶ • Restricts the activities of development groups ¶ and other bodies that would otherwise assist in ¶ economic and human
development¶ • Diverts aid and other resources from development ¶ into police and military
enforcement (reducing ¶ accountability and increasing the likelihood of ¶ human rights abuses)¶ Globally, in excess of $100
billion a year is spent ¶ on fighting the war on drugs (see Chapter 1, p. 23) – ¶ roughly the same as the total spent
by rich countries on ¶ overseas aid. The US, and other countries, have diverted ¶ development aid from where it would be most
effective, ¶ blurring it into military spending for its allies in the ¶ war on drugs – most significantly in Latin America and ¶
Afghanistan.¶ While any approach to drugs requires funding, there is a ¶ substantial opportunity cost from this
scale of ¶ expenditure on a policy which is not even delivering ¶ its stated goals. As a result, many of
the poorest areas ¶ of affected countries are being further impoverished ¶ through wasting money
that could have been invested in ¶ everything from education to infrastructure.
Mex – Environment
War on drugs destroys the environment – chemicals have a multiplier effect
Rolles et al, 12 a writer for the Guardian, Martin is Head of Campaigns and Communications
at Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Danny Kushlick is a British political activist and founder
of the Transform Drug Policy Foundation. Jane Slater is Head of Operations and Fundraising at
Transform Drug Policy Foundation (Steve, George Murkin, Martin Powell, Danny Kushlick, Jane Slater 26 June 2012
“The Alternative World Drug Report: Counting the Costs of the War on Drugs”
http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/AWDR.pdf) // czhang
6. Increasing deforestation and pollution¶ An often overlooked cost of
the war on drugs is its ¶ negative
impact on the environment – mainly resulting ¶ from aerial spraying of drug crops in ecologically
¶ sensitive environments, such as the Andes and Amazon ¶ basin, combined with pollution from unregulated ¶
chemical drug processing. These harms almost all ¶ accrue in the developing and marginal regions where ¶ drug crop production is
concentrated. Chemical ¶ eradication not only causes localised deforestation, but ¶ has a devastating multiplier
effect because drug ¶ producers simply deforest new areas for cultivation – the ¶ so-called “balloon effect”.
This problem is made worse ¶ because protected areas in national parks – where aerial ¶ spraying is banned – are
often targeted. (For more detail/¶ discussion on environmental costs, see Chapter 3, p. 43.)
Mex – HIV
War on drugs is the single largest contributer to the spread of HIV
Rolles et al, 12 a writer for the Guardian, Martin is Head of Campaigns and Communications
at Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Danny Kushlick is a British political activist and founder
of the Transform Drug Policy Foundation. Jane Slater is Head of Operations and Fundraising at
Transform Drug Policy Foundation (Steve, George Murkin, Martin Powell, Danny Kushlick, Jane Slater 26 June 2012
“The Alternative World Drug Report: Counting the Costs of the War on Drugs”
http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/AWDR.pdf) // czhang
7. Fuelling HIV infection and other health ¶ impacts¶ The war on drugs results
in a number of health-related ¶
harms that impact on development. Firstly, levels of drug ¶ use and the associated direct health harms tend to
rise ¶ in the vulnerable and marginalised countries and areas¶ used for producing and transiting
drugs, as availability ¶ rapidly increases, with employees sometimes even being ¶ paid in drugs. Secondly, criminalising
users encourages ¶ risky behaviours, like sharing needles, and hinders ¶ measures to help those infected with bloodborne viruses ¶ via drug injecting. As a result, there are epidemics of HIV ¶ and hepatitis B and C among
people who inject drugs in ¶ many developing countries. ¶ Roughly one tenth of new HIV infections
result from ¶ needle sharing among people who use drugs, with this ¶ figure rising to just under a third
outside of Sub-Saharan ¶ Africa, and approaching or exceeding a half in some ¶ regions, including
many former Soviet republics. (For ¶ more detail/discussion on health costs, see Chapter 5, p. ¶ 61.)
Mex – HRV
War on drugs is a human rights violation in so many ways
Rolles et al, 12 a writer for the Guardian, Martin is Head of Campaigns and Communications
at Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Danny Kushlick is a British political activist and founder
of the Transform Drug Policy Foundation. Jane Slater is Head of Operations and Fundraising at
Transform Drug Policy Foundation (Steve, George Murkin, Martin Powell, Danny Kushlick, Jane Slater 26 June 2012
“The Alternative World Drug Report: Counting the Costs of the War on Drugs”
http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/AWDR.pdf) // czhang
8. Undermining human rights, promoting ¶ discrimination¶ The UN is tasked with both promoting human rights ¶ and overseeing
the international drug control regime, ¶ yet in practice human rights abuses in the name of ¶ drug control are
commonplace. The range of abuses ¶ includes denial of the right to a fair trial and due process ¶ standards;
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading ¶ treatment or punishment; the death penalty and ¶
extrajudicial killings; over-incarceration and arbitrary ¶ detention; denial of the right to health;
denial of the right ¶ to social security and an adequate standard of living; ¶ denial of the rights of
the child; and denial of cultural ¶ and indigenous rights. (For more detail/discussion on ¶ human rights costs,
see Chapter 6, p. 71.)
Mex – Instability
War on drugs fuels drug cartels and allows them to fund international terrorist
organizations
Rolles et al, 12 a writer for the Guardian, Martin is Head of Campaigns and Communications
at Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Danny Kushlick is a British political activist and founder
of the Transform Drug Policy Foundation. Jane Slater is Head of Operations and Fundraising at
Transform Drug Policy Foundation (Steve, George Murkin, Martin Powell, Danny Kushlick, Jane Slater 26 June 2012
“The Alternative World Drug Report: Counting the Costs of the War on Drugs”
http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/AWDR.pdf) // czhang
1. Fuelling conflict and violence¶ There are a number of ways in which the war
on drugs ¶ is undermining security
and contributing to conflict ¶ and violence, mainly stemming from control of the ¶ lucrative illegal market defaulting
to adaptable and ¶ ruthless criminal entrepreneurs. In the absence of any ¶ formal market regulation, violence has become their key ¶
regulatory tool.¶ To secure and expand their business, cartels can and ¶ do equip private armies and militias – which are in ¶ many
cases able to outgun state enforcement. Organised ¶ criminal networks can also finance or merge with ¶
separatist and insurgent groups, and illicit drug profits ¶ have become a key source of funding for
various ¶ domestic and international terror groups.¶ Corruption, combined with intimidation and actual ¶
violence against politicians, police, judiciary, and armed ¶ forces then further undermines
governance and ¶ promotes conflict.¶ Police and military interventions can involve significant ¶ violence in themselves.
For example, there were 2,819 ¶ extrajudicial killings under the banner of the Thailand ¶ government’s war on drugs crackdown in
2003.4¶ State interventions can also precipitate a spiral of ¶ violence in which the cartels both fight
back against ¶ government forces with ever increasing ferocity, and ¶ also fight each other for control of the
trade as state¶ action disrupts established illicit market structures. This ¶ has been shown most clearly in Mexico in recent years. ¶ In
the longer term, endemic violence can traumatise ¶ populations for generations, in particular fostering ¶ a deeper culture of violence
among young people. ¶ (For more detail/discussion on conflict and violence see ¶ Chapter 4, p. 57.)
Mex – Poverty
War on drugs causes mass poverty in Mexico
Rolles et al, 12 a writer for the Guardian, Martin is Head of Campaigns and Communications
at Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Danny Kushlick is a British political activist and founder
of the Transform Drug Policy Foundation. Jane Slater is Head of Operations and Fundraising at
Transform Drug Policy Foundation (Steve, George Murkin, Martin Powell, Danny Kushlick, Jane Slater 26 June 2012
“The Alternative World Drug Report: Counting the Costs of the War on Drugs”
http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/AWDR.pdf) // czhang
2. Increasing corruption and undermining ¶ governance¶ The war on drugs
and the huge criminal market it has ¶
created have led to the corruption of institutions and ¶ individuals at every level in affected
countries. This is a ¶ result of the huge funds high-level players in the illicit ¶ trade have, their readiness to threaten violence to
force ¶ the unwilling to take bribes, and the poverty and weak ¶ governance of targeted regions.¶ Corruption can have a dire impact
on social and ¶ economic development. According to Transparency ¶ International:¶ “Corruption not only reduces the net
income of the poor ¶ but also wrecks programmes related to their basic needs, ¶ from sanitation to
education to healthcare. It results in ¶ the misallocation of resources to the detriment of poverty ¶
reduction programmes … The attainment of the ¶ Millennium Development Goals is put at risk unless ¶ corruption is
tackled…”5¶ As the UNODC has described it:¶ “The magnitude of funds under criminal control poses ¶ special threats to
governments, particularly in developing ¶ countries, where the domestic security markets and ¶ capital markets are far too small to
absorb such funds ¶ without quickly becoming dependent on them. It is difficult ¶ to have a functioning democratic
system when drug ¶ cartels have the means to buy protection, political support ¶ or votes at every
level of government and society. ¶ In systems where a member of the legislature or judiciary, ¶ earning only a modest
income, can easily gain the ¶ equivalent of some months’ salary from a trafficker ¶ by making one ‘favourable’ decision, the dangers
of ¶ corruption are obvious.”
*AT:___*
AT: WOD Fails – Generic
U.S. consumption drives the trade – that’s key to stop trafficking
Sheldon, 12 (Seina, Research Associate for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “Re: US SAYS
BOLIVIA, MYANMAR, VENEZUELA STILL FAILING DRUG WAR”, 10/2/2012,
http://www.coha.org/19743/, JKahn)
Your September 15 article, “US says Bolivia, Myanmar, Venezuela still failing drug war,” successfully addresses a U.S. report that
bears a dubious measure denouncing Bolivia and Venezuela’s “inadequate” steps in restricting the illicit drug
trade.[1] Despite this clear overview, the article fails to acknowledge the longstanding American practice
of illegal narcotics consumption . Moreover, it also neglects the substantive improvements that the
Andean nations have made in curtailing the illicit drug trade in recent years. According to the National Coca Monitoring
Survey for Bolivia, compiled by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), coca cultivation in Bolivia has
fallen 12 percent from 2010 to 2011.[2] Additionally, cocaine confiscation in Venezuela rose from 33 tons
in 2009 to 39 tons in 2010.[3] These statistics illustrate that Bolivia and Venezuela have made a
considerable effort in combating narco-trafficking, contrary to the U.S. report . Furthermore, it is
unreasonable for American authorities to condemn other nations for their less than stellar efforts when
illicit drug trade primarily stems from U.S. demand . The U.S. is the world’s largest market for drug consumption.
According to the World Drug Report compiled by UNODC, the United States reported 5.7 million cocaine users annually, making it
the highest cocaine consumer in the world. Moreover, a third of the world’s cocaine users live within its borders.[4] Perhaps the
U.S. should focus on its own troubled area of domestic demand rather than pointing fingers at others as a
specious source of the problem.
AT: WOD Fails - Mexico
The war on drugs is winnable – Mexico is achieving large successes, but continued cooperation
with the US is key
Poiré, 11 – Mexican government's spokesman for security affairs at the time of writing this article, now serves as
director general at the Center for Intelligence and National Security (Alejandro, “Can Mexico win the war against
drugs?,” Americas Quarterly, Vol. 5 No. 4, Fall 2011, ProQuest)//BI
By working with Mexican civil society and reforming the police force, we are scoring major
victories. Success in Mexico's fight against drugs can't be measured like a game of baseball, in which you
simply add up the score at the end of nine innings. It's a war with many fronts, and it requires a much different
perspective. Drug trafficking is only one element of the larger problem: the reach of organized crime into every
facet of our national life and economy. Mexico has chalked up major victories- and will continue to do so, thanks to its multitrack approach that focuses not just on eliminating drug trafficking, but on building stronger law
enforcement institutions and reinforcing our social fabric. That would not have been possible without the
engagement of both government and civil society. Thanks to the leadership of President Felipe Calderón and the work of groups such
as Asociación Alto al Secuestro, led by Isabel Miranda de Wallace, and México SOS, headed by Alejandro Martí, we have come a long
way. In recent decades, the drug traffickers' criminal business model has changed, and Mexico is bearing the brunt. Before, the
primary goal of drug traffickers was securing an uninterrupted flow of drugs into the United States. But the sealing of cocaine
trafficking routes through the Caribbean, the increased security on the U.S. border after 9/11, the mismanagement of Mexico's
economy from the 1970s through the 1990s, and the lack of professionalization in municipal and state police departments- among
other factors-have led drug traffickers to seek control of a large variety of unlawful activities as a means of enhancing their earnings
and competitive position in the criminal market. The end of the Assault Weapons Ban in the U.S. in 2004 has made this change all
the more threatening to Mexico's security. Addressing this escalation of crime and insecurity required not
only a plan for domestic action, but also recognition of the transnational dimension of the
problem. That recognition has been the key to our comprehensive, multifaceted approach. The National Security
Strategy, launched in 2006, rests on three main tenets: severely weakening criminal organizations;
massively and effectively reconstructing law enforcement institutions and the legal system; and
repairing the social fabric through, among other things, enhancing crime prevention policies. To date,
there have been significant achievements. Our enhanced intelligence capabilities and close
collaboration with U.S. agencies have allowed us to arrest or kill 21 of the 37 most-wanted leaders
of major criminal organizations. Moreover, Mexican authorities have seized over 9,500 tons of
drugs that will never reach U.S. or Mexican children, and captured more than 122,000 weapons since 2006-most of which were
bought in the United States. At the same time, the professional caliber of Mexico's Federal Police force has
improved significantly through strict recruitment, vetting and extensive training-even as the force has grown nearly sixfold
to 35,000 federal policemen. But it is not just a question of numbers; police intelligence capabilities have been
reinforced by the recruitment of an additional 7,000 federal law enforcement intelligence personnel from top-level universities.
A new judicial framework is in place, thanks to the introduction of legal reforms designed to strengthen due process
guarantees, provide fuller protection to victims and increase the efficiency and transparency of trials. Much of this has been the
result of the introduction of oral procedures in the federal court system, which is expected to be fully implemented in 2016. We
have also achieved significant success in dismantling criminal financial networks. Authorities
have confiscated a record amount of cash from the drug cartels-although more can still be done-and
special investigative units are spearheading a national effort to combat money laundering.
Currently, Congress is working on passing a bill aimed at increasing the capacity of the federal government to investigate and
prosecute money launderers. To improve Mexico's social fabric, we have focused on the economic and social roots
of crime and addiction since Calderón took office. We consider drug addiction to be a public health problem. Accordingly,
national legislation has decriminalized personal consumption of drugs, while directing drug
users to proper medical help. Also, public spending devoted to addiction/prevention programs has
more than doubled during the first five years of Calderón's administration. Mexico now boasts the largest
network in Latin America of centers for prevention and early treatment of addiction, with more than
330 units distributed throughout the country providing counseling, medical treatment and referrals to over 2 million people every
year. We have recovered thousands of public places-including parks, civic plazas and sports fields-through the
improvement of infrastructure, recreational activities, citizen participation, and more effective
security measures. This shared responsibility between federal and local authorities and community members provides people
with safe places to gather and forge stronger social ties. We have also implemented the Safe School Program, where over 35,000
elementary and middle schools provide some 9 million young kids with a violence-free and addiction-free environment. Mexico sits
between the largest consumer of drugs to the north, and the largest producers of many of these drugs to the south. That gives us a
special challenge. But all countries in the region need to coordinate their drug and crime interdiction
programs if we are ever going to break the power of transnational criminal networks. The spread of these
networks threatens not just Mexico but all of us in the region. Final success in the war against drugs can only be
achieved when we tackle together the conditions that allow these networks to operate with
impunity.
A shift in strategy towards punishment for violent crime can win the drug war
Rios, 13 – fellow in inequality and criminal justice at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. From 2010 to
2012, she and Michele Coscia, a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard’s Center for International Development, studied
how and where Mexican drug cartels operate (Viridiana, “How to win the Mexican drug war,” Huffington Post, 12
April 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-12/opinions/38492205_1_cartels-drug-violence-trafficking)//BI
The U.S. government has spent $1.6 billion to help Mexico end a war between drug cartels that has
killed 63,000 people south of our border in the past six years. Yet
many of our assumptions about this war are
wrong. As part of a study tracking the behavior of Mexico’s organized-crime groups, a colleague and I created an algorithm that
uses Google to explore blogs, newspapers and news-related Web content and extract detailed data about how Mexican drug cartels
operate. Our tool reads everything published and indexed as part of Google News and collects all the information the Web contains
about the activities of the cartels, including their routes of expansion, since the 1990s. Our discoveries shocked us and surprised the
U.S. officials who reviewed our findings. The United States may be helping Mexico fight the wrong war
because we do not know who the enemy is. At
the heart of the Mexican government’s strategy, which the
United States has supported, is the belief that Mexico’s drug violence is the result of antagonistic
trafficking organizations battling to monopolize a territory. Thus, the thinking goes, trafficking organizations
must be eliminated. Yet it is not true that drug violence necessarily increases when more than one
cartel operates in one area. In fact, in many areas, organized-crime groups share territory peacefully. Our data show that
multiple cartels operated simultaneously in at least 100 Mexican municipalities in 2010, yet those municipalities did not experience
a single drug-related homicide. Of the 16,000 assassinationsin Mexico’s drug war that year, 43 percent occurred in just eight cities. A
single city, Juarez, accounted for 8 percent of the deaths. What we learned is simple and powerful: Traffickers pick their
wars. Battling is a strategic choice for cartels — and they frequently choose peace. War is not the
unavoidable outcome of a profitable illegal industry. Violent criminal groups in Mexico are no different from other illegal groups that
manage to operate with low levels of violence. Consider: Bolivia and Peru produce marijuana in larger quantities than do many Latin
American countries and still have murder rates among the region’s lowest. The Japanese mafia controls the most profitable market
of methamphetamines in Asia without major episodes of violence. Endangered species are smuggled through Singapore, the
Philippines and Indonesia without significant confrontations with poachers. Bosnia’s sex trafficking industry has boomed without a
parallel upsurge in homicides. Because trafficking is a business and fighting is a business strategy, drug cartels
choose to fight whenever war brings more benefits than costs. And the
cost that governments can more efficiently
impose on a criminal entrepreneur is prison. Cartels have chosen to fight in certain areas of Mexico because it
makes business sense. South of the U.S. border, only 6 percent of all homicides produce a trial and
judgment. As such, killing trafficking enemies to take over their territory, and potentially increase illegal earnings, is profitable.
In short, war pays in Mexico. So the right way to fight a drug war in Mexico is not to aim at
eliminating criminal organizations, as many have assumed, but rather to create conditions in which
war does not pay. This will not be achieved with the strategy Washington has embraced. Even if all criminal organizations
were eliminated, new ones would emerge as long as profits could be made from cocaine. A war against drug organizations is an
endless war. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto plans to hold a national forum Tuesday with academics, laypeople and others to
discuss how the country can best achieve peace. Now is the time for Mexico to choose the right direction. Mexico must craft a
system of incentives, using arrests, sentencing and imprisonment, so that criminal organizations
cannot find it profitable to kill. Rather than help Mexico fight an unwinnable war against criminal organizations, the
United States must help its neighbor battle impunity. Ours must be a war to make sure those
who kill face consequences; a war to improve Mexico’s justice system, because only 31 percent of the population believes it
would be punished after committing a crime; a war against the sort of outbreaks where, in one day, more than 130 prisoners escape a
jail near the Texas border. The goal must be to make violent crime a risky endeavor, rather than a discretionary
choice made by criminal businessmen. A war against impunity can be won. A war against drugs cannot.
AT: Drugs K Mex Econ
Predictions of a Mexican economic apocalypse from limiting the drug trade are
factually impossible
Corcoran, 12 – researcher and writer for InSight Crime, graduate of the University of Tennessee and an MA
candidate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, citing the RAND Corporation, Wilson
Center, the US National Drug Intelligence center and other data/research institutions (Patrick, “Oliver Stone Gets
it Wrong on Mexico Drug War,” InSight Crime, 11 July 2012, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/oliverstone-gets-it-wrong-on-mexico-drug-war)//BI
On the publicity circuit to promote his new movie, director Oliver Stone has made a series of assertions about
Mexico and the war on drugs that are not only false, but promote a dangerously misleading view
of the country's criminal groups. In a recent interview on "Piers Morgan Tonight," Stone used a series of unfounded
statistical assertions to justify his opposition to the war on drugs , theme of his movie "Savages" which
opened in the US earlier this month. Among his comments, as compiled by the Los Angeles Times: The Mexican economy
would die without [drugs] because they need the money. It goes into their legitimate economy.
It’s bigger than tourism. It’s bigger than oil. It’s bigger than remissions from their Mexican emigrants back to their country ... Fifty
percent of our prison system is victimless crimes. People who’ve never hurt anybody, they’re in for marijuana and it has nothing to
do with punishment. It’s a medical issue, and I think we have to move to decriminalization and legalization. Stone is right to point
out that the mass incarceration of drug offenders is demonstrably inefficient and in many senses immoral, but his facts are
incorrect. Drug offenders do not constitute 50 percent of the US prison system’s inmates, but just over 20 percent. There are
certainly more effective and humane ways to deal with the issue than tossing these people behind bars, but the opponents of the
largely mindless approach to drug policy that has dominated in the last 40 years only hurt their case by casually tossing out
falsehoods. The problem continues with Stone's statement that flows of drug money in Mexico are larger than those from tourism,
oil, or remittances. Estimates for the value of the Mexican drug trade are all over the map, but the
most rigorous analyses have concluded that export revenue from the drug trade is far lower than
Stone suggests. Alejandro Hope, for instance, places the figure somewhere between $4.7 to $8.1 billion,
while the RAND Corporation estimates that Mexican traffickers earn roughly $6.6 billion per year from
sending drugs to the US. In contrast, remittances sent by Mexicans living abroad in 2011 amounted to $22.7 billion. Mexico’s tourist
trade, notwithstanding the nation’s unfortunate image in the international press, still managed to generate $11.9 billion in 2010.
Stone's claim is even further from the mark with regard to oil: the revenues for Pemex, the national oil company, amounted to $125
billion in 2011. Consequently, Stone’s statement that the Mexican economy “would die” without drug
money drifts into the terrain of the indefensible. Unfortunately, Stone is not alone in this exaggerated view of drug
money’s role in the Mexican economy. One story, put forward by authors like Richard Grant and Charles Bowden, holds that
a 2001 study by CISEN, Mexico’s intelligence agency, found that an end to the drug trade would
result in a 63 percent contraction of the Mexican economy. The study is not public -- citing a story
from El Diario de Juarez, Bowden wrote that it was leaked to the media in 2001, though InSight Crime's online search for the
original study turned up nothing. It is difficult to know, therefore, if its authors were perhaps making a more
nuanced point that was lost in subsequent references to it. However, the scenario posited by Grant and Bowden,
and the implicit idea that the Mexican economy would “die” without drug money, is simply absurd. The most obvious flaw
is the very idea that drug trafficking could disappear entirely. Though the size and composition of proceeds
from the illicit trade may vary, longstanding industries, especially those that feed upon deep-seated human desires, don’t simply
disappear from one year to the next. Moreover, as demonstrated above, the total revenue generated by the drug
trade is relatively small. Even using a methodologically suspect high-end estimate, such as the $39
billion cited by the US National Drug Intelligence Center for revenues of all Colombian and Mexican organizations, and for the sake
of argument attributing all of the profits to the Mexican gangs, the figure still amounts to less than 4 percent of
total Mexican output. Using the more rigorous calculations of the industry’s size, drug
trafficking probably accounts for roughly 0.5 percent of the nation’s economy. Eliminating the proceeds
of drug smuggling would certainly have a significant impact on the GDP, but such an event, aside from being virtually impossible,
would be nothing like the economic apocalypse posited by Stone.
AT: Afghan TradeOff
No tradeoff – regional drug trade is insulated
Kleiman, 4 (Mark, B.A. magna cum laude, Haverford College, M.P.P., Harvard Kennedy School, Ph.D., Harvard, Professor of
Public Policy in the UCLA School of Public Affairs, “Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist Threat: Causal Links and Implications for
Domestic Drug Control Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 4/20/2004, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32334.pdf, JKahn)
Even the same drug
may have very different implications for terrorism in different circumstances: where it
comes from, how it travels, and which organizations traffic in it all make a difference. The United States gets the bulk of
its heroin from poppies grown in Colombia , a smaller amount from poppies grown in Southeast Asia, and relatively
little from poppies grown in Southwest Asia, including Afghanistan. Most of the heroin produced from the Afghani
poppy crop either stays in Asia or is trafficked into Europe. Thus in the period leading up to September 11, 2001,
European heroin consumption potentially helped finance Al Qaeda activities, or helped support the Taliban
regime which harbored Al Qaeda, but heroin consumption in the United States likely did not. U.S. heroin
consumption may have contributed to the terrorist threat in Colombia, and perhaps in Mexico, but
likely had very little impact on Afghanistan or its neighbors.28 (Unlike petroleum, for example, which is traded in
world markets, so that increased demand or decreased supply anywhere tends to raise prices everywhere, the illicit trade in heroin
tends to be compartmentalized, so that prices for poppy can be high in Colombia but low in Afghanistan, or vice versa.) By contrast,
anyone concerned with the terror problem in Colombia can afford to ignore Asian heroin consumption, because virtually no
Colombian-source heroin makes its way to Asia.29
AT: Violence Deters Mex Investment
Violence doesn’t deter investment --- corruption hampers the economy --- MNCs
invest in Mexico because they are corrupt
Caldwell, 12 (Deborah, senior editor for Enterprise, cites George Haley, director of the Center for International Industry
Competitiveness at the University of New Haven, “Crime Explodes — But an Economy Booms,” CNBC, 9/18/12,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/49037775, Tashma)
Mexico’s violence, Selee argues, is “manageable,” despite appearances to the contrary. “Even in the
cities, the violence rarely touches most people in direct ways,” Selee said. “It’s more indirect. Most
people know of someone who was kidnapped, or they don’t go out at night. It’s like being in New York in
the late 1980s.” High-level foreign executives protect themselves and their investments with security systems, Selee said — just like
in the United States. As a result, large multinationals haven’t experienced much of the violence — which
is why those companies continue to invest in Mexico. Mexico received $4.37 billion in foreign direct
investment in the first quarter of 2012, down about 9 percent from the same period in 2011; the U.S. accounted for about 37 percent
of the inflow, followed by Spain at about 29 percent, and Luxembourg at 9 percent. From an operations point of view, the drug
war has very little effect on foreign corporations' operations. Experts say this is because it is difficult for drug
cartels to force a large company headquartered outside Mexico to pay a “protection fee." Extortion depends on the cartels' showing
there would be negative consequences of not paying — but the multinationals
can simply lean on the Mexican
government and military to strike back at the cartels. In fact, George Haley, who directs the Center for
International Industry Competitiveness at the University of New Haven, dismissed the violence problem, calling it
“overblown.” (More:Is This the Right Time to Invest in Mexican Real Estate?) “Corruption is the greater
problem ,” he said. “For instance, in the Wal-Mart case, what Wal-Mart's Mexican executives did would not
generally even be considered corruption in Mexico.” In April, Wal-Mart said it had discovered that its
Mexican subsidiary, Wal-Mart de Mexico, allegedly paid bribes to facilitate awarding store permits, and
then the company's corporate headquarters stifled an internal investigation into the allegations. Former Mexico foreign minister
Jorge Castaneda said Wal-Mart de Mexico’s actions may look like a bribe to Americans, but they’re standard
operating procedure in Mexico. Although the national government has made strides, "at the municipal level, anyone who
wants to open a business, it’s difficult to get all the permits you want to get without paying off low-level officials," he told CNBC in
April. "It's pretty hard to get anything done unless you spread money around.”
AT: Border Security
Doesn’t solve the impacts at all – unrealistic
Carpenter, 9 vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the
author of eight books, including Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in
Latin America (Ted Galen, “Troubled Neighbor: Mexico’s Drug Violence Poses a Threat to the United States” February 2, 2009
Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/troubled-neighbor-mexicos-drug-violence-poses-threat-unitedstates) // czhang
An increasingly popular measure among¶ Americans to stem drug-related violence seeping into
the United States from Mexico is to¶ greatly increase border security.¶ 42¶ Proponents¶ tout the alleged effectiveness of measures
taken to date, even as they press for stronger initiatives. Representative Hunter combines both ¶ themes:¶ While we have made some progress in¶ recent years toward creating a more¶ enforceable border, we still
have a lot of¶ work left to do. Moving forward, we¶ must continue strengthening security¶ through manpower, technology and¶ infrastructure, including the most reliable and effective enforcement tool so¶ far:
border security fencing. Much like¶ many other areas of the border today,¶ the land corridor that once existed between Tijuana, Mexico, and San Diego,¶ California, was for many years considered to be the most
prolific and dangerous smuggling route in the nation. It¶ was not until I wrote into law the construction of a double border fence that ¶ drug smugglers and armed gangs lost¶ control of this corridor and
the¶ traffickers merely moved their preferred
transit corridor a little farther to the east, crossing¶ into California in a more remote desert¶ region rather than through the more urbanized, visible, and guarded
San Diego metropolitan area. There was no evidence that the¶ fence and increased surveillance did anything¶
more than cause them as light inconvenience.¶ Although the principal reason for passage¶ of the Secure Fence Act of 2006 was anger over¶ the flow of
undocumented immigrants, concern about the drug trade and the violence¶ accompanying it was also a factor.
conditions¶ on both sides of the border started to¶ improve.¶ 43¶ What Hunter did not mention is that
Representative Hunter was candid about that motive.¶ “Recurring confrontations with Mexican soldiers, much like the drug smugglers and illegal¶ immigrants that attempt to cross into the U.S.¶ through Mexico
each day, further illustrate¶ why fencing and other infrastructure remains¶ so important to the security and enforcement ¶ of our border.”¶ 44¶ A major source of resistance¶ to fully funding anti-drug measures in
Mexico¶ has come from members of Congress, including influential Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (RTX),who want more of the money directed to¶ beefing up law enforcement on the U.S. side of ¶ the border.¶ 45¶
Proposals to seal or “secure” the border¶ with Mexico are unrealistic. The desire for¶ more security along the border is
understandable, and some additional steps may be¶ useful, but the logistics of attempting to dramatically reduce incursions along
the 1,952-¶ mile land border with Mexico would be prohibitively difficult. Not only would that goal¶ require building
the North American equivalent of the Berlin Wall, it would entail stationing tens of thousands of trained law ¶ enforcement,
and possibly military, personnel to guard it and prevent breaches. Clearly,¶ the more limited measures,
such as the existence of flimsy fences and periodic appearances by the U.S. Border Patrol, have
not¶ worked. Hundreds of thousands of unauthorized immigrants cross the border into¶ remote
sectors of the southwestern states¶ each year. Professional drug traffickers are¶ not going to be
stymied by such systems when ordinary immigrants are not.¶ Even if it were possible to seal the land border, the trafficking
organizations have ingenious ways of coping. On numerous occasions, U.S. authorities have detected tunnels¶ underneath the
border. Some of those facilities are incredibly sophisticated, with electric¶ lights, rail lines, and air conditioning.¶ 46¶ Controlling the border above ground
is no guarantee that it will be controlled below ground.¶ Aside from the problem of dealing with leakage of drugs and violence through the land
border, traffickers can bypass it entirely and enter¶ the United States through the lengthy coastline¶
in the Gulf of Mexico or along the California¶ coast. In addition to using speedboats (the most¶ common method), the Mexican
cartels have¶ begun to emulate their Colombian colleagues by¶ utilizing submarines to bring their product to¶ market.¶
47¶ And drug traffickers can circumvent¶ fences and border checkpoints by evading radar¶ and
flying over the border in small planes.¶ Indeed, the cartels seem to maintain a veritable¶ fleet of such planes to bring shipments into the¶ United States.¶ 48¶ The
immensity of the task means that¶ schemes to seal the border are just as futile as ¶ the calls to stop the southward
flow of guns as¶ a solution to the problems of drug trafficking¶ and drug-related violence. Policymakers
must¶ look elsewhere for effective measures. Unfortunately, the most popular proposal is to¶ redouble the effort to win the war on drugs—¶ yet another false panacea.
AT: Mexico Failed State
No risk of Mexico becoming a failed state anytime soon
Broder, 9 senior editor for defense and foreign policy at Roll Call. Before joining Congressional Quarterly in 2002, he worked
as an editor at National Public Radio in Washington and as a foreign correspondent for the Associated Press, NBC News and the
Chicago Tribune, based in Jerusalem, Beirut and Beijing. graduate of the University of Virginia and studied international relations at
Harvard University. (Jonathan, “Mexico's Drug War: Violence Too Close to Home” 3/9/09
http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-000003069323.) // czhang
¶ Mexican officials bristle at the dire forecasts for their country. “The suggestion that Mexico is remotely close to a
failed state or is heading in that direction is analytically flawed and therefore simply wrong,” Arturo Sarukhan,
Mexico’s ambassador to the United States, said in a statement. “Mexico is today a country with solid
institutions, a consolidating and pluralistic democracy, a vibrant civil society, and, despite the
global recession, strong economic fundamentals.”¶ ¶ In a separate interview, Sarukhan argued that the heavy
toll from the armed confrontations in Mexico is, if anything, a sign of his government’s strength and
determination to confront the cartels, which, he adds, have grown increasingly desperate under the
army’s assault. “The violence,” Sarukhan said, “is an indication that they’re feeling the pressure and
against the ropes.”¶ ¶ Many U.S. experts on Mexico also reject what George W. Grayson, a Mexico
scholar at the College of William & Mary, called the “overstated” tone of the recent warnings about Mexico.¶ ¶ “The army is
still loyal to the regime,” said Grayson. “Most workers get up and go to their jobs every day, and the
major production facilities around the country continue to turn out goods and services .”¶ ¶
Allyson Benton, a Mexico City-based analyst for the Eurasia Group, an international risk analysis
firm, said flatly, “Mexico is not a failed state and will not become one.”
Mexico will never become a failed state – stable influences
Carpenter, 12 (Ted Galen Carpenter is senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Dr.
Carpenter served as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for defense and foreign policy
studies from 1995 to 2011. He is the author of nine and the editor of 10 books on international affairs; 1/4/12; “Drug Mayhem Moves
South”; http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/drug-mayhem-moves-south) KD
What is so worrisome about the mounting presence of the drug cartels in Central America is the vulnerability and overall weakness
of the region. There has been speculation that the violence in Mexico could ultimately cause that
country to become a “failed state.” Such fears are understandable given the scope of the carnage, but they are
excessive. For all of its problems, Mexico still maintains powerful institutions that serve to keep the
country relatively stable. One is the Catholic Church, a prosperous, well-organized and pervasive
factor in Mexico. Another is the influential business community, which has an enormous
incentive to prevent the country from descending into chaos. There are three stable political
parties that have the same incentive and impressive capabilities. Though Mexico faces a serious threat
from the drug cartels—and there are a few areas of the country in which the government’s writ has become precariously weak—it is
still a long way from becoming a failed state.
AT: Heroin Kills People
Heroin overdoses usually aren’t responsible for death --- several other factors
make it inevitable
a) Alcohol and depressant usage
Darke, 1 (Shane, Matthew Warner-Smith, Shane Darke, Michael Lynskey, and Wayne Hall, all work at National Drug and
Alcohol Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia, “Heroin overdose: causes and
consequences,” Addiction, Volume 96, Issue 8, August 2001, pg. 1113-1125, wiley online library, Tashma)
Drug interactions
Concomitant use of opioids with other CNS depressant drugs, particularly alcohol and the
benzodiazepines, has been repeatedly shown to increase the risk of overdose (Table 1).
Morphine is rarely the only drug detected at autopsy17,22,45,62 and blood morphine
concentrations are negatively correlated with blood alcohol concentrations.63,64 The concurrent use of
alcohol and benzodiazepines is also a risk factor for non-fatal opioid overdose.12
Co-administration of other depressant drugs can substantially increase the likelihood of a fatal
outcome following injection of heroin, due to the potentiation of the respiratory depressant
effects of heroin. Thus, in the presence of other CNS depressant drugs a “normal” or usual dose of heroin may prove fatal.
Alcohol appears to be especially implicated, with the frequency of alcohol consumption a
significant risk factor for opioid overdose.12
b) Pulmonary diseases
Darke, 1 (Shane, Matthew Warner-Smith, Shane Darke, Michael Lynskey, and Wayne Hall, all work at National Drug and
Alcohol Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia, “Heroin overdose: causes and
consequences,” Addiction, Volume 96, Issue 8, August 2001, pg. 1113-1125, wiley online library, Tashma)
Pulmonary disease
A number of studies suggest that mortality from opioid overdose may be associated with
pulmonary dysfunction. Since the mechanism of death in opioid overdose is respiratory arrest55 it is plausible that
opioid users with reduced pulmonary function may be at greater risk of mortality from a given
overdose event through their increased vulnerability to fatal respiratory depression.
Very few epidemiological data on the levels of systemic morbidity in heroin users exist in the literature. While the prevalence
of pulmonary dysfunction in the heroin-using population is largely unknown, there is some
evidence to suggest that it may be common.
Heroin users are likely to suffer from impaired pulmonary function as a result of smoking,
predominantly tobacco but also heroin and other drugs; complications of overdose, and increased susceptibility to
infection. In one of the few studies investigating the prevalence and severity of lung dysfunction in heroin users Overland et al.76
reported that 42% of 512 intravenous heroin users had impaired respiratory function.
c) Smoking
Darke, 1 (Shane, Matthew Warner-Smith, Shane Darke, Michael Lynskey, and Wayne Hall, all work at National Drug and
Alcohol Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia, “Heroin overdose: causes and
consequences,” Addiction, Volume 96, Issue 8, August 2001, pg. 1113-1125, wiley online library, Tashma)
Smoking
Tobacco smoking is typically highly prevalent among heroin users. Burling & Ziff.77 for example, report
a prevalence of smoking above 90% in participants of a drug dependence programme. Heroin users in their
late 20s and early 30s, the highest-risk age group for overdose, are likely to have a history of daily tobacco use
dating back 10–15 years. There is an overwhelming body of evidence illustrating the dose–response relationship between
smoking and pulmonary disease and dysfunction.78 Smoking related respiratory conditions, such as
bronchitis, are reported to be widespread among IDUs.73 It is therefore highly probable that there is a
significant degree of tobacco induced pulmonary disease among heroin users.
AT: Drugs -/> Terror
Drug trafficking and narcoterror are globally integrated
Thomas, 10 (James, J.D. from Washington and Lee University Law School, “Narco-Terrorism: Could the Legislative and
Prosecutorial Responses Threaten Our Civil Liberties?”, Washington and Lee University Law School, 5/2010,
http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/66-4ThomasNote.pdf, JKahn)
The global War on Terror has changed.1¶ "State sponsorship of terrorism is ¶ declining . . . . Terrorist groups,
therefore, increasingly need
new sources of ¶ funds, and the drug business fills this need perfectly."2¶
Drugs fuel terrorism ¶ and economically support the very organizations America has pledged to ¶
defeat.3¶ As a result, the confluence of the War on Terror with the War on ¶ Drugs has culminated in the War on Narco-Terror.4¶
In post-9/11 America, with ¶ mounting evidence that the Taliban is funded by drugs,5¶ the United States ¶ government
increasingly focuses on committing resources to curb this ¶ dangerous practice.6¶ Narco-terrorism is the most
dangerous national security threat immediately facing Congress ,7¶ and it is readily apparent that legislative ¶
and prosecutorial action against it should be swift and severe.8¶ Yet, some ¶ restraint remains necessary.
AT: Terrorists Won’t Target US
Drug-revenue-based terrorists groups specifically target the U.S.
Kleiman, 4 (Mark, B.A. magna cum laude, Haverford College, M.P.P., Harvard Kennedy School, Ph.D., Harvard, Professor of
Public Policy in the UCLA School of Public Affairs, “Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist Threat: Causal Links and Implications for
Domestic Drug Control Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 4/20/2004, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32334.pdf, JKahn)
For example, the direct support the Taliban regime in Afghanistan received from drug trafficking (and
indirect U.S. support for its counter-drug efforts) helped
keep it in power during the time its territory was
being used by Al Qaeda as a base from which to plot hostilities against the United States . In that
case, then, the drug money that may have (indirectly) supported terrorism became a direct threat to the
United States . (It is less clear whether any of the assistance provided by the United States to replace the incomes of poppy
farmers put out of business by the Taliban’s prohibition on poppy production36 in practice helped keep the Taliban in power. The
same applies to the other relief aid that flowed to Afghanistan in that period — though not directly to the Taliban government —
from a variety of international sources, reportedly as a “reward” to the Taliban for the poppy ban.) On the other hand, drug
trafficking also helped sustain some elements of the Northern Alliance that were allies of the United States in ousting the Taliban.
Insofar as the goal is to protect the United States against terrorist acts, we
need not merely to cut down on the drugrelated contribution to terrorism generally, but to the drug-related contribution to terrorist
groups that threaten us.
Narcoterrorists will threaten the U.S.
Thomas, 10 (James, J.D. from Washington and Lee University Law School, “Narco-Terrorism: Could the Legislative and
Prosecutorial Responses Threaten Our Civil Liberties?”, Washington and Lee University Law School, 5/2010,
http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/66-4ThomasNote.pdf, JKahn)
This is a global phenomenon, and it is becoming increasingly clear that ¶ narco-terrorism is a
major threat to
the stability of Mexico, Peru, Pakistan, ¶ and other countries.22 This world-wide issue significantly
threatens the United States .23 Consider the following: ¶ As [foreign terrorist organizations] become more
heavily involved in the ¶ drug trade, hybrid organizations are emerging, foreign terrorist ¶ organizations that have
morphed into one part terrorist organization, one ¶ part global drug cartel. The Taliban and FARC—two perfect examples—¶
are, in essence, the face of twenty-first-century organized crime, a visage ¶ meaner and uglier than anything law enforcement
or militaries have ¶ heretofore faced. These hybrids represent the most significant security ¶ challenge to
governments worldwide.24¶ In response to these and other threats to America, Congress enacted the ¶ USA PATRIOT Act
in 2001 and reauthorized many of its sunsetting provisions ¶ in 2005.25 As part of the reauthorization, Congress introduced the
narcoterrorism statute, which President George W. Bush signed into law in 2006.
AT: Drugs Kill People
Illegal drugs kill LESS people than prescription drugs do
Mercola, 11 natural health expert with Mercola, a website that is a reliable source of health articles, optimal wellness products,
medical news, and free natural newsletter (Joseph, “The New Epidemic Sweeping Across America (and it's Not a
Disease)” October 26, 2011
Death by medicine is a 21st-century epidemic, and America's "war on drugs" is clearly directed at the wrong
enemy!¶ Prescription drugs are now killing far more people than illegal drugs, and while most major
causes of preventable deaths are declining, those from prescription drug use are increasing, an analysis of recently
released data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) by the Los Angeles Times revealed.¶ The Times
analysis of 2009 death statistics, the most recent available, showed:¶ For the first time ever in the US, more people were
killed by drugs than motor vehicle accidents¶ 37,485 people died from drugs, a rate fueled by overdoses on
prescription pain and anxiety medications, versus 36,284 from traffic accidents¶ Drug fatalities more than doubled
among teens and young adults between 2000 and 2008, and more than tripled among people aged 50 to 69¶
Again, these drug-induced fatalities are not being driven by illegal street drugs; the analysis found
that the most commonly abused prescription drugs like OxyContin, Vicodin, Xanax and Soma
now cause more deaths than heroin and cocaine combined.
Prescription drugs kill more people than illegal drugs do – widespread availabililty
Renick, 11 writer from Bloomberg News (Oliver, “Prescription Drugs Cause More Overdoses in U.S. Than Heroin and Cocaine”
Jul 7, 2011 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-07/prescription-drugs-cause-more-overdoses-in-u-s-than-heroin-andcocaine.html) // czhang
Accidental drug overdoses from prescription pills have more than doubled in the past decade as
deaths from illegal drugs decreased, a Florida study found.¶ Prescription medications were implicated
in 76 percent of all overdose deaths in Florida between 2003 and 2009, while illicit drugs like cocaine and
heroin were present in 34 percent of deaths, according to data compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention in Atlanta. Ten percent of overdoses came from a mix of both illegal and prescription drugs.¶ Unintentional poisoning is
the second leading cause of injury death in the U.S. after automobile accidents, accounting for 29,846 deaths nationwide in 2007,
the CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, said. In 2007, the U.S. government began the Prescription Drug Monitoring
Program, a $9 million program that provides state funding for recording and monitoring prescription drug use.¶ “By 2009, the
number of deaths involving prescription drugs was four times the number involving illicit
drugs,” the report said. “These findings indicate the need to strengthen interventions aimed at reducing overdose deaths from
prescription drugs.Ӧ The number of annual deaths from lethal concentrations of prescription
medicines increased 84 percent from 2003 to 2009, while deadly overdoses of illegal drugs fell 21
percent. Deaths from the narcotic painkiller oxycodone and anxiety medicine alprazolam, sold under the brand name Xanax,
more than tripled.¶ Availability¶ “The sense is that the widespread availability of prescription drugs is
causing people to switch from illicit drugs like cocaine and heroin,” Leonard Paulozzi, a medical
epidemiologist at CDC’s Injury Center, said in a phone interview.¶ Paulozzi said most prescription overdoses were in men between
the ages of 45 and 54.¶ Heroin death rates dropped 62 percent in the period. Cocaine overdoses increased until
2007, and declined in 2008 and 2009, researchers found. Methadone rates rose 79 percent, the study said.¶ The federal
government spent $15.1 billion on the so-called War on Drugs in 2010, according to the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Efforts to combat illegal drug use included prevention, treatment, law enforcement and interdiction.
AT: Impact Inevitable
The impact to drugs is inevitable - immigration
Jackson, 7/17 (David, USA TODAY “Obama: No immigration bill before fall”
http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2013/07/17/obama-immigration-hispanic-television-stations/2523827/
While President Obama once called for an immigration bill by August, he is now acknowledging
that
nothing will happen until after summer.¶ Obama told Telemundo's Denver affiliate that August "was
originally my hope and my goal," but too many House Republicans are balking at the
comprehensive bill the Senate passed.¶ Said Obama: "The House Republicans I think still have to
process this issue and discuss it further -- and hopefully, I think, still hear from constituents, from businesses to
labor, to evangelical Christians who all are supporting immigration reform."¶ Obama made similar comments in
interviews with three other Spanish language television affiliates.¶ Some Republicans in particular object to a
planned pathway to citizenship for people who are already in the United States illegally -- but Obama indicated
he would veto any immigration bill that did not include such a provision.¶ "It does not make
sense to me, if we're going to make this once-in-a-generation effort to finally fix this system, to
leave the status of 11 million people or so unresolved," Obama told the Denver station.
AT: Reduce Consumption
Internal factors are key
Thoumi, Manaut, Sain, and Jácome, 10 (*Francisco E., expert at the Wilson Center, Ph.D.,
professor of economics and the director of the Research and Minotiring Center on Drugs and
Crime at Universidad el Rosario, former research coordinator at the United National Office of
Drug Control and Crime Prevention, **Raúl Benitez, public policy scholar at the Wilson Center,
researcher at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research in Science and Humanities, professor
and researcher at the North America Rsearch Center of UNAM-Mexico, CNAS Senior Fellow,
Distinguished Scholar-in-Residence, School of Public Affairs and Washington College of Law,
Ph.D in Latin American Studies at UNAM, Master of International Affairs from the Centro de
Investigacion y Docencia Economica, ***professor at the University of San Andrés, Ph.D.,
University of Salvador, political science, Francine, professor of anthropology at the Central
University of Venezuela, political science degree, Friedrich, Ebert, and Stiftung Research, “The
impact of organized crime on Democratic Governance in Latin America”,
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07386.pdf, JKahn)
The concentration of the coca-cocaine and opium- poppy-heroin industry in few countries can only
be explained by internal factors . The point is quite simple: if the production and trafficking of a particular
product that is easy to produce and can be produced in many countries is declared illegal globally concentrates in one
or a few countries, it will do so where it is easier to do illegal things! As argued extensively (Thoumi, 2009), the
competitive advantage of Colombia in the cocaine in- dustry is rooted in its illegality not in its
profitability . Il- legal cocaine demand is a great incentive to produce co- caine in the world, but its production is
concentrated in Colombia because it is illegal and Colombia has a com- petitive advantage in illegal activities.
AT: Columbian Instability
Their impact is overstated --- drug trade isn’t responsible for Columbian instability
Lee, 2 (Rensselaer W., contract researcher for the Congressional Research Service and a senior fellow at FPRI, “Perverse Effects
of Andean Counternarcotics Policy,” Orbis, Volume 46, Issue 3, Summer 2012, pg. 537-554, sciencedirect, Tashma)
To ascribe these trends entirely to the pathologies of international drug policy would be
unfair. The United States did not invent Colombia’s modern-day guerrilla problem. Colombian
diversification into heroin was partly a response to growing saturation of the U.S. cocaine
market, a trend already apparent in the early 1990s. Criminals, rogues, and scoundrels in various
guises have always flourished throughout the Caribbean basin. Nevertheless, the “drug war” has often solved
nothing from a supply-reduction standpoint, and in some instances has exacerbated these problems. The deteriorating political–
military situation in Colombia in particular poses a major threat to U.S. security interests. For these reasons, alternatives to the
current failed supply-side approaches to fighting drugs must urgently be sought.
*Mexico*
US K to Mexico
US engagement with Mexico is key to defend against drug cartel instability
Broder, 9 senior editor for defense and foreign policy at Roll Call. Before joining Congressional Quarterly in 2002, he worked
as an editor at National Public Radio in Washington and as a foreign correspondent for the Associated Press, NBC News and the
Chicago Tribune, based in Jerusalem, Beirut and Beijing. graduate of the University of Virginia and studied international relations at
Harvard University. (Jonathan, “Mexico's Drug War: Violence Too Close to Home” 3/9/09
http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-000003069323.) // czhang
“The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police and judicial infrastructure are all under
sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels,” the report said. “How that internal conflict
turns out over the next several years will
have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state.Ӧ Just
listed the threat the drug gangs pose to
Mexico’s stability as one of top challenges facing Obama. He urged the president to strengthen
ties with Mexican intelligence to deal with the situation there. “As bad as it is — and it is bad,” Hayden said,
“there’s an opportunity here.”¶ ¶ Even Obama’s director of national intelligence, Dennis C. Blair, has chimed in, telling
Congress last month that the Mexican government already has lost control over some parts of its
country. “The corruptive influence and increasing violence of Mexican drug cartels,” Blair told the
Senate Select Intelligence Committee on Feb. 12, “impedes Mexico City’s ability to govern parts of its country.”
before he departed in January as director of the CIA, Michael V. Hayden
Mexico shares a border with the U.S. this magnifies the link
Carpenter, 09 (Ted Galen, senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato
Institute, contributing editor to the National Interest, editorial boards of Mediterranean
Quarterly and the Journal of Strategic Studies, Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from the
University of Texas, "The International War on Drugs", CATO Handbook for Policymakers”,
CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbookpolicymakers/2009/9/hb111-58.pdf, JKahn)
Mexico is a major source of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine for the U.S. market, as
well as the principal transit and distribution point for cocaine coming in from South America. For years, people
both inside and outside Mexico have worried that the country might descend into the maelstrom of
corruption and violence that plagued the chief drug-source country in the Western Hemisphere, Colombia, from the early
1980s to the early years of this century. There are growing signs that the ‘‘Colombi- anization’’ of Mexico is now
becoming a reality . That tragic prospect is a direct result of Washington’s policy of drug prohibition. The enormous potential
profit attracts the most violence-prone criminal elements. It is a truism that when drugs are outlawed, only outlaws will traffic in
drugs. If Mexico goes down the same path that Colombia did, the consequences to the United States will be much more severe.
Colombia is relatively far away, but Mexico shares a border with the United States and is closely
linked to this country economically through the North American Free Trade Agreement. Chaos in Mexico is already
spilling over the border and adversely affecting the United States—especially the southwestern states of Arizona, New Mexico, and
Texas. The prominence of the drug trade in Mexico has mushroomed over the past 15 years. One consequence of the increased
prominence of the Mexi- can cartels is a spike in violence. Even supposed victories
in the drug war prove to be mixed
blessings at best. As Stratfor, a risk-assessment consult- ing organization, notes: ‘‘Inter-cartel violence tends to swing upward
after U.S. or Mexican authorities manage to weaken or disrupt a given organization. At any point, if rival groups sense an
organization might not be able to defend its turf, they will swoop in to battle not only the incumbent group, but also each other for
control.’’
K World Trade
Mexican drug gangs are the center of world drug trade – one of the biggest
industries
Luhnow, 9 writer for Wall Street Journal (David, “Saving Mexico” December 26, 2009
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704254604574614230731506644.html) // czhang
Today, the world's most successful drug trafficking organizations are found in
Mexico. Unlike
drug gangs are a one-stop shop
for four big-time illicit drugs: marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamines and heroin. Mexico is the
world's second biggest producer of marijuana (the U.S. is No. 1), the major supplier of
methamphetamines to the U.S., the key transit point for U.S.-bound cocaine from South
America and the hemisphere's biggest producer of heroin.¶ This diversification helps them
absorb shocks from the business. Sales of cocaine in the U.S., for instance, slipped slightly from 2006 to 2008. But that
decline was more than made up for by growing sales of methamphetamines.¶ In many ways, illegal drugs are the most
successful Mexican multinational enterprise, employing some 450,000 Mexicans and
generating about $20 billion in sales, second only behind the country's oil industry and
automotive industry exports. This year, Forbes magazine put Mexican drug lord Joaquin "Shorty" Guzman as No. 701 on
Colombian drug gangs in the 1980s, who relied almost entirely on cocaine, Mexican
the world's list of billionaires.
K Cocaine Trade
Mexico is the center of cocaine trade – they are vital to global drug trade
Stewart 1/3/13 Vice President of Analysis at Security Weekly, writing for Stratfor (Scott, “Mexico's
Cartels and the Economics of Cocaine” Security Weekly, Stratfor http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexicos-cartels-and-economicscocaine) // czhang
As U.S. interdiction efforts, aided by improvements in aerial and maritime surveillance, curtailed much of the Caribbean cocaine flow in the 1980s and
1990s, and as the
Colombian and U.S. governments dismantled the Colombian cartels, the land routes
through Central America and Mexico became more important to the flow of cocaine. It is far more
difficult to spot and seize contraband moving across the busy U.S.-Mexico border than it is to spot contraband flowing across the Caribbean. ¶ This
increase in the importance of Mexico allowed the Mexican cartels to gain leverage in negotiations with
their Central American and Colombian partners and to secure a larger share of the profit. Indeed, by the mid-1990s the
increasing importance of Mexican organizations to the flow of cocaine to the United States
allowed the Mexican cartels to become the senior partners in the business relationship.¶ In a
quest for an even larger portion of the cocaine profit chain, the Mexican cartels have increased their activities in
Central and South America over the last two decades. The Mexicans have cut out many of the middlemen in Central
America who used to transport cocaine from South America to Mexico and sell it to the Mexican cartels. Their efforts to consolidate
their control over Central American smuggling routes continue today.¶ This move meant that the
Mexican cartels assumed responsibility for the losses incurred by transporting cocaine from
South America to Mexico, but it also permitted them to reap an increasing portion of the profit pool.
Instead of making a set profit of perhaps $1,000 or $1,500 per kilogram of cocaine smuggled into the United States, the Mexican cartels can now buy a
kilogram of cocaine for $2,200 or less in South America and sell it for $24,000 or more to their partners in the United States.¶ But the expansion of the
Mexican cartels did not stop in Central America. According to South American authorities, the Mexican cartels are now becoming more involved in the
processing of cocaine from coca leaf in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. There have also been reports of seizures of coca paste being smuggled to cocaine
processing laboratories in Honduras and Guatemala. The use of these Central American processing laboratories, which are run by Mexican cartels,
appears to be a reaction to the increased efforts of the Colombian National Police to crack down on cocaine laboratories and the availability of cocaine
processing chemicals. ¶ U.S. counternarcotics officials report that today
the Mexican cartels are the largest players in the
global cocaine trade and are steadily working to grab the portion of cocaine smuggling not yet
under their control. But the efforts of the Mexican cartels to increase their share of the cocaine profit are not confined to the
production side; they have also expanded their involvement in the smuggling of South American cocaine
to Europe and Australia and have established a footprint in African, Asian and European
countries. Furthermore, they have stepped up their activities in places like the Dominican
Republic and Haiti in an attempt to increase their share of the cocaine being smuggled through
the Caribbean to the U.S. market. As seen by recent operations launched by U.S. law enforcement, such as Operation Xcellerator,
Operation Chokehold and Operation Imperial Emperor, the Mexican cartels have also been increasing their presence
at distribution points inside the United States, such as Chicago, Atlanta and Dallas, in an effort
to increase their share of the cocaine profit chain inside the United States.¶ While marijuana sales have
always been an important financial source for the Mexican cartels, the large profits from the cocaine trade are what have permitted the cartels to
become as powerful as they are today. The
billions of dollars of profit to be had from the cocaine trade have
not only motivated much of the Mexican cartels' global expansion but have also financed it. Cocaine
profits allow the Mexican cartels to buy boats and planes, hire smugglers and assassins ("sicarios") and bribe government officials.
Econ High
Mexico’s economy is booming despite drug violence
O’Neil & Gwertzman, 12 – *Douglas Dillon Fellow for Latin America Studies, Council on Foreign Relations AND
**Consulting Editor, CFR.org (Shannon & Bernard, “Mexico's Burgeoning Economy Amid Drug Violence,” Council
on Foreign Relations, 20 February 2012, http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-burgeoning-economy-amid-drugviolence/p27386)//BI
Despite an escalation in drug violence and thousands of people killed in drug-related murders in Mexico in
recent years, Mexico's economy and the tourism industry are thriving, says CFR's Mexico expert,
Shannon K. O'Neil. "Mexico was the hardest hit in Latin America" as a result of the global
financial crisis, she says, "but it's recovered quite quickly, and in part it's been due to a huge boom in manufacturing
along the border tied to U.S. companies and to U.S. consumers." On the contentious issue of Mexican immigrants in the United
States, she says fewer Mexicans are immigrating to the United States because of a burgeoning economy and a demographic shift.
More broadly, one reason the two countries have failed to find a solution, she says, is because while Mexicans see immigration as a
foreign policy issue, the United States continues to treat it as a domestic one. There have been reports about Mexico's thriving
economy amid continuing drug violence. Does this sort of ambivalence truly exist in Mexico right now? It is true. Mexico is a
place that's seen a huge escalation in violence. Under President Felipe Calderon over the last five years, we've seen
almost 50,000 people killed in drug-related murders. But at the same time, Mexico's economy has actually
been doing quite well since the end of the global recession. Mexico was the hardest hit in Latin America but it's
recovered quite quickly, and in part it's been due to a huge boom in manufacturing along the border tied to U.S. companies and to
U.S. consumers.
Econ Ev Indict
Their studies are flawed – they don’t take into account aggregate costs and benefits
Rios, 8 – PhD candidate in Government and a doctoral fellow in Inequality and Criminal Justice at the Harvard Kennedy School,
studying drug trafficking, violence and corruption in Mexico (Viridiana, “Evaluating the economic impact of Mexico’s drug
trafficking industry,” Graduate Students Political Economy Workshop, Institute for Quantitative Social Sciences, Harvard
University, Spring 2008, http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios2008_MexicanDrugMarket.pdf)//BI
It is well known that the drug trade in Mexico represents one of the biggest industries in that
country, accounting for as much as $991 million dollars per year. The 2006 drug seizure of over $206 million in cash, the fortune
of Zhenli Yen Gon, an ostentatious drug smuggler, was approximately equivalent to the whole budget of the Mexican General
Attorney Office for three months (CDHCU 2006) and was the largest seizure of drug money anywhere in the world (Shenon 2007).
That the drug trade generates so much revenue in Mexico raises a set of crucial questions about the
rationale and efficiency of that country’s efforts to eliminate the industry. If -as some have estimated (Chabat
as cited by Ánderson 2007)- drug trafficking is one of the ten most important industries of the country, a serious analysis should be
undertaken before dismembering it. After all, drug dollars are also dollars and drugs also an industry, one that introduces large
capital flows into the country, generating employment, fostering consumption and sprinkling resources to other legal industries [for
example, the construction industry of many cities are boosted by the exotic housing preferences of drug smugglers (López 2007)]. In
other words, is Mexico winning or losing by having such a successful -but illegal- industry as part of
its economy? An analysis of the aggregate costs and benefits of Mexican drug traffic is absent in
the literature. Questions that require analysis include: How many dollars flow into the Mexican economy and to what
extent do these flows foster economic growth? Who are the winners of this industry? How do the poor and
isolated peasants fair? How are violence, corruption and drug abuse affecting the productivity of the Mexican economy? How much
is the country losing by being perceived internationally as the home of world famous drug dealers and corrupted politicians? By
analyzing and reviewing the literature about the consequences of drug trafficking in Mexico, this paper tackles the
aforementioned questions,
contributing to the formal study of a field that has been relatively
ignored. This work has two contributions. First, it evaluates the economic costs and benefits of the
Mexican drug industry to determine whether or not it is rational to suppress it. While some studies
have evaluated the impacts of drug profits in agriculture (Resa Nestares 2001, Marín 2002), the costs of drug abuse (CIDAD 2004),
the costs of violence and crime (Londoño and Guerrero 2000), the cost of corruption (WB 2004) and the estimated amount of
general illegal-drug cash flows (Reuter 2001, Toro 1995, Loret de Mola 2001, Resa Nestares 2003), none have evaluated the
aggregate economic impact of this industry. Second, the paper formally analyzes the Mexican drug industry, in
particular the profits and revenues generated through its productive chain. Similar analyses
have been undertaken in Colombia (Thoumi 1995, Lee 1989, Sarmiento 1991), but not for Mexico. Given Mexico’s
dominance in the drug industry, such an evaluation is necessary. [almost all the cocaine produced in Colombia enters the US with
the help of Mexican cartels (UNODC 2007a), and Mexico produces more marijuana and poppy than Colombia (ONDCP 2003)].
This paper is the first attempt to understand the fight against drug trafficking in Mexico with a
formal cost-benefit analysis. Contrary to the US, where anti-drug efforts have been rationally justified in terms of
productivity losses (ONDCP, 2000), addiction rates (ONDCP 2003), or the potential costs of alternative policies (e.g. MacCoun and
Reuter, 2001; Sabet 2006), the Mexican government has failed to formally frame the reasons for fighting this extremely costly war,
offering only vague references to violence and “social fragmentation” (e.g. Informe Presidencial 2006). The main hypothesis of this
paper is that Mexico’s efforts against the illegal drug trade are worth the costs because, even
accounting for all the economic benefits generated by drug traffic (employment, cash flows and
investments), extensive negative externalities (corruption, violence, productivity losses, and increase demand)
produced by drug industry generate an aggregate negative impact. The paper also claims that, although in
the aggregate drug traffic has had a negative economic impact, drug flows may be beneficial for local, less diversified economies such
as Mexican rural communities dedicated to poppy and marijuana production. This is no surprise since drug smugglers represent a
critical source of employment, income, and consumption.
US Econ IL
Mexican decline collapses the U.S. economy
Sarukhan, 12 (Arturo, Ambassador of Mexico to the United States, “Mexico ‘Critically Important’ to US Economy,” Wilson
Center, 2/24/12, video testimony, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/mexico-%E2%80%98critically-important%E2%80%99-tous-economy, Tashma)
It’s an incredibly strong relationship, for starters, because a lot of people sometimes don’t stop to think that we
trade one
billion dollars a day of goods in both directions. Second, that Mexico is the United States’ depending on crate
loads that we are either third, or second largest trading partner with the United States. China and Mexico have been
sort of in second or third, and we are the second largest buyer of U.S. exports on the face of the Earth. Depending what your area of
geographic expertise or fondness is, if you think of Latin America, Mexico buys more U.S. exports than all of Latin America and the
Caribbean combined. If you’re focused on Europe, Mexico buys more U.S. exports than the combined purchase of the
U.K., Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. If you’re focused on the new, sexy Asia-Pacific, Mexico is buying more U.S. exports than
Japan and China combined. We buy more exports than all
the four BRIC countries put together , so it’s a very
compelling story. 26 states in America today have Mexico as their #1 or #2 export market, and there are ten million U.S.
jobs directly related to trade with Mexico in those states. So, it is very vibrant, very important to weigh economic
relationship. Mexico’s macroeconomic fundamentals, when the world is hurting still and still facing some of the challenges from the
global recession, Mexico growth last year was five percent with 3.1 [percent] inflation and four percent unemployment. These are
very compelling numbers. I think that the macroeconomic fundamentals of Mexico are sound, and this
two-way successful relationship that we have developed is
prosperity of Americans.
critically important for the social well-being and the
Cooperation Key
Mexico diplomacy and cooperation are key – corruption and ineffective forces
mean U.S. action is key
Castañeda, 10 (Jorge, Ph.D. in Economic History from the University of Paris, B.A. from
Princeton University, professors at National Autonomous University of Mexico, the University
of California, Berkeley, Princeton University, New York University, and the University of
Cambridge, Bernard Schwartz fellow at The New America Foundation, “Mexico’s Failed Drug
War”, CATO Institute, 5/6/2010, http://www.cato.org/publications/economic-developmentbulletin/mexicos-failed-drug-war, JKahn)
What is going on with Mexico’s drug war? Why are we in our current mess, and what are the possibilities of
getting out of it in any reasonable time frame? We are in this mess today , as opposed to over the last 40 or 50 years,
because when the current president, Felipe Calderón, took office over three years ago, he felt that he had no choice but
to declare a full-fledged, no-holds-barred war on drugs. He declared this war after a three-month transition
period, which was very rocky because of the controversy surrounding the elections. And he declared this war because he had the
impression that it was as if a patient had come to him and said, “I have a stomachache.” Thinking it was a problem of appendicitis,
he opened the patient up and found that the entire abdominal cavity was invaded by cancer. He had no option other than to go in
with everything he had to fix it. This was the country Calderón said he found. He had to declare a war on drugs
because the drug cartels had reached a level of power, wealth, violence, and penetration of the state that made the situation
untenable. Why the War on Drugs? Why did President Calderón declare the war on drugs? The first reason was violence.
In
the last year of President Vicente Fox’s administration there had probably been more incidents of
violence related to drugs in some states of Mexico than in previous years. This is a hard judgment to make because only in the last
15 years has Mexico been a country where there is a real congress, where there is a free press, and where there is some sort of
accountability and transparency. We don’t really know how many people were killed in drug wars in the 1970s and the 1980s
because there was nobody to count them. We know how many were killed in 2003, 2004, 2007, or 2008, because we now have a free
press, we have an opposition in congress, we have international monitors, we have Human Rights Watch, we have the Drug
Enforcement Administration, and we have all sorts of people doing those jobs. Since we didn’t have that in the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s, we really don’t know if there is that much more violence now than there was then. However, President Calderón had
the impression that there was more violence when he assumed office and so he had to take on the drug cartels for
that reason. The second reason is that Calderón also thought there was more corruption now — or three years ago —
than before. However, the notion that drug-related corruption is worse today than 30 or 40 years ago is not really that clear since,
again, we do not know how much corruption there was before. Still, it’s probably true that there is less corruption stemming from
drugs today because there is less corruption, in general, in Mexico today for many reasons, including politics, globalization, and
NAFTA. Therefore, that reason was a difficult one to accept at face value. A third explanation given by the president was that the
drug cartels had penetrated the political arena at the local, state, and federal levels to such an extent that Mexico was losing control
of parts of its territory. Again, this is a tough call to make in a country where we have had that type of penetration for many years.
Finally, President Calderón has argued that Mexico has ceased being simply a transit country and has become a country of drug
consumption. That notion struck a chord in Mexican public opinion: “We are not doing this for the Americans
anymore; we are doing it for ourselves because drugs are reaching our children.” The problem with this argument is that the
government has not been able to come up with any statistics over the last three years to substantiate the claim. In fact, most of the
figures the government does provide, like the number of users, occasional users, addicts, and so on, show that, at best, there has
been a very small increase in the number of users, whether they are occasional users or addicts. One shortcoming of the numbers
that the government generally uses is that they only quantify “users,” without breaking down the data between occasional,
recreational, or addicted users. “Users” of drugs have gone up from 307,000 to 465,000 over the last seven years (2002—2008),
which in a country of 110 million people, is not a huge drug problem. Mexico is, by and large, today a middle-class country, with
approximately 60 percent of the country ranked as such. In a typical middle-class country you have much more than 0.4 percent of
the population that has used drugs. Fighting the War Who is waging this war? This is a complicated question. We have an
army in Mexico, the purpose of which is not to be a fighting army, but to participate in rescue efforts when some natural
disaster strikes the country. Mexico’s political system has, since the 1920s, deliberately ensured that the
army is useless . There is a tremendous consensus in the country on this matter. We want an army that is corrupt, poorly
trained, poorly equipped, and totally useless. Why? Because those armies don’t overthrow their governments. We
have not even had an attempted military coup in Mexico since 1938. An old, distinguished Mexican politician, Jesús Reyes Heroles,
who in the 1960s was head of Pemex, the stateowned oil company, once told me that one day there was a riot somewhere in the
country, and the minister of defense came to him and said, “I need more gas for my trucks.” Mr. Reyes Heroles refused, so the
minister of defense went to complain to the president about why he couldn’t have any more gas for his trucks. The president then
called the head of Pemex and asked him about the situation. Mr. Reyes Heroles said, “Look, Mr. President, I’ll do whatever you want,
but standing orders here in Pemex are never to give the army more than two days’ of gasoline. If you want me to give them more, I’ll
do it. But this is the way things operate.” It’s not as stupid as it sounds; it was actually very wise. The caveat is that you can’t ask such
an army to go to war because that’s not its business. Therefore, you
have an army that is totally unprepared to
fight a war against drug cartels . The second question is who else could be fighting this war if we don’t have an effective
army? What about the police? The problem is that Mexico doesn’t have a national police force like Chile or Colombia. We have
county and state police. Each of the 2,500 counties and 32 states in Mexico has its own police force, and they are the ones fighting
the war on drugs. The problem is that local policemen go through an identity crisis every day regarding who they work for. Do they
work for the drug cartels or the citizens of the country? They work for the drug cartels — and everybody in Mexico knows that.
Clearly, you can’t ask them to fight the drug cartels because they are part of the drug cartels. Therefore, Mexico has an army
which is not ready to fight a war on drugs, and a police force that is not willing to do so . The
remaining alternative is the United States, but that option is quite complicated. Historically, Mexico has always
wanted U.S. support for law-enforcement efforts, and the United States has been willing to give us such support,
but we want it on our terms, not on U.S. terms. And, since approximately the end of the Vietnam War, the United States has placed a
series of restrictions on military aid that involve human rights provisions, military supervision, and instruction, among others. That
means that we can’t get American aid on our terms, and thus it has been very limited. Who then is fighting the war on
drugs? We don’t really know . Another problem the president and the government faced has to do with the Powell
Doctrine. During the Gulf War, General Colin Powell, then head of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, outlined what came to be known as
the Powell Doctrine for U.S. involvement in conflicts abroad, and it establishes several conditions: you need to have a definition of
victory, you need to have overwhelming force, you need to have an exit strategy, and you need to have the support and
understanding of the people. If you apply the Powell doctrine to Mexico’s war on drugs, you will quickly notice that first, there is no
overwhelming force — as a matter of fact, there is no force. Second, there is no exit strategy, because there is no way to know
whether you have won the war on drugs or not. Third, there is no foreseeable way out of this war. And fourth, you have public
support for this endeavor only as long as you are not affecting the daily lives of the people, and even though the war on drugs
continues to have the support of most Mexicans, that support is quickly fading locally. If you ask someone what he or she thinks
about the army taking over Ciudad Juárez or Cancún, that person would probably say that it is a good idea. But if you ask the people
of Ciudad Juárez or Cancún whether they liked the massacre last week in the penitentiary or whether they liked seeing the severed
head of the newly appointed chief of security displayed by the side of the road three weeks ago, they will say they are not so happy
about it. Unrealistic Expectations of U.S. Change Everyone in Mexico knows that we can’t win this war. The government,
acknowledging this, has begun to say that drug trafficking and violence can’t be solved until the United
States does two things, knowing full well that those are impossible. One is reducing the demand for drugs . It is
well known that U.S. demand for drugs over the past 40 years has remained pretty much stable, although
the types of drugs consumed have changed: marijuana was the drug of the 1960s and 1970s, cocaine and crack were the drugs of the
1990s, and methamphetamine is the drug of the first decade of the 21st century. However, the overall number of users has remained
pretty much the same. If the United States hasn’t been able to reduce drug consumption in 40 years,
it’s very unlikely that it will be able to do it now. The first Mexican president to realize this was Gustavo Díaz Ordaz,
in 1969, when Richard Nixon told him “Yes, you’re right, absolutely, we have to do something on the demand side.” Since then, every
American president has recognized the need to do something about drug demand, but nothing has happened because it’s not
feasible. The second request to the U.S. government is to stop the traffic of weapons from the United States to Mexico because — the
Mexican authorities claim — all of the violence and all of the killing is done with American guns. In fact, we
only know with certainty that about 18 percent of guns come from the United States, according to Mexican and U.S. sources.1 The
rest is surely coming from Central America, countries of the former Soviet Union, and beyond. And as countries as diverse as Brazil,
Paraguay, Somalia, and Sudan attest — all countries with a higher arms per capita than Mexico — you don’t need a border with the
United States to gain easy access to guns. Nevertheless, the possibilities of really limiting the sales of weapons in the United States is
not imminent, to put it mildly. Moreover, asking the United States to stop arms trafficking from north to south is like asking Mexico
to control its border from south to north, whether it is for drugs, people, or anything else. It’s not going to happen. What Can Mexico
Do? President Calderón, in response to a recent report by former presidents Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, Fernando Henrique Cardoso
of Brazil, and César Gaviria of Colombia calling for the decriminalization of marijuana, said that such a move would condemn entire
generations of Mexicans to destitution and despair.2 It seems that he didn’t understand that what these former presidents were
calling for was decriminalization of drugs everywhere, not just in their own countries, but in particular, in large drug-consuming
nations such as the United States. There is no possible way that Mexico could get away with unilaterally decriminalizing possession,
commerce, and consumption of drugs in Mexico if the United States didn’t do the same thing, and in that sense, president Calderón
is right. Not only would Mexico become a meeting point for junkies from all over the world — and particularly from the United
States — but the real issue would be the pressure from the U.S. government not to do that, which would be unbearable for Mexico.
Does that mean that Mexico cannot do anything until the United States does something , and that, in the
meantime, we have to continue with this fratricidal war on drugs? I don’t think so. There are things Mexico can do, although they are
controversial even in Mexico. First, we need to go back to the modus vivendi that the government, society, and the cartels had over
the past 50 years. There was no explicit deal or negotiation, but there was an understanding, and those tacit rules were followed by
all sides. They were not ideal rules, and every now and then there were screw-ups: we would have to hand somebody over to the
United States as a scapegoat, or we would have a problem with the United States that we had to fix. This could be shocking to many
who might wonder how a democratic government could reach an understanding with criminals. Well, Mexico would not be the first
country in which this happened. We also have to push for drug decriminalization in Mexico and in the United States. Even though
we can’t do it unilaterally in Mexico, we can’t be silent about it either. This is not just a U.S. decision, since it affects everybody —
especially Mexico — and if there is one country in the world that feels the effects of what the United States does in any field or
endeavor, it is Mexico. We need to move in those directions, even though they are controversial and complicated. Last year, some
7,600 people died in drug-related episodes in Mexico — more than a thousand deaths more than in 2008. And the death rate in
2008 was, in turn, double that of the previous year. Mexico is paying an enormous price to fight a war which is going nowhere,
which we are not winning, which we cannot win, and which the United States does not want to fight in its own territory, but wants
others to fight elsewhere. We should find other solutions with the United States, not against the United States.
*Venezuela*
Cooperation Key
Collapse of cooperation means the impact is inevitable
Kraul, 09 (Chris, special correspondent the L.A. Times, “U.S. condemns Venezuela's anti-drug
efforts”, L.A. Times, 7/21/2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/21/world/fg-venezdrugs21, JKahn)
A breakdown in anti-drug cooperation between Venezuela and the United States has
contributed to an alarming surge in cocaine trafficking from Venezuela, according to a report issued
Monday by the U.S. Government Accountability Office. The volume of drugs passing through Venezuela
more than quadrupled from 66 tons in 2004 to 287 tons in 2007, the GAO said. U.S.-Venezuelan counternarcotics cooperation ended in 2005, as friction intensified between the Bush administration and leftist
President Hugo Chavez. Although Venezuela was already a major corridor for Colombian cocaine before Chavez
took office in 1999, the volume has increased to the point that in 2007, one-quarter of all Colombian cocaine produced passed
through Venezuela, according to estimates. The GAO said trafficking has increased in part because of Chavez's alleged tolerance of
Colombian rebels in Venezuelan territory and because of widespread corruption in his military and police ranks. "Venezuela is
caught between the world's largest producer of cocaine, Colombia, and largest consumer, the United States," the report concludes.
"Nevertheless, absent greater initiative by the Venezuelan government to resume counter-narcotics
cooperation with the United States, U.S. efforts to address the increasing flow of cocaine
through Venezuela will continue to be problematic ." Venezuela denies it has failed to hold up its end of the drug
fight, saying that it only chooses to no longer work with the United States. In an interview Monday, Venezuela's ambassador in
Washington, Bernardo Alvarez, said the report is "poor analysis that relies on old news and slanted sources." "It's another reflection
of a Cold War mentality against Venezuela. Colombia and the United States are exempted from blame. According to the report, it's
all Venezuela's fault," Alvarez said. Venezuela seizes 28% of all drugs passing through, a higher rate than the United States, Alvarez
said. Luis Fernandez, assistant director of Venezuela's anti-narcotics police, said the country has seized 25 drug-ferrying airplanes
and 30 tons of cocaine this year, and has invested in a $250-million Chinese radar system to detect drug flights. "We reject this
unilateral report from a country that pretends to be the judge of the world," Fernandez said. The report was commissioned in early
2008 by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee to look into allegations that Venezuela was becoming a cocaine trafficking
hub. Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) said in an e-mailed statement that the report's details reflect "corruption in that country's
government" and "require at a minimum a comprehensive review of U.S. policy towards Venezuela." In any case, the GAO report
amounts to a harsh official condemnation of what the U.S. sees as Chavez's failure to stem the rising flow of drugs across Venezuela.
American officials usually prefer to discuss the issue off the record for fear of exacerbating already troubled relations between the
countries. After hitting a nadir last year, when each country expelled the other's ambassador, U.S.-Venezuelan relations have
improved since President Obama took office, and full diplomatic relations were restored early this month. But the subject of
narcotics is likely to remain a thorny one. In 2005, Chavez reassigned more than 30 agents who had received training in the U.S.,
forbidding joint undercover sting operations and recalling intelligence officers working in the United States. He has also winnowed
the number of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents by not renewing their work visas, referring to the agents as spies.
Former Venezuelan anti-drug czar Mildred Camero said Monday that once-excellent cooperation between the countries began to go
downhill after the short-lived April 2002 coup against Chavez, in which the fiery president believes the United States had a hand.
The GAO report accuses the Chavez government of throwing a "lifeline" to drug-trafficking Colombian rebel groups by affording
them "significant support and safe haven" along the border. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, is thought to
control as much as 60% of Colombian cocaine production and trafficking, the report says. In condemning Chavez for supporting the
rebel group, the report relies on the Colombian government's representations of e-mails recovered in the laptop of FARC
commander Raul Reyes, who was killed by Colombian armed forces in a March 2008 raid into Ecuador. Although Interpol declared
a selection of the e-mails as legitimate, Chavez denies giving the FARC refuge and claims the e-mails were part of an elaborate
disinformation program to discredit him.
At: Failed State – Alt Cause
Oil prices – not cooperation – determine instability which is inevitable
Nagel, 5/16/13, (Juan, author for Foreign Policy, Venezuela blogger for Transitions, “Is
Venezuela becoming a failed state?”, 5/16/2013, Foreign Policy,
http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/16/is_venezuela_becoming_a_failed_stat
e, JKahn)
Venezuela remains mired in a political and economic crisis that shows no signs of letting up . But
while street protests, soaring inflation, scarcity, and skyrocketing crime are massive headaches , the
government can count on still-high oil prices to soothe the pain a bit. The question that begs asking is: How will Venezuela
maintain stability if oil prices drop ? A recent report by the International Energy Agency underscores the challenges the
country faces in the short term. The United States has made huge progress in oil extraction thanks to fracking technology. It is set to
become the world's largest oil producer by the year 2020, and the global spread of fracking is bound to significantly increase
international recoverable oil reserves in the near future. The agency crows that fracking is creating a "supply shock that is
sending ripples around the world." This obviously matters to Venezuela, a country that exports large amounts of oil and
little else. Venezuela is increasingly reliant on high oil prices to maintain some semblance of
stability. A prolonged drop in oil prices will undoubtedly shake the foundations of the petro-state to
its core. Being an oil producer, Venezuela can earn money in two ways: by sustaining high prices, or by increasing production.
(Obviously, if it can do both things, it has hit the jackpot). Fracking threatens the first, and the country has seriously failed on the
latter. Venezuela produces less oil now than it did in 1999, the year Hugo Chávez first came to power. Worryingly, the IEA sees few
prospects for increased production. For example, in spite ofincreasing investment to $22 billion last year, Venezuelan production
barely budged. State oil giant PDVSA vows to increase production by 3 million barrels per day in the next six years, but the IEA
believes that a combination of the company's inefficiency and its heavy debt burden means the increase will actually be a tenth of
that amount. Two other developments conspire against the future viability of Venezuela's oil industry. The country is increasing
sales of crude oil to China, as part of a geo-strategic move the Chávez administration embarked on many years ago. The problem is
that the oil being shipped has already been paid for, and the government has also already spent the money. The other issue is
Venezuela's creaking refining infrastructure. Last year, following several accidents at its refineries, Venezuela became a net importer
of gasoline and other refined products. In the last part of the year alone, PDVSA bought refined products for $1.5 billion, only to turn
around and give it away for practically nothing, thanks to the heavy subsidies that characterize its internal market. The consensus is
that Venezuela needs high oil prices just to stay afloat. But if the fracking oil boom results in low oil prices, what does the future hold
for the South American country? Sadly, Venezuelans have nothing else to fall back on. Its private industry is a shambles, and the
country is even importing toilet paper. Years of populism have left the state crippled and heavily in debt. The public deficit reached a
whopping 15 percent of GDP last year, even in the context of high oil prices. Most of the spending came in the form of entitlements
and subsidies that will not be easily eliminated. Furthermore, the country's current power clique seems particularly inept in dealing
with the complicated economic and political conditions it has inherited. Nicolás Maduro's only claim to legitimacy is that Hugo
Chávez chose him. Now he is left with the thankless task of dealing with the Chávez mess. He has surrounded himself with a Cabinet
composed of many of the same old faces, and neither his policies nor his rhetoric suggest any shift toward the type of solutions that
could steer Venezuela away from the precipice. The problem for Venezuelans is that there is no great reformer in the governing
party. And while opposition leader Henrique Capriles would undoubtedly steer Venezuela toward greater economic freedoms, there
is little he would be able to do if the price of oil were to tank. A long period of low oil prices spells doom for
Venezuela's political sustainability. Without high oil revenues, basic services would practically disappear, and the
potential for instability would be enormous. Already the country is stuck in a state of undeclared in civil war, and
there are claims that drug smuggling has permeated the higher echelons of the government . Venezuela
has so far avoided the fate of its neighbor Colombia, a country still deep in a long civil war with Marxist
guerrillas and drug cartels . This is largely due to the deep pockets oil has afforded the government, which allowed for state
presence even in the most remote corners of the country. It is hard to see how that presence could be maintained if oil rents were to
dry up significantly, and for a prolonged period. This could lead to the type of problems that have bedeviled Colombia, or even
poorer neighboring failed states such as Haiti. Even though its problems are of its own making, the thought of a large, failed state in
the heart of the Western Hemisphere should trouble the continent's leaders.
*Cuba*
Cooperation S
Despite current barriers to relations, the US and Cuba could still cooperate on
drug trafficking measures
Lee, 9 senior fellow at FPRI (Foreign Policy Research Institute), an authority on international crime, narcotics, and nuclear
security issues. Stanford Ph.D., President of Global Advisory Services, a consulting firm (Rens, April 2009, “Cuba, Drugs, and U.S.Cuban Relations” https://www.fpri.org/articles/2009/04/cuba-drugs-and-us-cuban-relations) // czhang
The United States and Cuba have a strong mutual interest in closing off trafficking routes in the western Caribbean and in
preventing attempts by Mexican and South American cocaine mafias to set up shop in Cuba proper. Yet they have
not entered
into a formal agreement to fight drugs – even though Havana maintains such agreements with at least 32 other
countries – and what cooperation exists occurs episodically, on a case-by-case basis. Washington and
Havana need to engage more fully on the issue, deploying intelligence and interdiction assets to
disrupt smuggling networks through and around Cuba. Washington hitherto has shied away from a deeper
relationship, fearing that it would lead to a political opening and confer a measure of legitimacy on the Castro regime. Yet current
strategic realities in the region and Havana's own willingness to engage in such a relationship, as
well as impending leadership changes in Cuba, argue for rethinking these concerns, even in the absence of
formal diplomatic ties.
Cooperation with Cuba solves drug trafficking
Lee, 9 – authority on international crime and narcotics and nuclear security issues, PhD from Stanford, senior fellow at the Foreign
Policy Research Institute, performed overseas contract assignments for the State Department, the Department of Energy, the World
Bank, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy and other agencies (Rensselaer, “Cuba, Drugs, and U.S.-Cuban
Relations,” Testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2005, https://www.fpri.org/docs/alt/testimony.20090429.lee_.cubadrugs.pdf)//BI
Now on the foreign policy front: looking back in time, narcotics-trafficking was a focal point of conflict in U.S.-
Cuban relations for most of the pre-1990 years, except for a brief period during the Carter administration. The
focus gradually shifted to cooperation in the 1990s, as the Cuban leadership ostensibly severed
connections to the international drug trade. Cooperation and information-sharing between the two
countries have netted a few high profile seizures, arrests, and extraditions, but all of this has occurred rather
episodically, without an umbrella agreement on counter-narcotics cooperation, (although Cuba has
concluded such agreements with many other countries inside and outside the hemisphere). Such an agreed framework
could set the stage for a more substantive level of engagement on drugs. For example, we could train
and equip Cuban Border Guards and Interior Ministry operatives, we could conduct joint naval
patrols with Cuba in the western Caribbean, we could coordinate investigation of regional trafficking
networks and suspicious financial transactions through Cuban banks and commercial entities, and we could
station DEA and FBI contingents in the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. We could also negotiate a shiprider agreement with the Cuban authorities, and possibly even the right to pursue drug-laden vessels and aircraft seeking safe haven
in Cuban territory. How far Havana and Washington would be willing to proceed in these directions is unclear, since the political
barriers on both sides are formidable. Yet the prospects for more productive collaboration against the
hemispheric drug threat seem a lot more promising today than in the past. In any event, failure to exploit
Cuba's law enforcement and intelligence assets to good advantage leaves a major gap in U.S. defenses
against drug trafficking through the Caribbean. Interdiction successes in Mexico seem likely to augment this flow down the
road, a further reason to closely monitor trafficking trends in a Caribbean country only 90 miles from U.S. shores. The drug
threat from Cuba seems destined to increase as the Castro regime's revolutionary order loses its hold
and appeal, as the island's economic ties with the outside world continue to expand, and as
criminally-inclined Cuban nationals seek alliances with South American and Mexican drug kingpins. Such an outcome is hardly in
the best interests of the United States and other countries in the hemisphere.
Combatting drug trafficking is one area of US-Cuban cooperation – positively
affects relations
Ramsey, 12 – researcher at Open Society Institute, writing regular analyses of political current events in Latin
America, former researcher and writer for InSight Crime, MA in Latin American Studies from the School of
International Service at American University (Geoffrey, “Drug Fight Builds US-Cuba Bridges,” InSight Crime, 2
February 2012, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/drug-fight-builds-us-cuba-bridges)//BI
Fighting drug trafficking is one of the few issues where the US and Cuba actually collaborate,
albeit on a small scale, though the true extent of drug smuggling on the island remains shrouded in mystery. At a Senate hearing on
international drug trafficking this week, lawmakers voiced concerns about the potential for Cuba to become
a major transit point for drugs into the US. While discussing a surge in drug smuggling through the Caribbean,
Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) warned that the island could turn into an important distribution platform for traffickers. Since
the 1959 revolution, Cuba has presented itself as taking a tough stance on organized crime, in part in
response to the fact that, under the Batista regime, the country was known as a haven for mob activity. During the latest meeting of
the Communist Party Congress, President Raul Castro issued a sharp critique of corruption on the island,
calling it "one of the main enemies of the revolution." It is likely that the kind of corruption Castro was referring to relates to bribery
and embezzlement rather than collusion with drug traffickers. The most recent high profile corruption case in the country, for
instance, involved a former minister who was convicted of accepting bribes from a Chilean businessman. But the country has
not been immune from the international drug trade. In 1989, General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, who fought
alongside Fidel Castro during the revolution, was executed along with three other military officers for their roles in a multi-million
dollar cocaine smuggling ring linked to Pablo Escobar’s Medellin Cartel. Nine years later, in 1998, Colombian officials
intercepted a 7.2 ton shipment of cocaine bound for Cuba. According to anonymous Colombian law
enforcement authority cited by the Miami Herald at the time, the large size of the shipment suggested that the route had been used
before. "No one dares to send seven tons at one blow unless they've tested the route,'' said the official. Since these incidents, there
has been evidence to suggest that drug trafficking is on the rise on the island, fueled by a small but growing domestic market. Cuba
first acknowledged the existence of this consumption in January 2003, and promised that there would be “no impunity” for anyone
caught trafficking illicit substances. Even with the resulting crackdown, the flow of drugs into the country appears to be increasing.
The government recently announced that they had seized nine tons of drugs in 2011, three times more than in 2010. The majority of
this was reportedly marijuana, with only a small percentage of cocaine and hashish. The site of much of this drug traffic is the rural
southeast province of Holguin. In 2005, the head of Cuba’s border security ministry told foreign press that Holguin is “the region of
Cuba most affected by drug trafficking.” Since then the area has become more popular with foreign tourists, providing both an
increased market for drugs and a ready supply of potential smugglers. Ultimately, it should be noted that the amount of
drugs that pass through Cuba on their way to the United States pales in comparison to the
country’s Caribbean neighbors, such as Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. For one thing, the 50-year-old embargo
makes it very difficult for drug smugglers to bring their product into the US. Additionally, drug trafficking is one of the
rare issues in which Cuban and American officials cooperate. As InSight Crime has reported, the US
Interests Section in Havana has a Coast Guard representative in Havana, and leaked diplomatic
cables reveal a level of engagement between the official and his counterparts in the Cuban
Ministry of Interior (MININT) on the issue of drug flights from Jamaica. This cooperation seems to be having an
effect on US-Cuba relations, at least as they relate to crime. While State Department officials under President Ronald
Reagan publicly accused Fidel Castro of attempting to traffic drugs in order to boost the Cuban economy, the State
Department’s 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) acknowledges that the
Cuban authorities have made major inroads against the drug trade. In a rare note of praise for
the Castro government, it notes that “Cuba’s counternarcotics efforts have prevented illegal
narcotics trafficking from having a significant impact on the island.”
The war on drugs is a rare area of cooperation between the US and Cuba
Rainsford, 12 – BBC Havana correspondent (Sarah, “Cuba and US find common ground in war on drugs,” BBC
News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19528416)//BI
The golden beaches of Cayo Cruz lie at the end of a long path through a nature reserve. It is an idyllic stretch of Cuba's
northern coast but this is key territory in the fight against international drug-tafficking.¶ Cuba sits
right between the world's major narcotics producers in South America and the biggest market for those
drugs, the United States.¶ The island has served as a bridge for traffickers in the past but in recent years it has been a barrier
to the illegal trade.¶ "We used to see a lot of suspicious boats here," Ardoldo Cisneros Pena recalls of the 1990s. He
is chief border guard in Cayo Cruz, where we were recently given rare access.¶ "There were almost daily drops into the sea," he says.
Small planes would bombard Cuban waters with packets of drugs, for speedboats to whisk to the US.¶
Today, the scene is tranquil. A young border guard scans the horizon from a mint-green watchtower. A stone slab below
reads "They shall not pass!" and "Viva Fidel!".¶ 'Mortal venom'¶ It was Fidel Castro, then president, who acknowledged a
surge in the use of Cuban waters by drug-traffickers in 1999. There was a nascent narcotics market too, as
smugglers' packages began washing up on the coast.¶ The government was compelled to act against what Mr Castro
calls a "mortal venom".¶ "We have more resources now, there is a helicopter for the border guards and more commitment
from the interior ministry, the military and the Cuban people too," Lt-Col Cisneros explains.¶ Operation Ache, as the
crackdown was known, also installed a new radar and recruited hundreds of unpaid "collaborators",
trained to keep their eyes peeled for suspicious parcels along the shore.¶ The drugs planes have now gone and
the main threat today is from speed-boat smugglers attempting to traffic marijuana north.¶ "They try to
escape us but if they can't, they try to dump the drugs because they know this activity is very heavily penalised
here," explains Lt-Col Mago Llanez Fernandez, who heads the team responsible for intercepting the smugglers at sea.¶ He admits
that up to 60% get away. Securing any abandoned narcotics is the priority here.¶ But as the boats flee,
Cuba now passes real-time data to the US coastguard so they can pick up the pursuit. It is rare
teamwork for two old, ideological enemies.¶ "I think this is important for Cuba, because we're preventing
the drugs reaching here, but it's also very important for the US and other countries in the area ," Lt-Col
Llanez points out.¶ With its very heavily policed society, it is no surprise Communist Cuba is not a big drugs market itself.¶ Scarce
supply means even a joint of marijuana can cost up to a week's wage ($5) for a state worker. But some smugglers have begun to see
potential here.¶ "We've seen a rise in attempts by Cuban Americans to bring drugs in, especially marijuana, because the prices are
high here," says police investigator Yoandrys Gonzalez Garcia.¶ "It's not a huge amount but it concerns us and we're increasing our
efforts to fight this."¶ 'Effective'¶ Between January and June this year, 24 attempts to traffic narcotics through the island's airports
were foiled, and these figures put Cuba on course to double the interdiction rates of 2010 and 2011.¶ The drugs were mostly destined
for sale in Cuba.¶ Police point to a surge in air traffic with the US since President Barack Obama removed travel restrictions for
Cuban-Americans. Lifting limits on remittances has also given some Cubans on the island greater spending power.¶ But the US is not
the only smuggling source.¶ Boris Adolfo Busto was arrested at Havana airport for drug-trafficking. His group was bringing in drug
"mules" from Ecuador, with up to a kilo of cocaine in their stomachs.¶ "There was a Cuban guy involved and he said he could sell
everything here, he said it'd be easy," Busto recalls when we meet at Havana's Condesa prison.¶ He is serving a 23-year sentence.¶ "I
think the authorities are very efficient," he says forlornly, adding that "dozens and dozens" of other smugglers have since joined him
behind bars.¶ Cuba has called for a formal co-operation agreement with the US to help stamp out
smuggling in both directions.¶ It already shares intelligence with European governments, and receives funding and
training.¶ "Our communication at sea gets good results but sadly we can't say the same about air traffic," Mr Gonzalez police
investigator complains of the Americans.¶ The US and Cuba severed diplomatic ties more than five decades ago.¶ But officials on
the ground acknowledge Cuba's contribution to the common war on drugs .¶ "[Without] a strong counterdrug stance, Cuba would be a prime area for drug smugglers, but its efforts are very effective," says Louis Orsini of the US
coastguard, adding that the US would find it "really challenging" if Cuba became a direct conduit for
illicit narcotics.¶ Today, though, the policy is zero tolerance and the interior ministry says nine tonnes of drugs were seized
from traffickers last year and incinerated.¶ Most were destined for the US market and beyond.
Cuba will say yes – they’ve already proposed cooperation
State Department, 10 (“Cuba,” International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, U.S. Department of State, 2010,
Academic OneFile)//BI
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs Bilateral Cooperation. The U.S. has no counternarcotics agreements with
Cuba and does not fund any GOC counternarcotics law enforcement initiatives. In July 2009, the
GOC stated it would present the U.S. with a proposed counternarcotics agreement, but as of
December, that proposal had not been presented to the U.S. Government. In the absence of normal bilateral relations, the USCG DIS
assigned at USINT Havana acts as the main conduit of counternarcotics cooperation with the host country on a case-by-case basis.
Cuban authorities have provided DIS continued access to Cuban counternarcotics efforts, including providing investigative criminal
information, such as the names of suspects and vessels; debriefings on drug trafficking cases; visits to the Cuban national canine
training center and antidoping laboratory in Havana; tours of CBG facilities; container x-ray equipment at the Port of Havana, and
access to meet with the Chiefs of Havana's INTERPOL and Customs offices. When scenarios dictate the need for first-hand visits to
wash-up or interdiction sites, Cuban authorities have readily involved the DIS in post-incident assessments and site visits, routinely
providing post-incident briefings and access to boats and aircraft involved in said cases. The Road Ahead. Cuba's Drug Czar Miguel
Guilarte raised the idea of greater counternarcotics cooperation with the USG, and Commander-in-Chief Raul Castro
publicly called for a bilateral agreement on narcotics, migration, and terrorism. However, these
calls have not been accompanied by actionable proposals on which to base future Cuban cooperation. Both
nations may gain by pressing forward with expanded cooperation, especially considering Cuba's
location in the Caribbean, and the potential for the island and its territorial seas to be utilized for
drug transshipments to the United States.
K Stuff
Root Cause – US
U.S. consumption is the root cause of drug problems
Xinhua News, 12 (“Cuba, drug trafficking dominate summit of Americas”, Xinhua News,
5/14/2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-04/15/c_131528055.htm, JKahn)
CARTAGENA, Colombia, April 14 (Xinhua) -- Cuba and drug trafficking, the two irritants in U.S.-Latin
American relations, dominated the first day of the sixth Summit of the Americas on Saturday. "AN
ANACHRONISM" Addressing the opening session of the two-day summit, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos called
for efforts to overcome the differences over Cuba, as the issue has long roiled U.S. relations with
Latin American countries. He criticized the policy of "isolation" and "embargo" against Cuba, calling it "an anachronism that keeps
us anchored to an outdated Cold War era." "We cannot be indifferent to the process of change that is going on in Cuba. It is time to
overcome our differences so that this process can receive support," he told a gathering of 31 hemispheric leaders. He expressed the
hope that Cuba would be present at the next summit, saying its absence then would be "unthinkable." At the opening session, Juan
Miguel Insulza, secretary general of the Organization of the American States (OAS), also made a veiled appeal to the leaders.
"Presidents (of the region) are faced with a dilemma," he said. "On the one hand, OAS principles call for the presence of all nations,
but the democratic charter demands full observance of civil rights." "The best way to strengthen this organization is via dialogue and
tolerance," he stressed. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, a bloc of eight Latin American and Caribbean
nations, said on Saturday that it will boycott any future Americas summit unless Cuba is granted unconditional admission to the
hemispheric gathering. "Our brother republic Cuba, as a part of our Americas, has the unconditional and unquestionable right to be
present and participate in this forum," the group said in a statement, declaring: "We will not participate in Cuba's absence."
Launched in 2004, the bloc now groups Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines as well as Venezuela. The bloc had threatened to boycott the Cartagena summit in case of Cuba's absence early this year,
but only Ecuador's President Rafael Correa delivered the threat. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who is battling cancer and has
called the summit meaningless as it is shunning fundamental issues like Argentina's claim of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands
(known as the Falkland Islands for the British) and Cuba's exclusion from the hemispheric event, is absent from the gathering as
well. Cuba, which was suspended from the OAS in 1962 at the height of the Cold War, has been unable to participate in all the past
summits since 1994. The suspension was officially lifted in 2009, but the Caribbean island nation has chosen not to return to the
pan-American bloc. Upon his arrival in Cartagena on Friday, Bolivian President Evo Morales demanded Cuba's presence at future
hemispheric summits, saying: "We are convinced this will be the last summit without Cuba." On Saturday, he joined the chorus
again, arguing: "How can we talk about integration if we exclude Cuba?" Addressing the opening session of the summit, Alicia
Barcena, executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, also called for all the 35
countries of the Western Hemisphere to be included in future summits so as to enhance and consolidate the inter-Amercan dialogue.
But in his remarks, U.S. President Barack Obama made no mention of Cuba. "I PROMISE" Surveys show that the general
public in Latin America see crime, violence and insecurity as the region's top problems, and there is
a growing consensus that the root cause is the massive use of narcotics in the United States, and an
unending flow of money and weapons southward to drug cartels. Upon taking office in December 2006,
Mexican President Felipe Calderon launched a war on drug cartels in his country by mobilizing the
army and federal police, which has resulted in some 50,000 deaths to date. In his remarks, President
Santos urged his peers to stop stalling and re-examine the approaches to the fight against drug
trafficking "without dogma, without prejudice," by looking at "different scenarios and possible alternatives." "This summit is not
going to resolve this issue, but it can be a starting point to begin a discussion that we have been postponing for far too long," the
president said. For his part, President Obama, while acknowledging that his country shared responsibility, said "no" to the idea of
legalizing and decriminalizing drugs as proposed by some Central American leaders. "Here in Cartagena, I hope we can focus on our
mutual responsibilities," Obama said. "As I've said many times, the United States accepts our share of responsibility for drug
violence." "That's why we've dedicated major resources to reducing the southbound flow of money and guns to the region. It's why
we've devoted tens of billions of dollars in the United States to reduce the demand for drugs," he remarked. "And I promise you
today -- we're not going to relent in our efforts," he said. Addressing a CEO summit of the Americas earlier Saturday, Obama said
"no" to the idea of decriminalizing drugs, declaring: "I personally, and my administration's position, is that legalization is not the
answer." "If you think about how it would end up operating, that the capacity of a large-scale drug trade to dominate certain
countries if they were allowed to operate legally without any constraint could be just as corrupting if not more corrupting than the
status quo," he explained. Washington launched the 1.6 billion-U.S.-dollar Merida Initiative in 2008 to help fund anti-drug
operations in both Mexico and Central America, the two areas hit hardest by the scourge of organized crime. "Today, I can announce
that the United States will increase our commitment to more than 130 million dollars this year to support the regional security
strategy led by our Central American friends," Obama told the summit.
Drug Neolib Link
The war on drugs is a justification for neoliberal intervention which just increases
drug cultivation
Newstext, 12 (Newstex, citing President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos, “The US War on Communism, Drugs, and
Terrorism in Colombia”, 10/31/2012, Newstex, Lexis, JKahn)
On Thursday 6th September the President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos
rejected a proposed bilateral ceasefire
by FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) rebels aimed at bringing an end to Colombia’s armed
conflict. He declared that he had asked operations to be intensified and stated that there will be no ceasefire of any kind. 1 These
comments bear reflection upon Colombia s half century dirty war, the actors involved and the motives behind U.S. policies that have
merely served to worsen the conflict. Today Colombia is one of the largest recipients of U.S. military training and aid in the world.
Although the U.S was involved in counterinsurgency operations in Colombia during the Cold War the continued flow of military
funding and training occurred as a result of Bill Clinton s Plan Colombia (2000-2006) and George W Bush s Andean Regional
Initiative (2008-2010) both of which were aimed at the forced eradication of coca and fighting Colombia s left-wing guerrillas due to
their involvement in terrorism and the international drugs trade. Through these initiatives billions of dollars have been spent
fighting a war on drugs followed by a war on terror. Coca production in Colombia, however, has increased as has the
intensity of the internal armed conflict with both FARC and right-wing paramilitary groups growing in size and
strength. Despite numerous studies concluding that the cheapest and most effective way to deal with the drug situation is to redirect
the U.S. government has
maintained its militaristic approach to the so called war on drugs both at home and abroad. Given the
resounding failure to achieve the stated objectives of these initiatives one must ask; is there an alternative objective, one that
the current strategy achieves sufficiently? The Neo-Liberal Effect The U.S. has long held a policy of pushing
neoliberal economic polices in Latin America. This has been achieved through NGO activity,
strategically allocated aid, coercive interventions, conditions attached to IMF and World Bank loans and bilateral and multi-lateral free trade agreements. There is a substantial literature exposing the resultant social stratification
these policies have caused in Latin America,3 but there is one particular effect of neoliberalism that has directly
resulted in increased cultivation of coca for export. The neoliberal model aims to re-orientate
agricultural production to the export market. While neoliberal policies remove protective tariff barriers
funds from law enforcement and forced eradication into treatment and prevention,2
on agricultural goods, subsidised U.S. agricultural imports undermine the price received for locally produced crops. Larger farms
and ranches with sufficient resources can move into growing export crops such as coffee but these crops are more labour intensive,
require more land and cost more to transport. Many small farmers and peasants therefore find that the only area in which they can
maintain a competitive advantage is in the cultivation of coca. This was evident in Mexico after the signing of NAFTA (the North
American Free Trade Agreement). U.S. subsidised corn imports destroyed Mexico’s domestic production and those who could not
afford to invest in the production of other export crops either switched to cultivating illicit drugs or left their land for the city where a
lack of employment opportunities pushed many rural immigrants into other elements of the drug trade. It is clear that if the U.S.
wished to reduce the cultivation of coca in Colombia the most effective policy would be to redirect military aid into funding
government subsidisation of legal crops. Yet the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement actually prohibits such action. Under the
agreement, that was signed in 2006 and came into affect in May of this year, Colombia is obliged to dismantle all of her domestic
protections while the U.S. is permitted to maintain her own agricultural subsidies and thus an unfair advantage in the trade of
agricultural produce. In 2010 Oxfam International commissioned a study which revealed the unequal terms of this trade agreement.
It demonstrated that the agreement would lower the prices local farmers would receive for major crops such as corn and beans
which, in turn, would reduce domestic cultivation of these crops and substantially impact the income and livelihood of hundreds of
thousands of Colombia s peasant farmers.4
U.S. anti-drug practices promote militarization and neoliberalism
Newstext, 12 (Newstex, citing President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos, “The US War on
Communism, Drugs, and Terrorism in Colombia”, 10/31/2012, Newstex, Lexis, JKahn)
The fact that the Colombian army and paramilitary groups continue to see coca growing peasants as
guerrilla collaborators and therefore legitimate military targets (due to the taxes they are forced to pay the FARC on their
coca crops) merely exacerbates the divide between the military and the peasantry. Some have been led to
argue that the real aim in Colombia is, in fact, to maintain a state of constant conflict. One in which there is sufficient order to
protect investments and transport links but, also, sufficient disorder and terror so as to maintain a subservient and flexible
workforce and an economic system which allows only a small local elite and foreign multinationals to benefit from the country s
resources.21 The official military protect investments and transport links important to the extractive industries
while paramilitaries closely linked to the official army, and revealed to be linked to the U.S. government, sufficiently intimidate any
move towards reform of the system. This is achieved through a policy of assassination, suppression and terrorisation of the political
left, human rights activists, trade unionists and peasant and indigenous movements. Economic Imperialism In 1996 four years
before Plan Colombia was passed by Congress, the U.S.-Colombia Business Partnership, representing U.S.
companies with interests in Colombia, was founded. This organisation launched a well financed lobbying effort for
U.S. intervention in the resource rich Andean state. Among the companies represented in this Business Partnership were Occidental
Petroleum, Enron, Texaco, and BP.22 A survey released just months prior to the passage of Plan Colombia in the U.S. congress
indicated that there were a large number of commercially viable and unexploited oil fields in the
Putumayo region of Colombia,22 incidentally, the same area that experiences the highest intensity of paramilitary activity and aerial
fumigation. This correlation has aroused suspicion that these policies are actually aimed at displacing local people from their land in
order to open it up to speculation by foreign multinationals23 while simultaneously clearing the dense rainforest that makes
identifying and pinpointing the location of oilfields difficult.22 This seems to be a recurrent theme in local impressions of the U.S.
war on drugs in a number of different countries. In Guatemala, for example, locals have criticised militarisation of
the resource-rich north eastern province of Petén. While it is known that this area is used to transport drugs to Mexico locals suspect
the heavy military presence is more to do with oil interests in the region.24 Similar complaints have emerged from the Moskitia
region of eastern Honduras which has experienced increased militarisation in recent years, particularly so since the 2009 coup.
According to Norvin Goff Salinas, president of an indigenous Miskitu federation; More than anything else, they re militarizing
because of the natural resources that are in the Moskitia, especially the strategic spots where there is oil. 25 Foreign direct
Investment (FDI) flows into Colombia rose from $2.4 billion at the outset of Plan Colombia to $14.4 billion by 2011. In the mid 90s
oil and gas constituted only 10% of all FDI in Colombia but by 2010 this had increased to almost one third.24 Colombia,
however, remains the most dangerous country in the world to be a trade unionist and one of the most unequal
countries in the world with the top 10% of the population controlling nearly half of the country s wealth.26 Conclusions It is evident
that in the stated objective of eradicating coca cultivation and narcotrafficking in Colombia the U.S.
anti-drug strategy has been a resounding failure. From the perspective of the U.S. State
Department, however, Plan Colombia was not a failure at all but instead allowed for the creation of an
effective new model for U.S. intervention. 24 As the U.S. Government Accountability Office s director of international affairs
and trade put it; international programs face significant challenges reducing the supply of illegal
drugs but support broad US foreign policy objectives. 27 These objectives, throughout the period of U.S. hegemony, have
remained the same. U.S. imperialism is not based on territorial control but on economic control. The adoption of the
neoliberal capitalist model across Latin America greatly benefited U.S. companies by making resource
extraction cheaper (due to reduced corporate tax), labour cheaper (due to labour flexiblisation practices) and domestic markets
easier to dominate (due to the removal of all state subsidies and the breakup of state owned companies). The last point holds a
particular level of hypocrisy because, while other countries must abandon all state subsidies, the U.S.
maintains high levels of protectionism in the one area that developing countries would hold a competitive advantage
in a free market system; agriculture. The difficulty lies in maintaining a system in which the main beneficiaries of economic
production in a country are a tiny local elite and foreign multinationals. This, historically, has been achieved through substantial
repression. Throughout the Cold War such repression was justified by labelling as communist any movement or political party
whose views fell outside of radical right-wing capitalism. One crucial method of ensuring the maintenance of this economic model in
Latin America has always been the cultivation of allied militaries whose ideological beliefs fall exactly in line with those of
Washington. The end of the Cold war necessitated a new justification for the continuation of this practice and thus, the war on drugs
was born. After the 9/11 attacks this evolved into a war on terrorism.
Terrorism Neolib Link
The drug war alienates populations and labels drug lords ‘terrorists’ to justify
imperialism
Newstext, 12 (Newstex, citing President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos, “The US War on Communism, Drugs, and
Terrorism in Colombia”, 10/31/2012, Newstex, Lexis, JKahn)
It is established that U.S. war on terrorism policies in Colombia and beyond further alienate the
populations of countries where they are implemented and swell the ranks of the militarised
terrorist forces the U.S. claims to be fighting. The purpose of this war however, like the war on
drugs and the war on communism before it, is the creation of a façade that justifies U.S.
economic imperialism. The terrorists therefore, like the narcoguerrillas , play a crucial role in
maintaining this façade. While the U.S. Colombia policy is certainly aimed at making sure the FARC never gain the strength
or political unity necessary to overthrow the state, the FARC are also a necessary enemy, just as the continuation of the
internal conflict is necessary, to justify continued U.S. military training , aid and intrusion in the
affairs of the strategically located, oil and resource rich Andean state. Reuters, Colombia s Santos Rejects FARC call for
Ceasefire, 7th September 2012.See for example, C. Peter Rydell (1994), Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs, Rand
Drug Policy Research Center.See for example: Stokes, Susan C. (2001), Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in
Latin America, Cambridge University Press; Weyland, Kurt (2004), Neoliberalism and Democracy in Latin America: A Mixed
Record, Latin America politics and Society. 46(1): p. 135-157; Gwynne, Robert N. and Cristóbal Kay (2000), Views from the
Periphery: Futures of Neoliberalism in Latin America, Third World Quarterly. 21(1): p. 141-156.Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (2010), Will the U.S. Colombia Free Trade Agreement Help Colombia s Small Farmers? March 10.Bigwood,
Jeremy (2001), Toxic Drift: Monsanto and the Drug War in Colombia.Robin, Marie-Monique (2010), The World According to
Monsanto: Pollution, Corruption and the Control of our Food Supply, p 138.This nickname no doubt originates from the fact that
Monsanto produced the chemical Agent Orange which was used for aerial fumigation during the Vietnam War resulting in birth
defects, poisoning of land and outbreaks of cancer. After the war it emerged that Monsanto had known of Agent Orange s toxicity
years before but had tried to cover it up. Due to the side affects seen in Colombians living in areas that have been sprayed with
Roundup Ultra, and Monstanto s less than savoury record, many fear that, like Agent Orange, Roundup Ultra will hold future health
implications yet unknown.Chemical War: Herbicides, drug crops and collateral damage in Colombia. After the Fact (a publication of
the Institute for Science and Interdisciplinary Studies), Winter 2001.U.S. based NGO Witness for Peace.See for example: RAND
Corporation, Sealing the Borders; The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction. The study also noted that
seven prior studies on the same topic over the preceding nine years had resulted in similar conclusions, including one done by the
Center for Naval Research and the Office of Technology Assessment. Upside Down World, Interview with Peter Watt. The drug war
in Mexico; politics, violence and neo-liberalism in the new narco-economy .DEA Congressional testimony July 9, 1997. Statement by
Donnie Marshall, Chief of Operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration, before the Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs and Criminal Justice.Villar, Olivar (2011), Cocaine, Death Squads and the War on Terror: U.S. Imperialism and
Class Struggle in Colombia, p. 79. Stokes, Doug (2005), America s Other War: Terrorising Colombia, Canadian Dimension Vol. 39,
No. 4; p. 26.Gill, Lesley (2004), The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas. p. 10.Human
Rights Watch, (2011), World Report 2012.Karl, Terry L. (1987), Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in
Venezuela, Latin American Research Review. pg82.These enclaves include an electoral law that results in overrepresentation of
rightwing parties, nonelected senators and institutions with veto power over the legislator. Olavarría, Margot (2003). Protected
Neoliberalism: Perverse Institutionalization and the Crisis of Representation in Postdictatorship Chile . Chile since 1990: The
Contradictions of Neoliberal Democratization, Part 2. Latin American Perspectives. 30 (6): p. 10-38.European Commission,
Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013.Feinberg, Leslie (2003), War in Colombia: Made in the U.S.A, International Action
Center p. 81.Klein, Naomi (2007), The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism.Gorman, Peter (2003), Plan Colombia: The
Pentagon s Shell Game, From the WildernessCraig-Best, Liam and Shingler, Rowan, Cultivation of Illicit Crops, Spectrozine.Paley,
Dawn (2012), Guatemala: The Spoils of Undeclared War. Upside Down World. Cuffe, Sandra and Spring, Karen (2012) Botched DEA
Raid in Honduras Exposes How Militarization Terrorizes Communities Around the World, AlterNet.World Bank Ford, Jess T.
(2012), Drug Control: International programs face significant challenges reducing the supply of illegal drugs but support broad US
foreign policy objectives, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy, Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform.
“Enemy” Security Link
The focus on the constructed ‘internal enemy’ destroys human rights and ensures
subornation
Isacson, 05 (Adam, Senior Associate for Regional Security Policy, the Washington Office on Latin America, M.A. from Yale
University in International Relations, B.A. Hampshire College, Social Science, “The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs”, Part of
“Drugs and Democracy in Latin America”, Youngers and Rosin, 2005, Rienner, Google Books, JKahn)
Human Rights Abuses and Civil-Military Relations The risks of counterdrug and counterterror military aid
go
beyond mission creep, however, as human rights advocates are quick to point out. Either mission requires
historically repressive armed forces – whose training is oriented toward overwhelmingly
defeating an enemy – to increase their internal role and their interaction with civilian populations. Worse, decades of
counterdrug aid have continued the Cold War focus on an internal enemy, distracting
governments from the tasks of reforming human rights practices and ensuring subordination to
civilian justice systems.
WOD – Error Replication
The aff causes error replication – reproduces another cold war
Isacson, 05 (Adam, Senior Associate for Regional Security Policy, the Washington Office on Latin America, M.A. from Yale
University in International Relations, B.A. Hampshire College, Social Science, “The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs”, Part of
“Drugs and Democracy in Latin America”, Youngers and Rosin, 2005, Rienner, Google Books, JKahn)
Overemphasizing the drug war’s military dimension has caused the United States to repeat
another Cold War error. U.S. policy is once again neglecting the historical and structural factors –
poverty and inequality, corruption and impunity , the lack of basic citizen security guarantees – that foster
perceived threats to U.S. interests. This all-stick-and-no-carrot approach has too often blinded U.S.
policymakers to the political realities their allies face. A notable example was the George W. Bush administration’s failure to
respond to Bolivian president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s pleas in 2003 for economic support in the face of growing opposition
fueled by that country’s continuing economic crisis. This approach has also had the unintended consequences of building a power
base for populist leaders and movements that have made opposition to U.S. policy a key focus of their rallying cries – as did the
movement that overturned President Sánchez.
No Root Cause – Drug Violence
There’s no root cause to drug violence – complex social and economic causes
underlie the drug trade
Isacson, 05 (Adam, Senior Associate for Regional Security Policy, the Washington Office on Latin America, M.A. from Yale
University in International Relations, B.A. Hampshire College, Social Science, “The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs”, Part of
“Drugs and Democracy in Latin America”, Youngers and Rosin, 2005, Rienner, Google Books, JKahn)
While the most dramatic of these examples took place during the Cold War’s darkest days, some of the same patterns in
U.S.-Latin American military relations continue today. U.S. policymakers continue to see the
region more as a source of potential threats than as a zone with potential for greater
cooperation, sustain democratization, and shared prosperity. The search for threats leads Washington to turn to
the region’s militaries to solve problems such as violence, insecurity, drug trafficking, and other
criminality, even though these problems have complex social and economic causes . U.S. aid and
doctrine then encourage militaries to increase their internal roles, with negative consequences for
human rights and political space, civil-military relations, democracy, and regional security
Mex - Security Link
Counternarcotic operations in Mexico disproportionately target marginalized
groups – the vulnerable are raped and tortured in the name of security
Mercille, 11 – lecturer in the School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Policy at Univeristy College Dublin, PhD from
UCLA (Julien, “Violent Narco-Cartels or US Hegemony? The political economyof the ‘war on drugs’ in Mexico,” Third World
Quarterly, Vol. 32 No. 9, 2011, pp 1637–1653, Taylor & Francis Online)//BI
The militarisation of internal repression has been accentuated in recent years . Calderón has sent 40 000
soldiers and police throughout the country, which have sometimes used the pretext of anti-drug operations to arrest and harass
groups and individuals who oppose government policies. A recent Human Rights Watch report documents some
of the many abuses by the military during counternarcotics, counterinsurgency and public security
operations and shows that those targeted are often members of vulnerable or dissident groups calling
for a more democratic polity, but are not involved in drugs or terrorism. It states: The abuses detailed in this
report include an enforced disappearance, the rape of indigenous women during counterinsurgency and
counternarcotics operations in Southern Mexico, the torture and arbitrary detention of environmental
activists during counternarcotics operations . . . Many victims of the abuses documented in this report had no
connection to the drug trade or insurgencies.43 In fact, a 2000 document from the Mexican Defense Ministry
confirmed that it is explicit policy to use drugs war operations to suppress dissent. The document outlined a
plan to establish counter-drug working groups that: . . . will adopt the measures necessary to obtain information on the existence of
armed groups, subversive activities, unjustifiable presence of foreigners, organizations, proselytizing by priests or leaders of religious
sects, ecological groups, political propaganda, [and] the presence and activities of bands or gangs of criminals.44 The International
Civil Commission on Human Rights has likewise reported in 2008 that ‘there have been widespread arbitrary arrests of members of
social movements . . . To justify the arrests false evidence is used . . . even false accusations of possession of drugs or of arms . . . The
logic behind all of this is to criminalise the members of social movements’.45 For example, environmental activists Rodolfo Montiel
and Teodoro Cabrera conducted a campaign against logging and deforestation by multinational corporations in Guerrero, which
angered local caciques, who told regional military commanders that the two activists were drug traffickers. The military then
arrested and tortured them until they confessed that they had been caught in possession of drugs and guns, even though it was later
found that the ‘evidence’ had been planted by the soldiers. They were both convicted by the Mexican government and imprisoned.
President Fox later released them but did not drop the charges against them, let alone punish those guilty.46 Finally, the drugs
war is also used as a means of social control of marginalised groups by arresting and
incarcerating them disproportionately. Since 1995 there have been about 10,000 drug-related arrests per year in
Mexico, and those who end up in jail tend to come from the poorest strata of society. In 2001, 20,000
people were convicted on federal charges (including over 9000 on drug-related charges). Fifteen thousand had less than a high
school education, and more than 10 000 were day labourers or farmers, along with a substantial number of indigenous people
incarcerated on drug charges, the majority of whom are used by drug traffickers to act as low-level drug transporters.47
Mex - Neolib Link
The war on drugs serves as a pretext for US hegemony over Mexico and expansion
of neoliberal policies
Mercille, 11 – lecturer in the School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Policy at Univeristy College Dublin, PhD
from UCLA (Julien, “Violent Narco-Cartels or US Hegemony? The political economyof the ‘war on drugs’ in Mexico,” Third World
Quarterly, Vol. 32 No. 9, 2011, pp 1637–1653, Taylor & Francis Online)//BI
What are the causes of Mexico’s drug trafficking and violence? What is the meaning and purpose of the war
on drugs in Mexico? The conventional
answers to such questions have been presented by a number of government officials,
journalists and scholars.4 While there exist a variety of theoretical, methodological and empirical emphases, such approaches have
all neglected the central role of political economy in their analyses. For example, some have provided
ethnographic accounts of US–Mexico drug trafficking,5 others have interpreted the drugs war at the border as
fulfilling a symbolic political function allowing US government leaders to show resolve to voters and Congress,6 or
have studied the role of the drugs war in militarising the US– Mexico border,7 and have compared
and contrasted the war on narcotics with the war on immigration and homeland security waged by
the US government.8 Despite these differences, the mainstream interpretation shares the following
components: . Overwhelming attention is directed to the drug cartels, seen as the main— or even only—source
of the problem of drug trafficking and violence. . The US, concerned with drug use and violence, collaborates with the
Mexican authorities to reduce the cartels’ power by waging a war on drugs in Mexico. If lawlessness
prevails, the cartels could take over parts of the state and refugees could flood the US. . A key obstacle to US plans is
corruption among Mexican officials, fuelled by the cartels, which makes it difficult to win the drugs war. . Thus,
solutions include cleaning Mexican institutions of corruption, interdiction and arrests of drug kingpins,
increasing military aid, and promoting NAFTA-type free trade agreements to achieve economic development. .
Some researchers recognise that US drug consumption and firearms smuggling to Mexico are part of the problem and call for
reducing US demand for drugs and regulating gun sales and trafficking. The conventional view thus focuses on the
drug cartels’ role in causing mayhem in Mexico and corrupting its governmental institutions. In
the words of General (ret) Barry McCaffrey, US drug czar under Bill Clinton, Mexico ‘is fighting for survival against narco-terrorism’
and we need to support ‘the courageous Mexican leadership of the Calderón Administration’ because ‘the violent, warring collection
of criminal drug cartels could overwhelm the institutions of the state’ and we could be faced with ‘a surge of millions of refugees
crossing the US border to escape the domestic misery of violence’.9 Robert Bonner, former director of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and chief of US Customs and Border Protection, comments approvingly on Calderón’s militarised drug war
because he thinks the Mexican military is ‘one of the country’s few reliable institutions’. True, it has led to 40,000 deaths since 2006,
but ‘the increase in the number of drug-related homicides, although unfortunate, is a sign of progress’, because it shows the
government is finally destabilising the cartels. The US is depicted as a well intentioned leader fighting the
scourge of drugs and corruption for which the cartels are responsible. For example, Richard Haass, the
president of the Council on Foreign Relations, comments that ‘American efforts to . . . shore up the [Mexican] justice system have
been substantial’.10 Some analysts add that the large US consumption of drugs and smuggling of firearms into
Mexico must also be
taken into account and rightly call for a reduction in demand in the US and better
regulation of the flow of guns southward. However, they remain blind to, and even support, US hegemony over
Mexico (political, economic and military). For example, David Shirk, in a Council on Foreign Relations report, asserts that ‘US
authorities should make greater efforts to encourage NAFTA trade by facilitating legitimate cross-border flows’ to develop the
Mexican economy.11 There is also a right-wing libertarian view that opposes drug prohibition and
Washington’s war on drugs in Mexico and elsewhere while calling for the legalisation of drugs as a solution. In some
respects this position goes against the mainstream interpretation, but it still focuses on corruption
and narcocartels, and neglects the crucial political economic dimension. For example, it fails to
consider the detrimental impact of neoliberal ‘free trade’ agreements on drug problems. On the
contrary, it advocates more economic deregulation: ‘Latin American governments should move more aggressively to deregulate their
economies and spur economic growth, thereby creating new opportunities for those people who are now involved in the lower
echelons of the drug trade . . . The adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement provided important new economic
opportunities for Mexico.’12 This article presents an alternative interpretation that focuses on US hegemony over Mexico and in
particular the neoliberal reforms like NAFTA that it has promoted since the early 1980s. Although the article’s emphasis is on drug
issues, it is framed within a critical political economic analysis of US foreign policy and neoliberalism. In outline, and as will be
illustrated throughout, it is maintained that post-World War II US foreign policy has been shaped by the
following key
factors. First and foremost is the corporate sector’s need to maintain a favourable
investment climate and markets in Latin America and elsewhere. Second is geopolitics and military
strategy, which in Latin America has meant trying to keep the region as a US ‘backyard’ free of
European, and later Chinese, influences, in addition to supporting allied military and militaristic regimes in power to
prevent internal opposition from steering the region on a path independent of US hegemony. Ideology also plays a role in
co-opting and making acceptable US policies to elites and segments of the population in Latin
America.13 The article first shows that neoliberal policies have increased the size of the drugs industry,
for example by forcing millions of peasants into the drugs trade in search of work. Second, it demonstrates
how US hegemonic projects like NAFTA have been protected and policed partly under the pretext
of the war on drugs, which is used discursively to promote closer bilateral relations between the
US and Mexican militaries. This allows the latter to contain popular opposition to neoliberal
policies in general, but also to use drugs control directly as a pretext to arrest individuals and groups who
resist such projects. Washington’s support for institutions and officials corrupted by the Mexican narcotics industry and associated
with human rights abuses—the Mexican government, military and security forces, and perhaps even some cartel leaders—will be
highlighted. Third, drugs money laundering by US banks will be discussed with reference to Mexican cases to show that the
financial sector’s involvement in narcotics has never been tightly regulated because it provides
significant liquidity to a powerful segment of US society. The article concludes by pointing to the
large US drug consumption that fuels trafficking and to Washington’s failure to invest more in
treatment of addicts and prevention, the two solutions proven by research to be the most effective in reducing
consumption, as opposed to the relatively ineffective arrests of drug kingpins and seizures of narcotics shipments.14 The US failure
to stop the smuggling of firearms south of the border will also be briefly discussed. Overall, and contrary to the mainstream
interpretation, the article emphasises the significant responsibility of the US in Mexico’s drug traffic
and its discursive manipulation of the war on drugs, none of which, however, negates the responsibility of
Mexican drug cartels as generators of violence. The next section provides historical background showing the continuities between
the past and more recent situation.
Mex - Turns Case (For Neolib K)
Turns the case – neoliberal reforms in Mexico have empirically increased the size
of the drug industry
Mercille, 11 – lecturer in the School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Policy at Univeristy College Dublin, PhD from
UCLA (Julien, “Violent Narco-Cartels or US Hegemony? The political economyof the ‘war on drugs’ in Mexico,” Third World
Quarterly, Vol. 32 No. 9, 2011, pp 1637–1653, Taylor & Francis Online)//BI
From the 1980s onwards four developments converged to increase dramatically the size of the drugs
industry in Mexico. Not all were related to neoliberal reforms, but the latter nevertheless made a key contribution. First,
South American cocaine had until then been smuggled into the US via the Caribbean and Florida, but interdiction efforts in these
areas diverted the traffic through Mexico, whose significance as transit country rose drastically. Essentially the Colombian narcotraffickers cut a deal with the Mexican cartels to ensure that their drugs would reach the US through Mexico rather than through the
Caribbean and Florida. Second, the flow of narcotics was further magnified by the neoliberal reforms that
increased commerce across the US–Mexico border and facilitated the smuggling of large
quantities of drugs. The cartels started putting shipments of heroin, crystal meth, cannabis and cocaine on the many trucks
crossing the border.21 Third, NAFTA and neoliberal reforms have increased the size of the drugs industry by
involving more Mexicans in it for two reasons: in order to find work and out of desperation. The
consequences of neoliberalisation for the majority of Mexico’s population have largely been
negative. The economy grew at an annual per capita rate of 3.5 per cent between 1960 and 1979, before
neoliberalisation, but only by 0.1 per cent in the 1980s and by 1.6 per cent between 1992 and
2007. NAFTA has failed to generate job growth and increase wages—the average wage in Juárez, for example, dropped from $4.50
a day to $3.70. True, the manufacturing sector has added some 500 000 to 600 000 net jobs since NAFTA went into effect,
but this has been offset by a loss of about 2.3 million jobs in the agricultural sector caused by cheaper
imports of corn from subsidised US agrobusinesses. Farmers were forced to abandon their land and migrate to the
US or move to the cities in Mexico along the US border, where they became cheap labour for US manufacturing businesses
(maquiladoras). Because maquiladoras mostly assemble imported components and immediately re-export finished products, few
linkages have been generated with the Mexican domestic economy, creating few employment opportunities. A related negative effect
has been the rise of the informal economy, which offers worse conditions to workers; it formed 57 per cent of the workforce in 2004,
up from 53 per cent in 1992.22 As a result, many in Mexico had little choice other than to resort to participation
in drug trafficking to supplement their income, usually acting as low-level dealers. This mass of unemployed or
underemployed in Mexico’s northern regions constituted a perfect supply of desperate labour for the cartels .
The supply increased even more around 2000, when the maquiladora industry faced competition from China and India, which could
provide lower-cost labour to make the same goods. Some companies established in Mexico moved their production to Asia, causing
further layoffs. Finally, by causing significant social dislocation and lack of employment opportunities, neoliberal reforms
increased people’s recourse to drugs to alleviate their suffering, enlarging the market within
Mexico itself and contributing to the growth of the narcotics industry. Charles Bowden, a veteran analyst
of the Mexican drugs trade, observes of Juárez, one of the most affected cities: ‘Who in their right mind would turn down a chance to
consume drugs in a city of poverty, filth, violence, and despair?’23
Mex - K of Failed State Impact
Claims of a Mexican “failed state” are false and consistent with moral panic theory
Schack, 11 – Assistant Professor, Department of Journalism at Ithaca College, PhD in Media Studies from the University of
Colorado (Todd, “Twenty-first-century drug warriors: the press, privateers and the for-profit waging of the war on drugs,” Media,
War & Conflict, Vol. 4 No. 2, pg. 142-161, August 2011, Sage Journals)//BI
When it comes to reporting on the Mérida Initiative, and the use of private contractors both within Mexico and
domestically in the US, we
find a similar pattern of convergence and amplification, one that is especially
dominated by at least two media memes: first, that Mexico is at best a ‘narco-state’, and at worst is on
the verge of being a ‘failed-state’; and second, that the drug-related violence that has arisen in Mexico
in recent years is threatening to ‘spill-over’ into the US. That is, the threat of drugs converges with the
threat of (1) Latin American drug lords running an entire country, and (2) violence that is
somehow ‘other’ than that which already exists in the US.3 A recent San Francisco Chronicle article provides a
clear example of the ‘failed-state’ meme: The U.S. Joint Forces Command called Mexico and Pakistan the world’s two most critical
states in danger of failing. While cautioning that Mexico has not reached Pakistan’s level of instability, it reported that Mexico’s
‘government, its politicians, police and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and
drug cartels’. (Lochhead, 2009) It is a quantifiable fact that there has been a rise in drug-related violence
in Mexico since the Calderon government took power, and this point should not be dismissed. Lest this argument be
misinterpreted as callous, permit me to make absolutely clear that I am not dismissing what is a seriously high number of deaths.
While the exact number of ‘drug-related’ deaths is difficult to figure precisely – and who is counted as a drug-related death even
further complicates the matter – it can be concluded that the violence is pervasive on the Mexican side of the border, especially in
Tijuana and Ciudad-Juarez. I am not disputing this here, nor do I wish to underestimate the seriousness of the
situation in Mexico. As stated, exact numbers are difficult to quantify, but what is not in dispute is that, since Calderon took
office in 2006, each year has seen a rise in drug-related violence: according to a Council on Foreign Relations report, in 2007, there
were more than 2500 deaths; in 2008, more than 4000 (Hansen, 2008). The Mexican paper El Universal places the 2008 figure at
5612 (Bricker, 2008). More recently, according to an internal Mexican Government report that was leaked to the press, in 2009 it is
estimated that there were 9635 deaths, and in the early months of 2010 it is claimed that at least 3365 deaths have occurred
(Ellingwood, 2010). However, some investigation into these reports is warranted, especially since they
are being used to justify the militarization of the border, which includes the use of private contractors.
Journalist Shamus Cooke (2009) writes that: Interestingly, Mexico has lately been compared to Pakistan as a
country ‘on the verge’ of becoming a ‘failed state,’ with the Mexican drug cartels accused of playing
the same ‘destabilizing’ role as the Taliban/terrorists in Pakistan. Calling such a comparison a
stretch would be a gross understatement, of course. Why exactly is this more than ‘a stretch’ to compare Mexico with
Pakistan? First, drug cartels are not motivated by political aims, as are the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Second, these reports completely ignore the people in Mexico themselves, both private citizens and public
government officials. Do they consider their country to be in danger of becoming a ‘failed state’ and, if not, why are their
voices not being heard? This process of only allowing certain voices to be heard is consistent with
moral panic theory – the voice of the ‘folk devil’ (Cohen, 2002[1972]) is never allowed to speak for itself. While it is not
reported in most media, those in Mexico are objecting to such a classification, and President Calderon himself
dismissed outright the US Joint Forces Command report that linked Mexico and Pakistan: ‘To say that Mexico is a failed state is
absolutely false,’ and added the nearly heretical accusation that the genesis of the problems is, in fact, in the U.S.: ‘I’m fighting
corruption among Mexican authorities and risking everything to clean house, but I think a good cleaning is in order on the other side
of the border.’ (Carl, 2009) Echoing this sentiment, and directly contradicting the Joint Forces Command report that cautioned that
Mexico was in danger of becoming a ‘failed state’ is Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who told Fox News: ‘I think that the chances of
the Mexican government losing control of some part of their country or becoming a failed state are very low’ (Agence France Presse,
2009). Another interesting opinion written on the subject by the well-known conservative website Human Events stated: It may be a
knee-jerk conservative response to dub Mexico ‘failed’… But Mexico is not a failed state … ‘Failed’ describes a state that has lost its
ability to exercise the powers of a sovereignty … calling it a ‘failed state’ is, so far, a stretch. It would be the equivalent of saying that
the U.S. was a ‘failed state’ during Prohibition, when gangs organized a lucrative – and illegal – alcohol trade. (Molin, 2009) Even
when some articles do make an effort to quote native counter-claims that Mexico is not in danger of failing,
those claims are quickly followed by outsider observations that even if it is not completely ‘failing’,
at least it has become a ‘narco-state’. This was evident in the San Francisco Chronicle article, where Lochhead (2009)
first quoted Professor George Grayson at Mexico’s College of William and Mary, saying: I’m in the heart of Mexico City as we speak,
and the buses are full of people, the metros are running, the shops are open and people are walking freely … I don’t see anything that
looks like a failed state. Then, in the next paragraph she writes: Others contend that Mexico is in danger of becoming a ‘narco state’
where drug cartels control large parts of the country and the government cannot perform its most important task, ensuring the
safety of its citizens. Further, some articles cite un-sourced claims, such as the one picked up in numerous papers in the US, that
‘70% of Mexicans are afraid to go outside for fear of crime’, to which Laura Carlsen (2009: 2), who lives in Mexico City writes: ‘This
statistic has been cited without a source. It’s ridiculous. In a recent poll Mexicans nationwide named the economic situation over
crime as the biggest problem in the country by a margin of two to one.’ In a classic case of amplification, the (US)
media breathlessly report on the narco- or failed-state meme and fail to report the fact that both
citizens and government alike in Mexico are bristling at these characterizations.
Moral panic creates a convergence between the perceived threat and a racialized
or class-based Other
Schack, 11 – Assistant Professor, Department of Journalism at Ithaca College, PhD in Media Studies from the University of
Colorado (Todd, “Twenty-first-century drug warriors: the press, privateers and the for-profit waging of the war on drugs,” Media,
War & Conflict, Vol. 4 No. 2, pg. 142-161, August 2011, Sage Journals)//BI
As such, drug scares have played this role far before the prototypical decade of drug panic (the 1960s), and the efficacy of these
moral panics has long been used for both financial gain by the media industries and political
gain by politicians using the ‘tough on crime’ campaign platform. Perhaps the best academic
investigation of a media-fomented, drug-related moral panic in the US is Reeves and Campbell’s
Cracked Coverage (1994), which details the ‘epidemic’ in crack cocaine use during the 1980s. Typical of this type of
moral panic, and to borrow from Stuart Hall, is the notion of convergence, where the perceived threat
(crack cocaine) is coupled with a racialized or class-based ‘Other’ (black urban males), and once this
link is established in the media, the moral panic gains momentum until demands are made to bring an end to this threat – typically
with a militarized or penal solution. Hall (Hall et al., 1978: 223) writes about an earlier moral panic (student hooliganism) and
explains that: Convergence occurs when two or more activities are linked in the process of
signification as to implicitly or explicitly draw parallels between them. Thus the image of ‘student hooliganism’
links student protest to the separate problem of hooliganism – whose stereotypical characteristics are already part of socially
available knowledge … In both cases, the net effect is amplification, not in the real events being described
but in their threat potential for society. It is in creating this ‘amplification’, or as Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994: 36)
have termed it, the ‘disproportionality’ of the perceived threat, where the media play a significant role, as we shall see with regard to
the drug war in Mexico. In this way, drug panics have been linked to racialized ‘Others’, dating as far back
as opium smoking and the Chinese (1880s), marijuana and Mexicans (1920–1940s), heroin and black
‘jazz’ culture (1930–1950s). In more modern times, drug scares have followed similar patterns, with
either race or class-based convergences: crack cocaine and black urban society in the US; heroin and (especially)
Scottish urban society in the UK during the 1980s; Ecstasy (which was a decidedly white, middle-class panic) in both the US and UK
in the 1990s; Methamphetamine (typically a white, lower-class panic) in both societies since 2000.
Mex - K of Spillover Violence Impact
Scenarios for violent “spillover” of drug violence into the US are unfounded
products of disaster capitalism – violence in border states is decreasing
Schack, 11 – Assistant Professor, Department of Journalism at Ithaca College, PhD in Media Studies from the University of
Colorado (Todd, “Twenty-first-century drug warriors: the press, privateers and the for-profit waging of the war on drugs,” Media,
War & Conflict, Vol. 4 No. 2, pg. 142-161, August 2011, Sage Journals)//BI
The same sorts of hype, spurious claims and statistics are being used in the ‘spill-over’ meme. This myth,
however, carries even more political utility for PSCs as it can and has been used to fast-track legislation allowing private companies
to profit from what is characterized as a crisis. This is entirely consistent with Klein’s concept of disaster
capitalism, as well as moral panic theory. Summarizing most mainstream media coverage, Gabriel Arana (2009) writes that:
Television segments narrated like war documentaries broadcast dramatic footage of Border Patrol Humvees kicking up dust in the
Southwest, Minutemen with binoculars overlooking the border and piles of confiscated drugs. In the national media, it’s
become a foregone conclusion that Mexican drug violence has penetrated the United States . In one
crystallizing media moment, CNN’s Anderson Cooper went to El Paso, and, dressed in military fatigues, reported on the spill-over of
violence, as guest Fred Burton, a ‘security expert’ claimed on air that: ‘It’s just a matter of time before it really spills over into the
United States unless we shore up the border as best we can’ (Del Bosque, 2009). Taking issue with the sensational reporting on these
related media memes, Del Bosque writes that: All too often the nightly news portrays Juarez and El Paso as
one and the same, with the U.S. city symbolizing the perils of that new buzzword: spillover. Night
after night, TV spin-meisters, retired generals, terror analysts and politicians rage on about spillover
violence. They call Mexico a ‘failed state’ and argue for militarizing the border. No wonder Americans are scared. In a rare
reflexive moment, one journalist (Negran, 2009) who had had enough of the media hype wrote An Open Letter to
the U.S. Media. In it, he managed to expose one of the principal aspects of a prototypical moral panic: the
racialized ‘Other’ who becomes the target of antipathy, obscuring the fact that the threat may
have other, less acknowledged, origins: Get this straight: The violence is not ‘spilling over the border’
into the U.S. No, every time you say that, whether you mean to or not, you’re conjuring up images of
crazed Mexicans crossing the border … and you have it backwards. It spilled over from the U.S. into Mexico and Latin
America long ago … for the past 20 years, we’ve slowly been turning the border into a militarized zone, so let’s not say there isn’t
violence associated with both sides of the drug trade and the Drug War. We could say that we’re now sharing the violence to a higher
degree, an important distinction from the simple-minded terminology of ‘spilling over’. This meme reached fever pitch when several
articles in The New York Times were published and re-reported in various news organizations, articles that relied: ‘heavily on
anecdotes, impressionistic quotes from police or politicians, and bare statistics presented without context’ (Arana, 2009). If one
does look at the publicly available statistics on violent crime in the area for a period ranging over
the last several years, what is discovered is an actual decrease in such crime in the border-states.
According to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, the four states that border Mexico (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas) have all seen a drop in violent crime since 2005.
In fact, Arizona’s violent crime rate (per 100,000 persons) dropped every year: 513.2 (2005), 501.4 (2006), 482.7 (2007), 447.0 (2008) and 408.3 (2009). Texas saw a similar
steady decline: 529.7 (2005), 516.3 (2006), 510.6 (2007), 507.9 (2008) and 490.9 (2009). California saw a spike in violent crime in 2006, and a decline since: 526.3 (2005),
532.5 (2006), 522.6 (2007), 503.8 (2008) and 472.0 (2009). New Mexico’s violent crime rate rose in 2007, but has since leveled off: 702.2 (2005), 643.2 (2006), 664.2 (2007),
649.9 (2008) and 619.0 (2009) (FBI, 2009). In the cities most often cited by the media as threatened by the ‘spill-over’ – Tucson, Phoenix, and El Paso – a similar trend
emerges. The Tucson Police Department reports that violent crimes overall are down from a spike in 2005 of 942 violent crimes (per 100,000 persons), to 757 in 2008 (Tucson
Police Department, 2009). The Phoenix Police Department reports a similar steady downturn in violent crime from a peak in 2006 of 710.8 (per 100,000 persons) to a 10-year
low in 2009 of 519.8 (Phoenix Police Department, 2009). El Paso, which is at the center of the controversy since it lies directly on the border with the Mexican city of CiudadJuarez, site of some of the most violent cartel action in recent years, has indeed seen a recent rise in crime, but this must be put into historical context. While the rate of violent
crime for 2008 did rise to 461.3 (per 100,000) from 2007 levels of 417.8, this is still far below a high of 597.2 in 2003, and 2009 has seen another drop in the crime rate to 440.4
(FBI, 2009). Interestingly enough, and rarely mentioned in the press, is that in an annual report that is based on these same FBI Uniform Crime Reports, El Paso was ranked as
the second ‘safest big city’ with a population of greater than 500,000, in the US in 2009 (O’Leary-Morgan et al., 2009). In 2010, after preliminary data were released for the
early months of the year, the Associated Press (AP: 2010) reports that: ‘The top four big cities in America with the lowest rates of violent crime are all in border states: San Diego,
‘Border Patrol agents face far less danger
than street cops in most U.S. cities.’ Further, Lloyd Easterling, spokesman for the US Customs and Border Protections,
said that: ‘The border is safer now than it’s ever been.’ Despite such findings, the disproportionality
– what Hall termed amplification – of the ‘spill-over’ meme has gained momentum. Arana (2009) writes that: ‘If
Phoenix, El Paso and Austin.’ Similarly, a recent Customs and Border Protection study concluded:
media reports are to be believed, an Armageddon-like rash of drug-related violence … has crossed from Mexico into the United
States.’ Yet, investigating the crime data from the areas most at risk, he comes to the conclusion: … the numbers tell a different story
… violent crimes, including robberies, have either decreased in the first part of 2009 or remained relatively stable. This is not to say
that the increased violence in Mexico has had no impact in the United States or that no violence in the United States can be traced to
the conflict in Mexico. Rather the drive not to get ‘scooped’ by competitors has led media outlets to conclude prematurely – based on
hearsay and isolated incidents – that a wave of drug-related violence is upon us. This motivating factor – that the competitive
nature of the media, which leads in this case to a fear of missing out on the next ‘war’ (especially if it
is right on the southern border), and which in turn leads to the type of ‘herd journalism’ that both misreports a story and fails even
to check readily available statistics – is
consistent with moral panic theory and what we know about drug
scares of the past. The journalism being done is so prototypically hyperbolic and sensationalistic
that even local police are frustrated at the gross misrepresentation of the situation. Quoted in Arana (2009), Sgt Mark
Robinson, of the Tucson Police Department, says: ‘The statistics speak for themselves and they are not indicative of a spike in violent
crime … The violence is in Mexico … [The reports] just cost us a bunch of trouble because of a misinterpretation of what somebody
said.’ The economically interesting and politically useful aspect of all this hyperbole and media panic is that the difference
between reality and public perception is only widening, and entering into that gap are those with
both a political agenda and an economic interest at stake. Del Bosque (2009) points out: That’s the reality these
days for El Pasoans. Or rather, it’s the twisted perception created by border-warrior politicians and national news media … For El
Pasoans and residents of nearby border towns, it might all be a mere oddity – maybe even worth a chuckle – if it didn’t mean the
construction of 18-foot border walls, blustery talk about National Guard troop surges, and new resources for the disastrous war on
drugs. While ‘troop surge,’ ‘border wall,’ and ‘drug war’ might sound irresistibly sexy to politicians and pundits, it’s border residents
who have to live with the fences and tanks and consequences.
*Legalization*
Legislation S
Drug violence is inevitable absent legalization – police and military training
backfire
Wakefeild, 13 – deputy editor of The Spectator (Mary, “Stop the drugs war,” The Spectator, 12 January 2013,
http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/8813601/stop-the-drugs-war)//BI
What about Calderon, the one before Peña Nieto, I asked Maria, who's seen ten presidents come and go. Wasn't he OK? At least he
tried to fight the drug cartels. 'He's loco! Mad,' said Maria, with a dismissive shrug. 'His so-called drug war--pah! Do you know
how many have died in the drug war? They say 50,000 dead but it's more like 100,000. It is more than died in
the Vietnam war. And these are not soldiers, they are young boys, babies, mothers, husbands. And for
what?' There's the question: for what? Felipe Calderon was once convinced he had the answer: to crack down on
the kingpins; restore moral order. But Calderon's war had a pretty clear outcome: the bad guys won. Capos were shot, but their
cartels just split and proliferated: more gang warfare, more severed heads dumped on beaches; more
corpses carved up and left on busy streets for kids to gawp at; extortion, kidnap, rape. It soon became clear even
to Calderon that the 'war on drugs' was unwinnable, for the simple reason that the cause of the mayhem is
not in Mexico, it's in the States. For as long as there are American junkies, Mexico will pay the
blood price for their addiction. This has been the status quo for the past few decades, and as far as I could tell on my
Mexican adventure last year, Maria was right: no one expected Peña Nieto to change much of anything. He belongs to
the PRI--the Institutional Revolutionary Party, which ruled Mexico for most of the past century, and its approach to the cartels has
been a blind eye. But late last year, there was a new twist: America, having spent billions on Calderon's daft crusade, last
month voted to legalise cannabis in some states (if the federal government gives them the OK). Colorado and
Washington started it, California is keen to follow suit, and Oregon, Rhode Island, Maine and Vermont aren't far behind. It creates
an irony that the Mexican president is puzzling over: some 40 per cent of the cartels' business is selling
cannabis across the border, so why should Mexico bust a gut keeping it from getting to America,
if it's legal there? This new legislation, said one of Peña Nieto's advisers cautiously, 'changes the rules of the game'. It does, and it
also creates an opportunity, though one that Peña Nieto might not welcome. If the Mexican president is brave enough, he could not
just follow the new rules, but perhaps change the game. He could follow the lead of President Otto Perez Molina of Guatemala, who
has asked the question: if fighting doesn't work, why not legalise drugs instead? Molina is a former head of the
intelligence services who has himself tried the iron-fist approach to gangs, but now he says the price paid in human lives is too high.
'It's time to end the myths, the taboos, and discuss legalisation.' Perhaps it sounds like a dramatic step. It's certainly one America
would oppose with every star and stripe, because to legalise drugs in Mexico would be to push the fight alarmingly close to their
border. But then, even as a tourist there, you can see Mexico requires a dramatic step. To say that the police aren't
effective is an almost comic understatement. It's not just that there are good cops and bad cops; it's that it's impossible to
tell the difference. Take this little tangle. Last year, in June, there was a shootout in the food court of Mexico City airport, Terminal
2. Three police officers who suspected another three of drug-smuggling went (they say) to make an arrest. The drug-running cops
opened fire, killed the good cops, then skipped off scot-free, leaving clumps of traumatised Texan tourists shivering under canteen
tables, vowing never to leave Dallas again. It later turned out that the runaway cops were in fact the good guys. They had been about
to expose all the other cops as drug-smugglers, and had been shot at as a result. All 348 airport cops were later reshuffled to other
states. If you think perhaps the answer to Mexico's troubles is a tougher army, then I'd like to
introduce you to Los Zetas. They are often also described as the paramilitary wing of the older Gulf Cartel, but that hasn't
been true for a while. In 2010 they bit off the hand that fed them, formed their own gang, and began to show their rivals the true
meaning of brutality. The Zetas specialise in the butchering of children. They have been phenomenally successful,
just recently overtaking the famous Sinaloa cartel and dominating the country. How have they managed this? Because they
came
from the army, from Mexico's equivalent of the SAS. They were trained by American and Israeli special forces
in intimidation, ambushing and marksmanship, just to fight the drug gangs. Then they upped and formed one.
The Zetas still recruit from Mexico's special forces and from the Guatemalan equivalent, the Kaibiles.
The more cash America puts into training the Mexican army, the happier the Zetas are, purring
over all the potential new recruits. So there aren't really many other alternatives. Why not legalise
drugs? It wouldn't be giving up, it would be winning without fighting --the best, cleverest way. The cartels
would be forced above ground; the big money would be in legitimate business. The psychos, like Rosario
Reta (opposite), would no longer be required, and who knows, the police might once again become an effective
force. After leaving Oaxaca, I headed for Veracruz state on the Mexican gulf and Maria waved us off with a warning: 'Be careful,
Los Zetas operate there!' The next night was an anxious one, high in the Sierra Norte mountains, Googling for signs of trouble. The
whole police force had been sacked recently, it turned out, and the Zetas were waging a war against journalists, leaving their beaten
bodies in the streets as a warning to others. That was enough for me. At the turn-off to Veracruz the following day, we turned tail and
made for safer-sounding Villahermosa, though I'm quite sure the chances of us actually meeting a Zeta were very slim. And that's
another tragedy for Mexico. It's a terrific place, but tourists are increasingly so paralysed with anxiety about
the cartels that they're reluctant to travel there. We ate alone one night in a three-storey restaurant in Mexico City on
the main square--the one the Lonely Planet said was usually chock-a-block. Waiters idled by the walls, waiting to go home. A
hundred tables laid in high season, and only two customers all night. If tourism dries up, there'll be only one career
for a young man with an eye to making money: join a gang.
Legalization Good
Legalization good – decreases demand for drugs
Stonebraker 13 associate professor of economics at Winthrop University, former professor in
the Department of Economics, Ph.D. degree in economics from Princeton University and a B.A.
degree in economics from the University of Maryland (Robert J. Stonebraker “Supply-Side Drug Policy: Will it
Ever Work?” The Joy of Economics: Making Sense out of Life Section II-C: Crime 06/04/13
http://faculty.winthrop.edu/stonebrakerr/book/supplysidedrugs.htm) // czhang
Legalization?¶ ¶ A more radical approach is legalization. Although quite controversial, legalization
does offer potential
gains. Much of the current drug-related crime occurs as rival suppliers battle for turf and market share both within the
U.S. and along supply routes throughout Central and South America and Asia. In a legal market,
suppliers are likely to enforce contracts by recourse to law rather than violence. Moreover, law
enforcement officials, free from having to chase down drug offenders, could reallocate their time and efforts
to reducing other types of criminal activity. Drug safety might also improve. Retail stores that offer
branded products meeting government-certified standards could replace back-alley vendors who offer drugs of unknown purity.
Legalization also might create financial benefits. In addition to the potential tax revenues states might collect on
the sale and use of controlled substances, billions
of dollars now being spent on drug enforcement and
prisons could be saved.¶ ¶ Legalization certainly would increase the supply of currently illegal
substances and bring down prices. The interesting question is what might happen to demand.
Opponents are convinced that legalization would cause the demand for drugs to soar as hordes of new users "experiment." Since
many of these might subsequently become addicted, the costs to society would quickly multiply. On the other hand, proponents
contend that quantities consumed will not rise significantly. Stripped of their illicit cloak, drugs would be
less alluring to rebellious youth. If so, the demand for drugs might actually plummet. And, if we fear
that lower prices will push usage up, governments can raise those prices by imposing
appropriate taxes. Moreover, alcohol can be a substitute for products such as marijuana or cocaine. If so, an increase in drug
usage might create a similar decrease in the consumption of alcohol and its related costs.¶ ¶ Since 2001, Portugal has used
a novel, but related, approach. While possession and use of drugs remains officially illegal, they have been
"decriminalized". The police can stop anyone they find using illegal substances and confiscate the drugs but, instead of
imposing criminal penalties, they send the users to "dissuasion commissions" that offer therapy. There are no
fines and no prison sentences. The initial results have been encouraging. Usage rates for most substances seem to have
fallen or remained constant and, with the fear of prosecution removed, the numbers of users seeking treatment has risen
significantly.9 Similarly, Uruguay has much lower rates of drug usage than the U.S. despite the
fact
that possession of drugs for individual use in that country never has been illegal. several other
Latin American countries now are considering similar policies.10 Although several U.S. states recently have
moved to decriminalize marijuana, at least for medical purposes, the approach remains controversial.
Total legalization key to solve the root cause of violence and drug crime –
otherwise corruption spreads to the US and causes instability – solving in the US
spills over
Carpenter, 9 vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books, including
Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America (Ted Galen, “Troubled Neighbor: Mexico’s Drug Violence
Poses a Threat to the United States” February 2, 2009 Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/troubledneighbor-mexicos-drug-violence-poses-threat-united-states) // czhang
The Only Real Solution¶ The brutal reality is that prohibitionism¶ simply drives commerce in a product underground, creating an
enormous black-market¶ potential profit that attracts violence-prone,¶ criminal elements. Even the U.S. State Department has
conceded that point, although it¶ remains blindly committed to a prohibitionist¶ strategy.¶ Drug organizations possess and wield¶ the
ultimate instrument of corruption:¶ money. The drug trade has access to¶ almost unimaginable quantities of it.¶ No commodity is so
widely available,¶ so cheap to produce, and as easily¶ renewable as illegal drugs. They offer¶ dazzling profit margins that allow¶
criminals to generate illicit revenues on¶ a scale without historical precedent.¶ 67¶ Governments around the world seem to be¶
awakening to the problems caused by a strict¶ prohibitionist strategy. Such countries as the¶ Netherlands and Portugal have
adopted¶ decriminalization measures (defacto or dejure)¶ for possession and use of small quantities of¶ drugs.¶ 68¶ That view is
taking hold in the Western¶ Hemisphere as well. The president of Argentina¶ has endorsed the
decriminalization of drug¶ consumption, and the president of Honduras¶ has gone even further,
embracing the legalization of drug use.¶ 69¶ Indeed, that sentiment seems¶ to be growing in Mexico
itself. The PRD(Party¶ of the Democratic Revolution), the country’s¶ largest opposition party, has called for drug¶ legalization, and
even President Calderón has¶ proposed decriminalizing the possession of¶ small amounts of street
drugs.¶ 70¶ Those proposals are modest steps in the¶ right direction, and they certainly are more¶
sensible than Washington’s knee-jerk support¶ for comprehensive prohibition. Legalizing, or¶
even decriminalizing, drug possession has the¶ beneficial effect of not stigmatizing (and¶ sometimes ruining)
the lives of users. And¶ such reforms have the salutary effect of not¶ filling prisons with nonviolent offenders. But¶ even those
desirable reforms do not get to the¶ root cause of the violence that accompanies¶ the drug trade.
Unless the production and sale¶ of drugs is also legalized, the black-market premium will still
exist and law-abiding businesses will still stay away from the trade. In other¶ words, drug commerce
will remain in the¶ hands of criminal elements that do not shrink¶ from engaging in bribery,
intimidation, and¶ murder.¶ Because of its proximity to the huge U.S.¶ market, Mexico will continue to be a
cockpit¶ for that drug-related violence. By its domestic¶ commitment to prohibition, the United¶ States is creating the
risk that the drug cartels¶ may become powerful enough to destabilize¶ its southern neighbor. Their
impact on¶ Mexico’s government and society has already¶ reached worrisome levels. Worst of all, the¶ carnage associated
with the black market¶ trade in drugs does not respect national¶ boundaries. The frightening violence
now¶ convulsing Mexico could become a routine¶ feature of life in American communities, as¶ the
cartels begin to flex their muscles north¶ of the border.¶ When the United States and other countries ponder
whether to persist in a strategy¶ of drug prohibition, they need to consider all¶ of the potential societal costs, both domestically and
internationally.¶ 71¶ Drug abuse is certainly a major public health problem, and its¶ societal costs are considerable. But banning¶ the
drug trade creates economic distortions¶ and an opportunity for some of the most¶ unsavory elements to gain dominant positions.
Drug prohibition leads inevitably to an¶ orgy of corruption and violence. Those are¶ even worse societal
costs, and that reality is¶ now becoming all too evident in Mexico.¶ The only feasible strategy to counter the¶ mounting turmoil in
Mexico is to drastically¶ reduce the potential revenue flows to the¶ trafficking organizations. In other words, the¶ United States
needs to de-fund the cartels¶ through the legalization of currently illegal¶ drugs. If Washington
abandoned the prohibition model, it is very likely that other countries in the international community
would¶ do the same. At that point, the profit margins¶ for the drug trade would be similar to the¶ margins for other legal
commodities, and¶ legitimate business personnel would become¶ the principal players. That is precisely what¶ happened when the
United States ended its¶ quixotic crusade against alcohol in 1933. To¶ help reverse the burgeoning tragedy of drug related violence in
Mexico, Washington¶ needs to adopt a similar course today.
Drug prohibition helps terrorists
Carpenter, 05 (Ted Galen Carpenter, the Cato Institute’s vice president for defense and foreign policy studies, is the author
of six books and editor of 10 books on international affairs; “Drug Prohibition Is a Terrorist’s Best Friend”; 1/4/05;
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/drug-prohibition-is-terrorists-best-friend?print) KD
There is little doubt that terrorist groups around the world profit from the drug trade. What anti-drug
crusaders refuse to acknowledge, however, is that the
connection between drug trafficking and terrorism is
the direct result of making drugs illegal. The prohibitionist policy that the United States and other drugconsuming countries continue to pursue guarantees a huge black market premium for all illegal drugs. The
retail value of drugs coming into the United States (to say nothing of Europe and other markets) is estimated
at $50 billion to $100 billion a year. Fully 90 percent of that sum is attributable to the
prohibition premium. Absent a world-wide prohibitionist policy, this fat profit margin would
evaporate, and terrorist organizations would be forced to seek other sources of revenue. Drug
prohibition is terrorism’s best friend. That symbiotic relationship will continue until the United States and its allies
have the wisdom to dramatically change their drug policies.
Legalization Bad
Drug legalization would fail – their evidence doesn’t assume crime groups’
retaliation
Felbab-Brown, 12 a senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program
at Brookings and an expert on international and internal conflicts and nontraditional security threats, including insurgency,
organized crime, urban violence, and illicit economies (Vanda, “Organized Criminals Won't Fade Away” August 2012 The World
Today Magazine http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/08/drugs-crime-felbabbrown) // czhang
Although frequently portrayed as an effective solution to the problem of organized crime, mere
legalization of illicit economies, particularly of drugs, is no panacea.¶ Proponents of legalization as a mechanism to
reduce organized crime make at least two arguments: it will severely deprive organized crime groups of resources. It will also free
law enforcement agencies to concentrate on other types of crime.¶ A country may have good reasons to want to legalize the use and
even production of some addictive substances and ride out the consequences of greater use. Such reasons could include providing
better health care to users, reducing the number of users in prison, and perhaps even generating greater revenues and giving jobs to
the poor.¶ Yet without robust state presence and effective law enforcement, both often elusive in parts of
the world such as Latin
America or Africa, there can be little assurance that organized crime groups
would be excluded from the legal drug trade. In fact, they may have numerous advantages over legal companies and
manage to hold on to the trade, perhaps even resorting to violence to do so. Nor does mere legalization mean that the
state will suddenly become robust and effective. Persistent deficiencies in the state explain why
there is so much illegal logging alongside legal logging, for example, or why smuggling in legal
goods take place.¶ Organized crime groups who stand to be displaced from the drug trade by legalization can hardly
be expected to take the change lying down. Rather, they may intensify their violent power struggles over
remaining illegal economies, such as the smuggling of other contraband or migrants, prostitution, extortion, and
kidnapping. To mitigate their financial losses, they may also seek to take over the black economy,
which operates outside the tax system. If they succeed in organizing street life in this informal sector, their political power
over society will be greater than ever.¶ Nor does legalization imply that police would be freed up
to focus on other issues or become less corrupt: The state may have to devote more resources to
regulating the legal economy.¶ Additionally, a grey market in drugs would probably emerge. If drugs
became legal, the state would want to tax them – to generate revenues and to discourage greater
use. The higher the tax, the greater the opportunity for organized crime to undercut the state by
charging less. Organized crime groups could set up their own fields with smaller taxation, snatch the market and the profits,
and the state would be back to combating them and eradicating their fields. Such grey markets exist alongside a host of legal
economies, from cigarettes to stolen cars.
Legalize MJ Good
Legalization of marijuana would destroy the foundation for Mexican drug cartel
success
Luhnow, 9 writer for Wall Street Journal (David, “Saving Mexico” December 26, 2009
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704254604574614230731506644.html) // czhang
Advocates for drug legalization say making marijuana legal would cut the economic clout of
Mexican cartels by half. Marijuana accounts for anywhere between 50% to 65% of Mexican
cartel revenues, say Mexican and U.S. officials. While cocaine has higher profit margins, marijuana is a steady
source of income that allows cartels to meet payroll and fund other activities.¶ Marijuana is also
less risky to a drug gang's balance sheet. If a cocaine shipment is seized, the Mexican gang has to write off the
expected profits from the shipment and the cost of paying Colombian suppliers, meaning they lose twice. But because gangs here
grow their own marijuana, it's easier to absorb the losses from a seizure. Cartels also own the land where the
marijuana is grown, meaning they can
cheaply grow more supply rather than have to fork over more
money to the Colombians for the next shipment of cocaine.¶ Several U.S. states like California and
Oregon have decriminalized marijuana, making possession of small quantities a misdemeanor, like a parking ticket.
Decriminalization falls short of legalization because the sale and distribution remain a serious
felony. One of the big reasons for the move is to reduce the problem of overcrowded and costly prisons.
Legalization solves the violence that arises from narcoterrorism and drug trade
Luhnow, 9 writer for Wall Street Journal (David, “Saving Mexico” December 26, 2009
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704254604574614230731506644.html) // czhang
"Economically, there is no argument or solution other than legalization, at
least of marijuana,"
a move would likely shift marijuana
production entirely to places like California, where the drug can be grown more efficiently and
said the top Mexican official matter-of-factly. The official said such
closer to consumers. "Mexico's objective should be to make the U.S. self-sufficient in marijuana," he added with a grin.¶ He is not
alone in his views. Earlier this year, three former Latin American presidents known for their free-market and conservative
credentials—Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, Cesar Gaviria of Colombia and Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil—said
governments should seriously consider legalizing marijuana as an effective tool against
murderous drug gangs.
Decriminalization Good
Decriminalization and regulation of drugs solves best in the long term
Rolles, 10 senior policy analyst at BMJ, an open-access, peer-reviewed medical journal (Stephen,
“An alternative to the war on drugs” 3 June 2010
http://www.bmj.com/content/341/bmj.c3360?ijkey=xIwckDCjknVi9wn&keytype=ref) // czhang
Consensus is growing within the drugs field and beyond that the prohibition on production,
supply, and use of
certain drugs has not only failed to deliver its intended goals but has been counterproductive.
Evidence is mounting that this policy has not only exacerbated many public health problems, such as
adulterated drugs1 and the spread of HIV and hepatitis B and C infection among injecting drug
users, but has created a much larger set of secondary harms associated with the criminal market. These now include vast
networks of organised crime, endemic violence related to the drug market,2 corruption of law
enforcement and governments, militarised crop eradication programmes (environmental damage, food
insecurity, and human displacement), and funding for terrorism and insurgency.3 4¶ These conclusions have been
reached by a succession of committees and reports including, in the United Kingdom alone, the Police Foundation,5 the Home
Affairs Select Committee,6 The prime minister’s Strategy Unit,7 the Royal Society of Arts,8 and the UK Drug Policy Consortium.9
The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime has also acknowledged the many “unintended negative consequences” of drug
enforcement,10 increasingly shifting its public rhetoric away from its former aspirational goals of a “drug free world,” towards
“containment” of the problem at current levels.¶ Problems of prohibition¶ Despite this emerging consensus on the nature of the
problem, the debate about how policy can evolve to respond to it remains driven more by populist politics and tabloid headlines than
by rational analysis or public health principles.¶ The criminalisation of drugs has, historically, been presented
as an emergency response to an imminent threat rather than an evidence based health or
social policy intervention .11 Prohibitionist rhetoric frames drugs as menacing not just to health but also to our
children, national security, and the moral fabric of society itself. The prohibition model is positioned as a response to such threats,
and is often misappropriated into populist political narratives such as “crackdowns” on crime, immigration, and, more recently, the
war on terror.¶ This conceptualisation has resulted in the punitive enforcement of drug policy becoming largely immune from
meaningful scrutiny.14 A curiously self-justifying logic now prevails in which the harms of prohibition—such as drug
related organised crime and deaths from contaminated heroin—are
conflated with the harms of drug use. These
policy related harms then bolster the apparent menace of drugs and justify the continuation, or
intensification, of prohibition. This has helped create a high level policy environment that routinely ignores or
actively suppresses critical scientific engagement and is uniquely divorced from most public health
and social policy norms, such as evaluation of interventions using established indicators of health and wellbeing.¶ Emerging
change¶ Despite this hostile ideological environment, two distinct policy trends have emerged in recent decades: harm
reduction15 and decriminalisation of personal possession and use. Although both are nominally permitted
within existing international legal frameworks, they pose serious practical and intellectual challenges to the
overarching status quo. Both have been driven by pragmatic necessity: harm reduction emerging in the
mid-1980s in response to the epidemic of HIV among injecting drug users, and decriminalisation in response to resource pressures
on overburdened criminal justice systems (and, to a lesser extent, concerns over the rights of users). Both policies have
proved their effectiveness. Harm reduction is now used in policy or practice in 93 countries,16 and several countries in
mainland Europe,17 18 and central and Latin America have decriminalised all drugs, with others, including states in Australia and
the United States, decriminalising cannabis.19¶ Decriminalisation has shown that less punitive approaches do not
necessarily lead to increased use. In Portugal, for example, use among school age young people has fallen since all drugs
were decriminalised in 2001.20 More broadly, an extensive World Health Organization study concluded: “Globally, drug use is not
distributed evenly and is not simply related to drug policy, since countries with stringent user-level illegal drug policies did not have
lower levels of use than countries with liberal ones.”21¶ Similarly US states that have decriminalised cannabis do
not have higher levels of use than those without. More importantly, the Netherlands, where cannabis is available
from licensed premises, does not have significantly different levels of use from its prohibitionist neighbours.19¶ New approach¶
Although these emerging policy trends are important, they can be seen primarily as symptomatic
responses to mitigate the harms created by the prohibitionist policy environment. Neither directly
tackles the public health or wider social harms created or exacerbated by the illegal production and supply of drugs.¶ The logic of
both, however, ultimately leads us to confront the inevitable choice: non-medical drug markets can remain in the hands of
unregulated criminal profiteers or they can
be controlled and regulated by appropriate government
authorities. There is no third option under which drugs do not exist. The choice needs to be based on an evaluation of which
option will deliver the best outcomes in terms of minimizing the harms, both domestic and international, associated with drug
production, supply, and use. This
does not preclude reducing demand as a legitimate long term policy
goal, rather it accepts that policy must also deal with the reality of current high levels of
demand.¶ A historical stumbling block in this debate has been that the eloquent and detailed critiques of the drug war have not
been matched by a vision for its replacement. Unless a credible public health led model of drug market regulation is proposed, myths
and misrepresentations will inevitably fill the void. So what would such a model look like?¶ Transform’s blueprint for regulation22
attempts to answer this question by offering different options for controls over products (dose, preparation, price, and packaging),
vendors (licensing, vetting and training requirements, marketing and promotions), outlets (location, outlet density, appearance),
who has access (age controls, licensed buyers, club membership schemes), and where and when drugs can be consumed. It then
explores options for different drugs in different populations and suggests the regulatory models that may deliver the best outcomes
(box). Lessons are drawn from successes and failings with alcohol and tobacco regulation in the UK and beyond, as well as controls
over medicinal drugs and other risky products and activities that are regulated by government.¶ Five basic models for regulating
drug availability22¶ Medical prescription model or supervised venues—For highest risk drugs (injected drugs
including heroin and more potent stimulants such as methamphetamine) and problematic users¶ Specialist
pharmacist
retail model—combined with named/licensed user access and rationing of volume of sales for moderate risk drugs such as
amphetamine, powder cocaine, and methylenedioxymethamphetamine (ecstasy)¶ Licensed retailing—including tiers of
regulation appropriate to product risk and local needs. Used for lower risk drugs and preparations such as lower strength stimulant
based drinks¶ Licensed premises for sale and consumption—similar to licensed alcohol venues and Dutch cannabis
“coffee shops,” potentially also for smoking opium or poppy tea¶ Unlicensed sales—minimal regulation for the least risky
products, such as caffeine drinks and coca tea.¶ Such a risk guided regulatory approach is the norm for almost all other arenas of
public policy, and in this respect it is prohibition, not regulation, that can be viewed as the anomalous and radical policy option.¶
Moves towards legal regulation of drug markets depend on negotiating the substantial institutional and political
obstacles presented by the international drug control system (the UN drug conventions). They would
also need to be
phased in cautiously over several years, with close evaluation and monitoring of effects and any
unintended negative consequences.¶ Rather than a universal model, a flexible range of regulatory tools
would be available with the more restrictive controls used for more risky products and less
restrictive controls for lower risk products. Such differential application of regulatory controls could additionally
help create a risk-availability gradient. This holds the potential to not only reduce harms associated with
illicit supply and current patterns of consumption but, in the longer term, to progressively encourage
use of safer products, behaviours, and environments. Understanding of such processes is emerging from “route
transition” interventions aimed at encouraging injecting users to move to lower risk non-injecting modes of administration by, for
example, providing foil for smoking.23 This process is the opposite of what has happened under prohibition, where a profit driven
dynamic has tended to tilt the market towards ever more potent (but profitable) drugs and drug preparations, as well as encouraging
riskier behaviours in high risk environments.
*Popularity*
WOD Popular
Fighting drug trafficking has empirically unanimously popular
Khatami, 12 wrier for CQ Weekly, which reports on the world’s most powerful legislative body
completely and accurately every week. The CQ news team—by far the largest on Capitol Hill,
with more than 100 reporters, editors, and researchers—covers virtually every act of Congress,
deliveritng nonpartisan news and analysis unavailable anywhere else (Elham, May 21, 2012 CQ Weekly
“House Takes Aim at Cross-Border Drug Smuggling”
http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cqweekly/document.php?id=weeklyreport112000004090661&type=hitlist&num=16) // czhang
A House-passed bill would give more tools to federal law enforcement agencies to combat drug
traffickers who use tunnels under the U.S.-Mexico border.¶ The chamber on May 16 passed the
measure (HR 4119) 416-4 under suspension of the rules, an expedited procedure requiring a two-thirds majority for
passage. The Senate unanimously passed a nearly identical measure (S 1236) earlier this year. (House vote 256,
p. 1056)¶ The legislation would expand a 2006 law (PL 109-295) that criminalized the construction or financing of
unauthorized cross-border tunnels used to smuggle drugs, weapons, illegal immigrants or
terrorists. It would subject tunnel smugglers and financiers to the same penalties imposed on those who construct the tunnels.¶ During floor debate May 15, sponsor Silvestre Reyes, D-Texas,
said that while security along the United States’ southwest border has strengthened in recent
years, it “has literally pushed drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations underground
as they try to smuggle illicit drugs and people and other types of contraband.”¶ “These are sophisticated, wellengineered and well-financed projects,” Reyes added. “That’s why it is imperative that this legislation be passed .” Lamar Smith, R-Texas,
agreed, saying that reports of drug-smuggling tunnels have increased significantly in recent
years. He called the tunnels an “unfortu nate testament to the ingenuity of the Mexican drug
cartels.Ӧ The bill would provide for criminal forfeiture of property used in tunneling activities
and civil asset forfeiture of merchandise brought into the United States through a tunnel. It also
would subject border tunnel offenses to money-laundering statutes.¶ The legislation would allow
the Justice Department to seek a court order authorizing the use of surveillance to intercept
wire, oral or electronic communications to aid in the investigation of tunnel-smuggling
activities.
WOD Unpopular
Anti-trafficking efforts in Mexico cause fights – Fast and Furious proves
Durbin, 13 professor of the School of Graduate and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy at
Norwich University (Kirk J. Durbin “International Narco-Terrorism and Non-State Actors: The Drug Cartel Global Threat”
Global Security Studies, Winter 2013, Volume 4, Issue 1 http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Durbin%20Narcotics.pdf) // czhang
Weapons Sources ¶ It makes sense that the United States at the northern door of Mexico is the best place to ¶
conduct business when it comes to small arms. Reports of estimates are as that thousands of ¶ firearms
cross over the border into Mexico each day. Operations such as Wide Receiver, White ¶ Gun, and the latest,
Fast and Furious, were planned operation led by the ATF (Alcohol, Tabacco, ¶ and Firearms) allowed suspected gun
traffickers to buy guns here in the United States to be ¶ transported across the border into
Mexico. According to Frieden (2012), United States ¶ lawmakers were extremely outraged of AFT’s poor
handling in tracking weapons once they went ¶ into Mexico. ATF agent, Larry Alt told CNN, it was "egregious"
that agents were watching ¶ people transfer guns to people who were handing them over to the
cartels, "and we were not taking an enforcement action" (Frieden, 2012, para. 7). Agencies like the ATF
are charged with ¶ the responsibility to prevent weapons from leaving the country illegally. The
issue is made ¶ worse with a lack of transparency, obstruction of the truth, and claimed executive privilege. ¶ Questions will to
continue to be asked about the weapons, who in authority knew, and when they ¶ knew about the operations. Political
infighting will continue on these botched operations for ¶ years to come. Rather than getting to the truth,
Mexico will continue to blame the United States¶ for its lax gun laws and the United States will
blame Mexico for its lack of enforcement and ¶ government corruption.
Other
Intl Key To Cuba
International agreements are key to Cuban enforcement
Lee, 09 (Renssaler, fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Testimony before the House
of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee of
National Security and Foreign Affairs, “Cuba, Drugs, and U.S.-Cuban Relations”, 4/29/2009,
https://www.fpri.org/docs/alt/testimony.20090429.lee_.cubadrugs.pdf, JKahn)
Cuba's relations with the international drug trade are historically complex and controversial and
deserve some mention here. The Castro regime, on its accession to power in 1959, largely wiped out what had been a flourishing
domestic market for cocaine and marijuana that was closely associated with the mob-run Havana casinonightclub scene. Despite
this achievement, opportunistic ties with foreign drugtrafficking organizations apparently persisted .
Allegations of Cuban state complicity in the drug trade date to the early 1960s, although hard evidence of a Cuban drug connection
did not surface until the 1980s. Such cozy relationships reached a height in the late 1980s, when a group of Cuban Ministry of
Interior officials, led by MC department head Antonio de la Guardia, together with representatives of Colombia’s Medellin cartel
coordinated some 15 successful smuggling operations through Cuba to the United States which – according to Cuban officials –
moved a total of six tons of cocaine and earned the conspirators $3.4 million. Also complicit in these activities, though tangentially,
was Division General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, a decorated hero of the Cuban revolution. An Ochoa emissary met with Medellin
cartel chief Pablo Escobar in 1988 to discuss a cocaine-smuggling venture and also a proposal to set up a cocaine laboratory in Cuba.
The discussions also touched on another topic – and this is what Escobar really wanted most – the transfer of some surface-to-air
missiles to the cartel in Colombia. The trafficking schemes never materialized, but in early 1990 the Colombian
National Police discovered an assortment of 10 ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles of French
manufacture (apparently originating in Angola) in a Bogotá residence belonging to an assassin employed by the Medellin cartel. The
Ochoa-de la Guardia machinations and the subsequent trials, executions, and purges marked the beginning of a
watershed in the Cuban government’s policies toward illegal drugs. In subsequent years the regime
made a visible and mostly successful effort to distance itself from the international drug trade,
setting up new and elaborate drugfighting institutions, establishing narcotics cooperation agreements with
European and other Latin American states, and adopting an increasingly prohibitionist approach toward the sale and use of drugs
inside Cuba. (This, incidentally, contrasts sharply with the harm-reduction approach being advocated by three former Latin
American presidents.)
Trade Solves Drugs
Trade and liberalization decrease the risk of drug trafficking
Bartilow, 9 associate professor of Poli Sci at U of Kentucky and Kihong is a professor of
comparative politics and quantitative methodology at Kyungpook National University and a
vising scholar at the Harvard-Yenching Institute (Horace and Kihong Eom, “Free Traders and Drug Smugglers:
The Effects of Trade Openness on States' Ability to Combat Drug Trafficking” Source: Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 51,
No. 2 (Summer, 2009), pp. 117-145 JSTOR) // czhang
Important policy implications emerge from this analysis. Should ¶ drug-consuming countries in the Americas restrict trade in order
to limit ¶ their exposure to drug trafficking? With the growing concern over trade ¶ related job losses and the
recent collapse of the financial sector in the ¶ United States and other OECD countries, U.S.
policymakers might be ¶ tempted to interpret this finding as additional evidence for placing ¶ restrictions on trade. In the post-9/11
security environment, this ¶ response may appear reasonable, especially considering that many ter ¶ rorist organizations are
connected to the drug trade (Drug Enforcement ¶ Administration 2002). However, it would be a mistake to erect
barriers ¶ to trade, because revenues earned from trade enable states in drug- pro ¶ ducing
countries in the Americas effectively to interdict drug trafficking ¶ at its very source and
potentially to limit the flow of drugs into North ¶ America. Moreover, because the analysis shows that
increasing levels of ¶ trade openness have a positive effect on the counternarcotics operations ¶ of
states in drug-producing countries in the Western Hemisphere, poli ¶ cymakers throughout the
region should consider extending the various ¶ trade and investment provisions of NAFTA to South America,
especially ¶ to the Andean countries, where drug trafficking is a major concern.
Evidence Indict
Be skeptical of their evidence – the media is one of the largest beneficiaries
Schack, 11 – Assistant Professor, Department of Journalism at Ithaca College, PhD in Media Studies from the University of
Colorado (Todd, “Twenty-first-century drug warriors: the press, privateers and the for-profit waging of the war on drugs,” Media,
War & Conflict, Vol. 4 No. 2, pg. 142-161, August 2011, Sage Journals)//BI
Academics have long established how the history of the media’s reporting of the drug war since the 1970s has
been one of over-hyped, sensationalized coverage that falls into easily categorizable stereotypes
and myths that fail to address the far more complicated issues beneath the ‘drug problem’ such
as poverty, social and political marginalization, and race (Gitlin, 1989; Marez, 2004; Reeves and Campbell,
1994; Reinarman and Levine, 1989; Viano, 2002). What scholars have repeatedly shown regarding this type of media involvement is
that, for the media, sensationalism in the drug war translates into pure profit: ‘War is, of course,
the health of the networks, and of their promotion departments. Scenes from the battlefront play especially
well. The drug war provides … the most vivid pictures’ (Gitlin, 1989: 17). Further, over-sensationalized
‘battlefront’ coverage and a focus solely on issues of violence are very useful for the overall
justification of the militarized response, in the very traditional manner of using fear to mobilize
support for pre-determined policy. This is nothing new, as the sociological notion of moral panic theory has established
for quite some time (Becker, 1963; Cohen, 2002[1972]; Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Hall et al., 1978; Jenkins, 1992; Thompson,
1998). In his seminal work on the subject, Cohen (2002[1972]) defined moral panic as: A condition, episode, person or group of
persons [that] emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and
stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking
people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to.
(p. 1)
Militarism Now
Obama is transitioning to a militarized policy
Freeman and Luis Sierra, 05 (*Laurie, Director for Yemen at the National Security Council, former State
Department Official, fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America, writer for the Washington Post Mexico Bureau, M.A. in
International Politics from Princeton University, degree from Duke in Latin American Studies, **Jorge, Knight International
Journalism Fellow, degree in International Journalism from the University of Southern California, defense policy and economics
fellow at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, “Mexico: The Militarization Traip”, 2005, part of
“Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The impact of U.S. Policy”, Rienner, Google Books, JKahn)
Barack Obama came to office amid a growing global consensus on the failure of a century of costly “war
on drugs” policies. The new administration inherited a legacy of US leadership focused on
increasingly militarized and politicized supply reduction efforts rather than evidence based and
rights based drug policy. The George W. Bush administration, in particular, explicitly sought to undermine the credibility and
scientific evidence behind harm reduction approaches, especially needle exchange as an essential HIV prevention measure. Obama’s
predecessors escalated measures such as aerial crop reduction in the Andes even in the face of overwhelming
evidence of their ineffectiveness. This paper, written early in the Obama administration, describes the political and historical
constraints inherited by the new government and also seeks to highlight the opportunities the Obama White House has for turning
the page on the wasteful and abusive drug policies of the past. It suggests that the first actions of the new administration signal a
different tone for drug policy and a shift toward respect for science as the basis for policy. It remains to be seen, however, whether
courageous leadership from the Obama White House will result in real resource and programmatic change in the face of inevitable
ideologically driven attacks. The stakes are high as US policy, for good or ill, shapes global drug policy decision making. Leadership
on evidence based drug policy could be among the Obama administration’s most important contributions to improved global health.
Cocaine – LA Key
U.S. is dependent on Latin American cocaine
Lee, 2 (Rensselaer W., contract researcher for the Congressional Research Service and a senior fellow at FPRI, “Perverse Effects
of Andean Counternarcotics Policy,” Orbis, Volume 46, Issue 3, Summer 2012, pg. 537-554, sciencedirect, Tashma)
United States international drug fighting strategy as it has evolved in recent years comprises two related but distinct imperatives.
The primary imperative is simply to limit the availability of illicit drugs in U.S. markets. Latin America has been the
venue for most source-control efforts—especially the Andean countries, which supply 100
percent of the cocaine and (now) as much as 60 percent of the heroin consumed in U.S. markets.
Standard supply-reduction measures include eradicating coca and opium poppy fields (sometimes spraying these crops with
chemical defoliants), destroying processing laboratories and seizing illegal drug shipments en route to the United States. For
instance, much of the $1.3 billion U.S. package of assistance to Plan Colombia, authorized in 2000, was earmarked for supplyreduction purposes: mainly helicopters, planes, and training to support a massive coca-spraying effort in southern Colombia, as well
as electronic surveillance technology to help detect the “northward flow” of drugs from coca-growing areas of that country.1
Target US
Drug traffickers target the US – violence spills over
Durbin, 13 professor of the School of Graduate and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy at
Norwich University (Kirk J. Durbin “International Narco-Terrorism and Non-State Actors: The Drug Cartel Global Threat”
Global Security Studies, Winter 2013, Volume 4, Issue 1 http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Durbin%20Narcotics.pdf) // czhang
The war between the Mexican Cartels over the control of the movement and the routing ¶ of drugs amounts to keys points
across Mexico and most important at the U.S./Mexico border. ¶ The narco-cartels use this term, plazas(geographical locations or points where drug contraband ¶ passes through
before entering into the United States). Control of locations near the United ¶ States and Mexico control the movement
of drugs, the transporters, and any resources that assist ¶ in conducting their business. The cartel
that controls these key locations possesses the ability to ¶ obtain and control the funds, the ultimate symbol of power. Serrano
(1997) quoted the Drug ¶ Policy Director Barry R. McCaffrey, "Colorado, Utah and Wyoming, the Rocky Mountain ¶ heartland of
America, are increasingly becoming populated with Mexican cartel trafficking organizations and
violent gangs using this major transportation crossroads as a trans-shipment ¶ center" (para. 12). Articles and reports illustrate that the drug problem has saturated the
United ¶ States had gone far beyond the major cities that serve as major distribution centers. Serrano¶
(1997) wrote the drug cartels have been concentrating on untapped areas of the Mid-west and the ¶ Rocky Mountains. States such as Wyoming, Utah, and Iowa have a large number of legal and ¶ illegal
Interstates 25, 70, ¶ and 80 serve as pipelines for the movement
of drugs and money. He adds that federal drug enforcement officials note that out the interstate
roadways are the major routes for drugs to move ¶ north and east, and money to move south and west (para. 12-14). Gun violence
will continue to ¶ spill over the border into the United States as the rival cartels continue to fight
over the key entry ¶ points (Plazas) into the United States.
immigrants who have converged on these areas. Serrano reports that
Drugs – LA Key
Latin America is the prime pathway for drug trafficking – geographical advantages
Durbin, 13 professor of the School of Graduate and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy at
Norwich University (Kirk J. Durbin “International Narco-Terrorism and Non-State Actors: The Drug Cartel Global Threat”
Global Security Studies, Winter 2013, Volume 4, Issue 1 http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Durbin%20Narcotics.pdf) // czhang
Introduction to Narco Terrorism in Central America
Central America’s geography is a natural land bridge connecting North and South ¶ America and provides
movement of drug contraband from South America to the United States. ¶ Mexico’s outline from the sky
resembles the familiar shape, that of a leg; parted by its various ¶ geographical regions and states. The lay of the land provides a
stretch of coast line on the east ¶ and west with water on each side. The Gulf of Mexico’s waters move along the
east coast,¶ providing easy routes by watercraft or plane to the gulf areas of the United States. The
Pacific ¶ Ocean also provides a path of travel to this country with access to the west coast of Canada. ¶ These coastline areas and the
interior roads that lead north to the United States border, provide ¶ convenient routes for narcotics activities. Some routes are at
times geographically impassible by ¶ air or land but numerous trails are available to move drugs into this
country and move cash from ¶ the sale of those drugs back to the south. Today’s war is against a mix of
terrorism, illicit drug ¶ trade, bribery of public and military officials, threats and coercion, weapons trafficking, human ¶ trafficking,
assassinations and kidnappings. The land bridge between North and South America ¶ will continue to be
the favorite route narco-terrorists will use to import drugs into the United ¶ States.
Central America is a key path for drug trade
Scutti, 6/28/13 reporter at Medical Daily, breaking health news, scientific trends, and
innovations (Susan, “Drug Trafficking As Well As Drug Abuse Pose Health Threat To Many, UN Report States”
http://www.medicaldaily.com/articles/16979/20130628/drug-trafficking-well-abuse-pose-health-threat.htm) // czhang
The region of Central America and the Caribbean continues to be used as a major transit area for
South American cocaine heading to the North American market. The increasing power of drug
gangs has helped to raise corruption and homicide rates in the region, especially in Belize, El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras, which are particularly affected by significant levels of drug-related violence. Areas exposed to intense
drug trafficking in Central America show higher homicide rates.¶ UNODC estimates that about 280 tons of South
American cocaine (purity-adjusted) are destined for North America. Much of it travels by way of
Central America and the Caribbean, where cocaine use is also increasing. Recently, cocaine
shipments destined for countries in Central America, with further deliveries for Mexico and the
U.S. have increased.¶ In 2011 and 2012, trafficking in precursor chemicals increased in countries in Central America, in
particular non-scheduled chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine. El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua
reported incidents in 2011 and 2012 involving significant seizures of esters of phenylacetic acid and methylamine. Illicit laboratories
have also been reported in the region. Seizures of chemical precursors, raw material (coca paste) and laboratories in Guatemala and
Honduras indicate the likely existence of both cocaine- and heroin-refining facilities. Furthermore, the abuse of MDMA
('ecstasy'), generally imported from Europe, has been spreading in Central America and the
Caribbean since the period 2010-2011.
The Caribbean is the center of drug trade – key to other regions of the global – US,
Africa, Europe
Brewer, 6/17/13 C.E.O. of Criminal Justice International Associates, a global threat mitigation firm headquartered in
northern Virginia (Jerry, “The Dominican Republic and Drug Smuggling via the Caribbean” http://www.mexidata.info/id3641.html)
// czhang
To break the cycle of narcotics trafficking and the accompanying violence by organized criminals
and gangs, as they increasingly (and once again) make end runs via the Caribbean Basin with drug routes to the
U.S., Africa and Europe, affected nations must commit and task multilateral enforcement efforts.¶ Yet we will hear arm
chair pundits once again call for drug legalization, as well as a primary focus of investing in education, prevention, and training “that
gives youth hope beyond crime,” albeit an investment in youth is a necessary and viable course of action for the future.¶ The
exception is for those who have progressed beyond youth, with many now in positions to compete as some of the wealthiest
personalities in the world. Ironically, they diabolically set the bar on how to rise and achieve massive wealth quickly, and eliminate
all those in their way that work to prevent them from achieving their offensives of death and terror for profit.¶ These moguls of evil
transgression are entrenched in virtually every facet of crime that brings quick and easy wealth that is easily concealed through a
myriad of international rogue financial conduits, as well as some rogue government facilitation. Global criminal networks corrupt
and launder illicit proceeds. Fortunes are easily invested into ostensibly legitimate companies and real estate projects.¶ Many of the
organized criminal and drug cartel principals that have been successfully interdicted, convicted, and sentenced to prison continue to
benefit as family members and other front persons act to monitor, control, and enforce their agendas by proxy.¶ The
Dominican Republic has been a frequent strategic conduit for drug trafficking that has impacted
crime, violence and addiction in Puerto Rico and other neighboring nations of the Caribbean.
Intense drug interdiction in those areas of the Caribbean cyclically, in the last couple of decades, forced South
American drug trafficking to more direct routes to the U.S. via Central America. Intense focus
there, in the last few years, bounces much of it back to the Caribbean in this vicious circle.¶ Venezuela
became a major transit country for cocaine shipments under the former Hugo Chavez dictatorial
rule. Corrupt Venezuelan military and National Guard personnel have been reported to facilitate
both the FARC and other Colombian drug trafficking organizations. ¶ In 2011, a report by Venezuela’s antidrug office stated that there was “a network of air routes between the Venezuelan border states of Apure and Zulia to destinations
like the Dominican Republic and Haiti.” As well, a Colombian drug trafficking organization run by Daniel Barrera moved tons of
cocaine from the “Venezuelan Caribbean island of Margarita to the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico in recent years. Authorities
confiscated US$2.7 million in drug money belonging to the organization in Puerto Rico in April 2010.Ӧ With the Dominican
Republic serving as a major transshipment point for South American drugs, it has also become:
a transshipment point for ecstasy from the Netherlands and Belgium destined for the U.S. and
Canada. Substantial money laundering activities in the Dominican Republic have been reported, as well as significant
amphetamine consumption since 2008.¶
Spills Over – ME
Mexican drug cartels spill over globally to instable regions – the Middle East
Ehrenfeld, 9 director of American Center for Democracy and author of Funding Evil: How
Terrorism is Financed - and How to Stop It (Rachel, “Defeating Narco-Terrorism” 3/17/09
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-rachel-ehrenfeld/defeating-narco-terrorism_b_175537.html) // czhang
And the threat is not limited to Mexican drug cartels; many criminal and drug trafficking
organizations in the Western Hemisphere collaborate with Muslim terrorist groups like alQaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah. The Tri-Border Area (TBA -- Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), for
example, is a known center of their operations. These anti-American narco-terrorist groups found
a good ally in Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez, who stopped cooperating with the U.S. drug eradication
efforts in 2005. Chavez provides these groups with a safe haven from which to transfer money, arms
and operatives to and from Syria, Southern Lebanon and Iran.
Police Force S
Revamped police force can help combat war on drugs
Astorga and Shirk, 10 (Luis Astorga is a researcher at the Institute of Social Research at the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM). He is also coordinator of the UNESCO Chair on Economic and Social Transformations Connected
with the International Drug Problem; David A. Shirk, PhD, joined the University of San Diego in July 2003. Shirk’s teaching covers
a wide range of subject areas, mainly concentrated in comparative politics, international political economy, Latin American studies,
and U.S.-Latin American relations, with a concentration in Mexico and border politics. He conducts research on Mexican politics,
U.S.-Mexican relations, and law enforcement and security along the U.S.-Mexican border. Shirk also directs the Trans-Border
Institute, which works to promote greater analysis and understanding of Mexico, U.S.-Mexico relations, and the U.S.-Mexico border
region; 1/1/10; “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context”;
http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/024/11632.pdf) KD
Meanwhile, Mexico has also introduced significant institutional changes, passing new legislation in 2009
giving more investigative powers to the Public Security Ministry (SSP), creating a new Federal
Police force, and replacing the Attorney General’s Federal Agency of Investigations (AFI) with
the new Federal Ministerial Police.63 Under these reforms, agents of the Attorney General’s new police
force will have greater powers to investigate crimes but will also be subjected to more rigorous
vetting. These reforms also effectively bestowed investigative powers upon what was previously the Federal Preventive Police
(PFP), which carried out a strictly preventive function, and created the new Federal Police (PF) within SSP. Under the
new law, Federal Police officers will be able to collaborate with the PGR on its investigations ,
operating under the supervision of the Attorney General. Of significant concern to advocates of civil liberties, the Federal
Police’s new investigative powers include the ability to seek judicial orders to monitor telephone,
satellite, and internet communications in the investigations of organized crime activity. Other
dedicated responsibilities of the Federal Police now include functions formerly performed by the AFI: securing crime
scenes, carrying out arrest warrants, and processing evidence. Federal Police agents will also have
authorization to operate undercover to infiltrate criminal organizations.
Some K card?
Profiteers of the drug war are driven to continuously create enemies to maintain
the industry
Schack, 11 – Assistant Professor, Department of Journalism at Ithaca College, PhD in Media Studies from the University of
Colorado (Todd, “Twenty-first-century drug warriors: the press, privateers and the for-profit waging of the war on drugs,” Media,
War & Conflict, Vol. 4 No. 2, pg. 142-161, August 2011, Sage Journals)//BI
Here we come to the heart of the matter: the media hype, hyperbole and moral panic have actual
consequences, and it is worthwhile asking the cui bono question: who, exactly, is benefitting, because there are
billions of dollars at stake, and the question of funding or not funding certain contracts explains more about what’s really happening
than all the sensational reports based on exaggeration, un-sourced claims, and lack of statistics. Crucial to understanding this
question of funding is one final point: that politicians in favor of the militarized response to the ‘drug war’ (which includes
privatizing the effort) must hold at all times the simultaneously contradictory position that, while the problem is worse than ever,
they are actually succeeding in their goals. Carlsen (2009: 1) points out that: Through late February and early March, a blitzkrieg of
declarations from U.S. government and military officials and pundits hit the media, claiming that
Mexico was alternately at risk of being a ‘Failed State,’ a ‘Narco-state’, on the verge of ‘Civil War’,
and as posing a direct threat to US National Security through ‘spill-over’ … In the same breath,
we’re told that President Calderon with the aid of the US Government is winning the war on drugs,
significantly weakening organized crime, and restoring order and legality. None of these claims are true. In fact, this
rhetorical double-bind is not only stock-in-trade for the entire drug control establishment, and has been for years, but is familiar to a
variety of what Howard S Becker (1963: 157) famously termed ‘moral entrepreneurs’: Enforcement organizations, particularly when
they are seeking funds, typically oscillate between two kinds of claims. First, they say that by reason of their efforts the problem they
deal with is approaching solution. But, in the same breath, they say the problem is perhaps worse than ever (though through no fault
of their own) and requires renewed and increased effort to keep it under control. This rhetorical situation has defined the war on
drugs since at least Nixon, and the enforcement organizations – the drug control establishment – have grown into what Reeves and
Campbell (1994) call the ‘narco-carceral complex’ which, with the rise of privatization, has become the for-profit industrialization of
the drug war. In other words, there is nothing new regarding the rhetorical situation whereby this
industry justifies itself, only pages taken out of a well-worn playbook and applied to the newest chapter in the continuing
saga that is the drug war. What is new, however, is the fact that the private security contractors stand to
benefit most – and that is precisely the point of this article: The motivations behind the recent hype vary. Alarmist cries of
a Mexican collapse help clinch the passage of measures to further militarize the southern border
and obtain juicy contracts for private defense and security firms. Local politicians are finding they can be a
cash cow for federal aid. (Carlsen, 2009: 2) So too are the five firms who won the $15 billion dollar Pentagon contract in 2007, and
aiding the effort was every breathless, over-hyped report of Mexico as a ‘failed state’, or of ‘spill-over’ violence, reports that are
especially useful during yearly funding cycles, as happened in 2009: The formation of local, state and national budgets at the
beginning of the year provides
an opportunity for politicians to exaggerate the threat posed by
Mexican drug cartels and thereby receive more funding for local police forces … Indeed, Texas Homeland Security
Director Steve McCraw stressed that the spillover had already occurred in asking state lawmakers to approve a $135 million increase
in funding requested by Texas Governor Rick Perry. (Arana, 2009) Therefore this is not simply a matter of press hype and
sensationalism – if it were it would be a matter of cultural relevance perhaps, but not political and economic. Using Becker’s term
‘moral entrepreneurs’, Reeves and Campbell (1994: 150) write that this synergy between the press and those who
profit from a crisis is a well-established tactic in war profiteering: In the political economy of
drug control, journalism is a market force that often raises the stock of moral entrepreneurs who profit from escalations in the
war on drugs … Like the merchants of war devoted to perpetuating the power of the military-industrial complex, the moral
entrepreneurs … – and their journalistic comrades – are in the hysteria business. This is precisely where
moral panic theory and the concept of disaster capitalism converge, in the advancing of the three aligning
interests: the press, which is perpetuating – and profiting from – the notion that the situation is at ‘crisis’ levels; the
private security contracting industry, which is financially self-interested in perpetuating the
‘crisis’; and government, which is seeking methods of absolving itself from public accountability
for carrying out unpopular policy, and plausible deniability for when things go wrong. What is crucial, and what moral panics
have proved to be so proficient at doing, is the creation and maintenance of the notion of ‘crisis’, and the creation of
an inextinguishable source of renewable enemies that justify the existence of these moral entrepreneurs-turnedindustrialists. Writing about the crack cocaine scare in the 1980s, but relevant here, Reeves and Campbell (1994: 20) conclude that:
Consequently, with nothing to gain and everything to lose from declaring a victory in the war on
drugs, the drug control establishment’s networks of power, knowledge, and discipline have a vested
interest in maintaining a perpetual sense of urgency, even a sense of hysteria, about cocaine pollution. It is in this
way that the increasing use of private contractors, and the re-conceptualization of the wars on terror and drugs as for-profit
endeavors can be likened to an addiction: ‘Our military outsourcing has become an addiction, and we’re headed straight for a crash’
(Singer, 2007). It is an addiction of policy that – if recent history in Colombia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Mexico are any guide –
will result in impunity, plausible deniability, will make the 21st-century drug warriors very wealthy, and will not in any measurable
manner result in gains made against the global flow of drugs.
At: No Nukes
Yes – the Taliban can project power in Pakistan
Sellin, 09 (Lawrence, retired colonel with the U.S. Army Reserve, Ph.D., “A nuclear-armed
Taliban?”, United Press International, 9/29/2009,
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2009/09/29/Outside-View-A-nuclear-armedTaliban/UPI-25021254238824/, JKahn)
WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 (UPI) -- A nuclear-armed Taliban? It may not be as far-fetched as it might first
appear. The Taliban already control or have a significant presence in northwest Pakistan along a
critical stretch of the Afghan border. Taliban units operate with relative impunity in the region surrounding
Peshawar, Pakistan's major population, commercial and transportation center less than 100 miles from Pakistan's capital,
Islamabad. Dominance of Taliban and al-Qaida forces in the pivotal northwest region of Pakistan provides not only a sanctuary and
training centers for attacks on Afghanistan, but it has become a base of operations to weaken any pro-Western sentiments among
the Pakistani people and the government in Islamabad. Not the least of which are the attacks the Taliban and al-Qaida have
mounted against Pakistani nuclear sites in the neighboring province of Punjab. According to an article published in the Long War
Journal by Bill Roggio, attacks on the Kamra and Sargodha air bases may have been designed to intimidate officers either on the
fence or who do not support the Islamists and erode the military's capacity to defend nuclear installations. The Taliban's
control of northwest Pakistan and its strong presence, along with al-Qaida, in Quetta and Baluchistan province
in general is a threat to the status quo in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. If unchecked, an unambiguous
Taliban victory in Afghanistan will not only produce mass executions on a scale not seen since the killing fields
of Pol Pot's Cambodia and a refugee crisis like Darfur, but it will produce massive political aftershocks and enormously
strengthen the hand of radical elements throughout the region. We are only fooling ourselves if we believe that a Talibancontrolled Afghanistan will not become a center for the export of radical Islamic ideology and terrorism. According to Gen. Stanley
McChrystal's recent assessment: "Afghanistan's insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan. Senior leaders of the major Afghan
insurgent groups are based in Pakistan, are linked with al-Qaida and other violent extremist groups and are reported aided by some
elements of Pakistan's (intelligence service)." With a base of operations already existing in western Pakistan, a Taliban victory in
Afghanistan will only increase the likelihood of radical elements challenging for control of the Pakistani government. If turmoil
breaks out in Pakistan, the United States and its allies may be placed in the unenviable position of securing Pakistani nuclear sites -at least those of which we are aware. Even without a change in government, a more radical Pakistan may increase the
possibility of nuclear proliferation. Case in point is that of radical Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, who allegedly
provided critical nuclear secrets to rogue states such as Iran and North Korea or, more ominously, to terrorist groups. The
secondary and tertiary effects of a Taliban victory in Afghanistan should not be underestimated. Attacks
by the Taliban and other radical insurgent groups against Pakistan proper are increasing. According to the National
Counterterrorism Center, terrorist operations in Pakistan more than doubled in 2008. Pakistan's present civil unrest and political
turmoil is already of concern to India. Any increase of the influence of radical elements within Pakistan could greatly exacerbate
tension between them, especially in the aftermath of the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. The stability of Pakistan is
threatened more by the radical groups within its own territory than by India. Diplomatic steps need to be taken to focus more
attention on internal threats than on those Pakistan believes to exist on its eastern border. Any perceived rout of Western forces and
Taliban control of Afghanistan will enhance the position of radical factions in Iran and further demoralize the nascent Iranian
democracy movement. It will strengthen Iran's position internationally and create a nuclear-armed belt of instability from India in
the east to Iraq in the west. One wonders if the progress that has been made in Iraq could possibly be sustained in the face of defeat
in Afghanistan and how it would affect the strategic choices for Israel, which seem increasingly narrow when facing a nuclear-armed
Iran with a ballistic missile delivery capability. The entire region is a volatile mixture of ethnic, religious, tribal, nationalistic and
historical grievances dating back 1,000 years. Fragmentation, prolonged conflict and devastating
consequences for the people of the region may be in their future, if the present negative trends toward
instability across southwest Asia are not contained and those who support it are not confronted. The United States,
its allies and the global community can help, but it is primarily the responsibility of the citizens of that region to move their countries
away from the brink. If not, then the so-called restored caliphate envisioned by Osama bin Laden and the
premise of his war on civilization may amount to nothing more than a caliphate of chaos, destruction and
collapse .
at – pomegranates, etc.
Wrong – poppy cultivation is the country’s only viable economic activity
Xinhua News, 12 (Abdul Haleem, Chen Xin, “Unchecked poppy cultivation to increase Afghan
instability”, Xinhua News, 2/17/2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/201202/17/c_131417059.htm, JKahn)
KABUL, Feb. 17 (Xinhua) -- Likewise the endemic militancy, poppy cultivation and production of illicit
drugs have been continuing over the past decade in the war-torn Afghanistan, triggering criticism at
home and abroad. " Security will not return to the country unless and until those big fishes involved in
producing and trafficking the illicit drugs are punished," a political observer and Editor-in-chief of the Daily
Mandegar Nazari Pariani told Xinhua. He made this comment in the wake of the concerns expressed by United Nations Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon on Thursday. The world body chief, according to media reports, in his address at the Third Ministerial
Conference of the Paris pact held in Vienna on Thursday, expressed concern over increase of Afghan poppy production and urged
the Afghan government to prioritize effort to eliminate the menace. "Drug trafficking and transnational organized
crimes undermine the health of fragile states, weaken the rule of law and hinder our attempts to meet the
Millennium Development Goals," the world body chief noted in his address, according to media reports. Based on Afghan Opium
Survey 2011, released by United Nations Office on Drug and Crimes (UNODC), the world body chief told the delegates that poppy
cultivation has increased by 7 percent and opium production has increased by 61 percent last year. "We cannot expect
stability when 15 percent of Afghanistan's Gross Domestic Product comes from the drugs trade. We cannot
speak of sustainable development when opium production is the only viable economic activity in the
country " Ban further said, according to media reports. The UN secretary general made these remarks while Afghan government
with the support of international community and the presence of some 130,000-srong NATO-led multinational force have been
fighting Taliban-led insurgency to ensure durable stability in the war-torn country. The total area under opium poppy cultivation in
Afghanistan, according to UNODC, was estimated at 131,000 hectares in 2011, a 7 percent increase compared to 2010; opium
production in 2011 was estimated at 5,800 tones, a 61 percent increase compared to 2010. Poppy cultivation in
Afghanistan has constantly increased over the past 10 years, in spite of international community's support in fighting
militancy and injecting billions of dollars to strengthen the capacity of Afghan administration. The production of opium poppy in
Afghanistan has increased from 185 tons in 2001 to 5,800 tons in 2011. Even though 20 out of the country's 34 provinces have been
announced poppy free, it is said that Afghanistan still supplies to the world 90 percent of the raw material used in manufacturing
heroin. "In fact, constant increase in Afghan poppy product exposes the continued failure of government and its international
backers in fulfilling their promises," Pariani opined. The analyst was of the view that producing and trafficking of drug is not the
business of ordinary Afghans, saying there are big fishes and influential figures that encourage poppy cultiv