***Aff
***Protectionism Advantage
1AC Advantage
US reliance on other countries causes price spikes, trade disagreements, effect
all sectors of the economy and heg
China has a monopoly --- that causes China bashing
Parthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of
Security,”
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf
Minerals are a subject of much contention. On one¶ hand, the United States remains less prepared for¶ supply
disruptions, price spikes and trade disagreements related to the global minerals trade¶ than most
experts realize. On the other hand,¶ public
concern over reliable access to the minerals required in key
sectors of the U.S. economy , in¶ particular those needed to produce military equipment, is
growing. Too frequently, however, such¶ concerns are based on inaccurate assumptions.¶ A sober and informed analysis suggests
there are¶ real vulnerabilities, which place critical national¶ security and foreign policy
interests at risk . In¶ worst-case scenarios, supplies of minerals that¶ the United States does not produce
domestically¶ may
be disrupted, creating price spikes and lags¶ in delivery. Even short of major
supply disruptions, supplier countries can exert leverage over the¶ United States by
threatening to cut off certain key¶ mineral supplies. The United States may also lose¶ ground
strategically if it continues to lag in man¶ -¶ aging mineral issues, as countries that consider¶ assured access to minerals as far
more strategically¶ important are increasingly setting the rules for¶ trade in this area¶ China’s
rising dominance is at
the heart of this¶ growing public debate. Its 2010 cutoff of rare¶ earth elements¶ 2¶ – a unique set
of minerals that¶ are difficult to process yet critical to many high-¶ tech applications – attracted
particular attention.¶ After Japan detained a Chinese trawler captain¶ over a skirmish in the East China Sea, Japanese¶
companies reported weeks of stalled shipments of rare earths from China amid rumors of an offi¶ -¶ cial embargo. This may sound
like a minor trade¶ dispute, but China
currently controls production of¶ about 95 percent of the world’s
rare earths, which¶ are critical to building laser-guidance systems for¶ weapons, refining petroleum and building wind¶ turbines.
Coinciding with possessing this incredible leverage over the rest of the world, China has¶ also
reduced its export quotas for these minerals.¶ For its part, the Chinese government contended¶ that it did not
put any formal export embargo in¶ place, and that its plans to reduce exports simply¶ reflect the need to meet growing domestic
demand¶ for rare earths. Japan-China relations experienced¶ further strain in their already tense relationship. In¶ the United States,
many reporters, policy analysts¶ and decision makers did not foresee this challenge.¶ Feeling
blindsided, some in the
United States characterized the situation in a manner that demonized¶ China rather than using the
opportunity to better¶ understand the true nature of U.S. supply chain¶ vulnerabilities.The 2010 rare earths case and
others are increasing¶ interest in critical minerals among U.S. policymakers. Congress held
hearings on the strategic¶ importance of minerals between 2007 and 2010,¶ and the 2010 National Defense
Authorization¶ Act required DOD to study and report on its¶ dependence on rare earth elements for weapons,¶ communications and
other systems.¶ 3¶ During a¶ 2009 hearing on minerals and military readi¶ -¶ ness, Republican Representative Randy Forbes of¶
Virginia called
minerals, “one of those things that¶ no one really talks about or worries about
until¶ something goes wrong. It’s at that point – the point¶ where we don’t have the steel we
need to build¶ MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehi¶ -¶ cles] or the rhenium we need to build a JSF [Joint¶ Strike Fighter]
engine that the stockpile becomes¶ critically important.”¶ 4¶ In October 2010, Secretary of¶ State Hillary Rodham Clinton
stated that it would¶ be “in our interests commercially and strategically”¶ to find additional
sources of supply for rare earth¶ minerals,
and stated that China’s recent cuts
to¶ rare earth exports
“served as a wakeup call that¶ being so dependent on only one source , disruption¶ could
occur for natural disaster reasons or other¶ kinds of events could intervene.”¶ 5¶ In January 2011,¶
Sen. Mark Begich, D-Alaska, Sen. Lisa Murkowski,¶ R-Alaska, and Rep. Mike Coffman, R-Colo., wrote¶ a letter to Defense Secretary
Robert Gates express¶ -¶ ing concern for minerals required for producing¶ defense equipment such as Joint Direct Attack¶ Munitions
(JDAMs), which stated, “Clearly,
rare¶ earth supply limitations present a serious vul nerability to our
national security . Yet early indications¶ are that DOD has dismissed the severity of the¶ situation to
date.”¶ 6 Additionally, the Department¶ of Energy (DOE) launched a multiyear effort to¶ explore potential vulnerabilities in supply
chains¶ for minerals that will be critical to four distinct¶ areas of energy technology innovation.While concern is growing, the
media and policy¶ -¶ makers often focus too narrowly on what may seem¶ the most compelling indicators – usually import¶
dependence or scarcity – in prescribing solutions to¶ reduce U.S. vulnerabilities, in particular to
supply¶ disruptions in critical minerals such as rare earths.¶ This focus is sparking protectionist attitudes ,
with¶ some worrying that import dependence poses an¶ inherent risk to the U.S. economy.
Discussion of¶ minerals also frequently focuses on supply scarcity¶ and resource depletion in absolute terms. However,¶ both the
rhenium and rare
earth minerals dis¶ -¶ ruptions of the past five years were triggered by¶ deliberate
decisions made by political leaders to¶ leverage their positions of strength, not by market¶ forces, disorder or scarcities of these
minerals.¶ Countries often revert to hoarding , pressuring¶ suppliers and otherwise behaving as if
scarcities¶ are present even when they are not, based solely on¶ concerns that shortages are likely in the near term.¶ In fact,
neither scarcity nor import dependence¶ alone is sufficient to signal vulnerability, and a¶ combination of factors including
concentration of¶ suppliers is most often required for mineral issues¶ to become security or foreign policy problems.¶ This report,
demand and use of
minerals can impair U.S.¶ foreign relations, economic interests and defense¶ readiness. It
based on two years of research, site visits¶ and discussions with stakeholders, explores how the¶ supply,
examines cases of five individual min¶ -¶ erals – lithium, gallium, rhenium, tantalum and¶ niobium – and rare earth elements, such as
neo¶ -¶ dymium, samarium and dysprosium, as a sixth group¶ in order to show the complexity of addressing these¶ concerns. Each
of these minerals is critical for defense¶ technologies and U.S. economic growth plans. They¶
share characteristics with minerals that have caused¶ important political or economic concerns
for the¶ United States in the past. Additionally, lithium is fre¶ -¶ quently cited in the media and in discussions of how¶
clean energy supply chains are critical to meeting¶ America’s future economic, energy and
environmental goals. Within the past five years, two of these cases¶ – rhenium and rare earth minerals – have
involved¶ supply disruptions or important threats of disruptions for the United States and its
allies. Each of these¶ minerals will require federal government attention in¶ the coming years.assessing¶ U.S. Vulnerability¶
Analysts vary widely in assessing the implications¶ of U.S. dependence on critical minerals, despite¶ broad
acceptance of the physical reality that mineral resources are finite and the economic realities¶ that
requirements are ubiquitous and demand is¶ growing. On one extreme, some analysts believe¶ the 2010
incident between China and Japan sug¶ -¶ gests an approaching Hobbesian world in which¶
resource demands outstrip supplies for minerals,¶ nonrenewable energy sources and even food sup¶ -¶ plies.
History indicates that conflict over absolute¶ scarcities is unlikely. At the other end of the¶ spectrum, many still believe that an open
market¶ and its invisible hand will continue to determine¶ winners and losers with no serious repercussions¶ or the United States
given its purchasing power. In¶ between these extremes, even staunch pragmatists¶ will point to the 2010 China rare earths
episode¶ as proof of one basic tenet: The
United States and¶ other market-based economies no longer
determine all the rules of global trade¶ Central to this narrative is a conundrum for¶ policymakers. Reserve
estimates show that¶ global supplies of almost all minerals are ade¶ -¶ quate to meet expected
global demands¶ over¶ the long term¶ , and for decades into the future¶ for most minerals. The U.S. Geological Survey¶
(USGS) indicates, for example, that world sup¶ -¶ plies of rare earths will be adequate for more¶ than 100 years.¶ 13¶ These
estimates, however,¶ can be meaningless ¶ in the near term¶ if supplies¶ are insufficient, or if
suppliers reduce exports ¶ or otherwise manipulate trade.
For example,¶ most experts project that global
production of¶ rare
earths will likely be insufficient to meet¶ the world’s demand over the next
two to three¶ years. The long-term sufficiency of supplies has¶ no practical effect because it takes years and¶ high capital
costs to start up new mining and¶ processing businesses for rare earths. Thus, the¶ risks of inaction are high . A range
of political,¶ economic and geographic factors can disrupt¶ supplies and cause price spikes that
can create¶ rifts in bilateral relations , trade disputes , accusations of economic sabotage and
instability in¶ countries that possess rare reserves of prized¶ minerals. They can also give
supplier countries¶ extraordinary leverage that can alter geopoliti¶ -¶ cal calculations, especially
when single countries¶ control most world supplies For U.S. policymakers, the risks fall into two rough¶
categories: Disruptions, delivery lags and price¶ spikes that affect military assets and place
unanticipated strains on defense procurement budgets ;¶ and lack of affordable access to
minerals and raw¶ materials preventing important national economic¶ growth goals.¶ The
defense industrial base in the modern era differs greatly from any previous time. Often,
actual¶ scarcity is not required for problems to arise , as¶ concerns about future scarcities
often drive countries to behave as if shortages are occurring
In particular, dependence on China for rare earths results in China bashing and
protectionist legislation towards China --- this escalates and collapses relations
with China
Eastman, 12 March 25, Scott, Policy Mic, “Why Obama And Romney Should Not Alienate
China,” http://dev.policymic.com/articles/5929/why-obama-and-romney-should-not-alienatechina
China is far too important as a trading partner for elected officials and presidential candidates, such as Mitt
Romney, to alienate for political points. Anti-China rhetoric hurts American citizens by
encouraging retaliatory , protectionist policies that discourage trade and make valuable
resources more difficult to obtain.¶ The most recent reiteration of China’s importance to the
United States has been a trade dispute over access to rare earth metals. The U.S. has joined the
European Union and Japan in filing a complaint with the World Trade Organization to protest a Chinese trade policy that caps the
amount of rare earth metals it exports. President Barack Obama
accused China of breaking trade agreements
and driving up the prices of rare earth metals. China is responsible for 90% of the world’s rare earth metal
production, and seven of these metals have been identified by the Defense Department as having military applications.¶ China’s
cap on rare earth metal exports should be particularly concerning for America. If our need for these
resources increases dramatically or unexpectedly, China’s export limit will keep America from obtaining
these resources until the U.S. finds a more reliable source . Since China controls such a large share of the
rare earth metal market currently, however, trade relations with China are all the more important to the U.S. and its ability to
acquire needed resources. For this reason, the
U.S. must find ways to promote free trade and discourage
protectionism in its trade relations with China.¶
Villifying China has not worked to promote positive trade
relations in the past. While protectionist policies within China cannot be blamed completely on rhetoric in the United States, there
is a noticeable trend linking anti-China rhetoric within American politics and protectionist
trade policies within China that illustrate how “ China-bashing ” can damage U.S.-China trade
relations. For example, Dan Ikenson of the Cato Institute suggests that economic hardship in the US amid the recession of 2008
created resentment at China’s comparably better economic status at the time. A feeling among Americans that U.S. policies
had too leniently allowed for China’s economic growth led to calls for protectionism that strained U.S.
relations with China . American businesses in China also began to complain about Chinese policies that favored local
Chinese businesses, leading these businesses to call for more protectionist policies. Obama acted on these sentiments by enacting a
tax on tires to protect U.S. tire manufacturers in September, 2009. Shortly after, China threatened tariffs on American goods, such as
chicken meat. This chain of events shows how anti-Chinese
rhetoric and calls for protectionism in America
have generated protectionist responses from China , which is in neither country’s best interest.¶
Demonizing China is not in the best interest of the U.S. especially given China’s economic
importance, as demonstrated by its 90% control of the rare earth metal market, which the U.S.
currently relies upon for military purposes. When anti-Chinese sentiment promotes protectionist policies, such as
Obama’s tire tariff in 2009, the U.S. risks losing a vitally important trade partner. Moreover, Americans are
forced to bear the costs of protectionism by paying more for Chinese goods that are tariffed, all so politicians can protect American
industries from competition.¶ A
healthy trade relationship with China is in the economic interest of all
Americans, no matter what politicians say. Striving for a more cooperative , less antagonistic
tenor in rhetoric regarding China will
do much more to foster a cooperative , healthy
with China than making China a political punching bag.
trade relationship
Tit-for-tat measures break down free trade and causes war and WMD terrorism
Panzner 8 Michael, faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global
stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros
Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase “Financial Armageddon: Protect Your
Future from Economic Collapse,” pg. 136-138
Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and
other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the
start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn
a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have
been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on
trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the
cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential
travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate
officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign
exchange. Foreign individuals and
companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure
assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly
depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will
cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement,
and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business
confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that
transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk
management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by
tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt
with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous
confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of
necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic
necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where
demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural
resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often
with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic
conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for
conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences . Alternatively, nations may look to
divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist
sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning
threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of
their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level.
Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue
nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely
assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt
colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling
list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts . Some observers, like John
Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the
United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological.
Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles
soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the
basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or
nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunkerbusting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and
Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war .
Independent of protectionism --- shortages and crack-downs cause war --- the
US needs its own sustainable supply
Hinten-Nooijen, 10 Professor of Economics at Tilburg University in the Netherlands, “Rare
minerals – The treasures of a sustainable economy”, http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/nl/overtilburg-university/cultuur-en-sport/cwl/publicaties/beschouwingen/minerals/)
Driving a hybrid car, using energy from wind turbines or solar panels. That are choices to
contribute to the transition to a sustainable economy . Sustainability is the spearhead of many
western policy plans. It is regarded as the solution to get out of the crisis. But ironically, the raw materials that are
needed for hybrid cars and wind turbines, for our technological industry as a whole, are not that
sustainable. Necessarily required minerals like neodymium and indium are rare . And they are not
China has almost all of them . And having this position of power, China wants to
use it. That is about strategy. The high-tech raw materials play a central part in the highly
industrialised high-wage countries to survive the global competition by technological
excellence. Will future wars be about minerals instead of oil, territories or water ? THE BONE
available in the west,
MARROW OF MODERN ECONOMY Minerals are an indispensable material pillar of our
current economies and societies. They are the natural product of geological processes and occur in the crust of the planet.
Only a fraction of the known minerals exists in greater quantities. Some of these are mined, refined and processed; are broken up
into their elemental components, which are recombined into different types of materials. These
materials are used to
manufacture products that form the backbone of our modern economies : from LCD displays to fighter
jets, from smart phones to electric cars. Without minerals, industrial society and modern technology would be inconceivable. That
seems unbelievable, because we hardly hear or read about them in the media - whereas several research reports have been
published recently. But imagine that by reading this article on printed paper or at your computer screen, minerals like nickel,
chromium, molybdenum, gallium, selenium, aluminium, silicon and manganese were needed! And
all these elements
have to be first extracted from minerals, which in turn need to be mined from the earth's
crust. CHINA'S GREEN DEAL In recent years, the world economy has grown enormously, and many new
high-tech applications have been made. Moreover, the demand for minerals has exploded . Mining
tried to meet the demand. A
global competition between countries and companies over rare mineral
resources started. Prices have shot up,
countries have created strategic stockpiles or imposed export restrictions in
order to secure supplies of these valuable resources. Mineral scarcity concerning the industry seems to be more of an economic
issue than an issue set by limited resources. Minerals are getting evermore difficult to find and costly to extract - while they are the
key to advanced sustainable technologies. Talking about sustainability seems not talking about China, because China is still building
many polluting coal-fired power plants, and the social circumstances there are poor. However, recent developments also show
progress concerning sustainability. And in a country like China these developments go faster than in many western democracies.
Where we in the west talk and dawdle, they think and act strategically. In the United States, president Obama
has to
explain the Americans that forms of the New Green Deal are inevitable - like the situation in the thirties
of the last century, when President Roosevelt made the so-called New Deal to reform the economy. Many Americans do not want
the government to influence the market. They radically believe in the free market. In China, by contrast, the
ideological
separation between market and government does not exist. There is no Wall Street with greedy bankers, no
neoconservative Grand Old Party that dreams of the cowboy economy. Decisions are taken quickly. And besides, they have to feed
one billion people and develop a country that lived in Mao-ist poverty before. The Chinese are successful, after all, also in creating a
sustainable economy: China does not only build old polluting power stations but uses the latest technology, with CO2- catch and storage. And they are working on alternatives: windmills. In the next five years, they will build 100,000 windmills in the Gobi desert.
Did they hate the wind in that area before, now they consider it the new gold. In the north-west area of China, the province of
Gansu, the Qilian-mountains pass into the Gobi desert. There China is building the biggest windmill and solar panel park in the
world. Six windmill parks with a capacity of ten gigawatts each are built, making China the biggest market of technology of wind
energy, defeating the United States. "Red China becomes green China", party officials are saying. China has to grow, and so has the
contribution of wind, water and sun at the energy market. This market would be interesting for foreign investments. According to
Chinese officials they are welcome and can get subsidies. But, Beijing has decided that 70 percent of the windmills have to be made
and designed in China. So it can be questioned if European and American companies have a fair chance in tendering for a contract.
China considers itself a developing country and thinks that the western countries should contribute money to China to reduce the
CO2 discharge. While America thought that energy saving is not worthwhile, China has taken an enormous energy-technological
lead. The authoritarian and undemocratic but intelligent China exposes a variant of the New Deal. THE OPEC OF THE RARE MINERALS
The example of China shows us that sustainable economy has everything to do with strategy
and power. In a few decades China has been flooding the market of rare metals. The legend goes that president Deng Xiaoping
had already predicted this in 1992, during a tour in the south of China: "They [the Mid East] have oil, but we in China have rare
minerals". Nowadays, China indeed has 95 percent of the global supply of rare minerals. How did it do that? It was a result of good
strategy: in the nineties, China
flooded the world market with the rare minerals, although there was
not that much demand. The west thought it okay because getting the minerals was a very
expensive production process and the environmental legislation was very strict. The western
competitors went bankrupt and they closed their mines. China became powerful. One of the centres of the rare mineral supply is
around the city Baotou, an industrial city of two million people in Inner Mongolia. Here the states concern exploits almost half of the
world storage of neodymium. DISRUPTION
OF THE MARKET The lack of raw materials is not particularly
a result of the geological availability but of disruptions in the market, because the developments of the
world wide demand for rare minerals are not recognised in time - as part of the stormy development of the Chinese economy and
the expansion of technical developments - and because the minerals occur in only a few countries. Experts have predicted that in
the next few decades the demand of neodymium will increase by a factor 3.8. China
uses 60 percent of its exploitation for
its own economy. What's more, the Chinese export quota become stricter every year . What happens?
Sudden peaks in the demand can lead to speculative price movements and a disruption of the
market. "2010 will be the year of the raw materials", according to Trevor Greetham, Asset Allocation Director of Fidelity. Indium,
a silver-white metal, which is not found directly in nature, but is a residual product of thin and zinc, is used in LCD displays for TVs,
computers, mobile phones, and for led lights and the ultrathin and flexible solar panel. The price of this mineral multiplied tenfold
between 2003 and 2006 from 100 to 980 Dollars per kilogram. The price of neodymium decreased from 11.7 dollar per kilogram in
1992 to 7.4 dollar in 1996. The market volume rose. In 2006 almost all of the world production of 137,000 tons came from China. By
scaling back the export, prices rose, up to 60 dollar per kilogram in 2007. Imagine that for a hybrid car, like the Toyota Prius or the
Mercedes S 400, you need at least 500 grams of neodymium for the magnetic power of the engine; and for the newest generation of
wind turbines, the ones that are 16 meters high, you need about 1000 kilogram. That makes 60,000 dollars - for just a little bit of
metal! Big business for China. At the same time, China makes further strategic investments: it took an interest in oil and gas fields. In
August 2009, PetroChina paid 41 billion dollar to gain access to an enormous field of natural gas in front of the coast of Australia.
And in September that year, it obtained a stake of 60 percent in the exploitation of fields of tar sand in Alberta, which might hold
one of the biggest oil reserves in the world. And because China considers titanium a growing market, it took an interest of 70
percent in a titanium mine in Kenia - not only to build the Chinese 'Jumbojet', but also to provide Boeing with 2000 tons of titanium
each year. By doing so, China might beat the competition in the battle for the market in green technologies. The 'free' market can be
questioned. The mineral policies of China and the US both mention the usage of administrative barriers. These nontariff barriers
involve regulations that seek to protect the national mineral extraction industry. As a result, it is much harder for foreign companies,
if not impossible, to invest and gain a foothold in the national mineral extraction industry in these countries. The search for rare
metals has become a global race: a mine in California has also been reopened, the mine of Mountain Pass. In 2008, it was bought by
a group of investors, the partnership 'Molycorp Minerals'. The process of bringing the old mines into use costs much time and
money. What does this mean for us? Do we get more dependent of China? The 'Innovationplatform' in Rotterdam planned to build a
unique windmill park in the sea, further from the coast and in the strongest sea wind than anywhere in the world. To build these
windmills, we need rare minerals, the export of which is dominated by China. Part of the project is Darwind, which designed
enormous windmills for at sea. But the umbrella company, of which Darwind is part, Econcern, was about to go bankrupt. Then, in
THE THREAT OF GEOPOLITICAL INSTABILITY
The transition to a sustainable economy involves underexposed elements like deficiency in
minerals and shifting balances of power . They are the ideal receipt for geopolitical
mid-August 2009 it was saved by the, surprisingly, Chinese XEMC.
instability. The new world order will be a balance between countries that do have particular
raw materials and ones that do not. The lack of indispensable minerals sharpens the
relations in the world. The access to critical minerals is more and more an issue of national
security, concluded the 'The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies' (HCSS) in its report about the scarcity of minerals (January 2010).
The US, Japan and China are making a policy that tries to secure the supply of these raw materials. That will disturb the free market
activity. HCSS thinks that large concerns will, with support of the government, compete more intensively with each other for access
to these raw materials, e.g. by direct investments in areas rich in raw materials. Mineral
scarcity will be an issue in
the next decades, though it is uncertain when and to what extent. And we have to do
something because a change in supply of rare minerals directly affects our current modern
lives.
US-China war causes extinction
Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the
author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From
1984 to 1987, he edited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?",
www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for
centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons .
The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet
another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and
China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently
challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in
Australia, and
deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need
this lead to
nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United
States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government
threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the
conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter
confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly
as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the
behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the
Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saberrattling persists. Some
pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed
nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between
nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in
that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the
war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons
toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t
nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred,
for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military
attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet
Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked,
they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense.
Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other
nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for
those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear
attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it
is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total
inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States.
Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A
nuclear attack by
China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while
leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war
would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands .
Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and
bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide
famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
The recent WTO ruling failed to stop China from still implementing protectionist
legislation --- China will continue to protect their industries and the US will
begin to act outside the legal system --- the aff is key to solve
Wu, 4/2 Mark, assistant professor of law at Harvard Law School, where he specializes in
international trade., “A Free Pass for China,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/opinion/afree-pass-for-china.html?_r=0
Cambridge, Mass. — A World Trade Organization panel ruled last week that China’s export
restraints on rare earth elements and other metals violate W.T.O. rules because they are
discriminatory. Rare earth minerals are critical in a wide range of industries, from electronics and hybrid automobiles to petroleum
and chemicals. Should the ruling stand, China will have to dismantle the discriminatory policies or face trade sanctions.¶ This
ruling may appear , at first glance, to be a vindication of the strategy of turning to the W.T.O. to
fight Chinese protectionism. But litigation victories do not always translate into economic
victories, especially when the W.T.O. is concerned.¶ In 2010, China imposed quotas and other
restraints to sharply limit exports of rare earths. Because more than nine-tenths of the world’s production of rare earths
occurs in China, price shocks hit foreign producers who rely on the Chinese minerals. Complaining that
the export restraints were discriminatory and illegal, the United States, the European Union and Japan all filed complaints before the
W.T.O.¶ China defended its actions by arguing that the export limits were necessary because of the environmental hazards
associated with rare earths production. That environmental harm can occur is undoubtedly true, but the W.T.O. panel found this
was just an excuse. The export restraints, it ruled, were designed to achieve industrial policy goals rather than promote
conservation. In other words, China sought to limit its export of rare earths to give a leg up to Chinese manufacturers. It also sought
to use cheaper domestic prices to entice foreign companies dependent on rare earths to relocate production to China. ¶ The strategy
worked. Chinese manufacturers in several industries relying on rare earths, such as wind turbines and chemicals, made formidable
inroads against their foreign competitors. Foreign companies making products relying on rare earths, such as camera lenses and
touchscreen glass, shifted some production to China.¶ Although the W.T.O. panel ruled against China, it did not require China to pay
compensation. By design, the W.T.O.’s remedies are not retrospective. Workers who lost their jobs because firms outsourced
production to China would receive no damages. In fact, so long as China eliminates the discriminatory elements of its policies going
forward, there are no remedies available for the United States or the other countries. The main goal of W.T.O. dispute settlement is
to force compliance with the law rather than provide economic justice for past harm.¶ The
W.T.O., in effect, provides
countries with a free pass to breach its rules temporarily. So long as a violating country ends its illegal policy
in a reasonable period of time following a final judgment, it need not worry about being punished.¶ W.T.O.
rulings do little to dissuade China from continuing to take advantage of the free pass to
advance other unfair and illegal policies when the gains are large enough . China has done
this in industry after industry, from semiconductors to electronic payment services. The approach typically involves
contravening trade rules just long enough to allow domestic players to build up their market position without incurring W.T.O.
sanctions. China then undoes the policy and claims that it is respectful of W.T.O. judgments.
afterward often proves difficult.¶
But undoing China’s gains
Continue reading the main story Continue reading the main story¶ Continue reading
the main story¶ It may seem as though the solution to China’s flouting of trade rules would be to push for more robust remedies at
the W.T.O. But retrospective remedies are not necessarily in the interest of other big countries like the United States. That is
because they also lose cases at the W.T.O.¶ Beyond the simple calculation of whether China’s competitors would gain or lose more
with stricter punishments, there
is also the political difficulty of implementing such a solution. Imagine
that having lost a cotton subsidies case to Brazil, the United States was ordered to pay compensation. Would the government claw
back these subsidies from cotton farmers? Or would it try to convince the American public to shoulder the burden on behalf of
cotton farmers through higher taxes or greater deficit spending?¶ Relying
on the W.T.O. alone to fight back
against Chinese protectionism is a losing strategy . The United States should employ an array of tools to ensure
that, even when our companies face discriminatory policies overseas, they are not tempted to relocate.¶ The United States
should undertake a comprehensive evaluation of the minerals critical for strategic interests.
The government then should play a major role in re-establishing a robust domestic supply
chain for such minerals . Such a strategy will take time to execute. In the meantime, stockpiles should be built to guard
against future attempts to use rare earths as economic leverage. The American Congress would do well to hasten its review of the
bills introduced to reduce foreign mineral dependency.¶ Careful consideration should be given to whether government procurement
policies can be altered to dissuade companies from succumbing to resource-based extortion by other countries. This may provide an
opening to make it clear that companies that shift technology or jobs overseas in response to discriminatory export restrictions may
hamper their chances of winning government contracts.¶ While
court victories are satisfying, they are often
not enough. This is doubly true when the legal system’s remedies are inadequate . When faced with unfair
competition, companies develop comprehensive plans beyond litigation to push back against such threats. So too should
governments. Otherwise, W .T.O.
victories will prove hollow .
2AC REE = War
Reliance on China for rare earth elements initiates resource fights that cause
WWIII
Anthony, 11 Sebastian, “Rare earth crisis: Innovate, or be crushed by China,” Lead editor at
Ziff Davis, Inc. Owner at SA Holdings Past Columnist at Tecca Editor at Aol (Weblogs, Inc)
Education University of Essex Extreme Tech, http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/111029rare-earth-crisis-innovate-or-be-crushed-by-china
The rare earth apocalypse¶ The doomsday event that everyone is praying will never come to
pass, but which every Western nation is currently planning for, is the eventual cut-off of Chinese
rare earth exports. Last year, 97% of the world’s rare earth metals were produced in China — but over the last few years, the Chinese government has
been shutting down mines, ostensibly to save what resources it has, and also reducing the
amount of rare earth that can be exported. Last year, China produced some 130,000 tons of rare earths, but export restrictions meant that only 35,000 tons
were sent to other countries. As a result, demand outside China now outstrips supply by some 40,000 tons per
year, and — as expected — many countries are now stockpiling the reserves that they have.¶ Almost every Western country is now digging
around in their backyard for rare earth-rich mud and sand, but it’ll probably be too little too late — and anyway, due to geochemistry,
there’s no guarantee that explorers and assayers will find what they’re looking for. The price of rare earths are already going up , and so are the nonChinese-made gadgets and gizmos that use them. Exacerbating the issue yet further, as technology grows more advanced, our reliance on the strange and magical
properties of rare earths increases — and China, with the world’s largest workforce and a fire
hose of rare earths, is perfectly poised to become the only real producer of solar power photovoltaic cells, computer
chips, and more.¶ In short, China has the world by the short hairs, and when combined with a hotting-up
cyber front, it’s not hard to see how this situation might devolve into World War III . The alternate,
ecological point of view, is that we’re simply living beyond the planet’s means. Either way, strategic and logistic planning to make the most of scarce metals
and minerals is now one of the most important tasks that face governments and
corporations. Even if large rare earth deposits are found soon, or we start recycling our gadgets in a big way, the only real solution is
to somehow lessen our reliance on a finite resource. Just like oil and energy, this will probably require drastic technological leaps. Instead of reducing the amount of tantalum used in capacitors, or indium in LCD
displays, we will probably have to discover completely different ways of storing energy or displaying images. My money’s on graphene.
2AC AT: No China Monopoly
China has monopoly
Dillow, 11 Clay, “Massive Undersea Discovery of Rare Earth Elements May Break Chinese
Monopoly,” http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-07/japanese-researchers-claimmassive-rare-earths-discovery-deep-pacific-seabed
Then there's the question of whether undersea mining of rare earths is commercially viable? It may be that getting to these seabed
deposits is so expensive as to be prohibitive. Or the discovery might lead to the development of entire fleets of seafloor mining
robots. Whatever
the future developments may be, the immediate impact is limited: China's grip
on the rare earths market is no less strong today as it was yesterday , and it's not likely to
change in the foreseeable future .
The US is currently reliant on rare earth elements---that threatens national
security as China can cut down on them---we need to have our own sources
Hays, 12 Jeffrey, Facts and Details, “RARE EARTHS OUTSIDE OF CHINA: OLD AND NEW
SOURCES, URBAN MINING AND ALTERNATIVES TO RARE EARTHS,”
http://factsanddetails.com/world/cat51/sub325/item2399.html
¶ Foreign companies and governments are scrambling to find new sources of rare earths as
China threatens to further tighten restrictions or even ban exports of some elements and close mines.
Dudely Kingsnrth, an Australia-based independent rare earth analyst, told AFP, “ It’s
crunch time , In the next few years, we
are going to be in a situation where [export and production] quotas are reduced and unless
we have sources outside China , more companies are going to have to relocate to China to secure access.Ӧ In the wake
of China's tougher restrictions, alternative mines have been explored across the globe. However, economists predict that the world
will rely on China for dysprosium in the foreseeable future. There
are rare earth mines with minimal production in Russia,
India and Brazil. Deposits are also being developed in Australia and United States. These will
produce about 50,000 tons of rare earths by 2014. This is not enough to keep up with demand , with some
analyst predicting a tight market starting in 2012 and severe problems
if there are delays in the Australian
and U.S. projects.¶ James Lifton, an independent U.S.-based rare earths analyst, told AFP, “China’s goal is to create jobs in China and
create goods in China . We need to start producing these metals here [in the United States] as we did in the past. If we don’t do that,
China will be the only country manufacturing devises using rare earth by the year 2015 .Ӧ Ren
Xianfang, a Beijing-based economist with IHS Global Insight, told AFP, “The government hopes the restrictions could prompt the
transfer of advanced rare earth processing technologies into China. Whether this resource-in-exchange-for-technology strategy will
work in favor of China remains to be seen.”¶ Rare Earths and Other Countries¶ search for rare earths Although
China
currently monopolizes rare earth mining (with 36 percent of the world's reserves), other countries
have deposits too. Russia has the largest reserves of rare earths after China. According to U.S. government data it holds 19 percent
of the world’s 99 million tons of commercially viable rare earths. The United States has 13 percent. Australian has five percent.
Namibia, Mongolia, Malaysia, Kyrgyzstan, Vietnam, Kazakhstan and Canada have substantial deposits as well. Kazakhstan is the
world’s second largest producer of rare earths, but it produces only about 4.5 percent of the world’s supply. The United States and
Australia mined rare earths in the past but stopped mining them because of cheaper competition from China.¶ Global rare earth
reserves (total 99 million tons); 1) China (36 percent ); 2) former Soviet countries (19 percent); 3) the United States (13 percent); 4)
Australia (6 percent ); 5) India (3 percent ); 6) Others (23 percent). [Source: Japan’s Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry, 2009]¶
Companies in Australia, Canada and Brazil are on the hunt for rare earth sites. Heightened interest in alternative sources has also
been an impetus to plans to reopen or establish new rare earth mines in a handful of countries around the world, including South
Africa, Russia Australia and Canada. An additional 40,000 tons is expected to come form non-Chinese sources in coming years.¶ The
Lynas Corp, won the right to mine world’s richest non-Chinese deposit of rare earths, in Australia. It will be at least until 2012 before
it is capable of mining the deposit. Other rare earth companies include China Rare Earth Holdings, Arafura resources, Alkane
resources and Greenland Minerals and Energy¶ rare earths Brazil has the world’s largest know deposit of niobium. It is said to be
large enough supply the world for 500 years at current consumption rates. Some in Russia claim that Yakutia’s Tontorskoye in Siberia
“is many times bigger in volume and quality than Brazil’s famous deposits.”¶ The European Union said it might 1) start stockpiling
rare earths; 2) strengthen ties with African countries that have rare earth deposits; 3) take measures to discourage speculation of
rare earths; and and consider nullifying most-favored-nation treatment to countries (i.e. China)that try to restrict supplies of rare
earths and other strategically important raw materials.¶ Yoichi Saito of Mitsui believes that China will use it monopoly status in rare
earths to crush competition. Although other places have reserves of rare earths, few places have significant refinery capacity.
Refineries require a lot of investment to set and China could easily undercut prices of materials produced by rival sources. Saito told
Times, “Many people are looking at establishing alternative refineries and sources outside China, but the investment is not
necessarily a sound one because of the threat of price revenge by China. If new projects emerge as they have recently in Malaysia
and Australia, China could just drop its prices and rivals are out of business.” China is also taking steps to corner the marker globally.
In early 2009, for example, it acquired 25 percent of Arafura Resources, a Australian rare earth miner.¶ Some suggest recycling
existing rare earths materials---known as "urban mining." Others are considering using substitute materials such as aluminum,
copper and iron in place of rare earths.¶ Rare Earths in Greenland and the Sea¶ 20111201-Molycorp Pr_214px.jpg¶ Recently a large
source of rare earth was found in southwestern Greenland in geological strata called the Ilimaussaq Intrusion. The find could enrich
Greenland and make China’s monopoly on rare earth a thing of the past. The Ilimaussaq Intrusion lies on a desolate plateau and is
thought to contain the largest known reserves of rare earths. An Australian mining company has the rights to mine the site and it
plans to process about 50,000 tons of rare-earth-bearing ore by 2010.¶ In July 2011, Japan announced it had found abundant rare
earth elements on the sea floor of the Pacific ocean. The Yomiuri Shimbun reported: “Mud on the seafloor in certain areas of the
Pacific Ocean contains about 800 times the amount of rare earth elements found in deposits on land, a Japanese research team has
reported in the electronic version of the British magazine Nature Geoscience. The nine-member team, which includes University of
Tokyo Associate Prof. Yasuhiro Kato, said it located the deposits in ocean-floor mud at depths of 3,500 meters to 6,000 meters in
central and southeastern areas of the Pacific Ocean.” [Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, July 5, 2011]¶ 20111201-Molycorp Pm_214px.jpg¶
The group believes deep-sea mud constitutes a highly promising source of these elements."If the technology to exploit them
efficiently is developed, it would be possible for the deposits to become an alternative to land-based rare earth elements," Kato said.
The group analyzed the elemental composition of more than 2,000 seafloor sediments, sampled from a wide stretch of areas in the
Pacific Ocean during international deep-sea drilling projects in which Japan and the United States participated. [Ibid]¶ It found high
concentrations of rare earth minerals, equivalent to those found in mines on land, in deep-sea mud 23.6 meters thick in the central
Pacific Ocean, including near the Hawaiian Islands. It also found such deposits in southeastern waters around the French Polynesian
island of Tahiti, in mud eight meters thick. Estimating from points where the sediments were sampled, the group believes the
deposits are distributed over an area of about 8.8 million square kilometers in the central Pacific and an area of about 2.4 million
square kilometers in the southeastern Pacific. [Ibid]¶ Rare Earths and Japan¶ Japan imports of rare earths from China accounted for
about 82 percent of Japan's imports of rare earths in 2010.The Economist reported: “Japan imports more rare earths than any other
country. Its electronics, fine-chemicals and car industries rely on them. A disruption of supply could paralyse the Japanese economy
as much as an oil embargo or food blockade. And because Japan dominates some of the technological processes that use rare
earths’such as polishing hard-drive platters with cerium oxide---interrupted access would be felt worldwide. [Source: The Economist,
January 20, 2011]¶ Japan is the largest consumer of rare earths. It uses a fifth of the world’s supply. It is predicted to face a rare
shortage of 11,300 tons in 2011. China’s rare earth exports (50,000 tons in 2009); 1) Japan (56 percent); 2) the United States (17
percent); 3) France (6 percent); 4) Others (21 percent) [Source: Japan’s Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry]¶ Japan gets 90
percent of its rare earths from China. Hiroko Tabuchi wrote in the New York Times, “Japanese companies generally avoid discussing
their mineral holdings. But experts say that some manufacturers have been stockpiling rare earths, building inventories ranging from
a few months’ to a year’s worth. In September 2010 the Japanese trade minister, said the government was considering starting a
stockpile of rare earths as a buffer against trade interruptions. [Source: Hiroko Tabuchi New York Times, October 4, 2010] ¶ China
Bans Rare Earth Exports to Japan¶ In early September 2010, when a major diplomatic row broke out between Japan and China over a
group of disputed islands after a Chinese trawler collided with two Japanese Coast Guard, China effectively imposed a ban on the
export of rare earths and silicon---materials critical in the electronics and automobile industry and of which China is one of the sole
suppliers---by initiating customs procedures such as requiring documents to be in Chinese, a deviation from usual practices, that
halted the shipments. All 31 Japanese companies involved in the rare trade said their businesses had been hampered by the Chinese
export restrictions.¶ Customs restrictions in rare earths remained in place even after the captain of the Chinese ship at the center of
the dispute was released. An industry official said, though a trickle of shipments seemed to be seeping out as a result of uneven
enforcement of the ban by customs officers at various ports. China has allowed exports of Chinese-made rare earth magnets and
other rare earth products to Japan, but not semi-processed rare earth ores that would enable Japanese companies to make
products. Finally, about five days after the captain was released China began to back down. The rhetoric was toned down. Customs
procedures returned to normal and shipments or rare earths and materials resumed. [Source: Hiroko Tabuchi New York Times,
October 4, 2010]¶ Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times, “Even before the Then came the trawler event. Chinese restrictions
on rare earth exports were already in violation of agreements China made before joining the World Trade Organization. But the
embargo on rare earth exports to Japan was an even more blatant violation of international trade law...Oh, and Chinese officials
have not improved matters by insulting our intelligence, claiming that there was no official embargo. All of China’s rare earth
exporters, they say---some of them foreign-owned---simultaneously decided to halt shipments because of their personal feelings
toward Japan. Right.” [Source: Paul Krugman New York Times, October 17, 2010]¶ Hiroko Tabuchi wrote in the New York Times, The
cutoff has caused hand-wringing at Japanese manufacturers, from giants like Toyota to tiny electronics makers, because the raw
materials are crucial to products as diverse as hybrid electric cars, wind turbines and computer display screens. Japan’s trade
minister, Akihiro Ohata, said he would ask the government to include a “rare earth strategy” in its supplementary budget for this
year. [Source: Hiroko Tabuchi New York Times, October 4, 2010]¶ “So what are the lessons of the rare earth fracas?” Krugman asked.
“First, and most obviously, the world needs to develop non-Chinese sources of these materials. There are extensive rare earth
deposits in the United States and elsewhere. However, developing these deposits and the facilities to process the raw materials will
take both time and financial support. So will a prominent alternative: “urban mining,” a k a recycling of rare earths and other
materials from used electronic devices.” [Krugman, Op. Cit]¶ Japan Responds to Chinese Rare Earth Quotas¶ The Economist
reported: “Two decades of economic impotence have convinced many observers that Japan is cautious and slow to change. But the
country can move quickly when sufficiently provoked?...for example by... “China’s hoarding of rare earths. Since shipments of rare
earths were cut off over the island dispute in September 2010 Japan Inc has sprung into action. [Source: The Economist, January 20,
2011]¶ “The big trading houses such as Sojitz, Sumitomo and Mitsubishi are securing alternative supplies, supported by state
financing. Companies such as Toyota, Hitachi, Nidec and TDK are working to reduce or eliminate the rare-earth elements needed in
devices. Recycling programmes are being studied. The government earmarked $1 billion from a stimulus package in November to
secure supplies, including funding university research and projects such as robotic deep-sea mining.” [Ibid]¶ “A national stockpile of
the kind that already exists for rice, cereals and petrol has been mooted. There is even talk of creating a generously funded agency
to acquire stakes in non-Chinese producers, possibly using the country’s vast foreign-exchange reserves (at $1 trillion, the world’s
largest after China’s). Japan’s prime minister has met his Vietnamese and Mongolian counterparts to discuss new production.”
[Ibid]¶ “Japan has been suddenly spurred to action before. The environmental crisis in the 1960s, the oil shocks of the 1970s and the
strong yen in the 1980s rallied bureaucrats, politicians, business leaders, the media and the public. High energy prices forced Japan
to become one of the world’s most energy-efficient countries....Japan will remain dependent on Chinese rare earths for some time.
The country’s resource mandarins say they have no specific target for reducing this dependency, though they reaffirm an earlier goal
that Japan should control 50 percent of its mineral needs, including rare earths, by 2030. “[Ibid]¶ Japan Seeks Alternative Source of
Rare Earths¶ The fallout over the Chinese fishing boat in waters of the disputed Senkaku islands in September 2010 and the blocking
of rare earth exports, accelerated Japan’s quest for alternative sources of rare earths and development of technologies that didn’t
need rare earths so it wasn’t so dependant on China for them.”¶ Days after the effective export on rare earths from China to Japan
was imposed the Japanese Economy and Trade Minister Akihiro Ohata established a new rare earth policy aimed at diversifying
Japan supply and stockpiling the materials. Ties were firmed up with Kazakhstan, the world’s second largest producer of rare earths
after China, and Vietnam and Mongolia, two other large rare earth producers. Kazakhstan was told to send representatives to Japan
as soon as possible to negotiate and expand its rare earth deal with Japan.¶ In November 2010, Sojitz, a large Japanese
conglomerate, announced a deal with Lynas, an Australian mining company, to secure rare earths through 2020s. According to the
agreement Sojitz would receive 70 percent of Lynas’s annual 22,000 ton annual rare earth capacity. In March 2011, a consortium of
Japanese and South Korean companies---including Nippon Steel and JFE Steel of Japan and POSCO of South Korea’said they were
buying a 15 percent stake in Companhia Brasileira de Meltalurgiae Mineracao (CBMM)---a major rare earth mining firm and
producer of niobium in Brazil for about $1.7 billion. Sojitz is also negotiating the rights to a rare earth mine in Vietnam. The industrial
conglomerate Sumitomo plans to work with Kazakhstan’s government to recover rare earth elements from uranium ore residues.¶
The Japanese companies Mitsui and Sumitomo Corp., are exploring the possibility of mining rare earths from deposits in Siberia that
weren’t expected to be exploited until 2030. The company talked with government officials in Yakutia---an area of northeastern
Russia the size of India with frigid winters and only about 1 million people “about mining deposits of niobium and scandium. [Source:
Bloomberg]¶ Geoff Bedford of the rare-earth-processor Neo Technologies, told AFP, “We do not have a customer in Japan whose
research and development group is not working overtime to figure out how to reduce, or eliminate, rare earths in their products.Ӧ
Japan has budgeted $1.25 billion---equal to the total annual rare earth market value---in 2011 to secure non-Chinese supplies. In
October 2010, Japan and the United States agreed to cooperate to diversify suppliers after China announced it was going to curb
exports. In February 2011, the Japanese government decided to give $360 million to 169 projects to encourages firms to cut their
use of rare earths,¶ Japan Seeks Recycled Rare Earths from Urban Mining¶ The National Institute for Materials Science, a
government-affiliated research group, says that used electronics in Japan hold an estimated 300,000 tons of rare earths. Though
that amount is tiny compared to reserves in China, tapping these urban mines could help reduce Japan’s dependence on Chinese
sources. Reporting from Kosaka, Japan, Hiroko Tabuchi wrote in the New York Times, “Two decades after global competition drove
the mines in this corner of Japan to extinction, Kosaka is again abuzz with talk of new riches. The treasures are not copper or coal.
They are rare-earth elements and other minerals that are crucial to many Japanese technologies and have so far come almost
exclusively from China, the global leader in rare earth mining. This town’s hopes for a mining comeback lie not underground, but in
what Japan refers to as urban mining---recycling the valuable metals and minerals from the country’s huge stockpiles of used
electronics like cellphones and computers.” “We’ve literally discovered gold in cellphones,” said Tetsuzo Fuyushiba, a former land
minister on a visit to Kosaka’s recycling plant.” [Source: Hiroko Tabuchi New York Times, October 4, 2010]¶ “In Kosaka, Dowa
Holdings, the company that mined here for over a century, has built a recycling plant whose 200-foot-tall furnace renders old
electronics parts into a molten stew from which valuable metals and other minerals can be extracted. The salvaged parts come from
around Japan and overseas, including the United States. Besides gold, Dowa’s subsidiary, Kosaka Smelting and Refining, has so far
successfully reclaimed rare metals like indium, used in liquid-crystal display screens, and antimony, used in silicon wafers for
semiconductors. The company is trying to develop ways to reclaim the harder-to-mine minerals included among the rare earths--like neodymium, a vital element in industrial batteries used in electric motors, and dysprosium, used in laser materials.” [Ibid]¶
“Various players have tried to recycle rare earths and metals in Japan. Last year, Hitachi began to experiment to extract rare earths
from magnets in old computer hard drives, though the company said the project was not expected to go into operation until 2013.
But it is Dowa, the company that has mined in Kosaka since 1884, that has emerged as the field’s early leader. And it could not come
a moment too soon for this town of 6,000, which is littered with the remnants of its old ore mines: tunnels overgrown with weeds,
old railroad tracks, and an abandoned bathhouse where miners once sponged off the grime from their long days underground. The
mines operated up to 1990, until a surging yen and international competition drove operations out of business. Now, portions of the
old red-brick ore processing factories serve as part of Dowa’s recycling plant, which started fully operating two years ago.” [Ibid] ¶ “It
is important for Japan to actively tap its urban mines,” Kohmei Harada, a managing director at the National Institute of Materials
Science, told the New York Times. He is an enthusiastic supporter of recycling efforts like the one in Kosaka. Apart from rare metals
and earths, Mr. Harada estimates that about 6,800 tons of gold, or the equivalent of about 16 percent of the total reserves in the
world’s gold mines, lie in used electronics in Japan. “Japan’s economy has grown by gathering resources from around the world, and
those resources are still with us, in one form or another,” he said.¶ “But this form of recycling is an expensive and technically difficult
process that is still being perfected. At Dowa’s plant, computer chips and other vital parts from electronics are hacked into two-
centimeter squares. This feedstock then must be smelted in a furnace that reaches 1,400 degrees Celsius before various minerals
can be extracted. The factory processes 300 tons of materials a day, and each ton yields only about 150 grams of rare metals.
Though Dowa does not disclose the finances of its Kosaka recycling operations, the company says that after a year of operating at a
low capacity, the factory now turns a profit. Over all, net income at Dowa Holdings, which deals in industrial metals and electronic
materials, almost tripled in the quarter ending June 30, to 6.52 billion yen, or $78.2 million, as global industrial production
rebounded.” [Ibid]¶ Utaro Sekiya, the manager of Dowa’s recycling plant, said, “It’s about time Japan started paying more attention
to recycling rare earths...If we can become a leader in this field, perhaps China will be the one coming to us to buy our technology.”
Tabuchi wrote: “As Dowa has turned its attention to rare earths, a priority is developing ways to render neodymium, which is used in
powerful magnets. Its extraction has proved costly. Neodymium is found only in tiny quantities in parts used in the speakers of
cellphones, for example, making it a challenge to collect meaningful amounts, said Sekiya... Finding enough electronics parts to
recycle has also grown more difficult for Dowa, which procures used gadgets from around the world. A growing number of
countries, including the United States, are recognizing the value of holding onto old electronics. And China already bans the export
of used computer motherboards and other discarded electronics parts.” [Ibid]¶ Rare Earths in the United States¶ Until the 1980s, the
United States led the world in rare earth production, thanks largely to the Mountain Pass mine in California. "There was a time we
were producing 20,000 tons a year when the market was 30,000 tons," Mark A. Smith, president and CEO of Molycorp, an American
company that reopened a rare earth mine at Mountain Pass, told National Geographic. "So we were 60-plus percent of the world's
market."¶ Tim Folger wrote in National Geographic, “American dominance ended in the mid 1980s. China, which for decades had
been developing the technology for separating rare earths... entered the world market with a roar. With government support, cheap
labor, and lax or nonexistent environmental regulations, its rare earth industries undercut all competitors.” Mountain Pass was
closed in 2002 after an industrial accident and because of competition from China and environmental concerns. [Source: Tim Folger,
National Geographic, June 2011 ]¶ The California deposit was discovered in the 1940s by uranium prospectors. It became the world's
largest supplier of rare earths as the demand for europium, which is used for color television screens, surged in the 1960s. When the
mine closed it left behind mounds of tailings, or leftover dirt, around the property.¶ Many
wonder how the United
States could let itself become so dependant on its rival China---and vulnerable to supply cut
offs --- for strategic minerals like rare earths. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times, “You really have
to wonder why nobody raised an alarm while this was happening, if only on national security
grounds . But policy makers simply stood by
as the U.S. rare earth industry shut down. In at least one case, in 2003-
--a time when, if you believed the Bush administration, considerations of national
security governed every aspect
of U.S. policy---the Chinese literally packed up all the equipment in a U.S. production facility
and shipped it to China. [Source: Paul Krugman New York Times, October 17, 2010]¶ “The result,” Kugman wrote,
“was a monopoly position exceeding the wildest dreams of Middle Eastern oil-fueled tyrants.
And even before the trawler incident, China showed itself willing to exploit that monopoly to
the fullest . The United Steelworkers recently filed a complaint against Chinese trade
practices, stepping in where U.S. businesses fear to tread because they fear Chinese retaliation. The
union put China’s imposition of export restrictions and taxes on rare earths---restrictions that give Chinese
production in a number of industries an important competitive advantage---at the top of the list.”
[Ibid]¶ In October 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a bill authorizing research to address the supply of rare earths,
saying the minerals were critical to energy, military and manufacturing technologies. The U.S. rare earths industry is hoping
domestic mines will open. The U.S. Geological Survey has identified several sites, including Music Valley in Southern California,
where rare earths could be mined. Congress is considering proposals, some pushing for loan guarantees for rare earths suppliers, to
encourage more domestic research and production. [Source: New York Times, Los Angeles Times]
***Clean Tech Advantage
1AC Clean Tech
We are in a new race and Sputnik has just launched --- US is losing out on the
clean tech race
Friedman, 9 Thomas, won three Pulitzer Prizes for the NYT, NYT Foreign Affairs Op-Ed
columnist, “The New Sputnik,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/opinion/27friedman.html
///BDS
Yes, China’s leaders have decided to go green — out of necessity because too many of their people can’t
breathe, can’t swim, can’t fish, can’t farm and can’t drink thanks to pollution from its coal- and oil-based manufacturing growth
engine. And, therefore, unless China powers its development with cleaner energy systems, and more knowledge-intensive
businesses without smokestacks, China will die of its own development.¶ What do we know about necessity? It is the mother of
invention. And
when China decides it has to go green out of necessity, watch out . You will not just be
buying your toys from China. You will buy your next electric car, solar panels, batteries and energyefficiency software from China.¶ I believe this Chinese decision to go green is the 21st-century
equivalent of the Soviet Union’s 1957 launch of Sputnik — the world’s first Earth-orbiting satellite. That launch
stunned us, convinced President Eisenhower that the U.S. was falling behind in missile technology and spurred
America to make massive investments in science, education, infrastructure and networking —
one eventual byproduct of which was the Internet.¶ Well, folks. Sputnik just went up again: China’s going cleantech.
The view of China in the U.S. Congress — that China
is going to try to leapfrog us by out-polluting us
It’s going to try to out-green us . Right now, China is focused on low-cost
manufacturing of solar, wind and batteries and building the world’s biggest market for these
products. It still badly lags U.S. innovation. But research will follow the market. America’s premier solar equipment maker,
Applied Materials, is about to open the world’s largest privately funded solar research facility — in Xian, China.¶ “If they invest
in 21st-century technologies and we invest in 20th-century technologies, they’ll win, ” says David
Sandalow, the assistant secretary of energy for policy. “If we both invest in 21st-century technologies,
challenging each other, we all win.”¶ Unfortunately, we’re still not racing. It’s like Sputnik
went up and we think it’s just a shooting star. Instead of a strategic response, too many of our
politicians are still trapped in their own dumb-as-we-wanna-be bubble, where we’re always
No. 1, and where the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, having sold its soul to the old coal and oil industries, uses its
— is out of date.
influence to prevent Congress from passing legislation to really spur renewables. Hat’s off to the courageous chairman of Pacific Gas
and Electric, Peter Darbee, who last week announced that his huge California power company was quitting the chamber because of
its “obstructionist tactics.” All shareholders in America should ask their C.E.O.’s why they still belong to the chamber. ¶ China’s
leaders, mostly engineers, wasted little time debating global warming. They know the Tibetan glaciers that feed
their major rivers are melting. But they also know that even if climate change were a hoax, the demand for clean, renewable power
is going to soar as we add an estimated 2.5 billion people to the planet by 2050, many of whom will want to live high-energy
lifestyles. In that world, E.T. — or energy technology — will be as big as I.T., and China intends to be a big E.T. player.¶ “For the last
three years, the U.S. has led the world in new wind generation,” said the ecologist Lester Brown, author of “Plan B 4.0.” “By
the
end of this year, China will bypass us on new wind generation so fast we won’t even see it go
by.”¶ I met this week with Shi Zhengrong, the founder of Suntech, already the world’s largest manufacturer of solar panels. Shi
recalled how, shortly after he started his company in Wuxi, nearby Lake Tai, China’s third-largest freshwater lake, choked to death
from pollution.¶ “After this disaster,” explained Shi, “the party secretary of Wuxi city came to me and said, ‘I want to support you to
grow this solar business into a $15 billion industry, so then we can shut down as many polluting and energy consuming companies in
the region as soon as possible.’ He is one of a group of young Chinese leaders, very innovative and very revolutionary, on this issue.
Something has changed. China realized it has no capacity to absorb all this waste. We have to grow without pollution.Ӧ Of course,
China will continue to grow with cheap, dirty coal, to arrest over-eager environmentalists and
to strip African forests for wood and minerals. Have no doubt about that. But have no doubt either that, without
declaring it,
China is embarking on a new, parallel path of clean power deployment and
innovation . It is the Sputnik of our day . We ignore it at our peril.
China’s monopoly enables them to decimate US military, economic, industrial,
and greentech primacy --- we need our own domestic supply
FLOYD G. BROWN, has written for the San Francisco Chronicle, the Washington Times,
Townhall.com and WND.com. His latest book is Killing Wealth/Freeing Wealth, published in
2010 by WND Books, Floyd writes a weekly syndicated column about politics, culture and the
economy, China is One Breath From Disarming the Entire U.S. Military, Western Journalism, 78-2013, http://www.westernjournalism.com/chinas-dangerous-rare-earths-monopoly/2///BDS
Of all the power that China wields in the world today, its monopoly over rare earth minerals could
have the most frightening impact. You see, rare earth resources are essential for producing hightech products, renewable energy technologies and advanced weapons systems. In fact, without rare
earth minerals, the United States would face a full-blown national security crisis. It was only a few
decades ago, during the Cold War, that the United States was an undisputed leader in the field. Yet as vital as these
minerals are to our future, Barack Obama’s administration has no plan for re-building America’s
capacity to produce and refine them. How quickly the mighty have fallen… Our supreme leader has no idea,
or even any desire, to get us back in the game. In fact, Team Obama doesn’t have a clue how to develop a domestic rare
earth supply. And That’s Not All Even beyond our ability to build arms, the rare earth shortages prevent
us from building a sustainable, green energy future. Rare earth minerals are indispensable for
building wind turbines and hybrid/electric vehicles. The Obama administration’s only solution to
our vulnerabilities is bringing a case against the Chinese at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The U.S.
Trade Representative lodged a formal complaint with the WTO about Chinese trade restrictions on the rare earths, including export
duties and quotas. These measures brought down prices for the minerals in China, although they increased prices for foreign firms.
As a result, Team Obama is alleging unfair competition. Unfair competition is putting it mildly, in my opinion. The
Communist
party has understood for years now that rare earths are an area of strategic advantage. Deng
Xiaoping made a cryptic statement all the way back in 1992 about his designs for the future: “There is oil in the Middle East; there is
rare earth in China.” With
huge rare earth deposits and world power – rather than profit – in mind, China
began supplying our need for rare earths at dirt-cheap prices, which our own companies
couldn’t match. Part of the Chinese strategy is to force American and Japanese manufacturers
to relocate to China. Industries that depend on rare earth minerals also have the added benefit of
having access to China’s supply at a lower cost. So medical device makers, automotive parts firms and green
energy firms have pulled up stakes around the world and relocated to China. America needs a plan
to restore our leadership. We need the capability to mine and process the minerals here. Sadly, even the ores mined here
by our domestic producer, MolyCorp Inc., are sent to China for processing. Once our American ore is processed in China, it becomes
subject to the Chinese export restrictions. Obama has resisted developing a strategic plan, and the reason is likely his slavish
devotion to radical environmentalist interests that dislike any company with the name of mining or refining in it. Ironically, the
lack of a domestic supply of rare earth minerals is stunting the growth of the green energy firms
these same environmental interests are always touting. Members of the Armed Forces House and Senate Committees are deeply
concerned, and they have some ideas. U.S. Senator Roy Blunt of Missouri recently said, “By encouraging
the domestic
production and refinement of rare earth minerals, we can reduce our dependency on other
countries and encourage economic development here in the U.S.” The bottom line is, we need a strategy,
and the Obama Administration is failing to provide it. Congressional members must step in and take the lead. Until we have a
strategy, we are hostage to the Chinese, and can only hope they don’t cut our supplies the
same way they cut Japan’s after a territorial dispute in 2010. Right now, the Chinese have us over a
dangerous barrel. Your Eyes on the Hill. Floyd G. Brown
REEs give the US the capabilities to transition to a green economy and
renewable industries like solar and wind
Investor Intel 13 (Investor Intel Admin, More please: The critical contributions of Rare Earth
Elements to the ‘new’ economy, Investor Intel, 10-10-2013, http://investorintel.com/rare-earthintel/please-critical-contributions-rare-earth-elements-new-economy///BDS)
Let me begin by clarifying, I am not an environmentalist, unless it makes sense economically. Irrespective of the deeply divided
political squabbling in the US about the importance of renewable energy and clean technology to long-term economic and
environmental challenges, there
is a strong consensus among governments, the corporate sector, and
investors that renewable energy will drive economic growth. However, even the most optimistic among
us regarding this developing industry (still very much in its early stages) must acknowledge one harsh reality: the sector faces
challenges. Exceptional challenges. Long-established, highly profitable reigning industries (with tremendous influence
among influencers), coupled with challenging financing hurdles are obviously obstacles to clean-tech expansion. But another
drawback for clean technology is one that hasn’t received enough attention. In
order to transition towards a cleaner,
healthier and more robust economy fueled by renewable energy and clean technology, rare earth elements (or
REEs, subdivided into two categories; light rare earth elements or LREEs, and the more-valuable heavy rare earth elements or HREEs)
have to be mined. REEs are needed to produce the requisite green energy infrastructure and associated products. That is a
bit of an understatement. Rare earth elements (metals, oxides, phosphors and other REE derivatives) are absolutely
essential ingredients for creating the technologies that reduce US and global dependence on
hydrocarbon energy sources. As most InvestorIntel readers are already aware, thanks to Publisher, Editor-in-Chief and
‘Queen of Rare Earths’ Tracy Weslosky, what makes rare earths ‘rare’ is not the relative scarcity (i.e. oil). Rare earth elements are
considered rare because they occur, widely dispersed in the earth’s crust, rather than in concentrated ores. REEs (and graphite
and, soon, graphene will) provide
critical contributions to renewable energy technology, including in
solar power, wind turbines, lithium-ion batteries, and all electric motors. Some wind turbines contain over
500 pounds of rare earth elements. Each and every Prius that rolls off the Toyota assembly line in Tokyo carries almost
30 pounds of REEs (Tesla Motors wasn’t able to respond by the publication deadline of this article). More people need to know that
without rare earth elements, it would be completely impossible to manufacture the building
blocks that operate these technologies. According to industry experts, with more supply, demand for
REEs will increase. And, obviously, more REEs will be required as these technologies (still in their
respective early stages) become more and more mainstream. Wind turbines and electric vehicles, in
particular, rely on rare earths neodymium and dysprosium. A recent study conducted by a US private research
university concluded that global demand for neodymium and dysprosium will outstrip supply over the
medium- and mid-term if worldwide production does not increase by 8% for neodymium and 14% for
dysprosium. The conclusion? Present rare earth production is not increasing at a sustainable level. The
problem of future access to rare earth resources is exacerbated by China’s recent imposition of REE
export quotas, which caused some users of REEs to charge REE surcharges to their customers. A shrinking supply of
REEs guarantees higher costs for industries desperate to be more cost-competitive and that are striving
to improve performance, while lowering price (remember, the world expects the price of a particular technology to come down over
time). The end result? This conundrum could set back wind and solar at a time when we need to advance them.
Who, in their right mind, could say we do not need more energy diversity — especially in the long term?
US clean tech leadership is key to hegemony and warming --- the aff is key to
turn America into a green-hegemon
Klarevas, 9 Louis Professor of Global Affairs, Professor at the Center for Global Affairs – New
York University, December 15, “Securing American Primacy While Tackling Climate Change:
Toward a National Strategy of Greengemony”, Huffington Post, 12-15,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/louis-klarevas/securing-american-primacy_b_393223.html
By not addressing climate change more aggressively
and creatively, the
United States is
squandering an opportunity to secure its global primacy for the next few generations to
come. To do this, though, the U.S. must rely on innovation to help the world escape the coming
environmental meltdown. Developing the key technologies that will save the planet from
global warming will allow the U.S. to outmaneuver potential great power rivals seeking to
replace it as the international system's hegemon . But the greening of American strategy must
occur soon . The U.S., however, seems to be stuck in time , unable to move beyond oil-centric geo-politics in any
meaningful way. Often, the gridlock is portrayed as a partisan difference, with Republicans resisting action and Democrats pleading
for action. This, though, is an unfair characterization as there are numerous proactive Republicans and quite a few reticent
Democrats. The real divide is instead one between realists and liberals. Students of realpolitik, which still heavily guides American
foreign policy, largely discount environmental
issues as they are not seen as advancing national interests in a
way that generates relative power advantages vis-à-vis the other major powers in the system:
Russia, China, Japan, India, and the European Union. Liberals, on the other hand, have recognized that global
warming might very well become the greatest challenge ever faced by mankind. As such, their thinking often eschews narrowly
defined national interests for the greater global good. This, though, ruffles elected officials whose sworn obligation is, above all, to
protect and promote American national interests. What both sides need to understand is that by becoming a lean, mean, green
fighting machine, the
U.S. can actually bring together liberals and realists to advance a collective
interest which benefits every nation, while at the same time, securing America's global
primacy well into the future. To do so, the U.S. must re-invent itself as not just your traditional
hegemon, but as history's first ever green hegemon . Hegemons are countries that dominate
the international system - bailing out other countries in times of global crisis, establishing and maintaining the
most important international institutions, and covering the costs that result from free-riding
and cheating global obligations. Since 1945, that role has been the purview of the United States. Immediately after
World War II, Europe and Asia laid in ruin, the global economy required resuscitation, the countries of the free world needed
security guarantees, and the entire system longed for a multilateral forum where global concerns could be addressed. The U.S.,
emerging the least scathed by the systemic crisis of fascism's rise, stepped up to the challenge and established the postwar (and
current) liberal order. But don't let the world "liberal" fool you. While many nations benefited from America's new-found hegemony,
the U.S. was driven largely by "realist" selfish national interests. The liberal order first and foremost benefited the U.S. With the U.S.
becoming bogged down in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, running a record national debt, and failing to shore up the dollar, the
future of American hegemony now seems to be facing a serious contest: potential rivals - acting like sharks smelling blood in the
water - wish to challenge the U.S. on a variety of fronts. This has led numerous commentators to forecast the U.S.'s imminent fall
from grace. Not all hope is lost however. With
the impending systemic crisis of global warming on the
horizon, the U.S. again finds itself in a position to address a transnational problem in a way
that will benefit both the international community collectively and the U.S. selfishly . The current
problem is two-fold. First, the competition for oil is fueling animosities between the major powers.
The geopolitics of oil has already emboldened Russia in its 'near abroad' and China in far-off
places like Africa and Latin America. As oil is a limited natural resource, a nasty zero-sum contest could
be looming on the horizon for the U.S. and its major power rivals - a contest which threatens
American primacy and global stability . Second, converting fossil fuels like oil to run national
economies is producing irreversible harm in the form of carbon dioxide emissions . So long as
the global economy remains oil-dependent, greenhouse gases will continue to rise. Experts are
predicting as much as a 60% increase in carbon dioxide emissions in the next twenty-five years .
That likely means more devastating water shortages , droughts , forest fires , floods , and storms. In
other words, if global competition for access to energy resources does not undermine
international security, global warming will. And in either case, oil will be a culprit for the instability.
Oil arguably has been the most precious energy resource of the last half-century. But "black gold" is so 20th century. The
key
resource for this century will be green gold - clean, environmentally-friendly energy like
wind, solar, and hydrogen power. Climate change leaves no alternative. And the sooner we realize this,
the better off we will be. What Washington must do in order to avoid the traps of petropolitics is to convert
the U.S. into the world's first-ever green hegemon. For starters, the federal government must drastically
increase investment in energy and environmental research and development (E&E R&D). This will require a serious sacrifice,
committing upwards of $40 billion annually to E&E R&D - a far cry from the few billion dollars currently being spent. By promoting a
new national project, the U.S. could develop new technologies that will assure it does not drown in a pool of oil. Some solutions are
already well known, such as raising fuel standards for automobiles; improving public transportation networks; and expanding
nuclear and wind power sources. Others, however, have not progressed much beyond the drawing board: batteries that can store
massive amounts of solar (and possibly even wind) power; efficient and cost-effective photovoltaic cells, crop-fuels, and hydrogenbased fuels; and even fusion. Such innovations will
not only provide alternatives to oil, they will also give
the U.S. an edge in the global competition for hegemony. If the U.S. is able to produce
technologies that allow modern, globalized societies to escape the oil trap, those nations will
eventually have no choice but to adopt such technologies. And this will give the U.S. a
tremendous economic boom , while simultaneously providing it with means of leverage that
can be employed to keep potential foes in check.
<insert warming impact>
2AC Dependence Bad
In particular, shortages and reliance on China for rare earth’s decks the clean
tech development
Vidal, 12 John, Global Research, “Shortages of rare minerals: China’s strategic control over
terbium, yttrium, dysprosium, europium and neodymium,”
http://www.globalresearch.ca/shortages-of-rare-minerals-china-s-strategic-control-overterbium-yttrium-dysprosium-europium-and-neodymium/29033
China’s near-exclusive access to terbium and yttrium sent prices soaring in 2011, potentially
hobbling clean energy industry ¶ Shortages of a handful of rare minerals could slow the future
growth of the burgeoning renewable energy industries, and affect countries’ chances of
limiting greenhouse gas emissions, business leaders were told at the World Economic Forum in Davos this week.¶ Last
year, prices of many scarce minerals exploded , rising as much as 10 times over 2010 levels before dropping back,
said PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).¶ Terbium, yttrium, dysprosium, europium and neodymium are
widely used in the manufacture of wind turbines, solar panels, electric car batteries and
energy-efficient lightbulbs. But because these “rare earths” are mined almost exclusively in
China , it is becoming increasingly difficult and expensive to source them in the required
quantities .¶ In a survey of some of the largest clean energy manufacturers, 78% told PwC said they were
already experiencing instability of supply of rare metals, and most said they did not expect shortages to
ease for at least five years. Currently, 95% of the rare earth minerals needed by clean tech industries
come from China which has set strict export quotas. Last year China reserved most for its own for its domestic
wind, solar and battery industries, shifting costs to the US and Europe which do not mine any of the minerals.¶ Scarcity of the
mineral resources could affect disrupt entire supply chains and countries’ attempts to meet
emissions targets, said PwC. “The energy sector could face very great problems if the world turns to
[renewables] in a big way. In the short term,
there will be major supply problem s. The availability of these metals
will define the growth of these industry sectors.
There are so far not many alternatives ,” said Rob Mathlener,
author of a report that urged companies to build future strategies around recycling and reusing resources.¶ Last December, Janez
Potočnik, the EU commissioner for the environment, warned that the waste of valuable natural resources threatens to produce a
fresh economic crisis.¶ None
of the minerals is likely to physically run out, but it can take 10 years for
countries to open new mines. In the US there has been growing concerns that China
dominates the supply of the materials considered crucial for the expansion of the US defence,
computer andrenewable energy sectors.¶ A series of US government reports have urged an immediate increase in
production of rare minerals. By mid-2012, US mining company Molycorp Minerals aims to produce 20,000 tonnes a year of nine of
the 17 rare minerals, or about 25% of current western imports from China.¶ Malcolm Preston, PwC’s global sustainability leader,
said: “ It’s
a time bomb . Many businesses now recognise that we are living beyond the planet’s
means. If these industries, supply chains and economies are disrupted by shortages in supply,
then the ‘luxury of choice’ lifestyle many in the Western world have become accustomed to,
will also be affected.”
2AC REEs Key
Rare earth supply problems kill renewable development
Jones 13 (Nicole, 18 November 2013, “A Scarcity of Rare Metals Is Hindering Green
Technologies,”
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/a_scarcity_of_rare_metals_is_hindering_green_technologies/2
711/, ADL)
A shortage of "rare earth" metals, used in everything from electric car batteries to solar
panels to wind turbines, is hampering the growth of renewable energy technologies. Researchers
are now working to find alternatives to these critical elements or better ways to recycle them. by nicola jones With the
global push to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it’s ironic that several energy- or resourcesaving technologies aren’t being used to the fullest simply because we don’t have enough raw
materials to make them. For example, says Alex King, director of the new Critical Materials Institute, every wind farm
has a few turbines standing idle because their fragile gearboxes have broken down. They can be fixed, of
course, but that takes time – and meanwhile wind power isn’t being gathered. Now you can make a more reliable
wind turbine that doesn’t need a gearbox at all, King points out, but you need a truckload of so-called "rare earth"
metals to do Rare earth metals recycling Haruyoshi Yamaguchi/Bloomberg These bits of critical elements are bound for
recycling at a Mitsubishi subsidiary in Japan. it, and there simply isn’t the supply. Likewise, we could all be using
next-generation fluorescent light bulbs that are twice as efficient as the current standard. But
when the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) tried to make that switch in 2009, companies like
General Electric cried foul: they wouldn’t be able to get hold of enough rare earths to make
the new bulbs. The move toward new and better technologies — from smart phones to
electric cars — means an ever-increasing demand for exotic metals that are scarce thanks to both
geology and politics. Thin, cheap solar panels need tellurium, which makes up a scant 0.0000001 percent of the
earth’s crust, making it three times rarer than gold. High-performance batteries need lithium, which is only
easily extracted from briny pools in the Andes. In 2011, the average price of 'rare earth' metals shot up by as much as 750 percent.
Platinum, needed as a catalyst in fuel cells that turn hydrogen into energy, comes almost exclusively
from South Africa. Researchers and industry workers alike woke with a shock to the problems
caused by these dodgy supply chains in 2011, when the average price of "rare earths" —
including terbium and europium, used in fluorescent bulbs; and neodymium, used in the
powerful magnets that help to drive wind turbines and electric engines — shot up by as much
as 750 percent in a year. The problem was that China, which controlled 97 percent of global rare
earth production, had clamped down on trade. A solution was brokered and the price shock faded, but the
threat of future supply problems for rare earths and other so-called "critical elements" still
looms. That’s why the Critical Materials Institute, located at the DOE’s Ames Laboratory, was created. The institute opened
in June, and the official ribbon-cutting was in September. Its mission is to predict which materials are going to become
problems next, work to improve supply chains, and try to invent alternative materials that don’t need so many critical
elements in the first place. The institute is one of a handful of organizations worldwide trying to tackle the problem of critical
elements, which organizations like the American Physical Society have been calling attention to for years. "It’s a hot topic in
Europe right now," says Olivier Vidal, coordinator of a European Commission project called ERA-MIN — one of a handful of
European initiatives that are now ramping up. "It's
really urgent," says King. "We're facing real challenges
today — we need solutions tomorrow, not the day after." Despite the high cost and high
demand of metals critical for energy technologies, very little of this metal is recycled: In 2009, it
was estimated that less than one percent of rare earth metals was recovered. Ruediger Kuehr, head of the Solving the E-waste
Problem (StEP) initiative in Bonn, says that 49 million tons of e-waste are produced each year, from cell phones to
refrigerators. Of that, perhaps 10 percent is recycled. It’s ridiculous to simply throw so much valuable material away, says
Diran Apelian, founding director of the Metal Processing Institute in Worcester, A Belgian company now recycles 350,000 tons
of e-waste a year, including photovoltaic cells. Massachusetts. "There’s something like 32 tons of gold in all the world's cell
phones," says Apelian. "There's a huge goldmine in our urban landfills." Getting
the metals out of modern
technology is a pain, since they are incorporated in tiny amounts into increasingly-complex
devices. A circa-2000 cell phone used about two dozen elements; a modern smart phone uses more than 60. "We’re making
things more difficult for ourselves," says King. Despite the relatively high concentrations of rare earths in technology, he says,
it’s actually chemically easier to separate them from the surrounding material in simple rocks than in complicated phones.
***Hegemony Advantage
1AC Industrial Base
Aside from clean tech, Dependence on other countries for REEs cause price rises
that eviscerates our defense industrial base and economic competitiveness
Parthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of
Security,”
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf
The 2010 rare earths case and others are increasing¶ interest in critical minerals among U.S.
policymakers. Congress held hearings on the strategic¶ importance of minerals between 2007 and 2010,¶ and the 2010
National Defense Authorization¶ Act required DOD to study and report on its¶ dependence on rare earth elements for weapons,¶ communications and other systems.¶ 3¶ During a¶ 2009 hearing on minerals
Forbes of¶ Virginia called minerals, “one of those things that¶ no one
really talks about or worries about until¶ something goes wrong. It’s at that point – the point¶
where we don’t have the steel we need to build¶ MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehi¶ -¶ cles] or the rhenium we need to build a JSF [Joint¶ Strike Fighter]
engine that the stockpile becomes¶ critically important.”¶ 4¶ In October 2010, Secretary of¶ State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated that it would¶ be “in our
interests commercially and strategically”¶ to find additional sources of supply for rare earth¶
and military readi¶ -¶ ness, Republican Representative Randy
minerals,
and stated that
China’s recent cuts to¶ rare earth exports “served as a wakeup call that¶ being so
dependent on only one source , disruption¶ could occur for natural disaster reasons or other¶
kinds of events could intervene.”¶ 5¶ In January 2011,¶ Sen. Mark Begich, D-Alaska, Sen. Lisa Murkowski,¶ R-Alaska, and Rep. Mike Coffman, R-Colo., wrote¶ a letter to
Defense Secretary Robert Gates express¶ -¶ ing concern for minerals required for producing¶ defense equipment such as Joint Direct Attack¶ Munitions (JDAMs), which stated, “Clearly, rare¶
earth supply limitations present a serious vul nerability to our national security . Yet early indications¶ are that
DOD has dismissed the severity of the¶ situation to date.”¶ 6 Additionally, the Department¶ of Energy (DOE) launched a multiyear effort to¶
explore potential vulnerabilities in supply chains¶ for minerals that will be critical to four distinct¶ areas of energy technology innovation.¶ While concern is growing, the media and policy¶ -¶ makers often focus
too narrowly on what may seem¶ the most compelling indicators – usually import¶ dependence or scarcity – in prescribing solutions to¶ reduce U.S. vulnerabilities, in particular to supply¶ disruptions in critical
minerals such as rare earths.¶ This focus is sparking protectionist attitudes, with¶ some worrying that import dependence poses an¶ inherent risk to the U.S. economy. Discussion of¶ minerals also frequently
focuses on supply scarcity¶ and resource depletion in absolute terms. However,¶ both the rhenium and rare earth minerals dis¶ -¶ ruptions of the past five years were triggered by¶ deliberate decisions made by
political leaders to¶ leverage their positions of strength, not by market¶ forces, disorder or scarcities of these minerals.¶ Countries often revert to hoarding, pressuring¶ suppliers and otherwise behaving as if
scarcities¶ are present even when they are not, based solely on¶ concerns that shortages are likely in the near term. ¶ In fact, neither scarcity nor import dependence¶ alone is sufficient to signal vulnerability,
and a¶ combination of factors including concentration of¶ suppliers is most often required for mineral issues¶ to become security or foreign policy problems.¶ This report, based on two years of research, site
visits¶ and discussions with stakeholders, explores how the¶ supply, demand and use of minerals can impair U.S.¶ foreign relations, economic interests and defense¶ readiness. It examines cases of five
individual min¶ -¶ erals – lithium, gallium, rhenium, tantalum and¶ niobium – and rare earth elements, such as neo¶ -¶ dymium, samarium and dysprosium, as a sixth group¶ in order to show the complexity of
addressing these¶ concerns. Each of these minerals is critical for defense¶ technologies and U.S. economic growth plans. They¶ share characteristics with minerals that have caused¶ important political or
economic concerns for the¶ United States in the past. Additionally, lithium is fre¶ -¶ quently cited in the media and in discussions of how¶ clean energy supply chains are critical to meeting¶ America’s future
economic, energy and environmental goals. Within the past five years, two of these cases¶ – rhenium and rare earth minerals – have involved¶ supply disruptions or important threats of disruptions for the
United States and its allies. Each of these¶ minerals will require federal government attention in¶ the coming years.¶ assessing¶ U.S. Vulnerability¶ Analysts vary widely in assessing the implications¶ of U.S.
dependence on critical minerals, despite¶ broad acceptance of the physical reality that mineral resources are finite and the economic realities ¶ that requirements are ubiquitous and demand is¶ growing. On one
extreme, some analysts believe¶ the 2010 incident between China and Japan sug¶ -¶ gests an approaching Hobbesian world in which¶ resource demands outstrip supplies for minerals,¶ nonrenewable energy
sources and even food sup¶ -¶ plies. History indicates that conflict over absolute¶ scarcities is unlikely. At the other end of the¶ spectrum, many still believe that an open market¶ and its invisible hand will
continue to determine¶ winners and losers with no serious repercussions¶ or the United States given its purchasing power. In¶ between these extremes, even staunch pragmatists¶ will point to the 2010 China
rare earths episode¶ as proof of one basic tenet: The United States and¶ other market-based economies no longer determine all the rules of global trade¶ Central to this narrative is a conundrum for¶
policymakers. Reserve estimates show that¶ global supplies of almost all minerals are ade¶ -¶ quate to meet expected global demands¶ over¶ the long term¶ , and for decades into the future¶ for most
minerals. The U.S. Geological Survey¶ (USGS) indicates, for example, that world sup¶ -¶ plies of rare earths will be adequate for more¶ than 100 years.¶ 13¶ These estimates, however,¶ can be meaningless¶ in
the near term¶ if supplies¶ are insufficient, or if suppliers reduce exports¶ or otherwise manipulate trade. For example,¶ most experts project that global production of¶ rare earths will likely be insufficient to
meet¶ the world’s demand over the next two to three¶ years. The long-term sufficiency of supplies has¶ no practical effect because it takes years and¶ high capital costs to start up new mining and¶ processing
businesses for rare earths. Thus, the¶ risks of inaction are high. A range of political,¶ economic and geographic factors can disrupt¶ supplies and cause price spikes that can create¶ rifts in bilateral relations,
trade disputes, accusations of economic sabotage and instability in¶ countries that possess rare reserves of prized¶ minerals. They can also give supplier countries¶ extraordinary leverage that can alter
Disruptions, delivery
lags and price¶ spikes that affect military assets and place unanticipated strains on defense
geopoliti¶ -¶ cal calculations, especially when single countries¶ control most world supplies¶ For U.S. policymakers, the risks fall into two rough¶ categories:
budgets ;¶ and lack of affordable access to minerals and raw¶ materials preventing
important national economic¶ growth goals.¶ The defense industrial base in the modern era
differs greatly from any previous time. Often, actual¶ scarcity is not required for problems to
procurement
arise , as¶ concerns about future scarcities often drive countries to behave as if shortages are
occurring . The¶ National Academies recently reported, “The risk¶ of supply interruption arguably has increased or,¶ at the very
least, has become different from the¶ mor---e traditional threats associated with the more ¶ familiar
ideas of war and conflict.”¶ 14¶ During World¶ War I and World War II, for example, governments¶ counted on domestic steel production – and even¶ civilian willingness to
modern warfare relies on¶ globalized and
privatized supply chains rather than¶ a primarily domestic (and often government-run)¶ network. Vulnerability to
mineral supply disrup¶ -¶ tions is likewise far broader and more complicated¶ than it was in
previous eras.¶ Policymakers should also consider minerals that¶ play uniquely important roles
in the American¶ economy. Rare earths, for example, are important¶ in petroleum refining, which today
enables the¶ smooth functioning of the economy . Looking to¶ the longer term, much concern is turning
contribute scrap materi¶ -¶ als for reuse and recycling – for tanks and other¶ equipment. In contrast,
toward¶ minerals that may see booming demand as the¶ economy develops a greater reliance
on energy¶ efficiency and renewable energy technologies,¶ such as the lithium used in advanced batteries¶ and hybrid and electric vehicles.
These minerals¶ will directly affect U.S. economic competitiveness, and plans for improving
economic growth ¶ and job development.¶ This vulnerability is not a new concern. Since the¶ early 1900s, U.S. defense analysts and national¶ policymakers
have worried about U.S. vulnerabili¶ -¶ ties to supply disruptions of the minerals critical¶ to manufacturing defense systems, from tanks¶ and munitions to communications equipment.¶ These concerns were
generally heightened in war¶ -¶ time. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting¶ Countries (OPEC) oil embargo and related oil cri¶ -¶ ses of the 1970s further brought into question the¶ assumption that the
United States could depend¶ on imports, as it became apparent that broader¶ global conditions and political decisions by other¶ countries could dramatically hinder the U.S. abil¶ -¶ ity to openly purchase
sufficient commodities at¶ affordable costs. This conclusion was reinforced¶ when supply disruptions and threats of disruptions¶ by apartheid-era South Africa, the hostile Soviet¶ Union and its satellites led to a
U.S.¶ vulnerability Following these Cold
War-era events, policy¶ -¶ makers held hearings and commissioned studies¶ in order to
understand which specific factors¶ were most important in signaling that U.S. eco¶ nomic and
security interests may be in jeopardy.¶ American analysts generally agreed that the following
factors were the most important to track:¶ Level of substitutes and the uniqueness of spe¶ -¶ •¶ cific minerals.¶ Level of U.S.
wave of congressio¶ -¶ nal hearings, government reports and independent¶ analysis of the conditions contributing to
domestic supplies and dependence¶ on foreign sources.¶
Geographic concentration of supplies.¶ •¶ Stability of producing countries and
their region.¶ •¶ Distances and routes of supply chains.¶ •¶ Availability of technology to recover and process¶ •¶ the minerals.¶ Economic price of the resources themselves.¶ •¶ Inability of foreign
governments to coordinate¶ •¶ minerals policies.¶ Level of domestic demand in producing¶ •¶ countries.¶ Some of these concerns remain today, but changes¶ in technology, economics and the international¶
Analysts often pinpoint China’s rising resource¶ Elements of Security¶ Mitigating the Risks of
demand as the major new cause for concern, yet¶ limited
transparency and the changing nature of¶ the defense industrial base and the broader
economy will also affect U.S. mineral supplies in the¶ coming decades. Looking forward, major concerns¶ for the U.S.
government will include: Lack of suffi¶ -¶ cient information for policymakers; understanding¶ the evolving energy
paradigm; increasing exploration of space and seabed territory ; and a changing¶ defense industrial base.¶ Elements of Security¶ Mitigating the Risks of U.S.
Dependence on Critical Minerals¶ JUNE¶ 2011¶ 12¶ |¶ demand as the major new cause for concern, yet¶ limited transparency and the changing nature
security environment will pose new challenges as¶ well.
U.S. Dependence on Critical Minerals¶ JUNE¶ 2011¶ 12¶ |¶
of¶ the defense industrial base and the broader econ¶ -¶ omy will also affect U.S. mineral supplies in the¶ coming decades. Looking forward, major concerns¶ for the U.S. government will include: Lack of suffi ¶
-¶ cient information for policymakers; understanding¶ the evolving energy paradigm; increasing explora¶ -¶ tion of space and seabed territory; and a changing¶ defense industrial base.¶ Poor information is a
vulnerabilities, and it is¶ creating conditions in which hype could drive¶ policy
debates. For example, the media and oth¶ -¶ ers focused heavy attention throughout 2009¶ and 2010 on Bolivia’s potentially large lithium¶ supplies, often noting the populist, and at times¶ erratic,
major obstacle to address¶ -¶ ing critical mineral
behavior of the Bolivian president as¶ a reason for great concern over future lithium ¶ availability. In reality, many independent experts¶ agree that reliable exporters such as Chile and¶ Argentina will prove to be
the most important¶ lithium suppliers for years, and supply gluts in¶ the lithium market will continue for the foresee¶ -¶ able future even in the face of rising demand. Yet¶ the popular media focus on lithium
rarely, if ever,¶ includes this market information.¶ 16¶ Identifying when and how mineral supply disrup¶ -¶ tions (or threats of disruptions) could affect U.S.¶ defense industries or foreign relations is further ¶
complicated by both often-long global supply chains¶ and the nature of transactions. In some cases, natu¶ -¶ ral disasters or strikes halt production at specific¶ mines that produce large proportions of global¶
disruptions” manifest¶ as long contracting or legal delays (often intentional,¶ for
pricing or political reasons) or long lags in¶ delivery. Whether disruptions are abrupt and clear,¶ or long and uncertain, delivery
times and prices of¶ important energy technologies and military equip¶ -¶ ment can rise
supplies. In murkier cases, “
significantly . Today’s global supply¶ chains are incredibly efficient, as companies have¶ worked to reduce the slack in their transit
routes¶ and shipping plans. This efficiency can save energy ¶ and money, but as infrastructure, routes and people¶ are taken out of service, it also reduces
options when¶ things go wrong.¶ 17¶ Four other trends are changing the ways in which¶ minerals affect U.S. security and foreign policy¶ interests.¶ Rare earth minerals are key to clean tech and electric grid
security ¶
Efforts to develop alternative energy sources¶ will influence the global demand for
minerals .¶ Governments around the world are promoting a¶ more sustainable , lower-carbon
energy paradigm ¶ that includes increasing adoption of renewable¶ energy sources, energy
efficiency technologies,¶ advanced batteries and other products. Just as¶ rare earths and other minerals are
critical to¶ petroleum production, developing and manufac¶ -¶ turing wind turbines , solar energy systems
and¶ efficient batteries on a large scale will drive new¶ mineral demands. In particular, energy
storage¶ will be critical in the coming decades for military-¶ specific energy innovation ,
electric grid security ,¶ clean energy development and much more. As¶ a result, the Obama administration has already¶ identified
energy storage as a key technology area¶ for research and development investment. The¶ Department of Energy has increased loans and¶ grants related to energy storage, and DOD has¶ begun fielding
development are likely to produce
new technolo¶ -¶ gies that trigger major changes in global mineral¶ requirements over the
decades ahead, making it¶ crucial for the U.S. government to monitor min¶ -¶ eral supply
chains¶ Due to requirements for advanced technologies¶ and components that can withstand extreme¶ conditions, the expansion of countries’ space¶ capabilities over the coming decades will
renewable energy generation and¶ advanced energy storage units in Afghanistan.¶ Such significant investments in research and¶
influence¶ demand for critical minerals. A range of nations¶ – from India to Iran – aim to bolster their reputa¶ -¶ tions as space powers and develop more advanced¶ satellite systems and launch capabilities.
The¶ U.S. government must therefore expect demand¶ growth (and potentially growth that is not linear¶ or predictable) for minerals like rare earths that¶ are critical in space technologies. On the supply¶ side,
many countries are considering the possibil¶ -¶ ity of mining space objects, and even the 2010 U.S. ¶ National Space Policy suggests that the United¶ States should “identify potentially resource-rich¶ planetary
Given the state of the modern defense industrial¶ base, the National Academies of Science deter¶ -¶ mined in 2008, “The
Department of Defense¶ appears not to fully understand its needs for¶ specific materials or to
have adequate information¶ on their supply.”¶ 19¶ In the information age, the U.S.¶ military increasingly relies
on dual-use equipment and depends on globalized supply chains .¶ Military equipment for the
objects.Ӧ
modern battlefield¶ includes communications technologies , robotics ,¶ computer systems and
space assets that are used¶ by DOD, civilian government agencies and private¶ enterprises
alike. Indeed, a 2008 Defense Science¶ Board report noted, “Military-relevant technol¶ -¶ ogy will continue to change rapidly and will be¶ increasingly global.”¶ 20¶ Defense supply
chains are,¶ therefore, less distinct from those in the broader¶ economy as they once were, and the dual-use¶ nature of a broad range of
assets also means that¶
many supply chains are more globalized t han ever .¶ Moreover, “higher risk of and
uncertainty about¶ supply disruptions owing to the fragmentation¶ of global supply chains”¶
21¶
threaten¶ assured access to critical minerals . Much of¶ today’s defense equipment is purchased directly¶ from civilian vendors and designed to
meet both¶ civilian and military needs. Consider modern¶ warfare’s dependence on computer systems,¶ satellites, radar
and Global Positioning System.¶ The National Academies study notes, “The glo¶ -¶ balization of materials production and supply¶ has radically changed the ability of the
United¶ States to produce and to procure materials vital to¶ defense needs,” and that the stockpiling system is¶ inadequate given today’s global supply systems¶ These risks, coupled
with long-enduring vulnerabilities, are heightening concerns about U.S.¶ access to minerals. We
can further
can gain an even deeper¶ understanding of the security challenges involved¶ by examining specific minerals in detail.
The industrial base formulates the underpinning of US military power
National Aerospace Week 10 September 18, “Aerospace and Defense: The Strength to Lift
America,” http://www.nationalaerospaceweek.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/04/whitepaper.pdf
The beginning of a new decade presents the defense industry with challenges that aren’t new, but are becoming more urgent.
Developing a national strategy to ensure a robust industrial base and modernizing our
military hardware must become frontburner priorities . The health of the industrial base is at
the heart of our ability to supply our nation with the weapons systems it requires. As we wrote in
our landmark study on the industrial base in 2009: “Military technologies used to be much more closely related to civilian
technologies. They even used common production processes. But because
DOD is today the sole customer for
industry’s most advanced capabilities, the defense industrial base is increasingly specialized
and separate from the general manufacturing and technology sectors. That means even a healthy
general economy will not necessarily help underwrite the industrial capabilities DOD most
needs.” A huge step forward was made this year when the industrial base was included in the Quadrennial Defense Review as a
factor to be considered in its long-term planning. We’re optimistic that the next step — inclusion of industrial base considerations in
program plans and policy — will be executed as directed by the QDR — ensuring that it becomes incorporated into long-range
defense plans. However, we
remain concerned about the fragility of the supplier base. With another
round of acquisitions and consolidations imminent along with a projected decline in defense
spending, the supplier base remains particularly vulnerable. These small businesses are critical
to the primes and to the government. They face multiple challenges overcoming barriers to federal contracting and
once they leave the contracting base, they and their unique skills cannot be recovered. 2010 Aerospace Industries Association of
America, Inc. 4 Along with our concern about the industrial base is the long-term issue of modernizing our military hardware. The
1980s defense build-up is now 25 years old, and systems acquired then are in need of
replacement. The decade of 2010-19 is the crucial time to reset, recapitalize and modernize our
military forces. Not only are many of our systems reaching the end of their designed lives, but America’s military
forces are using their equipment at many times the programmed rates in the harsh conditions
of combat, wearing out equipment prematurely. Delaying modernization will make it even
harder to identify and effectively address global threats in the future. The requirements
identified in the QDR — for the United States to overmatch potential adversaries and to execute
long-duration campaigns in coming years against increasingly capable potential opponents —
will require complex and expensive aerospace capabilities. This is a concern that the Defense Department
recognizes. Under Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has said that the department is looking to develop a “family of systems” for
future strike options that will be supported by the “family of industry.” 9 This is welcome news. However, defense
modernization is not optional. While the fiscal 2011 budget request is a reasonable target that takes into account
funding needed to fight two wars, the pressure on the procurement and research and development budget is sure to increase in the
future. At the same time, America must
adapt its defenses to new kinds of threats. A large-scale
attack on information networks could pose a serious economic threat, impeding or preventing
commerce conducted electronically. This would affect not only ATM transactions, but commercial and governmental
fund transfers and the just-in-time orders on which the manufacturing sector depends. It could even pose threats to American lives,
interrupting the transfer of medical data, disrupting power grids, even disabling emergency communications links. In partnership
with the government, our industry is on the forefront of securing these networks and combating cyber attack. The American people
also demand better security for the U.S. homeland, from gaining control of our borders to more effective law enforcement and
disaster response. The
aerospace industry provides the tools that help different forces and
jurisdictions communicate with each other; monitor critical facilities and unpatrolled borders,
and give advance warning of natural disasters, among other capabilities. In many cases, government is
the only market for these technologies. Therefore, sound government policy is essential not only to maintain
current capabilities, but to ensure that a technology and manufacturing base exists to develop
new ones.
Strong industrial base is critical to naval power
Eaglen and McGrath, 11 Mackenzie,- research fellow for national security studies Brian,retired naval officer and the Director of Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis in Vienna,
Virginia “Thinking About a Day Without Sea Power: Implications for U.S. Defense Policy” 5-16
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/05/Thinking-About-a-Day-Without-SeaPower-Implications-for-US-Defense-Policy)
Recapturing Innovation and a Sound Industrial Policy. Despite the fact that “industrial policy” became a dirty word from its
association with socialist governments during the Cold War, Congress needs
in defense-related research and development.
to prevent the loss of innovation
Members should already know and be alarmed that the U.S.
military has no manned aircraft under development—a first in the history of aviation. Similarly, no surface ships or attack
submarines are in the design phase. With development cycles lasting 20 years or longer, elected leaders
need to ensure
that the Defense Department is not losing critical skills that will be needed to imagine and
build the next generation of ships, aircraft, sensors, and weapons for the U.S. Navy . The critical
workforce ingredients needed to sustain an industrial base capable of building next-generation systems are specialized design,
engineering, and manufacturing skills. The growth of the defense industry after World War II peaked in the late 1950s when defense
production became a leading sector of the national economy, a trend that continued well into the 1980s. This period was also
marked by an increased focus on developing advanced defense technologies. By 1960, the federal government was responsible for
58 percent of the nation’s research and development investments. This emphasis required a new level of engineering skills and
capabilities within the industry to develop the complex defense systems the government sought to build. Since World War II, the
United States has benefited from the skills of a robust defense industrial and manufacturing
workforce. For more than six decades, various U.S. defense strategies have emphasized the benefits of a technologically
superior military to help to deter and win wars . The U.S. military has pursued this “technical overmatch” for decades
in an attempt to deter potential enemies from engaging the U.S. in conflict and to reduce risk and loss of life on the battlefield.
When the Cold War ended in 1991, the sudden apparent dissolution of national security threats prompted a period of intense
downsizing and consolidation. Whereas more than 50 major defense firms dominated the market in the early 1990s, only six prime
contractors remain today. Contrary to popular perception, 60 percent to 75 percent of work programs in the aerospace and defense
industries are performed by sub-prime companies and lower-tier suppliers, not the big defense contractors. These small
companies are increasingly vulnerable to the vagaries of defense budgets, and reductions in
defense research and development will cause them to disappear along with their tooling and
skills. An expected, the emerging round of consolidation of the defense industry has increased the burden on the small collection
of defense companies. The consolidation of major defense contractors has generally reduced the number of available workers.
Already at a turning point, the potential closure of major defense manufacturing lines in the next five years with no additional
scheduled production could shrink this national asset even further. While the manufacturing workforce alone should not dictate
congressional defense acquisition decisions, Congress needs to consider the potential defense “brain drain” when determining
whether or not to shut down major production lines permanently, particularly in shipbuilding and aerospace. More often than not,
once these highly skilled workers leave the federal workforce, they are difficult to recruit back and even more expensive to retrain.
This dynamic creates significant project gaps.
Naval power solves hegemony, alliances, SLOC insecurity, and global conflict
Cropsey 10- Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, (Seth Strategic Analysis Vol. 34, No. 1,
January 2010, 35–45)
The cooperative arrangements with foreign navies envisioned by the Navy’s cur- rent maritime strategy may perhaps moderate
problems of failing states and terror. But is this enough to manage other challenges? Is the Navy’s current organization capable of
addressing both conventional and asymmetric threats? Can today’s highly structured and inflexible system for designing and building
ships adapt quickly and cost-effectively to changes in the strategic environment? What, for example, do globalization, the growing
dependence of the United States on sea-borne transit for strategic resources and minerals, and the likelihood of more dislocations
such as con- tinue from Somali piracy mean for the future of US national security? American maritime strategy has played a major
role in binding together the international system that US foreign policy has aimed to establish since the begin- ning of the twentieth
century. What
are the consequences for the United States and its allies if those bonds crumble as a
result of a shrinking Navy with reduced international presence, and a weakening ability to project
power, provide stabilizing presence, and respond to serious crises? The widely-shared current
assumption that the immensity of US–China trade eliminates the possibility of serious SinoAmerican conflict recapitulates the United Kingdom’s decision a century ago that alliance with Japan was prudent
and sufficient to secure the Crown’s interests in the Far East. If this assumption proves wrong the consequences
for US influence in the Pacific would be as disastrous for us as they were for Great Britain. The historically
unprecedented half century of relative naval peace in the Mediterranean may continue indefinitely,
but such a prolongation would be a freak of history. The re-deployment of major United States naval force from
the Mediterranean to support operations in the Middle East and Central Asia, added to the declining US naval fleet would leave us
with terrible choices if, for example, Tur- key’s drift towards Islamism yields a naval force with ambitions similar to those of her
fifteenth century Ghazi Ottoman rulers. What
are the long-term consequences as our ability to maintain a
global naval presence which heretofore has been judged benefi- cent erodes? The size, shape, and strategy of the US Navy
are a critical element of America’s position as the world’s great power. Our ability to protect or rend
asunder the globe’s ocean-going lines of communication is inseparable from our position as the world’s great power. But very few
outside a small community of naval officers and selected military/foreign policy analysts appreciate the strategic results of American
sea- power’s slow but steady diminution. The eventual impact
of this weakening includes, but is not limited to, a
major shift of power away from American influence in Asia; the shattering of such key maritime alliances and
partnerships as those we currently maintain with Australia, India, Japan, and Singapore; the rise of
China as a hegemonic power; a debilitating loss in America’s ability to shape the future global
strategic environment; and a powerful reinforcement of the perception that the United States is in decline. Globally, the
continued attrition of US naval force also means a serious threat to the security of the world’s sea
lines of communication and the choke points – such as the Straits of Hormuz – through which pass an increasing
volume of global com- merce, the departure
of a visible and stabilizing American presence from allied ports as
well as potential worldwide flashpoints, and the international perception that the United States is
abandoning the critical element of military capability that under- girded the world system American policy has sought
for over a century, seapower.
Economic competitiveness is key to hegemony --- that solves great power war
Khalilzad 11 Zalmay Khalilzad was the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the
United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at
the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992. "The Econom and National Security" Feb 8
www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/259024
Today, economic and fiscal trends pose the most severe long-term threat to the United States’
position as global leader. While the United States suffers from fiscal imbalances and low economic growth,
the economies of rival powers are developing rapidly . The continuation of these two trends
could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar global system , leading in turn
to increased geopolitical rivalry and even war among the great powers .¶ The current recession is the
result of a deep financial crisis, not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was
preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost
350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles
burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and
massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38
to over 60 percent of GDP in three years.¶ Without
faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly
held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions . If interest rates were to rise significantly,
annual interest payments — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require
substantial tax increases that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a
“sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations,
precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally.¶
Such scenarios would reshape the international order . It was the economic devastation of Britain
and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their
empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of
Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan,
abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the
United States would be compelled to retrench , reducing its military spending and shedding
international commitments .¶ We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are
experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political,
social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours , and this could
alter the global distribution of power . These trends could in the long term produce a multipolar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new
international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could
intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers
to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to
international crises because of the higher risk of escalation.¶ The stakes are high. In modern
history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership.
By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable , with their competitive dynamics resulting in
frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international
systems produced both world wars.¶ American retrenchment could have devastating
consequence s. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an
attempt to balance against emerging threats . Under this scenario, there would be a heightened
possibility of arms races, miscalculation , or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict .
Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their
geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be
emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.
Aside from the Industrial Base, Rare Earths are critical to the military
Humphries, 10 Marc, September 30th, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply China”,
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=uzkYstWv_HYC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=rare+earth
+mineral+manufacturing&ots=w8pgQRrBjf&sig=JFDykOT6QCEPUhMgKpkveim6rY#v=onepage&q=rare%20earth%20mineral%20manufacturing&f
=false
Current government policies pertaining to the acquisition of certain minerals for defense
purposes are addressed, in part, in several different legislative initiatives, including the Defense Production Act (P.L. 81 774). National Defense Stockpile (Title 50 United States Code (U.S.C.) 98-h-^a)].1 Bay American Act (41 U.S.C. I0-I0d), Berry
Amendment (10 U.S.C. 2533a), and the Specialty Metal provision (10 U.S.C. 2533b). However, these
policies do not
present a unified opinion on whether every mineral is considered "critical," "strategic," or
necessary for national security purposes, and there is a certain lack of cohesion to the application of these policies. As
an example, rare earth elements (and rare earth metals) fall outside of the scope of the Berry Amendment and the Specialty Metal
provision." The primary defense application of rare-earth materials is their use in four types of permanent magnet materials
commercially available: Alnico. Ferrites, Samarium Cobalt, and Neodymium Iron Boron. With the exception of Neodymium Iron
Boron, all of ihc materials are domestically produced. The United States has no production capabilities for Neodymium Iron Boron.
Neo magnets, the product derived from Neodymium Iron Boron, and Samarium Cobalt, are
considered important to many defense products. They are considered one of the world's
strongest permanent magnets and an essential element to many military weapons systems, as
described in the following examples. • Jet fighter engines and other aircraft components, including samariumcobalt magnets used in generators that produce electricity for aircraft electrical systems: • Missile guidance
systems, including precision guidance munitions, lasers, and smart bombs;'' • Electronic
countermeasures systems; • Underwater mine detection systems; • Antimissile defense systems; • Range
finders, including lasers; and • Satellite power and communication systems, including traveling wave tubes (TWT) rare earth
speakers, defense system control panels, radar systems, electronic counter measures, and optical equipment.1" Many
scientific organizations have concluded that certain rare earth metals are critical to U.S. national
security and becoming increasingly more important in defense applications.11 Some industry
analysts are concerned with an increasing dependence on foreign sources for rare earth metals; a
dwindling source of domestic supply for certain rare earth metals; and the emergence of a manufacturing supply chain that
has largely migrated outside of the United States. In July 2010, the China Ministry of Commerce announced that
China would cut its export quota for rare earth minerals by 72%, raising concerns because of estimates that China controls
approximately 97% of the global production of rare earth minerals.11 It is also estimated that by 2012 China's domestic
consumption will outpace China's domestic production of rare earth minerals. Some experts are concerned that DOD is not doing
enough to mitigate the possible risk posed by a scarcity of domestic suppliers. As an example, the United States Magnet Materials
Association (USMM A), a coalition of companies representing aerospace, medical, and electronic materials, has recently expanded
its focus to include rare earth metals and the rare earth magnet supply chain. In February 2010. USMMA
unveiled a sixpoint plan to address what they describe as the "impending rare earth crisis" which they assert
poses a significant threat to the economy and national security of the United States." However, it
appears that DOD's position assumes that there are a sufficient number of supplier countries worldwide to mitigate the potential for
shortages.
2AC Deterrence
A healthy domestic industrial base is key to mobilization and deterrence
McCormick, 8 Beth, Acting Director, Defense Technology Security Administration,
Department Of Defense, Lexis
The third goal of my agency is to assure the health of the defense industrial base. U.S.
national security depends on a
strong U.S. industrial base that can easily mobilize to support military capabilities and deter
potential adversaries . The United States must maintain a technology superiority and highly
competitive defense industrial base to support increased global competition. DTSA will continue to
balance national security interests while being receptive to the needs of the U.S. industrial base.
2AC REEs Key
Securing rare earth independence from China is key to U.S. military capabilities
Coppel 11 (Emily, Feb 1 2011, "Rare earth metals and U.S. national security,"
americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Rare-Earth-Metals-and-US-SecurityFINAL.pdf, ADL)
Rare earth metals are essential for he United States’ military and economic well-being. Yet the
U.S. has been particularly lax when it comes to securing the supply of these metals. The U.S. has gone
from the world’s top producer and supplier of rare earths to being completely dependent on one country – China – for its supply. China’s
dominance in the rare earths market will have profound implications for U.S. national security
in the next couple of years. As it is, some analysts already believe it is too late to avoid a global shortage of rare earth metals, placing
the U.S. in greater risk. The U.S. needs to take steps now to remedy this situation. Background There are 17 rare
earth metals. Contrary to their name, rare earth metals are not rare at all. In fact, all of them are as common in the earth as silver. Some are even more
abundant than lead.1 Their name stems from the fact that, despite their relative abundance, they are difficult to extract from ore and the extraction
process is costly and more environmentally damaging than for other elements. Rare earth metals have a wide variety of applications. They are used in
hybrid car motors, computer hard drives, cell phones, and wind turbines. They
are also essential for military equipment.
Jet engines, smart bombs and guided missiles, lasers, radar, night vision goggles, and satellites
all depend on rare earth metals to function. The vast majority of these metals are produced by China, which owns
approximately 97% of the global market in rare earth metals.2 China also has 35% of the world’s reserves in rare earth metals, and supplies almost all
of the world’s demand. China’s stronghold in the rare earths market is due to strong government support, cheap labor, and relatively loose
environmental laws. These factors make it much more economical to mine and produce rare earth metals in China. The United States has the world’s
second-biggest deposit of rare earth metals. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the U.S. has “approximately 13 million metric tons of rare earth
elements,” mainly located in western states such as California, Alaska, and Wyoming.3 Until the 1980s, the U.S. was the chief supplier of rare earth
metals to the rest of the world, when production and mining facilities began to move to China.4 Today, the U.S. no longer produces any rare earth
metals, having sold off its last domestic producer of rare earth magnets (used in smart bombs) in 2003. The last U.S. rare earth mine, located at
Mountain Pass, California, closed in 2002. Before it closed, Mountain Pass was one of the world’s largest rare earth mines. National Security Risks Many
analysts fear that there will be a shortage of rare earth metals as early as 2012, although most believe the shortage will not occur until 2014. This
makes U.S. dependence on China for rare earths extremely problematic .
U.S. dependence poses both economic and
national security risks. Military: The United States’ reliance on technology, particularly for military
applications, is the biggest cause for concern. Although the Pentagon claims that the U.S. only uses 5% of the world’s supply
of rare earth metals for defense purposes,5 the fact is that the U.S. is completely reliant on China for the production
of some of its most powerful weapons. Peter Leiter, a former trade advisor at the Department of Defense, echoed this concern
when he stated, “The Pentagon has been incredibly negligent…there are plenty of early warning
signs that China will use its leverage over these materials as a weapon.”6 Even commercial uses
of rare earth metals, such as cell phones and laptops, have military applications and are
critical to operating current military platforms. Yet top U.S. defense officials are unaware of just how dependent they are
on rare earths. According to a U.S. National Defense Stockpile report, “[U.S.] defense leaders do not necessarily know exactly which minerals they use
in which systems in what amounts, [and] where the minerals came from…”7 Likewise, the U.S. does not track rare earth metals in its weapons systems
or platforms.8 A
shortage of rare earths will affect the strength and readiness of the U.S. military
until current systems are no longer in operation. However, it will also affect future
production: newer systems rely just as much, if not more, on computers and other electronic
equipment. The U.S. is developing itself into greater dependence on rare earth metals.
REEs vital to hegemony
Green 12 – Jeffery A. Green is the founder of the Strategic Material Advisory Council and an
adjunct scholar with the National Center for Policy Analysis (8/2/12, “The Defense Implications
of Rare Earth Shortages,” http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ib112, ADL)
Rare earth elements are used in everyday products: smart phones, hard disc drives, flat-screen televisions and advanced batteries.
They are essential to such “green” technologies as wind turbines, compact fluorescent lights and hybrid cars. In today’s world, which
emphasizes cutting-edge and environmentally-friendly technologies, rare earths are everywhere. Furthermore, a
range of
highly advanced defense systems depend on rare earth phosphors, metals, alloys and magnets
for their unique functionality. For example: The Ground Laser Target Designator, which allows
infantrymen to guide munitions onto targets and estimate ranges, depends on neodymium-doped yttriumaluminum garnets. Advanced jet aircraft engines rely upon thermal barrier coatings utilizing yttriastabilized zirconia to shield metal components from extreme heat. Samarium-cobalt and neodymium-iron-boron (“neo”)
permanent magnets are used to move the fins of precision-guided munitions and, in combination
with a terbium-iron-nickel alloy (with some dysprosium, also known as Terfenol-D), to mute rotor sound in
helicopter stealth systems.1 Possible shortages of some rare earths, therefore, threaten our
nation's defense systems. The Defense Implications of Rare Earth ShortagesRare Earth Supply Chain. During the Cold War,
U.S. companies encompassed the entire rare earth supply chain, from mining and chemical separation to metal-making and
component manufacture. The Mountain Pass mine in California dominated rare earth production and General Motors invented the
bonded neo magnet. Today, no U.S.-produced rare earth metals are sold commercially and only two firms can produce limited
amounts of rare earth alloys. Two other companies can manufacture rare earth permanent magnets, but only of the samariumcobalt type. Only one U.S. company mines and separates rare earths into oxides; however, this company reportedly intends to ship
to China for processing unspecified amounts of its heavy rare earth concentrates — the feedstock for additives to samarium-cobalt
and neo magnets.2 Today, as a direct consequence of active government support for the rare earth industry since the 1980s [see
Figure I below]: 3 China produces more than 94 percent of the world’s rare earth oxides, virtually 100 percent of all commercially
available rare earth metals and more than 90 percent of the rare earth alloys. China manufactures three-fourths of the world’s
samarium-cobalt magnets and 60 percent of the neo magnets. China
has leveraged this quasi-monopoly to
extract rents from the market by manipulating production and export quotas. For example: In 2002,
the export quota for rare earth oxide-equivalents was 40,000 metric tons for domestic Chinese companies, and there was no quota
for joint ventures with foreign companies. Since 2002, the quota has declined to 22,712 metric tons annually for domestic Chinese
companies and 7,472 metric tons for joint ventures.4 Simultaneously, China shifted from offering a value-added tax rebate to export
rare earths in 2005 to imposing duties of 10 percent and 25 percent for certain products, progressively including more value-added
rare earth products.5 The resulting volatility in prices, unavailability and two-tiered pricing structure (for exports versus domestic
consumption) cast doubt upon the ability of today’s supply chain to fulfill U.S. commercial or military requirements. A
2010
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report highlighted very real national security concerns,
noting that rebuilding the domestic supply chain from mining to magnet manufacture could take up to 15 years and was contingent
upon capital investment and the expiration of certain patents.6 Other reports — before and after the recommissioning of the
Mountain Pass mine — echoed the GAO’s concerns about
the availability of critical materials.7
***Manufacturing Advantage
1AC / 2AC Manufacturing
The US needs to develop its own domestic supply of REEs to sustain the entirety
of the manufacturing industry --- the alternative is collapse
Leybovich 10 (Ilya Leybovich, 10/12/10, “Will the Rare-Elements Shortage Cripple Industry?,”
http://news.thomasnet.com/IMT/2010/10/12/will-the-rare-elements-shortage-crippleindustry/, ADL)
The U.S. supply of rare-earth elements, necessary for the production of many manufactured
goods, is dwindling. How will American firms overcome their reliance on China to compensate for the shortage? The planet
has a limited supply of certain important elements, particularly the 17 “rare earth” elements. Several of these rare elements
are crucial for advanced manufacturing, including the production of electronics, energy
technologies and a range of defense goods. Concerns are on the rise that the United States’
diminishing supply of these critical elements may cripple some industries or increase the
reliance on China, the world’s largest supplier of rare-earth elements. Although rare-earth elements may be
less recognizable than other resources, they play an integral role in modern life. For example,
tantalum is found in cell phone capacitors; neodymium is used for powerful lightweight
magnets found in hard drives, automobiles, communications systems and countless
miniaturization applications; europium is used in both color televisions and computer screens;
and lithium is crucial for electronic batteries and hybrid car engines. “Increasingly important to
technology, they’re also playing a larger role in geopolitical maneuvering. Today, more than 95 percent of all rareearth elements come from China, while the United States produces at most 2 percent,” Popular Mechanics reports.
“That disparity makes some experts twitch. After all, what happens when Chinese industry needs so much of
the rare-earth elements mined in that country that there’s nothing left to export?” According to a
report from the U.S. Geological Survey, the U.S. did not mine any rare-earth elements in 2008 and 2009, but imported quantities
worth $186 million and $84 million, respectively. U.S. reserves of these elements currently stand at 13 million tons. By comparison,
China mined 120,000 tons of rare earth elements in both 2008 and 2009, while its reserves are at 36 million tons. Ninety-one
percent of U.S. rare-earth elements imports came from China between 2005 and 2008. An analysis released in July from the
Congressional Research Service found that global demand for rare-earth elements is roughly 134,000 tons per year, while
production is at 124,000 tons per year. Although stockpiles currently make up for the difference, demand is expected to rise to
180,000 tons annually by 2012 and 200,000 by 2014, “while it is unlikely that new mine output will close the gap in the short term.”
At the current rates of production and consumption, a worldwide shortfall seems inevitable. Apart
from the economic
repercussions, such a shortage could also pose a risk to U.S. defense capabilities, as the military relies on rareearth elements for a broad range of devices, such as missile-guidance systems, lasers and
aircraft electronics. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Government and industry officials have
identified a wide variety of defense systems and components that are dependent on rare-earth materials for functionality and are
provided by lower-tier subcontractors in the supply chain. Defense systems
will likely continue to depend on rareearth materials, based on their life cycles and lack of effective substitutes .” China’s dominance of the
rare-earth elements market may pose serious problems for countries that depend on its exports, as Chinese consumption of rareearth metals increases and availability is curtailed. Last month, a political dispute led China to block all shipments of rare-earth
materials to Japan, forcing Japanese manufacturers to introduce recycling and reclamation to meet basic production needs.
“Concern over China’s hoarding of rare earths has also been spreading to the United States,” the New York Times reports. “Although
China has not specifically blocked shipments to any place but Japan, it had already tightened its overall export quotas of the
minerals, announcing in July that it would reduce them by 72 percent for the rest of the year.” Japan and other countries, such as
South Korea, are instituting government initiatives to secure more stable rare-earth supplies and research possible alternatives.
The U.S. is also evaluating new rare-earth elements policies, with Congress considering a bill known as the
Rare Earths and Critical Materials Revitalization Act of 2010, which would establish a $70 million program to conduct research and
development to increase access to these elements. U.S.
industry groups support the measure.
A collapse of advanced manufacturing kills semiconductors, pharmaceuticals,
clean energy technologies, and nanotechnologies
McConaghy and Swezey 11 - Ryan and Devon, respectively, of the "Third Way Fresh
Thinking" and "Breakthrough" Instiutes of the Schwartz Initiative on American Economic Policy
(October 2011, "Manufacturing Growth: Advanced Manufacturing and the Future of the
American Economy," thebreakthrough.org/blog/BTI_Third_Way_Idea_Brief__Manufacturing_Growth_.pdf, ADL)
However, despite these relative declines, manufacturing remains a sizeable contributor to our economy and directly employs over 11.5 million people.8
Paradoxically, even as manufacturing’s relative share of employment and GDP has decreased in recent decades, manufacturing has actually become
even more important to sustaining American prosperity. Manufacturing
is the most capital-intensive and
productive sector of the economy, and it is key to developing and commercializing new
technologies. Manufacturing also has the largest employment and output multipliers of any sector of the economy, creating many indirect jobs
and making it a key catalyst of broad economic growth. Moreover, a healthy manufacturing sector is central to the United States’ ability to reduce its
large and persistent trade deficit. The changes in the employment, industrial focus, and workforce skills associated with the new manufacturing should
be viewed as the growing pains that accompany any significant metamorphosis. The most recent evolution in manufacturing has resulted in key
differences between advanced and traditional activities. These differences have profound implications for the role of manufacturing in our economy
and the design of national policy toward manufacturing. New manufacturing thrives on and drives innovation. Manufacturing
is a core
component of the nation’s innovation ecosystem. Firms engaged in manufacturing re-invest a significant portion of
revenues in research and development (R&D). Overall, the manufacturing sector comprises two-thirds9 of industry
investment in R&D and employs nearly 64% of the country’s scientists and engineers.10 Manufacturers also have unique opportunities to
apply new technologies for specialized functions and achieve economies of scale at the plant or firm,11 making the return on manufacturing R&D
significant. The transition to advanced
manufacturing will enhance the sector’s role in fostering
innovation and developing and commercializing new technologies. Advanced manufacturing
industries, including semiconductors, computers, pharmaceuticals, clean energy technologies,
and nanotechnology, play an outsized role in generating the new technologies, products, and
processes that drive economic growth. Advanced manufacturing is also characterized by the
rapid transfer of science and technology into manufacturing processes and products, which in and of
itself drives innovation. The research-to-manufacturing process is cyclical, with multiple feedbacks between basic R&D, pre-competitive research,
prototyping, product development, and manufacturing. This opens new possibilities for product development and manufacturing.12 Because of the
technological complexity of many modern, science-based industries, technology development often requires interactions among experts from many
different disciplines. It
is therefore supported by “geographic clustering” of related manufacturing,
supply chain, research, and educational facilities. 13 According to a 2004 report by President Bush’s Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology (PCAST), “design, product development, and process evolution all benefit from proximity to manufacturing, so that new ideas
can be tested and discussed with those working ‘on the ground.’”14 As a result, when a high-tech manufacturing cluster forms, it often attracts the colocation of R&D activities and helps sustain the global competitiveness of the entire region. This is why Intel recently decided to build a new stateofthe- art R&D facility near Portland, Oregon where it has long had a high-tech manufacturing presence, as well as related silicon manufacturers,
suppliers, and a high-skilled workforce.15
Pharmaceutical manufacturing is key to solve pandemics and bioterror attacks
Comstock 8 - Pharmaceutical Online Editor (Kristen, 4/10/08, "Pharmaceutical And
Biotechnology Industries Intersect At INTERPHEX 2008,"
www.pharmaceuticalonline.com/doc/pharmaceutical-and-biotechnology-industries-i-0001,
ADL)
The panel discussion From Pandemics to Bioterrorism: The Role of Bio Manufacturing in Global Healthcare addressed the vital
importance of concentrating on pandemics and bioterrorism in pharmaceutical
manufacturing. The panel included Parrish Galliher (founder, president, and CTO, Xcellerex,
Inc.), Melissa Hersh (VP of global risk intelligence strategies and resiliency solutions, MARSH),
Patrick Lucy (global business development leader, Dowpharma), and Dr. Diana M. Lanchoney
(executive director of world strategic integration, Merck Vaccine Division & Infectious
Disease). Melissa Hersh, Patrick Lucy, Parrish Galliher, and Dr. Diana Lanchoney answer questions from Moderator Anne Montgomery during the
INTERPHEX's panel discussion. The panelists agreed that it is the responsibility of government, local municipalities,
countries, health organizations, corporate partnerships, and the biomanufacturing industry to develop solutions to
quell pandemics or bioterrorism attacks. As Dr. Diana M. Lanchoney explained, "The
[biomanufacturing] industry has an incredible role in preventing pandemics, and we need a
broad range of public and private organizations to help develop solutions."
Impending disease and bioterror require nanotech
Treder 05 (Mike, March 2, 2005, "Early Development," crnano.typepad.com/crnblog/what_we_believe/page/31/, ADL)
"We at WHO [World Health Organization] believe that the
world is now in the gravest possible danger of a
pandemic," states Dr. Shigeru Omi, the WHO’s Western Pacific regional director. He says the
world is "now overdue" for an influenza pandemic, since mass epidemics have occurred every 20 to 30 years. It
has been nearly 40 years since the last one. For many reasons, including thronging urban populations and
high rates of overseas travel, health and government officials fear that an imminent flu
pandemic could kill many millions. New diseases such as the avian flu continue to be a threat to
the human race. Naturally occurring diseases could be more devastating than any pandemic in
decades, and an engineered disease could conceivably wipe out most of the human race. It is
becoming increasingly important to have a technology base that can detect new diseases even
before symptoms appear, and create a cure in a matter of days. Molecular manufacturing will
enable such a rapid response. With complete genomes and proteomes for humans and for all
known pathogens, plus cheap, highly parallel DNA and protein analysis and sufficient computer
resources along with new MM-based monitoring and diagnostic tools, it will be possible to spot any new pathogen
almost immediately and begin aggressive countermeasures. This isn't a guarantee that diseases and
epidemics won't occur, but clearly it could save millions of lives and untold human suffering.
2AC Uniqueness
China’s stranglehold on rare earth elements will kill the US manufacturing
supply chain
Goldenberg 10 (Suzanne, 12/26/10, “Rare earth metals mine is key to US control over hi-tech
future,” http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/dec/26/rare-earth-metals-us, ADL)
It's a deep pit in the Mojave desert. But it could hold the key to America challenging China's technological domination of the 21st century. At the
bottom of the vast site, beneath 6 metres (20ft) of bright emerald-green water, runs a rich seam of ores that are hardly household names but are
rapidly emerging as the building blocks of the hi-tech future. The mine is the largest known deposit of rare earth elements outside China. Eight years
ago, it was shut down in a tacit admission that the US was ceding the market to China. Now, the owners have secured final approval to restart
operations, and hope to begin production soon. "We will probably never be the largest [mine] in the world again. It will be hard to overcome China's
status in that regard, but we do think we will be a very significant supplier," Mark Smith, chief executive of Molycorp Minerals which owns the mine,
told reporters during a tour of the site. So far as the Obama administration is concerned, the mine can't open soon enough. A US department of energy
report warned on 15 December that, in the absence of mines such as this one, America
risks losing control over the
production of a host of technologies, from smart phones to smart bombs, electric car batteries
to wind turbines, because of a virtual Chinese monopoly on the rare earth metals essential to
their production. China controls 97% of global rare earth metals production. Such total domination of a
strategic resource became impossible to ignore in October when China cut exports of rare earth elements by more
than 70% over the previous year, disrupting manufacturing in Japan, Europe and the US. Prices
of even the cheapest of the 17 rare earth elements rose 40%. Now America, like Japan and Europe, is desperate to
find alternatives. "Reopening domestic production is an important part of a globalised supply chain ,"
David Sandalow, the energy department's assistant secretary for international affairs told a seminar in Washington. For Smith, the official recognition
of the strategic importance of the metals was a long time coming. "I've been going out to Washington DC every other week for about two years trying
to tell the rare earths story," he said. They are listening in Washington now. At the 15 December seminar at the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, one PowerPoint presentation lingered on a slide that showed only the Chinese flag. The room filled with nervous laughter. By 2015, global
demand for rare earths is expected to reach 205,000 tonnes. "If
we don't get alternative supplies up and running we
are going to have this supply gap that is going to cause a lot of issues, " Smith said. Those issues forced their
way onto the government's agenda this autumn when China began squeezing raw material exports of rare earth
minerals. Some US media reports have speculated China is trying to use its control over the supply lines for political leverage. But a number of
analysts say China is trying to get better control over an expensive, dirty and dangerous mining process, and to get more factories to set up shop inside
the country. Rare earths are extracted through opencast mining and generate radioactive waste. "I don't believe that China is trying to chop the west
off at the knees but it has a growing internal market that is driving the demand," said Gareth Hatch, an analyst at Technology Metal Research. "That
reduces the amount they are willing to export." That is where Molycorp – the frontrunner for now in a global race to develop alternative production of
rare earth materials – hopes to step in. Since going public last July, the company has raised more than $500m (£323m) to expand its production
facilities at Mountain Pass, a collection of rusting buildings that date from the 1950s. This month, Sumitomo Corp of Japan invested $130m in return for
guaranteed supplies of rare earths for the next seven years. The company has also applied for department of energy loans. By mid-2012, Molycorp aims
to produce 20,000 tonnes a year of nine of the 17 rare earths or about 25% of current western imports from China. Smith suggested the company could
possibly ramp up production to 40,000 tonnes within the next 18 months. He says Molycorp has exposed just 55 acres of the 2,200 acre site. But even
production on that scale may not be enough to guarantee the supply of metals needed to move to a clean energy economy: lanthanum
for
batteries for hybrid cars, neodymium for the permanent magnets for wind turbines, especially
offshore, europium for energy efficient lighting. "You would need seven mines the size of Molycorp's just to meet the
demand for wind turbines and that would mean no neodymium for motors or any other applications," said Jim Hedrick, who until last year was the rare
earth expert at the US Geological Survey. "Obviously there is a demand for 10 or 20 mines through the world to meet all the different demands for
these products." Some companies, such as General Electric, are already moving to reduce their use of rare earths. "What we are going to absolutely
have to do is diversify our sources and optimise the use of these materials in manufacturing," said Steve Duclos, who heads GE's global research
division. In Japan, meanwhile, Hitachi has started a recycling effort to recover rare earths from hard drives and other materials. Aside from raw
materials, it is also unclear whether the US still has the expertise for the complicated process of turning minerals into usable clean tech components.
Such challenges were unthinkable half-a-century ago when prospectors looking for uranium stumbled instead on a rich deposit of rare earths about an
hour's drive from Las Vegas. By the 1960s, the mine was booming, largely through sales of europium, used to produce the bright red tones of colour
televisions. But prices fell as China came on the market, with its low production costs. A pipeline accident in the late 1990s, which leaked radioactive
fluid into the desert and a nearby town, led to an expensive clean-up. The mine closed in 2002. The central pit in the 55-acre site became a pool of
bright green water. White bales of minerals – some mined eight years ago – were stockpiled until such time as prices would rise. This time around,
however, Molycorp claims it has a fighting chance against China, especially if it is able to meet its goal of complete mines-to-magnet processing at the
Mountain Pass facility. The company is also confident it can head off competition from a slew of new mines due to begin coming online from Australia,
Wyoming, Quebec and South Africa. "The growth in demand for these minerals is just phenomenal," Smith said. "A 6% average growth rate for us
would be very, very good but when you start adding things like hybrid vehicles and wind turbines to the rare earth sectors now you are talking about
double digit growth, and you still don't know where that will end." At this point, though, Molycorp is not even at the beginning. "The road to the green
world of the future starts from the black earth. But first you have to get the materials out of the ground," said Hatch. "The whole clean-tech energy
industry is hinging on it." The
"rare earth elements" are a group of 17 naturally occurring metallic
elements used in small amounts in everything from high-powered magnets to batteries and
electronic circuits. The materials (including scandium, yttrium and a group of elements called the lanthanides) have
chemical and physical properties that make them useful in improving the performance of
computer hard drives and catalytic converters, mobile phones, hi-tech televisions, sunglasses
and lasers.
2AC Spillover IL
Manufacturing sectors are interconnected
Pisano and Shih, 12 [September, Producing Prosperity: Why America Needs a
Manufacturing Renaissance [Kindle Edition], Harry E. Figgie Professor of Business Administration
at the Harvard Business School. He has been on the Harvard faculty for 23 years, Professor of
Management Practice. He joined the Technology and Operations Management Unit in January
2007, p. amazon kindle]
The rough and tumble of international competition means we should expect industries to
come and go. Even if this is sometimes painful, it is, in fact, a healthy process by which
resources flow to their most productive uses. When a commons erodes, however, it
represents a deeper and more systematic problem. It means the foundation upon which
future innovative sectors can be built is crumbling. When the semiconductor production business moved to Asia
in the 1980s, it brought with it a whole host of capabilities—electronic-materials processing, deposition and coating, and
sophisticated test and assembly capabilities—that formed an industrial commons needed to produce a whole host of advanced,
high-valued-added electronic products such as flat-panel displays, solid-state lighting, and solar PV. In this book, we will examine the
dynamics that underlie both the rise and decline of commons, and the consequence of those declines. Our argument is built around
three core themes. Theme 1:
to Innovate
When a Country Loses the Capability to Manufacture, It Loses the Ability
Innovation and manufacturing are often viewed as residing at the opposite ends of the economic spectrum—
innovation being all about the brain (knowledge work) and manufacturing all about brawn (physical work). Innovation requires
highly skilled, highly paid workers, and manufacturing requires low-skilled, low-paid workers; innovation is a high-valued-added
specialty, and manufacturing is a low-value-added commodity; innovation is creative and clean, and manufacturing is dull and dirty.
Such a view of manufacturing is a myth and is based on a profound misunderstanding of how the process of innovation works and
the link between R&D and manufacturing. R&D is a critical part of the innovation process, but it is not the whole thing. Innovation is
about moving the idea from concept to the customer’s hands. For some highly complex products (flat-panel displays, PV cells, and
biotechnology drugs, to name a few) the transfer from R&D into production is a messy affair, requiring extremely tight coordination
and the transfer of learning between those who design and those who manufacture. If you do not understand the production
environment, you have a harder time designing the product. In these settings, there
are strong reasons to co-locate
R&D and production. It is a lot easier for an engineer to walk across the street to the plant or drive
down the road than to fly halfway around the world to troubleshoot a problem. This helps to explain why
the American company Applied Materials, a leading maker of equipment for manufacturing semiconductors and solar panels, moved
its chief technical officer from the United States to China.14 Because most of its large customers are now in China, Taiwan, and
South Korea, it
makes sense for the company to do its research close to the factories that use its
equipment. Applied Materials is now moving much of its manufacturing operations to Asia as well. In chapter 4, we will offer a
framework for determining when it matters whether R&D and manufacturing are located near each and when it does not. Theme 2:
The Industrial Commons Is a Platform for Growth
The industrial commons perspective suggests that a
decline of competitiveness of firms in one sector can have implications for the competitiveness
of firms in another. Industries and the suppliers of capabilities to the industries need each
other. Kill a critical industry, and the suppliers probably will not survive for long; other industries in
the region that depend on those suppliers will then be jeopardized. When the auto industry declines, it causes
an atrophy of capabilities (such as casting and precision machining) that are also used in industries such as heavy equipment,
scientific instruments, and advanced materials. The unraveling of a commons is a vicious circle. As
capabilities erode, it is
harder for companies that require access to stay in business . They are forced to move their operations or
their supplier base to the new commons. As they move, it is harder for existing suppliers to sustain themselves. Ultimately, they
must either close shop or move their operations. Even worse, the
loss of a commons may cut off future
opportunities for the¶ emergence of new innovative sectors if they require close access to the
same capabilities. Four decades ago, when US consumer electronics companies decided to move production of these
“mature” products to Asia, who would have guessed that this decision would influence where the most important component for
tomorrow’s electric vehicles—the batteries—would be produced? But that is what happened.15 The offshoring of consumer
electronics production (often contracted to then-little-known Japanese companies such as Sony and Matsushita) led to the
migration of R&D in consumer electronics to Japan (and later to South Korea and Taiwan). As consumers demanded ever-smaller,
lighter, and more powerful (and power hungry!) mobile computers and cell phones, electronics companies were pushed to innovate
in batteries. In the process, Asia became the hub for innovation in the design and manufacturing of compact, high-capacity,
rechargeable, lithium ion batteries, a technology that was invented in America. This explains why Asian suppliers have become the
dominant source of the lithium ion battery cells used in electric vehicles.
A collapse of one sector affects all other sectors and the economy
Green 10 (Harlan Russell, June 27 2010, “Economic Interdependence Is Good,”
http://populareconomicsweekly.blogspot.com/2010/06/economic-interdependence-isgood.html, ADL)
How interdependent we have become! The lessons of this recession and the ongoing recovery, is that going it alone
won’t work—whether when drilling oil wells, or evading financial regulations. We even have to thank our dependence on foreign
what is leading this recovery—the manufacturing
sector. Economic interdependence is becoming the norm in this decade—private industry (via
innovation) and governments (via regulation) are becoming more interdependent. One can no longer
exist without the other. And what affects one sector now affects the overall economy. The
trade with Asia, and our government-aided auto industry, for
bursting housing bubble almost caused the worldwide collapse of the financial system because financial markets are now
interconnected. The BP Gulf oil disaster is an example of nature’s interconnectedness. A toxic spill has become toxic to all states in
the Gulf region. Overall
industrial production in May surged 1.2 percent, following a 0.7 percent boost the month
before. The latest number was stronger than the consensus forecast for 1.0 percent. Manufacturing has been robust
over the last three months with this component gaining 0.9 percent in the two latest months and jumping 1.2 percent in March.
Economic systems and industries are dependent on each other – one collapse
creates a domino effect
Haimes Santos et al (Yacov Haimes, Joost Santos, Kenneth Crowther, Matthew Henry,
Chenyang Lian, Zhenyu Yan, No Date, "Risk analysis in interdependent infrastructures,"
www.docin.com/p-367199136.html, ADL)
Human activities are defined and influenced by interdependent engineered and
socioeconomic systems. In particular, the global economy is increasingly dependent on an
interconnected web of infrastructures that permit hitherto unfathomable rates of information
exchange, commodity flow and personal mobility. The interconnectedness and
interdependencies exhibited by these infrastructures enable them to provide the quality of life
to which we have become accustomed and, at the same time, expose seemingly robust and
secure systems to risk to which they would otherwise not be subjected. This paper examines
several analytical methodologies for risk assessment and management of interdependent
macroeconomic and infrastructure systems. They include models for estimating the economic
impact of disruptive events, describing complex systems from multiple perspectives, combining
sparse data to enhance estimation, and assessing the risk of cyber attack on process control
systems. 1. Introduction Critical infrastructure and industry sectors in the United States and
abroad are becoming more interdependent due largely to the increasing integration and
application of information technology in business operations such as manufacturing
marketing and throughout the supply chain. New sources of risk to critical infrastructures and
national security emerge from the dynamics of large-scale, complex systems that are highly
interconnected and interdependent.
2AC Food Prices
Nanotech is key to solving future food shortages
Sarchet et al - Penny Sarchet, Alok Jha (science and environment correspondent), Kathy
Groves (food microscopist of Leatherhead Food Research), Terry Jones (Director of
communications of Food and Drink Federation), (Ian Illuminato of the Friends of the Earth)
("Nanotech's role in feeding the planet," www.theguardian.com/what-is-nano/nanotechfeeding-the-planet-nanotech-s-role-in-feeding-the-planet, ADL)
The challenge is clear: globally, we will need to feed two billion extra people by 2050 . As
politicians, industry and scientists turn their attention to the problem of world food security, many believe we will need
to use every available tool to tackle this impending crisis. One such tool could be nanotechnology, the applications
of which could potentially help us to produce more food, using less water and fertiliser, and
with less of an impact on the environment. A recent Guardian seminar, sponsored by the European
Commission, met to debate how we will continue to feed the world, and the panelists – Terry Jones, Kathy
Groves and Ian Illuminato, chaired by Alok Jha – considered how important nanotechnology is
likely to be in this task. Their opinions were listened to by members of an invited public audience, who were also able to
put questions to the panel. "The scale of the challenge is reasonably well known," suggested Jones, director of communications at
trade association the Food and Drink Federation. "The more pressing number, I think, is the eight billion people on the planet by
2025. If we're going to feed them, then we need to produce more food, from fewer resources, with a smaller impact on the
environment – and that's going to require us to think differently." Futuristic goals Nanotechnology is the engineering of the very
small, at the scale of millionths of a millimetre. It can describe both the futuristic goals of building tiny molecular machines and the
more contemporary practice of adding nanoparticle substances to consumer products to make them lighter, stronger or more
hygienic. The current use of nanotechnology in the food industry is still in its early stages and generally builds upon longstanding
processes and practices in food production. Jones, however, says it is clear that nanotechnology might provide solutions to a range
of industry problems. "You
could see nanotechnology used in the cultivation, production, processing
or packaging of food," he said. "It could be used to develop new food products or, indeed, improve existing ones." As well
as reducing water use and contamination in food processing, Jones believes nanotechnology could
help make food healthier. "In the UK, we talk a lot about what we need to take out of food, but nanotech could help us to
add or enable the release of positive foods as well," said Jones, who noted that 30% of food waste occurs in the home and suggested
that nanotech-enhanced packaging might tackle this. He also posited that nanotech
could be used to enhance our
enjoyment of food by providing us with new textures, tastes and colours.
2AC Economy
Manufacturing is vital to the economy – erosion of manufacturing kills the
economy
McConaghy and Swezey 11 - Ryan and Devon, respectively, of the "Third Way Fresh
Thinking" and "Breakthrough" Instiutes of the Schwartz Initiative on American Economic Policy
(October 2011, "Manufacturing Growth: Advanced Manufacturing and the Future of the
American Economy," thebreakthrough.org/blog/BTI_Third_Way_Idea_Brief__Manufacturing_Growth_.pdf, ADL)
MANUFACTURING AND THE FUTURE U.S. ECONOMY Manufacturing Growth and Jobs Advanced manufacturing is vital to
widespread job creation and economic growth. Manufacturing already has a major impact on
American employment and prosperity. Manufacturing jobs are “good” jobs that pay higher-than-average wages. In March 2009,
manufacturing companies paid $32 per hour in wages and benefits, while all employers paid an average of $29.39 per hour—a 9% wage premium.25
Beyond direct job creation, manufacturing generates high levels of output and employment
throughout the economy. The sector has the largest “employment multiplier,” according to economist
Josh Bivens, who finds that each job created in manufacturing leads to the creation of 2.91 additional jobs, compared to 1.54 jobs in business services
and 0.88 jobs in retail trade.26 The
manufacturing “output multiplier” is also higher than any other sector
of the economy. Every dollar in final sales of manufacturing products supports $1.40 in output from other economic sectors. Most industries,
including professional and business services have multipliers of less than $0.70, and no other industry has a multiplier above $1.10.27 As the
demand for manufacturing grows, it therefore spurs investment, job creation, and innovation
throughout the economy.28 Conversely, the erosion of U.S. manufacturing output and
employment has an outsized and often devastating impact on regional economies . The
economic multiplier effects from manufacturing are even greater in high-tech, “advanced”
manufacturing sectors. The Milken Institute finds that every job created in electronic computer
manufacturing generates 15 other jobs throughout the economy.29 Intel’s new $4 billion R&D and
manufacturing facility near Portland, Oregon, for example, will create 6,000 to 8,000 construction jobs and nearly 1,000 permanent high-tech jobs in
the area. The government will benefit from property and sales taxes, and additional jobs will be created in downstream industries like home
construction and services.30 In
addition to creating jobs, manufacturing is a driver of widespread
economic growth. As Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke notes, increasing productivity is “perhaps the
single most important determinant of living standards” and prosperity. 31 And as one of the most intensive
users of capital equipment and technology in the economy, the manufacturing sector is one of the nation’s most
productive sectors; from 1987-2008, labor productivity in the U.S. manufacturing sector grew by 103%, nearly double the rate of 56% for the
private sector as a whole.32
2AC Hegemony
Semiconductors are key to hegemony
NDU 03 - The National Defense University ("Electronics Industry Study Report:Semiconductors
and Defense Electronics," www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA524792, ADL)
Overview. Semiconductors are found in many defense related electronics components such as
computers, sensors, switches and amplifiers. Semiconductors are critical to the way the U.S.
military fights and to the functioning of the global economy. Electronics content in military
ordnance, fighter planes, bombers, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and a range of other
weapons systems is all increasing, according to analysts. 23 In an interesting paradox, electronics are
becoming more important to the Defense Department, while the Defense Department is becoming
increasingly unimportant to thesemiconductor industry. Estimates put electronics as 60% of the cost of new weaponssystems, yet
defense represents only .3% of the semiconductor market
2AC Renewables
Semiconductors key to viable renewables
Backlund and Rahimo 10 - Bjorn Backlund and Munaf Rahimo of ABB Switzerland Ltd
(Power Mag, Issue 4 2010, "Power Semiconductor Technologies for Renewable Energy Sources,"
www.power-mag.com/pdf/feature_pdf/1283337722_ABB_Feature_Layout_1.pdf, ADL)
High power semiconductors are key components for controlling the generation and
connection to the network of renewable energy sources such as wind-turbines and
photovoltaic cells. For a highest efficiency of the energy source, it is therefore essential to select the right device for the
given conditions. This article looks at the performance features for the available high power semiconductors of choice and also takes
a look at future device technologies and their expected impact on efficiency. Björn Backlund and Munaf Rahimo, ABB Switzerland
Ltd, Semiconductors, Lenzburg, Switzerland Renewable
energy sources as windturbines and photovoltaic
cells have reached power levels of several MWs which have resulted in the need for high
power semiconductor devices for optimized generation and network connection. The state-of-the-art devices of choice
for these power levels are the IGBTs and IGCTs. Due to the power quality requirements, the earlier used solutions with thyristors in
the wind turbines are rarely seen today. During the last 15 years, high power semiconductors
have gone through a
remarkable development. Several new generations of IGBT-dies have lead to a reduction in VCEsat of almost 40 % since
the early 1990s, and still a potential for further improvement is available. The Bipolar devices have also seen large
improvements where the introduction of the IGCT have had a large impact on the MV-Drive design and higher ratings for them have
recently been introduced or are in development. The thyristors have also not been standing still but have moved from 6500 V, 2600
A to 8500 V, 4000 A devices based on 150mm silicon now in production. The
power semiconductors are used for
two main tasks in the chain of renewable energy sources such as conversion of the power in
the plant, as in wind-turbines, and transmission of the power to the grid. The best solution to
determine what semiconductors to use for these tasks is to move top-down by following the path system requirements defining
equipment requirements which in turn are defining the power semiconductor requirements. Through this chain the requirements on
the devices are determined regarding items as required voltage and current ratings, needed degree of controllability, and operating
frequency.
***Solvency
1AC Plan Text – Loan Gurantees
Text: The United States federal government should offer loan guarantees for
the mining of rare earth elements in the Outer Continental Shelf
The Federal Government is key – financing, loan-guarantees, knowledge
infrastructure, interagency collaboration, and competitive grants for public and
private entities
Smith 10 – Mark A. Smith is the Chief Executive Officer of Molycorp Minerals, LLC. This is from
a written testimony in front of the House Science and Technology Committee, Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight (March 16 2010, “Rare earth minerals and 21st century industry,”
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2010_hr/Smith_Testimony.pdf, ADL)
These process improvements fundamentally reverse the conventional wisdom that superior environmental stewardship increases production costs. At
the same time, we significantly distinguish ourselves from the Chinese rare earth industry that has been plagued by a history of significant
environmental degradation, one that it is just beginning to
recognize and rectify need for Federal Leadership Over the
have spent a significant amount of time in Washington meeting with Members of
Congress and their staffs as well as officials in a variety of federal agencies to direct greater attention to this
issue. I’m pleased to report, just over one year since we began our efforts, that the federal government is beginning to
take meaningful steps toward understanding and addressing our rare earth vulnerabilities . The
past year, I
question remains, however, if it will be able to make its assessments, determine the required actions, and execute them within a timeline that seems to
be accelerating daily. In each of these meetings, and as this Committee has also inquired, I am asked what role the
federal government
should play in tackling this pressing concern, and I believe that there are 4 areas where it can have the greatest near- and longterm impact: 1) federally based financing and/or loan guarantee support for highly capital
intensive projects like ours; 2) assistance rebuilding America’s rare earth knowledge
infrastructure (university-based rare earth research, development of academic curricula and fields of study, training and exposure to the
chemical and physical science related to rare earths, etc .); 3) increased interagency collaboration at the highest
levels on the impact of rare earth accessibility on major national objectives; and 4) funding
competitive grants for public and private sector rare earth research
Financing support: Given the size, scale, ambition, and necessity of Molycorp’s redevelopment efforts, we submitted an application for the Department
of Energy’s Loan Guarantee Program (LGP). We believed that the program was well-suited for our project, particularly given that the project’s
substantial implications closely match the program’s paramount objectives. Traditional bank financing in the current climate – with very short
repayment periods and interest rates near double digits – is not economically feasible. The LGP offers longer term financing and lower interest rates
and would allow Molycorp to accelerate development in the near-term while ensuring rare earth resource availability in the long term. However, the
DOE summarily rejected our application in December, saying that the project did not qualify as a “New or Significantly Improved Technology.” We
reviewed the relevant portion of the Rule, Section 609.2, and our project meets every one of the stated criteria. We requested further discussion with
the DOE to understand how it came to its conclusion and how Molycorp might proceed. After almost two months, the DOE finally responded to our
request. During the meeting, the DOE contended that this project goes “too far upstream” and that the program was not intended to cover mining
projects. We have yet to find the legislative or regulatory language that provides such a limitation. However, it appears we may need to ask Congress
for legislative direction or possibly new legislative language specifically authorizing the use of loan guarantees for strategically important projects like
this. Our frustrations with the loan guarantee notwithstanding, I still believe that this kind of financing support is exactly what a project like ours needs.
We will be in a very strong position to both raise our portion of the capital to execute the project and repay the loan well-within the required timeline.
nfrastructure: The United
States used to be the world’s preeminent source of rare earth information and expertise, but it has ceded that advantage over the past decade, as its
position in the industry has become subordinate to China and other countries in East Asia. The
federal government, and the
House Science and Technology Committee in particular, can play a pivotal role in
reestablishing that institutional knowledge and expertise and sharing it with a wider audience of researchers,
scholars, and practitioners here in the U.S. and abroad. At Molycorp, we are fortunate to have a team of 17 rare earth researchers and technologists
who are second to none in the world, but almost all of them had no previous expertise in rare earths prior to joining Molycorp. It will be difficult for the
U.S. to reestablish
its preeminence without a concerted effort to attract the brightest scientists and researchers to the field of
rare earths. Rebuilding the knowledge infrastructure and the research support will go a long way toward that goal. Dr. Gerschneidner, who I’m
honored to testify with today, is regarded as the father of rare earths, and his work at Ames Laboratory and Iowa State University as well as the great
work being done by Dr. Eggert and his colleagues at the Colorado School of Mines can serve as the foundation on which to expand America’s rare earth
expertise. As a reminder of the rest of the world’s interests and actions in this regard, the Korea Times recently reported that Korea is developing rare
earth metals for industrial use at a governmente been very
pleased to learn about efforts within many federal agencies to direct specific attention to rare earth issues. We have been in direct contact with the
Departments of Defense, Commerce, and State, and each is examining this issue within the unique context of their agencies’ work. It is also worth
noting that the Commerce Department convened a group of stakeholders from both the government and the private sector in December, 2009, which
included representatives from DoD, GAO, USTR, and OSTP. We have also had multiple discussions with the Office of Science and Technology Policy
directly and have been very appreciative of their engagement on this issue. In fact, OSTP, along with Commerce, is facilitating interagency collaboration
going forward. While we are encouraged by these recent efforts, it is our hope that the agencies and the White House recognize that the global supplydemand challenges are approaching at an increasingly rapid pace and that their efforts should reflect the requisite urgency. Funding support for rare
earth research: Part of China’s success in growing and dominating the market for rare earths can be attributed to their efforts to find and
commercialize new applications for rare earth materials. Federal
funding support for competitive grants specifically
directed at rare earth research will help to expand the U.S.’s ability to do the same. This has the
potential to broaden the economic impact of rare earths, and contribute to the goal mentioned above of
reestablishing America’s superior expertise in rare earth research.
1AC Plan Text – Licensing
Text: The United States federal government should issue licenses for rare earth
element mining on the Outer Continent Shelf
Minerals management service is who issues the leases
RSOC, 95 The Resource Agency of California, July, “California's Ocean Resources: An Agenda
for the Future,” Chapter 3 http://resources.ca.gov/ocean/html/chapt_3.html
Minerals Management Service : leases the federal outer continental shelf, as well as conducts
permit processes , and ongoing monitoring for specific proposals to explore
for, or produce oil and gas resources
environmental review,
2AC Licensing
The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, part of the Department of Interior,
is responsible for offshore leasing
Virginia Places, 9 “Virginia and the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS),”
http://www.virginiaplaces.org/boundaries/ocs.html
Federal agencies issue permits for species harvest and mineral extraction, beyond state
waters, to the limit of US claims. For example, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, a part of
the Department of the Interior, is responsible for offshore leasing outside of state waters.
2AC Naitilus
Naitilus plan uses two cutters, collector, and a pump system
Goodier, 11 Rob, Journalist, “Why Deep-Sea Rare-Earth Metals Will Stay Right Where They
Are—For Now,” http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/why-deep-sea-rareearth-metals-will-stay-right-where-they-are-for-now, Vitz
Nautilus plans to unleash three remote-controlled devices on the sea floor: two cutters and a
collector, adapted from technologies used in the oil and cable-trenching industries. An as-yetundesigned pump system will lift the ore from the seafloor to the ship. "They've already spent about
$400 million, the boat will be a couple hundred million," Wiltshire says. " A complete operation for Nautilus will
easily be a billion."
2AC AT: No REEs in OCS
Rare earth metals exist in the US outer continental shelf
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE N.O.A.A. 75 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration is a federal agency focused on the condition of the oceans and the atmosphere. It plays
several distinct roles within the Department of Commerce: A Supplier of Environmental Information
Products, A Provider of Environmental Stewardship Services and a Leader in Applied Scientific Research.
(1975, "MINING IN THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF AND IN THE DEEP OCEAN,"
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CZIC-tn291-5-a87-1975/html/CZIC-tn291-5-a87-1975.htm, ADL)
The Bering Sea --- outer continental shelf has the most
promising potential for mining hard minerals of all United
States outer continental shelf waters. Placer deposits of this potential include gold, platinum, cassiterite (tiLn),
scheelite (tungsten), rare earths, ilmenite (titanium), and others. Lode deposits are likely to include barite and copper, lead and
zinc (as sulf ides), and molybdenum, while deposits of chemical precipitates of uranium-bearing minerals are probable in some
anoxic sites. Government,
industry, and academic groups have been conducting hard mineral
surveys in this area for more than ten years.
Rare earths are harvested from outer continental shelf deposits
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE N.O.A.A. 75 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration is a federal agency focused on the condition of the oceans and the atmosphere. It plays
several distinct roles within the Department of Commerce: A Supplier of Environmental Information
Products, A Provider of Environmental Stewardship Services and a Leader in Applied Scientific Research.
(1975, "MINING IN THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF AND IN THE DEEP OCEAN,"
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CZIC-tn291-5-a87-1975/html/CZIC-tn291-5-a87-1975.htm, ADL)
On the continental shelf, the Panel believes that initial mining operations in the production of sand and gravel will
continue to be conducted with rather conventional equipment (Table 1). On a smaller scale, and with similar
conventional equipment, other resources, such as rare earth sands, barite, coal, tin, and phosphate rock have
already been produced from shelf deposits in various parts of the world. Such activities are expected to increase as
technological capability and economic rewards increase. Unlike the area underlying the deep ocean, the
question of ownership of much of the continental margins of the world is well-defined under
existing international law.
2AC AT: R&D
R and D solves the aff and avoids backlash
Humphries 10 (Marc Humphries is a , September 30th, 2010, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain”, Congressional
Report Service)
The bill would establish
an R&D program within the DOE to assure long-term supply of rare earth
materials. The R&D program would, among other things, seek to identify and test potential
substitutes, improve extraction, processing, recovery, and recycling technology of rare earth
materials. The Secretary of Energy would establish an R&D Information Center and collaborate with members of the European
Commission to coordinate activities of mutual interest. The proposed R&D Information Center would be a
repository for scientific and technical data, assist scientists and engineers in using the Center,
provide advice to the Secretary on the R&D program and promote information sharing among
the interested parties. The Secretary of Energy would present a plan to Congress that describes R&D activities and their
anticipated contribution to providing rare earth materials to the U.S. economy, explain the
requirements of the DOE loan guarantee program and the status of the programs receiving loan guarantee support. After four years
the program would be assessed by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). The program would be authorized for $70 million over a
five-year period (2011-2015). H.R. 6160 would
establish a Rare Earth Materials Loan Guarantee program
for commercial application of new and improved technologies for the separation, and
recovery of rare earths, the preparation of rare earths (i.e., oxides, metal, and alloys) and the
application of rare earths in the production of magnets, batteries, optical systems, and
electronics, among other things. The Secretary would be required to cooperate with the private sector to assure
complete rare earth materials production capacity five years after H.R. 6160 would be enacted into law. The
authority to enter into loan guarantees would expire in 2018. The bill would also amend sections 3, 4, and 5 of the National
Materials and Minerals Policy Research and Development Act of 1980.
2AC AT: BOEM
The US has these resources and can initiate drilling.
BOEM 12 (BOEM Ocean Science, Winter 2012, No author, “The Marine Minerals Program: Meeting the Needs of
Our Nation’s Coastline”,
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedfiles/boem/newsroom/publications_library/ocean_science/os_12_oct_nov_dec.pdf)
Offshore extraction of marine minerals that are critical to the U.S. economy and national
security may become an important resource managed by BOEM under the Marine Minerals
Program in the future, but the concept is not new. In fact, BOEM (then MMS) looked into leases for offshore mining of these
resources on the Hawaii, California, and Oregon OCS during the mid- to late 1980s. The marine minerals of interest were cobalt-rich
manganese crusts in Hawaii and massive sulfide deposits offshore Oregon and California. During that period, two task forces were
established with the States, one with Hawaii and the other with Oregon and California, to assess the economic, engineering, and
environmental aspects of ocean mining A three-year program to assess the mineral and biological resource potential of the Gorda
Ridge was completed in 1986. The program discovered large polymetallic sulfide deposits on the Gorda Ridge, located approximately
150 miles offshore northern California and southern Oregon in water depths between 10,000 and 11,000 feet. Task Force sponsored
surveys also resulted in the discovery of cobalt-rich manganese crusts on seamounts in the Hawaiian OCS, and US territories and
possession. In both cases, MMS opted not to offer the areas for lease due to the adequacy of existing onshore mineral supply
sources, market conditions, and consultations with mining companies that expressed the opinion it was premature to consider
leasing the areas due to the technological mining constraints. Some
30 years later, demand has increased for
products with components that contain copper, lead, zinc, manganese, cobalt and platinum,
and rare earth elements (REEs) which are used in color television and flat panel displays (cell
phones, portable DVDs, and laptops), rechargeable batteries for hybrid and electric vehicles,
important defense applications, such as night vision equipment, and space-based satellites
and communication systems. REEs often occur with other elements (e.g., copper, gold,
uranium). Higher prices for those metals in recent years may be another reason for the
increased interest in offshore mining. Most REE mining is likely to occur far from our mainland shores. The U.S.
Geological Survey estimates that global reserves of 110 million tons are found mainly in China, although Japanese researchers say
they have discovered vast deposits at 78 locations on the Pacific Ocean floor at depths of 11,500 to 20,000 feet below the ocean
surface in international waters east and west of Hawaii and east of Tahiti. Mining offshore REE deposits would likely be costly, but it
doesn’t appear that consumption of products containing REEs will decline any time soon. Global demand for REEs may reach
210,000 tons per year by 2015, according to one estimate (see Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain). Only time will tell
whether mining the sea floor can be commercially viable off our Nation’s coasts in the Pacific Region and elsewhere. If so, BOEM’s
Marine Minerals Program will ensure it is carried out without damaging the diverse life forms found in these delicate offshore ocean
environments.
BOEM is our agent, also US is key
BOEM 14 (Bureau of Ocean Management is a section of the department of the interior responsible for all ocean based drilling
and mining projects, January 2014, Marine Minerals Program Fact Sheet, http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/MMP-FactSheet.pdf)
BOEM is the agency within the U.S. Department of the Interior which manages the responsible
exploration and development of offshore energy and marine mineral resources on the U.S.
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The bureau promotes energy independence, environmental protection and
economic development through responsible management of these resources based on the
best available science. Although the largest component within BOEM is the exploration and development of oil and gas
resources, the Marine Minerals Program (MMP) is responsible for managing non-energy minerals
(primarily sand and gravel) on the ocean floor. As stewards of these resources, BOEM must ensure that
the removal of any mineral resource is conducted in a safe and environmentally sound
manner, and that any potentially adverse impacts on the marine, coastal, or human
environments are avoided or minimized For over 20 years, BOEM has provided OCS sand resources to complete 42
projects and convey more than 77 million cubic yards of material to coastal communities. That amount of sand, in cubic feet, would
circle Earth’s equator 15.85 times. What are the primary uses of marine minerals? Marine minerals are used primarily in coastal
restoration projects, including beach nourishment and wetlands restoration. Beach nourishment is the replenishment of beach sand
by natural or artificial means.
2AC AT: LOST/I-Law
International law allows deep sea mining and the US hasn’t ratified lost, so nbd
Troianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep
Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,”
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello
This lack of progress occurs in a context where the sustainability of consensus on international waters is not yet established. The
U.N.C.L.O.S. conception of the seabed as the “common heritage of mankind” is not universal .
Indeed it is important to keep in mind that the United States has not ratified U.N.C.L.O.S.33 and
rather consider that “Deep seabed mining is a “high seas freedom ” that all nations may engage
in regardless of their membership or non- membership in U.N.C.L.O.S. or any other treaty. Like
other high seas freedoms, the right to engage in deep seabed mining is inherent to all sovereign
nations under customary international law. Rather, it is the convention that attempts to restrict
access to the deep seabed and infringe on the intrinsic rights of the United States and other
nations that have chosen to remain non- parties.”34However, in the past the United States has secured its rights
to mine the deep seabed through bilateral agreements with other deep seabed mining nations.
2AC AT: No Tech
Tech is based off of existing undersea tech and it is in the public domain
Birney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC)
“Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea”
***DSM = Deep Sea Mining
In order to develop DSM technology, Nautilus put together an Alliance of eight key players
from the offshore equipment, services and engineering industries. These players are still developing
deep-sea mining technology. Current designs have drawn upon existing technology from both
the offshore petroleum and transoceanic communications cable industries. The basic methods and
designs for exploration and extraction are in the public domain . Specific designs and methods developed
by industry first movers are considered patentable or trade secrets. As such, for the purposes of this section, we will only
review currently proposed DSM technology and operations designs within the public domain
and then offer some potential solutions to identified problems.
Tech now, research has been done
Duarte 13 (Carlos Duarte is a professor at the University of Western Australia, co-written by Sophie Arnaud-Haond,
SBS, “Deep Sea Mining: Coming soon to an ocean near you”, http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2013/09/25/deepsea-mining-coming-soon-ocean-near-you_
These facts suggest that we may soon face and underwater gold rush, but in most citizen’s minds deep-sea mining is still something
for sci-fic movies. Much
to the contrary, the technology for deep-sea mining is not something of the
future but it is largely existing. A deep-sea mining operation consists of a mining support platform or vessel; a launch
and recovery system; a crawler with a mining head, centrifugal pump and vertical transport system; and electrical, control,
instrumentation and visualization systems. Companies such as Lockheed Martin, Soil Machine Dynamics, IHC Mining and Bauer
or Nautilus Minerals are
developing vehicles for deep-sea mining, pledging they are in the position
to readily develop techniques to operate down to 5,000 metre depth. Indeed, the submarine vehicles
required are already in existence and their operations are described in compelling animations.
We have the locating tech now
Birney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC)
“Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea”
Exploratory technology for deep-sea mining is currently in use and is similar to petroleum
exploratory technology . Active vents can be located from the plume, which can be detected
up to 10 km away , and tracked it to its source. Continental margin fault lines can be followed using
side scan sonar. Vent fields generally occur along continental margins where geologic
instability is common. Inactive vents and active vents can generally be found in close proximity (Baulch, 2005b).¶ Active
vent plumes can be located by detecting compounds or elements such as methane and manganese, which
occur in the water around the source vent. (Herzig and Petersen, 2000). Locating inactive vents is more difficult; exploration
teams use side-scan sonar, seismic surveyors, and deep-tow video systems to find the telltale features
of an SMS mound (Herzig and Petersen, 2000).
2AC AT: Can’t Mine
Mining the resources is 5 years away
Goldenberg, 14 Suzanne, US environment correspondent, “Marine mining: Underwater gold
rush sparks fears of ocean catastrophe,”
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/02/underwater-gold-rush-marinemining-fears-ocean-threat
Mining the ocean floor of the central Pacific on a commercial scale is five years away , but the
beginnings of an underwater gold rush are under way The number of companies seeking to mine
beneath international waters has tripled in the last three or four years. "We have already got a gold
rush, in a way," said Michael Lodge, deputy secretary general of the International Seabed Authority, which regulates the use of the
sea floor in international waters. " The
amount of activity has expanded exponentially."
2AC AT: Can’t Extract
We have the extraction tech now
Birney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC)
“Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea
After the size and ore grade of the deposit have been assessed, trial mining may begin. Specific designs
for SMS extraction are still in development and have not been disclosed, but concepts have
been publicly discussed. These are a mixture of previous designs for crust and nodule mining,
including modified technology from terrestrial coal and ocean diamond mining methods. SMS
deposits present several challenges for extraction technology. First, the ore body is comprised of a combination of loose material
such as fallen chimneys, and solid fused minerals such as re-crystallized sulfides and deposition layers (Herzig, 1999). Second, the
seafloor terrain may be rugged due to tectonic activity. Extracting
the ore body, while minimizing environmental impacts,
will require a¶ 25¶ combination of technologies working in stages. An SMS extraction device can be
divided by three components: 1) drive body, 2) ore crusher and 3) ore lifter.
2AC AT: Can’t Process
We have the processing technology
Birney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC)
“Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea
Ore processing technology has typically had the most widespread , concentrated, and lasting environmental
impacts in the mining industry. The use of cyanide leaching techniques in gold processing and the resultant cyanide settling
ponds have been the source of some of the worst environmental mining catastrophes (i.e., Summitville Mine in Colorado,
Marcopper Mine in the Philippines, or Omai Gold Mine in Guyana).¶ Processing methods of massive sulfide deposits typically recover
only 40% of the gold (INEEL, 2005). Much of the losses are because the gold particles in the sulfide ore are too fine (<10 microns)
whereas the average particle size used in ore processing slurries is 70 microns (Newmont). This leaves much of the gold on the inside
of the ore particle, unavailable to the cyanide molecules during leaching. The gold left in the particle ends up in the tailings,
considered too uneconomical to recover. The polymetallic nature of the SMS deposits may further complicate processing, though
“dore” bullion (gold bullion with other metallic impurities such as Zn, Cu, or Ag) can be separated further during smelting.¶ A
potential solution to cyanide tainted sulfide tailings disposal may be the ocean. The basic
design involves a pipe from the processing plant out to a slope on the seafloor that falls to a
kilometer depth. The technique relies upon anoxic conditions at the bottom to be sufficient to
inhibit the formation of sulfuric acid and heavy metal dissolution and transport associated with terrestrial
acid mine drainage problems. There are 26 such tailings disposal operations in the world and the
majority are found in the Asia-Pacific region (Pearce, 2000).
2AC AT: No REEs
Lots of REEs
Goodier, 11 Rob, Journalist, “Why Deep-Sea Rare-Earth Metals Will Stay Right Where They
Are—For Now,” http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/why-deep-sea-rareearth-metals-will-stay-right-where-they-are-for-now
So it's no surprise that the Japanese study, which appears in the journal Nature Geoscience, sparked excitement. The
researchers took core samples at 78 sites around Hawaii , Tahiti and other locations in the
eastern South Pacific and central North Pacific, finding rare-earth concentrations of about 0.2 percent. At that
concentration, they reported, just 1 square kilometer of sea-floor mud could provide one-fifth of the
world's annual rare-earth consumption, making it a "highly promising huge resource for
these elements ."
***AT: Topicality
2AC AT: Exploration
Exploration means the process of searching for minerals---the aff meets that
Outer Continental Shelf Land Act, 53, Bureau of Ocean Management, “1 of 59¶ TITLE 43¶
CHAPTER 29¶ > SUBCHAPTER III¶ SUBCHAPTER III—OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS,”
http://www.boem.gov/Outer-Continental-Shelf-Lands-Act/
The term “exploration” means the process of searching for minerals , including¶ (1)¶
geophysical surveys where magnet¶ ic, gravity, seismic, or other systems are used to detect
or¶ imply the presence of¶ such minerals, and¶ (2)¶ any drilling , whether on or off known geological structures,
including the drilling of a well in which¶ a discovery of oil or natural gas in paying quanti¶ ties is made and the dr¶ illing
of any additional¶ delineation well after such discovery which is needed to delineate any reservoir and
to enable the¶ lessee to determine whether to proceed¶ with development and production;
2AC AT: Development
Development means the discovery of minerals---the aff meets that
Outer Continental Shelf Land Act, 53, Bureau of Ocean Management, “1 of 59¶ TITLE 43¶
CHAPTER 29¶ > SUBCHAPTER III¶ SUBCHAPTER III—OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS,”
http://www.boem.gov/Outer-Continental-Shelf-Lands-Act/
The term “development” means those¶ activities which take place following discovery of
minerals
in paying¶ quantities, including
geophysical activity, drilling , platform construction , and
operation of all onshore support¶ facilities, and which are for the purpose of ultimately producing the
minerals discovered
***AT: Disads
AT: Obama Good
Domestic military applications and previous legislation prove popular.
Humphries 10 (Marc Humphries is a , September 30th, 2010, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain”, Congressional
Report Service)
World demand for rare earth elements is estimated at 134,000 tons per year, with global
production around 124,000 tons annually. The difference is covered by previously mined aboveground stocks.
World demand is projected to rise to 180,000 tons annually by 2012, while it is unlikely that new mine
output will close the gap in the short term. New mining projects could easily take 10 years to reach production. In the long
run, however, the USGS expects that global reserves and undiscovered resources are large enough
to meet demand. Legislative proposals H.R. 4866 (Coffman) and S. 3521(Murkowski) have been
introduced to support domestic production of REEs, because of congressional concerns over
access to rare earth raw materials and downstream products used in many national security
applications and clean energy technologies.
Plan popular—military supply
Grasso 13 (Valerie Bailey Grasso is a specialist in defense acquisition, “Rare Earth Elements in National Defense:
Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress”, CRS, December 23rd, 2013,
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41744.pdf)
Some Members of
Congress have expressed concern with the nearly total U.S. dependence on
foreign sources for rare earth elements. Some have raised questions about China’s near dominance of the rare earth industry
and the implications for U.S. national security. Yet the “crisis” for many policymakers is not the fact that
China has cut its rare earth exports and appears to be restricting the world’s access to rare
earths, but the fact that the United States has lost its domestic capacity to produce strategic
and critical materials, and that the manufacturing supply chain for rare earths has largely
migrated to outside the United States. Still others are concerned about the impact of a potential
supply chain vulnerability of materials critical for defense systems. Additionally, some Members of Congress have
questioned the lack of knowledge of what specific materials are needed for defense purposes,
which materials are strategic and critical to national security, and what steps might be taken to increase the domestic capability to
produce these materials. In January 2011, three
Members of Congress wrote a letter to Secretary of
Defense Robert M. Gates outlining their concerns over what they perceived as a lack of action
on DOD’s part to ensure that adequate supplies of rare earths were available. They pressed for DOD to take immediate action,
as described in excerpts below
Plan popular—renewables and offsets china
GCC 14 (Green Car Congress is a website specializing in bills related to renewable technology, 2/8/14, “Senators introduce bill to
encourage US production of thorium and rare earth minerals”, http://www.greencarcongress.com/2014/02/20140208-blount.html)
US Senators Roy Blunt (Mo.) and Joe Manchin (W. Va.) introduced the “National Rare Earth
Cooperative Act of 2014” this week, bipartisan legislation to encourage US production of rare
earth metals (and thorium), relieving US dependence on China’s rare earth minerals. Noting that
thorium is a mildly radioactive element commonly associated with the lanthanide elements in the most heavy rare earth deposits
that are located in the United States and elsewhere, and that current regulations regulations regarding thorium represent a barrier
to the development of a heavy rare earth industry that is based in the United States, the act grants private rare earth suppliers and
end-users with an opportunity to set up a thorium-bearing rare earth refining cooperative in America. The bill proposes that: It is the
policy of the United States to advance domestic refining of heavy rare earth materials and the safe storage of thorium in anticipation
of the potential future industrial uses of thorium, including energy, as— (1) thorium has a mineralogical association with valuable
heavy rare earth elements; 2) there is a great need to develop domestic refining capacity to process domestic heavy rare earth
deposits; and (3) the economy of the United States would benefit from the rapid development and control of intellectual property
relating to the commercial development of technology utilizing thorium. The bill proposes that as soon as practicable after
enactment, the Cooperative Board, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, establish the Thorium Storage, Energy, and
Industrial Products Corporation to develop uses and markets for thorium, including energy. Thorium, among other uses, is of
interest in advanced nuclear fuel cycles. According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), rare earth elements are located in
the Pea Ridge iron-ore mine in Washington
County, Mo. Missouri also has a long mining history in
various minerals, including some of the largest sources of lead deposits in the country. Blunt is
also a co-sponsor of Senators Ron Wyden (Ore.) and Lisa Murkowski’s (Alaska) Critical
Minerals Bill, which directs the USGS to establish a list of minerals critical to the US economy
and national security such as Rare Earth Elements.
Plan popular—Republicans support breaking dependence on China
Topf 13 (Andrew Topf is a exclusive writer for Rare Earth Investing News, 9/23/14, “House Passes Critical Minerals Act”, Rare Earth investing News,
http://rareearthinvestingnews.com/16395-house-passes-critical-minerals-act.html)
Known as the National Strategic and Critical Minerals Production Act, the
bill was passed 246 to 178, with just 15
Democrats in favor. In the last Congress, 22 Democrats supported a similar bill. The act would give federal agencies a
maximum 30 months to decide on whether to approve or reject permits for exploration and mining, and it limits the ability of
opponents to use courts to stop mining. Get the latest Rare Earth Investing News articles delivered to your email inbox. Learn more
Email Sign up Republican supporters
of the bill say the legislation is needed to speed up mining
approvals, to ensure that the US has adequate sources of strategic minerals such as rare
earths. Locally sourced strategic minerals would break US dependence on other countries,
such as China, on importing the materials, used for defense and other applications. “Burdensome red tape,
duplicative reviews, frivolous lawsuits and onerous regulations can hold up new mining
projects here in the U.S. for more than 10 years,” The Hill reported House Natural Resources
Committee Chairman Doc Hastings (R-Wash.), as saying. “These unnecessary delays cost
American jobs as we become more and more dependent on foreign countries for these raw ingredients. “As China continues to
tighten global supplies of rare earth elements, we should respond with an American mineral mining
renaissance
that will bring mining and manufacturing jobs back to America.”
AT: Midterms (Plan Popular)
2NC Card- Blue Economy Warrant from Bugel Evidence
The blue economy nature of Ocean Mining is popular and is seen as
revitalization of American technological dominance
Moorcroft 13 (Sheila, April 17th, “Ocean mining a race to the bottom”,
http://www.innovationmanagement.se/2013/04/17/ocean-mining-a-race-to-the-bottom/)
The blue economy, the term ascribed to a wide range of activities such as fishing, shipping,
coastal tourism, energy, cable laying and mining, presents huge opportunities. Estimates of the current value vary
from $6-$21trillion; a recent study put the value added arising from the EU opportunity alone at €500 billion, rising to €600 billion by
2020. Investment is
growing, but also environmental concern. Deep sea mining is at present a small but
increasingly significant element of that economy. What is changing? The oceans cover an area of about 360 million
km2, at an average depth of about 3800 metres, and contain the world’s most active volcanoes, highest mountains and deepest
valleys. At present, only about 5% of the ocean bed is accurately mapped, but the advent of new deep sea robotic submersibles as
well as ever more sophisticated survey ships and even satellites is beginning to address the challenge. But it will be a long, slow
process – the area that each ship or submersible can cover is small. Deep
sea mining is attracting significant
investment. It was first attempted when the mineral-rich, deep sea vents surrounding underwater volcanoes were first
discovered in the late 1970s: the cost and technical challenges of exploration prevented progress – till
now. The sophistication of new technologies and the growing demand for and price of many mineral resources are changing the
equations. Copper, zinc, manganese and gold – among many others – are all to be found in deep sea deposits, many of which are
said to produce far higher levels of purity than their land based equivalents. Global metal
and mineral mining output
was valued at $644 billion in 2010; but even land based mining is facing challenges as resource extraction moves to
remoter and more inhospitable locations. Deep sea mining today provides almost none of that global supply, but by 2020 it could be
providing 5%, 10% by 2030, valuing it at $65 billion in 2010 prices. However, to put the scale of deep sea deposits in perspective, the
estimated value of deep sea gold deposits alone has been put at $150 trillion at today’s prices. But it is very early days. To date, 12
exploratory permits have been issued and one area of active mining is underway off the coast of Papua New Guinea. However,
controversy is not far away. The Papua New Guinea government is challenging the terms of the deal and environmentalists are
challenging the adequacy of the environmental impact assessment. Exploration continues. Why is this important?
The
potential rewards are enormous. In coming years we may witness a new ‘gold rush’ as nations and companies try to
establish technological leadership to capture as much of the market not just for the minerals, but for the
technologies needed to locate and extract them. Aerospace and oil industry companies, electronics and
robotics suppliers, marine and mining specialists all stand to gain as they transfer their various
areas of expertise to this new frontier. Governments too are investing heavily including many emerging nation
economies. Depending on whether the scale of the deposits lives up to expectations and our ability to extract them proves
technically and economically as well as environmentally viable, deep sea mining could change the mineral supply base. For
example, deep sea mining may break the relative stranglehold China has on supplies of rare
earths, essential for mobile phones and clean technologies. Demand for gold has been increasing – to offset fears of inflation and
financial uncertainty, but also in consumer markets such as India; a significant increase in supply could destabilize price structures.
2AC AT: REE DA
Deep sea mining inevitable
Troianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep
Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,”
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello
Initiated by the Japanese after Chinas’ economic sanctions over¶ Senkaku¶ territorial dispute, the revival
of Deep Sea mining projects has¶ expanded¶ worldwide . China ¶ 15¶ and India¶ 16¶ have both
launched important programs. Despite¶ impressive challenges, Deep Sea mining projects are
ongoing and¶ their spreading¶ seems inevitable
2AC AT: China Monopoly Good DA
China only cares about producing for domestic industries – they can still meet
their own demand post plan
Alec Gimurtu, interviewing Jack Lifton, an independent consultant and commentator, He
specializes in nonferrous strategic metals and studies those businesses; He has more than 50
years of experience in the global OEM automotive, heavy equipment, electrical and electronic,
mining, smelting and refining industries, Streetwise Reports, A Radical Solution for the Rare
Earth Supply Crunch: Jack Lifton, 7-9-2013, http://www.theaureport.com/pub/na/a-radicalsolution-for-the-rare-earth-supply-crunch-jack-lifton//BDS)
TMR: In August, you are presenting your case for a new international REE toll refinery to the Chinese Society of Rare Earths. What
reaction are you expecting? JL: My thinking about this has evolved. I think that the Chinese want this to happen. The
Chinese
are now restructuring their REE production industry and downsizing it to match their internal
demand. They will grow the industry in the future, but only to meet their domestic demand . I
do not believe that the Chinese are interested in the REE export business. In the last year the
Chinese have cut legal, reported production by more than 30%. Originally, Chinese domestic users
consumed 60% of their own production. It's up to more than 80% today. When I proposed an international toll
refinery, I was surprised at the positive reaction I got from this in China. I was told by a high-ranking Chinese official
in the REE industry that this is an excellent topic. The Chinese really do want to hear outsider views on this. It
appears that the Chinese would like the rest of the world to develop enough REE production
and refining so that the domestic Chinese REE industry can be left alone. That's my analysis at this point
in time. TMR: How would new international toll refining change REE pricing? Would there still be a Chinese domestic price and a
different international price? JL: Yes. At the moment the export prices are set by tax. Domestically, Chinese REEs are much cheaper
than internationally posted prices because of the large export tax. There's a cap on volume as well as a large tax. The prices we see
for cerium or lanthanum in North America, for example, are Chinese domestic prices plus export duties and transport. The problem
for a new REE producer is—which price is it that you're going after? For example, say I can buy lanthanum in Chicago for the Chinese
export price of $20/kg. Suppose I can produce lanthanum in New Jersey for $10/kg. That looks like a solid profit. The problem is
"where is your market?" Yes, $10/kg is great if you're going to sell this into a North American market and the Chinese maintain their
export duties. That is fine, except that there's no real market for these materials in North America. There's no total supply chain
outside of China. China is the main place where the raw materials get turned into finished product. China is the only location of an
existing "mine to magnet" total supply chain. Better than even, "mine to magnet," China has "mine to vacuum cleaner," "mine to
car," and "mine to washing machine." They've got everything. As a North American producer of lanthanum, I'm going to have to sell
into China at the domestic price, and pay the import duty and cover transport costs. These are all issues that junior miners do not
think about. But these issues matter if you are trying to finance a $1B refinery. Is there a market at the price you're going to
produce? It's not just about your costs per kilogram. When there is an accidental or intentional monopoly player like China, there are
substantial additional factors to consider. And we haven't even mentioned the possibility of import quotas. And then there is the
uncertainty. . .everything could change tomorrow. The
Chinese REE market is evolving rapidly. They have
dramatic overcapacity in everything: mining, refining, fabrication, you name it. There is a
desire to cut back to profitable unit production. As they move in that direction, prices will rise in China.
The Chinese goal is to have prices that can sustain the industry. External competition in the
commodity markets is not their concern. The model of Rhodia as a toll refinery does not concern China. Solvay is
not in the mining business. They don't make metals. They don't make magnets. They are a solvent exchange separation and highpurity refining company. Their output goes directly to the chemical, automotive and high-tech industries. Rhodia has a large
competitive advantage because of its extant investment and China is not trying to take it away. However, REE permanent magnets
are a different business because the refined elements from a company like Rhodia have to go to metal maker, an alloy maker and
then a magnet maker. While they have these industries in Europe, there is not enough capacity to satisfy all European industrial
demand. The Chinese
dominate the HREEs because there are no sources outside China. There are
still no mines outside of China that are producing significant quantities of HREEs. The Chinese
still supply 100% of the world production. The locations of the REE survivors will determine where the toll refining
business opportunities will happen. Ucore is in Alaska, Rare Element Resources in Wyoming. The American political climate is such
that exporting natural resources to China, especially ones that have been as hyped as REEs, is not very likely to get the support of
the government. Therefore, I think there is a strong possibility of a REE toll refinery being built in North America. Tasman is located
in Sweden and does not have to deal with the U.S. political climate. In this case, there is a strong possibility that HREE concentrates
will be sold to China, for processing inside China. Other than Rhodia and perhaps two other small facilities in Japan, there's
no
HREE processing capability outside of China. While Tasman could ship ore or concentrates to China for the
dysprosium content, the company wouldn't make any money doing it. Tasman is under review by several European companies as a
source for potential feedstock into their vertical supply chain. That would be one path to the creation of a central European REE toll
separation and refining plant. The
entire HREE industry of the world, which today is 100% in China,
outside of China
could double the world's production of the HREEs. In order to do that, we'd have to obtain
HREEs ores from outside of China. The surviving juniors will be the companies that supply the midrange and HREEs to
produces total of 15,000 tpa of HREEs. Of that, 60% is the element yttrium. Two new toll refining plants
these types of refineries.
And Turn China can meet domestic Light REE demand indefinitely but can’t
maintain a Heavy REE export monopoly, other production is required to avoid
industry collapse
Jack Lifton, a Founding Principal of Technology Metals Research, LLC. He is also a consultant,
author, and lecturer on the market fundamentals of the technology metals, Investor Intel, Lifton
‘Unchained’ (Part 2): The Driver for Global Rare Earth Demand, 10-1-2013,
http://investorintel.com/rare-earth-intel/part-2///BDS)
The overall driver for global rare earth demand now and for the foreseeable future is a
function of the evolution, nationally (i.e. domestically in China), regionally (i.e. in southeast Asia), and
globally, of the Chinese Rare Earth Industry. It is the same for global rare earth supply. Thus rare
earth pricing and its impact on Future Supply and Demand also is dominated by the Chinese rare earth industry growth and the
Chinese industry’s deployment of short term tactics based on its long term strategy. Based on what I know today, I think that: 1.
There is sufficient developed light rare earth (lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium) total supply
chain capacity domestically in China to completely satisfy China’s domestic demand for the
indefinite future . Thus the only markets available to non-Chinese light rare earth producers
are those outside of China and these account today for at most 20% of global demand, 2. The same
is most likely true also for China’s domestic total supply chain and demand for the SEG (samarium,
europium, and gadolinium) rare earths, 3. The total global demand for primary HREEs is today
essentially China’s domestic manufacturing market, However, from my own background knowledge and
experience, and my personal research in China, I believe that China does not have sufficient economically
practical (profitable) or environmentally safe to mine supplies of new HREEs (I define these as terbium,
dysprosium, and yttrium) to satisfy even its near-term domestic (and currently the global) demand. It’s not
that the Chinese ion-adsorption clays are played out; it’s that their continued legal production is likely to be
dramatically reduced by environmental and regulatory restrictions in the new era in China of
the nation’s switch from export and savings driven GDP growth to that of domestic
consumption as the principal driver. 4. It is my further opinion that if it were not for the fact that the Chinese
rare earth processing industry is already massively recycling HREE bearing waste streams from
industrial processing and end of life industrial components there would already be a shortage within China of
the HREEs. As it is, and as I stated above, I believe that new production of terbium, dysprosium, and yttrium from the
Chinese adsorption clay deposits are diminishing due to the crackdown on illegal mining and
on the issue of environmental pollution. Thus the rare earth market is truly segmented. On the one hand the two
large non-Chinese producing primary rare earth mines, Mountain Pass and Mt Weld, overwhelmingly contain and produce just the
light rare earths. Those deposits that are relatively rich in the HREEs, and are today in operation to produce HREEs, are the very low
grade “adsorption clays” in southern China. The HREE separation and refining market within China has or seems to have vast
overcapacity. This would seem to be an ideal situation for non-Chinese producers of mixed rare earth concentrates that have
significant percentages of HREEs. But
the issue is the rare earth total value chain not just the supply c
hain. Those without knowledge of either chain have been for the last several years simply assuming the they could ascribe the
market value or a high proportion of it to their models of the values for the mixed rare earth process leach solutions derived from
their mechanically beneficiated ore concentrates. The primary error in this reasoning is the assumption that the discount from
“market pricing” would be “only” 40%. In fact the principle and majority OPEXs are incurred downstream of this point which involves
processing the PLS all the way to the fabricated metallic forms or specified chemical blends required by the actual consuming
industries. Among other glossed over expenditures are: The costs added for removing and disposing of radioactive components from
the PLS are not just CAPEX and OPEX chemical but must also include future regulatory costs, which are today purely speculative, at
best, The costs of separating the “desired” rare earths from each other involve substantial initial CAPEX and OPEX but most of the
juniors have even so vastly overestimated such costs while simultaneously trivializing the costs discussed in factor 1 above, The cost
of obtaining the latest, most efficient and competitive, supply chain component technology, such as those for separation,
purification, metal making, and alloy making, The cost in time and manpower (person-power) to bring a total supply chain or enough
of its components into operation to make a rare earth venture profitable from the start, and The cost of finding the people for and
setting up a marketing organization to convince end users that they should risk adding a vendor to their procurement profile. Note
well that this process normally takes up to three years!
China is shifting to supplying domestic demand and ei they can meet global
demand now the CCP is purging the country of excess production
Jack Lifton, a Founding Principal of Technology Metals Research, LLC. He is also a consultant,
author, and lecturer on the market fundamentals of the technology metals, Investor Intel, Lifton
‘Unchained’ (Part 4): China is officially shifting focus to domestic consumer demand, 10-3-2013
http://investorintel.com/rare-earth-intel/part4///BDS)
The late and unlamented Soviet Union created this planning model, but could not make it work, and so the Soviet Union became a
hypocritical dead end benefiting only privileged elites that in the end simply went bankrupt. Even though it had produced immense
stockpiles of natural resources. It had not managed to create an economy that could consume them. China,
over the last 25
years, just one generation, has created the largest export led economy in the world. It has accumulated US$3
trillion of reserves in doing so. China is now officially shifting gears. It has announced that it will shift its focus
to domestic consumer demand so as to be able to maintain the vast productive capacity it has built
as a low labor cost exporter. The Chinese mining industry and its downstream value chain are
part and parcel of this shift in emphasis. Let’s see how exactly this is affecting the rare earth supply chain in China
and how this will affect any forecast of future global demand for the rare earths collectively and individually. First of all please note
that China
today, notwithstanding the entry of both Molycorp and Lynas into the light rare earth supply market, remains
the overwhelmingly largest supplier of light rare earths in the world. I estimate that during the last 12
months China has produced and sold 90% of the world’s legally traded light rare earths. I say “sold” to emphasize that Molycorp has
stated that it has built a large inventory of material and it is not clear to me how much has been actually sold into the market. Lynas,
hopefully due to start up issues, has so far produced almost nothing in finished goods (at its entry point into the market). Three
weeks ago when I was in China at the ICRE in Ganzhou a
speaker from Baotou dramatically emphasized that
his company is the world’s largest vertically integrated producer of light rare earths all the
way through to metals, and that, by itself, Baotou could easily supply the world’s demand for such
products indefinitely. Keep in mind that of the 200 or so people in that audience only a dozen, at most, were not Chinese.
Ganzhou is the heavy rare earth processing center of the world. There are, as I mentioned above, some 38 rare earth
separation plants with more than 60,000 tons per year of capacity in the three-province local
region of southern China. The Baotou speaker wasn’t trying to impress us, few, non-Chinese, he was very
pointedly telling the other Chinese to stick to mining and refining heavy rare earths. Why?
Because he is worried about competition in refining not from Molycorp or Lynas but from
other increasingly stressed Chinese rare earth refiners who are being told by the central
government that unless they are legal, environmentally in order, and profitable they can be
ignored by the new consolidators of the rare earth industry appointed by the central
government who, the consolidators, are the only ones who can give out production and enduse allocations and licenses. Interestingly enough there was a list shown of the individual capacities of the 38 rare earth
separation plants in the region. The largest was of 5000 tons per annum capacity, the smallest was 1000 tons, and the average was
2000 tons. There are a small, relative to the total, number of much larger light rare earth separation plants in China. Notably in
Baotou’s home, the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia. I was told that China Minmetals, now appointed as a rare earth
consolidator, for example, is building a new 10,000+ ton per year capacity SX plant. The statement was made in the conference that
90% of China’s rare earth refining is done by the largest 6 SX plants and that 97% is done by the top 20 SX plants. There
is
clearly a vast excess rare earth separation and refining capacity in China and there is clearly a
bloodbath underway among them to see which will survive. These “communists’ are doing a very good job
of using market capitalism to sort out a problem. When this type of behavior occurs in a free market
economy it normally results in temporary low prices during the oversupply period followed by
price stability as inefficient companies fail and then price rises by the winners to compensate
for their losses in the battle for survival . I think this is exactly what we’re seeing today in the, still dominated by
China, rare earth markets
China has control over the REM industry but overheating, structural failures,
and overproduction has left China’s industry weak
Morrison and Tang 12 (Wanye and Rachel, April 30th, “China’s Rare Earth Industry
and Export Regime: Economic and Trade Implications for the United States”,
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc85418/m1/1/high_res_d/R42510_2012Apr
30.pdf
Overheated rare earth production in China during the 1990s and the early 2000s generated a
fragmented industry with thousands of mines, many engaging in reckless mining
and illicit production. In order to maximize profits, these small companies often ignored safety
and environmental regulations and fiercely competed with each other for export deals. In addition to
environmental degradation in China, this overcrowded rare earth sector and often intense
competition sharply drove down rare earths prices and. therefore, further pressed producers to cut
corners in order to secure their already thinning profit margins. Local governments, which often had vested interests, often
tolerated these practices.34 In
addition to illicit rare earth production, smuggling also became
widespread, which exacerbated resource depletion and kept prices low. According to
China Business News, about 20.000 tons of rare earths were smuggled from China in 2008.
Which was estimated to have accounted for one- third of the total volume of rare
earths leaving China that year. This smuggling is often the main reason behind the discrepancies between the
official statistics and the actual data of rare earth production and exports in China. Chinese policymakers and
industry experts have voiced concerns over the perceived rapid depletion of their
exhaustible rare earth resources. They contend that the rare earth deposits in China account for less than half
of total global reserves; however, the country mines and provides over 95% of the global
supply Rare earth production in China has far outpaced the sustainable level which makes Chinese officials concerned that
such a disproportionately high level of output could soon deplete their resources. The Chinese government is
also concerned that overproduction and illegal mining often came at the cost of
environmental degradation - safety or environmental protection is often ignored in pursuit of revenue
potential.36 The Chinese media have repeatedly exposed incidents of water system and
farmland contamination in rare earth mining areas, from Inner Mongolia to southern provinces such
as Guangdong and Jiangxi.37 hi the southern provinces, rare earths can be found in high concentration in clays and soil a few
feet underground. As a result, the 1990s saw
an explosion of the number of poorly constructed
and maintained local mines that were both polluting and wasteful, leaving behind
contaminated soil and water. In November of 2011, during a product quality inspection, China's General
Administration of Quality Supervision found that 19 of 85 tea products contained excessive levels of toxic rare earths,
including a batch of Lipton tea produced and sold in China by Unilever. Unilever later stated that the rare earth metals had
come from the soil where the tea was grown and had nothing to do with its production process.38 China
currently
argues that it is now moving to consolidate production and put supplies of a critical
and exhaustible resource on a more sustainable footing. China maintains that rare earth export
prices have been too low to reflect its virtual monopoly position. Moreover, such dominance, in view of the
Chinese industry experts and policymakers, should assist China to move up the
supply chain and engage in rare earth application and end products, not just being
the world's supplier of raw materials.39 hi recent years, China has put in place a series of
industry and trade policies, aiming to capitalize on its dominance of rare earth
supply
Clean Tech Leadership isn’t zero-sum ,empirics proves
Economy 10 (Elizabeth C, "The game changer: coping with China's foreign policy revolution." Foreign Affairs, Academic
OneFile. Web, http://go.galegroup.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ps/i.do?action
=interpret&id=GALE%7CA246715580&v=2.1&u=
northwestern&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w&authCount=1)
If the United States wants to be the global leader in clean-energy technology by 2050, for
example, it should now be developing the intellectual, financial, and political infrastructure to
get there. And when Chinese clean-energy investment interests come knocking, as they are doing, the
United States will be well positioned to determine what types of investment should be
welcomed. When done right, such deals have the potential to result in equitable partnerships and
successful cooperation. In August 2010, for example, the United Steelworkers union struck a deal with
the Chinese companies A-Power Energy Generation Systems and Shenyang Power Group to develop
a $1.5 billion wind-farm venture in Texas that will create 1,000 jobs for U.S. workers--up
from 330 U.S. jobs when the project was first proposed--and use about 50,000 tons of U.S.made steel. Similarly, China's efforts to move the international financial system away from the dollar as the world's
reserve currency, although potentially costly if done abruptly, might nonetheless be advantageous for Washington over the
long run. If the United States were no longer able to borrow money at a better rate than other countries or run greater trade
deficits with the benefit of a much-delayed economic impact, for example, it would impose a potentially helpful fiscal discipline
on the U.S. economy.
Not zero-sum basis for cooperation in squo means that technology and
development get shared
Wan 2013 (Zheng, Brian Craig, Utilities Policy 27, “Reflections on China-US energy cooperation:
Overcoming differences to advance collaboration”,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957178713000581
(2008). These
intergovernmental agreements/protocols promote cooperation and
interaction among institutions and personnel on a wider scale. The US is an important force in
the development of energy technology, with obvious advantages in research, development, and
industrialization. Meanwhile, China is home to the fastest-growing energy markets with enormous
potential for domination in the world market. China adopts a "market for technology" strategy (Mu and Lee, 2005) to
introduce direct investment projects from the US and guide technology transfer. In this manner, China has enhanced its energy
efficiency schemes and developed its strengths in research and development During the Obama administration, China
and the US accomplished additional breakthroughs in energy cooperation. In November
2009, the two governments established the US—China Clean Energy Research Center
(CERC), which promotes cooperative research and development through collaboration in
production, learning, and research on clean coal, clean energy vehicles, and building
energy conservation. The cooperation between the two is not limited to related technology developments and
government investments in scientific research; it also brings in more investments from enterprises
and business agencies, with marketing as an important consideration. In early 2011, the energy sectors
of China and the US signed the energy cooperation agreement (which covers product procurement), which
amounts to more than US$13 billion (The Economic Times, 2011). The Sino-US Relations Research Croup of
China Energy Fund predicts that if the US lifts its restrictions on exports, China can import American energy and
environmental protection technology worth hundreds of billions of dollars.
Such large-scale bilateral energy
cooperation will enable China to acquire technology for new energy sources, as well as resolve
urgent energy and environmental issues. Meanwhile, business opportunities will reduce the huge
trade deficit of the US and alleviate bilateral trade imbalance.
Clean Tech Markets aren’t Zero-Sum
Eisen 2010 (Joel B, “China’s Renewable Energy Law: A Platform for Green Leadership?”,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1917549)
It is exceedingly tempting to descend into stereotyping about a monolithic "Red
Menace" aiming to dominate the world's economy. Of course, some do see China's growth in
renewables as a threat. Many Western commentators focus on the growth of China's greentech manufacturing sector and its
potential impact on trade. n23 Protectionism
in China's domestic greentech industries is a
continuing concern, and, as I discuss below, it has led to claims, as most prominently made in a recent investigation
commenced by the United States Trade Representative ("USTR"), that multinational companies face obstacles to cracking the
Chinese market. n24 Some Western observers also see Chinese firms as competition at [*5] home,
focusing on potential imports of Chinese technology into the United States at the expense of domestic companies and the
economy. n25 This important subject is worth a full treatment in its own right, as it is inextricably bound up in a much broader
discussion about multilateral trade relations. I will touch upon it briefly in this article. For now, it
is worth noting
that growth in China's renewable power sector need not be viewed as a zero-sum
game. Precisely the opposite may well be true. Chinese and Western companies have begun to and China are much more
complex than they are often made out to be. Similarly, I contend in this article that continued expansion of
renewable energy in China is complex because it faces substantial technical and
legal challenges similar in some respects to those faced in the United States. I will embark on an in-depth analysis of
those challenges, set against the legal, political, and financial environment for renewable energy deployment in China.
Beginning with China's governmental structure, I note that its unique characteristics pose special challenges for increasing the
deployment of renewable energy.
The race is all rhetoric because it’s actually zero sum and the US would win
anyways
Christina Larson, journalist focusing on international environmental issues, based in Beijing and
Washington, D.C. contributing editor at foreign policy, America’s Unfounded Fears of A GreenTech Race with China, Yale Environment 360, 8-2-2010,
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/americas_unfounded_fears_of_a_greentech_race_with_china/2238///BDS)
At a factory in Wuxi, China, workers lift solar panels onto conveyor belts, while others in white lab coats move between machines as they check on a
process for etching and engraving silicon wafers to form solar cells. This scene in itself isn’t remarkable. But there is a new sort of excitement about the
work. China’s production of solar panels has grown quickly in the past two years; it is it now the world’s leading exporter. When Matt Lewis, a
representative of the California-based nonprofit ClimateWorks, visited the factory in October, he said it reminded him of his native Silicon Valley: The
workers, even ordinary line workers, had a sense that they were part of building the future, the hot new industry. This comparison makes some in the
United States, and especially in Washington, nervous. Thomas Friedman has used the bully pulpit of his China Production Line influential New York
Times column to warn that the United States is engaged in a global green-tech competition with China, whose potential dominance represents a “new
Sputnik.” (“How do you say ‘clean your clock’ in Chinese?” he wrote.) This notion, conjuring residual memories of the days in which U.S. rivalry with
Soviet Union was crystallized in the space race — when the word “Sputnik,” the name of the Soviet space program, inspired quivers of anxiety about
America’s political and economic prowess and its existential place in the world — has today struck a resonant chord in Washington, drawing upon
existing fears and mistrust of China. While some U.S. politicians and commentators still paint China as the global pollution villain, especially after the
disappointing outcome at Copenhagen, others are beginning to take green China seriously — as a threat. Last fall, for instance, when Senator Charles
Schumer got wind of a planned wind farm in west Texas, announced by a partnership of American and Chinese companies, that would use some wind
equipment made in China and potentially create new jobs across the Pacific, he recommended blocking stimulus money from the project, rather than
help boost green China. The stimulus money “is supposed to create jobs in America,” he wrote in a letter to Energy Secretary Steven Chu. (The new
wind farm would also have created 300 jobs in Texas, but Schumer was worried that a greater number could be created in China.) Last month, a frontpage Sunday piece by Keith Bradsher of the New York Times took the competition metaphor a step further and declared that China was in fact already
winning the green-tech race. The article, “China Leading Race to Make Clean Energy,” made the rounds in Washington with its assertion that China had
passed the U.S. and several western European countries to become the word’s top manufacturer of both solar panels and wind turbines; it quoted the
CEO of a private equity firm in Beijing saying, ominously, “Most of the energy equipment [of the future] will carry a brass plate, ‘Made in China.’” The
Times article also raised another spine-tingling geopolitical comparison — this time not likening Beijing to the latter-day USSR, but to the modern-day
Middle East. “[China’s] efforts to dominate renewable China will gain thousands of jobs, but not necessarily at America’s expense. energy
technologies,” Bradsher wrote, “raise the prospect that the West may someday trade its dependence on oil from the Mideast for a reliance on solar
panels, wind turbines and other gear manufactured in China.” In other words, China might become the Saudi Arabia of alternative energy; the
implication seems to be that not only might green China pose an economic threat, but the sheiks of Beijing might soon wield undue political influence
over a “dependent” United States. Few business stories
have ever been imbued with so much gravitas, so
many fears, so many metaphors, so much geopolitical speculation, as the recent articles and
coverage of China’s growing green-tech manufacturing sector. Behind these fears, there is
something worth probing — and some myths worth dispelling. Just what are Americans afraid of? To distill
the cloud of anxiety, there seem to be three chief fears. The first is very tangible — jobs. The second is about
America’s place in the world — will the U.S. remain a global leader in innovation? And the third is about leverage — will the U.S. control its future, or be
beholden to a foreign energy gatekeeper, one that exerts undue pull on its economic or foreign policy? “Even when you are looking at these big
numbers that are coming out of China today, I think it really pays
to give a close look at what is actually happening
on the ground,” says Elizabeth Economy, director of Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of The River Runs Black. “Then
you begin to get a different, more nuanced picture than what is blasted on the business section of the New York
Times.” The first essential fact to be aware of is that most news stories about China’s greentech gains are about manufacturing.
China is becoming the wind-turbine factory to the world for much the same reasons it has long been the TV and t-shirt factory to the world: lower
wages, lower land prices, fewer regulatory and other requirements, etc. This isn’t particularly surprising, and it shouldn’t
be seen as a
reversal of the status quo. What’s changed most dramatically in the last five years has been growing global
demand. With significant government investment, Chinese factories have planned for and stepped up production accordingly. Yes, this is bad news
for U.S. cities like Detroit, where planners have recently been retrofitting old hot-rod factories into wind-turbine factories, such as an old Ford
Thunderbird plant in Michigan that’s being converted into a green-tech manufacturing center in a bid to boost the local economy. China’s
research labs are politically constrained, limiting their ability to attract top talent. Manufacturing in
China, especially low and medium-tech manufacturing, has certain clear economic advantages. But it’s also worth considering a few other facts.
Most of the green manufacturing jobs that the U.S. stands to “lose” haven’t in fact been
created yet; China will gain thousands of new jobs, but not necessarily at America’s expense. Moreover, the
United States will still gain many new green-collar jobs, in installation and maintenance, which can only be
locally based, as well as sales teams, conference planners, and other positions already arising to support the
growing green-tech field. Besides green-tech hardware, there’s also the question of the technology that enables it. Who will be
responsible for the innovation that drives the low-carbon future? At present, America still has significant
advantages — including the world’s leading university system and the entrepreneurial culture and
venture-capital spigots of technology hubs, particularly Silicon Valley. “Intellectual property
rights have done a lot to hamper China’s development of green technology,” says Linden Ellis, U.S. director of
nonprofit China Dialogue. “People would rather come to Silicon Valley and develop a technology where they know it
will be protected by the law, right down to every line, than go to China and try to develop a technology there where maybe the components
will be cheaper and there is a lot of interest, but people do not trust that their findings will be protected.” Similar concerns have, for the
past two decades, grounded Beijing’s attempts to build a domestic airline industry , considered the pinnacle of
high-tech manufacturing. Foreign companies and top-notch engineers have simply been unwilling to share
technology with China (Boeing has even avoided building factories in China, for fear of commercial espionage). The result: Planes that fly
from Beijing to Shanghai today are still built by Boeing and Airbus. Of course, most green-energy equipment won’t match the complexity of assembling
something like Boeing’s new Dreamliner, but the airplane situation sheds light on two points: that cheap
labor is hardly the only
factor driving business decisions, and that, despite substantial government support, China’s
domestic aerospace engineers have not yet produced research to rival that of Western
competitors. (China’s university system and research labs are famously politically constrained, limiting their ability to attract top global talent.)
Of course, China would like to change this. Beijing is doing its best to both allay the fears of international partners and to nurture its own homegrown
innovators. A program known as the “State High-Tech Development Plan,” launched by Beijing in March 1986 and nicknamed the “863 Program,”
‘The clean-tech war is overblown from the start,’ says one American entrepreneur. aims to develop
top scientists in China and to incubate cutting-edge technology projects in energy and other sectors. So far, its results have been modest over two
decades: birthing a family of computer processors known as Loongson, and some technology used in the Shenzhou spacecraft. While the 863
Program’s track record should certainly dispel Western assumptions that no good research can come from China, it also
disproves the notion that money alone can clone a Steve Jobs or Bill Gates or Sergey Brin. This
should allay some anxiety in Washington about America having fallen behind, but it is not a
reason to become complacent. America has neither relinquished, nor is forever assured, her
innovation crown. Meanwhile, folks in the green-tech and environmental frontlines — as opposed to politicians and
commentators — don’t
see a “race” at all. “I do not see such a pattern exists,” says Wen Bo, a Beijing
environmentalist. “The clean-tech war is overblown from the start,” says Richard Brubaker, an American
environmental entrepreneur in Shanghai. To them, the green-tech “race” is not one that one side wins
and the other loses, but a scenario where partnerships are sought out and the final equation
doesn’t have to be a zero-sum game. “For now at least, there is a great symbiotic relationship with
California and the east coast of China on green technology,” says Linden Ellis. “Where California has
the know-how, the technology, the universities and programs dedicated to developing technology,
people who are interested in piloting it on a very expansive scale, or trying new combinations, often seek out research partners in
China.” Similar partnerships can exist even when the focus shifts from research to commercial activity. Kevin Czinger, the CEO of a Santa Monicabased electric car company that partners with a Chinese battery company, noted in a New Yorker article that if the U.S. would stop
feeling threatened by China’s progress on clean technology, it might begin to recognize its
own strengths in this field.
China and US achieve best results through cooperating on cleantech
[this ev is probably more prescriptive than descriptive]
Jonathan Woetzel, director in McKinsey’s Shanghai office, China and the US: The potential of a
clean-tech partnership
, McKinsey & Company, 8-2009,
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/energy_resources_materials/china_and_the_us_the_poten
tial_of_a_clean-tech_partnership//BDS)
China and the United States, the world’s dominant producers of carbon emissions, have adopted aggressive
programs to reduce oil imports, create new clean-energy industries and jobs, and generally improve the environment.
But the environment that will be most critical to making or breaking the two countries’ efforts to curb the
dangers of global warming could well be the market that they jointly create in pursuit of their
aims. Unless the two work together to provide the scale, standards, and technology transfer
necessary to make a handful of promising but expensive new clean-energy technologies successful, momentum to curb
global warming could stall and neither country will maximize its gains in terms of green jobs,
new companies, and energy security. The risk is real. Electrified vehicles, carbon capture and storage (CCS), and
concentrated solar power, among other emerging “green tech” sectors, will need massive investment ,
infrastructure, and research to get off the ground. While the Chinese and US governments, along with
private investors, are pursuing all of these technologies, they cannot achieve separately what they
could jointly. Whether collaborating formally or informally, China and the United States
working as a group of two (or G-2) dedicated to climate change would boost these technologies
and deliver benefits that would accrue to all nations. Clean-energy solutions are critical for reducing the
amount of harmful greenhouse gases produced not only by the two highest-emitting nations but also by countries worldwide. For
instance, if the majority of vehicles on the world’s roads by 2030 were hybrids and battery-powered vehicles, they would generate
42 percent fewer emissions than if all cars continued to run on today’s gas and diesel engines.1 But such reductions won’t occur—
won’t even come close to happening—unless China and the United States lay the groundwork to make it so. A
global electriccar sector must start in China and the United States, and it must begin with the two countries jointly
creating an environment for automotive investors to scale their bets across both nations. Private
companies in China and the United States will most certainly compete to make the products, including electric-drive (or hybrid)
vehicles, batteries, charging stations, and so on. But the two governments can no doubt create the conditions for both of them to
succeed—for example, by setting coordinated product and safety standards across the two markets, funding the rollout of
infrastructure, sponsoring joint R&D initiatives in select areas (such as new materials for car parts), ensuring that trade policies
support rather than hinder the development of a global supply chain for the sector, and providing consumers with financial
incentives to buy the new models. More immediately, the two governments could pick matching cities in China and the United
States for electrified-vehicle pilots that could be used to collect standardized data on real electrified-vehicle consumer adoption,
infrastructure costs, and driving conditions that could then be shared with companies in both nations. This
new sector will
require scale to succeed—more scale than could be found any time soon in either country alone.
Electrified vehicles may one day become a viable market within both nations, but that day will arrive much more
quickly if the two countries collaborate to create a market that is bigger and more attractive. In building this
market, China and the United States would also ensure that the companies and jobs associated with it would be created in both
countries sooner. Oil consumption will fall more quickly as well: today, about 50 percent of China’s oil imports—and 80 percent of
America’s—are used to fuel vehicles. In other words, one plus one would equal three. Such momentum would also likely spark
Europe into competing in a global electrified-vehicle industry faster. CCS
is another technology whose success
needs the scale that only China and the United States can create together. Adapting CCS technology to
coal-fired plants to capture the emitted greenhouse gases is expensive. CCS technology also uses a lot of energy to capture the
emissions, thereby making plants less efficient. And fundamental questions about how the captured emissions are to be stored still
need addressing. Neither nation is pursuing this expensive, uncertain emissions reduction technology quickly, but they would
improve their chances and their options if they pooled costs and knowledge. Together, the
two governments could
fund demonstration plants in China and the United States, jointly evaluate technologies available from vendors, set
standards, and drive down costs. By using the pilot plants as research labs to learn more about the challenges CCS faces and how to
overcome them, the governments could share the information with companies entering the CCS business, advancing learning in this
industry at a quicker pace. Assuming engineers find solutions to the technical and storage hurdles, we estimate that by 2030 this
technology could “clean” 17 percent of coal power in the United States and 30 percent of China’s coal power, reducing total
combined emissions by as much as 7 percent—a significant benefit to both nations and to the world. Concentrated solar
power
(CSP) might not even have a future without joint action by China and the United States . As an
emerging technology, CSP requires both technical progress and massive investments that only the largest economies can support.
CSP technology uses sunlight to create and store steam power to drive turbines that transmit electricity on a larger scale more easily
than they could using photovoltaic technology (which uses flat-screen receptors that turn sunlight into power). If clean concentrated
solar power is scaled to generate 22 percent of total power in China and the United States by 2030, it could create over half a million
jobs in each country. Setting common standards, coinvesting in pilot projects and R&D, and undertaking other joint initiatives are
the way to get this started. There are other benefits to joint action on clean energy besides reducing oil imports, cleaning up the air,
and creating jobs. Cooperation
on tangible actions that result in positive improvements for each
country could help to foster trust between governments that have real differences on other
political and economic issues. In addition, meaningful reductions in oil consumption by the world’s
two largest importers of oil could ease pressure on future global supply and demand
imbalances of the fossil fuel. It won’t be easy for countries and companies to work in common to make these
technologies real. The challenges to cooperation are numerous. Companies in both nations will be wary about what information
they share with partners and competitors. Real cooperation between the two countries on technology initiatives is limited, so both
sides will have to work hard to build relationships. In addition, they will need to create institutional frameworks for implementing
and managing projects, as well as cofinancing mechanisms, partnership rules, and governance models. US companies will be
concerned about protecting the intellectual property (IP) technologies that they use in pilot projects in China. The two governments
will need to cleanly separate bilateral initiatives on clean-energy development from broader, multilateral agreements on emissions
reductions. The list goes on. But none
of these challenges are showstoppers. Negotiations between the two
countries could address nearly all these issues comprehensively. Even the thorniest—IP protection—is manageable.
Because companies from many nations would contribute to making these three big technologies a success, IP agreements should be
international. On that front, China will need to improve its ability to enforce global IP rules. Most critical, however, is the leadership
that will be needed to surmount these obstacles. A commitment at the top levels of both governments to set a joint course for
making these technologies real would be the signal of a real beginning. From there the impulse for collaboration may well filter
down through the public and private sectors in the two countries to make research, investment, and policy a cooperative agenda.
2AC AT: China Monopoly Good (China Econ Impact)
Chinese economy resilient – urbanization, investment, and stimulus prove
Reuters 11
(Kevin Yao, June 23, “Analysis: China economy resilient, for now”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/23/us-china-economygrowth-idUSTRE75M1AO20110623) RA
BEIJING (Reuters) – China's growth is slowing under the weight of Beijing's anti-inflation campaign and weaker global demand, but
any investors
betting on a hard landing would be underestimating the resilience of the world's
second-largest economy. China's relentless urbanization continue to drive expansion even as
Beijing seeks to check unfettered investment by growth-obsessed local authorities, while
stronger domestic consumption is providing a firmer cushion against external shocks. China bears
may have been emboldened on Thursday by a purchasing managers' survey showing growth in the factory sector nearly stalled in
June as new export orders fell. But skeptics
who are expecting an abrupt economic slowdown may have
miscalculated Beijing's resolve to act quickly if needed to revive growth, especially if inflation eases later
this year as expected, reducing the need for fresh monetary tightening measures, analysts say. "The economy is set up for
growth. You've still got urbanization and industrialization to come and all the incentives at local
government levels are still to do with encouraging growth," said Stephen Green, an economist
at Standard Chartered Bank in Hong Kong. "People always over-worry about a China hard
landing. Clearly there are a lot of problems with the economy but people may underestimate the government's
ability to muddle through." Green expects some policy relaxation later this year as price pressures start to moderate. NO
HARD LANDING? Global investors are unnerved by any sign of a slowdown in China, a key global growth engine, even as the U.S.
economic recovery loses momentum and Europe struggles with a sovereign debt crisis. An abrupt slowdown in China could hammer
international financial markets and stifle demand for commodities from iron ore to soybeans. The economy has expanded at an
average annual pace of 10 percent in the past three decades. Fears of a hard landing have gained traction as a recent stream of data
showed the turbo-charged economy is cooling, but for now China
shows no signs of following the West with
growth levels falling well below long-term trends. Indeed, most market watchers typically define
a hard landing in the Chinese context as a sudden dip in quarterly GDP growth below 8 percent, a level
advanced economies can only dream about. The 8 percent threshold is, more importantly, a political line in the sand
for Beijing, which it deems to be the minimum level needed to create enough jobs to ensure social stability. The last time the
economy showed signs of a sudden slump, during the depths of the global financial crisis in late
2008, Beijing announced a 4 trillion yuan ($600 billion) stimulus plan, quickly returning to doubledigit growth. While few argue with the success of that scheme, many economists say the spending binge also sowed the seeds
of inflation and created excesses such as unrestrained lending and property bubbles which are aggravating imbalances in the
economy, leaving it more vulnerable if the current "soft patch" in Western demand turns out to be a prolonged downturn. MORE
STIMULUS? Policymakers will certainly have more room to consider fresh pump-priming if inflation peaks in June or July near 6
percent, as widely expected, and then moderates steadily in the second-half of the year. Dong Tao, an economist at Credit Suisse,
believes the central bank will not rush to relax policy for fear of fueling further property price rises, but said the government will
unleash its spending power to prevent growth from slowing too much. "Should
the threat of a hard landing emerge,
we would expect fiscal stimulus to come to the rescue, instead of monetary easing. Providing
funding to policy housing and speeding up infrastructure projects would be the easy options," he
said. China has already announced an ambitious plan to start building and upgrading 36 million affordable homes between 20112015, with 10 million to be completed this year, to quell growing public discontent over rapidly rising house prices. Many
economists, while trimming their growth forecasts for China, don't believe the current
slowdown will amount to a slump akin to that during the global financial crisis. Most still expect GDP
growth of more than 9 percent in the second quarter from a year earlier compared with 9.7 percent in the first quarter, with fullyear growth seen at about 9 percent. "I'm
not worried about the risk of a hard landing in China. It's a lowprobability event this year and next year," said Gao Shanwen, chief economist at China Essence
Securities in Beijing. After all, a gentle easing in growth is exactly what Beijing wants and is in line with its policy to priorities'
efforts to cool inflation. "The slowdown is essentially part of the deal. you need to a slowdown to reduce excesses and control
inflation," said Kevin Lai, economist at Daiwa Global Markets in Hong Kong.
Chinese economy is self-correcting – threats of crisis are overblown and not
supported
Ulrich 10 - Managing Director and Chairman of China Equities at J.P. Morgan (Jing, March 3, J.P. Morgan’s Hands-On China Series,
Google, “Debunking the myth of a China collapse”) RA
There have always been cynics regarding China’s economic growth and without joining the ranks of the doomsayers, it is easy to
veer towards pessimistic conjecture simply by observing the changing landscape in China’s rapidly developing cities. Any casual
visitor will marvel at the sprawling complexes of newly-built apartments and office towers – admittedly many units at these
developments are typically owned by speculative investors holding out for capital appreciation. The worst-case fears concerning
China’s property market are based upon a layer of truth and we ourselves have highlighted the untenable nature of price increases
in some big Chinese cities, as well as the possibility that last year’s property boom was partly fuelled by misdirected bank loans.
However,
there are crucial differences between China’s real estate markets and those of the U.S.
(and indeed Dubai), which require that we view the apparent building bubble through the lens of
China’s unique circumstances. Unlike the dramatic increase in household leverage that
precipitated the U.S. sub-prime crisis, Chinese household debt amounts to approximately 17% of
GDP, compared to roughly 96% in the US and 62% in the Euro area. While the level of Chinese household leverage
has increased in recent years, it has done so from a very low base. HANDS-ON CHINA REPORT – MAR 3, 2010 With respect to
residential property, homebuyers in China are required to make minimum downpayments of 30% before receiving a mortgage, and
at least 40% for a second home purchase. Even at the height of the government’s stimulus efforts, the minimum down-payment
requirement for first homes was only lowered to 20%. The Chinese cultural tendency of shunning debt explains the many anecdotal
accounts we hear about homebuyers putting down amounts that substantially exceed these minimum requirements. This is made
possible by the massive amount of savings that Chinese households have accumulated, while in comparison, the U.S. savings rate
stood below 1% in the years preceding the housing crisis. Although price increases in the Chinese residential market appear rapid
(over 20% in 2009), such headline figures cannot be viewed in isolation of the broader trend in income growth. Over the past 5
years, urban household incomes grew at a 13.2% compound annual rate, compared to an 11.9% CAGR in home prices. This is not to
say that pockets of overheating cannot be found in some regional markets. In Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hangzhou, for
instance, prices did in fact outpace income growth by a margin of more than 5 percentage points over the same period. But again,
we see this as a symptom of new urban wealth being put to speculative use, rather than the profligate use of leverage. The
combination of excessive leverage and mortgage securitization were at the epicenter of the U.S.
sub-prime crisis – both of these factors are absent in the Chinese context. The commercial segment of
real estate has inspired just as much concern, with prices rising 16% in 2009, despite low rental yields and prime office vacancy rates
as high as 21% and 14% in Beijing and Shanghai, respectively. However occupancy and rental rates have started to pick up for prime
properties – many of the current vacancies are at the lower end. While returns for new projects may end up lower than expected,
China’s urbanization process is far from over and vacant space will be absorbed over time. The crux
of the problem with the Chinese real estate sector is that property is seen by the country’s investing class as a store of value, within
an economy that offers its citizens persistently low deposit rates and limited investment options. The absence of a recurring
property holding tax allows speculative homebuyers to disregard rental yields in hopes of reaping capital appreciation in the nottoodistant future. We share many of the concerns about flawed incentives and overheating in the Chinese property market – but even
if property prices were to undergo a correction, this would not trigger the type of economic and
financial devastation that might arise in an over-leveraged economy. Although stability in the
property market is critical to sustaining the Chinese economy’s recovery, policymakers are
clearly concerned about the risk of asset bubbles and the threat that excessive speculation could
drive prices beyond affordability for average homebuyers. The government is also well aware of the need to
increase the holding costs for property investment and is weighing the potential value of introducing a national property tax. This
measure might be introduced in the medium-term and should serve to deflate prices in some overheating markets. In the
meantime, authorities have re-imposed a business tax on homeowners who resell their properties within a period of two years and
could hike this further to deter speculation. The perennial ups and downs of China’s property sector arise from the fact that the
country’s closed capital account and underdeveloped capital markets leave its citizens with few investment options. Investment
interest in residential property has fuelled a mismatch between the stock of higher-ed apartment buildings and practical needs for
affordable housing. This imbalance must be resolved over time by spurring the development of affordable housing, which is
currently one of the government’s HANDS-ON CHINA REPORT – MAR 3, 2010 main policy initiatives.
In the long run,
financial reform, including capital account liberalization, will provide Chinese investors with
broader investment options, reducing the role of real estate as a form of capital preservation. Worries about public sector
debt A more recent warning issued by some China bears is that of hidden debt risk among Chinese local government investment
companies – which according to state media reports, received approximately 40% of last year’s RMB9.6 trillion in new loans. Official
estimates of the total outstanding loan balance for such investment entities exceed RMB6 trillion – or roughly 20% of Chinese GDP –
a figure that has been criticized by some as being too low. According to a Bloomberg report quoting Victor Shih of Northwestern
University, the worst case scenario arising from hidden borrowing by China’s local investment intermediaries is a large-scale financial
crisis around 2012. Since many shovel-ready local infrastructure projects were brought forward as part of the stimulus plan, nearterm returns on investment are likely to be subdued. However, as J.P. Morgan analysts Samuel Chen and Sunil Garg have pointed
out, Chinese bank loans for public sector investment projects carry implicit or explicit sovereign guarantees, and are thus almost akin
to a bond issuance for a public works project. Moreover, the majority of projects at local government levels carry land collateral and
explicit fiscal revenue guarantees. Over the past year, the Chinese government has also stepped up efforts to enforce tax collection
across the corporate sector. This effort, when combined with improving business conditions, brought last years’ fiscal deficit to a
narrower-thanbudgeted 2.2% of GDP. Chinese economic planners are already aiming to achieve a slowdown in infrastructure
investment, shifting focus toward completing existing projects rather than funding new construction. Growth in infrastructure
investment slowed to 42.5% in FY09, from 50.7% in the first half. On a year-over-year basis, the slowdown has been more
pronounced, with infrastructure investment growth peaking at 55.5% in May, vs. 31.9% in December. Meanwhile, China’s banking
regulator has ordered banks to closely follow lending guidelines to ensure that all lending to local government investment
companies are backed by actual projects and that project risks are properly accounted for. Looking ahead, while certain local
administrations might struggle to service debt, the magnitude of public sector debt risks do not appear as severe as some have
suggested. According to IMF forecasts, China’s government debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to reach 22% in 2010, compared to 94% in
the U.S. and 227% in Japan. Even if the more alarming estimates of local government debt were included, the ratio would only grow
to approximately 51% of estimated 2010 GDP. As a pillar of demand for a number of economies and for the commodities complex,
China's ability to regulate its economy has far reaching implications for global markets. One
must not underestimate the scale of future demand in a country that is urbanizing at a rate of
15 million people a year. Today, many observers are concerned that China’s economy has grown
too rapidly, and are all too-ready to point to pockets of overcapacity as proof of an imminent
system-wide collapse. While we agree that certain vulnerable areas of the economy deserve
closer monitoring, we find little support for the sceptics' views of an imminent crisis.
2AC AT: Enviro DA
Robotics don’t link to the environment DA---it doesn’t tear up the ocean floor
Currie, 13 Adam, Rare Earth Investing News, “The Pacific Dream: An Underwater Rare Earth
Behemoth,” http://rareearthinvestingnews.com/9349-underwater-rare-earth-deep-sea-chinajapan-ocean-floor-geophysics-discovery.html
Environmentally sound¶ Over half of the metal in this underwater deposit is on the heavier
end of the spectrum, “twice the level of China’s key mines and without the radioactive by-product thorium that makes the metals so hard to mine,” according to researchers cited by The
Telegraph.¶ Commenting on the environmental implications of mining REEs from the seabed , Kowalczyk noted
that there will likely not be any major implications and that if issues arise, they will most likely be associated with the
amount of material that needs to be moved to access the ore-bearing horizons, which are subhorizontal and exist over large areas. ¶ Describing the kind of extraction
process that would be used to retrieve REEs from the seabed, Kowalczyk stated it will
undoubtedly be robotic.¶ “It is very unlikely it will be an open-cut type of extraction sequence
as this would impact considerable amounts of material. Possible candidates are in situ leaching,
robotic mining machines that are analogues of tunnel boring machines and perhaps subhorizontal
drilling similar to that used in the extractions of tight gas from shale formations on land.Ӧ He
continued, “it may be that a process similar to that used for roll-front uranium deposits on land may
be adaptable to this environment also. If the new high-grade nodule type deposits are
confirmed to be extensive and not buried deeply, this will simplify the mining process.”
The plan is net better than status quo mining and could to lead to
environmental protection
UNEP 12 (United Nations Environmental Programme, “Green Economy in a Blue World”,
http://www.unep.org/pdf/Green_Economy_Blue_Full.pdf)
2.2 Environmental Opportunities It may at first glance appear that deep-sea mining offers very few
environmental 'opportunities' but advocates of deep-sea mining have argued that focusing mineral exploration
on the deep sea is significantly better for the environment than the continued exploitation of
minerals on land {Branan, 2007 and Schrope, 2007). The reasons put forward include less waste, smaller
mine footprint, reusable infrastructure, lower greenhouse gas generation and easier site
remediation. The trend of terrestrial mining to exploit ores of increasingly lower grades results in larger
and larger amounts of waste material being generated. The comparatively high grade of deep-sea ores and the
general absence of overburden means that, in comparison toon-land mining, there is likely to be a much smaller mine
footprint and much less waste generation {Scott, 2001). Historically mining waste has often caused serious pollution
- contamination of waterways, increased sedimentation and acid mine drainage - but due to the minimal amount of
waste theorized to be generated at deep-sea mine sites, toxic waste is considered to pose less
of a problem with marine mining. Deep-sea mining is not likely to displace most land-based mining, however, unless
policy actions are implemented to limit or at least charge for environmental impacts associated with mining (see text box). Deepsea mining activity may provide environmental spin-offs, which include increased knowledge of
deep-sea biological communities. For example, private company funded research in the Manus Basin, Papua New
Guinea, has already produced a significant body of literature on vent communities and the physio-chemical conditions surrounding
hydrothermal systems. The value of these scientific discoveries is difficult to quantify, but it is clear that the costs of conducting such
research in the absence of commercial exploration would be high and therefore may not occur. Increased knowledge assists with the
management and conservation of deep-sea environments. Deep-sea
mining activity and the habitat-mapping data it
could generate can be used to define meaningful marine protected areas in regions of the deep
sea where there is currently very sparse information.
Don’t have to drill---can scoop it up
Goldenberg, 14 Suzanne, US environment correspondent, “Marine mining: Underwater gold
rush sparks fears of ocean catastrophe,”
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/02/underwater-gold-rush-marinemining-fears-ocean-threat
Lodge expects the pace to continue, with rising demand for metals for emerging economies, and for technologies such as hybrid cars
Extracting the metals will not require drilling. The ore deposits are in nodules
strewn across the rolling plains of sediment that carpet the ocean floor. Oceanographers say
they resemble knobbly black potatoes, ranging in size from a couple of centimetres to 30cm. Mining
companies say it may be possible to scoop them up with giant tongs and then siphon them
up to vessels waiting on the surface.
No risk—their studies are all hype.
Begley 10 (Sharon Begley is a environmental writer for Newsweek, 9/20/11, “Is Deep-Sea Mining Bad for the Environment?”,
and smart phones.
http://www.newsweek.com/deep-sea-mining-bad-environment-71983)
To the surprise of
many scientists, however, the risk mining poses to the vent communities may
be smaller than originally feared. For one thing, seafloor deposits are much more concentrated than
those on land: at a site 3,000 feet down off Papua New Guinea called Solwara 1, where Nautilus expects to begin mining in 2012,
deposits contain 6.7 percent copper. That compares with 0.46 percent for typical deposits on land. Pound for pound, seafloor ore
also has more gold, zinc, and silver than land deposits do. That’s why seafloor mining should make economic sense in the first place.
It’s also why, to extract a given quantity of metal, less
material needs to be processed, which is the most
environmentally destructive part of mining . (Processing requires toxic compounds and leaves
vast piles of waste.) Seafloor mining might therefore be less destructive than mining on land,
which brings such not-exactly-benign consequences as mountaintop removal, mercury pollution, and destruction of watersheds. In
addition, the “cutter suction” technology pioneered by Nautilus—some version of which China presumably would adopt—
minimizes how much sediment is stirred up , says Samantha Smith, Nautilus’s environmental manager.
Remote-controlled machines smash the sulfide deposits, which are then hoovered up through
a riser pipe to a vessel on the surface. Although the process destroys the chimneys that encase the sulfide-rich
plumes, the vents themselves survive. The challenge, says Duke’s Van Dover, “is to ensure that cumulative
effects of mining activities do not exceed the rate of recovery of the organisms that rely on
these habitats for survival.”
The vents are resilient
Begley 10 (Sharon Begley is a environmental writer for Newsweek, 9/20/11, “Is Deep-Sea Mining Bad for the Environment?”,
http://www.newsweek.com/deep-sea-mining-bad-environment-71983)
Another reason for optimism is that the vents can withstand disasters such as undersea volcanoes. A huge
one near the East Pacific Rise erupted in 1991, releasing molten lava that basically paved the seafloor and choked off the geyser,
obliterating the vent creatures. Yet microorganisms and larger animals recolonized the vent
within two years, as larvae from neighboring vents arrived and set up housekeepin g. (Of course, if
larvae from a species different from the one wiped out arrive first, the new colony will differ from the original, with unknown
consequences for deep-sea biodiversity.) That
suggests a resilience that bodes well for recolonization after
the mining operation moves on , too, though only for vents on tectonically active sites such as that where the eruption
occurred. Vents such as those on the Mid-Atlantic Ridge, for example, are not likely to be frequently overrun by lava and are
relatively far apart, suggesting they may be less resilient. Still,
“vent organisms seem to be adapted to
withstand relatively frequent natural and severe disasters,” says Van Dover. “Seafloor mining
might be no worse than what nature delivers, though the effects of mining come on top of
what nature does.”
Aff would mine in safe ways.
Begley 10 (Sharon Begley is a environmental writer for Newsweek, 9/20/11, “Is Deep-Sea Mining Bad for the Environment?”,
http://www.newsweek.com/deep-sea-mining-bad-environment-71983)
The surest way
to spare the vent creatures would be to mine only inactive vents, where the
geysers have stopped and the ecosystem has died . Nautilus has not agreed to that, but says it will take
steps to preserve vents. “We’ve put in place a number of measures to ensure that ecosystems
and biodiversity are maintained, ” says Smith. It plans to use undersea robots to move some vent
animals away from the area being mined, establish refuges from which vent creatures can seed
ecosystems recovering from mining,
tackles adjacent sites.
and allow one vent community to recover from mining before the company
AT: Midterms
No one cares about rare earths
Dobranksy 13 (Steve Dobransky is an Adjunct Professor at Cleveland State University.
He is completing his Ph.D. studies at
Kent State University, majoring in International Relations and Justice Studies. He has an M.A. from Ohio University and a B.A. from
Cleveland State University, October, 2013, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, “Rare Earth Elements and U.S. Foreign Policy”, Rare Earth
Elements and U.S. Foreign Policy)
The political
dimension of REEs has not been developed or debated fully by Americans ,or by
the rest of the world. Many politicians and corporate executives have transnational interests and cannot argue for more
aggressive policies without risking possible severe consequences. Most of the Wes tern public are not aware of
REE s and, thus have not demanded redress of the issue. Political scientists and other
scholars in general have not been attuned to the REE issue
and, therefore, have not made any significant
attempt to examine the issue, let alone make recommendations. A number of journalists and think tank members have been lighting
the torch and waving it to get others’ attention but so far few people have taken notice. With such relatively
the general public or intense demands by a fervent and powerful few,
little interest by
the REE issue is riding below the
political radar screen to the grave disadvantage of all. This issue has the potential to bring down America and greatly undermine its
well-being and security, as well as the rest of the world. American
prosperity and stability, and the world’s
strategic balance, may well hang in the balance on the REE issue. If China consolidates its position and
maintains a long-term monopoly of REEs, then it will ensure that most high-end and valuable products with REEs will be
manufactured eventually in China and, thus, much of the world’s wealth will shift to China and be utilized there. China, then, will
attain the level of the new—and, possibly, sole—superpower in the world in the coming decades.27
***AT: CPs
2AC FG Key (Generic)
Federal Gov Key to Mining Operations
UNEP 12 (United Nations Environmental Programme, “Green Economy in a Blue World”,
http://www.unep.org/pdf/Green_Economy_Blue_Full.pdf)
There are several reasons why comprehensive and well-implemented legislative and
regulatory frameworks are essential to the governance of mining activity. As a first step, investors
require a minimum of rules before making a positive investment decision , because of 1} the
long-term nature of the investment ; 2) the extremely high capital intensity of the industry,
especially in mining; and 3) the immobility of assets once built . In devising legal and contractual
frameworks, it is important to entrench internationally accepted standards and practices
concerning natural resource sector administration and management. This includes making
appropriate provisions mining in legislation which reflect best internal practices for
transparency in decision-making, together with measures which are designed to uphold accepted standards of
corporate responsibility for companies, as well as enhancing the developmental benefits for
local communities.
2AC FG Key (Protectionism)
Government is key to obtain the knowledge infrastructure to protect US
interests --- the CP causes protectionism
Parthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of
Security,”
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf
To protect the U.S. government’s ability to manage critical minerals appropriately, Congress¶
should protect the government’s role in analyzing critical mineral vulnerabilities and¶
producing its own data .¶ As congressional leaders¶ in both political parties strive to reduce spend¶ -¶ ing and seek
efficiencies, they should maintain¶ a strong U.S. government capacity for research¶ and analysis – a
public good that is both necessary to protect U.S. interests and undersupplied¶ by the
private sector . Without vigilance, the¶ United States risks being blindsided by regular¶ trade
disputes and supply disruptions , and by¶ countries exerting political leverage.¶ Improving¶ how the
U.S. government handles mineral issues¶ should not require major increases in manpower¶ or spending. But the
administration and Congress¶ must maintain the existing capacities and preserve the
knowledge infrastructure that the¶ government has redeveloped in the past few years¶ (See Key
U.S. Government Offices box).
2AC FG Key (Regulations)
Outer Continent Shelf Lands Act confirms federal jurisidiction
RSOC, 95 The Resource Agency of California, July, “California's Ocean Resources: An Agenda
for the Future,” Chapter 3 http://resources.ca.gov/ocean/html/chapt_3.html
Outer Continental Shelf (seaward of 3 nautical miles from shore): the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of
1953 (43 U.S.C.A. 1331 et seq.), passed in coordination with the Submerged Lands Act, confirmed
federal jurisdiction over the resources beyond three nautical miles from shore and created a
legal process for developing those resources (such as oil and gas).
The FG has the jurisdiction for the 197 miles
RSOC, 95 The Resource Agency of California, July, “California's Ocean Resources: An Agenda
for the Future,” Chapter 3 http://resources.ca.gov/ocean/html/chapt_3.html
Exclusive Economic Zone (3 nautical miles to 200 miles offshore): pursuant to a 1983 proclamation by President
Reagan (Proclamation No. 5030), the United States now asserts jurisdiction over the living and nonliving resources within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). While coastal states have primary jurisdiction and
control over the first three miles of the EEZ and the federal government has primary jurisdiction over and
controls the remaining 197 miles , the Coastal Zone Management Act provides coastal states with substantial authority
to influence federal actions beyond three nautical miles. The
assertion of jurisdiction under the EEZ provides
a basis for U.S. economic exploration and exploitation , scientific research, and protection of
the environment.
Federal government, rather than states, have control over the coastal waters
RSOC, 95 The Resource Agency of California, July, “California's Ocean Resources: An Agenda
for the Future,” Chapter 3 http://resources.ca.gov/ocean/html/chapt_3.html
Debate over who controls and manages the waters and resources found offshore the United States
began in the late 1700's and continues to this day. Issues in this debate include key federal and State
relationships which must be better understood for effective management of California's ocean resources.¶ Soon after the
founding of the United States, the newly formed federal government asserted sovereignty over a territorial sea extending three
miles from the coast. Moreover, the
coastal states asserted the ability to develop ocean resources out
to three miles. Over the past 45 years, however, a number of events have occurred which
drastically modified management of the offshore area. In 1947, the United States Supreme Court
upset what had appeared to be settled law and determined that the United States , rather than
coastal states, had
paramount rights over the nation's coastal waters and resources
[United States v.
California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947)]. This decision was surprising to coastal states, and set the stage for a debate resulting in the
enactment of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (granting coastal states ownership of the lands and resources out to three nautical
miles from shore). Also enacted was the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, establishing federal
jurisdiction over the resources beyond three nautical miles from shore and creating a legal
process for developing those resources.¶
In the early 1970's, Congress recognized that activities beyond states'
control and jurisdiction could significantly affect coastal states. Congress enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA; 16
U.S.C. 1451 et seq.) in 1972, providing a crucial link between coastal states and federal activities, or federally permitted activities,
which occur just beyond state waters. As an incentive for states to develop management plans for their coastal resources, the
Congress granted states the ability to review, and in some circumstances stop, federally permitted activities which "affect" the
resources of the coastal zone, if those activities are not consistent with the federally approved state coastal program. However, the
CZMA allows the U.S. Department of Commerce to override a state's objection to a federal
permit activity if the Secretary for Commerce finds that the objection is not supported
by the
approved coastal management program, or the activity is otherwise required in the interests of national security.
Federal government has control over the outer continental shelf
Virginia Places, 9 “Virginia and the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS),”
http://www.virginiaplaces.org/boundaries/ocs.html
In 1953 Congress also passed the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Land Act, endorsing the national government's
claim to the ocean resources issued originally by President Harry Truman. International claims of rights to control navigation, fishing,
and economic development of mineral resources led to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. ¶ The Department of the
Interior determines the boundary of Federal/state jurisdiction , when defining parcel
boundaries for leasing OCS resources such as sand, heavy minerals, and especially
hydrocarbons (oil and gas). The Department has adopted the mean lower low water (MLLW) line, as drawn on National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administation (NOAA) - National Ocean Service nautical charts, as the coast line. (NOAA uses the average of the lower low water height of
each tidal day to draw the the mean lower low water or MLLW line.) Because the boundary changes as storms, currents, or even construction projects
reshape the shoreline, the Federal
government is partnering with the states to adopt a fixed set of
geographic coordinates to "immobilize" the boundary, eliminating future changes and
minimizing confusion regarding jurisdiction.8¶ More legal wrangling was required after 1953 to clarify the relative power of
the states/Federal government over the Outer Continental Shelf, beyond the 3 nautical mile limit. In United States v. Maine,
Virginia claimed that its colonial charters granted the state exclusive jurisdiction of Atlantic
Ocean resources for 100 miles beyond the coastline.9 The US Supreme Court rejected that claim
in 1975, affirming state control over the "inner" Continental Shelf but ensuring Federal
authority over the Outer Continental Shelf.¶ International standards for ocean boundaries are established in an
international treaty. President Clinton signed the Convention on the Law of the Sea treaty in 1994, after it was modified to resolve President Reagan's
concerns regarding international controls on deep sea mining of polymetallic (iron/manganese) nodules. However, Senate approval is required to
finalize the US commitment to the treaty. Congress has never ratified it, declining once again in 2012 due in part to concerns that the International
Seabed Authority could limit US sovereignty. (The International Seabed Authority is headquartered in Kingston, Jamaica, and is not part of the United
Nations.) 10¶ Consistent with the treaty (even though Congress has not ratified it), the United States claims a Territorial Sea for 12 nautical miles
offshore. The starting point for defining offshore vs. inland waters is the "baseline," defined by the US as the line of mean low low water (MLLW) as
mapped on the most-detailed (large scale) NOAA nautical charts.11¶ The US exercises sovereignty over its Territorial Sea, the air space above it, and
the seabed and subsoil beneath it, but foreign-flag ships enjoy the right of innocent passage. The Federal government also claims a Contiguous Zone
out to 24 miles (12 miles further than the Territorial Sea), allowing enforcement of federal customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws (but
otherwise the US does not exercise sovereignty in the Contiguous Zone). Finally, the US claims an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extending from 12-200
nautical miles offshore, with exclusive rights to develop and manage marine resources - including energy and mineral resources on the seabed, such as
oil/natural gas and iron/manganese nodules.¶ While the
Federal government claims full ownership of lands
outside the state claims , in 1986 Congress created the Revenue Sharing Boundary in section 8(g) of the OCS Lands Act amendments so
the Federal government will share a "fair and equitable" portion of offshore revenues. The 8(g) Zone extends 3 miles beyond the state waters, and the
Federal government gives coastal states 27% of revenues from oil/gas and renewable energy leases (i.e., offshore wind turbines) located in the 8(g)
Zone.12
Federal government controls the land
Carlson and Mayer, 13 Ann E. Carlson is the Shirley Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law
and the co¶ -¶ Faculty¶ Di¶ rector of the Emmett Center on Climate Change and the Environment.
Andrew Mayer is a 2012¶ graduate of the UCLA School of Law and is currently an associate at a
law fi¶ rm. We thank Rich¶ Ambrose,¶ William Boyd, Megan Herzog, Jon Michaels, Jon Varat,
Jonathan Z¶ asloff, participants in¶ workshops at the University of Colorado¶ -¶ Duke
Environmental Roundtable and the UCLA School of¶ Law School, and research assistant Will
Marshall, “Reverse Pre-Emption,”
http://www.boalt.org/elq/documents/Carlson_Mayer_Reverse_Preemption.pdf
Coastal states own the land in their “territorial sea,” which includes “all¶ lands permanently or periodically covered by tidal waters¶
.¶ .¶ . seaward to a line¶ three geographical miles distant from the coast¶ line of each such state.”¶ 104¶ The¶ lands
the states’ territorial seas¶ —¶ the outer continental shelf, or¶ “OCS”¶ —¶
beyond
are owned by the
federal government .¶ 105¶ The Outer Continental Shelf¶ Lands Act of 1953 granted the
Secretary of the Interior the authority to lease¶ the OCS for oil and gas exploration and drilling.¶ 106¶
Absent the CZMA, states¶ would not be able to affect federal management of OCS lands .¶ 107¶ Given
that¶ the CZMA was inspired in part by the Santa Barbara oil spill of 1969, it is¶ unsurprising that most of the ma¶ jor disputes over
the consistency requirement¶ have involved the federal leasing of tracts on the OCS¶ —¶ and thus outside a¶ state’s coastal zone¶ —
¶ for oil and gas exploration or extraction
2AC AT: China CP
With increasing demand the magnitude and ease of access of deep sea REE’s
makes them more viable than the most efficient land source
[in context of china but can be read on land CP]
Tom Green, Editor in chief of the Robotics Business Review, Deep Sea Dive for Rare Earth
Elements, Robotics business review, 5-12-2014,
http://www.roboticsbusinessreview.com/article/deep_sea_dive_for_rare_earth_elements//BD
S)
Rare metals with names rarely heard After a year of falling prices and depleting customer inventories, buyers of Rare Earth Elements
(REEs) are coming back into this $10B market, but now supplies are getting scarce and prices are beginning to soar. With populations
consuming metals and minerals on the rise, especially new middle-class consumers in China and India, demand
is set to
skyrocket. Future supply chains and national economies will witness major disruptions, according to
a PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) study: Minerals and metals scarcity in manufacturing: The ticking time
bomb. Three deep-ocean mining companies, Nautilus Minerals; UK Seabed Resources (the British division of Lockheed Martin);
and DeepGreen Resources, plan to mine the sea floor under the Pacific Ocean (most notably in the Bismarck Sea off Papua New
Guinea) using a combination of remotely operated or autonomous underwater vehicles, pumps, suction and riser pipes to extract
the minerals. papua mines These REEs, with odd monikers like lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, promethium, neodymium,
samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, and lutetium, are not household
names, but what they do makes every household—and the people in those households—live better lives. For example, most of our
fancy electronic gadgets—like our Smartphones and laptops—depend on REEs to operate. Better
yet for this Pacific sea
hunt, the REEs aren’t alone on the sea floor: “staggering” levels of magnesium, gold, silver,
cobalt, nickel and copper are there for the taking as well; much of which are easy pickings as
mineral-rich nodules scattered over the sea bottom. Frontrunner: Nautilus Minerals Of the three contenders,
the Canadian company, Nautilus Minerals (TSX:NUS), is the more ready to mine. “Nautilus plans to deploy three machines, operated
by remote control. Operators sitting on a ship stationed above the deposit will control mine-bots on the seafloor: an initial cutter for
clearance; a bulk cutter to do most of the work; and a machine to collect and transport the material to a pumping station. slurry ship
“The material will then be pumped up in slurry form to the ship, where it will be de-watered and set to shore for processing. For
nodules, robots will roam the seabed.” Critical to high-tech everything REEs are metals with unique physical, chemical and lightemitting properties vital to hybrid vehicles, rechargeable batteries, wind turbines (renewable energy) mobile (cell) phones, compact
fluorescent light bulbs, laptop computers, disk drives, catalytic converters, and LED, Plasma, and LCD display panels. Neodymium, for
example, is responsible for ensuring that the likes of Smartphones, hard drives, earphones, even MRI scanners, do the job they are
designed to do. Far
from abundant on land With over 30 percent of the world’s known REE
deposits and by far the cheapest extraction process, China supplies 95 percent of the world’s
REEs. However, China, with a rising middle class and booming domestic market, is steadily
reducing export quotas. The Word Trade Organization (WTO), of which China is a member, ruled in March of 2014 that
China was hoarding and taking unfair advantage of the market. That decision was two years in coming, and now China will appeal
the current WTO judgment, which might take another two years. Byron Capital analyst, John Hykawy said “I’ve heard from so many
critical materials buyers at large corporations that they want
security of supply. And security of supply to them
means avoiding Chinese supply at all costs because they got fooled once. They don’t want to get fooled again.” 2to 3-miles down: REEs not alone on the seabed In the meantime, REEs are again getting to be in short
supply, and with demand forecast to progressively increase, the world drastically needs new
suppliers of REEs. The London Metal Exchange lists neodymium at $800 Kg; terbium metal at 1,900 Kg; and scandium metal
15,500.00 per Kg. Relatively inexpensive is lanthanum at $13 Kg. However, the battery in a Toyota Prius hybrid requires more than
10kg of lanthanum. Now multiply $130 times millions of Toyota’s and the need for lots of lanthanum comes into focus. Stephen Ball,
chief executive officer of Lockheed Martin UK, owner
of UK Seabed Resources, told the BBC “It’s another
source of minerals – there’s a shortage and there’s difficulty getting access, so there’s
strategic value for the UK government in getting an opportunity to get these minerals.” UK Seabed
Resources says surveys have revealed huge numbers of nodules – small lumps of rock rich in valuable
metals – lying on the ocean floor south of Hawaii and west of Mexico. The exact value of these resources
is impossible to calculate reliably, but a leading UN official described the scale of mineral deposits in the
world’s oceans as “staggering” with “several hundred years’ worth of cobalt and nickel.” “These
tennis-ball sized nodules,
found approximately four kilometers (2.5 miles) beneath the ocean’s surface, can
provide millions of tons of copper, nickel, cobalt and manganese, as well as rare earth
minerals, that are used in the construction, aerospace, alternative energy, and communications industries, among others,”
reports Lockheed Martin. The Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology and the University of Tokyo confirmed
the discovery of a “huge new deposit” on the Pacific seabed, claiming the “deposit can be
mined at very low cost and will be able to produce materials that are 20 to 30 times more
concentrated than those currently being mined in China.” Robot submersibles hold the key Located
approximately 5,700 meters or 3.5 miles down, the Japanese scientists “claim the deposits to be approximately 6.8 million metric
tons of rare earths, equivalent to 230 years of local demand.” subsea mining Although subsea mining at depths of 500 feet or less
has been carried out for some time, deep
sea projects have had to await technology, which is now
coming on line, funded by companies like Nautilus Minerals, with subsea robot mining tools built by technology partners like
Soil Machine Dynamics. Then too, there are plenty of environmental issues about the potential impact on an ecosystem 3-miles
deep—the flora and fauna of that lightless place we know little to nothing about. An adverse report was published in 2012: Out of
our Depth: Mining the Ocean Floor in Papua New Guinea. Also, according to Mining Magazine, The UN’s International Seabed
Authority (ISA) is involved, reporting that these new sea floor mining areas “provide the habitat for a variety of animal life previously
unknown to science, and that over 500 new species have been discovered…and are of great interest to science.” Yet the ISA didn’t
say no to the Bismarck Sea (Solwara I) operation. The ISA basically said “be careful”: “The uniqueness and fragility of this
geographically fragmented ecosystem, and the value it holds for fundamental biological studies of metabolism, evolution and
adaptation, will have to be taken into account in planning for mineral exploration and exploitation.” Below is a Nautilus-produced
video that explains the Solwara I mining venture in depth. . About Nautilus Minerals: A Canadian registered company, Nautilus is
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange TSX:NUS. Its corporate office is in Brisbane, Australia. Its major shareholders include MB
Holding Company LLC, an Oman based group with interests in mining, oil & gas, which holds a 28.00% interest, Metalloinvest, the
largest iron ore producer in Europe and the CIS, which has a 20.75% holding and global mining group Anglo American, which holds a
5.95% interest.
Lax environmental restrictions means the cost of producing REEs in china is
externalized onto the environment
Jonathan Kaiman, Beijing Guardian writer, The Guardian, Rare earth mining in China: the bleak
social and environmental costs, 3-20-2014, http://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/rare-earth-mining-china-social-environmental-costs//BDS)
Although Wang Jianguo knows little about rare earths mining, he is an accidental expert on its consequences. A short walk from the
43-year-old former farmer's dilapidated brick home in Xinguang Number One Village, is the world's largest rare earths mine tailings
pond – an endless expanse of viscous grey sludge built in the 1950s under Mao Zedong. The
pond, owned by the Inner
Steel, lacks a proper lining and for the past 20
years its toxic contents have been seeping into groundwater, according to villagers and state media reports.
It is trickling towards the nearby Yellow River, a major drinking water source for much of
northern China, at a rate of 20 to 30 metres a year, a local expert told the influential Chinese magazine Caixin. "In the
Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare-Earth Hi-Tech Company, or Baotou
beginning, there was no tap water here, so we all drank from wells," Wang said. "The water looked fine, but it smelled really bad." In
the 1990s, when China's rare earths production kicked into full gear, his sheep died and his cabbage crops withered. Most of his
neighbours have moved away. Seven have died of cancer. His teeth have grown yellow and crooked; they jut out at strange angles
from blackened gums. Rare earths are a group of 17 elements: "iron grey to silvery lustrous metals" that are "typically soft,
malleable, and ductile; and usually reactive", according to the US Geological Survey. They're crucial in manufacturing a broad array
of high-tech products, such as smartphones, wind turbines, camera lenses, magnets and missile defence systems. China produces
more than 85% of the world's supply, about half of which comes from Baotou, a city of 2.5 million in China's Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region, 650km northwest of Beijing. Processing
rare earths is a dirty business. Their ore is often
laced with radioactive materials such as thorium, and separating the wheat from the chaff requires
huge amounts of carcinogenic toxins – sulphates, ammonia and hydrochloric acid. Processing
one ton of rare earths produces 2,000 tons of toxic waste; Baotou's rare earths enterprises
produce 10m tons of wastewater per year. They're pumped into tailings dams, like the one by
Wang's village, 12km west of the city centre. China began mining the minerals on a mass scale in the mid 1980s, and after
nearly two decades of lax environmental regulation has only recently begun to address their
noxious legacy. Seven years ago, China began restricting and taxing its rare earths exports, ostensibly to improve its
environmental record. In 2010, the US, European Union and Japan – long accustomed to China's inexpensive supply – lodged a
complaint with the World Trade Organisation. China, they argued, was simply encouraging domestic consumers to pick up the slack.
In late October, the organisation ruled that China's export restrictions violated its regulations. China is expected to appeal. In 2009,
Baotou Steel began relocating farmers from villages around the tailings pond to resettlement sites on the city's outskirts; it has set
up a waste managing warehouse staffed by 400 employees. Yet the pond is still a reminder of how far China's cleanup effort has to
go. Surrounding villages
are decimated. Stray dogs amble through dessicated corn and wheat fields, the rusted frames of
the cost of environmental
violations and damage is still way too low," said Ma Jun, director of the Beijing-based Institute of
Public and Environmental Affairs. "Rare earths is such a classic case of this – we basically
export the resources at a rather cheap price, and much of the environmental cost is externalised
to local communities." Most of the rare earths processed by Baotou are extracted in Bayan Obo, a
dismantled greenhouses arching above tangles of discarded plastic bags. "In China,
mining district in the Gobi desert 120km north of the city. Its largest open-pit mine is 1,000 metres deep and spans 48 sq km; in
satellite images by Nasa released in 2012, it appears as one of many massive black craters dwarfing a sprawl of apartment blocks
directly to their south. In 2009, the Beijing Science and Technology News reported that the
area is struggling with its
own pollution problems. A villager near its eastern mine told the newspaper that while visiting a nearby sheep market the
year prior, he found that many of the animals had two rows of teeth, some so long that they couldn't close their mouths. Other
countries have become less dependent on China's rare earths supply since 2010, when export quotas caused global prices to spike.
The US and Australia are developing their own, more environmentally friendly mines. Rare earthsdependent industries are learning to recycle. A hard hat-wearing mechanic outside a tightly-guarded refinery near Baotou's tailings
pond said the declining demand has hurt his job prospects. The man, surnamed Li, said a few hundred of his colleagues had been
laid off over the past few months. When asked about the plant's environmental impact, he shrugged his shoulders. "We don't
understand these things," he said. "We're just here to make a living."
2AC AT: Int’l CP (Protectionism DA)
The US is hypocritical when it tells China to stop putting REEs
Tamny 12 (John, “China's "Rare Earths", and the Hypocrisy of the Obama Administration,”
Forbes, 3-25, http://www.forbes.com/sites/johntamny/2012/03/25/chinas-rare-earths-and-thehyprocrisy-of-the-obama-administration/)
As is well known now, the Obama administration recently joined the EU and Japan in a lawsuit filed at the
World Trade Organization over China’s alleged restrictions on the export of rare earth
elements. For those who’ve properly ignored what until now should have been a non-story, “rare earths” are metals
essential for the production of everything from smart phones, to hybrid cars, to military equipment. At present,
China produces roughly 95% of rare earths, and it’s of course assumed that the high price of these obscure
metals has resulted from export restrictions. Obama et al really ought to look in the mirror on this
one , and once they do, leave China alone. To see why, let’s think for a moment about what this is all about. The U.S. and others
are telling China – the country – that it must sell more of what is endemic to China. The
hypocrisy here is impressive ,
particularly considering the myriad restrictions our own government puts on the exploration
for and mining of, nearly everything . What the Obama administration is doing here is the
equivalent of China going to the WTO with a lawsuit demanding that we open up more of
Alaska and other oil rich locales controlled by the U.S., not to mention reduce the various
regulations controlling the mining of other commodities that the U.S. is rich in. If the Chinese were to do so,
there’s no telling what the negative reaction would be from the U.S. political class, not to
mention its citizenry. We’d be rightfully offended for another country nosing in on what should be a U.S. matter. It’s
arguable that what makes the U.S. great is our collective lack of self-awareness that often reveals itself through some of the most
disruptive entrepreneurial innovations known to mankind, but goodness, aren’t
we crossing the line when we
meddle in the affairs of other countries; essentially saying to them “Mine what we tell you to,
and then sell to us”? A little humility is surely in order, for one.
The US must be the leader in stopping protectionism
Perry, 4/14 Bill, Perry was an attorney with the Office of General Counsel, U.S. International
Trade Commission ("ITC"), and Office of Chief Counsel and Office of Antidumping Investigations,
U.S. Department of Commerce., “US CHINA TRADE WAR DEVELOPMENTS–TRADE, IP, ANTITRUST
AND SECURITIES,” http://uschinatradewar.com/us-china-trade-war-developments-trade-ipantitrust-and-securities/
Fourth, some nations simply don’t share America’s commitment to labor and the environment,
so when the U.S. doesn’t lead the way with strong standards and enforcement, trade agreements fall
short. Commitments on these issues have to be core parts of trade agreements , rather than
something like a side deal that’s just coasting along for the ride. This is one area where the U.S. has made
progress. . . .¶ Finally, agreements must be ambitious, opening foreign markets and helping U.S.
workers, farmers, manufacturers and service providers increase exports. . . .
2AC AT: Land CP
Sea mining will substantially decrease the environmental strain of land mining
[also a one line cap answer- and perhaps a space warrant above it]
Winston Tarere, referencing an environmental expert Samantha Smith, Deep sea mining to
drive green growth and economy, Vanuatu daily post, 9-20-2012,
http://www.dailypost.vu/content/deep-sea-mining-drive-green-growth-and-economy//BDS)
Dr Samantha Smith, environmental
expert employed by the Canadian firm Nautilus Minerals is promoting deep
sea mining at the world conservation congress organized by the International Union of Conservation Network (IUCN) in Jeju,
South Korea, as the solution to the ecological destruction of ecosystems by mining operations on
land. “The world demand for minerals is on the rise and with the land resources stretched and the
grades of minerals declining, deep sea mineral production offer sound environmental
advantages.” She said the green growth can only be sustained by deep sea mining. Nautilus argues
that deep sea mining is needed now more than ever to drive the growth towards developing
clean technologies such as solar and wind energy. “To build just one wind turbine requires 500kg of nickel plus
1000kg of copper. This means that a single turbine requires 12 times more copper to create 1 kilowatt of power than fossil fuels,” Dr
Smith said. To put things into perspective,
land only represents 30% of the earth’s surface while 70% is
submerged underwater. Today 100% of mining is done terrestrially on 30% of the earth’s
surface while 70% remains untouched on the seabed. Because most of these metals especially nickel are found
in the equatorial regions, it is argued that the further we delay mining the seabed, more virgin forests
have to be destroyed to make way for mining, destroying biodiversity and tropical ecosystem
as well as the earth’s capacity to absorb carbon emissions. With declining quality in the
average ore grade to 0.61% grade on ore extracted on land compared to a 7.2 % grade from
samples obtained on the seabed in the Bismarck Sea in PNG, these large sulphide deposits on the seabed
will become the world’s major source of gold, copper, zinc and silver. Nautilus Minerals argue that building
electric and hybrid cars with low carbon emissions and costs will require more minerals such as
copper that terrestrial mining cannot offer without further destruction to the environment,
loss of biodiversity and livelihoods from climate change. The average car built in the US today has around 5055 pounds or 22 to 24kg of copper. In a hybrid electric vehicle, this amount will double to 44 to 48kg of copper and triple to 66 to
72kg of copper in a pure electric vehicle. The vehicle’s inverter system alone which delivers power to the motors is connected to
them by cables containing 8-18 kg of copper. The trade off in using more copper in vehicles in the US is 93% less smog-forming
volatile and organic compounds and 31% less nitrogen oxide, compared to a car on fossil fuels. The Copper Development Association
Inc translates this into a one-third reduction in use of oil if three-fourths of American vehicles were electric. Operating costs of plugin cars are likely to be significantly lower than those on fossil fuel-powered cars because electricity costs three to five cents per mile
with average electric rates, of the equivalent of 75 cents to $1.25 per gallon of gasoline. The rationale used is that the
green
economy will be driven by the use of renewable energy sources that has seen developed
countries investing in new technology that seeks to make them become less dependent on
fossil fuels for their energy supplies, building electricity based infrastructure for transportation. In-order to
convert wind and solar energy directly into electric energy requires large amounts of metals
whose terrestrial extraction have been cause of much destruction of nature’s biodiversity. According
to a technical report prepared by SRK consulting (Australasia) Pty Ltd released May this year for Nautilus Minerals Inc, it has made
applications for prospecting licenses and mining leases in PNG, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu, Tonga and New Zealand. Applications
were made through Nautilus Minerals Offshore, a company registered in Vanuatu and fully owned by Nautilus Minerals Inc. Nautilus
has 41 granted Prospecting Licenses in Vanuatu covering an area of 3630km2 on the eastern side of the main islands while there are
14 further Prospecting License applications covering 1247km2 Safe and environmentally friendly Deep Sea Mining has been hailed as
the new frontier and the ‘Solwora 1’ site at the bottom of the Bismarck Sea is the experimental site and the new Wild West that
needs to be conquered and subdued. Dr. Smith said the deep
sea mining is environmentally friendly because
they will be using technology that will scrape the top of the ocean floor getting metals like a
lawnmower cutting grass and transporting it in closed tubes back up to the to avoid spills and
pollution to the surrounding environment. In her presentation she said the mineral deposit under the seabed at the
‘Solwora 1’ site in the Bismarck Sea goes down to a depth of 30 to 50 meters, however, there was enough deposits on the surface to
sustainably produce enough without having to dig. When pressed about the drilling below the seabed to meet global demands she
responded: “Even
if we have to drill, 50 meters is not deep enough into the earth’s crust to trigger off
a volcanic eruption, an earthquake or tsunami.” The Solwara 1 deposit is a stratabound seafloor massive
sulphide that occurs on the flank and crest of a sub-sea volcanic mound which extends about 150m to 200m above the surrounding
seafloor. Despite the safety assurances, opposing groups argue that there is too much that is unknown about seafloor mining to
guarantee a full proof protection against any form of destruction of the marine biodiversity and ecosystems. The irony of deep sea
mining as a green solution to terrestrial mining is that after we have extracted all minerals, leveled mountains and dig deep holes
towards the earth’s crust to milk every last bit of rock, we now want to shift into the sea which truly remains as the last frontier.
Perhaps after we have depleted all mineral resources at the bottom of the ocean, the new frontier will become the moon and Mars.
Capitalism, modern consumerism and our desire and wants to have more, bigger, better, faster, smaller and efficient has a
funny way of justifying greed for profit in a green growth and green economy framework.
Land mining is substantially more destructive to the environment and people
than sea mining
Meghan Miner, a freelance science and travel writer based in Washington, DC, master’s in
science journalism, editorial researcher for National Geographic’s Traveler Magazine, science
news writer for COSMOS Magazine in Sydney, Australia, and for the NPR program Living on
Earth., Will Deep-sea Mining Yield an Underwater Gold Rush?, National Geographic, 2-1-2013,
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130201-underwater-mining-gold-preciousmetals-oceans-environment///BDS)
But a fledgling deep-sea mining industry faces a host of challenges before it can claim the precious
minerals, from the need for new mining technology and serious capital to the concerns of
conservationists, fishers, and coastal residents. The roadblocks are coming into view in the coastal waters of Papua New
Guinea, where the seafloor contains copper, zinc, and gold deposits worth hundreds of millions of dollars and where one company,
Nautilus Minerals, hopes to launch the world's first deep-sea mining operation. Last year, the Papua New Guinean government
granted the Canadian firm a 20-year license to mine a site 19 miles (30 kilometers) off their coast, in the Bismarck Sea in the
southwestern Pacific Ocean. The company plans to mine the site, known as Solwara 1, by marrying existing technologies from the
offshore oil and gas industry with new underwater robotic technologies to extract an estimated 1.3 million tons of minerals per year.
Samantha Smith, Nautilus's vice
president for corporate social responsibility, says that ocean floor mining is
safer, cleaner, and more environmentally friendly than its terrestrial counterpart. "There are
no mountains that need to be removed to get to the ore body," she says. "There's a potential to
have a lot less waste ... No people need to be displaced. Shouldn't we as a society consider such an option?"
But mining a mile below the sea's surface, where pressure is 160 times greater than on land and where temperatures swing from
below freezing to hundreds of degrees above boiling, is trickier and more expensive than mining on terra firma.
CP has quantifiably one tenth the solvency
Meghan Miner, a freelance science and travel writer based in Washington, DC, master’s in
science journalism, editorial researcher for National Geographic’s Traveler Magazine, science
news writer for COSMOS Magazine in Sydney, Australia, and for the NPR program Living on
Earth., Will Deep-sea Mining Yield an Underwater Gold Rush?, National Geographic, 2-1-2013,
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130201-underwater-mining-gold-preciousmetals-oceans-environment///BDS)
A mile beneath the ocean's waves waits a buried cache beyond any treasure hunter's wildest
dreams: gold, copper, zinc, and other valuable minerals. Scientists have known about the bounty
for decades, but only recently has rising demand for such commodities sparked interest in
actually surfacing it. The treasure doesn't lie in the holds of sunken ships, but in natural mineral
deposits that a handful of companies are poised to begin mining sometime in the next one to
five years. The deposits aren't too hard to find—they're in seams spread along the seafloor,
where natural hydrothermal vents eject rich concentrations of metals and minerals. These
underwater geysers spit out fluids with temperatures exceeding 600ºC. And when those fluids
hit the icy seawater, minerals precipitate out, falling to the ocean floor. The deposits can yield
as much as ten times the desirable minerals as a seam that's mined on land. While different
vent systems contain varying concentrations of precious minerals, the deep sea contains enough
mineable gold that there's nine pounds (four kilograms) of it for every person on Earth,
according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Ocean
Service. At today's gold prices, that's a volume worth more than $150 trillion.
Plan or perm solves net better, land mines have more regulations, less
resources, and a larger environmental impact
Simon Rees, Deep-sea mining firms up standards as Nautilus ‘turns corner’, Mining Weekly, 8-82013, http://www.miningweekly.com/article/deep-sea-mining-firms-up-standards-as-nautilusturns-corner-2013-08-08//BDS
“This fits in with the notion that all mankind should share in the wealth accrued by exploiting
minerals from the ocean floor in international waters. But how they set up an equitable
mechanism for payment to all countries will be an immense challenge,” he added. When
considering the benefits to mankind, proponents of deep-sea mining argue it also affords a
partial solution to offsetting the interruption and impact caused by surface operations.
Questions about how, where and to what extent traditional mining should take place will
undoubtedly intensify as the global population continues to climb. “It’s getting harder to
develop mines on land and there are fewer places left on the planet where you can establish a
mine without affecting people,” Johnston said. Nonetheless, it is critical that marine
ecosystems are afforded equal respect to those on land. In this regard, binding frameworks for
deep-sea mining, environmental best practice and monitoring should be formally codified
sooner rather than later. By striking the right balance now, future mineral rewards from the
deep will be both great and good
Solvency deficit: deep sea mining can produce comparatively more minerals
Robert Thomason, CIA Cover Story Gives Birth to Deep Ocean Mining, DC BUREAU, 3-10-14,
http://www.dcbureau.org/201403109664/natural-resources-news-service/cia-cover-storygives-birth-deep-ocean-mining.html//BDS )
Resting deep on the seabed of the Pacific are two symbols of oceanic politics, one decaying as time ticks by; the other slowly
growing at a pace measured in millions of years. The first symbol is the salvage site of Soviet submarine K-129. Once it prowled the
seas with three nuclear missiles, but suddenly she and her crew were lost to the depths. After sinking mysteriously in 1968, the
diesel-powered submarine became the object of an expensive and elaborate operation of the Cold War. The Central Intelligence
Agency and Howard Hughes devised a cover story about deep-sea mining to recover it secretly. The operation, run by former CIA
Director William Colby, was trying to determine the state of Soviet nuclear weapons prowess. After a string of near mishaps, the
mission recovered only part of the sub. The other symbol is a widespread deposit of potato-sized rocks rich in manganese and other
minerals. Called polymetallic nodules, these rocks were the original fictitious prey of the CIA’s cover story. But today those
nodules are the prizes of a very real, but hardly less complicated, search of the ocean floors. The stories of the
sunken Soviet sub and the polymetallic nodules are intertwined in history, technology and politics. Deep-sea mining is on track to
become a reality soon despite serious questions about its environmental consequences. The linkage began soon after the United
States found the lost Soviet submarine. A CIA plan codenamed “Project Azorian” oversaw the design and construction of the Hughes
Glomar Explorer, a ship of unprecedented design and cost. The ship’s goal was to lift a 1,750-ton submarine, armed with nuclear
missiles and torpedoes, off the seabed and into the belly of a huge ocean-going vessel. The CIA buried the operation in code names
like AZORIAN, DESKTOP and JENNIFER. Only a few years later, the very same ship that had pretended to look for deep sea minerals
was in fact employed by Lockheed Martin to developed modern technology for pulling nodules off the seabed. Now, after
four
decades of international treaty negotiations, scientific studies, technological progress and
roller coaster-like business cycles of metal prices, the polymetallic nodules still sit silently on
the seafloor. Interested parties around the globe are debating both economic and environmental concerns. But the interest
in deep sea mining of these mineral resources is intensifying, and by 2016 remote controlled
vehicles could be crawling the ocean floor environment, cutting into or scooping from the seabed, and
pulling up ore that is richer in bounty than many mining resources that remain on dry
land.
The polymetallic nodules are not the only treasure deep sea miners will be pursuing. Seamounts formed by underwater
volcanoes and cobalt-rich crusts are also being studied intensively for commercial exploitation.
DSM is cheaper and less environment impact --- private companies say now
Birney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC)
“Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea”
***DSM = Deep Sea Mining
As we enter the 21st century, and assuming mining companies are finding deposits of sufficient size and
grade, there are three possible economic drivers required for DSM to become a viable
industry: 1) deep-sea mining may actually be cheaper than land mining , as suggested by
Nautilus Minerals’ Worley Parson Engineering study (Heydon, 2005)¶ 1¶ which indicates that DSM
for copper could cost about half the price of developing a land- based mine, 2) though unproven,
the concept of “surgical mining” of relatively small areas of SMS deposits may have less
impact on the environment than terrestrial mining
(Heydon, 2005), and 3) India and China will both need large
amounts of copper to build power-grid infrastructure, driving the metals market to deep-sea mining (Yamazaki, 2005b).
2AC AT: LOST
no net benefit - LOST fails to regulate mining due to lack of coordination and
proactive authority
Brooke Jarvis, independent journalist based in Seattle. Her work has appeared in Rolling Stone,
The Washington Post, Sierra Magazine, Aeon Magazine, and The American Prospect, among
others., Deep-Sea Mining—Bonanza or Boondoggle?, NOVA Next, 6-25-2013,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/earth/deep-sea-mining///BDS)
Policing the Deep Sea It was the prospect of deep sea mining that prompted the Law of the Sea
Convention, an effort to regulate marine resources it calls “the common heritage of all mankind.”
Concluded in 1982 and ratified in 1994, the Convention set up the ISA to issue mining leases and regulate
how minerals and other resources outside of national economic zones can be harvested. (Mining
within territorial or archipelagic waters or Economic Exclusive Zones, which extend for 200 miles off of coastlines, is within national
jurisdiction. Island nations are already scrambling to figure out how to oversee and profit from mining projects. For signatories to
the Law of the Sea, the ISA’s regime will be a guidepost.) “Right now, we’re flying in the dark.” But the
current system has
a number of unresolved issues, Ardron says. The ISA doesn’t coordinate with the international
bodies that oversee other ocean industries, such as fishing and shipping. Without communication, it
will be hard to know when areas are being overtaxed. Likewise, the ISA’s current method for
protecting what it calls “Areas of Particular Environmental Interest” is not proactive: first
mining leases are assigned, then certain areas outside those leases are protected. “Right now,
we’re flying in the dark,” Ardron says. “We don’t know if these leases are in ecologically important
places or not—and it’s too late by the time they’re handed out.” There are also concerns about
the transparency of the approval process—“generally we don’t know what leases are up for
discussion until they’ve already been approved,” Ardron points out—as well as about how future infractions will
be dealt with. Because no projects have gone into production yet, he argues it’s not too late to push for stronger reporting,
transparency, and compliance guarantees: “The door hasn’t closed yet.” But with the rush for mining leases on, it is beginning to
close. And at stake is a strange world we have only barely begun to understand.
UNCLOS would negatively effect the FG’s capability to sea-bed mine
Parthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of
Security,”
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf
The Senate should ratify the U.N. Convention¶ on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).¶ While today¶ the United States recognizes UNCLOS
as custom¶ -¶ ary international law, ratifying this treaty would¶ increase the ability of U.S. policymakers to promote¶ the rule of law
and freedom of navigation around¶ the world and also to participate in important dis¶ -¶ cussions about critical minerals. Today,
the United¶ States cannot play a full role in the Arctic Council¶ because it has not ratified
UNCLOS, and its position¶ of promoting the rules enshrined in this treaty rings¶ hollow to international audiences. Since
American¶ concerns over seabed mining informed the initial¶ refusal to ratify this treaty, these
issues are likely to¶ resurface in any debates about UNCLOS. To date,¶ efforts toward UNCLOS
ratification have stalled ¶ out of a misguided notion that the treaty would Elements of Security¶ Mitigating the Risks of
U.S. Dependence on Critical Minerals¶ JUNE¶ 2011¶ 26¶ |¶ negatively affect U.S. sovereignty, as it recognizes¶ exclusive economic
zones for countries around the¶ world.
LOST is not required for resource extraction – in fact it cuts profits in half killing
business confidence
Tennant 12 - not the Doctor (Michael, 27 June 2012, "Will Our Freedoms Be LOST at Sea?,"
www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/11824-will-our-freedoms-be-lost-atsea, ADL)
U.S. accession to LOST, then, will have a significant number of negative consequences. But what about
the treaty’s alleged benefits? LOST backers claim the treaty will secure certain navigational rights for U.S. military and commercial shipping. However,
the United States already enjoys such rights as a matter of customary international law. Moreover, America has for decades been a party to the
International Maritime Organization, which establishes international laws with regard to shipping. Thus, to the extent LOST codifies navigational rights,
it is redundant. The
treaty’s fans also argue that it will secure U.S. rights to extract natural resources
from its continental shelf. As with navigational rights, the United States already exercises sovereignty over its
continental shelf to a distance of 200 miles from shore; and other countries, after initially contesting the U.S. claim,
adopted the policy themselves. America could similarly claim rights over its continental shelf beyond 200
miles and work out its differences with the individual nations affected by such a claim. By
ratifying LOST , however, it
cedes such authority to the ISA and, in addition,
is forced to surrender half the
royalties earned from mining and drilling in the extended continental shelf . Although LOST
supporters say U.S. accession to the treaty is necessary for American companies and their
investors to feel confident that their claims to deep seabed mining sites will be recognized
internationally, Rabkin observed, “It remains a fair question whether a complex U.N. regulatory
bureaucracy — especially one that counts international wealth redistribution as one of its
functions — is a reassuring presence for investors.” Knowing that the seemingly profitable site in which they
are considering investing stands a good chance of being stolen by the Enterprise and that any profits generated from the site the
company is allowed to mine — not to mention any new technologies employed — may be similarly confiscated, why would
investors take such a risk?
Ratification limits Navy jurisdiction-Can’t solve Heg
Zenko 3/24/14-Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow with the Center for Preventive Action at the Council
on Foreign Relations (“How to Avoid a Naval War with China”, Foreignpolicy.com,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/24/how_to_avoid_a_naval_war_with_china)
patel
Most countries, including the United States, agree that territorial waters extend 12 nautical
miles from a nation's coastline, while EEZs extend much further -- usually up to 200 nautical
miles. There is also consensus that while the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) established EEZs as a feature of international law and gives coastal states the right to
regulate economic activities within them, it does not provide coastal states the right to regulate
foreign military activities in their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. However,
China and some other countries like North Korea interpret UNCLOS as giving coastal states the
right to regulate all economic and foreign military activities within their EEZs.
The treaty hurts the US
-Sovereignty
-Environmentalists
-Naval Rights
-Intelligence
Schaeffer et al 7 – Brett D., Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory
Affairs (9/1/7, Heritage, “The Top Five Reasons Why Conservatives Should Oppose the
U.N.Convention on the Law of the Sea,”
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/09/the-top-five-reasons-why-conservativesshould-oppose-the-un-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea) patel
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will hold hearings this week on whether the United
States should ratify the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Twenty-five years ago, President
Ronald Reagan rejected the treaty-and rightly so. Today, the convention remains a threat to
American interests. Reason #1: The Treaty Will Undermine U.S. Sovereignty. President Reagan
rejected the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 and cited several major deficiencies, none of
which have been remedied. Reagan was concerned that the U.S., though a major naval power,
would have little influence at the International Seabed Authority that the convention created.
Although the Authority is supposed to make decisions by consensus, nothing prevents the rest
of the "international community" from consistently voting against the United States, as regularly
occurs in similar U.N. bodies, such as the General Assembly. In addition, President Reagan was
troubled by the fact that the International Seabed Authority has the power to amend the
convention without U.S. consent. That concern has also not been remedied in the intervening
years. Another issue is that the convention requires states to transfer information and
perhaps technology to mandatory dispute resolution tribunals. Under the convention, parties
to a dispute are required to provide a resolution tribunal with "all relevant documents,
facilities and information." This amounts to a blanket invitation for unscrupulous foreign
competitors to bring the U.S. and American companies before a tribunal for the sole purpose of
obtaining sensitive data and technologies that would otherwise be unavailable to them. The
safeguards against such practices that President Reagan demanded have never come to pass.
Reason #2: The Treaty Will Become a Back Door for Environmental Activists. The Executive
Director of Greenpeace International, Thilo Bode, has explained how the environmentalist
movement plans to leverage the treaty to advance its agenda, which often runs counter to
U.S. interests: "Global warming is likely to have a big impact at sea…. Solving the
environmental problems facing the oceans…is one of the greatest challenges facing
humankind…. No single action or region can do this alone: It will require comprehensive
international cooperation as required by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea." President Clinton-a major supporter of the treaty-did not mince his words when he stated
that the convention was "the greatest environmental treaty of all time." Indeed, the treaty
states that convention participants must "take…all measures consistent with this Convention
that are necessary to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment from
any source," (Article 194). This provision goes on to require that such measures address "all
sources of pollution of the marine environment…including those from land-based sources, from
or through the atmosphere, or by dumping…." Signatories are also required to "adopt laws and
regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from or through
the atmosphere…" (Article 212). The convention's provisions and mandatory dispute resolution
mechanisms will create new opportunities for environmental activists and like-minded
governments to bring action against the U.S. for violating the Kyoto Protocol, even though
America is not a party to that accord. American opponents of the Kyoto Protocol should be
under no illusion: U.S. accession to this convention risks embroiling the U.S. in a plethora of legal
actions, even if the Senate does not ratify Kyoto. Reason #3: America Should Not Participate in
Yet Another U.N. Bureaucracy. International institutions created by multilateral treaties spawn
unaccountable international bureaucracies, which in turn inevitably infringe upon U.S.
sovereignty. The convention creates a bureaucracy known as the International Seabed
Authority Secretariat. Like all international bureaucracies, the Secretariat has a strong
incentive to enhance its own authority at the expense of state sovereignty. When
international bureaucracies are unaccountable, they-like all unaccountable institutions-seek to
insulate themselves from scrutiny and thus become prone to corruption. The International
Seabed Authority is vulnerable to the same corrupt practices that have riddled the U.N. for
years. The United Nations Oil-for-Food scandal, in which the Iraqi government benefited from a
system of bribes and kickbacks involving billions of dollars and 2,000 companies in nearly 70
countries, is a prime example. Despite ample evidence of the U.N.'s systemic weaknesses and
vulnerability to corruption, the U.N. General Assembly has resisted efforts to adopt serious
transparency and accountability reforms. Reason #4: American Participation Will Undermine
U.S. Military and Intelligence Operations. Under the convention, the United States assumes a
number of obligations at odds with its military practices and national security interests,
including a commitment not to collect intelligence. The U.S. would sign away its ability to
collect intelligence vital for American security within the "territorial waters" of any other
country (Article 19). Furthermore, U.S. submarines would be required to travel on the surface
and show their flags while sailing within territorial waters (Article 20). This would apply, for
example, to U.S. submarines maneuvering in Iranian or North Korean territorial waters; they
would be required to sail on the surface with their flags waving. Reason #5: The U.S. Does Not
Need the Convention to Guarantee Navigation Rights. The U.S. enjoys navigation rights by
customary international practice. The fact that the U.S. is not a convention member does not
mean that other states will begin to demand notification by U.S. ships entering their waters or
airspace. Indeed, the U.S. is not a signatory to the convention today and yet has freedom of
the seas because current participants are required to grant the U.S. navigation rights afforded
by customary international practice. In addition, these states have reciprocal interests in
navigation rights that will discourage them from making such demands on American ships in
the future.
UNCLOS does not deter South China Sea conflict
Haidfer 14 – Ziad, Attorney at White & Case LLP (4/10/14, Foreign Policy, “Nine-Dash-Mine,”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/10/beijing_should_let_law_reign_south_china
_sea) patel
Tensions continue to roil Asia's waters, but they are now also finding their way into
international arbitration. The perilous churn in the South China Sea, dubbed "Asia's Cauldron"
by one leading strategic analyst, stems from the overlapping claims of six states -- Brunei,
China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam -- over a body of water vital to global trade,
which contains energy resources and abundant fish stock in its vast depths. Negotiations over
a maritime Code of Conduct to stabilize interactions in the South China Sea have been outpaced
by the jockeying of ships between China and the Philippines. In the wake of a dangerous and
asymmetric two-month standoff over the disputed Scarborough Shoal beginning in April 2012,
Manila has rightly sought recourse in international law to manage the dispute through
arbitration. For the sake of regional stability and its own interests, Beijing should follow suit. The
legal wrangling started in January 2013, when the Philippines notified China of its intent to
bring a challenge under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an international
treaty governing the rights and responsibilities of states in their use of the oceans and seas.
(Both China and the Philippines are parties to UNCLOS, while the United States has yet to ratify
it.) The Philippines argued then that China's so-called "nine-dash line," which encompasses
virtually the entire South China Sea, was unlawful and contrary to UNCLOS. China's response
was to reject the Philippines' notification letter altogether, noting Beijing had opted out of
UNCLOS procedures for settling disputes that involve sovereignty claims or maritime
boundaries. Beijing must now take a clear and hard look at the merits of abstaining any further.
Beijing must now take a clear and hard look at the merits of abstaining any further. While it may
have a legal basis to abstain, acting on it could be strategically shortsighted. Given Beijing's
assertions that its nine-dash line is grounded in international law, a greater show of confidence
would be to defend its position before a neutral tribunal. Beijing will have the chance, if it
chooses. Despite China's protestations, a five-member Arbitral Tribunal was assembled to
hear the Philippines' claims; on March 30, the Philippines announced that it had filed its brief,
here called a Memorial, elaborating its challenge. (Intriguingly, Beijing may have asked Manila
to delay filing its Memorial in exchange for a mutual withdrawal of ships from the contested
Scarborough Shoal.) China's willingness to abide by international norms would not only
telegraph confidence, but could help offset the growing anxiety generated by its military
modernization and maneuverings among neighbors who fear the Beijing doctrine may be
veering toward realpolitik. For its part, the United States has expressed its support for the
Philippines' submission. President Barack Obama's visit to the Philippines in late April will
provide an opportunity to reaffirm the importance of such a rules-based approach to managing
the dispute. Yet that largely depends on how Beijing responds. To be sure, nationalist public
sentiment stoked by Beijing may have painted China into a corner. Hours after the Philippine
Foreign Secretary announced the Memorial's submission on March 30, the Chinese Foreign
Ministry responded that it did not accept the Philippines' submission of the dispute for
arbitration and called on the Philippines to return to bilateral talks. With its Foreign Minister
stating that China will never accede to "unreasonable demands from smaller countries" in the
South China Sea, its Defense Minister stating that China will make "no compromise, no
concessions," and official media outlets wading in with criticism of the Philippines'
"unilateral" actions in filing its Memorial, it will be that much harder to backtrack. Yet
submitting to an international tribunal is by no means beyond the pale for Beijing. China
regularly engages in the WTO dispute settlement system and has a relatively strong
compliance record in the face of adverse rulings, largely due to the reputational costs of noncompliance. Arbitrating the South China Sea dispute is assuredly more fraught than
commercial disputes, grating as it does on China's rawest nerve: territorial sovereignty. That is
why it must be complemented by all claimant states exploring the equivalent of an amicable
settlement: shelving questions of who owns what and focusing on joint development of
resources for which compelling precedent exists. For now, however, Manila's lawyers have
staked out important legal ground in the South China Sea. Beijing should consider meeting them
there.
Ratification undermines US proliferation efforts and Navy data intelligence
Rabkin 6 – Jeremy, professor of law at George Mason University School of Law, attended
Harvard University, Cornell University (6/1/6, CEI, “The Law of the Sea Treaty: A Bad Deal for
America,” http://cei.org/pdf/5352.pdf)patel
The United Nations did not invent the law of the sea. There has been a law of the sea in effect
for many centuries. When Spanish and Portuguese explorers fi rst charted new sea routes to the
Americas and Asia, their governments imagined that they could lay claim to all the ocean
vastness in between. Successful challenges by new maritime powers, especially Britain and
Holland, soon established the principle that the high seas should be open to all. In the early 17th
century, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius published an extremely learned treatise which summed
up the new approach in a catchy phrase: “freedom of the seas.” To secure freedom on the seas,
there had to be rules applicable to most situations that also acknowledged—and thereby
constrained—necessary exceptions. These rules were developed over centuries in a process of
mutual accommodation—and occasional challenge by war at sea—among major maritime
powers. Nearly all of this law was “customary law,” meaning that it refl ected actual practice
among maritime states—including particular agreements among particular states—without
being set down in any formal document. The conventions of 1958 had somewhat more
ambitious goals. They sought to secure general agreement on precisely defi ned rights of
“innocent passage” through coastal waters, specifying a 12-mile limit on territorial claims at
sea (where the national laws could be enforced by coastal states). They laid down rules for
charting the seaward boundaries of coastal waters when the actual coastline has an irregular or
interrupted pattern. Almost all nations ratified these conventions within a few years, though not
all observed their terms. The treaties did not address some matters on which there remained
important disagreements, such as the status of fishing and mining rights outside territorial
waters. These issues might have been addressed in a third convention fashioned along similar
lines as its predecessors. But instead, UNCLOS III set out on a very different premise—that
what belongs to no one must belong to everyone. Yet serious statesmen have never embraced
this idea of a world authority on boundaries, empowered to make definite decisions on all
disputed borders. This is partly because too many affected nations would not accept the
decisions of such a world authority and other nations are not prepared to provide troops on an
open- ended basis to back up such decisions—especially considering the conflicts that arise over
border disputes. Yet this is the idea at the core of the new law of the sea treaty. It sets out
relatively precise rules about who can claim what as national waters, then establishes an
international "Authority" to regulate the unclaimed areas under the high seas—and a new
tribunal to resolve any and all disputes about these rules. Most risks posed by the "Authority"
are somewhat hypothetical at present, because mining on the floor of the deep seas has not
yet been attempted. But the tribunal presents immediate problems for the United States
because the U.S. Navy is, right now, very much present on the high seas. The United States is
already committed, by its own policies, to abide by UNCLOS rules on transit rights and wants
other nations to do so as well. The difficulties concern exceptions or the handling of
exceptional circumstances. The question is. Who decides on the exceptional cases? The answer
provided in UNCLOS III is a new international tribunal, most of whose judges—elected by the
usual U.N. formulas to assure geographical and political "balance" —cannot be expected to have
much sympathy for American concerns. The law of the sea’s most pertinent rule is that no
nation can interfere with the ships of other nations on the high seas. The UNCLOS treaty
acknowledges exceptions, such as when a ship is suspected of involvement in “piracy” or in
the “slave trade” or falsely flying the flag of the intervening state.2 But UNCLOS’
acknowledgement of these exceptions is superfl uous in these cases because interventions on
these grounds were already well established in the early 19th century, when these evils were of
major concern to naval powers. Meanwhile, UNCLOS makes no provision for contemporary
concerns. In particular, it makes no provision for intervention against ships operated by
terrorists or ships transporting weapons of mass destruction to rogue states. Terrorists have
obvious reasons to take their operations out to sea. An attack on an oil tanker, for example,
could do vast environmental damage and have a sizable impact on international oil markets.
Seaborne shipping may be used to transport missiles and other weapons components not
easily sneaked through airports. Currently, the United States does not claim the right to stop
any and all ships on the high seas, merely on general suspicion. Since 2004, the United States
has encouraged other nations, under the American-led Security Proliferation Initiative (SPI), to
sign agreements authorizing American naval patrols to inspect merchant ships fl ying their fl
ags when there is reason to fear the ships are engaged in illicit activities. While more than half
the ships engaged in international commerce are covered by these agreements, many are not.
American policy implicitly acknowledges that stopping other ships on the high seas would
usually be improper. But special circumstances might justify exceptional measures. UNCLOS III
provides that, if a ship or its crew are seized on the high seas, the fl ag state can appeal to the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in Hamburg, Germany, for a prompt
decision on the legality of the seizure.3 The treaty allows states to opt for other forms of
arbitration on other disputes, but other forms of arbitration require all nations involved to agree
on a specifi c panel of arbitrators. The only important category of dispute where one party can
force another to answer before ITLOS is when a ship has been detained on the high seas and the
complaining party seeks its immediate release. Seizing a ship on the high seas without the
consent of its home government would inevitably trigger a diplomatic confrontation. But in the
right circumstances, the United States or its allies might feel obliged to act first and try to
handle the diplomatic protests later. If intelligence gives reasonably firm indications of an
imminent terror attack to be launched from a particular ship, the U.S. could insist on
intervening, claiming a right of self-defense that supersedes the general “rules of the road” at
sea. Alternatively, the United States might claim that a ship operated by terrorists was so
closely analogous to a pirate ship that intervention could be justifi ed under the UNCLOS
exemption for piracy. In still another variant, the United States might interpret a bilateral
agreement with the fl ag state as covering a particular intervention, while the fl ag state insisted
on a different interpretation. In any of these cases, the fl ag state would likely sit on the
sidelines while the ship’s operators pursued a claim on their own initiative, “on behalf of the fl
ag State,” as UNCLOS allows.4 It is easy to imagine situations in which U.S. intervention might
trigger a complaint to ITLOS. It is hard to imagine situations in which ITLOS would be other than
a complicating factor in ensuing U.S. diplomacy toward the fl ag state. Nor is there much
consolation in the prospect of appealing to ITLOS against the seizure of an American ship, since
the most vulnerable American ships would be small craft, gathering intelligence near the coasts
of unfriendly states. UNCLOS couples transit rights with provisions for national regulatory
measures in coastal waters, including the right of the coastal state to prohibit intelligence
gathering in these waters. Suppose an American ship were seized outside the territorial waters
of a hostile state, on the claim that it had earlier traversed these waters for illicit purposes
and then been pursued into “contiguous” waters—as UNCLOS allows, for a belt of water
extending twelve nautical miles beyond the twelve mile reach of “territorial waters.”5 The
United States being required to document for ITLOS exactly what its ship was doing in exactly
which waters could very well compromise sensitive U.S. intelligence gathering operations. It is
not even clear that the United States would benefi t from having the option to pursue its own
claims. In a direct confrontation over a seizure, the United States has considerable resources—
naval, diplomatic, and economic—to unilaterally pursue its demands for immediate release.
But having subscribed to UNCLOS, the United States would have much more difficulty wielding
such pressures, if the state which effected the seizure insisted that the matter should be taken
to ITLOS for resolution. UNCLOS seems to provide protection against these concerns by
stipulating that states may opt out of its compulsory arbitration requirements when disputes
concern “military activities...by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial
service.”6 At its narrowest reading, this provision might mean only that ITLOS will avoid
intervening in full-scale confrontations between opposing battle fleets—a situation that would
create problems far beyond those of dispute resolution. At its broadest, this exemption might
mean that any seizure could be excluded from ITLOS review, since seizures are never
effectuated by unarmed commercial vessels, which would entirely negate the provision
bestowing mandatory jurisdiction on ITLOS for seizures at sea. So which is it? The only thing
certain is that it will be up to ITLOS to decide how far it wants to intrude into U.S. naval
strategy. The State Department has proposed ratification with an “understanding” that the
military exemption will be read broadly. (Sec. 2, Par. 2 of ‘Text of Resolution of Advice and
Consent to Ratification,” printed with Treaty Doc. 103-39 in Hearings on the Un Convention on
the Law of the Sea, Ot. 21, 2003, along with “Statement of William H.Taft, Legal Adviser to the
Department of Stat) But UNCLOS itself stipulates that states may not attach “reservations” to
their ratifi cation.7 Again, it will be up to ITLOS to decide what signifi cance, if any, should be
accorded such unilateral U.S. “understandings.” And the court’s composition is not
encouraging. As of September 2005, a clear majority of the court’s 21 judges were from states
that cannot be supposed to be friendly to American naval action—including Russia, China,
Brazil, Cameroon, Ghana, Senegal, Cape Verde, Tunisia, Lebanon, Grenada, and Trinidad. The
earlier round of UNCLOS negotiations in the 1950s proposed, in addition to specifi cations of
transit rights and delimitations of coastal waters, a separate treaty obliging signatories to refer
disputes about these matters to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, the
Netherlands. The United States welcomed clarifi cation of the basic rules but successfully
resisted the proposal that all disputes be referred to the ICJ. In the mid-1980s, infuriated by the
ICJ’s handling of a case launched by the Marxist Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the U.S.
withdrew its previous commitment to respond to claims before the ICJ by any state which
agreed to open itself to all such claims in turn. And, of course, the United States has resisted
urgings to submit its military personnel or any other U.S. citizens to judgments of the
International Criminal Court. UNCLOS has packaged improved rules for the seas with the
requirement that major disputes about these rules will go to a permanent international court,
thus deemphasizing “freedom of the seas” in favor of claims of collective ownership. As a
result, states with little involvement in maritime commerce will help to determine how these
rules will be interpreted and applied to nations with a lot at stake in international commerce.
UNCLOS requires payments and mitigates any benefits
Rabkin 6 – Jeremy, professor of law at George Mason University School of Law, attended
Harvard University, Cornell University (6/1/6, CEI, “The Law of the Sea Treaty: A Bad Deal for
America,” http://cei.org/pdf/5352.pdf)patel
The best provisions in UNCLOS are those setting down rules for economic development in areas
extending up to 200 nautical miles beyond the shorelines of coastal states. In addition to their
territorial waters of up to 12 miles, coastal states can also claim control over fi shing and
drilling in this exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The United States claimed such rights in 1945 for
the continental shelf adjacent to its shores. This action provoked a variety of conflicting claims
by other states, since the continental shelf—where waters are relatively shallow—does not
extend nearly as far beyond coastlines elsewhere. The UNCLOS formula of a 200-mile limit for all
coastal states was a compromise quite acceptable to the United States. Therefore the United
States has asserted that this portion of UNCLOS should now be regarded as settled customary
law, binding on all states whether they ratify this particular treaty or not. In fact, most coastal
states have already claimed an exclusive economic zone in accord with UNCLOS provisions.
However, the actual treaty insists that in return for the acknowledgement of such claims,
coastal states must provide compensation to the rest of the world. The most blatant
application of this concept concerns mineral extraction on the continental shelf beyond the
200-mile limit. UNCLOS allows claims to the limit of the continental shelf or up to 350 miles
from the shoreline, whichever is less.8 However, to claim such additional drilling rights the
state must fi rst accept delineation of its continental shelf by a special Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf, established by UNCLOS with a requirement that the
Commission’s membership show for “equitable geographical representation” in its
membership.9 If it chooses to exercise drilling or mining rights in this area beyond its EEZ, a
state must provide a portion of revenue derived from such activity—increasing at 1 percent a
year up to a rate of 7 percent per year—to the Deep Seabed Authority, an agency established
by UNCLOS for general supervision of deep sea development.10 The United States government
already provides sizable contributions—often over extended periods—to international aid
organizations for programs—such as vaccination, schooling, and road building—which it
considers likely to improve conditions in developing countries. UNCLOS does nothing to advance
this. Instead, it requires states that are able to extract mineral wealth from the seas to
compensate those that are not—while the non-extracting state contributes nothing to the
equation. Moreover, money extracted from drilling efforts on the continental shelf goes to an
entity that is not equipped to administer development assistance to developing countries. The
Seabed Authority is not even charged with doing that. UNCLOS instead makes all mining
operations in the deep seas—beyond the continental shelf or the 350 mile limit of coastal
states—subject to approval by this agency. The Authority is not only authorized by UNCLOS to
regulate mining operations to guard against environmental and safety concerns, it is also
authorized to enforce the treaty’s assertions that “resources [of the deep seabed] are the
common heritage of mankind”11 and that “all rights in [these] resources are vested in mankind
as a whole, on whose behalf [the Authority] shall act.”12 The original treaty, negotiated during
the heyday of socialist enthusiasm, contemplated that the Authority would serve “mankind” by
reserving a considerable share of mining operations to an internationalized public production
entity, to be known as “the Entity.” By the late 1970s, many Third World governments had
“nationalized”—i.e. forcibly seized—mines and oil wells developed by foreign companies and
were eager to form OPEC-style international cartels to boost the prices they could obtain for
raw material exports by limiting their supply in world markets. While nothing came of this
effort, UNCLOS enshrines one aspect of it. UNCLOS provides for an Economic Planning
Commission to monitor “factors affecting supply, demand and prices of minerals.”13 Relying on
Planning Commission reports, the Authority is then directed to adjust its permits for deep
seabed mining to assure “just and stable prices remunerative to producers and fair to
consumers.”14 The idea is to assure that mining from the deep seabed does not provide too
much competition to mines on land. The Reagan Administration emphasized objections to the
regulatory role of the Authority when it rejected U.S. participation in UNCLOS in 1982. Most
European countries also withheld their approval at the time. A decade later, with communism
in collapse and the benefi ts of the free market widely acknowledged, the Clinton
Administration joined with Europeans in negotiating revisions to UNCLOS. A supplementary
agreement, completed in 1994, does go far in correcting the treaty’s most egregious provisions
on deep seabed mining. The agreement directs that mining in the area controlled by the
Authority should be pursued “in accordance with sound commercial principles” and neither
subsidized nor protected by special tariffs. One revision eliminates enforced contributions to the
Entity and stipulates that its activities be regulated on the same terms as private fi rms. The
treaty also signals a repudiation of cartel planning by folding the Economic Planning Commission
into a separate Legal Commission. All of this is to the good. It might also be seen as bowing to
reality. Mineral extraction from the deep seas has turned out to be much more expensive and
diffi cult than Third World diplomats imagined in the 1970s—in fact, no fi rms have expressed
serious interest in such projects. Since its establishment in 1995, the Authority has authorized a
handful of exploration efforts but has received no bids for actual mining projects. It remains a
fair question whether a complex U.N. regulatory bureaucracy—especially one that counts
international wealth redistribution as one of its functions—is a reassuring presence for
investors. The 1994 Agreement does not actually abolish the Planning Commission, but simply
suspends its operations until the regulatory council of the Authority “decides otherwise.”15 The
Seabed Authority still proclaims, on its offi cial website, that it will oversee “action to protect
land-based mineral producers in the third world from adverse economic effects of seabed
production.” The 1994 Agreement seems to give at least tacit support to this notion in
empowering the Authority to provide “economic assistance” to “developing countries which
suffer serious adverse effects on their export earnings” from deep seabed mining.16 The
Authority can still direct proceeds from mining or drilling approved for the continental shelf to
compensate “affected developing land-based producer States.” If the world wants to
encourage mining in the deep seabed, this is no way to do it. Further, this approach carries an
immediate risk to U.S. national security. Allegedly to ensure that the benefi ts of deep sea
mining are properly shared, UNCLOS requires all states to “cooperate in promoting the
transfer of technology and scientifi c knowledge” relevant to exploration and recovery
activities in the deep seas.17 The 1994 supplementary agreement endorses these provisions,
qualifying them only with vague assurances that technology transfer should be conducted on
“fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions, consistent with the effective protection
of intellectual property rights.”18 It remains to be seen whether the Authority will assert claims
to impose technology transfers in this fi eld. It could do so by making such transfers a condition
for approving permits for exploration or recovery by Western fi rms, since all such activity
requires approval of the Authority.19 Yet even without direct demands from the Authority, the
Chinese government, by invoking these provisions, managed to obtain microbathymetry
equipment and advanced sonar technology from American companies in the late 1990s. China
claimed to be interested in prospecting for minerals beneath the deep seas. Pentagon offi cials
warned against sharing this technology with China, given its potential application to antisubmarine warfare. But other offi cials in the Clinton Administration insisted that the United
States, having signed UNCLOS—even if not yet having ratifi ed it—must honor UNCLOS
obligations on technology sharing. Future administrations may be more vigilant, but the
Authority may, in the future, be more insistent. That is the logic of a treaty that makes mining by
fi rms in one country contingent on the approval of the governments in other countries.
LOST undermines the US Naval power and risks war with China
Bolton and Blumenthal 11 – John and Dan (9/29/11, “Time to Kill the Law of the Sea Treaty—
Again,” WSJ,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111904836104576560934029786322)patel
The Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST)—signed by the U.S. in 1994 but never ratified by the Senate—
is showing some signs of life on Capitol Hill, even as new circumstances make it less attractive
than ever. With China emerging as a major POWER , ratifying the treaty now would
encourage Sino-American strife, constrain U.S. naval activities, and do nothing to resolve
China's expansive maritime territorial claims. At issue is China's intensified effort to keep
America's military out of its "Exclusive Economic Zone," a LOST invention that affords coastal
states control over economic activity in areas beyond their sovereign, 12-mile territorial seas
out to 200 miles. Properly read, LOST recognizes exclusive economic zones as INTERNATIONAL
waters, but China is exploiting the treaty's ambiguities to declare "no go" zones in regions where
centuries of state practice clearly permit unrestricted maritime activity. Take the issues of
INTELLIGENCE , surveillance and reconnaissance, both by air and sea. LOST is silent on these
subjects in the exclusive zones, so China claims it can regulate (meaning effectively prohibit)
all such activity. Beijing also brazenly claims—exploiting Western green sensibilities—that U.S.
naval vessels pollute China's exclusive zone, pollution being an activity the treaty permits
coastal states to regulate out to 24 miles. China wants to deny American access to its nearby
waters so it can have its way with its neighbors. Beijing is building a NETWORK of "anti-
access" and "area denial" weapons such as integrated air defenses, submarines, land-based
ballistic and cruise missiles, and cyber and anti-satellite systems designed to make it
exceedingly hazardous for American ships and aircraft to traverse China's exclusive zone or
peripheral seas. If the Senate ratifies the treaty, we would become subject to its disputeresolution mechanisms and ambiguities. Right now, since we are the world's major naval power,
our conduct dominates state practice and hence customary INTERNATIONAL law—to our
decided advantage. This dispute is not really about law. China simply does not want the U.S.
military to gather INTELLIGENCE near its shores. And other nations quietly support China's
position, including Russia, Iran, Brazil and India. Given China's incessant incursions into the
exclusive zones of other Asian nations such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, these states
may seek to restrict international maritime activities in their exclusive zones as well, further
complicating U.S. efforts. All Washington wants is to continue doing what it has been doing
since it became a maritime POWER : use its Navy to enhance international peace and
security, deter conflict, reassure allies, and collect intelligence. LOST undercuts these strategic
imperatives, and that is why it has always been a bad idea for the U.S.—a formula for endless
legal maneuvering and the submission of conflicting claims to the treaty's international tribunal,
where our prospects are uncertain at best. One hopes India and Japan will stop reflexively
supporting LOST. They have significant alternatives to check China's growing power, including
closer cooperation with the United States. The treaty is not an answer—it is only a beguiling,
flawed escape hatch from the hard work America and others must do to meet China's challenge.
That hard work must include properly funding and equipping the Navy and exercising it in
China's exclusive zones, including especially on intelligence missions, based on longestablished state practice. Together with diplomacy to PREVENT nascent conflicts from
escalating, these steps will reassure allies of full U.S. support in resolving disputes with China
Resource extraction will only fund terrorist groups
Rumsfeld 6/12/12 – Donald (“Why the U.N. Shouldn't Own the Seas,”
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303768104577460890850883780)
patel
Thirty years ago, President Ronald Reagan asked me to meet with world leaders to represent
the United States in opposition to the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty. Our efforts soon
found a persuasive supporter in British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Today, as the U.S.
Senate again considers approving this flawed agreement, the Reagan-Thatcher reasons for
opposition remain every bit as persuasive. When I met with Mrs. Thatcher in 1982, her
conclusion on the treaty was unforgettable: "What this treaty proposes is nothing less than the
INTERNATIONAL nationalization of roughly two-thirds of the Earth's surface." Then, referring
to her battles dismantling Britain's state-owned mining and utility companies, she added,
"And you know how I feel about nationalization. Tell Ronnie I'm with him." Reagan had
entered office the year before with the treaty presented to him as a done deal requiring only his
signature and Senate ratification. Then as now, most of the world's nations had already
approved it. The Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations had all gone along. American diplomats
generally supported the treaty and were shocked when Reagan changed America's POLICY.
Puzzled by their reaction, the president was said to have responded, "But isn't that what the
election was all about?" Yet, as the Gipper might have said, here we go again: An impressive
coalition—including every living former secretary of State—has endorsed the Obama
administration's goal of ratifying the treaty. The U.S. Navy wants to "lock in" existing and widely
accepted rules of high-seas navigation. BUSINESS groups say the treaty could help them by
creating somewhat more certainty. Can so many people, organizations and countries be
mistaken? Yes. Various proponents have valid considerations, but none has made a
compelling case that the treaty would, on balance, benefit America as a whole. Though a 1994
agreement (signed by some but not all parties to the treaty) fixed some of its original flaws,
the treaty remains a sweeping power grab that could prove to be the largest mechanism for
the world-wide redistribution of wealth in human HISTORY. The treaty proposes to create a
new global governance institution that would regulate American citizens and businesses
without being accountable politically to the American people. Some treaty proponents pay
little attention to constitutional concerns about democratic legislative processes and principles
of self-government, but I believe the American people take seriously such threats to the
foundations of our nation. The treaty creates a United Nations-style body called the
"International Seabed Authority." "The Authority," as U.N. bureaucrats call it in Orwellian
shorthand, would be involved in all COMMERCIAL activity in international waters, such as
mining and oil and gas production. Pursuant to the treaty's Article 82, the U.S. would be
required to transfer to this entity a significant share of all royalties generated by U.S.
companies—royalties that would otherwise go to the U.S. Treasury. Over time, hundreds of
billions of dollars could flow through the Authority with little oversight. The U.S. would not
control how those revenues are spent: The treaty empowers the Authority to redistribute
these so-called INTERNATIONAL royalties to developing and landlocked nations with no role in
exploring or extracting those resources. This would constitute massive global welfare,
courtesy of the U.S. taxpayer. It would be as if fishermen who exerted themselves to catch fish
on the high seas were required, on the principle that those fish belonged to all people
everywhere, to give a share of their take to countries that had nothing to do with their costly,
dangerous and arduous efforts. Worse still, these sizable "royalties" could go to corrupt
dictatorships and state sponsors of terrorism. For example, as a treaty signatory and a
member of the Authority's EXECUTIVE council, the government of Sudan—which has harbored
terrorists and conducted a mass extermination campaign against its own people—would have
as much say as the U.S. on issues to be decided by the Authority. Disagreements among treaty
signatories are to be decided through mandatory dispute-resolution processes of uncertain
integrity. Americans should be uncomfortable with unelected and unaccountable tribunals
appointed by the secretary-general of the United Nations serving as the final arbiter of such
disagreements. Even if one were to agree with the principle of global wealth redistribution from
the U.S. to other nations, other U.N. bodies have proven notably unskilled at financial
MANAGEMENT. The U.N. Oil for Food program in Iraq, for instance, resulted in hundreds of
millions of dollars in corruption and graft that directly benefited Saddam Hussein and his
allies. The Law of the Sea Treaty is an opportunity for scandal on an even larger scale. The
most persuasive argument for the treaty is the U.S. Navy's desire to shore up INTERNATIONAL
navigation rights. It is true that the treaty might produce some benefits, clarifying some
principles and perhaps making it easier to resolve certain disputes. But our Navy has done
quite well without this treaty for the past 200 years, relying often on centuries-old, wellestablished customary international law to assert navigational rights. Ultimately, it is our
naval power that protects international freedom of navigation. This treaty would not make a
large enough additional contribution to counterbalance the problems it would create. In his
farewell address to the nation in 1988, Reagan advised the country: "Don't be afraid to see what
you see." If the members of the U.S. Senate fulfill their responsibilities, read the Law of the Sea
Treaty and consider it carefully, I believe they will come to the conclusion that its costs to our
security and sovereignty would far exceed any benefits.
Ratification means CP cannot solve for the affirmative- the theory is flawed
Bandow 4 – Doug, Senior Fellow at Cato, holds a J.D. from Stanford University, writes for many
journals and papers, focuses on civil liberties and political science (3/15/4, “Sink the Law of the
Sea Treaty,” Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/sink-law-sea-treaty)
patel
President Bush has demonstrated his willingness to stand alone internationally. Yet for little
better reason than go-along, get-along multilateralism, the administration is now pushing the
Senate to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, which was just unanimously voted out of Richard
Lugar’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee. At a committee meeting in February, Lugar noted a
wide range of support from American interests “for U.S. accession to be COMPLETED swiftly.”
However, the treaty is a flawed document, and there would be serious costs from accepting it.
The Law of the Sea Treaty originated in the 1970s as part of the United Nations’
redistributionist agenda known as the “New International Economic Order.” The convention
covers such issues as fishing and navigation, but the controversy arose mainly over seabed
mining. In essence, the Law of the Sea Treaty was designed to transfer wealth and technology
from the industrialized states to the Third World. Two decades ago, President Ronald Reagan
ignored criticism of American unilateralism and refused to sign the treaty. U.S. leadership
caused the Europeans and even the Soviet Union to stay out. Many Third World states
eventually acknowledged the treaty’s many flaws. But treaties attract diplomats as lights attract
moths. The first Bush and Clinton administrations worked to “fix” the treaty, leading to a revised
agreement in 1994. Washington signed, leading to a cascade of ratifications from other
countries. GOP gains in Congress, however, dissuaded the Clinton administration from pushing
for ratification. Now George W. Bush has stepped in where Bill Clinton feared to tread.
Unfortunately, the revised treaty retains many of its original flaws. There is still a complicated
multinational bureaucracy that sounds like an excerpt from George Orwell’s “1984”: At its
center is the International Seabed Authority. The Authority (as it calls itself) supervises a
mining subsidiary called the ENTERPRISE, ruled by an Assembly, Council, and various
commissions and committees. Mining approval would be highly politicized and could
discriminate against American operators. Companies that are allowed to mine would owe
substantial fees to the Authority and be required to do surveys for the Enterprise, their
government-subsidized competitor. A mandatory transfer of mining technologies to Third
World companies has been watered down. However, “sponsoring states” — that is,
governments of nations where mining companies are located-would have to facilitate such
transfers if the Enterprise and Third World competitors are “unable to obtain” necessary
equipment commercially. Depending on the whims of the Authority, ensuring the
“cooperation” of private miners could look very much like mandatory transfers. The Authority,
though so far of modest size, would suffer from the same perverse incentives that afflict the
U.N., since the United States would be responsible for 25 percent of the budget but easily
outmaneuvered. Proposals by industrialized signatories to limit their contributions have so far
received an unfriendly reception. Still, when it signed the Law of the Sea Treaty, the Clinton
administration said there was no reason to worry, because the treaty proclaims that “all organs
and subsidiary bodies to be established under the Convention and this Agreement shall be costeffective.” Right. Presumably just as cost-effective as the U.N. The treaty’s mining scheme is
flawed in its very conception. Although many people once thought untold wealth would leap
from the seabed, land-based sources have remained cheaper than expected, and scooping up
manganese nodules and other resources from the ocean floor is logistically daunting. There is
no guarantee that seabed mining will ever be commercially viable. Yet this has not dimmed
the enthusiasm of the Authority. Like the U.N., it generates lots of reports and paper and
obsesses over trivia. Protecting “the emblem, the official seal and the name” of the
International Seabed Authority has been a matter of some concern. Among the crises the
Authority has confronted: In April 2002 the Jamaican government turned off its air conditioning,
necessitating “urgent consultations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade.” A
year later Jamaica used the same tactic in an ongoing battle over Authority payments for its
facility. Oh yes, half of the Authority members are behind on their dues. Were seabed mining
ever to thrive, a transparent system for recognizing mine sites and resolving disputes would
be helpful. But the Authority’s purpose isn’t to be helpful. It is to redistribute resources to
irresponsible Third World governments with a sorry history of squandering abundant foreign
aid. This redistributionist bent is reflected in the treaty’s call for financial transfers to
developing states and even “peoples who have not attained full independence or other selfgoverning status”-code for groups such as the PLO. Whatever changes the treaty has
undergone, a constant has been Third World pressure for financial transfers. Three voluntary
trust funds were established to aid developing countries. Alas, few donors have come forward
to subsidize the participation of, say, sub-Saharan African states in the DEVELOPMENT of ocean
mining. Thus, the Authority has had to dip into its own budget to pay into the funds. Why, given
all this, was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee eager to sign on? The treaty is not without
benefits. Provisions regarding the ENVIRONMENT, resource management, and rights of transit
generally are positive, though many reflect what is now customary international law, even in the
absence of U.S. ratification. Lugar notes that “law and practice with respect to regulation of
activities off our shores is already generally compatible with the Convention.” This would seem
to be an equally strong argument for not ratifying the treaty. Most influential, though, may be
support from the U.S. NAVY, which is enamored of the treaty’s guarantee of navigational
freedom. Not that such freedom is threatened now: The Russian navy is rusting in port, China
has yet to develop a blue water capability, and no country is impeding U.S. transit,
commercial or military. At the same time, some ambiguous provisions may impinge on
freedoms U.S. shipping now enjoys. In Senate testimony last fall, State Department legal
adviser William H. Taft IV noted the importance of conditioning acceptance “upon the
understanding that each Party has the exclusive right to determine which of its activities are
‘military activities’ and that such determination is not subject to review.” Whether other
members will respect that claim is not at all certain. Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the vice chief of
naval operations, acknowledges the possibility that a Law of the Sea tribunal could rule
adversely and harm U.S. “operational planning and activities, and our security.” Moreover, at a
time when Washington is combating lawless terrorism, it should be evident that the only sure
guarantee of free passage on the seas is the power of the U.S. Navy, combined with friendly
relations with the states, few in number, that sit astride important sea lanes. Coastal nations
make policy based on perceived national interest, not abstract legal norms. Remember the
luckless USS Pueblo in 1968? International law did not PREVENT North Korea from seizing the
intelligence ship; approval of the Law of the Sea Treaty would have offered the Pueblo no
additional protection. America was similarly unaided by international law in its 2001
confrontation with China over our downed EP-3 surveillance plane. Nor has signing the Law of
the Sea Treaty prevented Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, North Korea, Pakistan, and others from
making ocean claims deemed excessive by others. INDEED, last October Adm. Mullen warned
that the benefits he believed to derive from treaty ratification did not “suggest that countries’
attempts to restrict navigation will cease once the United States becomes a party to the Law of
the Sea Convention.” Critics of the U.S. refusal to sign in 1982 predicted ocean chaos, but not
once has an American ship been denied passage. No country has had either the incentive or the
ability to interfere with U.S. shipping. And if they had, the treaty would have been of little help.
In 1998 Law of the Sea Treaty supporters agitated for immediate ratification because several
special exemptions for the United States were set to expire; Washington did not ratify, and no
one seems to have noticed. Now Lugar worries that Washington could “forfeit our seat at the
table of institutions that will make decisions about the use of the oceans.” Yet last October
Assistant Secretary of State John F. Turner told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
America has “had considerable success” in asserting “its oceans interests as a nonparty to the
Convention.” Law of the Sea Treaty proponents talk grandly of the need to “restore U.S.
leadership,” but real leadership can mean saying no as well as yes. Ronald Reagan was right to
torpedo the Law of the Sea Treaty two decades ago. Creating a new oceans bureaucracy is no
MORE attractive today.
There is no framework for exploitation which means cp isn’t necessary and
mining could occur in US waters
Norton Rose Fulbright 13 (October 2013, “Current Issues in Seabed Mining,”
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/107981/current-issues-inseabed-mining) patel
When the International Regime for Seabed Mining was introduced at the United Nations in
1994, as an amendment to the Law of the Sea Treaty (the Treaty) the then Secretary General of
the International Seabed Authority (ISA) Ambassador Satya Nandan described the proposed
regime as providing for: "a stable environment for investors in deep - seabed minerals under a
market - oriented regime; it guarantees access to the resources of the seabed to all qualified
investors; it provides for the establishment of system of taxation which is fair to the seabed
miner and from which the international community as a whole may benefit;" As of 2013 it is fair
to ask what progress has been made towards these goals. The Regime described to the United
Nations by Ambassador Nandan concerned the development of a Seabed Mining Regime in
respect of the ocean floor beyond the territorial limits of coastal states (the Area). A mining
regime within the limits of the jurisdiction of a country does not involve the ISA; consequently
the development of the necessary relationships to pursue mining are between the miner and
the government of the coastal state. However, many of the issues are relevant to both mining
areas. Activity in coastal waters has been concentrated in the Southern Pacific. A number of
Pacific Island countries have granted either exploration or exploitation leases and the
Secretariat of the Pacific Community has identified seabed mineral potential in Papua New
Guinea, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, the
Cook Islands, Samoa and Niue. In the Area, the ISA has granted seventeen contracts either
directly to countries or to companies sponsored by a country (this is a requirement of the ISA).
ISA contracts are for exploration; contracts granted in respect of mining in territorial waters
may include rights to exploit the resource (this is the case with the lease granted by Papua New
Guinea to Nautilus Minerals). The result of all of this is that both governments and private
industry have interests in the development of seabed mining in territorial waters and beyond.
All this interest in seabed mining arises from a number of sources, two of which are the world
need for more metal (including rare earth metals) and the possibilities of financial benefits for
the countries that possess the metals. Using copper as an example, the US Geological Survey
has estimated that world consumption of copper over the next 25 years will exceed all of the
copper metal ever mined to date. The average reserve grade of land based copper projects as
of 2009 stood at .61 %. Nautilus has estimated that the grade available in its Papua New Guinea
seabed project is 7.2 %. As a potential beneficiary the Cook Islands estimate that mining the
minerals in their waters has the potential to increase their GDP a hundred fold. The UN
estimates that the current per - capita income of the Cook Islands is $12,200. Seabed mining is
not unlike other new industries attempting to establish themselves. In order to prosper there
must be a legal framework in place and industry must have a social license from the relevant
stakeholders. With a new industry in uncharted waters the attainment of a social license
involves the development of a consensus that the activity is safe and that it does not adversely
affect the environment in which it is conducted. This is frequently a substantial hill to climb for
industries in new areas. The seabed is one such area. Mining for shale gas faced much the
same developmental issues and one expects that methane hydrate mining will encounter
similar hurdles. The complete legal framework for seabed mining is not yet in place, what
currently exists is a developing framework. There is no exploitation code for seabed mining in
areas regulated by the ISA. Many ISA exploration licenses expire in 2016 and the current
licensees will require guidance on an exploitation framework. The ISA has recently published a
study describing what might be included in a regulatory framework for exploitation but
currently it is just that, a study. In the South Pacific very few of the island nations have mining
codes, although some are in progress, such as the Cook Islands. Part and parcel of the
establishment of the regulatory framework is the development of a taxation/royalty regime to
provide certainty for a developer assessing its risks. For activities in territorial waters this may be
negotiated between the developer and the coastal state. The Finance Minister for the Cook
Islands, Mark Brown, has recently stated that the Cook Islands would expect to receive stakes in
mining companies for free as the price for granting rights to exploit the resources of the Cook
Islands. In the case of ISA regulated leases one expects that a generic regime, including a royalty
structure, will be developed to cover production in all ISA regulated areas. This will probably be
a regime bereft of any individual negotiation between ISA and its individual licensees. It will be
interesting to see whether the companies who have leases in ISA areas as a result of state
sponsorship have the staying power to await an ISA articulated mining regime.
2AC AT: LOST (Enviro NB)
There is no guarantee of environmental protection absent an
establishment of a network of marine protected areas
TULLIO SCOVAZZ No date - United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law,
Professor of International Law at University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan(“THE CONSERVATION
AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF MARINE BIODIVERSITY, INCLUDING GENETIC RESOURCES, IN
AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE,”
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/consultative_process/ICP12_Presentations/Scovazzi_Abstra
ct.pdf) patel
New challenges are facing States as regards the subject of conservation and
sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. This
report will focus on the legal aspects of the subject. It will elaborate on how the present
regime, as embodied in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
could evolve to address some of the new challenges, such as a regime for genetic
resources and the establishment of a network of marine protected areas. The basic
aspect of the high seas regime is freedom. Today the freedom of the high seas is not
absolute, but subject to a number of conditions, as specified by the relevant rules of
international law, including UNCLOS. Today it cannot be sustained that a State has the right
to engage in specific marine activities simply because it enjoys freedom of the sea, without it
being bound to consider the opposite positions, if any, of the other interested States. Also
the concept of freedom of the sea is to be understood in the context of the present range of
marine activities and in relation to the other potentially conflicting uses and to interests
having a general character, such as the sustainable use of living resources and the
protection of the environment. The most innovating aspect of UNCLOS is the concept of
common heritage of mankind. It presupposes a regime completely different from
both the traditional concepts of sovereignty, which applies in the territorial sea, and
of freedom, which applies on the high seas. The basic elements of the regime of
common heritage of mankind, applying to the seabed beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction (the Area), are the prohibition of national appropriation, the destination
of the Area for peaceful purposes, the use of the Area and its resources for the benefit
of mankind as a whole with particular consideration for the interests and needs of
developing countries, as well as the establishment of an international organization
entitled to act on behalf of mankind in the exercise of rights over the resources.
However, the prospects in the field of mineral resources in the Area remain today
uncertain. A number of factors, including the cost of seabed mining activities, have
inhibited progress towards commercial exploitation of mineral deposits.
Exploitation is inevitable and LOST excludes any provisions on the
environment
TULLIO SCOVAZZ No date - United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law,
Professor of International Law at University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan(“THE CONSERVATION
AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF MARINE BIODIVERSITY, INCLUDING GENETIC RESOURCES, IN
AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE,”
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/consultative_process/ICP12_Presentations/Scovazzi_Abstra
ct.pdf) patel
The exploitation of commercially valuable genetic resources may in the near future
become a promising activity taking place beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
But what is the international regime applying to genetic resources in areas beyond
national jurisdiction? Neither the UNCLOS nor the Convention on Biological Diversity
provide any specific legal framework in this regard. Some States take the position that
the UNCLOS principle of common heritage of mankind and the mandate of the International
Seabed Authority should be extended to cover also genetic resources. Other States rely on
the UNCLOS principle of freedom of the high seas, which would imply the freedom of access
to, and the unrestricted exploitation of, genetic resources. In fact, both the divergent
positions move from the same starting point, namely that the UNCLOS is the legal
framework for all activities in the oceans and seas, including in respect of genetic
resources beyond areas of national jurisdiction. There is no doubt that the UNCLOS is a
cornerstone in the field of codification of international law. Nevertheless, the UNCLOS, as
any legal text, is linked to the period when it was negotiated and adopted (from 1973 to
1982). Being itself a product of time, the UNCLOS cannot stop the passing of time. While it
provides a solid basis for the regulation of many subjects, it would be illusory to think that
the UNCLOS is the end of legal regulation. International law of the sea is subject to a process
of natural evolution and progressive development which is linked to new needs and
involves also the UNCLOS. In particular, the UNCLOS cannot be supposed to regulate
those activities that its drafters did not intend to regulate for the simple reason that
they were not foreseeable in the period when this treaty was being negotiated. At this
time, very little was known about the genetic qualities of deep seabed organisms. The
words “genetic resources” or “bioprospecting” do not appear anywhere in the
UNCLOS. When dealing with the special regime of the Area and its resources, the
UNCLOS drafters had only mineral resources in mind. The UNCLOS defines the
“resources” of the Area as limited to “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in-situ in
the Area at or beneath the sea-bed, including polymetallic nodules”. This means that the
UNCLOS regime of common heritage of mankind cannot be automatically extended to the
non-mineral resources of the Area. But, for logical and chronological reasons, the
regime of freedom of the high seas cannot apply to genetic resources either. While
establishing specific regimes for living and mineral resources in areas beyond
national jurisdiction, the UNCLOS does not provide any third regime for the
exploitation of marine genetic resources. A legal gap exists in this regard. Sooner or
later it should be filled (better sooner than later) through a regime which, to be
consistent, should encompass under the same legal framework the genetic resources
of both the deep seabed and the superjacent waters. However, some general
principles of the UNCLOS should be taken into consideration when envisaging a
future regime for marine genetic resources beyond national jurisdiction. They include
the paramount objective to “contribute to the realization of a just and equitable
international economic order which takes into account the interests and needs of mankind
as a whole and, in particular the special interests and needs of developing countries,
whether coastal or land-locked” (UNCLOS preamble). Also in the field of genetic resources,
the application of the principle of freedom of the sea under a “first-come-first-served”
approach leads to inequitable and hardly acceptable consequences. New cooperative
schemes, based on a regime for access and the benefit of all States, should be envisaged in a
future agreement on genetic resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. This is also
in full conformity with the principle of fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out
of the utilization of genetic resources set forth by the Convention on Biological Diversity.
The scope of the UNCLOS regime of the Area is already broader than it may be believed at
first sight. The legal condition of the Area has an influence also on the regulation of
matters and activities that, although different from minerals and mining activities,
are also located in that space and are more or less directly related to mining
activities, such as marine scientific research, the preservation of the marine
environment and the protection of underwater cultural heritage. As far as the first
two matters are concerned, it is difficult to draw a clercut distinction between what
takes place on the seabed and what in the superjacent waters. Bioprospecting, that is
what is currently understood as the search for commercially valuable genetic
resources of the deep seabed, can already be considered as falling under the UNCLOS
regime of marine scientific research. Also bioprospecting is consequently covered by
Art. 143, para. 1, of the UNCLOS, which sets forth the principle that “marine scientific
research in the Area shall be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the
benefit of the mankind as a whole”
2AC AT: LOST (Politics NB)
LOST is massively unpopular in both chambers
Tennant 12 - not the Doctor (Michael, 27 June 2012, "Will Our Freedoms Be LOST at Sea?,"
www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/11824-will-our-freedoms-be-lost-atsea, ADL)
Although the Obama administration is putting on the drive to get the Senate to ratify LOST, its
success is by no means certain. The House of Representatives recently voted to deny the
administration millions of dollars in funding for LOST organizations, which suggests that the anti-LOST
movement is strong and well-organized. Kerry has said he will not bring the treaty up for a vote before the November election
because, according to The Hill, “some lawmakers ‘on and off the committee’ have candidly told him they’d ‘be more
comfortable’ if they could avoid having to cast the controversial vote during the campaign
season” — another indication that the treaty is widely unpopular. Kerry will likely try to get LOST through the
Senate during the lame-duck session after the election. That may not be easy: At least 27 Senators have signed a letter
circulated by Sen. Jim DeMint (R-S.C.) stating that they will not vote to ratify LOST, and it only takes 34 Senators in
opposition to sink its ratification. If the vote is delayed until the next President is inaugurated, it could end up being opposed from the White House,
which would likely prevent ratification. Obama’s presumptive Republican opponent, Mitt Romney, has signaled his unease with LOST; and while the
Libertarian Party’s nominee, Gary Johnson, does not appear to have taken a stand on LOST, the party has in the past specifically praised U.S. refusal to
join the accord. America, by rejecting LOST, cannot stop the UN from claiming control over the oceans. But, wrote Greenley, “U.S. ratification would
provide that final stamp of legitimacy for the UN’s power grab over the oceans and seas and constitute a major step into world government.” The
globalist elites are pushing hard for U.S. accession to LOST. Those concerned about U.S. sovereignty and fearful of
transferring more power to unaccountable international organizations will have to work just as hard to ensure that if and when the treaty finally does
come up for a vote,
the Senate has the guts to tell the globalists to get lost.
2AC AT: LOST (Conflict NB)
LOST is too vague and not binding
Troianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep
Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,”
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello
In this context, it’s feared that poor States owning offshore mineral resources are undemanding
and agree an implementation of this new industry without precaution. Although scientists have
uncertainty about their actual extent, it’s obvious that marine environmental hazards would be very significant. The
risk to see this activity starting and developing outside of any international regulation is unfortunately not negligible. This fear
reflects the fact that the provisions of U.N.C.L.O.S. relating to the protection of the marine
environment are too vague and not actually binding on States as illustrated by the offshore oil
and gas industry development.
2AC AT: PIC out of Minerals
Mineral mining is an all or nothing thing --- you cant pick which ones you mine
until they are processed on land --- that means either CP doesn’t solve the aff
bc it mines NO minerals or it links to the net benefit
Parthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of
Security,”
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf
Though supply chains differ for every mineral, several steps are common across most of these supply ¶
chains and can help analysts identify potential¶ points of vulnerability. Once potentially profitable¶
reserves are discovered, companies must obtain the¶ technology, permits and capital needed for min¶ -¶ eral extraction. Since most
minerals are not pure¶ ores – extracted resources typically contain many¶ different materials in
various concentrations – the¶ minerals must be processed and separated. Unless¶ the deposits are
processed on site, the minerals¶ may be shipped multiple times before they are¶ ready to use. Many minerals are sold in
commodities markets, which requires additional physical¶ shipment or financial steps. Finally, the minerals¶ are
purchased, shipped to the consumer and used.
2AC AT: Privatization (Capital)
No mining for a decade---start up costs too high
Goodier, 11 Rob, Journalist, “Why Deep-Sea Rare-Earth Metals Will Stay Right Where They
Are—For Now,” http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/why-deep-sea-rareearth-metals-will-stay-right-where-they-are-for-now
John Wiltshire, director of the Hawaii Undersea Research Laboratory, also at the University of Hawaii,
Manoa, puts it even more bluntly. "The truth of the matter is, nobody's going to mine in the deep
sea — even if somebody massively funds this — for a minimum of a decade ," he says. The
startup cost could run from $1 to $2 billion .
REE mining requires a lot of capital start up
Anthony, 11 Sebastian, “Rare earth crisis: Innovate, or be crushed by China,” Lead editor at
Ziff Davis, Inc. Owner at SA Holdings Past Columnist at Tecca Editor at Aol (Weblogs, Inc)
Education University of Essex Extreme Tech, http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/111029rare-earth-crisis-innovate-or-be-crushed-by-china
Rare earths — a block of seventeen elements in the middle of the Periodic Table (pictured below) — aren’t actually all that rare,
but they tend to be very hard to obtain commercially. Generally, rare earth elements are only
found in minute quantities in mineral deposits of clay, sand, and rock (earths!), which must
then be processed to extract the rare metals — an expensive process, and also costly for the
environment as billions of tons of ore must be mined and refined to yield just a few tons of usable rare
earths.
Privates won’t distribute equally
Nemeth et al 8 (Stephen C. Nemeth and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Department of Political
Science, University of Iowa,Elizabeth A. Nyman and Paul R. Hensel Department of Political
Science, Florida State University, “Ruling the Sea: Institutionalization and Privatization of
the Global Ocean Commons,” http://mailer.fsu.edu/~phensel/garnetphensel/Research/UNCLOS08.pdf) patel
Within their EEZ, states have jurisdiction and are free to manage, develop, and exploit all
resources within the sea, the floor, and subsoil from their continental shelf with a boundary
at 200 nautical miles or to the edge of the continental margin.6 This idea gained widespread
support amongst both developed and developing states. During the first substantive
conference of UNCLOS in 1974, 100 out of 143 participating states supported the idea (Pratt
and Schofield, 2000: 4). By the time a preliminary text was made ready in 1977, 29
states had made a formal EEZ claim; by the signing of UNCLOS in 1982, 59 states had
done so (Pratt and Schofield, 2000: 4). While privatization is an attractive solution, its
primary drawback is the potential for the creation and/or exacerbation of resource
distributional inequities. It has been admitted that the formalization of EEZs as part
of the UNCLOS agreement “has increased, rather than decreased, inequality among
states, giving more to the already well-endowed richer states” (Borgese, 1995: 15). One
of the most significant problems is that the subdivision of the commons is not homogenous.
Merely allocating equivalent portions of the commons does not mean that all users
will get an equal share. States may be tempted to seek larger shares of the commons
to put more resources under their private control; a lack of information about the
resource will also complicate negotiations regarding the distribution of a resource
since a state risks getting a worthless share (Wijkman, 1982). In addition, the migratory
nature of fish stocks and the interconnectedness of the ocean’s ecosystem mean that
resources cannot be managed solely within the EEZ, leading to problems with fishing fleets
pursuing migratory fish stocks just outside of other states' EEZs (Borgese, 1995; Bailey,
1996).7 Since some resources can move between EEZs, each state has incentives to
exploit the resource before another does the same.
2AC AT: Privatization (Enviro DA)
Private companies have no regulations---causes haphazard regulations that
only the federal government harmonizing solves
Troianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep
Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,”
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello
The greatest fear would be this new industry expanding without being subject to any form of
international supervision control or regulation. The dreadful precedent of the offshore oil
exploitation evidences that it would be irresponsible to relinquish the regulation of Deep Sea
mining industry under the sole responsibility of the private companies and the States involved. This
regulation obviously involves stakes that exceed the framework of national policies. ¶ The first part of this work deals with the inadequacy of the current international legal
framework regarding Deep Sea activities and particularly Deep Sea mining. Changing this situation and introducing international regulation involves reconsidering the current
conception of the law of the sea, which has remained focused on the sovereignty of coastal States.¶ The second part is related to the foreseeable issues of Deep Sea mining.
Even though environmental protection is a vital challenge, the increasing strategic dimension of raw materials, especially some rare metals, might counter it. Geopolitical stake
of the seabed control could all the more speed the rush to the abyss.¶ I. INADEQUACY OF DEEP SEA MINING LEGAL FRAMEWORK¶ The E.E.Z. is usually considered as an
extension of the State’s territory. Such a view tends to impede international regulation. The uncontrolled development of offshore oil and gas industry reflects this almost total
lack of international regulation. It stresses the need to establish an international regulation based on the precautionary principle in order to avoid a haphazard development of
the seabed exploitation.¶ 17. Nautilus would be the first company worldwide to commercially explore thigh grade massive sulphide deposits on the sea floor. In January 2011
Nautilus was granted a 20 years mining lease by the Government of Papua New Guinea for the development of the Solwara 1 deposit which lies in the Eastern Manus Bassin on
the Bismark Sea at approximately 1600 metres depth. Nautilus planned to produce copper and gold in 2010. However, the company has been embroiled in a dispute with the
P.N.G. Government under a shared funding agreement (http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2012-11-14/nautilus-project-halted-over-dispute- in-png/1045884).¶
4¶ A. E.E.Z. Regime Impedes International Regulation¶ Since its recognition by the Geneva Convention of March 29th, 1958, prominence of the coastal State over the natural
resources of the continental shelf – which is considered as an extent of its territory – has never been challenged. This prominence has even been strengthening through the
creation of the 200 miles E.E.Z. under U.N.C.L.O.S. adoption in Montego Bay in December 10th, 1982. Coastal States have the “exclusive rights” to exploit, manage and preserve
resources of seawater, and ocean floor beyond their territorial waters, up to 200 nautical miles from their coastline. Furthermore, E.E.Z. can be expanded under certain
conditions (see hereinafter III C.).¶ Following Article 56 (1) (a) U.N.C.L.O.S., the term refers to an area where the coastal State has “sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring
and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed subsoil, and with regard
to the other activities for the economic exploitation of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, current and winds”.¶ In this area, the coastal State shall
conserve and manage natural resources. This requirement echoes the duty to ensure the protection and preservation of the marine environment referred to in Articles 192 to
237 U.N.C.L.O.S. Among these provisions Article 194-3 asserts that coastal States should limit the “pollution from installations and devices used of the exploitation or exploration
of the natural resources of the seabed and the subsoil”.¶ According to Article 56 (2) U.N.C.L.O.S.:« In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the
exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this
Convention ».Indeed “sovereign rights” appear not to be absolute but circumscribed by the rules of international law of the sea. Thus, the coastal State does not have a plenary
jurisdiction as may suggest use of the term "sovereignty".¶ For instance, coastal States must take into account the rights and freedoms of other States (Art. 72 § 2 U.N.C.L.O.S.)
and do not affect other uses of the sea with respect to the waters and the airspace above them (Art. 78 § 1 U.N.C.L.O.S.). For example, the establishment of offshore platforms is
normally prohibited in areas where there is intense fishing activity (Art. 147 § 2 (b) U.N.C.L.O.S.).Generally, the Convention seeks to find a balance between the rights granted to
coastal States and traditional uses of the sea.¶ Despite the tensions caused by the increasing use of marine resources only a few international initiatives have been taken18.
Ocean governance remains limited. Thus, these last years witnessed the spectacular development of offshore oil industry in a legal lacuna. Despite the high importance of the
subject, the¶ 18. See, Harry N. Scheiber, Economic Uses of the Oceans, in Law, Technology and Science for Oceans in Globalisation: IUU Fishing, Oil Pollution, Bioprospecting,
Outer Continental Shelf, Davor Vidas, ed., Martinus Nijhoff (2010).¶ 5¶ pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation of the seabed continues to spark little interest.¶
This kind of pollution is expressly referred to in Article 208 U.N.C.L.O.S. which requires coastal
states to adopt laws and regulations in order: "to prevent , reduce and control pollution of
the marine environment resulting directly or indirectly from the seabed." It means any activity or operation within
the area under the jurisdiction of a State, that is to say the internal waters, territorial sea, E.E.Z. and the continental shelf.¶ The coastal State shall regulate
in particular the E.E.Z. under its jurisdiction. In addition, § 4 and 5 of Article 208 U.N.C.L.O.S. require efforts to
harmonize national regulations through international organizations, in order to avoid differences , which could
be reflected by some States introducing more permissive standards than othe¶ Thus, States wishing to
authorize mining activities underwater must first establish an appropriate legal framework .
Then normally coastal State incurs responsibility in case of damage caused to the marine environment
(Art. 304 U.N.C.L.O.S). However, even if the State is theoretically responsible for its E.E.Z.’s use, there is no binding provision to regulate its action in this regard. In fact, Article
5 U.N.C.L.O.S. invites only Parties to establish global and regional rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures to prevent , reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment.
208-
Only federal government and national legislation can provide the guide and
regulation for private companies---solves the environemnt
Birney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC)
“Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea”
The importance of law and policies addressing deep-sea mining cannot be understated
because establishing such regulations allows all deep-sea mining stakeholders a better
command of their interests . This includes how effective the management of marine mineral
extraction will be and how well the ocean environment is protected. Therefore, a careful
assessment of current and past laws and regulations of deep-sea mining are addressed such as;
international legislation, national legislation and environmental regulations in PNG, local and state government legislation
in PNG, and the Madang Guidelines and code for environmental management of marine mining.
Privatizing risks more environmental destruction-this answers your
study
Chris Fred 12/21/13-Associate Editor of the Journal of Applied Ecology (2004-) Former
Editor of ICES Journal of Marine Science (2001-2005) Governor and member of Council,
Marine Biological Association UK (2003-) (Harry Blustein,” Privatizing the oceans is a bad
idea,” http://harryblutstein.com/environment/privatizing-the-oceans/) patel
The oceans cover almost three-quarters of the planet’s surface, and for many people they
represent the last great wilderness. But in fact the seas support many human activities, and
have done for millennia – for how much longer, though, is debatable. And that has raised
many suggestions of how to save them. Marine ecosystems underpin an estimated twothirds of global GDP, and seafood makes up around 6% of the world’s total protein
consumption. As the world’s population approaches nine billion by the middle of this
century, the demands on the sea to provide nutrition will continue to rise. Yet the UN has
already acknowledged the failure to ensure sustainable use of the seas – efforts to ensure
stocks are fished sustainably have been underway for more than 100 years in Europe, yet
most stocks are over-exploited with population numbers below safe biological limits. As
well as over-fishing, human activities impact upon the whole marine ecosystem. The
food chain is affected as predator or prey species are removed in great numbers,
causing population shifts and imbalances. The seas are used as a dumping ground,
from household rubbish to toxic waste. The oceans have also absorbed around half of all
the carbon dioxide emitted since the industrial revolution, which has raised the oceans’
acidity levels. This build up of toxins, warming and acidification all impose great stresses on
sea life. So it’s clear that existing management schemes are failing to protect the oceans.
This has prompted some to call for a partial privatization of the oceans, with coastal
communities “owning” areas of the sea. A recent proponent is the World Bank. Its 21person panel of experts concludes that the threats to the ocean are so diverse and
difficult for traditional measures to regulate that large-scale public-private
partnerships are the best hope of delivering sustainable use. The idea that someone
who has ownership of a resource will protect it seems intuitive and proposals to
“privatize” fisheries have a long history. Private rights do not themselves deliver
sustainability or environmental protection – look at the impact industrialization of
agriculture has had on the countryside, for example. It is legislation that protects
woods, hedgerows and field margins, not the fact that someone owns them. From an
economic point of view, creating a market – attributing value to, buying and selling areas of
the sea – would contribute to economic indicators such GDP as these “services” currently
rendered gratis would now be captured in the trading accounts of companies. But
ultimately it would take something that is the common property of all and sell it (one
assumes governments would sell rather than give) to corporations and consortia.
These would then trade the sea floor like any other property. From an ecological
point of view the proposal is flawed. The seawater that carries fish larvae, plankton
and other foods, and pollutants too, will wash in and out of these regions without any
regard for boundary lines drawn on maps and charts. Similarly, fish will swim in and
out of the areas without checking in at border control. These cross-boundary
movements would render many of the possible protective measures ineffective. When
we own land we generally erect a fence or wall to keep our livestock in and to prevent
others from gaining access to or damaging or our property. The land ownership analogy is
simply not appropriate in the context of the oceanic world. The UN Convention on the Law
of the Seas (UNCLOS) follows the principle that the high seas are international and owned
by no nation, and are the common heritage of mankind (Article 136). A policy of
privatisation of the seas therefore involves setting aside this principle. Human
pressures on the ocean continue to increase and effective action is certainly needed,
and urgently. The idea of ceding parts of the ocean to local communities, perhaps in
partnership with multinational corporations, is seen as providing a mechanism that
would allow the communities that have a stake in the health of their local ecosystems
to play a part in managing them, using their local knowledge. Anthropologists are keen
to promote examples where indigenous people develop their own environmental and
resource management practice using traditional ecological knowledge. There are many
examples of such successes in the marine environment – particularly in dynamic,
productive ecosystems – but where fish are highly mobile such approaches fail. If your fish
move in and out of your patch it will always pay to catch them now, rather than let
them go to be caught by someone else, or risk them moving to another area and not
returning. The “noble savage” living in balance with nature is simply a romantic Victorian
construct. Archaeological evidence shows clear over exploitation of fisheries
resources by Stone Age peoples. The world’s fish catch peaked in the 1980s; even
from the 1960s on it was clear many stocks were severely over exploited. In the 50
years since then we have seen proposal after proposal to save the seas – reduce
pollution, introduce Marine Protected Areas, extend Exclusive Economic Zones to 200
miles, and others. None has really delivered. Speaking as an ecologist, the answer is
simple – we need to reduce fishing. We need to do this urgently, make a significant change,
and in one or two decades we might have healthier stocks which can then sustain catch
rates similar to now. But talk of privatizing the sea is just another example of how
politicians are unwilling to face the challenge head on.
2AC AT: Privatization (Defense DA)
In the context of defense related minerals, the private sector wont invest in
them and there isn’t a reliable supply --- that collapses defense industries
Parthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of
Security,”
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf
In developing new policies related to minerals,¶ policymakers must remember that
substantial¶ government intervention already exists, includ¶ -¶ ing permitting exploitation on government lands¶ and regulating environmental
impacts. However,¶ policymakers must navigate a market that is not¶ always easy to predict and in which the need¶ for federal government intervention (or nonin¶ -¶ tervention) is not always obvious. In the
the private sector responded by¶ providing some capital for a domestic mining¶
operation to resume. This does not always solve ¶ the foreign policy and geopolitical challenges
the¶ U.S. government experiences. In particular, for¶ minerals that private companies will not reliably ¶ produce or more
defense-specific applications,¶ U.S. government interests may be at stake while¶ private
recent¶ rare earths case,
interests are not¶ To manage circumstances where the federal¶ government must act to protect
U.S. interests¶ against the threat of supply disruptions , various¶ federal agencies have existing mechanisms that¶ must be preserved and
utilized. The Departments¶ of Defense and Energy already have mechanisms¶ for offering low-interest loan guarantees for busi¶ -¶ nesses in a broad range of strategically important¶ fields, from semiconductors to military assets to¶ energy infrastructure. Similarly, these agencies¶ can use loan guarantees to facilitate production¶ or advance research and development related to¶ minerals, including lending
funds to support¶ research on the more efficient use of rare earths,¶ rhenium or lithium in defense or energy appli ¶ -¶ cations.
Only a willingness to use these
tools is¶ required
Government is key to obtain the knowledge infrastructure to protect US
interests --- private companies withhold information to understand the global
supply chain --- that causes protectionism
Parthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of
Security,”
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf
To protect the U.S. government’s ability to manage critical minerals appropriately , Congress¶
should protect the government’s role in analyzing critical mineral vulnerabilities and¶
producing its own data .¶ As congressional leaders¶ in both political parties strive to reduce spend¶ -¶ ing and seek efficiencies, they
should maintain¶ a strong U.S. government capacity for research¶ and analysis – a public good
that is both necessary to protect U.S. interests and undersupplied¶ by the private sector .
Without vigilance, the¶ United
States risks being blindsided by regular¶ trade disputes and supply
disruptions , and by¶ countries exerting political leverage.¶ Improving¶ how the U.S. government handles mineral
issues¶ should not require major increases in manpower¶ or spending. But the administration and Congress¶ must
maintain the existing capacities and preserve the knowledge infrastructure that the¶
government has redeveloped in the past few years¶ (See Key U.S. Government Offices box).¶ In addition to
continuing to produce good data,¶ the U.S. government can do more to leverage its¶
relationships with contractors. The private sector¶ will continue to withhold important
information in order to keep information proprietary or¶ because it could be harmful to the
bottom line if¶ shared with the government. But when DOD, for¶ example, has billion-dollar
contracts with suppliers¶ for critical military assets, it should be able to have¶ contractual
requirements that these companies¶ share information about major supply chain
vulnerabilities that can provide other countries with¶ leverage over the United States or
potentially cause¶ major disruptions . The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall¶ Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is an¶ important
model for requiring due diligence in¶ understanding and reporting supply chain infor ¶ -¶ mation among manufacturers that source minerals ¶ from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
2AC AT: Recycle CP
Can’t sustain our industries --- has little impact
Paramaguru, 13 Kharunya, “Rethinking Our Risky Reliance on Rare Earth Metals,”
http://science.time.com/2013/12/20/rare-earths-are-too-rare/
Recycling metal has been advocated by some as a possible way of managing these precious
resources—the European Parliament adopted a law curbing dumping of electric waste in 2012, meaning member states will
need to collect 45 tons of e-waste for every 100 tons of electronic goods sold in the previous three years by 2016. But Gradael
says that for rare earths, recycling will have little impact until our use of these materials first
plateaus, as there will not be enough in the recycling stream to keep up with future demand .
Instead, Gradael hopes that product designers, material scientists and engineers will fully take into account the
risks and limitations of relying on such resources in the future and design new products
accordingly. Until that innovation comes, we’ll continue to be exposed to the environmental damage, geopolitical scares and
price shocks that come with being reliant on rare earths.
Most rare earth’s cannot be recycled
Parthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of
Security,”
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf
The ability to recover and recycle minerals economically can expand sources of supply .
Minerals¶ can be removed from manufactured items that¶ are headed for the landfill, extracted and then¶ recycled. Lithium, for
example, has good recy¶ -¶ cling potential, and economical recycling and¶ reuse is being researched extensively. Gallium can¶ be
recovered and reprocessed in some cases, as¶ can rhenium, niobium and tantalum. However,¶ for
most rare earths,
very little material can be¶ recycled or recovered economically given current¶ technologies
and methods
Links to environment DA
Marshall 14 (Jessica Marshall is a science journalist for ensia, “WHY RARE EARTH RECYCLING IS RARE (AND WHAT
WE CAN DO ABOUT IT)”, Ensia, April 7th, 2014, http://ensia.com/features/why-rare-earth-recycling-is-rare-and-whatwe-can-do-about-it/)
Not Curbside Recycling
rare earth elements isn’t as easy as recycling glass or plastic — there are
challenges at nearly every level . For one thing, the elements are present in small amounts in things like
cell phones. As parts get smaller, so do the amounts of material used. In a touch screen, for example, the
elements are distributed throughout the material at the molecular scale . “It’s actually getting much harder to
recycle electronics,” says Alex King of the Ames Lab in Ames, Iowa, and director of the Critical Materials Institute — a U.S. Department of Energy–
funded “Innovation Hub” focused on strategies for ensuring the supply of five rare earth metals identified by the government as critical. “We used to
have cell phones where you could snap out the battery, which is probably the biggest single target for recycling. With smartphones, those things are
built so you can’t get the battery out, at least not easily.” Cell
phones are typically recycled by smashing, shredding
and grinding them into powder. The powder can then be separated into component materials
for disposal or recycling. But new cell phones incorporate more elements than ever — some
around 65 in total. (For comparison, all of industry uses only about 85 different elements.) This makes the powder a more complicated
mixture to separate than it was with older phones. “It’s easier to separate rare earth elements from rocks than
from cell phones ,” King says. To separate these materials often means “very aggressive solvents
or very high temperature molten metal processing. It’s not simple,”
says Yale University industrial ecologist
Thomas Graedel. Because
of the nasty materials or large amounts of energy needed, in some cases
recycling could create greater environmental harm than mining for the metals in the first place. “A case
by case analysis is needed to decide whether a given product is a good recycling candidate,” Graedel says. The researchers, led by Benjamin Sprecher at
the Materials Innovation Institute in Delft, Netherlands, also found
in a 90 percent loss of neodymium. “The
that shredding hard drives for recycling resulted
large losses of material incurred while shredding the
material puts serious doubts on the usefulness of this type of recycling as a solution for
scarcity ,” the researchers wrote. They propose a method in which hard drives are taken apart by hand as a way to address this issue.
Elements can’t be separated and regs stop.
Marshall 14 (Jessica Marshall is a science journalist for ensia, “WHY RARE EARTH RECYCLING IS RARE (AND WHAT
WE CAN DO ABOUT IT)”, Ensia, April 7th, 2014, http://ensia.com/features/why-rare-earth-recycling-is-rare-and-whatwe-can-do-about-it/)
When small amounts of rare earths are part of complex mixtures, separation can be too expensive to justify for these elements
alone, leading some to suggest that the even more valuable elements within electronics, such as gold, palladium and iridium, may
make recycling economically worthwhile. “It might be that the rare earths will pay for the price of doing the processing and the gold,
platinum and palladium will be the cash flow,” says Eric Peterson of Idaho National Laboratory, who leads the rare earth reuse and
recycling research program for the Critical Materials Institute. To address both environmental and economic problems with
recycling, the Critical Materials Institute and other research groups, including a European consortium, are testing supercritical
carbon dioxide, ionic liquids, electrochemical methods and more as strategies for improving the prospects of rare earth recycling.
Getting the Goods While the technical challenges of recycling rare earths are substantial,
Graedel says, they are not the main problem. “I think it’s fair to say that the biggest challenge we have
with recycling the rare earths and many other things is the challenge of collection ,” he says. “It’s
more of a social and perhaps regulatory challenge than a technological challenge.” The existing
recycling infrastructure for fluorescent bulbs makes them good candidates for rare earth recycling, many experts say.With price
pressures off, at least for now, and
few laws requiring recycling, there is little incentive to try to get the
materials back . As of 2011, less than 1 percent of rare earths were recycled. People tend to hoard or toss their old phones.
Cars , which may have more than two dozen rare-earth-containing motors in them driving everything from windshield wipers to
the rear view mirror adjustment, are not recovered formally. Many electronics end up in developing
countries where they may ultimately be dismantled in unsafe or inefficient ways. And even fluorescent light bulbs, which are
supposed to be recycled by law because of the mercury in the tubes, are only recycled at a rate of around 30 to 35
percent. The existing recycling infrastructure for fluorescent bulbs makes them good candidates for rare earth recycling, many
experts say. Fluorescent light bulbs make use of rare earth elements to fill out the color spectrum: the red and green phosphors in
the powder that lines the inside of the lights are the rare earth elements europium and terbium. Recyclers collect the mercury, the
glass and the metal parts of the bulbs,
but they have traditionally dumped the rare-earth-containing
white powder that lines the tubes.
Some companies are now recovering these. While LED lights may be taking off in
popularity, there will be plenty of fluorescent and compact fluorescent bulbs in use for decades to come, Peterson says, so they
remain good targets for recycling. LEDs use rare earths, too, but in much smaller amounts than fluorescent bulbs and in ways that
make them more difficult to recycle.
“I am not convinced that it will be possible to extract rare earths
from LEDs in an economical manner, ” King notes.
No devices to recycle
Marshall 14 (Jessica Marshall is a science journalist for ensia, “WHY RARE EARTH RECYCLING IS RARE (AND WHAT
WE CAN DO ABOUT IT)”, Ensia, April 7th, 2014, http://ensia.com/features/why-rare-earth-recycling-is-rare-and-whatwe-can-do-about-it/)
Supply and Demand Of
— which
course this all assumes a big enough supply of ready-for-recycling electronics
may not be a safe assumption right now. Wind turbines, for example, have a 20- to 30-year lifetime,
meaning almost none is yet ready for recycling . In one recent study, Jelle Rademaker of the Green Academy in
the Netherlands and colleagues calculated
the potential for rare earth recycling from magnets in
computer hard drives, hybrid cars and wind turbines, assuming 100 percent recovery in each
case. They found that the amount available for recycling could be at most 10 to 15 percent of the demand between now and 2015.
The percentage dips even further toward 2020 , as demand takes off but only computer hard drives are available
for recycling.
2AC AT: States
States cannot access the rare earth metals we need
Alex Benkenstein April 14-senior researcher for The Governance of Africa’s Resources
Programme and South African Institute of International Affairs, graduated from the University of
Stellenbosch with a M.A. in International Studies (cum laude) (The Governance of Africa’s
Resources Programme, “Seabed Mining: Lessons from the Namibian Experience,”) patel
Seabed mining exploration has focused on four main resources: polymetallic (predominantly
manganese) nodules, seafloor massive sulphides (SMS), cobalt-rich crusts and phosphates.
Most of these minerals occur in the deep-sea regions beyond the continental shelf.
Polymetallic (manganese) nodules occur on the seafloor in abyssal plains, which generally
range from 3 000 m – 6 000 m in depth.2 SMS occur along the mid-oceanic ridges and volcanic
arcs that form at the boundaries of the earth’s tectonic plates, typically at water depths
ofaround 2 000 m.3 Cobalt-rich crusts form on seamounts (essentially underwater mountains) at depths of 400 m – 7 000 m.
Phosphates, conversely, are found in relatively shallow waters, generally less than 600 m deep.4 Phosphate is an important input in
the production of fertilizer and has become central to modern agricultural production
2AC AT: Substitutes CP
Some rare earth minerals don’t have substitutes --- this collapses heg and is
vulnerable to price spikes and vulnerabilities which links to our protectionism/
trade advantage
Parthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of
Security,”
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf
For many minerals and raw materi¶ -¶ als, consumers have options to substitute different¶ minerals
with similar properties if something is¶ unavailable or too costly.¶ Others possess properties for which scientists
and manufacturers have¶ yet to find substitutes . Rare earth minerals fall into¶ this category.
In many defense applications, for¶ example, certain rare earths retain magnetism at¶ extreme
temperatures to a degree not readily found¶ in other minerals . Niobium and tantalum can be¶ replaced in
some applications but with reduced¶ effectiveness. For rhenium and lithium, however,¶ there are a variety of
substitutes in use today, with¶ additional substitutes currently being tested and¶ developed. Gallium
can be replaced for many of its¶ uses, although some substitutes are also vulnerable¶ to disruptions and
price spikes
No reliable source substitute for REEs --- we are still reliant --- in particular,
doesn’t solve renewables
Paramaguru, 13 Kharunya, “Rethinking Our Risky Reliance on Rare Earth Metals,”
http://science.time.com/2013/12/20/rare-earths-are-too-rare/
From our smartphones to our latest weaponry, the technology that underpins modern life would be impossible without rare earth
metals. The
importance of rare earths has only grown as emerging markets increase their
demand for technologies made with it, as does the renewable energy industry . Now a new
study from researchers at Yale has found that many of the materials used in high-tech
products, including rare earth metals, have no satisfactory substitutes, underscoring not only
our vulnerable reliance on them,
but also the need to better manage these crucial resources.
***Neg
***Privatization CP
1NC CP
Text: The United States federal government should reform the
cooperate tax system and repeal laws that drive up company costs
Picking winners and losers fails and turns the aff – only reforming policies and
regulations solve
U.S. Joint Economic Committee (June 22 2011, "MANUFACTURING IN THE USA: WHY WE
NEED A NATIONAL MANUFACTURING STRATEGY," www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG112shrg67529/html/CHRG-112shrg67529.htm, ADL)
What is good for the manufacturing industry is good for all businesses in the U.S.. Our trading partners are not gaining
ground on U.S. manufacturing because our manufacturing sector is declining; they are gaining
ground because our current economic policies are failing U.S. manufacturers and businesses in the
U.S. We cannot use targeted and excessive regulations and policies that actively engage in picking
winners and losers in the economy in order to compete globally. If we wish to continue to
attract and retain innovative and successful companies, we need to reform many of the
federal policies that are hampering U.S. companies.
1NC Picking Winners
The Aff picks winners and losers – that kills competitiveness and private
investment
Loris 12 - Nicolas Loris, an economist, focuses on energy, environmental and regulatory issues
as the Herbert and Joyce Morgan fellow at The Heritage Foundation (12/13/12, "Blowing More
Taxpayer Money for Offshore Wind," dailysignal.com/2012/12/13/blowing-more-taxpayermoney-for-offshore-wind/, ADL)
Higher costs for a technology should not be a signal for the government to step in and try to lower
those costs to make the politically preferred technology competitive. By attempting to force
government-developed technologies into the market, the government diminishes the role of
the entrepreneur and crowds out private-sector investment. This practice of the government
picking winners and losers denies energy technologies the opportunity to compete in the
marketplace, which is the only proven way to develop market-viable products. When the
government attempts to drive technological commercialization, it circumvents this critical
process. Thus, almost without exception, it fails in some way. This is true with renewable technology, fossil fuel
technology, or technologies pushed forward by the DOE to make businesses and homes more energy efficient. The same reasoning
holds true for why Congress should not extend the wind production tax credit. An extension would perpetuate America’s addiction
to energy subsidies and create technological stagnation that adversely affects the long-term competitiveness of the wind industry.
Providing another year of tax credits would be a $12 billion taxpayer-funded mistake that would further distort the electricity
markets and, on net, cause economic harm by shifting labor and capital toward windmill production and away from more
economically valuable investments. If the windmills add value to the economy, they won’t need the subsidy. All
of these
subsidy programs continually ignore the fact that we are always going to have a demand for electricity—and
we have ample supply from a variety of sources to meet that demand. The resources and
technologies that can most efficiently meet that demand will all almost certainly have one thing in
common: They won’t need a government program to be successful.
Picking winners and losers entrenches policy in protectionism
U.S. Joint Economic Committee (June 22 2011, "MANUFACTURING IN THE USA: WHY WE
NEED A NATIONAL MANUFACTURING STRATEGY," www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG112shrg67529/html/CHRG-112shrg67529.htm, ADL)
President Carter's Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Charles Schultz observed: One does
not have to be a cynic to forecast that the surest way to multiply unwarranted subsidies and
protectionist measures is to legitimize their existence under the rubric of industrial policy.
The likely outcome of an industrial policy that encompassed some elements of both
``protecting the losers'' and ``picking the winners'' is that the losers would back the
subsidies for the winners in return for the latter's support on issues of trade protection.
2NC Say Yes
Investors are willing to invest in rare earth elements
Foote 14 (Bill, 1/7/14, "How China Is Creating Rare Earth Investment Opportunities in the
U.S.," www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/01/07/how-china-is-creating-rare-earth-usinvestment-opp.aspx, ADL)
Rebooting U.S. production Molycorp owns a mine in Mountain Pass, CA, that was shut down over 10 years ago due to soaring
extraction and production costs in direct competition with Chinese mining companies. Molycorp reopened
the mine in
2012 and expects to be at its full capacity of 19,000 tons in 2014. Molycorp also operates a
separation plant and sells rare earth concentrates and refined products from newly mined and
previously mined above-ground stocks. With China restricting rare earth materials for more
domestic consumption, and with a U.S. domestic demand of about 6,000 tons annually, Molycorp
will be able to export most of its production. If non-Chinese sourced rare earth supplies are tight, then over the next five years
prices should rise, fueling Molycorp's revenue growth, payback for mine investments, and profit
to plow back into more mine development. Molycorp is not alone, though. Ucore is breaking
ground in its Alaskan Bokan Mountain mine. This mine will not only extract uranium ore, but also the heavy rare
earths needed in defense, industrial, and consumer goods technology. Within 3-5 years Ucore could be able to produce 10,000 tons
annually. World
supply net of Chinese production may still be short enough to buoy prices for
further mine and processing expansion. Perhaps there is now enough incentive to encourage
other U.S. companies to join the rare earth business. Until then, Molycorp and Ucore can enjoy the profits of
being the only companies capable of meeting technology demand in U.S. domestic and export markets.
Investors are looking at rare earth elements – too many projects to ‘pick
winners’
Hampton 09 (Michael, 11/30/09, "Rare Earths: Is the present hype justified? Can we pick
winners?," www.financialsensearchive.com/fsu/editorials/2009/1130.html, ADL)
What a difference a year makes. There has been a dramatic transformation for the Rare Earth
companies from no hope to big hopes as the Rare Earths became the latest "hot" sector to
capture investors' imagination. We all know that mining investors are prone to flights of fancy, and the staying power of dreams will
be tested on a long hard road from discovery to production. Metal Events Ltd's“5th International Rare Earths Conference" held in Hong Kong last week,
was a great place for a reality check on the current state of the Rare Earths sector. Despite its history, and an ability to attract the top companies in this
growing industry, the conference was concerned about their numbers. A room had been booked for 70 people, but in March it seemed that the interest
level was too small to attract the usual number of participants. The organizers decided to go ahead with the same size room anyway, with whatever
numbers they could get. When the doors opened on November 18th for the two day conference, there were 170 delegates, a new record - and the
room was groaning with people. The changes in market capitalization of companies involved in the conference revealed the extent of the turnaround.
Picking ten public companies in the audience with Rare Earth mining projects at various stages of development, the aggregate market capitalization as
of mid-November was $1.59 Billion. Using the same number of shares outstanding, and the end-2008 stock prices, the market cap would have been
$518 Million. That's a rise of 206% in 10 1/2 months, far above the general stock indices. One cannot help but ask, is the present hype justified? Dudley
Kingsnorth of Industrial Minerals Company of Australia Ltd put it well in his presentation. Money is available, he said, but is not infinite. "Perhaps $2
Billion will be available to the Rare Earths sector," said Kingsnorth. "If it is spread evenly over the 57 existing projects, it will be squandered." The
industry will need to advance the right projects, and advance them quickly; it is to prevent a destructive price squeeze in a few years time. The crunch
may arrive as early as 2014 or 2015. Both China and the US have seized on green technologies as a way out of the present global slump. But we are
unlikely to get to a brighter greener future without the special qualities of rare earth metals. They are an essential part of magnets, batteries, glass, and
other components, making them smaller, lighter, and more heat resistant. An alphabet soup of obscure elements on the periodic table, with odd names
like Lanthanum, Europium, and Dysprosium, the 17 rare earth elements (REE) are used in critical applications. For instance, Rare Earths permit the
manufacture of small permanent magnets, capable of operating at a wide range of temperatures. Few, if any, substitutes are available. Where there
are substitutes, it is commonly one REE replacing another. Consider the applications and you get an idea of the potential for future growth in the
market. Each typical disk drive has two magnets utilizing an alloy of Neodymium (Nd), a rare earth. According to Takehisa Minowa, of Shin-Etsu
Chemical Co Ltd, a conference presenter, 500 million drives are sold each year. That's 1 billion magnets, for a single high tech product. Rare earths are
also needed in air conditioners, wind turbine generators, and hybrid cars. The motor for the Prius hybrid car uses 1 kilogram of Nd, and the battery uses
10-15 kg's of Lanthanum (Ln), another rare earth. Multiply that by a car market which may potentially reach 5 to 6 million hybrid cars by 2018, an
optimistic figure in a presentation by Olivier Touret, Rhodia Electronics, and you have a very big demand number. On top of that, new applications are
being discovered every year, as technological innovation constantly requires smaller and lighter components. Overall annual growth rates in
consumption have mostly fallen in the range of 9% to 22% per annum, according to Baotou Research Institute of Rare Earths (BRIRE.) In a paper
prepared by Ms. Song Honghang, Director; and presented by her colleague Wang Yan, a review of 60 years of history showed China's remarkable role in
taking production from just 1,000 tons 1978, to 2,500 in 1980, and then 20,000 in 1989. After that rapid pace, and a slowdown in 1990 from the Asian
Crisis, growth resumed. From 1991 to 1995, growth was again back over 20% per annum. Over the past decade, growth has been much closer to 10%
annually, which is still rapid on this bigger base. Total demand for Rare Earth Oxides was near 130,000 tones in 2008. While 2009 is a clear down year,
thanks mainly to a big destocking in Japan, the potential for high growth over the rest of this decade is excellent. Our green dreams cannot be realized
without ongoing growth in production of these unique metals. The political reality (which I discussed in an article last year*) is that the world is highly
dependent on China for Rare Earths. Something like 90% of annual production comes from that country, and that the Chinese are using more
domestically and tightening their export quotes. BRIRE's figures show that Rare Earth Oxide ("REO") exports peaked at 55,000 tons in 2005, and have
been falling as quotas are tightened. (REO figures are slightly deceptive, since the oxide is about 5-10% heavier than its REE content.) Some industry
sources estimate that as much as 10,000 tons of "gray" material leaves the country outside the quotas. But this is conjecture, and the Chinese
government is aiming to restrain this. This nervousness over supply sources has brought about a race for new sources of production. Manufacturers in
Japan, Europe, and the US all want to see diverse sources for these critical elements, as they launch new products with REE content. Prices
are
down year-on-year, but a mania for the Rare Earth miners was ignited by story coming out of
one of the Chinese ministries in the Spring of 2009 that China was considering a complete ban on the
export of certain rare earths in their raw form, preferring export value-added products and keep growing the jobs in China.
This report was later "clarified" in the summer, but it was followed by recommendations from various stock
brokers and analysts that Rare Earth related mining stocks were a good way to play the
emerging green energy boom, since new mines were needed to counter a possible stranglehold by the Chinese. In fact, with a
2008 demand for 130,000 tons of REO, a resumption of 10% plus growth could add 15,000 - 20,000 tons
annually to demand. That would essential require perhaps one new world class Rare Earths
mine being added each year for the foreseeable future. Fortunately, there are two giants waiting in the wings, and
they are both outside China. Lynas Corp's (LYC.au) Mount Weld deposit in Western Australia is a high grade carbonatite deposit. According to the
presentation from the company's Vice President, Matthew James, the project is progressing well again. The key step was raising A$450 Million to fund
remaining construction costs. In late April, China Non-Ferrous Metals agreed to invest A$252 Million for a majority stake. But the terms were not
approved by the Australian government. So the company turned to the equity markets, and completed a financing at A$0.45 in October. This will allow
them to complete the mine and related infrastructure, and build a large processing facility in Malaysia, where they will have access to cheaper power.
Mr. James expects production to commence in the first half of 2011, initially at an annual rate of 11,000 tons. Later, they will ramp up to 20-22,000
tons, which would give them perhaps 14% of the global market in REO. The second major project in the pipeline is a mine reopening for Molycorp
Minerals.
Eight private equity investors backed the company, including Goldman Sachs, Traxis
Partners, and Resource Capital amongst others, allowing Molycorp to buy the large Mountain
Pass project in California from Chevron in September 2008. The mine was a historic producer and holds a 30 year
mining permit, and a completed environment impact statement, needing only minor revisions. But prior to full reopening, a new state-of-the-art
processing plant is being built at a cost of $250 million or more. The plant will permit far higher recoveries, with less waste, and 99% purity. Once in full
operation in 2012, they will have 1,000 employees and production of 20,000 tons of REO per annum, which is almost fully covered by long term sales
contracts. The higher efficiencies and better recoveries may allow production to be ramped up to 40,000 tons without a new mining permit. Geoff
Bedford of Neo Material Technologies (NEM.v) spoke about the "rollercoaster ride" of 2009, and how some market participants may have over-reacted
to some misinformation about falling Chinese export quotas. He does not expect a full ban on any REO exports, but rather that the Chinese will
accomodate changes in demand. He also spoke of his company's involvement in the Pitinga project in Brazil, where his company is assisting a mining
company, Taboca, in investigating whether their existing producing tin mine will undergo some changes in its extraction and separation methods to
allow production of heavy rare earths. Several
other projects are competing with each other to meet
demand growth needs beyond 2012. Avalon Rare Earths has a promising project at Thor Lake
which has reached about halfway "on a 5 to 10 year journey to production." The company finished a scoping study in 2007, and undertook extensive
delineation drilling in 2008. They have a deposit of 64 million tonnes, with 20% Heavy Rare Earth Elements (HREE), at over a 2% grade, with a 1.6%
cutoff. This appears to be commercial, but there are still tests underway to see if transport and processing methods are workable. After a capital
investment of $300 - 400 million, it could be in production by 2012 - 2013. Donald
Ranta of Rare Element Resources (RES.v)
has the Bear Lodge carbonatite deposit in Wyoming, which will be the subject of a scoping study in 2010. Also at an
advancing stage is Arafura's (ARU.au) Nolan’s project, which Chairman Nick Muir spoke about. They have an approximate 30 million ton deposit, right in
the "center of Australia." They have a pilot plant funded by the government, and are facing a capital expenditure of perhaps A$400 million to put a
mine into production. They will be replacing their CEO, who has recently resigned, and seeking possible strategic partners. Ian Chalmers of Alkane
Resources (ALK.au) described his company's Dubbo project in New South Wales, which is a Zirconium and HREE project, which was the subject of a
feasibility study in 2002, and has also received a government grant to build a pilot plant, which went into operation in 2008. Prospective buyers are
presently evaluating output products. The economics of starting up an enlarged mine will be improved if zirconium, niobium, and yttrium prices line up,
and allow them to sign long term offtake agreements at prices which will permit construction of an expanded mine. Brief presentations were also given
by: privately-owned Frontier Minerals which has the high grade Zandkopsdrift arbonatite deposit, in the Northern Cape province of South Africa,
Greenland Minerals (GGG.au) with its Kvanefjeld deposit in the country with the same name, privately-owned Mongol Gazar with a deposit in
Mongolia, and Trevor Blench spoke about his company's "small but very high grade" project at Steenkampskraal in South Africa which needs a renewal
of a mining license to be restarted. Beyond
these, but not presenting are dozens of companies, with Rare Earth
projects. Industry expert, Dudley Kingsnorth mentioned that there were 57 Rare Earth projects on the go,
but another conference delegate told me that is figure was over 120 projects, including some newly added ones, which are based upon only
"a handful of grab samples." If history is any guide, and the market stays keen, a number of the new companies will raise
enough capital to progress their projects. But how can anyone, especially an investor new to
this sector be expected to pick the winners , in what is becoming a crowded field at the early stage end? The old formula: go
for size and grade may not work, because the development of RE deposits is a highly complex matter. Evaluating the potential for a gold deposit with
straightfoward metallurgy is relatively easy. A poly-metallic deposit which complex metallurgy is more difficult, but picking
winners in the
Rare Earths sector may be the most difficult games of all. That is because there are so many
different elements involved each with their own supply, demand and pricing dynamics. And then
there are the problems which begin as you mine the deposit. The rare earths must be extracted and separated from each other. But then there is the
"dirty secret" of rare earths, virtually every deposit is radioactive with a significant concentration of thorium or uranium bound up with the Rare Earths.
This makes the separation and handling of the materials even more complex and critical and is why the price tags for capital expenditures are so very
high. The other problem is the timeline. It can take 5 to 10 years to bring one of these deposits into production. Dudley Kingsnorth provided a list of 10
steps to production, showing that it is longer and more expensive than most think. Compared with other mining projects, there are some added steps,
like: defining the extraction and separation process, and running a pilot plant. And because of the radioactivity, the environmental approvals can be
difficult to obtain. Kingsnorth estimates the cost of a pilot plant and preparing a banking feasibility study could be in the region of $40 to 60 Million.
And that is for a project that will only have "proven" itself on a benchtest, and so there is a risk that the money may be wasted. A typical process might
involve as many as 1,000 steps. And even when the pilot plant is operating well, prospective buyers will want to evaluate the output products from the
plant, and see how well they can be incorporated into their own manufacturing process. Running a pilot plant can take years ("5 - 6 years" is the figure I
have in my notes), until buyers are found that are willing to sign the long term offtake agreements that banks may require to provide financing for
capital expenditures. With such long time frames, Kingnorth's notion that the limited capital must be allocated selectively takes on special urgency.
There is no doubt that the Rare Earths mining sector has a bright future. The usual gold rush that we saw
after the nickel discovery at Voisey's Bay and the uranium price boom of 2007 may come to Rare Earths at well. But if too many early
stage companies are floated, a large number of investors in these new companies are going to
be disappointed.
2NC Solvency
Private interest in Mining exists now, only a question of funding and
regulations
Vic Kolenc, Reporter referencing an interview, $8 billion worth of rare earth minerals in Sierra
Blanca area mountain, company says, El Paso Times, 1-26-2014,
http://www.elpasotimes.com/business/ci_24993344/8-billion-worth-rare-earth-minerals-sierrablanca//BDS
A fledgling Sierra Blanca company is trying to raise $20 million to continue developing plans
for its proposed open-pit mine on a mountain near the West Texas town to produce billions of
dollars of rare earth minerals that federal agencies have deemed critical to make clean-energy
products and weapons. "We're going to put Hudspeth County on the map," said Anthony
Marchese, 50, a New Jersey investment banker and board chairman for Texas Rare Earth
Resources Corp., which trades on the Over-the-Counter, or penny, stock market under the TRER
symbol. "This could be a very large opportunity for the area, including El Paso." China supplies
more than 90 percent of the world's rare earth minerals. Besides, energy and defense
applications, the minerals also are used in electronic devices, lasers, in oil and gas drilling, water
treatment, and other uses. Texas Rare Earth Resources holds two state leases to explore and
develop a 950-acre rare-earth minerals deposit in the almost mile-high Round Top Mountain,
located eight miles northwest of Sierra Blanca and about 85 miles southeast of El Paso. The
company this month released an updated economic assessment, which estimated Round Top
could produce about $8 billion worth of rare earth minerals over a 20-year mine life. It would
cost almost $293 million to build the mining facility and go into production, the assessment
concluded. The company has spent more than four years and about $20 million so far in
developing its plans, Marchese reported. It's now trying to raise about $20 million, which could
be done by attracting a partner, Marchese said. It needs about $13 million to do a year-long
feasibility study. The goal is to have the mine operating in three years, Marchese said. Nick
Pingitore, 69, a geologist at the University of Texas at El Paso, said the mountain's resources
have been known for about 30 years, but they didn't become important until recent years. "The
demand for rare earth materials was very small in the past and now they are incredibly
important in the modern world in various applications," he said. Pingitore and Phil Goodell,
another UTEP geology professor, are Texas Rare Earth shareholders and members of the
company's board of directors. The minerals are called rare, not because they are hard to find,
but because they are found in small concentrations that are difficult and often costly to extract
from the ground. There are 17 rare earth elements divided into two groups — light, and heavy.
The heavy group of elements are in shorter supply and thus considered more valuable,
Marchese said. Round Top has 10 heavy and five light rare earth minerals, he reported. The
Sierra Blanca company isn't the only one trying to cash in on the rare earth market. Molycorp
Inc., a Denver-based mining company, has spent more than $1 billion in recent years to reopen,
modernize and expand its rare earth mining facility at Mountain Pass, Calif., Molycorp financial
documents show. It also has rare earth mining facilities in China. The California mine has been
producing light rare earth minerals, and in 2012 the company reported it began operating new
facilities at Mountain Pass to produce heavy rare earth minerals. Marchese said he doesn't see
Molycorp competing against Texas Rare Earth because, he said, Round Top has a larger heavy
rare earth deposit than he's seen reported by Molycorp for its California mine. Molycorp's heavy
rare earth minerals are coming from its China operations, he said. Australia also has mines
producing rare earth minerals. Texas Rare Earth has identified five other rare earth mining
projects proposed by companies in the United States and Canada. But those projects are
either not in good locations or are on federal property, which makes getting mining permits
difficult, Marchese said. Hudspeth County Judge Mike Doyal said poor and sparsely populated
Hudspeth County needs an economic boost, but, he said, he also wants to make sure the mine
wouldn't hurt residents' health. "They're talking about some low-grade uranium there, which
raises some concern about dust, and everything they pull out of there will use an acid wash to
purify it," Doyal said. "I can't say one way or the other about the operation. I don't know enough
about it." That's why he invited the company to make a presentation at Hudspeth County
Commissioners Court on Tuesday. UTEP's Pingitore said Round Top has a small amount of
uranium, which is found in "virtually any rare earth deposit." "The uranium is a sellable material
if we can separate it" from the rock, he said. Laura Lynch, 55, a Texas Rare Earth executive,
board member, and shareholder, whose family has operated a ranch in Hudspeth County for
more than 70 years, said she has yet to find opposition to the mine. Almost 90 people attended
an open house at its Sierra Blanca offices this month, she reported. Jim Suydam, a spokesman
for the Texas General Land Office in Austin, which in 2011 granted Texas Rare Earth two, 19-year
leases for Round Top, said the company's proposed mine has great potential. But the agency
doesn't study a lease holder's plans except to make sure it follows applicable state and federal
laws, he said. Marchese said the state would get about $490 million over 20 years if the mine
operates as proposed. Money from state mineral leases goes into the state's education fund.
Texas Rare Earth raised $17.5 million from a stock offering several years ago when the stock was
at $2.50 per share, Marchese said. But the stock has dived to around 40 cents per share today.
The drop is largely due to New York investment fund Libra Advisors, which held almost 10
percent of the company's stock, selling most of its shares last year as part of its plan to liquidate
the fund, he said. The fund now holds about 2 percent of the company's shares. The company
has about 700 shareholders, Marchese said. Almost 40 percent of its stock is owned by eight
board members and three executive officers, two of whom are also board members. The
company recently hired KLR Group, a New York investment bank, to help identify financing for
the project. Texas Rare Earth CEO Daniel Gorski, with more than 40 years experience in the
mining industry, said in a recent conference call with investors that all financial options are
being considered. Those include joint ventures, and the "outright sale of the company," he said.
UTEP's Pingitore said he bought shares in the company about three years ago but got heavily
involved with the company after he became unhappy with its very expensive plan for extracting
the rare earth minerals from rocks. He is involved with research at UTEP on the much lessexpensive heap leach process the company now plans to use to extract the microscopic rare
earth minerals from rocks. UTEP's findings are double checked by the company with
independent labs, he noted. The plan is to crush rocks from the mountain, lay them out in big
piles on a football-size field, and use a sprinkler system to dribble acid onto them to get the rare
earth minerals out, Pingitore said. A ground liner system would protect the ground. "It's not like
a vein of gold. You can't just follow a vein," he said. "You have to process the whole rock
somehow." The rare earth mineral ends up in a powder form, he said.
Private sector is on the cusp of thorium mine development only funding is
needed
Boyle 11 (Rebecca, March 10th, “The electronic future is buried under the ground in Missouri”,
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-03/rare-earth-mine)
Mountain Pass now produces about 3 percent of the world's rare earth supply, and Molycorp
hopes to increase that to 25 percent, producing 40,000 metric tons a year by 2013. Mountain Pass will be the
country's leading rare earth mine, but it won't be able to produce many of the so-called heavy rare earths, like
dysprosium, which is used to make computer memory and lasers. One analyst suggested this week that Molycorp
should diversify by buying up companies with claims on heavy rare earth deposits. Pea Ridge has
them in abundance, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. Despite their name — a holdover from the 1800s and early
1900s — rare earths aren't particularly rare; they're much more common than gold, and some are nearly as common as lead.
They're found in relatively low concentrations, however, requiring the processing of lots of rock. Ten states are known to have
significant rare-earth deposits, according to a 2010 study by the USGS. Most are in the western U.S., but the Pea Ridge deposit has
the highest grade of any site in the country, averaging 12 percent rare earth oxide concentration. Mountain Pass
has much
more tonnage, but at an average of only 8 percent concentration (and the vast majority is "light" rare
earths). Given its resources and existing infrastructure, why isn't Pea Ridge already producing rare earths? There's a catch. Along
with iron, the heavy
rare earths at Pea Ridge are found intermingled with thorium, a radioactive
element that requires special processing and cleanup. Hoping to turn this into a positive, Kennedy is drumming
up support for thorium as an alternative energy source, namely powering molten salt reactors that could be scattered throughout
cities. "When you mine for rare earths, you get the thorium for free," he said. Kennedy, a former Army Special
Forces soldier and investment banker, has become an outspoken evangelist for rare earths and thorium, speaking to members of
Congress, mining groups and engineers — he just gave a presentation at Oak Ridge National Laboratory — about the problem of
Chinese dominance and the potential for American resurgence. He is pressing lawmakers in Missouri and Washington to
establish a public-private cooperative to come up with $1 billion to build a rare earth refinery in
Missouri, and he is hoping to spur a new thorium energy industry. For now, his plans center on iron
production. He wants to build a pipeline to ship iron ore to the Mississippi River 44 miles to the east, where he already has a permit
for a processing facility and barge port. Pea Ridge will be the only domestic producer of merchant pig iron, which is used to make
steel. Currently, American mills import pig iron from countries like Brazil and Sweden. Just like in its past, iron will be the mine's
main motivation, Kennedy said. But the almost-forgotten rare earths could be the icing on the cake.
2NC Solves Picking Winners
Reforming policy is the best way to solve competitiveness and private
investment
U.S. Joint Economic Committee (June 22 2011, "MANUFACTURING IN THE USA: WHY WE
NEED A NATIONAL MANUFACTURING STRATEGY," www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG112shrg67529/html/CHRG-112shrg67529.htm, ADL)
As we listen to testimony today from distinguished lawmakers, economists, and business leaders, my thought is that, instead of
a Washington-centric industrial manufacturing policy, Congress should instead adopt
progrowth economic policies that raise the competitiveness and opportunity for all economic boats
in our country: 1 ) To ensure businesses do not bear higher tax costs, Congress should adopt a
comprehensive plan to reduce federal spending
them sustainably solvent, and gradually bring
relative to the size of our economy, reform our entitlement
the federal budget back into balance.
2)
programs to make
To increase
competitiveness around the globe, Congress should reform our corporate tax system . The
United States has the second highest corporate income tax rate in the world. Congress should reduce the after-tax cost of new
investment by expensing most equipment and shortening the depreciation schedules for buildings. Congress should move to a
territorial tax system. Until then, Congress should act now to allow U.S. corporations to repatriate stranded American profits to
invest in new jobs, research, investment, and financial stability here at home. 3) To find new customers for American
manufacturers, farmers, and service companies, Congress should immediately approve the three outstanding free trade
agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea and seek more opportunities to open growing markets to American
workers.
4) To
reduce unit costs and keep American companies located in America, Congress
should repeal laws that drive up costs --such as the new national health care law and unnecessary federal
regulations. To help erase the estimated 18 percent disadvantage in costs for U.S. manufacturers compared to their global
competitors, Congress should act now to modernize our
of frivolous lawsuits. I believe adopting these
patent system and reform our tort system to reduce the
excessive costs
economic policy changes would benefit U.S.
manufacturers, their customers, their suppliers, and their workers far more than any national
manufacturing strategy.
2NC AT: Links to Politics
Reforming tax law is bipartisan
RATE - A lobby in Washington (Reforming America's Taxes Equitably, "Democratic and
Republican Platforms Agree: Corporate Tax Rate is Too High, Needs Reform,"
ratecoalition.com/pressreleases/democratic-and-republican-platforms-agree-corporate-taxrate-is-too-high-needs-reform/, ADL)
WASHINGTON, D.C. – The recently released Democratic and Republican platforms both include
language calling for corporate tax reform with the aim of increasing job creation, economic
growth and competitiveness through a lower corporate tax rate and broader tax base. RATE Cochairs Elaine Kamarck and James P. Pinkerton released the following statements regarding the common goal of the two parties: “At
a time of hyper partisanship and few policy agreements, the agreement in the Democratic and
Republican platforms on corporate tax reform shows much promise that something will be
done to reform our corporate tax rate, which is far too high,” said James P. Pinkerton, Co-Chair of the RATE
Coalition and former White House domestic policy adviser to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. “Having the highest
corporate tax rate in the world hurts economic growth and increases job losses at a time when both parties are looking boost the
Such agreement bodes well for policymakers aiming to reform our
corporate tax code.” “Democratic and Republican lawmakers agree that corporate tax reform
that lowers the rate and broadens the base is key to economic growth and drastically lowering
the unemployment rate,” said Elaine Kamarck, Co-Chair of the RATE Coalition and former White House adviser to President
economy and job creation.
Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore. “In 1986 Democratic and Republican leaders worked together to enact tax reform that led to
more than a decade of strong economic growth. Policymakers have another such opportunity today to create jobs and once again
make the United States the top nation in which to grow a business.” The corporate tax reform sections of the Democratic and
Republican platforms can be found below. Democratic
Platform: We are also committed to reforming the
corporate tax code to lower tax rates for companies in the United States, with additional relief for those
locating manufacturing and research and development on our shores, while closing loopholes and reducing incentives for
corporations to shift jobs overseas. … There is more to do. We Democrats support lowering the corporate tax rate while closing
unnecessary loopholes, and lowering rates even further for manufacturers who create good jobs at home. Republican
Platform: American businesses now face the world’s highest corporate tax rate. It reduces their worldwide competitiveness,
encourages corporations to move overseas, lessens investment, cripples job creation, lowers U.S. wages, and fosters the avoidance
of tax liability-without actually increasing tax revenues. To level the international playing field, and to spur job creation here at
home, we call
for a reduction of the corporate rate to keep U.S. corporations competitive
internationally, with a permanent research and development tax credit, and a repeal of the
corporate alternative minimum tax. We also support the recommendation of the National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform, as well as the current President’s Export Council, to switch to a territorial system of corporate taxation,
so that profits earned and taxed abroad may be repatriated for job-creating investment here at home without additional penalty.
Lobbies shield the link to politics
CTJ 13 - citizens for tax justice (August 21 2013, "Corporate-Backed Tax Lobby Groups
Proliferating," ctj.org/ctjreports/2013/08/corporatebacked_tax_lobby_groups_proliferating.php#.U78JBvldU6w, ADL)
In recent years, the corporate tax reform debate in the nation's capital has been invaded by
an army of acronyms such as T.I.E., A.C.T. and R.A.T.E., representing different businesses and corporate
interest groups. These groups seek to rebrand and build momentum for a corporate tax reform
that benefits corporate rather than public interests. In this report we identify the nine lobby groups
most actively and publicly advocating for business interests in the corporate tax debate: the
Alliance for Competitive Taxation (ACT), Businesses United for Interest and Loan Deductibility
(BUILD), Campaign for a Home Court Advantage (a campaign by the Business Roundtable), Coalition for Fair
Effective Tax Rates, Fix the Debt, Let's Invest for Tomorrow (LIFT) America, Reforming America's
Taxes Equitably (RATE), Tax Innovation Equality, and the WIN America Campaign. We also identify the
ten U.S. corporations most aggressively pursuing tax reform through these groups based on each of the company’s participation in
four or more such coalitions. Though the specific goals of these groups vary, there are common threads between them. For example,
five of the nine groups explicitly support moving to a territorial tax system, which would exacerbate corporate tax avoidance
overseas and promote the offshoring of jobs. Four of the groups explicitly support revenue-neutral tax reform. And, the WIN
America Campaign, BUILD, and TIE each support either protecting or implementing very specific tax breaks that would benefit their
corporate backers. For a full inventory of the groups' policy positions see Table 1. Based just on the lists of corporate members
released by these groups (many remain private), they
represent at least 359 different corporations and 186
different trade associations. Further, 87 of the corporations are actually supporters of two or more of these corporate tax
lobbying efforts, with 31 supporting as many as 3 or more of these groups. See Table 2 for breakdown of the most active
corporations and which groups they belong to.
***States CP
2NC Follow-On
States can successfully shape federal law
Carlson and Mayer, 13 Ann E. Carlson is the Shirley Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law
and the co¶ -¶ Faculty¶ Di¶ rector of the Emmett Center on Climate Change and the Environment.
Andrew Mayer is a 2012¶ graduate of the UCLA School of Law and is currently an associate at a
law fi¶ rm. We thank Rich¶ Ambrose,¶ William Boyd, Megan Herzog, Jon Michaels, Jon Varat,
Jonathan Z¶ asloff, participants in¶ workshops at the University of Colorado¶ -¶ Duke
Environmental Roundtable and the UCLA School of¶ Law School, and research assistant Will
Marshall, “Reverse Pre-Emption,”
http://www.boalt.org/elq/documents/Carlson_Mayer_Reverse_Preemption.pdf
Many states appear to use their reverse preemption power under the¶ CZMA robustly and
successfully to challenge federal actions as inconsistent ¶ with their coastal plans. Although
states find that proposed projects are¶ consistent with the applicable CZMP about¶ 95¶ percent
of the time, findings of¶ inconsistency have been used to block a significant number of large
projects . Even when a consistency finding is appealed as¶ described above,¶ 131¶ many appeals are
settled before final determination. Given¶ the lengthy appeals process, these settlements are likely to be on terms¶
favorable to the state. Thus, for large pro¶ jects with significant effects on the¶ coastal zone, the consistency requirement
energy¶ infrastru¶ cture
can be an effective tool for states to¶ bargain for mitigation, or even to block the project altogether
2NC AT: Licenses
States have the capacity to issue licenses for federal land
CGOPLR, 2 Governor's Office of Planning and Research, State of California, “INDUSTRIAL
USES,” http://ceres.ca.gov/planning/preemption/Part2c.html
States are permitted to impose environmental controls on mining activities on federally
owned land, according to a 1987 U.S. Supreme Court ruling. In this case, the high court held that the California
Coastal Commission could require a company to obtain a permit for its limestone mining
operations in the Big Sur region of the fede rally owned Los Padres National Forest. The decision
represented a victory for states , particularly western states with substantial acreage owned by the federal
government. It allows states to impose environmental regulations upon private mining operations
conducted on federal lands. The decision may have a far broader reach, for the Court has distinguished
"land-use decisions" from "environmental regulation," noting that states may impose
"environmental regulations" even where they have no authority to make "land-use decisions"
(California Coastal Commission, et al. v. Granite Rock Company, (1987) 107 S.Ct. 1419; Curtin, p. 66)
***LOST CP
1NC Solvency
LOST is a prerequisite to gaining access to resources and space especially in the
artic
Langer 12 (Andrew Langer is the president of the Institute for Liberty, “The Case for Ratification
of the Law of the Sea Treaty, November 28, 2012,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/11/28/the_case_for_ratification_of_the_law_of
_the_sea_treaty_116272-2.html) patel
Russia and China, two of America’s most powerful strategic foes, are actively exploring the
Arctic and Pacific for oil, gas and seabed mineral riches. The U.S. is not. Why? Because, Russia
and China have ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty and the U.S. hasn’t. Without ratifying LOTS,
the U.S. has no standing to apply for mining and drilling permits under international law.
Bottom line: there is a new Cold War taking place, and America is not winning. The seabed holds
trillions of dollars of mineral resources. According to RT, a Russian/English news channel,
Russian Foreign Ministry official Alexander Gorban last month stated his hope that “there will
never be a “war for resources” – or an even “hotter” conflict – in the Arctic Region.” In the next
breath, he then went on to reiterate that Russia is indeed "…trying to fight for the Arctic shelf…”
Gorban is a close Putin ally and his acknowledgement that Arctic conflict is possible
demonstrates the global stakes in play. Russia is not alone in recognizing the value of the LOTS
in the fight for global resource dominance. Five countries border the Arctic: Russia, the U.S.
(via Alaska), Canada, Norway and Denmark (via Greenland). However, only one country is
ineligible to mine or drill those resources -- the U.S. That’s because the U.S. is not a member of
the international body that grants title, or property rights, to countries to engage in the
exploration of seabed resources. That body is called the International Seabed Authority (ISA).
Admittance into that body is accomplished via ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty. China is
also utilizing LOTS and the ISA to aggressively pursue the wealth of the Arctic. According to a
report by Elisabeth Rosenthal in the New York Times last month, “The Arctic has risen rapidly
on China’s foreign policy agenda in the past two years,” said Linda Jakobson, East Asia program
director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia. So, she said, the
Chinese are exploring “how they could get involved.” China is already playing the role of the
Russia of the Pacific. Right now, China is exploring U.S.-based mineral claims in the Pacific and
there is nothing the U.S. can do about it. China is acting within the framework of international
law and the U.S., because we have not ratified LOTS, has no standing in the International Seabed
Authority to challenge China’s abuses. Another concern about Russia and China centers on rare
earth minerals which are found in abundance in the seabed. The U.S. requires an incredible
number of military products for which rare earth minerals are essential. Those products have
historically been manufactured here in the U.S., and ought to be. The U.S. also faces a serious
munitions problem: today, a tremendous number of our bullets are manufactured in
China…meaning that if we find ourselves cross-wise with the Chinese, they can cut off our
supply of bullets. When it comes to high-end military hardware, it is essential that America be
self-reliant, not reliant on China and Russia for the minerals needed for our own defense
products and national security. Over 160 nations have ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty during
the past 20 years. The U.S. now stands alone with Iran, Venezuela, North Korea and sad
smattering of third world and disreputable nations in turning our backs on the greatest
opportunity for wealth creation available on the globe today. In doing so, the U.S. is not losing
jobs and economic opportunity to BRIC nations and the rest of the world, we are surrendering
them. The Senate still has time to act to ratify LOTS and to set things right. This is the most
important economic agenda item the Congress can take up – and they can still do it before the
end of the year. With one vote, the United States Senate has the power to unleash staggering
economic growth and jobs creation.
2NC Solvency
The CP provides the legal certainity necessary for companies
Clinton 12 –Hilary (5/23, “Clinton's Testimony on the Law of the Sea Convention, May 2012,”
http://www.cfr.org/global-governance/clintons-testimony-law-sea-convention-may2012/p28340) patel
U.S. oil and gas companies are now ready, willing, and able to explore this area. But they have
made it clear to us that they need the maximum level of international legal certainty before
they will or could make the substantial investments, and, we believe, create many jobs in
doing so needed to extract these far-offshore resources. If we were a party to the convention,
we would gain international recognition of our sovereign rights, including by using the
convention's procedures, and therefore be able to give our oil and gas companies this legal
certainty. Staying outside the convention, we simply cannot. The second development
concerns deep seabed mining, which takes place in that part of the ocean floor that is beyond
any country's jurisdiction. Now for years, technological challenges meant that deep seabed
mining was only theoretical; today's advances make it very real. But it's also very expensive, and
before any company will explore a mine site, it will naturally insist on having a secure title to the
site and the minerals that it will recover. The convention offers the only effective mechanism for
gaining this title. But only a party to the convention can use this mechanism on behalf of its
companies. So as long as the United States is outside the convention, our companies are left
with two bad choices – either take their deep sea mining business to another country or give up
on the idea. Meanwhile, as you heard from Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar, China, Russia, and
many other countries are already securing their licenses under the convention to begin mining
for valuable metals and rare earth elements. And as you know, rare earth elements are essential
for manufacturing high-tech products like cell phones and flat screen televisions. They are
currently in tight supply and produced almost exclusively by China. So while we are challenging
China's export restrictions on these critical materials, we also need American companies to
develop other sources. But as it stands today, they will only do that if they have the secure
rights that can only be provided under this convention. If we expect to be able to manage our
own energy future and our need for rare earth minerals, we must be a party to the Law of the
Sea Convention. The third development that is now urgent is the emerging opportunities in the
Arctic. As the area gets warmer, it is opening up to new activities such as fishing, oil and gas
exploration, shipping, and tourism. This convention provides the international framework to
deal with these new opportunities. We are the only Arctic nation outside the convention. Russia
and the other Arctic states are advancing their continental shelf claims in the Arctic while we are
on the outside looking in. As a party to the convention, we would have a much stronger basis to
assert our interests throughout the entire Arctic region. The fourth development is that the
convention's bodies are now up and running. The body that makes recommendations regarding
countries' continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles is actively considering submissions
from over 40 countries without the participation of a U.S. commissioner. The body addressing
deep seabed mining is now drawing up the rules to govern the extraction of minerals of great
interest to the United States and American industry. It simply should not be acceptable to us
that the United States will be absent from either of those discussions. Our negotiators obtained
a permanent U.S. seat on the key decision-making body for deep seabed mining. I know of no
other international body that accords one country and one country alone – us – a permanent
seat on its decision making body. But until we join, that reserved seat remains empty. So those
are the stakes for our economy. And you will hear from Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey
that our security interests are intrinsically linked to freedom of navigation. We have much more
to gain from legal certainty and public order in the world's oceans than any other country. U.S.
Armed Forces rely on the navigational rights and freedoms reflected in the convention for
worldwide access to get to combat areas, sustain our forces during conflict, and return home
safely all without permission from other countries. Now as a non-party to the convention, we
rely – we have to rely – on what is called customary international law as a legal basis for
invoking and enforcing these norms. But in no other situation at which – in which our security
interests are at stake do we consider customary international law good enough to protect rights
that are vital to the operation of the United States military. So far we've been fortunate, but our
navigational rights and our ability to challenge other countries' behavior should stand on the
firmest and most persuasive legal footing available, including in critical areas such as the South
China Sea. I'm sure you have followed the claims countries are making in the South China Sea.
Although we do not have territory there, we have vital interests, particularly freedom of
navigation. And I can report from the diplomatic trenches that as a party to the convention, we
would have greater credibility in invoking the convention's rules and a greater ability to enforce
them. Now, I know a number of you have heard arguments opposing the convention. And let me
just address those head-on. Critics claim we would surrender U.S. sovereignty under this treaty.
But in fact, it's exactly the opposite. We would secure sovereign rights over vast new areas and
resources, including our 200-mile exclusive economic zone and vast continental shelf areas
extending off our coasts and at least 600 miles off Alaska. I know that some are concerned that
the treaty's provisions for binding dispute settlement would impinge on our sovereignty. We are
no stranger to similar provisions, including in the World Trade Organization which has allowed
us to bring trade cases; many of them currently pending against abusers around the world. As
with the WTO, the U.S. has much more to gain than lose from this proposition by being able to
hold others accountable under clear and transparent rules. Some critics invoke the concern we
would be submitting to mandatory technology transfer and cite President Reagan's other initial
objections to the treaty. Those concerns might have been relevant decades ago, but today they
are not. In 1994, negotiators made modifications specifically to address each of President
Reagan's objections, including mandatory technology transfer, which is why President Reagan's
own Secretary of State, George Shultz, has since written we should join the convention in light
of those modifications having been made. Now some continue to assert we do not need to join
the convention for U.S. companies to drill beyond 200 miles or to engage in deep seabed
mining. That's not what the companies say. So I find it quite ironic, in fact somewhat
bewildering that a group, an organization, an individual would make a claim that is refuted by
every major company in every major sector of the economy who stands to benefit from this
treaty. Under current circumstances, they are very clear. They will not take on the cost and
risk these activities under uncertain legal frameworks. They need the indisputable,
internationally recognized rights available under the treaty. So please, listen to these
companies, not to those who have other reasons or claims that are not based on the facts.
These companies are refuting the critics who say, "Go ahead, you'll be fine." But they're not
the ones – the critics – being asked to invest tens of millions of dollars without the legal
certainty that comes with joining the convention.
LOST provides jurisdiction for U.S. companies to drill
Bellinger 12-John, Adjunct Senior Fellow for International and National Security Law (CFR,
June 14,2012, “Should the United States ratify the UN Law of the Sea?,”
http://www.cfr.org/treaties-and-agreements/should-united-states-ratify-un-lawsea/p31828) patel
The Convention would also codify U.S. legal rights to exploit vast oil and gas resources
on our extended continental shelf off the coast of Alaska (an area the size of two
Californias), to mine valuable minerals on the deep seabed, and to lay and service
submarine telecommunications cables. U.S. companies are not willing to invest the
billions of dollars necessary to exploit Arctic resources unless they have the clear
legal rights guaranteed by the Convention. As a result, the treaty is also strongly
supported by the U.S. business community, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
major oil companies, the shipping and fishing industry, and telecommunications
companies. Unfortunately, some Republican Senators have blocked Senate approval of the
Law of the Sea Convention based on myths and misperceptions about the treaty, including
concerns that president Reagan opposed the treaty when it was originally drafted in 1982,
and that it might now infringe on U.S. sovereignty. But the flaws identified by president
Reagan were fixed by amendments to the treaty in 1994 (which led all other major
industrial countries to join the treaty). And far from infringing on U.S. sovereignty, joining
the Law of the Sea Convention would codify U.S. sovereignty over vast new oil and gas
resources in the Arctic. Other countries have benefited greatly by joining the
Convention, and the United States is losing out by remaining on the sidelines.
The tech is ready- companies are waiting for ratification
Pincus 12 – Walter, reports on intelligence, defense and foreign policy for The Washingon Post
covered numerous subjects, including nuclear weapons and arms control, politics and
congressional investigations, awarded the 2002 Pulitzer Prize for national reporting, other
honors were the 1977 George Polk Award for articles exposing the neutron warhead, a 1981
Emmy from writing a CBS documentary on strategic nuclear weapons, and most recently the
2010 Arthur Ross Award from the American Academy for Diplomacy for columns on foreign
policy (5/28/12, The Washington Post, “Fine Print: Treaty on the seas is in rough Senate waters,”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fine-print-treaty-on-the-seas-is-inrough-senate-waters/2012/05/28/gJQAzCyFxU_story.html) patel
Supporting the latter argument, she said, previously U.S. energy companies weren’t
technologically prepared to take advantage of the provisions that allow a country to claim
economic sovereignty to 600 nautical miles from its coasts. That’s far beyond the current 200
nautical miles. “U.S. oil and gas companies are now ready, willing and able to explore this
area,” she said, but they need “international legal certainty” from the treaty “before they will
or could make the substantial investments . . . needed to extract these far offshore resources.”
Clinton described arguments against the treaty as being “based on ideology and mythology, not
in facts, evidence or the consequences of continuing failure to accede to the treaty.” For
example, Sen. James M. Inhofe (R-Okla.) raised the prospect that “under this treaty, any country
could sue the United States in the International Tribunal Law of the Sea, not in the U.S. courts,
or take the U.S. before binding arbitration,” under provisions designed to “reduce and control
pollution of the maritime environment.” Inhofe went on to cite an article by William C.G. Burns
which, he said, named the United States as “the most logical state to bring action against.”
Burns, however, in his 2006 article, adds that the convention “does not impose an absolute
prohibition against pollution” and that it would be difficult to succeed with such legal action.
Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) raised another concern, repeating an argument that the treaty’s
language about abating air pollution would enforce the Kyoto Protocol, which the United States
has not ratified. “A lot of people believe . . . the administration wants to use this treaty as a way
to get America into a regime relating to carbon, since it’s been unsuccessful doing so
domestically,” Corker said. Clinton responded, “It is our legal assessment that there is nothing in
the convention that commits the U.S. to implement any commitments on greenhouse gases
under any other regime. . . . It doesn’t require adherence to any specific emission policies. Sen.
James E. Risch (R-Idaho) raised one of the critics’ major arguments: money paid to the
International Seabed Authority as royalties for extraction of resources from the deep sea are to
be distributed by the authority. “Why do we as Americans, give up our taxing authority, handing
money over to the United Nations to develop some kind of formula that we have no idea what
it’s going to?” Risch said. Clinton noted that it’s not a tax but a royalty arrangement, similar to
those that exist on land and sea. The royalty doesn’t start for five years, she added, then rises at
1 percent each year until it caps at 7 percent. One of the 1994 modifications to the convention
gives the United States a permanent seat on the Council of 36 signatories that sets the policies
for royalties as well as approves their distribution. Those decisions must be made by consensus,
meaning unanimous approval. “We would have a permanent veto power over how the funds
are distributed, and we could prevent them from going anywhere we did not want them to
go,” Clinton said. She later added that consensus is necessary to deal with “any decision that
would impose an obligation on the United States” or any country. Sen. Jim DeMint (R-S.C.)
repeated several criticisms then added that the signatories “also help get to define the rules of
engagement for the U.S. Navy all over the world.” Dempsey diplomatically responded, “Where
in the treaty do you see our rules of engagement or our activities limited, because they’re not
limited in any way.” One main selling point, emphasized by Clinton, is that “the largest single
portion of the U.S. extended continental shelf is in the Arctic,” where Russia, Canada, Norway
and Denmark, through its ownership of Greenland, are already establishing their claims. As Palin
wrote in her 2007 letter, “If the U.S. does not ratify the convention, the opportunity to pursue
our own claims to offshore areas in the Arctic Ocean might well be lost. As a consequence, our
rightful claims to hydrocarbons, minerals, and other natural resources could be ignored.”
Perhaps it’s time for conservative Republicans to listen to Palin on something she knows
about firsthand.
American companies and the Navy want certainty before proceeding
Abrahams 12 – Joseph (3/12/9, “LOST and Found: Senate Moves Toward Ratification of U.N.'s
'Law of the Sea Treaty,’” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/12/lost-senate-movesratification-uns-law-sea-treaty/) patel
The U.N. began working on LOST in 1973, and 157 nations have signed on to the treaty since it
was concluded in 1982. Yet it has been stuck in dry dock for nearly 30 years in the U.S. and
never even been brought to a full vote before the Senate. But swelling approval in the Senate
and the combined support of the White House, State Department and U.S. Navy mean LOST
may be ready to unfurl its sails again. Sen. John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, said during a January confirmation hearing that he intends to push for ratification.
"We are now laying the groundwork for and expect to try to take up the Law of the Sea Treaty.
So that will be one of the priorities of the committee, and the key here is just timing -- how we
proceed." Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, saying the treaty is vital for American businesses
and the Navy, told Kerry that his committee "will have a very receptive audience in our State
Department and in our administration." LOST apportions "Exclusive Economic Zones" that
stretch 200 miles from a country's coast and establishes the International Seabed Authority to
administer the communal territory farther out. The treaty's proponents say it clears up a murky
legal area that has prevented companies from taking advantage of the deep seas' wealth.
"American firms and businesses want legal certainty so they can compete with foreign
companies for marine resources," said Spencer Boyer, director of international law and
diplomacy at the Center for American Progress. Without the clearly defined authority
established by the treaty, "there's confusion -- a lot of businesses don't want to take that
risk." The American military is looking for another kind of certainty from LOST -- a guarantee
of safe passage through all seaways, a right China sought to deny an unarmed Navy vessel
Monday in its own Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea. "The Convention codifies
navigation and overflight rights and high seas freedoms that are essential for the global mobility
of our armed forces," the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote in a June 2007 letter to Senate leadership.
LOST has even managed to unify environmental groups and deep-sea miners, who both see
something to gain in the treaty. "We gain sovereignty, we gain territory, we gain access to
places that we have not had access to as easily," said Don Kraus, president of Citizens for Global
Solutions, a group that advocates strengthening international institutions. "We don't stand to
lose anything."
The CP provides legal certainty for mining and drilling
Adams 12 – Shar, EPOCH staff writer (5/23/12, “Ratifying Law of the Sea Urgent, Says Clinton,”
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/united-states/ratifying-law-of-the-sea-urgent-says-clinton241708.html) patel
WASHINGTON—The need for the United States to sign onto a maritime treaty is a matter of
“utmost security and economic urgency,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a Senate hearing
Wednesday. The U.N. Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) has become the leading accord in dealing
with international maritime disputes, offering guidelines on a range of issues—including free
passage through world’s seaways, jurisdiction of ocean beds, and passage for underwater
telecommunication cables. Whether to join the international body has been a point of
discussion in the U.S. Senate for over 20 years—but to date, the United States remains one of
the few major countries that has not signed up. Currently, 160 nations, including Russia and
China, are members. Clinton said, “Twenty years ago, ten years ago, maybe even five years ago,
joining the convention was important, but not urgent. That is no longer the case.” The race for
resources is a big contributor to the urgency. The convention allows nations to claim economic
sovereignty over their continental shelf to a distance of around 200 nautical miles from shore.
That would extend U.S. territory by at least one-and-a-half times the size of Texas, maybe
more, Clinton said. Before, oil and gas companies did not have the technology to drill in such
areas. Yet, now that they do, without the treaty they do not have the legal certainty of
jurisdiction. Similarly, mining companies now have the technology to mine deep waters,
beyond the continental jurisdiction, but without the mechanism the Treaty provides to ensure
secure title, companies are hesitant to make expensive investments. “As long as the United
States is outside the convention, our companies are left with two bad choices: either take their
deep-sea mining business to another country or give up on the idea,” Clinton said.
Even if the treaty hurts the US companies are ok with it
Bower and Poling 12 – Ernest, Gregory (5/25/12, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
“Advancing the National Interests of the United States: Ratification of the Law of the Sea,”
http://csis.org/publication/advancing-national-interests-united-states-ratification-law-sea)patel
The Law of the Sea has been ratified by 162 countries, including every other member of the UN
Security Council and every other industrialized nation on the planet. It undergirds the modern
international order in the maritime domain, an order built by the United States and its allies. It is
the only comprehensive treaty recognized worldwide that lays out the rules for vessels on the
high seas. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard, recognizing its value, operate under its
guidelines even in the absence of ratification. So why has it repeatedly failed to receive Senate
approval? Opponents have presented four general arguments: The Law of the Seas restrictions
would interfere with U.S. military interests. The International Seabed Authority (ISA), which
determines rights to seabed mining, would block U.S. economic interests. The Law of the Sea’s
taxation scheme for exploitation of resources within a nation’s exclusive economic zone would
redistribute revenues unfairly. The treaty would limit U.S. sovereignty. Fortunately for the law’s
proponents, each of these ideological battles has been fought and won, especially following the
treaty’s renegotiation. The first objection has largely been dropped in the face of more than
two decades of overwhelming support from every branch of the U.S. military. The second is
clearly not a concern to the U.S. industries actively pushing U.S. ratification. The ISA’s 39 staff
and narrow jurisdiction have little chance of bullying the United States or anyone else. U.S.
mining interests meanwhile are sitting on the sidelines while the ocean’s resources are
claimed by others, and U.S. telecom companies lack the protections and dispute resolution
mechanisms for undersea cables that all their international competitors enjoy. Regarding the
third concern, the taxation on resource extraction in exclusive economic zones amounts to
just over 2 percent on average, a price that mining and hydrocarbon companies have signaled
they are willing to pay as the world’s energy markets hunger for new resources and prices of
commodities climb. As for revenue redistribution, opponents too often overlook the fact that
following renegotiation of the Law of the Sea, the United States is guaranteed the only
permanent veto on how funds are distributed. It is also exempt from any future amendments
to the treaty without Senate approval. In other words, the United States would enjoy a
position of unequaled privilege, not unfair treatment, within UNCLOS. The final, and currently
most prominent, argument against ratification surrounds sovereignty. Opponents say that, by
limiting itself to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone and whatever extended continental
shelf it can claim, the United States is restricting its jurisdictional sovereignty. What this
argument misses, however, is that the United States’ continental shelf is the largest of any—
up to 600 miles offshore in the Arctic alone. John Norton Moore of the University of Virginia
School of Law has argued that ratification would “massively increase [U.S.] sovereign
jurisdiction” by more than the size of the Louisiana Purchase and Alaska combined. The
arguments against ratification have been steadily weakened in the last three decades and
were overwhelmingly addressed in 1994. The most important reason, however, for U.S.
accession has remained unchanged for 30 years: a rules-based international order is in the
United States’ interests. The current global order and the U.S. preeminence within it are built
upon legal norms and rules. Those rules do not unfairly constrain the United States. They
constrain those that would overturn the system, and they prevent a return to an earlier era of
great-power competition and might-makes-right diplomacy. General Dempsey said May 9 at a
forum on the Law of the Sea, “Force of arms should not be our only national security
instrument. [A] stable legal framework has never been more important to the United States.”
All your arguments are hype- the CP solves and EVERYONE is on board
Hurst 13 – Isaak, an attorney with the International Maritime Group, PLLC—a boutique law firm
that provides legal services to Alaska’s maritime, oil and gas, mining, and international business
communities (11/1/13, “The Law of the Sea and Its Effects On Offshore Mining,”
http://www.akbizmag.com/Alaska-Business-Monthly/November-2013/The-Law-of-the-Sea-andIts-Effects-On-Offshore-Mining/) patel
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—the US military backs it, the oil industry
loves it, and Senators Murkowski and Begich support it. Hell, even the environmentalists are
behind this piece of legislation. So why won’t Congress ratify this treaty and put this issue to
bed? Despite the majority of world’s nations adopting this treaty (84 percent), the United States
still believes accession to this treaty is not in its best interest. The argument: the treaty
contravenes the nation’s economic ideology and it erodes US sovereignty. These arguments
are misguided, and non-ratification has begun to stem offshore mining projects by US
companies due to the uncertainty over “clear legal title” to the resources extracted. This
article will examine the Law of the Sea Convention and the fierce political debate surrounding
ratification. The Law of the Sea—the Early Years Introduced in the late 1960s by UN member
states to prevent conflicts over maritime rights between nations, the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (also known as “UNCLOS” or the “Convention”) is a treaty designed to
govern the navigation, fishing, and exploitation of resources in the world’s oceans. The
Convention’s primary value is it provides legal clarity to the world’s maritime boundaries and
clarifies the rights nations have to the exploitation and development of resources within those
boundaries. Of the world’s 196 nations, 166 have ratified UNCLOS. One country, however, has
been noticeably absent from adopting the Convention—the United States. The United States
had its first opportunity to adopt UNCLOS in 1982 under the Reagan Administration. Reagan,
however, had serious reservations about UNCLOS. First, Reagan believed the language in
UNCLOS conflicted with America’s economic ideology and its free market principals. Under
UNCLOS, deep-sea resources are classified as the “common heritage of mankind”; may only be
mined for “the benefit of mankind as a whole”; and a percentage of the royalties generated
from these projects must be “shared” with the world’s developing and landlocked nations.
Naturally, the Reagan Administration balked at this language, calling it “fundamentally flawed.”
Reagan’s secondary concern was that accession would erode US sovereignty. Under UNCLOS,
the International Seabed Authority (ISA) is tasked to manage and control certain aspects of
deep-sea mining, including the permitting of these projects. Reagan saw the ISA as an
unelected, unaccountable international bureaucracy that had no business controlling the affairs
of the United States or its offshore mining companies. Reagan’s reservations were enough to
convince congress not to ratify the Convention, and his disapproval now forms the political
backbone against UNCLOS ratification. The Law of the Sea—Modern Debate In June of 2012,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held an array of hearings on UNCLOS to drum up
congressional support for the Convention’s ratification. Senator John Kerry lead the charge
and invited key players from the oil and gas, telecommunications, offshore mining,
manufacturing, shipping, environmental, and tourism industries. Their argument was
straightforward: without a universally recognized legal regime governing the exploitation of
the mineral resources of the deep-sea beyond the zones of national jurisdictions, US
companies would not assume the investment rights associated with such projects until it was
clear who had “clear legal title” to the resources extracted. Uniformly, these industry leaders
testified that accession to UNCLOS would provide such clarity, which would subsequently
create jobs, protect the environment, and ultimately lead to a stronger US economy. To drive
the point home, Kerry also invited senior members from every branch of the US armed forces to
testify that accession would increase national security. The US military supports the Convention
because it ensures unimpeded access to travel through and over the world’s oceans. Even
former Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta support ratification—
declaring accession will increase the United States’ sovereign right to the outer continental
shelf, which, in Alaska, extends six hundred miles offshore, instead of the current two
hundred-mile limit. Yet, despite the overwhelming support and expert testimony of our
nation’s military, industrial, and political leaders, the Senate pushed back. Senator Jim DeMint,
a conservative Republican from South Carolina and prominent figure of the Tea Party
movement, led the opposition. DeMint, armed with Reagan’s reservations about UNCLOS,
resurrected congressional fears that accession will erode US sovereignty by subjecting it to the
authority of the ISA. DeMint also propagated Reagan’s ideological concerns over the deep
seabed mining provisions, which DeMint’s supporters tagged as “socialist.” DeMint and his
fellow conservatives even promoted the slogan, “What would Reagan do?” By playing the
Reagan card, DeMint secured the signatures of thirty-four other Senators, which scuttled Kerry’s
attempt to ratify the Convention. Why UNCLOS Matters Now DeMint’s concerns are noble, but
they are misguided—accession to UNCLOS will not erode US sovereignty, but solidify it. First,
under UNCLOS, the United States is entitled to permanent seat on ISA’s Council, which
provides the United States with veto power over any decisions or policies it finds
objectionable. This “seat at the table” is a seat the United States does not have but desperately
needs. Countries like China and Russia are now aggressively pursuing offshore mining leases
within the parameters of the Convention. As of September of 2013, China is now the only
nation authorized by the ISA to explore the deep seabed for as many as three major types of
minerals. Would the United States have allowed such a sweeping grab of minerals rights if it
were a member of the ISA Council? Likely not, but without UNCLOS membership, the United
States has no voice. Second, there is no universally recognized legal regime governing the
navigational rights of nations beyond the zones of their respective jurisdictions. This issue is of
particular concern as China continues to exploit this international law loophole by engaging in
naval operations and fishing expeditions in the territorial waters of other nations (Malaysia,
Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei, and Vietnam). Under UNCLOS, such activities are explicitly
prohibited. Indeed, to curtail China’s lackadaisical stance on maritime borders and resources of
other countries, the United States needs to ratify this treaty. Moving Forward The United
States is one of the last remaining countries that has not ratified UNCLOS—along with Iran,
Libya, North Korea, Ethiopia, and Burundi. Embarrassing political associations aside, nonratification is curtailing offshore development as US companies are afraid of the legal risks
associated with such projects due to the lack of clear legal title to deep-sea resources. To
combat this issue, Congress should look past the political hyperbole and understand that
accession will expand US sovereignty by solidifying the world’s maritime borders and provide
US entities with the legal confidence necessary to engage in deep-sea mining projects.
Companies are waiting for ratification- Only the counterplan accesses solvency
of the aff
Lobe 12 – Jim, American journalist and the Washington Bureau Chief of the international news
agency Inter Press Service (“U.S.: Law of the Sea Treaty Ratification Faces Unsettled Waters,”
http://www.globalissues.org/news/2012/06/05/13919)patel
Successive administrations — both Democratic and Republican — led negotiations for the treaty
from the late 1960s onward. But when completed in 1982, then-President Ronald Reagan,
under pressure from big U.S. mining and ENERGY COMPANIES, rejected it, citing its provisions
for deep-sea mining, particularly its requirement that mining claims be regulated by a
Jamaica-based International Seabed Authority (ISA). Nonetheless, Reagan ordered the
government to abide by all other sections of the treaty, which amounted essentially to a
codification of existing international customary and maritime international law. In 1994, the
seabed provisions of the treaty were amended to satisfy Reagan's objections. Both Bill Clinton
and George W. Bush - the latter, however, only in his second term - subsequently supported
its ratification. In 2007, it was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a
lopsided 17-4 vote but was never sent to the floor for final action. After Obama took office in
2009, his administration listed LOST as one of a half-dozen treaties, including the 1979
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (which has been ratified by 185
countries), as priorities for ratification. None, however, have yet made any headway on Capitol
Hill due to opposition by Republicans, a growing number of whom have argued that
international treaties unduly constrain Washington's freedom of action in the world and
threaten its sovereignty. All branches of the U.S. armed services, particularly the Navy, have
long supported the treaty because of its recognition of navigation rights for vessels engaged in
military activities. In addition, the same U.S. mining and energy interests that had previously
opposed the treaty because of its possible interference with deep-sea drilling or mining have
also now lined up in favour. It was Pentagon chief Leon Panetta who launched the new
ratification campaign at a Law of the Sea symposium May 9 and who later appeared with the
chiefs of all four armed services, as well as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to testify in favour
of the treaty before Kerry's committee two weeks later. '(T)his treaty is absolutely critical to
U.S. national security …the longer we delay, the MORE we undermine our own national
security interests,' said Panetta, who this week urged Washington's Asian allies worried about
China's territorial claims in the South China Sea at the Shangri-La Defence Dialogue in Singapore
to speak out in support of ratification. Similarly, U.S. oil, gas, and mining industries that have
developed new technology to exploit the deep seabed, as well as TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMPANIES that rely on undersea cables, have come out strongly for ratification, insisting
that U.S. adherence to the treaty would not only offer them greater security in undertaking
such expensive investments, but also give Washington a voice in managing the ISA
The CP solves the entirety of the case and gives further jurisdiction
-heg
-manufacturing
-economy
-access to minerals
Grady et al 12- Jim, CEO of LighTec Inc. in Merrimack, Republican state Sen. Gary Lambert of
Nashua is a colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Larry A. Mayer is director of the Center for
Coastal and Ocean Mapping at the University of New Hampshire (“Sea treaty a must for U.S.,”
http://www.concordmonitor.com/news/4218363-95/kellyayotte-jeanneshaheenlawoftheseetreaty)
Commissioned by President John Adams in 1800, the Portsmouth Navy Yard has built the ships
that delivered more than a century of U.S. maritime dominance. New Hampshire was also at the
forefront of America's industrial revolution, and the Granite State remains home to a vibrant
high-tech and manufacturing ECONOMY. U.S. Sens. Jeanne Shaheen and Kelly Ayotte have an
unprecedented opportunity to advance New Hampshire's industry and help maintain U.S. sea
power by supporting ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty. Currently under consideration in
the U.S. Senate, this U.S.-initiated treaty would help drive investment, economic growth and
job creation in New Hampshire and across America. By ratifying the treaty, America would
gain exclusive sovereign commercial rights to the full U.S. outer continental shelf, which, in
some areas, extends up to 600 miles beyond the coast - three times the current 200-mile
limit. The University of New Hampshire's own Center for Coastal and Ocean Mapping has been
deeply involved in mapping unexplored regions of the Arctic seafloor in support of potential U.S.
claims under the Law of the Sea Treaty. UNH is home to some of the world's leading experts in
hydrographic and seafloor mapping, and they've spent months at sea in support of expanded
U.S. claims that can only be realized if the country becomes a party to the treaty. Former U.S.
senator Judd Gregg was instrumental in ensuring UNH researchers had the resources they
needed to pursue their exploration. With ratification, U.S. companies would gain exclusive
access to vast oil, gas and mineral resources in the deep seabed off America's shores including rare earth minerals that New Hampshire's high-tech manufacturing businesses
depend on. These minerals are used in a wide spectrum of high-tech products that will be
increasingly important to the Granite State's ECONOMY. On the national security front,
perhaps no one stated the benefits of the treaty better than the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, who explained to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in May how Law of the Sea would affirm critical navigational freedoms and reinforce the
sovereign immunity of U.S. warships as they conduct naval operations around the world. The
Law of the Sea would guarantee international legal recognition of the right of America's
armed forces to move unencumbered throughout the world's oceans. Moreover, ratifying the
treaty would give the United States access to an internationally recognized system for resolving
commercial disputes in foreign waters while protecting America's exclusive right to address
military disputes directly and on its own terms. Opponents of the treaty argue that it would
somehow weaken U.S. military strength and that U.S. companies could reap the benefits of
the deep seabed without it. Those arguments don't hold water - and the people who would
know - our military and business leaders - have made that clear. The treaty strengthens our
military posture and offers additional protections to our armed forces overseas. That is why
all living former U.S. presidents and secretaries of state, as well as current and former Army,
Marine and Air Force generals and Navy and Coast Guard admirals, have endorsed ratification.
No American company will make an investment in deep seabed mineral recovery without
international legal recognition of its right to do so. Thomas Donohue, president and CEO of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June
said, 'Accession benefits the U.S. economically by providing American companies the legal
certainty and stability to do what they do best: putting people to work by creating new and
innovative goods and services.' Jay Timmons, president and CEO of the National Association of
Manufacturers, testifying before the same committee said, 'Other nations are actively seeking to
knock us from our mantle of economic leadership, yet, too often, we remain on the sidelines.
Manufacturers can't afford for the U.S. to sit on the sidelines when it comes to the Law of the
Sea.' American companies have President Ronald Reagan to thank for the treaty's extremely
favorable deep seabed mining provisions. Reagan's efforts to secure a better deal for America
led to changes that granted the United States a permanent seat - with veto authority - on the
council that governs seabed mining. Reagan held out for amendments that eliminated mandates
that would have required the United States to share technology and revenue from deep seabed
mining. But the U.S. Senate must act to secure all of these important economic and national
security benefits for America. Without treaty ratification, America stands to lose out to claims
from nations that are parties to the treaty and want to encroach upon the vast seabed mineral
wealth off U.S. shores. By endorsing the Law of the Sea Treaty, Shaheen and Ayotte can help
support the Granite State's high-tech and manufacturing industries - and create jobs for New
Hampshire workers - while strengthening American sovereignty and providing important legal
recognition for the navigation rights of America's armed forces
Ratification allows for licensing and the GOP House is on board
Gupta 14 – Sajata (1/24/14, Professional Mariner, “Critics: U.S. missing the boat in failing to
endorse Law of the Sea,” http://www.professionalmariner.com/February-2014/Law-of-theSea/) patel
Thousands of meters below the ocean’s surface lie nodules and hydrothermal vents —
essentially underwater volcanoes — rich in precious metals, such as silver, gold, manganese,
copper, cobalt and zinc. As new technologies have made exploration and extraction of these
metals feasible, companies from various countries have been queuing up for access to the
spoils. To date, the International Seabed Authority, which was established by the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has issued almost 20 licenses for
prospecting of these mineral deposits and is considering several more. Mining could begin as
soon as 2016. When UNCLOS went into effect in 1994, it essentially codified maritime law,
covering issues such as safety at sea and pollution. To date, MORE than 160 countries have
ratified the treaty. Despite playing a central role in its creation, the United States has not
followed suit. Oddly, the treaty enjoys broad bipartisan support with both Republican and
Democratic presidential administrations pushing for its ratification in the Senate, which is all
that is needed for the U.S. to take its seat at the table. Yet some conservative senators have
said the treaty will threaten U.S. sovereignty on the high seas and have repeatedly blocked the
measure. The ramifications of this opt-out are far-reaching. Angling its way into the deep-sea
“gold” rush, said Larry Mayer, director of the Center for Coastal and Ocean Mapping at the
University of New Hampshire, would require the U.S. to break the law. In a document titled
“Why the United States Needs to Join the Law of the Sea Convention Now,” Lockheed Martin
Corp. wrote: “Timing is critically important if U.S. industry is to undertake exploitation of the
deep seabed for valuable rare earth and other mineral resources. Other countries are already
moving quickly and aggressively to secure internationally recognized rights to these resources.
... U.S. companies cannot use this country’s technological leadership to pursue, with the
sponsorship of the United States government, a leadership position in this strategically
important EMERGING MARKET.” Besides limiting deep-sea mining, failure to ratify the treaty
could stymie America’s ability to drill for oil in the Arctic. There, receding ice caps are providing
access to oil-rich seabeds, which are thought to hold up to a quarter of the world’s undiscovered
reserves. UNCLOS establishes that a country has full jurisdiction over resources within 200 nm of
its seashore, an area referred to as the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Countries can petition to
extend their reach by showing that their continental shelf extends beyond the EEZ. By joining
the treaty, the U.S. could extend its EEZ off the coast of Alaska by 400 nm. Russia has already
submitted a claim for half of the Arctic, and Canada intends to put forth a large claim that could
encroach upon the U.S.’s EEZ. “We believe that it is now time for action on the Law of the Sea
(Convention). The U.S. can no longer afford to wait to secure access to the vital resources that
lie within” its extended continental shelf, Jack N. Gerard, president and chief executive of the
American Petroleum Institute, wrote in a letter to Sen. Lisa Murkowski, then the Republican
senator from Alaska, in 2011. Until recently, seafarers followed a general set of ethical
guidelines on the open ocean, said Caitlyn Antrim, executive director of the Rule of Law
Committee for the Oceans in Washington, D.C. It was generally accepted, she said, that ships
could sail anywhere without interference from neighboring countries. That system worked well
for hundreds of years, but President Harry Truman muddied the waters in 1945 when he laid
claim to America’s entire continental shelf for oil and gas exploration. Hundreds of other
countries soon followed suit, both to gobble up underwater oil reserves and to protect their
fisheries. The first Law of the Sea conference was held in 1958, but delegates couldn’t figure out
how to best carve up the ocean, so they let the question hang. By the mid-1960s, a more
comprehensive solution was clearly needed. After almost a decade of negotiations lasting from
1973 to 1982, delegates drafted a comprehensive document laying out how member countries
should use the world’s oceans and established the framework for the EEZ. Article 87 codified
key freedoms on the high seas, including a country’s right to navigate and fly over the world’s
oceans, lay cables and pipelines, fish and conduct scientific research. Articles 192 through 237
spelled out extensive rules on pollution prevention and protection of the marine
environment. UNCLOS established an international tribunal to moderate disputes between
countries. “UNCLOS was simply intended to be the suitcase, if you will, that you could put a lot
of (maritime) topics in,” said Clay Maitland, chairman of the North American Marine
Environment Protection Association and former delegate to the Law of the Sea Convention.
When UNCLOS first came up for Senate ratification in the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan
laid out six areas of concern. He was particularly worried that the treaty did not adequately
protect U.S. mining interests in the deep sea. As it stood, any country could hire a company to
scope out areas in the high seas thought to be rich in precious metals. That meant that one
country could pay for all the prospecting only to have another country come in and start
mining right next to them. By the 1990s, policymakers had addressed all of Reagan’s concerns.
Notably, the U.S. was guaranteed a permanent seat — with veto power — on the
International Seabed Authority, the agency responsible for governing actions, including
mineral extraction, in the deep sea. By then, after garnering the necessary 60 votes, the treaty
was already in effect globally. But the Senate has never been able to muster the 67 votes
(two-thirds majority) necessary for ratification. In 2007, Antrim and others went to scores of
senators’ offices pushing the case for ratification. Backers of ratification included industry reps
from mining and oil and gas companies, various environmental groups, and the U.S. COAST
GUARD. But conservative senators blocked the vote. Right-to-life groups partnered with the
anti-internationalist groups, Antrim said, and proponents faced a “broad coalition of ‘no.’”
UNCLOS came up for consideration again in 2012. That year, in a letter to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, COAST GUARD Commandant Adm. Robert Papp Jr. said that ratifying
UNCLOS would help sustain America’s leadership as a maritime first responder, protect
American prosperity and ensure America’s Arctic future. “For decades, we have largely acted in
accordance with a treaty that we have no ability to SHAPE and without the additional benefits
that come from being a party,” Papp wrote. “We need to lock in the favorable navigational
rights that our military and shipping interests depend on. We need to be a party as the best way
to secure international recognition of our sovereign rights over our extended continental shelf.
We need to be a party to influence and lead the further development of the international rules
governing the oceans.” Without the U.S. at the table, said Mayer, companies will remain
unwilling to explore and extract on our behalf. “The reason why all the industry wants this —
why all the oil companies want this — is because of certainty. They hate uncertainty. They’re
not going to invest a billion dollars in an oil rig if they’re not certain who has the rights to it.”
That shared distaste for uncertainty has created strange bedfellows. Besides oil and gas and
mining companies, several environmental agencies, including Oceana, World Wildlife Fund and
Ocean Conservancy, are pushing for ratification. Clear guidelines ensure that all countries are
following established environmental protocols, Mayer said. “I’ve never in my life sat on a panel
that will have Greenpeace, THE MILITARY and the oil companies all agreeing,” he said. With the
U.S. forfeiting its role as a leader in international maritime issues, UNCLOS has started to show
its age. Most of its provisions were set forth in the 1970s, Maitland said. They did not cover
issues related to piracy or environmental advocacy on the high seas. In a recent high profile
case, Russia, which is party to UNCLOS, seized a Greenpeace ship carrying two journalists and 28
individuals protesting the development of the country’s first offshore oil platform in the Arctic.
Russia has refused to participate in a case being heard at the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea. “What do we do with all these situations that are cropping up now, and the
Greenpeace situation is one of them … that are not covered in UNCLOS at all?” Maitland asked.
“Congress shows little to no interest in any international maritime matters.” Treaties
automatically come up for reconsideration every two years. The Senate may vote on UNCLOS
during the lame-duck session in 2014 or in 2015. However, unless Senate opponents of the
treaty fail to get re-elected, ratification remains unlikely.
The US is behind- ratification is the only guarantee of extraction
Dr. Maurin 13 - Legal Consultant at the Applied Geoscience and Technology Division (SOPAC) of
the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Suva Sub-Regional Office, Fiji (4/22/13, Islands
business, “Pacific region faces seabed mining challenge,”
http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/environment/950/pacific-region-faces-seabed-miningchallenge/) patel
Minerals, such as rare earth metals, are increasingly becoming an important commodity in a
resource-constrained world economy. As a result new frontiers both onshore and offshore, to
the depths of the ocean, are emerging around the world. The Pacific region stands at the
forefront of this pioneering venture. Yet concerns abound about the environmental impacts of
future offshore mining projects on deep sea ecosystems. With limited experience in managing
extractive resources and embryonic capacities to oversee offshore activities, Pacific Island
governments must remain cautious in making decisions about whether to engage with seabed
mining activities, and consider how to do so in the best and long-term interest of their nations.
Conscious of the opportunities but also the risks, states in the Pacific Islands region have
recently embarked on a regional initiative. This initiative is the development of policy and
legislative regimes to manage seabed mining activities, with the assistance of the Secretariat
of the Pacific Community and the European Union. Seabed minerals: a new frontier The recent
discovery of rare earth elements in the deep seabed by Japanese interests, and the granting
by Papua New Guinea of a pioneering offshore mining license for seabed mineral deposits
1500m below sea-level, has drawn renewed international attention to the Pacific region.
Resource competition continues to intensify for rare earth metals critical to the new high-tech
and ''green'' economies, whereas China still maintains a near monopoly on current world
supplies. Global demand for various other metals found within deep seabed mineral resource
samples - copper, gold, manganese, cobalt, nickel and other strategic metals - is on an upward
trend, sustained by the industrialization of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa) and other emerging economies. Since the discovery of polymetallic nodules in
the abyssal plains of ocean basins in 1873, the deep seabed has been viewed as a potential
new mining frontier. Marine mineral exploration in the 1970s and 1980s highlighted two
additional seabed mineral types: cobalt-rich crusts found on the flanks of submerged volcanic
islands and seamounts throughout the world's oceans (at depths of 400 - 4,000 meters), and
seafloor massive sulfides (SMS) (or 'black smokers') that form along seabed ridges in water
depths ranging from 450 to 5,000 meters. A 21-year seabed mineral prospecting program run
by the government of Japan in collaboration with the South Pacific Applied Geoscience and
Technology Commission (SOPAC) investigated the seabed minerals potential in the Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZs) of 12 countries in the Pacific region. A number of Pacific Island
countries (PICs) have since issued exploration licenses within their EEZs to exploration
companies. In a pioneering move, in January 2011, the government of Papua New Guinea
granted Canada's Nautilus Minerals Inc the rights to extract SMS deposits containing gold,
copper, silver and zinc from the Bismarck Sea under its ''Solwara 1'' tenement: a world-second
deep sea mining license to be issued. The copper grades of SMS are found to be several times
the grades currently mined onshore. From the early 2000s, increase in metal prices on global
markets have reignited commercial interest in deep sea mineral potential, and have
encouraged advances in subsea mining technology, building on methods used for offshore gas
and oil, relatively shallow marine diamond mining, and sand and gravel dredging. Pioneer
state-owned entities from Japan, Korea, China and France now share the ground with private
entities enticed by the estimated commercial value of seabed recoveries. Significant new
investments in exploration activities presage prospects for a long term source of revenues for
PICs. The economic development potential of this new offshore mining industry, enormously
attractive for developing nations like the PICs, remains however to be balanced against the risks
to the marine environment (that could impact on other essential industries), and existing
capacities to monitor such developments and mitigate adverse impacts. Initiated by PICs
governments, with the support of the Metal Mining Association of Japan, the Pacific Islands
Forum and SOPAC, a Workshop on Offshore Minerals Policy was convened in February 1999 in
Papua New Guinea, which led to the adoption of some principles for the development of
national offshore mineral policies (Madang Guidelines, December 1999). Building on this
initiative a decade later, PICs requested technical support from SOPAC to assist with the
development of policy and legislative regimes to manage their deep sea mining potential. With
funding from the European Union, SOPAC, now a Division of the Secretariat of the Pacific
Community (SPC), launched in 2011, the ''Deep Sea Minerals Project'' to provide relevant
assistance to 15 Pacific ACP states. A dual regime for DSM activities The UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) divides the ocean space into maritime zones and prescribes rights
and responsibilities within those zones, including conferring sovereign rights to coastal states
over the seabed minerals within their EEZs and an overriding shared responsibility by all states
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Beyond the limit of national
jurisdiction the seabed is known as ''the Area''. State parties to UNCLOS recognize the seabed
resources of the Area to be the ''common heritage of mankind.'' UNCLOS established a body the International Seabed Authority (ISA) - to organize and control seabed minerals activities in
the Area. States, through their own agency or through sponsorship of private contractors, can
carry out activities in the Area under the control of the ISA and in accordance with its
regulations. A special regime applies to developing countries, who are given preferential access
to 'reserved areas'. The ISA's regulations currently cover exploration only. Regulations for
exploitation are aimed to be completed by 2016. Developing such a regime while so many
scientific ''unknowns'' remain is challenging, and there is concern whether the ISA organs will
have sufficient teeth to monitor contractors' performance and enforce compliance with the
regime.Whether state party consensus on the exploitation regulations can be achieved remains
also to be seen. The ISA has already approved 17 contracts for exploration in the Indian, Atlantic
and Pacific oceans. Lying between the Line Island Group of Kiribati and Mexico in the
international waters of the Pacific Ocean, the Clarion Clipperton Fracture Zone, known for its
elevated abundance of polymetallic nodules, is currently subject to 13 exploration licenses,
including three sponsored by developing small island states, all from within the Pacific region:
Nauru, Tonga and Kiribati. Potential for development in PICs With some of the world's largest
EEZs and known seabed mineral potential, Pacific Island countries stand at the forefront of this
new industry. But concerns are voiced regarding national regulatory capacities, particularly
given the lack of scientific consensus on the risks to marine ecosystems and biodiversity
associated with deep sea minerals. To secure national development from resource extraction,
a range of factors are at play including effective macroeconomic management and high quality
governance institutions characterized by transparency and the rule of law. Comprehensive
and well implemented legal and regulatory frameworks for deep seabed mining are a
requirement of UNCLOS, and equally important to attract responsible foreign investors into a
state jurisdiction. For projects that entail such high risks, consistency of regulation and security
of tenure would be a prime expectation for any creditable operators in this pioneering field.
How states (and the ISA) formulate fiscal regimes for seabed mining taxes and royalties will also
be key. Facilitating a viable industry must be balanced against securing appropriate return to the
states (or for ''mankind'' in general) whose resources are being exploited. As the SPC-EU Deep
Sea Minerals Project assists PICs with the development of legal and regulatory frameworks to
govern deep sea minerals activities, prospects are taking shape for a new economic opportunity
for the Pacific region. But lessons must be learnt from history: from decades of negative social
and environmental impacts from ill-managed onshore mining operations, and from failure to
maximize returns to the state from the exploitation of other natural resources - on-land mining,
logging and fisheries. Pacific states now have the opportunity of a new start, developing wellthought-out, precautionary, proactive policies and dedicated seabed minerals legislation before
any mining activities commence. The Cook Islands and the Kingdom of Tonga have taken the
lead amongst PICs to establish national legislative regimes to complement the ISA's efforts at
the international level - designed to uphold international law standards, minimize adverse social
or environmental impacts, and the realization of economic benefits. All parties recognize,
however, that the implementation of such regimes will be a challenging ''ask'' of small island
governments. Looking ahead, and building on the work of the regional SPC-EU Deep Sea
Minerals Project, there is conceivable benefit to PICs adopting a collaborative approach at the
regional level. Strengthening regional capacity to oversee and assist with legal and technical
matters, and the setting of minimum standards on a regional basis, for the management and
monitoring of DSM activities is recommended. A coordinated negotiating bloc of PICs, using
pooled capacity for regulatory mechanisms, could support equitable and sustainable
development across the region, rather than mere exploitation of those non-renewable
resources. A different kind of ''race to the bottom'' could be avoided if PICs coordinate, rather
than compete, to attract investors.
US needs LOST to contribute to decisions
Stratfor 7 (3/29/7, “The Law of the Sea: Climate Change in the Arctic and Washington,”
http://www.stratfor.com/law_sea_climate_change_arctic_and_washington#axzz370UYwyUR)
Patel
Leon Panetta, the chairman of the U.S. government's Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, told a
Washington audience March 29 that Senate ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) is a national imperative. Panetta, a former congressman and chief of staff to
former President Bill Clinton, pointed to a number of concerns raised by the United States'
nonparticipation in the treaty. By speaking out, Panetta adds his voice to a growing chorus of
politicians and interest groups that have decided that UNCLOS ratification should be a national
priority. Ratification of the treaty has enjoyed general support among policymakers since the
treaty was re-crafted in 1994 to meet U.S. concerns about sovereignty, but staunch opposition
from conservative and libertarian senators has stifled ratification. The metaphorical tide is
turning, however, as more and more conservative interest groups come to see UNCLOS as, at
worst, a necessary evil. Climate change and its impact on the Arctic is the most significant
factor pushing UNCLOS ratification toward a tipping point. As the polar ice melts, a number of
heretofore unimaginable situations have developed. These include the possible emergence of
the Northwest Passage as a major shipping route and the fear that the newly accessible
resources of the Arctic will spur significant battles over seafloor boundaries. The debate over
U.S. UNCLOS ratification is a familiar one. It focuses on whether it is better for the United
States to be inside a flawed, sometimes troublesome international system where Washington
can exert power to minimize the damage the organization can do, or to remain outside such an
organization, unfettered by the agreements others are making. Since the Reagan administration,
the United States has generally followed the latter approach, one favored by politically
conservative factions. The emerging Arctic-related issues challenge this prevailing approach,
however. Being outside UNCLOS has reduced U.S. ability to influence debates that are
increasingly relevant to the country's primary interests. In response, a powerful coalition of
industries, environmentalists and hawkish foreign policy groups and the Bush administration
have aligned in support of the treaty -- though not yet in a coordinated manner. Traditionally
conservative political groups are coming to view the price of nonparticipation as growing in
relation to the sacrifices of signing on. As a result, entrenched interests aligned against the
treaty are shrinking, and the question increasingly appears to be one of when UNCLOS will be
ratified, not whether. Treaty participation always has been a double-edged sword. By definition,
treaties demand the abdication of some sovereignty. In return, countries get a seat at the table
where the treaty's language is interpreted and refined. Because the reward is one of having
power within an organization, smaller and less-powerful countries that otherwise have no
voice in international affairs are strong boosters of international treaties. Powerful counties,
conversely, lose power by joining treaty organizations. The reward for the larger players is the
ability to tailor discussions and limit the range of options considered by the treaty parties. The
use of power within a treaty is now most visible in Europe's new strategy on climate change,
where the Continent is using its hegemony over the climate regime to adjust the treaty to suit
its own long-term geopolitical needs. Despite all the talk about climate change, the discussion
has largely been about a theoretical problem: the effects of climate change. The actual
warming of the planet until recently largely has been ignored. This is changing, however,
particularly in light of the unexpectedly swift retreat of the ice cap near the North Pole. The
visible changes in the Arctic brought by global warming will have numerous implications. Most
important, the Arctic will come to stand as a symbol of climate change, as visible evidence
that the Earth is warming. Scientists and interest groups will battle strenuously over the
question of how much of the warming is caused by human activities and about whether the
warming is necessarily a bad thing. In all likelihood, most will come to see the Arctic as a
symbol of the effect of human activities. Those who view the melting polar ice as a symbol will
doubtless see irony in the fact that the shrinking cap could make it cheaper to get to
hydrocarbon deposits that were previously uneconomical to produce. A much-quoted study
released in 2000 by the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that the unexplored Arctic contains as
much as one-quarter of the world's remaining hydrocarbon reserves. In November 2006,
however, the consulting firms Wood Mackenzie and Fugro released a report that argues the
recoverable reserves are closer to 3 percent. Either way, the Arctic has lots of oil to exploit. The
Wood Mackenzie study asserts that three fields in the Arctic contain more than 10 billion barrels
of oil -- Russia's South Kara Yamal Basin, East Barents Sea and the Kronprins Christian Basin off
Greenland's northeastern coast. Alaska's North Slope has an estimated 6 billion barrels of oil
equivalent in undiscovered reserves. The rules defining which country has economic control
over access to mineral reserves fall under UNCLOS. The treaty gives countries exclusive rights
to resources within 200 nautical miles (nm) of their shorelines. In addition, if the continental
shelf extends beyond the 200 nm limit, countries have exclusive rights to minerals either as far
as the shelf extends or until the furthest of two absolute limits it met: 350 nm or 100 nm from
the 2,500-meter depth line. The Arctic Ocean is very shallow, and the region's continental
shelves extend far beyond 350 nm before an average sounding of 2,500 meters is met. Though
not a party to the treaty, the United States respects these definitions of mineral rights. By not
being a party, however, Washington lacks significant influence on an important aspect of
drawing the boundaries. Under the treaty, countries must submit claims of the extent of their
continental shelves to the New York-based Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS), a group that approves the science behind countries' continental shelf claims. Countries
that ratified UNCLOS in 1994 or before have until 2009 to submit their claims. Unsurprisingly,
countries' claims overlap throughout the Arctic. From the U.S. perspective, the crucial issue is
not merely the minerals that it can claim, but the potential for a major shift in the relative
mineral wealth of Russia vis-a-vis its neighbors. A growing dispute between Russia and Norway
is perhaps the most important of these. In 2001, Russia submitted its definition of its
continental-shelf borders. Russia's claim is widely considered a significant overreach, since it
claimed a shelf extending almost to the North Pole and it made territorial claims that impinged
on oil- and natural gas-rich Norwegian claims (claims that have long been widely, if informally,
acknowledged as belonging to Norway) in the Barents Sea. Though Norway's claim, released in
late 2006, is in some ways more realistic, it appears to have been drafted to meet Russia's
aggressive claim in kind. With Russia increasingly aggressive in its use of oil and natural gas as
a lever against Europe, it will fall in part to UNCLOS (and possibly the CLCS) to make decisions
that will affect the reserves and production potential of Norway and Russia. As it stands now,
the CLCS is highly unlikely to support one side over the other, and it will throw the decision over
the extent of continental shelf ownership to the two countries to negotiate, a resolution that
bodes ill for Norway. Treaty advocates say this would not necessarily be the case if the United
States were involved in the organization. National security-focused advocates in the United
States say the country's nonparticipation in UNCLOS shuts out Washington from being able to
meaningfully influence how UNCLOS resolves the disputed claims. Industry, from oil and natural
gas producers to their major customers in the chemical and transportation industries, also
wants the United States to have a seat at the table.
1NC Enviro NB
LOST provides environmentally friendly standards
Alex Benkenstein April 14-senior researcher for The Governance of Africa’s Resources
Programme and South African Institute of International Affairs, graduated from the University of
Stellenbosch with a M.A. in International Studies (cum laude) (The Governance of Africa’s
Resources Programme, “Seabed Mining: Lessons from the Namibian Experience,”) patel
The UN Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS) provides the central framework for determining
rights and responsibilities in terms of the exploration and exploitation of seabed minerals.
UNCLOS grants states the right to undertake exploration and exploitation activities for marine
minerals on their continental shelves, a zone which generally extends up to 200 nautical miles
from the state’s coastline.7 The seabed beyond areas of national jurisdiction is defined by
UNCLOS as ‘the Area’, and this zone and its resources are declared to be ‘the common
heritage of mankind’, in which exploration and exploitation of marine minerals are to be
carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole.8 The International Seabed Authority (ISA)
was established through UNCLOS in order to develop and oversee regulations governing the
prospecting, exploration and extraction of deep-sea minerals in areas beyond national
jurisdiction.9 All rules, regulations and procedures established by the ISA to govern seabed
mining are collectively referred to as the ISA Mining Code. To date the ISA has only issued
contracts for exploration activities,10 but it has recently indicated that contracts for the
exploitation of polymetallic nodules may be issued as soon as 2016.11 The ISA Mining Code
establishes a number of central principles on environmental safeguards for seabed mining,
including requirements to: • prevent, reduce and control pollution and other hazards to the
marine environment, applying a precautionary approach and best environmental practices; •
gather environmental baseline data against which to assess the likely effects on the marine
environment; • establish comprehensive programmes for monitoring and evaluating
environmental impact; • include proposals for ‘impact reference zones’ (areas that are
sufficiently representative to be used for assessment of impact on the marine environment);
and • include proposals for ‘preservation reference zones’ (areas in which no mining shall
occur to ensure representative and stable biota of the seabed in order to assess any changes
in marine biodiversity). 12 While the ISA Mining Code is aimed primarily at governing seabed
mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction, a number of UNCLOS provisions are also of
relevance to national jurisdictions. Article 192 of UNCLOS creates a general obligation for states
to protect and preserve the entire marine environment, both within and outside areas of
national jurisdiction.13 Perhaps the central legal obligation for states with regard to seabed
mining is the determination by the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea that state laws and regulations governing seabed mining must be ‘no less
effective than international rules, regulations and procedures’ – such as the ISA Mining Code.14
Moreover, the Seabed Disputes Chamber notes that states have a direct obligation under
international law to ensure that seabed mining activities are governed in accordance with the
precautionary approach, employing best environmental practice and conducting prior
environmental impact assessment.15 However, an effective state response to these
obligations ultimately requires an appropriate national legislative framework.
1NC Multilat NB
Ratification supports a multipolar world
Scott G Borgerson May 2009 – former Liuetenant of Coast Guard, fellow for ocean
governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and an adjunct senior research
scholar at Columbia University’s Center for Energy, Marine Transportation, and Public
Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, “ The National Interest and the Law of the Sea,”
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/LawoftheSea_CSR46.pdf) patel
In many ways, the arguments surrounding the treaty are emblem- atic of the broader
debate about the role of U.S. diplomacy in the post- 9/11 world. Skeptics of the convention
believe it is not needed, given the hegemonic strength of the U.S. Navy. And, they ask,
why does the United States need to join this international agreement if it has gotten
along fine so far without it? They also worry that the United States will undermine its
sovereignty by incurring additional treaty obligations to international bodies established
within the United Nations' svstem. In a fast-changing world, with new threats
confronting the United States all the time, this camp holds that the United States
needs to be able to respond as nimbly as possible, unencumbered by lengthy legal
conven- tions that might restrict its freedom of action. Supporters of the convention
counter that the principles embodied in the treaty are the cornerstone of U.S. naval
strategy and create the rule of law for prosecuting pirates and the growing number of
other threatening nonstate actors. They argue that the convention is impor- tant for
economic reasons as well, as it creates legal certainty for all kinds of commercial
ocean uses, from offshore oil and gas to undersea cables to deep-seabed mining, that
favor U.S. interests. They also argue, from an ecological perspective, that the convention
helps the United States assume a leadership position for dealing with collapsing
fishing stocks, pollution from land-based sources and ships, and the growing danger
of ocean waste. Convention advocates highlight how oceans are, by their very nature,
international and thus require a regime of international law and collaborative
approaches to their management. They point to the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement as a
prime example of how a carefully constructed international accord negotiated within the
framework of the convention can provide for a legally binding conservation regime.
Recognizing the utility of this specific fisheries management tool, the United States rapidly
ratified this additional instrument as soon as it was possible to do so in 1996. Lastly,
supporters ask that if the United States is not willing to accede to a convention that it
requested, funda- mentally shaped, and subsequently caused to be modified in order
to address its own concerns, then why in a multipolar world should other countries
follow its diplomatic leadership? In such a context, how will expressions of U.S.
commitments to the rule of law abroad be heard?
Multilat is key to hegemony
David A Lake, 10– Professor of Social Sciences, distinguished professor of political science
at UC San Diego ( “Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the
Rehabilitation of US authority”,
http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeMakingAmericaSafe.pdf) patel
The safeguarding of US authority requires multilateralism that is broader and
certainly deeper than in the 1990s—more like NATO than the ad hoc coalitions of the
new world order. Indeed, absent the constraints exerted by competition with the Soviet
Union, the institutional fetters through which the United States must bind its own hands
will have to be even stronger than those in NATO. 47 The great paradox of contemporary
international politics is that the unprecedented international power of the United
States requires even more binding constraints on its policy is fit to preserve the
authority that it has built over the last half-century and extend it to new areas of the
globe. ¶ The advanced military capabilities of the United States will make it a key actor
in any such multilateral institution and will allow it to set the collective agenda. Since
it is highly unlikely that anything will happen in the absence of US involvement, as in Bosnia
where the Europeans dithered until the United States stepped to the fore, 48 Americans
need not be overly concerned about “runaway” organizations or global mission creep.
At the same time, if any organization is to be an effective restraint on the United States,
other countries will have to make serious and integral contributions to the collective effort.
Both sides to this new multilateral bargain will need to recognize and appreciate the
benefits of a stable international order to their own security and prosperity and contribute
to its success - 480 Making America Safe for the World. The United States will need to
continue to play a disproportionate role in providing international order, even as it
accepts new restraints on its freedom of action. Other countries, however, must also
contribute to the provision of this political order so that they can provide a meaningful
check on US authority. ¶ Americans are likely to resist the idea of tying their hands more
tightly in a new multilateral compact. After six decades, US leadership and its fruits—
security, free trade, economic prosperity—have developed a taken-for-granted
quality. It is hard for average Americans to tally the myriad benefits they receive
from the country’s position of authority, but it is relatively easy for them to see
multilateral institutions constraining the country’s freedom of action. Precisely because
unipolarity makes coercion and unilateralism possible, and for some attractive, any
constraints on US foreign policy may appear too high a price to bear. 49¶ But if the United
States is to remain the leader of the free world and possibly beyond, it must make its
authority safe for others. To sustain US authority over the long term, it must be
embedded in new, more constraining multilateral institutions. Americans trust their
government only because of its internal checks and balances. Although there may be
disagreements on exactly where the appropriate scope of government authority ends,
nearly all Americans agree that limited government is the best form of government. This
same principle extends abroad. If the United States is to exercise authority over other
states, and enjoy its fruits, that authority must be checked and balanced as well. The
height of hubris is not that the United States might govern the world, at least in part. This is
a fact of international politics. Rather, hubris arises in the belief that the virtue of its
people and leaders will restrain the United States sufficiently such that other peoples
will voluntarily cede a measure of their sovereignty to it. 50 Politicians and peoples
may occasionally be saintly, but it would be folly to rely on this quality at home or
abroad. Recognizing the universal need to restrain authority, the United States
should, in its own self-interest, lead the way to a new world order.¶
2NC Multilat NB
UNCLOS shows commitment to multilateralism
Scott G Borgerson May 2009 – former Liuetenant of Coast Guard, fellow for ocean
governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and an adjunct senior research
scholar at Columbia University’s Center for Energy, Marine Transportation, and Public
Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, “ The National Interest and the Law of the Sea,”
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/LawoftheSea_CSR46.pdf) patel
Opponents or the convention argue that there is no need to join the treaty because, with the
world's hegemonic navy, the United States can treat the parts of the convention it likes as
customary international law, following the convention's guidelines when it suits American
inter- ests and pursuing a unilateral course of action when it does not. They also argue that
the convention is an unforgivable forfeiture of U.S. sovereignty to states that mean
American interests harm. Supporters counter by saying that the convention expands
the rule of law over the vast expanse of the world's oceans and contains provisions
that could actually extend U.S. sovereignty. They also believe that shunning the
convention is a tone-deaf response to the spirit of multilateralism and that, beyond
undermining specific ocean policy issues and freezing the United States out of the
convention's decision-making bodies, it tar- nishes America's diplomatic reputation
at a critical moment in interna- tional relations.
UNCLOS sustains multilat and US leadership in order to fulfill our role in
the international community
Scott G Borgerson May 2009 – former Liuetenant of Coast Guard, fellow for ocean
governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and an adjunct senior research
scholar at Columbia University’s Center for Energy, Marine Transportation, and Public
Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, “ The National Interest and the Law of the Sea,”
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/LawoftheSea_CSR46.pdf) patel
The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea may seem an obscure agreement to nonexperts.
That is not the case. The convention is a care- fully negotiated international agreement
numbering several hundred pages that covers a host of measurable national security,
economic, and environmental issues of vital strategic importance to the United
States. By remaining a nonparty to the convention, the United States not only forfeits
these concrete interests but also undermines something more intangible: the
legitimacy of U.S. leadership and its international repu- tation. For example,
American pleas for other nations to follow pollu- tion and fishing agreements ring
empty when the United States visibly rejects the Law of the Sea Convention.
Remaining outside the con- vention also hurts its diplomatic hand in other
international forums, as well as the perceptions of other states about U.S.
commitments to multilateral solutions. As former Supreme Court justice Sandra Day
O'Connor has noted, "The decision not to sign on to legal frameworks the rest of the
world supports is central to the decline of American influ- ence around the world."2
Given the unprecedented challenges, threats, and opportunities the United States
currently faces, it is as important as ever at this critical juncture to strengthen
American influence and diplomatic leadership. Historically, one of the underlying
foundations of U.S. global leadership has been a perceived commitment to the international
rule of law and willingness to build international institutions that create a predictable
international order from which all peace-loving countries can benefit. Acceding to the Law
of the Sea Convention will help undergird contin- ued U.S. leadership, by sending a
tangible signal that the United Statesremains committed to its historic role as an
architect and defender of world order. From this perspective, acceding to the
convention is low-hanging fruit to advance a much broader U.S. foreign policy agenda.
It has the broadest bipartisan domestic support; supplies the most direct national
security, economic, and environmental benefits for the United States; and has
genuine global reach. A committed political effort to join the convention during 2009 will
provide a highly visible demonstration to a world audience that U.S. leadership has the
resolve to match words with actions, especially when domestic follow-through means
expending political capital. Breaking the fifteen-year stalemate in the Senate on the
convention will be a strong signal that the United States is committed to multilateral
agreements, especially those whose development both Republican and Democrat
presidents and a strong bipartisan caucus in Congress cham- pion. Therefore: 1. The central
and strongest recommendation of this report is that the Senate should exercise its
constitutional authority by offering its consent for the United States to formally join the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.In doing so, the Senate should consider the carefully
worded and painstakingly crafted text resolution of advice and consent sub- mitted as part
of the SFRC Executive Report in December 2007 (Appendix III). This draft resolution
chooses arbitration for dis- pute settlement and makes other important declarations, understandings, and interpretations that safeguard U.S. interests. These details are not
insignificant, specifying U.S. exemption from man- datory dispute settlement in certain
cases; requiring legislation for implementation in U.S. waters and to guide interpretation in
U.S. courts; and preserving Senate oversight over any future amend- ments to the
convention. If the Senate takes the convention up again this year, it would also have
another opportunity to revisit this text of advice and consent and could make
additional decla- rations, interpretations, and understandings needed to safeguard
U.S. sovereignty. For the reasons listed in this report, the president should consider
making U.S. accession to the convention a leading foreign policy ini- tiative in 2009.
2NC AT: Perm do both
The regime must come before we divide up the ocean, otherwise it becomes a
geopolitical concern and causes fights
Troianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep
Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,”
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello
In order to prevent the offshore mining industry from suffering the same fate, it would be
necessary to introduce international requirements into E.E.Z.’s legal regime upstream before
Deep Sea mining takes off . This would be a crucial step in Ocean governance’s strengthening.
However, growing strategic issues related to the control of raw materials constitute a major obstacle. It is feared that the
control of the bottom of the oceans shall become a growing geopolitical concern in the
coming years.
Unilateralism means the plan doesn’t claim territorial rights
Panchyson 13- Dorian (12/19/13,”UNCLOS-er than ever; why the U.S. should learn to stop
worrying and love the law of the sea http://www.nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/unclos-er-thanever-why-the-u-s-should-learn-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-law-of-the-sea/) patel
Preliminary studies indicate the U.S. extended continental shelf totals close to one million
square kilometers – an area approximately double the size of California, with a large portion in
the Arctic Sea north of Alaska. As knowledge of these areas expands through ambitious
mapping projects such as Ballard’s and other joint-government projects, the U.S. is likely to
encounter increasingly tense negotiations over disputed areas. Without the adjudication
mechanism offered by UNCLOS, the U.S. may be forced to settle disputes through diplomacy,
or alternatively, assert the claims unilaterally. Given that all other Arctic Council member
countries have ratified UNCLOS, the U.S. should make UNCLOS ratification a key security priority
moving forward. Presidential Proclamation granted the U.S. sovereignty over its marine holdings
rather than international law. In 1983, President Reagan signed Proclamation 5030, declaring
sovereignty over the 200 nautical miles extending from the continental U.S., as well as its
overseas territories and protectorates. This came a year after the U.S. declared it would not
ratify UNCLOS, as Part XI was seen to be unfavorable to free-markets and counter to U.S.
security interests. Despite support from both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations,
ratification was unreachable as a result of Congressional resistance. However, a recent support
has been driven by recognition that UNCLOS could be in the national interest in a variety of
areas. Supporters cite the need to establish additional mechanisms to counter China’s
increased unilateralism in the South China Sea, while securing rights for U.S. commercial and
naval ships, amongst others. Perhaps most importantly, ratifying UNCLOS would provide a
legitimate mechanism for adjudicating national claims to extended EEZs, especially in
contested areas such as the Arctic. Sea. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel recently released the
Pentagon’s Arctic Strategy, which prioritizes the ability to detect, deter, prevent and defeat
threats, allowing the U.S. to exercise “sovereignty in and around Alaska.” However, any claims
that extend beyond the 200-mile nautical limit would be negotiated without the legitimacy of
the diplomatic channels offered through UNCLOS. Although the U.S. has partnered with
Canada in mapping the continental shelf in the Beaufort Sea, bilateral negotiations may
become increasingly difficult if U.S. is forced to engage non-allied countries in resource
disputes. Critics maintain that UNCLOS would commit the U.S. to a dispute-resolution
mechanism that has traditionally been unfavorable to its interests. Further, UNCLOS has been
recognized as customary international law, thereby encouraging adherence to its provisions,
regardless of ratification. Others suggest the U.S. should continue to pursue unilateral options,
engaging partners through traditional diplomatic channels only when necessary. With the
largest continental shelf in the world, a lot is at stake for U.S. interests moving forward. By
some estimates, there are more than 100,000 underwater mountains containing a variety of
strategic and valuable minerals within the borders of the U.S. EEZ. However, these areas – and
those just beyond the 200 nautical mile limit – remain unexplored. As the areas are mapped,
UNCLOS provides the legal framework for the U.S. to make claims on maritime territory within
the extended continental shelf area. This would allow U.S. companies to apply for exploration
licenses in the deep seabed where no country has sovereign rights. Ratifying UNCLOS is not
without its costs. Much like any international treaty, countries are forced to adopt provisions
that may be counter to national policies, while relinquishing a degree of sovereignty in exchange
for a body of law with no enforcement mechanism. However, with such a vast, unexplored
continental shelf, the U.S. could leverage UNCLOS to extend maritime claims beyond the 200mile nautical limit. Asserting these claims under the auspices of international law would allow
for easier dispute resolution with partner countries, while providing access to valuable
extractive resources. Without UNCLOS, the U.S. may be forced to adopt an increasingly
aggressive unilateral stance – a decision that is likely to prove counter to long-term national
security interests.
The perception of the CP sends a multilateral signal that avoids the unilateral
signal of the plan
Borgerson May 2009 – Scott G former Liuetenant of Coast Guard, fellow for ocean
governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and an adjunct senior research
scholar at Columbia University’s Center for Energy, Marine Transportation, and Public
Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, “ The National Interest and the Law of the Sea,”
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/LawoftheSea_CSR46.pdf) patel
Opponents for the convention argue that there is no need to join the treaty because, with the
world's hegemonic navy, the United States can treat the parts of the convention it likes as
customary international law, following the convention's guidelines when it suits American
inter- ests and pursuing a unilateral course of action when it does not. They also argue that the
convention is an unforgivable forfeiture of U.S. sovereignty to states that mean American
interests harm. Supporters counter by saying that the convention expands the rule of law over
the vast expanse of the world's oceans and contains provisions that could actually extend U.S.
sovereignty. They also believe that shunning the convention is a tone-deaf response to the
spirit of multilateralism and that, beyond undermining specific ocean policy issues and
freezing the United States out of the convention's decision-making bodies, it tar- nishes
America's diplomatic reputation at a critical moment in interna- tional relations. Debating the
wisdom of whether to enter into international agree- ments is as old as the nation itself. Stung
by the controversy over the 1794 Jay Treaty and the emergence of bitter partisanship between
anglophile Federalists and francophile Democratic-Republicans (who felt the United States
betrayed its French midwife when negotiating with the British in light of the 1778 treaties of
Amity and Commerce), George Washington warned in his 1796 farewell address against "permanent alliances." In the centuries that followed, two distinct camps emerged in the American
foreign policy tradition: one was isolation- ist, seeking to hide behind the Monroe Doctrine
and remain aloof from corrupt, European deal-making; the other was more internationalist,
seeking a more active United States in world affairs.1'' Debates for and against the convention
roughly fit within these two categories. Proponents of the convention, who can be assumed to
include almost all Democrats and moderate Republicans (by most accounts, a large enough bloc
to achieve a two-thirds majority, as required by the Constitution for the United States to join
the convention), have been frustrated to date by a passionate minority that strongly believes
it is not in U.S. interests to join the convention. Opponents of the treaty argue that the
convention unnecessarily commits the United States to follow rules designed by states hoping to
constrain American free- dom of action. Their specific objections to the convention are crystallized in the minority views submitted for the record the last time the convention was favorably
voted out of the SFRC in December 2007: "[CJertain provisions of the [convention], particularly
those dealing with navigation, have merit," but overall and especially in regard to the dispute
resolution, "[i]t is puzzling why we would want to submit to a judicial authority selected by the
United Nations, given the organiza- tion's corruption scandals, and the fact that of the 152
countries Party to the treaty, the median voting coincidence with the United States in the
General Assembly was less than 20 percent. This treaty subjects the United States to a governing
body that is hostile to American inter- ests." 16 Other provisions found objectionable included
"taxes" assessed to outer continental shelf activities; fear of judicial activism by the Law of the
Sea Tribunal, especially with regard to articles relating to land- based sources of pollution that
are called a "backdoor Kyoto Protocol"; and a belief the convention will severely curtail U.S.
intelligence-gath- ering activities.On an item-by-item assessment, however, these arguments
are found to be lacking (Appendix I in far greater detail addresses the convention's opponents'
critical concerns). With regard to dispute settlement, the United States has indicated that it
would choose arbitration as stated in the draft resolution of advice and consent; it cannot be
forced into any other dispute settlement mechanism. Specifically, Article 287 of the convention reads: "[I]f the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for the
settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to arbitration in accordance with Annex VII,
unless the parties otherwise agree." Under no circumstances can the United States be
subjected to any dispute resolution procedures without its consent. Also, the con- vention
does not assess a "tax" but, rather, includes modest revenue- sharing provisions from
exploitation of oil and gas from the seabed beyond the EEZ that have been supported by every
president since Richard Nixon, including Ronald Reagan. These resources were far outside any
earlier claim made by the United States, and the agreement to the modest payments was part
of a package deal that included will- ingness to recognize extension of U.S. control over the
resources on the continental margin beyond two hundred nautical miles, which may encompass
well over a million square kilometers of potentially exploit- able minerals. That the payments
are, indeed, modest is attested to by the support of the U.S. oil and gas industry for these
convention provi- sions. With regard to a "backdoor Kyoto Protocol," Bush administration
officials testified before the SFRC that the convention does not apply the Kyoto Protocol to the
United States, either directly or indirectly. The convention's provisions include no cause for legal
action regard- ing land-based sources of pollution; they only represent agreement that states
are responsible for addressing pollution under their own laws and enforcement. Lastly, the
heads of the U.S. Navy and intelligence agencies have testified before the Senate Intelligence
Committee that the convention does not impede intelligence-gathering activities; on the
contrary, the rights afforded to the United States by the convention significantly empower U.S.
intelligence-gathering abilities.On balance, the arguments in favor of the convention far
outweigh those opposed, which is the reason the convention has attracted such a diverse and
bipartisan constituency. As presidents Clinton and George W. Bush forcefully argued in their
written communications with the Senate (Appendix II), objections to the 1982 convention were
substan- tively addressed in the 1994 agreement on implementation. Continu- ing to treat most
parts of the convention as customary international law, as the United States does now, literally
leaves it without a seat at the table in important decision-making bodies established by the
con- vention, such as the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS); weakens
the hand the United States can play in negotia- tions over critical maritime issues, such as
rights in the opening of the Arctic Ocean; and directly undercuts U.S. ability to respond to
emerg- ing challenges, such as increasing piracy in the Indian Ocean. Joining or not joining the
convention is more than an academic debate. There are tangible costs that grow by the day if
the United States remains out- side the convention. The majority view of the SFRC and the
opinion of every major ocean constituency group is that joining the convention is in America's
foreign policy interests. Debating the merits of internationalism versus unilateralism is a great
U.S. tradition, but the irony is that the conventionactually allows for an expansion of U.S.
sovereignty: freedom of move- ment for a powerful navy; a legal tool for U.S. forces to combat
scourges at sea, such as piracy, drug trafficking, and human smuggling; and a pro- cess for
extending U.S. jurisdiction over a vast amount of ocean space equal to half the size of the
Louisiana Purchase.As the next section of this report details, acceding to the conven- tion would
advance a long list of national security, economic, and envi- ronmental issues of strategic
importance to the United States. Beyond establishing the rules for territorial seas and
exclusive economic zones, the convention establishes regimes for managing shipping fleets,
fish, and pollutants that do not abide by national boundaries. The Law of the Sea Convention
includes specific provisions guaranteeing free- dom of navigation for merchant fleets and
navies, and sets firm limits on jurisdiction to prevent "creeping sovereignty" by a few
aggressive coastal states eager to unilaterally extend their authority seaward. The convention
is used to prosecute pirates and is the basis for the Prolif- eration Security Initiative (PSI) to
interdict weapons of mass destruc- tion (WMD). In addition to these traditional geostrategic
issues, the conven- tion is also germane to a host of other ocean uses, some traditional and
others new. It governs commercial activities on, in, and under the world's oceans. With onethird of the world's oil and gas alreadv pro- duced offshore, this is especiallv important, as the
future of hydrocar- bon extraction is in ever-deeper waters. The convention establishes the
jurisdictional framework for rules governing this industry operating on the extended continental
shelf. Deep-seabed mining is also an emerging industry, and the convention establishes,
together with the 1994 agree- ment on implementation, the legal regime for extracting
resources from the ocean floor. The International Seabed Authority (ISA), cre- ated by the
convention, introduces chambered voting, a permanent seat for the United States in the
executive decision-making bodies, and the power to block adoption of rules and budgets that
are counter to U.S. interests. The convention is also crucial for helping to manage commercial uses yet to be envisioned. Innovation and new technologies have played an essential role
in sustaining U.S. prosperity and preeminence, and American entrepreneurs will undoubtedly
discover future oppor- tunities in the oceans.
Perm can’t solve-the CP eliminates the unilateral signal and only ISA can grant
mining rights to companies
Bates 6 – Candace L. (UNC law review, “U.S. Ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea: Passive Acceptance Is Not Enough to Protect U.S. Property Interests ,”
https://www.law.unc.edu/components/handlers/document.ashx?category=24&subcategory=52
&cid=669) patel
The revised Agreement limits the full application of the deep seabed regime to the point of
economic viability.127 U.S. companies were not certified as having the ability to participate as
pioneer investors in the Agreement entering into force because the United States has not
signed UNCLOS. 128 Pioneer investors are those states that are signatories to UNCLOS III and
have the opportunity to explore the deep seabed.129 The new agreement allows U.S.
companies to have the same rights as pioneer investors if they meet certain technical
requirements.130 In this instance, the United States was put in the same position as potential
deep seabed-mining states.131 The United States is also guaranteed a position on the Council
should it sign UNCLOS. There are many misconceptions as to what the signing of UNCLOS
would mean for the United States and deep seabed mining. It is argued that by ratifying
UNCLOS, including the Agreement, states will inevitably have to discontinue their unilateral
attempts at deep seabed mining.133 However, this is unfounded as the law of the deep seabed
was intentionally not settled in order to produce solid negotiations of the sort that resulted in
UNCLOS.134 Most, if not all, of the potential deep seabed mining nations are dedicated to the
adoption of UNCLOS and the Agreement.135 The potential deep seabed mining countries
understand that there is a lack of economic viability in the present deep seabed mining
industry, and “it is inconceivable that the necessary financial markets would support
unilateral mining if it is contrary to the principles” of UNCLOS.136 The other issue that could
present slight problems in the deep seabed mining framework is the dual regimes developed
under UNCLOS and the Agreement.137 Some states adopted the original Part XI, whereas
others, such as the United States, negotiated and adopted the 1994 Agreement.138 However,
the dual system is unlikely because most nations supported the 1994 Agreement and no state
voted against it.139 The only possibility of a dual regime will arise if the United States fails to
ratify the Agreement and then unilaterally attempts to subsidize its own industry.140 The
question then arose as to the accessibility of the nodules of the deep seabed—particularly the
unlimited access of private entities not signatories on UNCLOS.141 The fear was that such
unlimited access would create a shift in the market, eroding the stability of the seabed
market.142 Developing nations were opposed to the limited access provisions because they
would drive a technological and economic gap between the developed and developing
nations.143 In this instance, those nations already producing land-based minerals would most
likely choose to protect themselves from the unlimited supply of deep seabed minerals by
lowering the prices of the land-based minerals.144 Most of the G-77 considered political control
of economic activity to be the solution to the instability of the seabed market; many nations
consequently requested production controls.145 However, those countries already involved in
mining supported a free market system because of the uncertainty in the deep seabed potential
market.146 The rift in the negotiations occurred when the potential miner nations feared great
political constraints to limit the possibility of failure would create a less friendly market.147
However, other nations feared that ocean mining would be overburdened and force mineral
prices to fluctuate.148 Because of this fear, these nations required a limited market in which the
political entity would rule on the matter as circumstances arose, leaving the political entity
rather than the demand for the minerals as the driving force in the market.149 Part XI of the
Convention pertains directly to individual seabed mining companies.150 If a company is
sponsored by a member state, state sponsorship presupposes some general supervisory
duties, allowing a company to apply for exclusive or exploitation rights to mine along the
international seabed.151 The private property rights of those companies depend on the
authority of international law to grant these exclusive and/or exploitation rights.152 Granting
of these rights was in response to the position that exclusive mining rights over a particular
length of time and area are a necessary precondition to private investment in the
development of nonliving resources found in the seabed.153 The grant of private access to
international organizations for the attainment of mining rights induces more provisions for
property and economic rights of the private entities.154 In order to explore the continental
shelf, mining companies must acquire exclusive mining rights of a specific area through a
contract.15
***NEPA CP
2NC Squo = Circumvent
Current processing and refining methods of REE’s causes massive
environmental pollution only the CP allows for a reassessment of those
practices
Weng et al 13 (S. M. Jowitt, G. M. Mudd and N. Haque, June 1st, “Assessing rare earth element
mineral deposit types and links to environmental impacts”,
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=f
35e17a-eedd-436a-8a4b-82d011441848%40sessionmgr4001&vid=2&hid=4206)
The mining, processing and refining of the REEs has the potential to cause major environmental
problems that arc closely linked to the deposit type, processing methods used and there extent of pollution control adopted to
mitigate environmental impacts. There are, however, very few published detailed studies on the actual impacts of RHE processing.
This lack of comprehensive studies limits the understanding of potential and actual risks, especially when considering the various
REE deposit types and project configurations.
In general, common concerns (as outlined by Chen et aiy 2005; Mudd,
2008; Qifan et aL, 2010; Pillai et a!.9 2010; Wen et al., 2013; IAEA, 2011) include: (i) significant use of chemicals (e.g. acids,
alkalis, solvents) (ii) the presence of significant Th concentrations in REE ores and concentrates, and to much a lesser extent U, and
the radioactive nature of some refinery wastes (especially gypsum wastes) (iii) corrosive fluorine-bearing
gases (iv)
occupational and public health risks from potential chemical and radiation exposures (both
perceived and actual)These issues are exacerbated by the high-tech end-uses of the majority of the REEs; their uses mean that the
majority of REE demand is for high-purity single REEs. Hence, the processing of REE ores does not simply involve the concentration
of ore minerals such as sulphides or native metals (as is the case for many base and precious metals), but instead required the
selective separation of each individual REE from the hosting minerals and subsequent production of a single clement concentrate or
product. The highly variably nature of REE minerals (e.g. Table 2), again sharply contrasts with both base and precious metal
resources where commodities of interest are hosted by one or two relatively easily processable minerals in any given deposit. The
variety of REE minerals means that the REE extraction and processing is problematic and can be
time-consuming. This, combined with the fact that the REE are chemically similar (i.e. have similar properties and behaviors)
means that REE mineral processing techniques are both energy and chemically intensive. The difficulties and
expenses in REE extraction and processing also means that these processes can have significant
environmental impacts. The relatively small and somewhat poorly documented (compared to, for
example, Cu processing by smelting or Au processing using cyanide, both of which are harmful but with more wellknown and more easily remediated impacts) nature of global REE production means that little research to
date has focused on the life cycle environmental impacts of REE production, including the impacts of
REE mine site, processing, production, manufacturing and recycling (or lack thcrcoi) processes on the environment. In addition, REE
mineralization is often associated with enrichments in the radioactive elements U, Th and K, as
well as a wide variety of other harmful (and biologically active) elements; all these elements can
potentially cause significant environmental and public health problems during processing and
waste disposal. The difficulties inherent in processing these ores are evidenced by a report in the China Daily (Jiabao and Ji,
2009). This report indicates that the production of a single tonne of refined REE oxide from Bayan Obo, the world's most important
REE deposit, also produced 63 000 m3 of harmful S- and F-bcaring gases, 200 m3 of acidic water, and 1 -4 t of radioactive waste
(especially Th-related wastes).
The safe disposal of these wastes, especially the radioactive wastes that
are often produced during REE production, is a significant problem that needs to be overcome
during REE mine planning and remediation. Rare earth element mining and processing also involves a wide range
of occupational hazards such as pneumoconiosis as well as potential occupational poisoning from Pb, Hg, benzene,
and phosphorous. In addition, the costs and likelihood of successful rehabilitation of affected mining and processing sites need to be
considered during mineral exploration and within feasibility studies; to date, these have not been significant factors given the low
number of REE mines globally, although the increased demand for the REE means that these impacts need to be considered in detail
in the very near future. At present, there is a dearth of literature linking REE deposit mineralogy, processing routes and waste
management methods to environmental risks through formal methodologies such as life cycle impact assessment (LCA). By
developing a more comprehensive understanding of the key mineralogical and geological
differences in REE deposits, this study should facilitate more thorough life cycle impact
first
assessments in the future. This facilitates better understanding of the real and perceived
environmental risks from the whole REE production chain, and all of these factors should be quantified in an
urgently needed comprehensive LCA for REE mining and processing. Currently, LCA is the primary methodology
used to quantify environmental impacts of material extraction, refinery, and processing for most base
metals mining activities, such as Au, Al, Cu and Fc (e.g. Norgate and Haquc, 2010; Norgate and Jahanshahi, 2010; Northcy et a/.,
2013). As outlined above, REE deposits arc geologically and mineralogically diverse. This means that evaluation of the impacts of REE
extraction and processing requires specifically focused LCAs. The distribution of the REEs in both value and in terms of allocation of
mass of HREEs and LREEs within an individual deposit is also crucial to determine the effectiveness of inputs and outputs within an
LCA. For example, LREE-dominant deposits require different processing and refinery routes than HREE-dominant deposits, and the
added complexity of the production of multiple co-products such as U. Nb, Ta, Zr and Fe (e.g. Dubbo-Toongi, Bayan Obo) also needs
to be taken into account during LCA analysis. Here, we compare the
2NC Solvency
CP is a pre-requisite to deep sea mining and causes a spur of technological
innovation critical to Aff solvency
Halfara and Fujita 02 (Jochen and Rodney, “Marine Policy”, Volume 26 Issue 2 pg. 103-106,
http://www.sciencedirect.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/science/article/pii/S0308597X0
1000410) It is well known that terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems can be disrupted,
damaged, or destroyed by terrestrial mining operations. Relative to terrestrial and aquatic systems, deepsea ecosystems are much less understood and more difficult to monitor. Until and unless a better understanding of
these ecosystems has been reached, the threats posed by deep-sea mining will be
uncertain but potentially serious. The current consumption rate and the projected increase of consumption of minerals
may increase incentives to proceed with deep-sea mining. Because the environmental impacts of deep-sea
mining are uncertain but potentially serious, a prudent policy approach would consist of: (1)
conserving mineral resources, (2) increasing the recycling of minerals, and (3) exploiting land based mineral resources with much
greater efficiency and more
stringent environmental regulation. Mining on land has caused environmental
devastation, certainly, but environmental risks of terrestrial mining are better known and perhaps could be more easily contained than
those of deep-sea mining. Environmental impacts associated with terrestrial mining should be reduced before deep-sea mining is
allowed to proceed. Once
these concerns are addressed, comprehensive risk assessment for
commercial deep-sea mining can be conducted. A precautionary approach can create
incentives for reducing uncertainty and minimizing ecological impacts associated with
deep-sea mining. A presumption that deep-sea mining will have adverse ecological impacts until compelling evidence shows
that it will not creates a strong incentive to conduct credible research on impacts. We therefore recommend the establishment of
marine protected areas around hydrothermal vents to facilitate monitoring and regulation of all activities in these zones. Conditions on
the expansion of a mining operation from pilot phase to commercial phase and a mechanism to halt mining if adverse impacts are
detected create incentives for minimizing ecological impacts. Since
less developed nations may lack adequate
environmental regulations or sufficient funds for environmental studies, mining within
the EEZs of the above countries could cause serious marine environmental degradation.
Incentives and financial resources to study and reduce environmental impacts related to the mining activities will likely be needed.
New discoveries of rich and massive mineral deposits could spur a great deal of investment in deep-sea mining. Historically,
environmental regulations have followed the development of new technologies and industries, rather than anticipating and guiding
them. Massive
investment in economic activities tends to result in resistance to
environmental regulation. Performance standards and other types of regulations that
anticipate potential environmental impacts have the potential for guiding technological
innovation and industry operations toward the goal of minimizing such impacts. Lack of
regulation within EEZs could result in harm to deep-sea ecosystems rich in species. Presently, a window of opportunity exists for the
international community to implement scientific, technological, and legal measures to minimize negative environmental impacts
before a sudden rush to commercialization (and attendant opposition to regulation) develops.
2NC AT: Perm do Both
We should have environmental review---this needs to happen before we deploy
the deep sea mining otherwise it causes our environment disturbances impact
Birney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC)
“Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea”
***DSM = Deep Sea Mining
Many uncertainties surround deep-sea mining and one of the most significant is the potential
impacts to the surrounding environment . To better understand and identify the potential
impacts, a brief review of nodule DSM experiments was completed. Information gathered from
these studies and other research studies focused on SMS mining led to the identification of potential impacts
from exploration and extraction of SMS deposits. These impacts were categorized as follows: direct
physical disturbances , sediment plumes , acoustic impacts , waste water disposal , and
machinery leaks or malfunctions.¶ In order for the industry to determine the extent of
impacts environmental assessments will need to be conducted. It is suggested that a Before
After Control Impact Paired Series field assessment be conducted. This will allow for a comprehensive
and targeted environmental monitoring program in the dynamic deep sea environment. Placer
Dome may be the first company to conduct a full scale deep-sea mining operation; it is essential that they use a
sampling method that will identify impacts and quantify the magnitude of¶ vi¶ these impacts.
The assessment method they choose will need to be rigorous so that it stands up to outside review and critique by scientists and
stakeholders.
2NC AT: Normal Means
1. NEPA EIS isn’t normal means in the context of mining operations
Kasperowicz 12 (Pete, 7/12, “House votes to streamline federal mining permit process”,
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/237551-house-votes-to-streamline-federalmining-permit-process)
The House approved legislation Thursday that would require federal agencies to take no longer
than 30 months to make decisions related to mining permits, and limit the ability of groups to
mount legal challenges against these permits. Members voted 256-160 in favor of H.R. 4402, the National Strategic
and Critical Minerals Production Act. Twenty-two Democrats voted with Republicans in favor of the bill,
after several Democrats argued during debate that the bill would unacceptably ease environmental rules. Under the bill, federal
agencies would have to make an effort to minimize delays in the mining permitting process. This
includes making a finding that proposed projects should not be subject to National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) standards, if it can be determined that agency guidelines
and/or state guidelines are enough to "ensure that environmental factors are taken into
account." It would also require civil suits against granted permits to be filed within 60 days after
they are granted. Republicans said these changes are needed to help the United States keep pace with the rest of the world in
producing minerals seen as key to manufacturing and national security.
***Misc CPs
Substitutes CP
Text: The USFG should provide incentives to develop substitute and recycling
technology for REMs
CP solves the price disruptions by reducing demand
Parthemore, 11 Christine, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Elements of
Security,”
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf
The U.S. government should create incentives¶ to reduce consumption when its interests are¶
on the line.¶ This report focuses primarily on the¶ nature of current and potential supply
challenges,¶ but solutions must also include reducing demand¶ for minerals that see major
disruptions or erratic ¶ prices . Policymakers can maximize the potential¶ of substitution and
recycling by clearly identifying¶ the minerals for which U.S. government interests are affected
most directly, and then offering¶ incentives to develop substitutes for these minerals. Developing
efficient solutions, however, will¶ require addressing the daunting information chal¶ -¶ lenges discussed earlier
Recycling CP
The United States Federal Government should expand its e-recycling programs
for rare earth collection.
E-recycling solves short term market problems and avoids the link to the DA
Cho 12 (Renee Cho is an environmental writer for the Earth Institute, “Rare Earth Metals: Will We Have Enough?”,
9/19/12, http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2012/09/19/rare-earth-metals-will-we-have-enough/)
“I
would like to see more exploration and research to make sure we know what’s there and
what the challenges are of going after it,” said Graedel. “I don’t think we know if we’ll have the
resources to meet future demand.” He also wants material scientists to aim their product design and lab investigations
at the most common elements, rather than the scarcer ones. Some companies, including GE, Toyota and Ford, are trying to use less
rare earth metals in their products, limit waste and/or develop substitute metals. E-waste recycling in Ann Arbor, MI. Photo: George
Hotelling Though recycling
e-waste cannot satisfy the rapidly growing demand for rare earth
metals, it is one way to help alleviate the shortage . Recycling and reusing materials also saves
the energy used in mining and processing, conserves resources, and reduces pollution and
greenhouse gas emissions . The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency reports that in 2009, 2.37 million tons of
electronics were discarded, but only 25 percent was recycled. The European Union recently enacted new e-waste
recycling rules requiring member states to recycle 45 percent of all electronic equipment sold starting in 2016, rising to 65 percent
by 2019. (Find out where you can recycle your e-waste.)
to rare earth elements are the only viable option
Worthington 11 (David Worthington, Feb 18 2011, “Experts: U.S. cannot mine enough rare
earth minerals,” http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/intelligent-energy/experts-us-cannot-mineenough-rare-earth-minerals/, ADL)
The U.S. government must fund new research into alternatives to rare earth minerals if it is to
forestall supply shortages, experts say. The U.S. can’t dig its way out of its rare earth minerals
shortage. Instead, increased government investments are necessary to foster the development
of alternatives, experts groups concluded in a joint study. The American Physical Society (APS) and Materials
Research Society were unanimous in calling for broader research into new materials and increased
electronics recycling. The study was released to lawmakers today. Ask as they may, the U.S. House of Representatives seems unlikely
to oblige. The House majority's FY 2011 discretionary budget proposal dramatically reduces government spending for the sciences
by 33 percent, the APS reports. House Republicans have committed to cut US$100 billion in government spending, with the
possibility of further cuts to come. Washington's nascent austerity politics puts the experts at loggerheads with policy makers: the
study saw no away around greater government involvement. The Associated Press quoted Robert Jaffe, co-chair of the joint study
group and professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as saying, "We do not recommend economic stockpiling, which we
believe is a disincentive to innovation and has backfired in the past." Jaffe continued, "After all,
many of these elements
are not even found in significant deposits in the United States so mining independence
doesn't even make sense.” The Obama administration called on Congress take action to diversify sources of supply for the
U.S. and its allies. There has been a slight uptick in domestic supply in response. In December, a rare earth mine reopened in
California. Rare earth minerals belong to a family of elements that are used to manufacture many staples of the modern world ranging from electronics, hybrid cars, solar panels and wind turbines to guided missiles. China is the world’s leading source of rare
earth metals, the rest of the world lags far behind its production capacity. China
has used export bans to put the
squeeze on Japan and the United States in political disputes. However, China is also reliant upon on imports
for sourcing its solar technology, the study's authors noted.
***China DA
1NC China DA
Current Chinese monopoly over the REM industry is critical to maintain
stable control of Clean Tech Leadership
Labrutoa 13 (Leslie Hayes, Simon J.D. Schillebeeckx, Mark Workman, Nilay Shahd,
“Contrasting perspectives on China’s rare earths policies: Refraining the debate through a
stakeholder lens”, http://ac.elscdn.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/S0301421513007805/1-s2.0S0301421513007805-main.pdf?_tid=a1077004-0782-11e4-940d
00000aab0f01&acdnat=1404922015_d6c9c9f884a2ea2cf247a1220417ee0b)
This sparked significant investments in China's knowledge and technology base
(Hannon et aL, 2011; Haxel et aL, 2002; Hurst, 2010; Seaman. 2010), which has led to what is sometimes called "China's rareearth stranglehold" as shown in Fig. 1 (Plumer. 2011). China
has thus become the de facto producer,
user, and exporter of REEs (Kingsnorth. 2011), with the USA. Japan. Germany and France
as the key importers (see Fig. 2) (BGS. 2011; UN Comtrade, 2009) . The problematic nature of this importdependency is accentuated by China's questionable control of corruption, regulatory quality political stability, voice and
accountability as measured by the worldwide governance indicators, where China ranks between the 25th and 50th
percentile, with an average of 29.7/100 (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Based on such information, nations
have started
to stress the importance of diversified rare earth metal portfolios for domestic imports.
Secondly, REEs have no known alternatives or substitutes (Hoenderdal, 2011; Holliday et al., 2012),
which in combination with high lead times for mine development (Kidela Capital Group, 2010) and the lack of
production and refining capability outside of China, reinforces the powerdependence relationship between China and the ROW (Humphries, 2012). The appeal of REEs
lies in their unparalleled electrical, optical, magnetic, and catalytic applications that significantly improve energy
efficiency and aid in miniaturization thereby decreasing environmental impacts, which is why they are used
in many high-tech, cleantech and precision applications as shown in Tables 1 and 2 (Angerer etal.,
2009; BGS, 2011; US Department of Energy, 2011; USGS, 2011; Wouters and Bol, 2009). Thirdly, there is
considerable uncertainty about the quantity and location of rare earth reserves. The
following figure compares the data on anticipated REE reserves as produced by the Chinese Society of Rare Earths and UKbased Roskill (Zhanheng, 2011) with data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) on proven reserves (Long et al.,
2010). While the definition of proven and anticipated reserves differs, the various sources seem to distribute responsibility in
different ways through the use of different reserves definitions. Following Zhanheng (2011) China holds less than 23% of
global reserves and Brazil holds almost 32.5%. Long et al. (2010) argue that China holds about 36% of global REE reserves and
attribute only 0.05% to Brazil. Korinek and Kim (2010) discuss the reserve base for rare earths as well as state that 57.71% is
to be found in China, 13.62% in FSU and 9.1% in the USA. This suggests a varying distribution of responsibility from the actors
involved. China's data suggest that Brazil's anticipated reserve quantities have the potential to be exploited, thus reducing the
current reliance on China. The
USGS data, on the other hand, suggests that China's proven
reserve dominance warrants their role as global provider of rare earths (Long et al., 2010;
see Fig. 3). Despite these differences, it is unanimously agreed that China produces 95-97 percent
of REEs used in downstream end-user products. It is also generally accepted that the deposits in China
are plentiful in heavy rare earths, and estimated to contain 80 per cent of the world's heavy rare
earth elements (BGS, 2011; Long et al.. 2010; USGS, 2011). With the relatively recent boom in the use of
REEs, especially driven by rapid development of clean technologies and high-tech
applications, REE usage is likely to increase in the future (Alonso et al., 2012; Ayres and Talens-Peiro, forthcoming;
Buchert, 2011; Hoenderdal, 2011). This estimated demand increase for resources with unique, hard-toimitate-and-substitute properties can create a sustainable competitive advantage for the
resource owner (Barney, 1991), while countries and organizations that need such
resources end up in a position of dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This power-dependence
relationship (Emerson, 1962) is fundamental to understanding
China currently is outpacing American green technology but an increase
in their domestic competiveness trades off with China’s industry
Eisen 2011 (Joel B. “The new energy geopolitics? China, Renewable Energy, and the “Greentech
Race”, http://www.heinonline.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu
/HOL/Page?page=9&handle=hein.journals %2Fchknt86&collection=journals#14)
The prevailing concern seems to be that Chinese firms will dominate the global
greentech market if current growth rates continue. However, it is by no means clear that they will.
Some signs in the past year point to over- building and overcapacity in the wind
industry, and a possible retrenchment and consolidation of existing firms. In mid-2010, concern about the failure of
nations to agree on a climate change agreement and projections of slowing demand in China for wind energy made for an
uncertain business climate for wind energy companies.72 One China-based research analyst wrote, "it's a tough situation to be
a wind turbine manufacturer anywhere in the world right now, including in China."7' On the other hand, there were reports
that the top three IPOs in 2010 in global greentech were by Chinese companies.74 Other firms
moved forward
with their offerings,75 but a planned initial public offering for one firm had to be scrapped in mid- 2010 due to
unfavorable market conditions.76 There is also evidence that Chinese firms are not yet
competitive in certain market segments. Some provincial utilities in China have
chosen Western wind turbines over products from domestic firms due to superior control
systems and longer experience with manufacturing larger turbine sizes.77 The quality of some Chinese
greentech is often not yet as strong as that of foreign products.78 As recently as 2009,
Chinese wind turbines were less capable than their foreign counterparts,79 as measured
by lower capacity factors (the percentage of time that the turbines operate to generate electricity).80 One article on the wind
industry observes,
"Western producers lead in the high performance segments, while
the Chinese lead in lower- performance, price-driven segments."81 Chinese firms have grown
quickly in manufacturing high-volume products but often do not hold key technology patents that would enable them to
develop more sophisticated equip- ment.82 Chinese
firms have grown rapidly through acquiring
manufacturing equipment and capitalizing on advantages such as their lower cost of
labor.83 As a result, they have quickly ascended into a leadership position in "downstream" areas of the PV production
chain, including cell production and module assembling, but lag behind in "upstream" areas requiring more technological skill,
such as silicon purification, ingot, and wafer manufacturing.83 Chinese
companies have a rapidly
increasing number of patents, but to date, the companies are "relatively weak" in
terms of the patents they hold on more sophisticated technology.85 A Chinese observer notes
that "[i]n quantity, China has become a great solar energy patent country but power does not mean technical power."86 In
2009,
American companies held the top ten cited patents worldwide in solar
technology.87 Government research and development support is aimed at closing this technology gap.88 However,
funding from the central government may be inefficient because it focuses too little on basic research.89 Still, many who are
familiar with China believe that it
is only a matter of time before Chinese greentech improves
through the well-known Chinese propensity to grow domestic companies by
innovating, based at first on importing foreign technology and assimilating it. As energy policy analyst
Julian Wong observes: One of the historical features of China's technology innovation is the role of foreign technology in the
innovation chain. To achieve its goals of indigenous innovation, China's
government has adopted a model
of "import-absorb-digest-re-innovate." Thus, the early stages of all technology development include heavy
reliance on foreign technologies.90 Over time, much as Japanese and Korean automakers have evolved over the past few
decades, Chinese
greentech firms may eventually close the gap and sell more
sophisticated products. Even if Chinese solar and wind technology improves, however, the greentech
industry in the United States is hardly standing still. Unlike a moribund Rust Belt industry ripe for
trampling by foreign companies, it is growing and providing more products to the domestic and global markets.91 The cost
advantages of Chinese firms may eventually fade,92 or the gap may close. Chinese workers increasingly are demanding higher
wages and better working conditions.93 Foreign firms are increasingly taking another strategy to cut costs: building their own
manufacturing plants in China 94 Some greentech, like the larger components of wind turbines, is heavy and expensive to
transport.*5 In the American market, the costs of shipping large turbines from China might outweigh higher domestic labor
costs. And
American greentech firms enjoy other cost advantages, such as preferential
tax policies.96 On the whole, then, Chinese firms are not yet invincible juggernauts
displacing their foreign counterparts. To assert that as a fact is simply erroneous. Further, while predictions
of dominance may or may not be accurate, the real question may be whether it matters. Americans may perceive, rightly or
wrongly, that Chinese firms are about to dominate this sector. There is obvious concern at the highest levels of the United
States government, as the USTR investigation and high-level discussions and trade missions involving the American and
Chinese government’s suggest.97 Some retort that fear of Chinese firms is as overblown as rhetoric in the 1980s claiming that
mighty Japan was about to dominate the world economic scene 98 Who is correct? The picture is muddled and leaves room for
arguments based on fear of what the Chinese firms might do. Setting up China as an economic bogeyman has a potential
drawback: it could imperil the bumpy economic relationship between the two nations. If American
companies'
biggest fear is being shut out of the Chinese green- tech market, portraying Chinese
companies as participants in a competition can easily lead to an arms race where each
nation erects protectionist barriers to the other's firms. In this zero sum game, there may be one
winner. or none at all. Some have argued that for this reason alone, it would be best to drop the rhetoric about a
green energy race."
Chinese clean tech leadership is key to their economy, internal stability, and
solves extinction
Delinger, 10 Paul consultant specializing in the China market who is based in Hong Kong,
7/20/10, “Why China Has To Dominate Green Tech,”
http://www.forbes.com/sites/china/2010/07/20/why-china-has-to-dominate-green-tech/
On the policy level, the Chinese government has to perform a delicate balancing act , it has to balance the
desire of many Chinese to live a Western lifestyle, together with its high energy consumption and waste, with the need to preserve
the environment, since China,
and the world , would suffer enormous damage if 1.3 billion people
got all their energy needs from coal and oil, the two most widely used fossil fuels. China’s political and
social stability depends on finding the right balance, since the party has an implicit mandate: it will deliver
economic growth to the Chinese people. This is why the Chinese government has chosen to invest in
developing new green energy technology . The country is very fortunate in that most of the discovered deposits of
rare earths used in the development of new technologies are found in China. While these deposits are very valuable, up until
recently, the industry has not been regulated much by the Chinese central government. But now that Beijing is aware of their
importance and value, it has come under much closer scrutiny. For one, Beijing wants to consolidate the industry and lower energy
waste and environmental damage. (Ironically, the rare earth mining business is one of the most energy-wasteful and highly polluting
industries around. Think Chinese coal mining with acid.) At the same time, Beijing wants to cut back rare earth exports to the rest of
the world, instead encouraging domestic production into wind and solar products for export around the world. With patents on the
new technology used in manufacturing, China would control the intellectual property and licensing on the products that would be
used all over the world. If Beijing is able to do this, it would control the next generation of energy products used by the world for the
next century. That is the plan. It would be like if the oil-producing nations in the 1920s and 1930s said that they didn’t need Western
oil exploration firms and refineries to distribute oil products; they would do all the processing themselves, and the Western
countries would just order the finished oil products from them. This is how China obviously plans to keep most of the value-added
profits within China’s borders. Before any Western readers snap into “evil Chinese conspiracy to take over the world” mode, it’s
worth pointing out that Chinese rare earth experts and government officials have repeatedly warned Western visitors that this
policy change would be introduced. Unfortunately, these warnings have gone largely unheeded and ignored by the Western media
and politicians who, it seems, have been largely preoccupied by multiple financial crises and what to do about the West’s debt load.
The debt crisis in the West means that it is very hard for Western green energy companies to
find financing for their technologies, then to market them as finished products. New energy
technologies are highly risky, and initial investments are by no means guaranteed. Because they are
considered high-risk and require high capital expenditure (unlike Internet technologies which are very cheap and practically
commoditized), banks
are reluctant to finance them unless they are able to find government-secured financing.
Because most U.S. banks are recapitalizing their businesses after the debt bubble burst, there
are very few, if any
western banks who will finance new green energy technologies. This has opened a window of
opportunity for the Chinese government to finance, and for Chinese technology companies
to develop,
then manufacture
these new green products. But just making these technologies is
not enough; they need to be competitive
against traditional fossil fuels. When it comes to the amount of energy
released when coal or oil is burned, the new green technologies are still way behind. This means that, at least in the early stages of
adoption, Chinese businesses will still be reliant on coal and oil to bridge that energy chasm before the new energy technologies
become economically competitive. Much depends on how much the Chinese government is willing to spend to promote and
incentivize these new technologies, first in China, then overseas. Because
of China’s growing energy demands,
we are in a race for survival . The 21st century will be remembered as the resurgent coal and
oil century, or as the century humanity transitioned to green technologies for energy consumption.
While China is investing heavily now in green tech, it is still consuming ever larger amounts of
coal and oil to drive its economic growth. Right now, we all depend on China’s success to make the
transition to green energy
this century. For all practical purposes,
we’re all in the same boat .
China’s economic rise is good --- they’re on the brink of collapse --- causes CCP
instability and lashout --- also tubes the global economy, US primacy, and Sino
relations
Mead 9 Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the
Council on Foreign Relations, “Only Makes You Stronger,” The New Republic, 2/4/9,
http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8
The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too
far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the
turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn . The Chinese financial
system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of
Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset
bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle
class. The political consequences could include dangerous unrest --and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling
that blames others for China's woes. (Think of Weimar Germany, when both Nazi and communist politicians
blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved
their money out of the country, further
slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness . Thanks to
has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of
modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops.
a generation of rapid economic growth, China
2NC Uniqueness
China’s leading the globe in clean tech competitiveness
Yu 12 Hongyuan, professor and deputy director of the Institute for Comparative Politics and
Public Policy, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 12/28/12, “A revolution is here, and
clean energy is the spark,” http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/201212/28/content_16065380.htm
Technological innovation is critical in the energy structure and, furthermore, next-generation energy will
determine not only the future of the international economic system but shifts in political power.¶ Since the modern international system
was set up, the energy chain has undergone two important changes. The first was during the Industrial Revolution in the 1860s, ushered in by Britain,
which was marked by a transition from the era of fuel-wood, or the bio-fuel era, to the era of coal. The second change was the second industrial
revolution, in the United States in the 1920s, which saw a transition from the era of coal to the era of oil. Today we are in the midst of a third
ownership and use of new energy
is closely related to national technological and institutional advances. Countries with a
dominant position in new energy must have an institutional and technical advantage stemming
revolution, a transition to an era of clean and low-carbon energy.¶ Under the long-cycle theory, the
from their possession and use of new energy. They have to break through constraints imposed by previous economic structures, which leads to big
changes in the global industrial chain, allocation of resources and national competitiveness.¶ There is every reason to believe that those new-
energy powerhouses will ultimately change the global distribution of power through
international competition. As history shows, every significant structural change in the international system has been due to a revolution
in energy. The country or non-state entity that seized a new energy chain or part of it was challenging the status quo. ¶ As the world debates collective
action against climate change, most countries have found that economies based on new and clean energy and on low-carbon and clean energy hold the
keys to the future.¶ The European Union's carbon aviation tax aimed at boosting the bloc's competitiveness and promoting climate negotiations could
also boost its creativity and competitive edge. The Low Carbon Economy Report by the Royal Institute of International Affairs says that the EU
promoted climate negotiations not just because it was a pioneer in low-carbon economics, but because it also wanted to predominate in global
governance and lay the foundations for the future economy. ¶ Considering
China's huge economy and the rapid
growth in its emissions, it clearly matters when it comes to energy and climate change . China is
developing many energy resources, and putting in place a system that supplies stable, economic and clean
energy. It is working hard to develop a recycling economy so it can garner the highest possible economic and social benefits using the least energy
possible. Since the late 1990s China has been promoting clean, renewable energy to try to balance growth and
environmental concerns and ultimately to reduce its reliance on coal .¶ In 2010 it set the goal of meeting 15 percent of
its primary energy consumption through non-fossil fuels by 2020. It is targeting the development of non-fossil energy including wind power, solar
power, biomass energy, solar energy, and thermal and nuclear power equivalent to 480 million metric tons of standard coal by the end of 2015,
according to the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15) for the renewable energy industry issued recently by the National Energy Administration. ¶ Hydropower
is the leading source of renewable energy. It provides more than 97 percent of all electricity generated by renewable sources. The dams and
hydropower plants also play an important role in water resource planning, in preventing flooding, making rivers navigable, solving irrigation problems
and creating recreation areas. During the 12th Five-Year Plan China will begin building more than 60 key hydropower projects, and the aim is to have
430 GW of total hydropower installed capacity in the country by 2020. However, debate about the negative impacts of dams and hydropower plants is
heated, most of it focused on environmental problems. ¶ By
the end of 2015 the country's wind power capacity is
expected to reach 100 million kW , with annual electricity output of 190 billion kW/h, the plan says. China's wind power will reach
100 million kilowatts by 2015 and annual wind power generation will be 190 billion kilowatt hours. Of that, offshore wind power will
account for 5 million kilowatts ; solar power will be 15 million kilowatts and annual solar power generation will hit 20 billion kilowatt
hours.¶ China enjoys many advantages in developing solar energy. It has become a world leader in photovoltaic cell production. The demand in the
country for new solar modules could be as high as 232 mW each year from now until 2012. The government has announced plans to expand the
installed capacity to 1,800 mW by 2020. If Chinese companies manage to develop low-cost, reliable solar modules, then the sky is the limit for a country
that is desperate to reduce its dependence on coal and oil imports as well as the pressure on its environment by using renewable energy.¶ China
has overtaken the US to become the largest producer of zero-carbon energy. The US is the hegemony and
China is the rising power, but clean energy will create a new paradigm for relations between the US and
China in energy. Cooperation between the two on clean energy is noteworthy , and both countries are
leading the world in investing in renewable energy and should seek to resolve trade disputes and eliminate protectionist trade policies. The US should
closely look at sales of Chinese renewable energy products in the US market and seek to reduce trade barriers.¶ The difficulty lies not in new ideas, but
in escaping from old ones. Whatever the outcomes and motivations, in order to deal with the energy-water-food nexus, China should understand it is in
its economic and national interest to move ahead with clean and zero-carbon energy development. Together with recently announced plans,
China's clean energy development marks a sea change in the reform of the international
system .
China has control over the REM industry but overheating, structural failures,
and overproduction has left China’s industry weak
Morrison and Tang 12 (Wanye and Rachel, April 30th, “China’s Rare Earth Industry
and Export Regime: Economic and Trade Implications for the United States”,
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc85418/m1/1/high_res_d/R42510_2012Apr
30.pdf
Overheated rare earth production in China during the 1990s and the early 2000s generated a
fragmented industry with thousands of mines, many engaging in reckless mining
and illicit production. In order to maximize profits, these small companies often ignored safety
and environmental regulations and fiercely competed with each other for export deals. In addition to
environmental degradation in China, this overcrowded rare earth sector and often intense
competition sharply drove down rare earths prices and. therefore, further pressed producers to cut
corners in order to secure their already thinning profit margins. Local governments, which often had vested interests, often
tolerated these practices.34 In
addition to illicit rare earth production, smuggling also became
widespread, which exacerbated resource depletion and kept prices low. According to
China Business News, about 20.000 tons of rare earths were smuggled from China in 2008.
Which was estimated to have accounted for one- third of the total volume of rare
earths leaving China that year. This smuggling is often the main reason behind the discrepancies between the
official statistics and the actual data of rare earth production and exports in China. Chinese policymakers and
industry experts have voiced concerns over the perceived rapid depletion of their
exhaustible rare earth resources. They contend that the rare earth deposits in China account for less than half
of total global reserves; however, the country mines and provides over 95% of the global
supply Rare earth production in China has far outpaced the sustainable level which makes Chinese officials concerned that
such a disproportionately high level of output could soon deplete their resources. The Chinese government is
also concerned that overproduction and illegal mining often came at the cost of
environmental degradation - safety or environmental protection is often ignored in pursuit of revenue
potential.36 The Chinese media have repeatedly exposed incidents of water system and
farmland contamination in rare earth mining areas, from Inner Mongolia to southern provinces such
as Guangdong and Jiangxi.37 hi the southern provinces, rare earths can be found in high concentration in clays and soil a few
feet underground. As a result, the 1990s saw
an explosion of the number of poorly constructed
and maintained local mines that were both polluting and wasteful, leaving behind
contaminated soil and water. In November of 2011, during a product quality inspection, China's General
Administration of Quality Supervision found that 19 of 85 tea products contained excessive levels of toxic rare earths,
including a batch of Lipton tea produced and sold in China by Unilever. Unilever later stated that the rare earth metals had
come from the soil where the tea was grown and had nothing to do with its production process.38 China
currently
argues that it is now moving to consolidate production and put supplies of a critical
and exhaustible resource on a more sustainable footing. China maintains that rare earth export
prices have been too low to reflect its virtual monopoly position. Moreover, such dominance, in view of the
Chinese industry experts and policymakers, should assist China to move up the
supply chain and engage in rare earth application and end products, not just being
the world's supplier of raw materials.39 hi recent years, China has put in place a series of
industry and trade policies, aiming to capitalize on its dominance of rare earth
supply
China Rare Earth dominance is critical to sustaining Clean Tech
Leadership
Eichner 12 (Andrew W, Tech & Poly 257, “More Precious than Gold: Limited Access to Rare
Elements and Implications for Clean Energy in the United States”,
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals /jltp2012&div=14&id=&page=)
China is the world's leading producer of rare earths, making the country one of the
most important suppliers of materials in the global clean energy movement.54 When
compared with the rest of the global supply, Chinese ownership of rare earth deposits far
overshadows any other country, with China controlling 36% of the world's total
rare earth reserves. 5 By comparison, the next greatest supply, held by the Commonwealth of Independent States, is
only 19% of the global reserve total.56 The United States remains a distant third, controlling only
13% of reserves.57 Furthermore, not only does China hold the greatest concentration of
the world's rare earth reserves, the country is also the world's biggest producer of
rare earth materials, providing between 95% and 97% of the global supply.58 The
combination of these factors makes China the most dominant country in today's rare earths
market. A similar, though less extreme, situation exists with the global lithium supply. Chile holds approximately 76% of
the world's currently accessible lithium reserves,59 dwarfing Argentina and Australia, which hold a combined total of 14% of
the world's reserves.60 Additionally, recent findings in Bolivia suggest that there may be a massive supply of lithium located
underneath the country, causing some "Bolivians ... to speak of their country becoming 'the Saudi Arabia of lithium.'"
2NC Link
China monopoly on REE key to maintain tech companies which is key to their
economy
Troianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep
Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,”
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello
After the low cost of labor has allowed the relocation of traditional industries in China, rare
earths are used as a lever to encourage the relocation in China of research and technology
industries. This transition from an economy¶ mainly based on the industry is at the heart of
the economic development plan of China . Rare earths monopoly is used as a lever to achieve
this goal . High-tech companies wishing to ensure a steady supply of rare metals are thus
encouraged to relocate their production there , or to grant technology transfer. "With this program
planned asphyxia, China is in a position to turn into a great power on the high-value segment
of high-tech industries ." 46
Chinese monopoly key artificially raising global prices and forcing companies to
move to China for production
Perry, 4/14 Bill, Perry was an attorney with the Office of General Counsel, U.S. International
Trade Commission ("ITC"), and Office of Chief Counsel and Office of Antidumping Investigations,
U.S. Department of Commerce., “US CHINA TRADE WAR DEVELOPMENTS–TRADE, IP, ANTITRUST
AND SECURITIES,” http://uschinatradewar.com/us-china-trade-war-developments-trade-ipantitrust-and-securities/
The Chinese export restraints challenged in this dispute include export duties and export quotas, as well as related export
quota administration requirements. These types of export restraints can skew the playing field against the United
States and other countries in the production and export of downstream products. They can
artificially increase world prices for these raw material inputs while artificially lowering prices for
Chinese producers. This enables China’s domestic downstream producers to produce lowerpriced products from the raw materials and thereby creates significant advantages for
China’s producers when competing against U.S. and other producers both in China’s market
and other countries’ markets. The export restraints can also create substantial pressure on
foreign downstream producers to move their operations, jobs and technologies to China.
Chinese monopoly of REEs is key to clean tech development
Reuters, 10 – (Reuters, “Analysis: Rare earth monopoly a boon to Chinese clean tech firms,”
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/12/us-china-rareearth-idUSTRE67B0BT20100812)
(Reuters) - In
the race to build hybrid cars and wind turbines to feed growing demand for green
technology, China has one clear advantage , it holds the world's largest reserves of rare earth
metals and dominates global production.¶ Wind turbines, made by No.2 wind turbine maker Xinjiang
Goldwind Science & Technology, and hybrid cars, being developed by Warren Buffet-backed Chinese
automaker BYD are among the biggest guzzlers of rare earth minerals, which analysts say are
facing a global supply crunch as demand swells .¶ This little-known class of 17 related elements is also used for
a vast array of electronic devices ranging from Apple's iPhone to flat screen TVs, all of which are competing for the 120,000 tons of
annual global supply.¶ China controls 97 percent of rare earth production.¶ "Rare earth for China is like oil to the Middle East," said
Yuanta Securities analyst Min Li.¶ Worldwide
demand for rare earth is expected to exceed supply by
some 30,000 to 50,000 tons by 2012 unless major new production sources are developed, say officials at Australian
rare earth mining company Arafura Resources.¶ China has curbed exports of the mineral since 2005 through quotas and
duties, saying it needs additional supplies to develop its domestic clean energy and high-tech sectors.
On Wednesday, it said it would cut export quotas in 2010 by 40 percent.¶ "Export restrictions may provide an advantage to Chinese
turbine makers, again because of the cost advantage," said CIMB analyst Keith Li.¶ He said Chinese
green companies
would have priority in securing supply of the metals over international peers and their
proximity to sources of the minerals ensures quicker and cheaper long-term supply.¶ China's
domestic consumption of the metals poses the biggest threat to global supply. The country, which
holds a third of the world's reserves, eats up to 60 percent of global rare earth supply for a wide range of applications from
consumer gadgets and medical equipment to defense weapons.¶ For related factbox click:¶ China's trading partners have grown
increasingly vocal about its move to cut its export quotas, but Beijing is determined to control the rare earth market. ¶ "Foreign
companies could be facing some material supply risks, unless they decide to move production to China," warned Yuanta's Min Li.¶
NO GUARANTEES¶ But while China may ensure its first-tier green companies are given access to the rare elements, analysts agree
this alone is unlikely to guarantee success for the Chinese clean tech firms.¶ New technologies free of rare earth elements could
emerge that may undermine China's advantage, while further cuts in rare earth quotas could trigger a political backlash which could
force the nation to keep supply open for its trading partners.¶ "Chinese technology needs to develop quickly enough to make full use
of that advantage," said CIMB's Li.¶ "That window closes if its existing technologies fail to evolve."¶ Still China will have the upper
hand in the global rare earth market for a while yet.¶ There are currently many new mine projects outside of China in the pipeline
but few will be able to compete with it on price unless governments offer production subsidies.¶ Low
prices for rare earth
metals from China have undermined production and led to closure of several mines overseas. Lax
environmental rules and cheap labor also allow China to sell rare earth metals at low prices.¶ Also, the development of new rare
earth mines could take as many as 10 years.¶ China's leading rare earth company, Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare Earth Hi-Tech
Co., is building 200,000 tonnes in rare earth oxide reserves, and state media reported that the company is joining forces with Jiangxi
Copper Corp to set unified prices for rare earth metals.¶ If
supply becomes extremely tight as experts suggest,
Chinese green companies may take upon themselves to secure the mineral by getting involved in the
actual process of making rare earth products, analysts said.¶ BYD is scouting for new sources of lithium, an important ingredient for
its high-performance batteries.
Chinese monopoly is necessary to maintain low cost
Morrison and Tang, 12 – (**Wayne, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance, AND **Rachael
Analyst in Asian Affairs, “China’s Rare Earth Industry and Export¶ Regime: Economic and Trade
Implications for¶ the United States,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42510.pdf)
In recent years, China
has been restructuring its domestic rare earth industry while putting more¶
restrictions on rare earth exports, which has greatly affected the price and quantity of rare earths¶
available in the global market. This has caused concern among businesses and foreign¶ governments about potential
business risks and geopolitical implications. Such concerns became¶ more acute when China reportedly suspended shipments of rare
earths to Japan, due to a months-¶ long diplomatic crisis with Japan in September of 2010
Its independently key to chinese economy and tech transfer for green industries
--- low costs are key
Morrison and Tang, 12 – (**Wayne, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance, AND **Rachael
Analyst in Asian Affairs, “China’s Rare Earth Industry and Export¶ Regime: Economic and Trade
Implications for¶ the United States,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42510.pdf)
To many observers, China’s
rare earth policies are part of a complex web of Chinese government¶
industrial policies that seek to promote the development of domestic industries deemed
essential ¶ to economic modernization . In the late 1980s, the United States was the global leader in rare earth¶
production. However, preferential policies by the Chinese government and lax environmental¶ standards
there quickly enabled China to become a dominant, low-cost producer of rare earths by¶ the late
1990s. Many analysts contend that China’s recent actions to consolidate its rare earth¶ production and
restrict exports are intended to promote the development of domestic downstream¶
industrie s, especially those engaged in high technology and green technology industries , by¶
ensuring their access to adequate and low-cost supplies of rare earths . It is further argued that¶
China’s rare earth export policies are intended to induce foreign rare earth users to move
their¶ operations to China, and subsequently, to transfer technology to Chinese firms. China
denies that¶ its rare earth policies are political, discriminatory, or protectionist, but rather, are intended to¶ address environmental
concerns in China and to better manage and conserve limited resources.
2NC Zero Sum / IL
China Clean Tech Leadership zero-sum- companies are shoring up
markets and dominance is key to securing them
Caperton et al, 11 (Richard W., Kate Gordon, Bracken Hendricks, Daniel J. Weiss, “Helping
America Win the Clean Energy Race,” Center for American Progress, February 7, 2011,
http://www.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2011/02/pdf/ces_brief.pdf, )
This is no way to build a modern industry. Already we
have seen cutting-edge solar power
manufacturing companies begin to close their doors, either permanently or to move
to other countries with strong and dedicated clean energy markets. Evergreen Solar
Inc., for example, recently announced plans to close its Massachusetts plant to put
more funds into solar panel manufacturing in China. Hie company followed on the heels of
SpectraWatt Inc. in New York and Solyndra Inc. in California closing some of their facilities. As General Electric Co.s chairman
and chief executive, Tefflmmelt, said at last year's ARPA-E summit, those
countries with strong demand for
renewable energy products will naturally pull these companies into their borders
because "innovation and supply chain strength gets developed where the demand is the
greatest." Similarly, wind manufacturers in Iowa, once a state leader in this industry, are laying off workers as new orders fail
to materialize. Leading
global financier Deutsche Bank decided to move billions of
investment dollars out of the U.S. clean energy market, and into China and Europe as soon
as it was clear there would be no comprehensive climate and energy legislation coming out of the 111th Congress. China
and our other economic competitors in Asia, Europe, and emerging markets are not
waiting for America to regroup. These stories share a common theme: investment dollars leaving the United
States to be deployed among our global competitors who have fully embraced the economic and environmental imperative to
enter a new era of cleaner, more sustainable and domestic energy. China
is the most striking example. In
2009, even as the United States was installing more wind turbines, China driven by
stable long-term demand for its products, became the world’s largest manufacturer
of wind power systems. It was already the world’s largest solar manufacturer and developer of efficient nuclear
and coal technologies. But China isn’t alone. Not by a long shot. Germany is not far behind in linking strong clean energy
policies to market growth and manufacturing leadership, as the leading global manufacturer of solar inverters—a key part of
solar power systems—and has made huge strides in energy storage solutions that will further accelerate the widespread
adoption of renewable power. Denmark, Japan, and the United Kingdom are also global clean energy leaders with thriving
domestic markets. All these countries
have comprehensive programs in place to spur robust
and stable demand for low-carbon energy, which then creates a market for
businesses to manufacture and install the technologies to meet that demand. Last June,
China announced its plan to meet a renewable energy standard of 20 percent by
2020, matching the European Union’s target. Germany has set a target of 60 percent by 2050. The country already gets 16
percent of all its power from renewables, well on its way to meeting this ambitious goal, and some think it may reach 100
percent by 2050. Denmark has gone a step further, actually announcing its intention to become 100 percent independent of
fossil fuels by 2050, something that at least one of its islands has already achieved. This occurred in a country that in 1970 was
almost completely dependent on foreign fossil fuels. These countries prove that strong clean energy standards build growing
economies. But even more than that, strong clean energy standards are now imperative if we are to compete on the same
playing field as China and Europe. America over the course of the 20th century took command of the Industrial Revolution and
the communications revolution, and then led the world into the Information Age. It is time for us to lead the clean-tech
revolution, too. Today, others are beating us to the punch, not because we lack the technology and innovation to lead this new
revolution, but because we are not providing the market signals needed for our private-sector entrepreneurs need to invest
over the long haul. This clean energy investment gap is rapidly becoming the greatest threat to America’s technology
leadership.
U.S. competition would stonewall Chinese foreign markets and cripple
innovation which kills aff solvency
Economy et al. 10 (Elizabeth, Micheal Levi, Shannon O’Neil, Adam Segal, “Globalizing the energy revolution:
how to really win the clean-energy race”, http://go.galegroup.com.turing.library.
northwestern.edu/ps/i.do?action=interpret&id=GALE%7CA246715577&v=2.1&u=northwestern&it=r&p=AON
E&sw=w&authCount=1)
The world faces a daunting array of energy challenges. Oil remains indispensable to the global economy, but it is increasingly
produced in places that present big commercial, environmental, and geopolitical risks; greenhouse gases continue to
accumulate in the atmosphere; and the odds that the world will face catastrophic climate change are increasing. These
problems will only worsen as global demand for energy rises. Environmental advocates and security hawks have been
demanding for decades that governments solve these problems by mandating or incentivizing much greater use of the many
alternative energy sources that already exist. The political reality, however, is that none of this will happen at the necessary
scale and pace unless deploying clean energy becomes less financially risky and less expensive than it currently is. This is
particularly true in the developing world. yyyyyyyyyyyyyA massive drive to develop cheaper clean-energy solutions is
necessary. Indeed, many claim that it has already begun--just not in the United States. They warn that the United States
is losing a generation-defining clean-energy race to China and the other big emerging economies. They
are right that the United States is dangerously neglecting clean-energy innovation. But an energy
agenda built on fears of a clean-energy race could quickly backfire. Technology advances most rapidly when
researchers, firms, and governments build on one another's successes. When clean-energy
investment is seen as a zero-sum game aimed primarily at boosting national
competitiveness, however, states often erect barriers. They pursue trade and industrial
policies that deter foreigners from participating in the clean-energy sectors of their economies,
rather than adopting approaches that accelerate cross-border cooperation. This slows down the very innovation
that they are trying to promote at home and simultaneously stifles innovation abroad. To be
sure, clean-energy innovation alone will not deliver the energy transformation the world needs. It can drive down the cost of
clean energy and narrow the price gap between clean and dirty sources, but it is unlikely to make clean energy consistently
cheaper than fossil fuels anytime soon. Government policies will still need to tip the balance, through regulations and
incentives that promote the adoption of alternatives to fossil fuels.
Possible alternatives for Rare Earth Metals make China’s Clean Tech
leadership uniquely vulnerable to U.S. competition
Yale Global 10 (11/15, YaleGlobal Online Magizine, “China’s Chokehold On Rare-Earth
Minerals Raises Concerns”, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinas-rare-earth-minerals)
However, Beijing may have overplayed its hand. China’s
moves have sent major consuming countries
scurrying to secure sources of supply outside China: building stockpiles, providing
incentives for domestic firms to mine and process rare earths, and finding alternative ways
of make high-tech products that reduce reliance on rare earths. The US Geological Survey says that
substitutes are available for many applications, but generally are less effective. Still, Japan announced earlier this
month that it had developed the first high-performance motor, free of rare earths, for petrolelectric hybrid vehicles. The House of Representatives in Washington recently approved legislation to support revival of the
once leading-edge rare-earths industry in the US, while the Energy Department says
it will release a plan
this autumn for developing more rare-earth metal supplies, in part by encouraging US trading partners to
hasten expansion of production. Yet China could keep its dominant grip on the rare-earths industry for some
years. It holds 35 percent of global reserves, but supplies over 95 percent of demand for rare-earth oxides, of which 60 percent
is domestic, according to Industrial Minerals Company of Australia, a consultancy. Just as important, Chinese
companies, many of them state-controlled, have advanced in their quest to make China the
world leader in processing rare-earth metals into finished materials. Success in this quest could
give China a decisive advantage not just in civilian industry, including clean energy, but also in military
production if Chinese manufacturers were given preferential treatment over foreign competitors. Cerium is the most abundant
of the 17 rare earths, all of which have similar chemical properties. A cerium based coating is non-corrosive and has significant
military applications. The Pentagon is due to finish a report soon on the risks of US military dependence on rare earths from
China. Their use is widespread in the defense systems of the US, its allies, and other countries that buy its weapons and
equipment. In a report to the US Congress in April, the Government Accountability Office said that it had been told by officials
and defense industry executives that where rare-earth alloys and other materials were used in military systems, they were
“responsible for the functionality of the component and would be difficult to replace without losing performance.” For
example, fin actuators in precision-guided bombs are specifically designed around the capabilities of neodymium iron boron
rare-earth magnets. The main US battle tank, the M1A2 Abrams, has a reference and navigation system that relies on
samarium cobalt magnets from China. An official report last year on the US national defense stockpile said that shortages of
four rare earths – lanthanum, cerium, europium and gadolinium – had already caused delays in producing some weapons. It
recommended further study to determine the severity of the delays. The
surge in Chinese rare-earth output
initially flooded the market, cutting prices and stimulating new applications. Now with China
seeking to capitalize on its advantage, the US and other advanced economies are trying to rush
alternative rare-earth mines into production to reduce reliance on China and improve
security of supply. While demand is forecast to increase by around two thirds over the next five years, the US Geological
Survey says that undiscovered resources are thought to be very large relative to expected demand. However, bringing new
mines into production will take several years. And although
the GAO report said that rare-earth deposits
in the US, Canada, Australia and South Africa could be mined by 2014, rebuilding the US
rare-earth supply chain might take up to 15 years. Meanwhile, China will hold sway and serve a cautionary
note on global interdependence and reliance of high technology.
2NC Brink
China has devoted their energy capacity to renewable technology,
restrictions to clean coal development have left their energy sector
vulnerable to U.S.
Hjalte 8 (Krister-Lund University School of Economics, “The Clean Tech Development Mechanism in China”,
http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1335711&fileOId=1646654)
China has promoted renewable energy as center of the focus. Yet insufficient attention has been
paid onto other sectors that would have greatly contributed to China's sustainable development benefits otherwise.
Chinese government has barred lending to steel and cement companies. This is to
postpone the unrestrained expansion of heavy industry. This is considered crude generalized industrial policy. Yet its
efficiency in blocking clean energy finance is considerable. Bankers are not
supporting energy efficiency projects as they expect too high transaction costs to workaround such investment control. Furthermore higher efficiency in industrial energy would
stem from shutting down old factories that are often characterized by poor management and outmoded
technology, and replacing them with new, modem and efficient ones. However, the idea is difficult to put into action. This is
because of high political barrier to closing them; most of them are owned and operated by local government (Chandler &Gwin
2008: 9).
The investments in coal energy sources have also been impeded. Due to the
restructuring of the State Power Corporation environmental goals have been set
aside and foreign investors are being redirected only when local partners tail to
keep up with the agreements within the power sector. Unclear definition of baseline, methodology
and justification of additionally has been a major barrier as well (Zeng 2006: 83; Ojner 2007: 46). Similarly, the growing sector
as transportation raises pressing emission problem. China is expecting more than 140 million cars on its roads by 2020, seven
times higher than now (Vennemo et al 2006: 255). However, the
sector is less financially attractive,
mainly due to high monitoring costs (Bueninterview). The wider coverage of strong market
mechanism support to lower transaction costs, as provided for renewable sectors,
may result in greater sustainable development to China.
International Competition means that China needs Clean Tech
Leadership to maintain stability
Pernick 7 (Ron, June, “The Clean Tech Revolution”,
http://web.mit.edu/cron/project/urban-sustainability/Old%20
files%20from%20summer%202009/Ingrid/Urban%20Sustainability%20Initiative.
Data/Clean%20Tech%20Revolution.pdf)
And it isn't just China that is embracing clean tech. Across the globe developing
nations in Asia, Africa, and South America view clean-energy sources such as wind,
solar, and biofuels not as niche novelties environmentalist-motivated "alternatives" but as a critical, urgent,
a growing piece of a diversified energy mix needed to fuel their rapid developing
economies and middle classes. With the hypercharged economies of China and India both
growing 5% to 9% annually, there's a palpable feeling of wanting to deploy and use
any energy source they can % their hands on. There's less of a perceived conflict between establish'
energy sources and newer, cleaner options. Wind, solar, small hydroelectric, biogas, biofuels—we need all of those, these
nations seem to say as much as possible, as soon as possible, and above all, as
cheaply as possible. This adds up to unprecedented opportunity for clean-tech manufacturers and investors in
meeting the power and water needs of billions people. The profit opportunity to serve the emerging
markets in China and countless other nations is expanding for both large corporations are
emerging start-ups. That's why today the world’s leading wind, solar, and other
clean-tech providers are already moving into the Chinese mark via joint ventures
with local companies and other avenues. Tapping these markets won't be easy, but the growing, energy-
hungry middle classes of developing nations require massive new water energy infrastructure projects, be they wind farms off
the Indian corn ethanol plants in China, or desalination facilities in Algeria. And nr communities, which still represent nearly
50% of the global population, are in desperate need of finding creative ways to meet the resource needs of their residents. In
India, some 56% of the population's 700 million rural residents lack reliable access to electric power. The nation wants deliver
electricity to all of them by 2020—5O% of it from renewal sources including wind, solar, and biofuels.
2NC Impact
Chinese growth fueled by clean tech is key to global sustainability
Wu, 12 Changhua Greater China Director, The Climate Group, July 2012, “CONSENSUS AND
COOPERATION FOR A CLEAN REVOLUTION,”
http://thecleanrevolution.org/_assets/files/TCG_ChinaCC_web.pdf
This transformation, together with growth of other emerging economies, is reshaping the world. Along with
the likes of India and Brazil, China’s growing economic power has a direct impact on a range of global
sustainability issues , from climate change and resource use, to international trade and
responsible business investment. With the world’s second largest economy and the largest population, China’s
actions now have global repercussions – for good or bad.¶ Policy and decision makers in China understand this. This is
why, after three decades of rapid economic growth, China has started to restructure its economy and transform
the way it grows. This means working to decouple energy and resource use from economic growth and
reduce
greenhouse gas
emissions . But this is not being done simply for altruistic reasons. The biggest driver for
change is
energy and resource security , along with the recognition that global climate change, if left unchecked, has
the potential to undermine much of what China has achieved.¶ Over the next five to ten years, China
intends to make
green development the engine room of its economy . By doing so, China’s aim is not only to address its energy
and resource concerns, but also to
develop and lead the clean industries that will be at the heart of
low carbon 21st century economies. And as policies and measures laid out in last year’s 12th Five Year Plan
demonstrate, China’s plans are more than just rhetoric.¶ But success is by no means guaranteed.
In
the absence of a proven road map or uniform template for green economic growth, a learning-by-doing approach is necessary.
Because this means mistakes may be made, China
is seeking greater consensus and cooperation in finding
systemic solutions to the sustainability problems it shares with the rest of the world. These
solutions will require that issues of equity and inclusiveness are addressed. They will also depend on the willingness of all
parties to move away from fixed positions, as well as display greater reciprocity.
China’s renewable dominance is key to combating climate change,
reducing pollution, increasing food and water security, and eliminating
oil dependency
Lo 13 (Kevin, June 3rd, “A critical review of China’s rapidly developing renewable energy and energy
efficiency policies, http://ac.els-cdn.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/S1364032113006655/1s2.0-S1364032113006655 -main.pdf?_tid=61bc6f90-0619-11e4-91d100000aab0f6c&acdnat=1404766861_72a7dae949cc9b2e2c6a0d9bf789d119)
Renewable energy and energy efficiency (REEE) policies relate to five significant
issues in China. First among these is energy security, defined as "unimpeded access or no planned
interruptions to sources of energy" China's sustained economic development over the past three decades has accompanied a
rapid rise in energy demand, which, at times, has contributed to widespread electricity shortages [2]. China's
increasing dependence on oil imports is also a concern. China has changed from an oil exporting
country in the early 1990s to one of the largest oil importing countries in the world, with an oil import dependency rate of
more than 50% [3j. Oil
imports are perceived as susceptible to interruption because most
oil imported to China must pass through the Malacca Strait, a chokepoint wedged
between Indonesia and Malaysia that is vulnerable
to maritime blockage |4|. Climate change is
the second issue affecting China's commitment to REEE policies. Despite its status as a
developing country and its historically low emissions, China faces international pressure to control its
carbon emissions, which has intensified since China surpassed the United States as
the world's largest carbon polluter [5]. Domestic concerns about the impact of climate change also contribute
to the urgency of climate mitigation [6]. Third, REEE policies affect economic competitiveness. The manufacturing
of renewable energy products (e.g., wind turbines and photovoltaic cells) has been designated as a pillar
industry by the government which hopes that China will become a global leader and exporter of
green technologies |7,8j. Therefore, REEE policies can be understood as both economic and environmental policies.
Pollution is the fourth issue. The burning of fossil fuels is associated with air, water,
and soil pollution, which have serious implications for health, water security, and
food security. Finally, human livelihood is the fifth issue affecting China's adoption of REEE policies. Despite rapid
development, many Chinese rural households still depend heavily on traditional biomass energy for heating and cooking [9).
Renewable energy,
such as photovoltaic and solar water heating, can significantly improve the
livelihood of people from underdeveloped areas in China. Due to the salience of these issues, the Chinese
government has expended considerable effort to develop and implement REEE
policies, manifested in an array of major policy initiatives since 2005. However, as this critical review demonstrates,
China's REEE policies are still far from comprehensive, and significant room for improvement exists. Chinese REEE
policies are differ from those of the United States, where the federal government has
been slow to act and instead relies on state-level policy experiments (10), and Europe,
where a supranational body (the European Union) plays a significant role in REEE policy- making [ 111. In China, the
central government is the key policymaking body [12], and central-level policies are therefore the
focus of this study. REEE policies span a wide spectrum and are very diverse. For example, policies designed
to improve industrial energy efficiency differ significantly from policies aiming at
improving energy efficiency in buildings or promoting the deployment of renewable
energy. To ensure comprehensive coverage, this critical review is organized into five parts: electricity, industry, transport
buildings, and local government.
Rare Earth Metals and Clean Tech Leadership key to Stable Chinese
Economy
Seaman 10 (John, “Rare Earths and Clean Tech Analyzing China’s Upper Hand”,
IFRI)
The rare earth industry is now a cornerstone in a wider restructuring of the Chinese
economy bent on increasing domestic wealth and consumption. After all, China's emergence as the world's dominant rare
earth producer did not happen by accident. Its leaders recognized early on that its wealth of mineable deposits constituted a
strategic advantage. As production ramped up, Deng Xiaoping, China's leader and Communist Party Chairman famously made
the revealing correlation in 1992 that "there is oil in the Middle East; there is rare earth in China." But Chinese
leaders
also recognized that the resource advantage could be translated into a boon for
economic development and the competitiveness of Chinese industries. In 1999, Jiang Zemin,
Chinas President and Dengs successor, would explain the logic: Improve the development and application
of rare earth and change the resource advantage into economic superiority."42 Today,
global REO production is worth an estimated $1.3 billion, but the industries that rely on these elements are
reportedly worth over $4.8 trillion.43 Downstream industries hold the majority of
the jobs and wealth. China is hoping to use its resource advantage and the growth in projected
demand of rare earth applications not simply to sell more raw materials, but to develop the country's
production capacity of the high tech applications themselves. Profits from this
higher-earning production would then benefit Chinese companies and create more,
higher earning jobs at home. At a time when upward pressure is being put on wages in China and masses of
young, unemployed graduates are scouring the job market in search of skilled work, growth spurred on by a
well-planned management of rare earth resources could help to ease social tension.
As Dudley Kingsnorth explained for the South China Morning Post, "China dominates the rare earth supply and only employs,
for argument's sake, hundreds
of workers to get it out of the ground. To refine it further,
they employ thousands more workers. But to get the real value added and produce the end
products - the phones, cars and hard disks - then China can employ millions. And China will need to supply
300 million [extra] jobs by 2020."44 This also plays into a broader economic strategy designed to rebalance China's economy.
For decades China has been dependent on export-driven growth. Western leaders have long decried trade imbalances and
Chinese policies that favor exports at the expense of its internal consumption. In the aftermath of the global economic crisis,
the need to rectify global imbalances is all the more evident, and China
is now determined to spur
consumption at home.45 A key to generating this consumption is to increase domestic
wealth, and one important element in creating this wealth is capturing value- added steps in the production ladder. This
affects rare earths in two ways. First, curbing the export of REO promotes the development of higher value-added levels of
rare earth-related production in China. Rather than simply being content with selling oxides and refined rare earth metals,
restricting exports of these products supports the development of local manufacturers of rare earth applications and
industries further downstream. After all, why be content with selling REO when you can eventually sell the electric cars and
wind turbines that depend on them? Secondly,
mastering value-added production of rare earthrelated technologies in China also requires foreign expertise and technology. As
mentioned above, restricting REO export quotas is meant in part to encourage foreign
manufacturers of rare earth-dependant technologies to move to China, bringing with them highly
specialized knowledge and innovation that could give Chinese companies an advantage over the purely
foreign competition.
China rise is Good- Economic contraction causes global depression, Taiwanese
invasion, and democratic backsliding
Lewis 7 [Dan, 4-19, World Finance, “The Nightmare of a Chinese Economic Collapse,”
http://www.worldfinance.com/news/137/ARTICLE/1144/2007-04-19.html]
According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the City’s most accurate and respected economists in recent years, potentially
far more serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on
many Western nations such as the UK. Quite simply, China’s undervalued currency has
enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong currencies, reduce
inflation and keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried
about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation of the Chinese yen. Should that revaluation
happen to appease China’s rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, sterling and
the euro would quickly
depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield
on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget
deficits in the USA, the UK and much of Euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a
decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to
keep China’s society
stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating
unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and
unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is
when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t
end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist
authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic
tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic
stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become
successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way
of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very
worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by
going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend. Today, people are looking at
Chang’s book again. Contrary to popular belief, foreign investment has actually deferred political reform in the world’s oldest
nation. China
today is now far further from democracy than at any time since the
Tianneman Square massacres in 1989. Chang’s pessimistic forecast for China was probably wrong. But my
fear is there is at least a chance he was just early.
2NC World Tech Impact
China accesses a better i/l to clean tech leadership their innovation
methods and R&D are critical to global development
Tan 2010 (Xiomci, Energy Policy 38, “Clean Technology R&D and innovation in emerging
countries- Experience from China”,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421510000315)
failure to acquire wind energy technology has motivated the Chinese
government to back domestic turbine producers' R&D and innovation. Through the 863
and 973 Programs (2005, 2008), the central government has provided a significant amount of research
funding to domestic turbine manufacturers. China's top five wind turbine
manufacturers all have a large R&D center. They play a key role in the acquisition, localization, diffusion
The joint-ventures'
and re-innovation of wind energy technology in China. For instance, Xinjiang Coldwind Science & Technology Company
(Coldwind), the largest turbine manufacturer in China, started its R&D operation by undertaking the National Key Science and
Technology Project in the 9th Five-Year Plan to develop 600 kW wind power generating sets in 1998. One year later, Coldwind
successfully developed China's first 600 kW wind power generating set, with a localization rate of 90%. During the 10th FiveYear Plan period, Coldwind was granted three National Science and Technology Projects, one of which was to develop 1.2 MW
direct-driven permanent magnet wind turbine. Four years later the first two 1.2 MW magnet turbines were erected. Their
localization rate, again, reached 90%. So far Coldwind has acquired independent R&D capacity and proprietary IPR for 1.5 MW
and is currently testing its 3 MW model. And the design and development of 5 MW wind turbine is in the conceptual design
stage. This
paper has examined an array of complementary policy measures that China
utilizes to spur domestic R&D and innovation in clean technology. These measures include
designing a national level-S&T strategy prioritizing clean energy; establishing direct
funding programs to support clean energy R&D; incentivizing the private sector to
undertake a leading role in R&D and innovation; and capitalizing on public-private synergies to bring
together multi-sector expertise. In addition to direct R&D funding assistance from the central
government, Coldwind has also received much support from the government of Xinjiang Autonomous Region. The local
government designated a high-tech development zone for Coldwind and also provided matching R&D funds to some of the 863
and 973 grants. In terms of favorable policy, Coldwind enjoys an up to 15% income tax deduction for the year 2001-2010. This
benefit is supported by two regulations promulgated by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC): the
Catalog for the Guidance of Industrial Structure Adjustment (2005) and the Circular on Preferential Tax Policy Issues for
Developing the Western Region (2001). The paper did not seek to provide a critique of these measures. Rather, it
described the totality of China's clean technology development efforts as an example
of the approaches that can be taken in crafting effective, country-specific clean
technology policy and development. For developing countries, the bulk of technological
progress comes from the adoption and adaptation of pre-existing but new- to-market
technologies, and through the spread of technologies across firms, individuals, and the public sector within a country
(World Bank, 2008). In the decades ahead, most of the growth in global energy demand—90% by
2030—will come from emerging countries. If greenhouse gas emissions are to be
constrained, and a low carbon economy achieved, large-scale clean technology deployment is
therefore especially vital for the developing world. Also critical is crafting an
innovation model that caters to particular conditions and needs of developing countries. China's
comprehensive efforts laying the groundwork both to achieve a domestic clean
energy economy, and to assist other developing countries to do so, indicate its
commitment to becoming a global leader in the clean technology revolution. The China
experience also provides policy approaches and funding and partnership models from which other emerging and developing
countries can learn.
China’s Clean Tech dominance is key to global stability and solve the aff
through tech diffusion
Wu 12 (Changhua, The Climate Group, “Consensus and Cooperation For a Clean
Revolution”, http://thecleanrevolution.org/_assets/files/TCG_ChinaCC_web.pdf)
This transformation, together with growth of other emerging economies, is reshaping the world. Along with the likes of India
and Brazil, China's
growing economic power has a direct impact on a range of global
sustainability issues, from climate change and resource use, to international trade
and responsible business investment. With the world's second largest economy and the largest population, China's actions
now have global repercussions-for good or bad. Policy and decision makers in China understand this. This is why, after three
decades of rapid economic growth, China
has started to restructure its economy and transform
the way it grows. This means working to decouple energy and resource use from economic growth and reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. But this is not being done simply for altruistic reasons. The biggest driver for change
is energy and resource security, along with the recognition that global climate change, if left unchecked, has the
potential to undermine much of what China has achieved. Over the next five to ten years, China intends to make
green development the engine room of its economy. By doing so, China's aim is not only
to address its energy and resource concerns, but also to develop and lead the clean
industries that will be at the heart of low carbon 21st century economies. And as policies and measures laid out in last
year's 12th Five Year Plan demonstrate, China's plans are more than just rhetoric. But success is by no means guaranteed. In
the absence of a proven road map or uniform template forgreen economic growth, a learning-by-doing approach is necessary.
Because this means mistakes may be made, China
is seeking greater consensus and cooperation in
finding systemic solutions to the sustainability problems it shares with the rest of the world. These
solutions will require that issues of equity and inclusiveness are addressed. They will
also depend on the willingness of all parties to move away from fixed positions, as well as display greater reciprocity. China
today is embarking on a new period of economic, social and environmental
transformation. This change is likely to be as profound -and probably even more so- than the extraordinary two
decades it has just witnessed. This clean revolution will be a journey measured in decades, not years. It will
require China to constantly learn, experiment and explore. But like many of China's other
endeavors, success in achieving a green development pathway will help reshape the world.
***Politics
1NC Politics
Plan unpopular—empirics
Doggett 10 (Tom Doggett is an economist of Reuters, 9/30/14, "U.S. aims to end China's rare earth metals
monopoly”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/30/us-earth-metals-rare-idUSTRE68T68T20100930)
Legislation has been introduced in both the Senate and House of Representatives to increase
investment and production of the rare metals in the United States, including providing extraction companies with
federal loan guarantees. However, the legislation is not expected to clear the Congress this
year.
2NC Politics
Environmentalists hate the plan
Cox 13 (Ramsey Cox is a bill analyst for the Hill, July 3rd, 2013, “House bill aims to ‘streamline’ permits for mining
rare earth elements”, The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/309177-house-bill-aims-to-streamlinepermits-for-mining-rare-earth#ixzz375uEe916
Decade-long permitting delays are standing in the way of high-paying jobs and revenue for local communities,” Amodei said. “This
bill would streamline the permitting process to leverage our nation's vast mineral resources, while paying due respect to economic
and environmental concerns.” In
May, the House Natural Resources Committee marked up the bill and
voted to advance it on a 24-17 vote. Only one Democrat on the committee supported the bill
— Rep. Jim Costa (D-Calif.). Some
Democrats have argued that streamlining mining permits could be
harmful to the environment and should be thoroughly reviewed before mining is allowed. The
bill would require the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to work with state and local governments to expedite
the permitting process in order to keep the United States competitive with other mining countries, such as China and India.
Plan is unpopular
Topf 13 (Andrew Topf is a exclusive writer for Rare Earth Investing News, 9/23/14, “House Passes Critical Minerals Act”, Rare Earth investing News,
http://rareearthinvestingnews.com/16395-house-passes-critical-minerals-act.html)
Opponents voted against the bill because they said it would erode environmental protections
and because it includes a broad definition of “strategic minerals,” The House reported. “The bill’s
classification of critical minerals is so broad that even sand and gravel and other such things
can fall under its definition,” said Rep. Rush Holt (D-N.J.). Attempts by House Democrats to
narrow the definition of strategic minerals were unsuccessful. Not surprisingly, the bill was applauded by
the US mining industry. “Without compromising our rigorous environmental standards, this bi-partisan legislation carefully
addresses the inefficiencies of our underperforming system by incorporating best practices for improving coordination among state
and federal agencies, clarifying responsibilities, avoiding duplication, setting timeframes and bringing more accountability to the
process,” National Mining Association CEO Hal Quinn said in a statement. However,
while the bill has the blessings
of House Republicans and industry, it is unlikely to gain the support of a majority of
lawmakers in the Democrat-controlled Senate. A similar version of the legislation died in the
the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources in 2012, Mineweb reported.
***Environment DA
1NC Environment DA
Mining disrupts the ocean floor---that’s critical to food security and ocean
biodiversity
Goldenberg, 14 Suzanne, US environment correspondent, “Marine mining: Underwater gold
rush sparks fears of ocean catastrophe,”
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/02/underwater-gold-rush-marinemining-fears-ocean-threat
The problem is much remains unknown – not just about what exists on the ocean floor but
how ocean systems operate to keep the planet habitable. The ocean floor was once thought to be a
marine desert, but oceanographers say the sediment is rich in marine life , with thousands of species of
invertebrates at a single site.¶ "It's tampering with ecosystems we hardly understand that
are really at the frontier of our knowledge base," said Greg Stone, vice-president for Conservation International.
"We are starting mining extracting operations in a place where we don't fully understand how it works yet. So that is our
concern – disturbing the deep sea habitat ."¶ Most of the models rely on being able to produce 1
million tonnes of ore a year. Stone said the seabed authority was putting systems in place to
protect the ocean floor , but other scientists said there still remained enormous risks to the
sediment and the creatures that live there.¶ " It is going to damage vast areas of the sea floor ,"
said Craig Smith, an oceanographer at the University of Hawaii who served as an adviser to
the International Seabed Authority. "I just don't see any way [in] mining one of these claims
that whole areas won't be heavily damaged."¶ Earle expressed fears about how mining
companies will deal with waste in the high seas. "Mining is possible," she said. "But the 20,000ft question is
what do you do with the tailings? All of the proposals involved dumping the tailings at sea
with profound impacts on the water column and the sea floor below. The Seabed Authority initially
proposed to set aside 1.6m sq km of the ocean floor as protected areas, or about 20% of its territory. But those reserves are under
review. As economic pressures rise, there are fears that commercial operations would begin to erode those protected areas.¶ "I
think it is certain that within a year or two there will be more claims covering these areas and there won't be enough room left to
develop these scientifically defensible protected areas," Smith said.¶ Some have argued that with all the unknowns
there
should be no mining at all – and that the high seas should remain out of bounds for mineral
extraction and for shipping.¶ José María Figueres, a former president of Costa Rica and co-chair with the former British
foreign secretary, David Miliband, of the Global Ocean Commission, an independent entity charged with developing ideas for ocean
reform, suggested leaving
all of the high seas as a no-go area for commercial exploitation (apart from
we understand enough
about the interconnection between the seabed, the column of water, the 50% of the oxygen that the
ocean produces for the world, the 25% of the carbon that it fixes in order to go in and disrupt the seabed in
way that we would if we went in and started mining? I don't think so, not until we have scientific backing to
determine whether this is something good or bad for the planet."¶ World leaders are now mobilising to address
concerns, not just about seabed mining, but about how to safeguard ocean systems which are increasingly
recognised as critical to global food security and a healthy planet.¶ US secretary of state John Kerry, in
a video address delivered to a high-level ocean summit hosted by the Economist and National Geographic last
week, invited leaders to a two-day summit in Washington that will seek ways of protecting fishing stocks from
overexploitation and protecting the ocean from industrial pollution , plastic debris and the
shipping).¶ "Do we know enough about the seabed to go ahead and mine it?" said Figueres. "Do
ravages of climate change.¶
The stakes have never been higher, scientists said.
The oceans are becoming
increasingly important to global food security . Each year more than a million commercial fishing vessels extract
more than 80m metric tonnes of fish and seafood from the ocean. Up to three billion people rely on the sea for a large share of their
protein, especially in the developing world.¶ Those demands are only projected to grow. "If you
look at where food
security has to go between now and 2030 we have to start looking at the ocean . We have to start
looking at the proteins coming from the sea," said Valerie Hickey, an environmental scientist at the World Bank.¶ That makes it all
the more crucial to crack down on illegal and unregulated fishing, which is sabotaging efforts to build sustainable seafood industries.
Two-thirds of the fish taken on the high seas are from stocks that are already dangerous depleted – far more so than in those parts
of the ocean that lie within 200 miles of the shore and are under direct national control.¶ Estimates of the unreported and illegal
catch on the high seas range between $10bn and $24bn a year, overwhelming government efforts to track or apprehend the illegal
fishing boats. The illegal fishing also hurts responsible fishing crews.
Food insecurity triggers wars
Trudell 5 (Robert H., Fall, Food Security Emergencies And The Power Of Eminent Domain: A Domestic
Legal Tool To Treat A Global Problem, 33 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 277, Lexis)
2. But, Is It Really an Emergency? In his study on environmental change and security, J.R. McNeill dismisses the scenario where
environmental degradation destabilizes an area so much that "security problems and ... resource scarcity may lead to war." 101
McNeill finds such a proposition to be a weak one, largely because history has shown society is always able to stay ahead of
widespread calamity due, in part, to the slow pace of any major environmental change. 102 This may be so. However, as the events
in Rwanda illustrated, the environment can breakdown quite rapidly - almost before one's eyes - when food
insecurity drives people to overextend their cropland and to use outmoded agricultural practices. 103
Furthermore, as Andre and Platteau documented in their study of Rwandan society, overpopulation and land
scarcity can contribute to a breakdown of society itself. 104 Mr. McNeill's assertion closely resembles those of many
critics of Malthus. 105 The general argument is: whatever issue we face (e.g., environmental change or overpopulation), it will be
introduced at such a pace that we can face the problem long before any calamity sets in. 106 This wait-and-see view relies on many
factors, not least of which are a functioning society and innovations in agricultural productivity. But, today, with up to 300,000 child
soldiers fighting in conflicts or wars, and perpetrating terrorist acts, the very fabric of society is under increasing
world-wide pressure. 107 Genocide, anarchy, dictatorships, and war are endemic throughout Africa; it is a
troubled continent whose problems threaten global security and challenge all of humanity. 108 As [*292] Juan
Somavia, secretary general of the World Social Summit, said: "We've replaced the threat of the nuclear bomb with
the threat of a social bomb." 109 Food insecurity is part of the fuse burning to set that bomb off. It is an
emergency and we must put that fuse out before it is too late.
Mining destroys the biod---that causes extinction
Goldenberg, 14 Suzanne, US environment correspondent, “Marine mining: Underwater gold
rush sparks fears of ocean catastrophe,”
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/02/underwater-gold-rush-marinemining-fears-ocean-threat
But with rising demand from China and India for rare earth metals like copper, and deep-sea surveys
having now found concentrations of minerals four to five times those on land, it has returned but this
time in the ‘unregulated’ territorial waters of PNG, conveniently close to the Asian markets. ¶ Ecologists say the PNG government is
allowing Nautilus to go ahead with the first ever commercial deep-sea mining project without properly considering the
environmental impacts or local opposition. Nautilus investors include the mining giant Anglo-American which is ignoring indigenous
opposition to a gold and copper mine in Alaska.¶ ‘Cradle of life on earth’¶ As
well as being metal-rich, the
volcanogenic hydrothermal deposits which Nautilus plans to mine are home to a unique ecosystem
that is still largely unknown to scientists since being discovered in the late 1970s. Initially, the deep sea
was thought to be full of soft sediment and little else but the discovery of hydrothermal vents
on the seabed, which produce the deposits, revealed a completely novel ecosystem , unreliant
on photosynthesis.¶ ‘It’s the cradle of life on earth ,’ explains Dr Rod Fujita from the Environmental Defense
Fund and author of studies looking into deep-sea mining, ‘and the only one that does not depend on sunlight. There are
species there that are found nowhere else on earth . It’s not like any land habitats we are used to; in fact you
have to have your perspective altered to appreciate this deep-sea world,’ he says.¶ The
mining process in PNG will take
the top 20-30m off the seabed at a depth of 1,500m and lift it up to the surface before transferring it by barge
to processing sites on land. ‘ You will destroy fauna just by lifting the land,’ says deep-sea ecologist Professor
Paul Tyler, from the National Oceanography Centre at Southampton University. ‘It is possible you might mine at a distance [from the
hydrothermal vents] but by mining
close by you will affect the flow and the vents might switch off and
then all the animals die – you lose a huge biomass .’¶ 'Flimsy' environmental report ¶ Nautilus has
attempted to fend off these criticisms by publishing an environment assessment, co-produced by a respected deep-sea biologist Dr
Cindy Van
Dover. In it they admit the impact to vents and seafloor habitats will ‘inevitably be
severe at the site scale’ and that they will take ‘ many years’ to recover. ¶ However, other ecologists
say the assessment is ‘flimsy’ and fails to give a full account of the potential damage mining will cause.¶ Professor Richard Steiner,
from the University of Alaska cites the incompleteness of classification of species found at the sites and an inadequate assessment of
the risks associated with sediment and waste rock disposal. He also cites the
effects of increased light and noise in
the deep ocean environment and the toxicity of the dewatering plume [the process of removing water
from the mined deposits] to deep-sea organisms, which will not be able to differentiate between food and junk sediment.¶
Of particular concern are the hundreds of thousands of tonnes of waste that will be produced by the
mining process, which Steiner compares to that of a ‘ giant underwater tractor’ and which will be
pumped onto deeper seabeds nearby. Dr Fujita said the physics of water as well as weather
and currents made it difficult to predict or contain any spill and that deep-sea mining had the
capacity to produce pollution that could travel across into international waters.¶ A smoking
hydrothermal vent on the ocean seabed¶ Exploitation or financial gain?¶ ‘I don’t think the project would be allowed to proceed
anywhere else in the world based on such a poor analysis of risks,’ says Steiner. The USA is known to have similar deposits off the
coast of Washington as has Canada but mining is not thought to be imminent. Dr Fujita suggests Nautilus is just the latest overseas
mining giant to take advantage of lax regulations in the country. ‘In PNG they have a poor record of mining on land resulting in lots
of poor conditions and that bad record and lack of oversight is now moving from land to sea,’ he says.¶ Only this week the PNG
government was accused by Greenpeace of allowing rampant logging and failing to respect the rights of indigenous groups who
depend on the forests.¶ Nautilus has reportedly suggested the country would benefit by more than $200 million from the mining but
Steiner says the benefits to local people or the economy of PNG were likely to be disproportionately low compared to the scale and
risk of the project. ‘While the project could gross almost $1 billion USD in its 30-month lifetime, it expects to provide only $41 million
in total taxes and royalties to the government, a $1.5 million development fund and a few dozen jobs at most to PNG nationals,’ he
said.¶ Prof Steiner is also acting as a science advisor to Mas Kagin, a group formed in 2008 to give a voice to coastal indigenous
people in PNG oppose any commercial mining. The group says it depends on the coastal waters for their ‘livelihood, culture and way
of life’ and has a right to oppose the seabed mining. In a campaign video community groups from two provinces expressed their
fears.¶ ‘When we first heard that Nautilus was going to mine the seabed using technology that had never been used anywhere else it
felt as though we were becoming a science lab…and our very lives part of an experiment to test this new technology,’ it says.¶
Nautilus conducted workshops with local villages to explain its proposals but rejected calls to set up a permanent citizens advisory
council. The company also declined to respond to concerns raised in this article but has previously said it took great pride in ‘leading
Opening the floodgates¶ It has estimated several billions tons of
copper could be extracted from seafloor sites around the world. Dr Tyler acknowledges that the deep-sea has ‘not
even had its surface scratched with what it might contribute to the economy’ but fears PNG’s decision to approve Nautilus mining
plans will ‘ open the floodgates’ before proper assessments have been made of the impact. China
is known to be seeking to mine similar deposits in the South-West Indian Ocean.¶ ‘Deep-sea fishing is a good example.
We can ring alarm bells but there is no regulation of it. If I had my way the whole area of
deep-sea would become a protected area and people who want to exploit it would have to
apply to a body who can ensure that they were doing a proper environmental analysis before
they were allowed to exploit it. At the moment there is no requirement at all and we end up looking at
the damage done,’ he says.¶ Steiner agrees and says there is too much wrong with the PNG project: ‘the way this first deepsea mine proceeds will set the tone for all others, and this is a very, very bad start’ . He argues investment in
reusing copper and gold made more sense than continuing to pay mining companies to take bigger risks in
an effort to dig up more.
the mining industry into the deep ocean’. ¶
1NC Midterms
Plan popular— boosts economy and supplies
Kilzer 11 (Lou Kilzer, 1/30/2011, Trib Live, “U.S. control of 'rare earth' minerals slipping”,
http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/nation-world/s_720470.html#axzz376Xqz8zU)’
Those minerals, called "rare earths," shape a modern nation's defense and economy. Your
iPhone and hybrid car won't work without them, nor will your laptop computer. The Pentagon
needs them for its precision-guided "smart" bombs. China has locked up the supply —
stripping the United States of its dominance. U.S. lawmakers in both parties blame China's
"mercantilist" policies — state interference in international trade. Yet, the United States and other nations
also were caught napping, according to members of Congress, lobbyists and industry experts .
Consider: • China produces 97 percent of the rare earths used in high-tech items such as fiber optics, flat-panel monitors and
televisions, and electricity-generating wind turbines. • Through export policies and tariffs, China forces foreign companies to
manufacture there in order to remain competitive. And where manufacturing goes, research and development often follow. • China
dominates more than rare earths. It leads the United States (or even the rest of the world combined) in key elements such as
germanium, indium, antimony, zinc, manganese, tungsten, magnesium, cadmium, pig iron, graphite and fluorspar. Those materials,
used to make alloys, feed China's surging steel industry. A decade ago, China and the United States produced roughly equal amounts
of steel; in 2010, the United States produced about 90 million metric tons — to China's 630 million. • China is acquiring even more
foreign resources. While most of the world fell into recession in 2008, China went on a spending spree: It bought all or part of 184
foreign mining assets for $37.2 billion, according to the U.S. accounting firm Ernst & Young. Recently, Shanghai Securities News
reported that China may create a strategic stockpile of rare earths, tungsten, antimony, molybdenum, tin, indium, germanium,
gallium, tantalum and zirconium. In contrast, the United States began selling its reserves in the 1990s. China has positioned itself to
surpass the United States in purchasing-power parity — a closely watched measure of an economy's real size — next year, according
to the Conference Board, a nonprofit international business association. 'Free market isn't working' The situation leads some
analysts to stark conclusions. "The free market isn't working right now," says Rep. Mike Coffman, R-Colo., who intends to sponsor
legislation to re-stockpile strategic materials. China, he says, "had the foresight to say, 'We
want to be a manufacturing
country. There are critical components to that in terms of raw materials, and we're going to
make sure that we have unfettered access to those supplies.' "And now it's (their) goal as a country not to
export those raw materials. It is to export finished products." John Pike, a defense expert and director of GlobalSecurity.org, a
Virginia-based website analyzing military and intelligence matters, says "we cannot pretend there's a free market when there's not."
Ronald Ashburn, executive director of the Association for Iron & Steel Technology, a Warrendale-based nonprofit promoting
industrial research, says China controls "huge aspects of the world capacity for many materials."
Congressional staffers, speaking on background, agree. "China is going to produce, whether they are making a profit or not," says a
Democratic staffer who has studied the issue for years. Its mining companies "are willing to get hammered" financially in order to
gain control over markets. A
Senate Republican staffer says the federal government has backed
American firms, but "people didn't like it. But they do like jobs — and mining jobs are good
jobs." Three bills countering China's rare-earths policies were introduced in the last Congress by
Coffman, Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, and Rep. Kathleen Dahlkemper, D-Erie, who lost re-election in November. Each bill involved
some degree of government intervention. None won approval. Dahlkemper's bill emerged at a sensitive moment — during China's
brief rare-earths embargo on Japan in September. A spooked House passed it, 325-98, but the bill lost momentum as the midterm
election neared and China relented. Like Coffman, Murkowski plans to try again. Many Republicans, however, caution against going
too far, too fast. In a statement, 10 GOP congressmen on the committee that sent Dahlkemper's bill to a House vote said federal
loans "should be restricted to those areas not undertaken by the private sector," to avoid "favoring certain companies ... and
potentially crowding out further private-sector investment." Congressional
trimming regulations to spur rare-earth mining.
Republicans generally favor
2NC BioD Link
Seabed mining kills animals and their natural habitats
Allsopp et al 13 –Michelle, researcher at Greenpeace (“Review of the Current State of
Development and the Potential for Environmental Impacts of Seabed Mining Operations,”
Greenpeace Research Laboratory, http://www.greenpeace.to/greenpeace/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/seabed-mining-tech-review-2013.pdf) patel
There are many environmental concerns regarding these projects and other prospective deep
sea mining activities – these are identified and discussed in this report. The habitats targeted
and the probable impacts from mining may be summarised as follows: Hydrothermal vents host
a unique community structures with many species of animals being exclusively native to these
habitats. Mining would remove thousands of vent chimneys completely, flattening the seabed.
Resident animals would be killed. As part of its developments in Papua New Guinea, Nautilus
plans to try and transfer animals to other sites but this is scientificallyuntested and could also
disturb other ecosystems. It is unknown whether habitats would recover or if animals would
return if vent chimneys reformed. Seamounts studied to date show there is an abundance of
life associated with these structures, including corals and sponges and huge aggregations of
fish. Seamounts have been described as underwater oases and they appear to be important
habitats for migrating species. Mining in the vicinity of these structures will destroy corals and
sponges which grow on the seamounts and recent studies indicate that recovery times would
be in decades to centuries. Manganese Nodules extraction would remove some of the only
hard substrate on the abyssal deep sea floor resulting in habitat loss and mortality of resident
animals. Manganese nodules themselves take millions of year to form so these habitats could
be completely lost from large areas of seabed. There are concerns that noise from any deep
sea mining operations would travel over large distances and could negatively impact on deep
diving whales and deep sea fish which use sensitive acoustic changes for communication and
navigation. There are also fears that exclusion zones around mining areas in coastal waters
will reduce fishing areas impacting on local people’s livelihoods. Furthermore, the deep-sea
has high intrinsic and potentially commercial value in the form of marine genetic resources,
including perhaps the pharmaceutical basis for new treatments and therapies., There are
concerns that mining may destroy genetic resources before they are even investigated. Mining
is thus certain to cause some irreversible damage and negative impacts to unique deep sea
habitats. To protect marine habitats Greenpeace is calling for the implementation of a global
network of Marine Reserves which would protect at least 40% of the world’s oceans including
particularly vulnerable areas such as seamounts, and hydrothermal vents.
It causes biodiversity loss and slow rates of recovery
EPA 12 ( “Interim Report: Seabed Mining in the Northern Territory,”
http://www.ntepa.nt.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/144039/Seabed-Mining-Report.pdf)
patel
Based on an extensive review of dredging and offshore mining studies, Penney et al. (2008)
found benthic recovery to be most rapid (< 2 years) in the intertidal and shallow subtidal zone
(around 5 m depth), where fine-grained sandy sediments are affected by high wave action and
strong current effects that allow removed or disturbed sediments to be rapidly replaced,
redistributed and restratified. Penney et al. (2008) noted recovery to be slower in coarse
gravel-type sediments and slowest in deep-sea areas, where it takes approximately 40 years
for substantial recovery (Figure 5, Appendix 11). Penney et al. (2008) also found natural
benthic recovery rates, following cessation of seabed mining in Namibia, to be substantially
faster than recovery of vegetation communities following cessation of land-based mining
(Figure 5, Appendix 11). They illustrated this point by comparison with the arid Namibian desert
where natural recovery processes are extremely slow, potentially taking decades before
vegetation communities show significant signs of recovery, with some impacts still obvious after
a century or more. In contrast, the turbulent, high-energy nearshore marine environment, with
its benthic components well-adapted and robust to high levels of natural disturbance, supports
much faster recovery processes. In some cases, a markedly different benthic community may
recolonise the disturbed seabed area following the cessation of mining or dredging,
particularly if sediment characteristics have been altered. Sand extraction, for example, can
result in reduced sediment depths or exposure of different seabed sediments that support a
different benthic community structure (Penney et al. 2008). Consideration needs to be given to
differing recovery rates between different biological components of the marine environment.
For example, nearshore benthic recovery rates may be relatively rapid (Penney et al. 2008) but
recovery times for seagrass beds may be relatively slow (D. Parry, pers. comm., 29 Oct 2012).
Differing recovery rates will need to be factored into seabed mining impact mitigation and
rehabilitation programs.
Deep seabed mining exploits the habitats of life and results in biodiversity loss
Craw 13 – Alicia, Head of Campaigns at World Animal Protection, Studied the Legal Writing and
Media Training (Greenpeace, “Deep Seabed Mining,”
http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/Global/canada/report/2013/07/DeepSeabedMiningReport
.PDF) patel
The deep sea is a place of myth and mystery, filled with weird and wonderful life forms, and
vital to the survival of our planet. But now, this mostly unknown world is facing large-scale
industrial exploitation – as mining of the deep seabed for minerals fast becomes reality. As
land-based minerals become depleted and prices rise, the search for new sources of supply is
turning to the sea floor. This emerging industry, facilitated by advances in technology, poses a
major threat to our oceans, which are already suffering from a number of pressures including
overfishing, pollution, and the effects of climate change.1 A growing number of companies and
governments2 – including Canada, Japan, South Korea, China and the UK – are currently rushing
to claim rights to explore and exploit minerals found in and on the seabed, such as copper,
manganese, cobalt and rare earth metals. There are currently 17 exploration contracts3 for the
seabed that lies beyond national jurisdiction in the deep seas of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian
oceans, compared with only 8 contracts in 2010. Contract holders will be able to apply for
licences to carry out commercial mining in the high seas as soon as regulations for exploitation
are developed – anticipated as early as 2016.4 There is also significant exploration interest
within national waters, particularly in the Pacific Ocean, and one licence to mine the deep
seabed has already been granted in Papua New Guinean waters. However, very little is known
about deep-sea habitats, or the impact that mining operations will have on ecosystems and the
wider functioning of our oceans. Once thought to be relatively lifeless, scientists now
recognise that the deep sea is actually a species-rich environment5, with many species still to
be discovered. Because deep-sea species live in rarely disturbed environments and tend to be
slow growing and late maturing, with some unique to their particular habitat types (such as
hydrothermal vents) or even specific locations, they are highly vulnerable to disturbance or
even extinction.6 Deep seabed mining could have serious impacts on the ocean environment
and the future livelihoods and wellbeing of coastal communities. Only 3% of the oceans are
protected and less than 1% of the high seas7, making them some of the least protected places
on Earth. The emerging threat of seabed mining is an urgent wake-up call: the world’s
governments must act now to protect the high seas, including by creating a global network of
marine reserves8 that will be crucial sanctuaries at sea for marine life and the ecosystems which
we all rely on for our survival. An international, multi-sector approach to management and
protection is needed, if we are to ensure the health and sustainable use of our oceans. The
remote deep and open oceans host a major part of the world’s biodiversity, and are vital for
our survival on Earth.9 The deep sea plays an important role in regulating planetary processes,
including regulation of temperature and greenhouse gases.10 It supports ocean life by cycling
nutrients and providing habitat for a staggering array of species.
Animals who cannot escape will die and result in biodiversity loss-not knowing
the impact makes it worse
Craw 13 – Alicia, Head of Campaigns at World Animal Protection, Studied the Legal Writing and
Media Training (Greenpeace, “Deep Seabed Mining,”
http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/Global/canada/report/2013/07/DeepSeabedMiningReport
.PDF) patel
Seabed mining poses a major threat to our oceans. All types of seabed mining will kill
whatever can’t escape the mineral extraction operations. Organisms that grow on the seabed
will be smothered as a result of sediment disturbance and the discharge of waste. The current
lack of scientific knowledge on the deep-sea environment, and the lack of knowledge of the
technology employed, limits our ability to predict the environmental impacts of mining
operations and to determine whether habitats can ever recover from the disturbance.15 We
know that deep-sea species from many habitats, such as seamounts and abyssal plains, are
particularly vulnerable due to their slow growth rates, their low resilience to changes in their
environment, and slow recovery rates after disturbance.16 Some hydrothermal vent
communities may be more resilient to impacts because of the high natural levels of turnover of
these ecosystems, although this is dependent on the underlying geology and biogeography of
the individual systems.17 Mining licences for hydrothermal vents have already been granted to
Nautilus Minerals by the Papua New Guinean government to mine for sea floor massive
sulphides in national waters 1,500 metres under the sea, despite significant environmental
concerns and community opposition. A study at the mining site found 20 new species, with
more species likely to be found in the future.18 The impacts on the actual mining site will be
very high, but the resilience of this system is unknown, as are the effectiveness of the
proposed efforts to assist natural recovery. The wider impacts of the mining operation on
surrounding ecosystems are also unknown.19
Mining pollutes the waters and creates higher risk for death
Craw 13 – Alicia, Head of Campaigns at World Animal Protection, Studied the Legal Writing and
Media Training (Greenpeace, “Deep Seabed Mining,”
http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/Global/canada/report/2013/07/DeepSeabedMiningReport
.PDF) patel
The release of sediment plumes20, clouds of potentially toxic particles that will smother
species and habitats, and could expose seabed communities to heavy metals and acid, is a
major concern.21 Even if they manage to survive the direct mining impact, filter-feeding
organisms will have their feeding apparatus clogged by these sediments, causing starvation.
Some plumes are likely to be nutrient rich, which could cause algal blooms and reduce oxygen
concentrations.22 It will be hard to predict how these plumes may spread. It is likely to be
impossible to restrict impacts from tailings, or the release of metals to a local area, due to the
very nature of ocean currents.23 Impacts that spread far away from the original site could
potentially lead to international disputes. Pollution from dewatering, the removal of water
from metals removed from the seabed, may contain heavy metals and other pollutants, which
will be re-suspended if discharged into the water column.24 Potential contamination of the
food chain? Metals and other contaminants mobilised during mining or processing operations,
as well as some processing chemicals themselves, could accumulate in the tissues of marine
organisms, including fish. It is not clear how significant any increases above background
contamination might be in any one case, and concerns have been raised by scientists and
fishing communities in areas targeted for prospecting and mining, regarding the potential for
tainting of fish or even the introduction of harmful levels of contaminants into the food
chain.25 Noise and light pollution Deep-sea communities live in relative silence, and in the
dark. Studies have shown that deep-sea fish communicate at low sound frequencies26, and
are sensitive to acoustic changes to sense food falls – the fall of organic matter that provides
an important source of nutrients to the deep sea27. Whales rely on sound for communication
and navigation, and when encountering increased noise, change their vocalisation patterns
and behaviour, and move away to new areas.28 Studies show that baleen whales experience
chronic stress when exposed to increased shipping noise.29 Low-frequency mining noise could
travel far from the mining site, with one estimate suggesting that noise from the Nautilus
operation near Papua New Guinea could travel up to 600km from the site.30 This could have
negative impacts on deep diving whales in the area. Mining will also introduce bright light into
an environment that, but for bioluminescence, is constantly dark, impacting species that are
adapted to these conditions, such as deep-sea vent shrimp, which have been shown to be
blinded by the lights used by researchers.31
Mining results in catastrophic destruction of the natural habitat and
biodiversity loss
Craw 13 – Alicia, Head of Campaigns at World Animal Protection, Studied the Legal Writing and
Media Training (Greenpeace, “Deep Seabed Mining,”
http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/Global/canada/report/2013/07/DeepSeabedMiningReport
.PDF) patel
The impacts of seabed mining are expected to change species diversity and density in the
mined area, resulting in changes to the food web, with potential impacts on ecosystems and
fish populations of unknown duration. The extraction of minerals from the seabed will destroy
seabed habitat, and depending on the location and the mining technique used, leave a flatter,
compressed surface that could be unsuitable for recolonisation and habitat recovery, or
smother habitat in mining tailings. On seamounts, mining will cause the destruction of
centuries-old coral and sponge communities and change complex seabed topography into a
flattened and rubble and sediment strewn sea floor. Seabed mining could cause fish mortality,
due to habitat loss and a decline in food sources. For example, phosphate extraction proposed
in shallow water near Namibia is expected to impact fish populations through habitat and
food source removal, with mining operations set to take place within migratory routes and
spawning grounds.39 Similarly, within the deep sea, mineral deposits often occur in habitats
that support important and diverse fish populations. For example, cobalt-rich crusts are often
located on the flanks and summits of seamounts, underwater mountains that host a great
abundance of species. These include slow-growing fish species such as orange roughy,
grenadiers and redfish, the status of which – in the cases where data exist – is generally
considered already overexploited or depleted by deep-sea fishing.40 In cases where
seamounts have been severely destroyed by bottom trawling, there has been no sign of
recovery of large bottom-dwelling fauna five years after trawling stopped, highlighting the
vulnerability of these communities.41 Research suggests that it will take many decades or
more for seamount communities to recover from such trawling.42 Greenpeace has been
calling for a ban on deep-sea bottom trawling to stop the potentially irreversible impacts of this
destructive fishing practice on sensitive deep-sea habitats and species. The impacts of mining in
these areas would be even more devastating to the already threatened fragile ecosystems of
the deep ocean.
Mining kills unique species
Tom Levitt 10/28/10 – journalist (Ecologist, How deep-sea mining could destroy the 'cradle
of life on earth',
http://www.theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/653840/how_deepsea_mining_could_d
estroy_the_cradle_of_life_on_earth.html) patel
Deep-sea hydrothermal vents systems may be where life first evolved on earth It was perhaps only a matter of time before mining the deep seas
took off. Following in the footsteps of deep-sea fishing and drilling for oil it has been lurking in the minds of exploration companies like Nautilus
Minerals, which is behind a major project in Papua New Guinea (PNG). The idea of digging up the seabed one mile beneath the ocean surface to
extract mineral-rich deposits such as copper and zinc first emerged in the 1960s. An initial flurry of interest in the 1970s was put off by low
metal prices and UN regulations that exist on exploiting resources in international waters. But
with rising demand from
China and India for rare earth metals like copper, and deep-sea surveys having now
found concentrations of minerals four to five times those on land, it has returned but this time in
the ‘unregulated’ territorial waters of PNG, conveniently close to the Asian markets. Ecologists say the PNG government is allowing Nautilus
to go ahead with the first ever commercial deep-sea mining project without properly considering the environmental impacts or local opposition.
Nautilus investors include the mining giant Anglo-American which is ignoring indigenous opposition to a gold and copper mine in Alaska. ‘Cradle
of life on earth’
As
well as being metal-rich, the volcanogenic hydrothermal deposits which
Nautilus plans to mine are home to a unique ecosystem that is still largely unknown
to scientists since being discovered in the late 1970s. Initially, the deep sea was
thought to be full of soft sediment and little else but the discovery of hydrothermal
vents on the seabed, which produce the deposits, revealed a completely novel
ecosystem, unreliant on photosynthesis. ‘It’s the cradle of life on earth,’ explains Dr
Rod Fujita from the Environmental Defense Fund and author of studies looking intio
deep-sea mining, ‘and the only one that does not depend on sunlight. There are
species there that are found nowhere else on earth. It’s not like any land habitats we
are used to; in fact you have to have your perspective altered to appreciate this deepsea world,’ he says. The mining process in PNG will take the top 20-30m off the seabed at a depth of 1,500m and lift it up to the surface
before transferring it by barge to processing sites on land. ‘You will destroy fauna just by lifting the land,’ says
deep-sea ecologist Professor Paul Tyler, from the National Oceanography Centre at
Southampton University. ‘It is possible you might mine at a distance [from the
hydrothermal vents] but by mining close by you will affect the flow and the vents
might switch off and then all the animals die – you lose a huge biomass.’ 'Flimsy'
environmental report Nautilus has attempted to fend off these criticisms by
publishing an environment assessment, co-produced by a respected deep-sea
biologist Dr Cindy Van Dover. In it they admit the impact to vents and seafloor
habitats will ‘inevitably be severe at the site scale’ and that they will take ‘many
years’ to recover. However, other ecologists say the assessment is ‘flimsy’ and fails to give a full account of the potential damage
mining will cause.
Professor Richard Steiner, from the University of Alaska cites the incompleteness of classification of species found at the
sites and an inadequate assessment of the risks associated with sediment and waste rock disposal. He also cites the effects of increased light and
noise in the deep ocean environment and the toxicity of the dewatering plume [the process of removing water from the mined deposits] to deepsea organisms, which will not be able to differentiate between food and junk sediment. Of particular concern are the hundreds of thousands of
tonnes of waste that will be produced by the mining process, which Steiner compares to that of a ‘giant underwater tractor’ and which will be
pumped onto deeper seabeds nearby. Dr Fujita said the physics of water as well as weather and currents made it difficult to predict or contain
any spill and that deep-sea mining had the capacity to produce pollution that could travel across into international waters. A smoking
hydrothermal vent on the ocean seabed Exploitation or financial gain? ‘I don’t think the project would be allowed to proceed anywhere else in
the world based on such a poor analysis of risks,’ says Steiner. The USA is known to have similar deposits off the coast of Washington as has
Canada but mining is not thought to be imminent. Dr Fujita suggests Nautilus is just the latest overseas mining giant to take advantage of lax
regulations in the country. ‘In PNG they have a poor record of mining on land resulting in lots of poor conditions and that bad record and lack of
oversight is now moving from land to sea,’ he says.
Only this week the PNG government was accused by Greenpeace of allowing rampant
logging and failing to respect the rights of indigenous groups who depend on the forests. Nautilus has reportedly suggested the country would
benefit by more than $200 million from the mining but Steiner says the benefits to local people or the economy of PNG were likely to be
disproportionately low compared to the scale and risk of the project. ‘While the project could gross almost $1 billion USD in its 30-month
lifetime, it expects to provide only $41 million in total taxes and royalties to the government, a $1.5 million development fund and a few dozen
jobs at most to PNG nationals,’ he said. Prof Steiner is also acting as a science advisor to Mas Kagin, a group formed in 2008 to give a voice to
coastal indigenous people in PNG oppose any commercial mining. The group says it depends on the coastal waters for their ‘livelihood, culture
and way of life’ and has a right to oppose the seabed mining. In a campaign video community groups from two provinces expressed their fears.
‘When we first heard that Nautilus was going to mine the seabed using technology that had never been used anywhere else it felt as though we
were becoming a science lab…and our very lives part of an experiment to test this new technology,’ it says. Nautilus conducted workshops with
local villages to explain its proposals but rejected calls to set up a permanent citizens advisory council. The company also declined to respond to
concerns raised in this article but has previously said it took great pride in ‘leading the mining industry into the deep ocean’. Opening the
floodgates It has estimated several billions tons of copper could be extracted from seafloor sites around the world. Dr Tyler acknowledges that
the deep-sea has ‘not even had its surface scratched with what it might contribute to the economy’ but fears PNG’s decision to approve Nautilus
mining plans will ‘open the floodgates’ before proper assessments have been made of the impact. China
is known to be
seeking to mine similar deposits in the South-West Indian Ocean. ‘Deep-sea fishing is
a good example. We can ring alarm bells but there is no regulation of it. If I had my
way the whole area of deep-sea would become a protected area and people who want
to exploit it would have to apply to a body who can ensure that they were doing a
proper environmental analysis before they were allowed to exploit it. At the moment
there is no requirement at all and we end up looking at the damage done,’ he says. Steiner
agrees and says there is too much wrong with the PNG project: ‘the way this first deep-sea mine proceeds will set the tone for all others, and this
is a very, very bad start’. He argues investment in reusing copper and gold made more sense than continuing to pay mining companies to take
bigger risks in an effort to dig up more. ‘The
global economy simply does not need the gold or copper
that would be recovered at these deep-sea hydrothermal vents. We know how to
recycle and reuse much of the copper already up out of the ground, run through the
economy, and discarded in waste dumps. It is a unidirectional waste of resources,
energy and money. And we know better.’
2NC Link / AT: Oversight
Negative impact on aquatic life---regulation diminish farther out of sea
MacDonald, 12 Alistar, Writers WSJ, “Next Frontier: Mining the Ocean Floor,”
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303395604577434660065784388
Meanwhile, environmental groups have raised concerns about the possible effect of deep-sea
mining on aquatic life. While nations have specific regulatory authority over the seabed
under their territorial water, that oversight diminishes farther out to sea . Miners counter the
likely environmental impact is less than onshore mining, in part because it doesn't require building
roads and is far from human habitation.
2NC AT: Regulation
Its not that drilling causes accidents but that the fundamental activity is
problematic
Troianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep
Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,”
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello
However Deep Sea mining could make this situation change for several reasons . Firstly, because of
the increasing public awareness on environmental issues. Secondly, because compared to offshore oil or gas
industry, environmental risks are fundamentally different in nature. While in offshore oil or gas
industry the environmental risk is mainly accidental, with Deep Sea mining it comes from the
nature of the activity itself . In the first case, the risk is identified, whereas in the second case it is poorly understood and
difficult to assess. The difference is significant:
about unknown.
Deep Sea mining risk is not contained and its extent is just
2NC AT: Van Dover Study
Van Dover’s study is wrong
Goldenberg, 14 Suzanne, US environment correspondent, “Marine mining: Underwater gold
rush sparks fears of ocean catastrophe,”
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/02/underwater-gold-rush-marinemining-fears-ocean-threat
Nautilus has attempted to fend off these criticisms by publishing an environment assessment, coproduced by a respected deep-sea biologist Dr Cindy Van Dover. In it they admit the impact to vents and
seafloor habitats will ‘inevitably be severe at the site scale’ and that they will take ‘many years’ to recover.¶ However, other
ecologists say the assessment is ‘ flimsy’ and fails to give a full account of the potential
damage mining will cause.¶ Professor Richard Steiner, from the University of Alaska cites the
incompleteness of classification of species found at the sites and an inadequate assessment
of the risks associated with sediment and waste rock disposal. He also cites the effects of
increased light and noise in the deep ocean environment and the toxicity of the dewatering
plume [the process of removing water from the mined deposits] to deep-sea organisms, which will not be able to
differentiate between food and junk sediment.
2NC Impact Calc
The effects on the environment are long lasting and unpredictable due to
untested equipment
Alex Benkenstein April 14-senior researcher for The Governance of Africa’s Resources
Programme and South African Institute of International Affairs, graduated from the University of
Stellenbosch with a M.A. in International Studies (cum laude) (The Governance of Africa’s
Resources Programme, “Seabed Mining: Lessons from the Namibian Experience,”) patel
As minerals targeted by seabed mining occur in different forms and geological settings, the
potential environmental impact - including on fisheries - should be considered within the
particular geological region and mining methodology proposed. Nevertheless, certain
common effects of seabed mining may be distinguished, such as the removal of mined
material, along with seabed sediments and associated benthic organisms (organisms living on
or under the seabed); the perturbation of the seabed; and the introduction of new materials
to the environment, such as processing waste or energy in the form of heat, light and seismic
and acoustic waves.5 The recovery of benthic communities (seabed plants and organisms)
depends on a range of natural processes, but is generally most rapid in the intertidal and
shallow subtidal zone, slower in coarse gravel sediments and slowest in deep- sea areas, where
substantial recovery takes about 40 years. In some cases the impact of marine seabed mining
may be particularly long lasting, for example, where mining or dredging changes the
characteristics of the seabed, leading to a change in habitat.6 Opponents to seabed mining
emphasise that scientific knowledge of ecosystems in the deep sea and other marine
environments is often poorly developed and seabed mining relies on untested technologies
that may result in unforeseen impacts on marine ecosystems.
We should utilize the precautionary principle when evaluating these types of
debates---the lack of knowledge about the effects of mining on the ocean sea
bed means we shouldn’t take the risk---this is how legislation and international
law is structured and should shape your decision calculus
Troianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep
Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,”
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello
Obviously this kind of risk falls within the scope of the precautionary principle , which has had a
global impact since the 1992 Rio Conference. It has become influential in many fields of
international environmental law and central in the debate on climate change. Beyond that, the
precautionary approach inspires public policy management especially in the context of
sustainable use of natural resources. The well-known example is the fish stocks management.
While U.N.C.L.O.S. does not expressly refers to the precautionary principle26it appears more or less explicitly in other more
specialized conventions related to marine pollution. Moreover upon
the formula of “ prudence and caution ” it is
implicitly assumed by the jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (I.T.L.O.S.). For instance, it was
invoked against Japan by Australia and New Zealand in the 1999 Southern Bluefin Tuna case. In the
absence of scientific certainty on how to ensure the conservation of this fish, the Court
encouraged the parties to act with caution , without mentioning explicitly the principle and to take
measures to avoid irreparable damage
to existing stocks: “Considering that, in the view of the Tribunal, the parties
should in
the circumstances act with prudence and caution to ensure that effective conservation
measures are taken to prevent serious harm to the stock of southern Bluefin tuna.” 27
2NC Species IL
Deep sea mining causes disruptions to the benthic layer---causes water toxicity,
water columns, zooplankton, food chain
Troianiello, 12 Antonio, University of French Polynesia, Associate Professor of Law, “1¶ Deep
Sea Mining, A New Frontier for International Environmental Law,”
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello
As stated, the effects of underwater mining are largely unknown and require a precautionary approach. Specialists and
conservationists are nevertheless convinced that the removal of parts of the seabed will cause
disruptions in the benthic layer, increased toxicity of the water column and suspended
sediment residues. Removing parts of the seabed could cause permanent disturbances into the
habitat of benthic organisms, possibly depending on the type of mining and location. Among these disturbances fine
particles resulting from the mining could have the greatest impact. They could cause
asphyxiation of several organisms. Depending on particles size and water currents the plumes could spread
over more or less extensive zones, possibly having an impact on light penetration, zooplankton ,
which in turn could affect the food chain.
2NC Vent IL
Drilling hurts the vent ecosystems
Birney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC)
“Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea”
Additionally, it has been suggested that drilling could impact the flow of vent fluid diverting
hydrothermal fluids away from the vent communities (Interridge, 2000). This could result in a wide
range of impacts on the vent ecosystem , including the possibility of activating a new area at
the drilling location. This may be diverting vent fluid away from previously active locations
resulting in significant short term effects on the ecosystem . However, the vent ecosystem is well adapted
to a changing environment because of natural tectonic activity as discussed in the environment section so long term impacts may be
less severe over the entire vent field.
The organisms in the bottom of the ocean form the basis for the food chain
Birney, 6 Kristi, Marine Conservation Analyst for the Environmental Defense Center (EDC)
“Potential Deep-Sea Mining¶ of Seafloor Massive Sulfides:¶ A Case Study in Papua New Guinea”
The vent ecosystems are rich in carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, organic carbon compounds,
methane, hydrogen, and ammonium. Mineral rich venting fluid forms the basis for the food web.
The bacteria found in the vent systems are chemoautotrophic and use hydrogen sulfide or methane as
their energy source. The majority of bacteria obtain their energy source from sulfide. Bacteria are specialized for extreme
conditions. Hyperthermophiles can be found in extreme temperatures over 80°C, barophiles survive at high pressure, and
acidophiles survive in acidic conditions.¶ Bacteria
can be found living in the subsurface of the vents, on
surfaces surrounding vent openings, on the surfaces of vent animals, and suspended within the effluent
itself (Hessler, 1995). Bacteria and hydrothermal vent organisms form symbiotic relationships with various
animals. The importance of the symbiotic relationships between these organisms is illustrated by the Giant Tubeworm, Riftia
pachyptila, where the relationship¶ 17¶ with bacteria is obligatory (essential for both host and symbiont). This tubeworm is a large
animal reaching 1-2 meters in length. The host, Riftia, provides the symbiont, bacteria, with a stable supply of nutrients from the
external environment, and the symbiont supplies the host with a stable supply of organic carbon (Van Dover, 2000). Riftia pachyptila
lacks a digestive system, and relies exclusively on the chemosynthetic bacteria for energy. The bacteria live inside the trophosome of
It is imperative that the higher
organisms are able to incorporate the energy produced by the microorganisms so that they
can survive at hydrothermal vents. Other symbiotic dependent organisms include the Giant White
Clams and the mussel Bathymodiolus. In both cases bacteria live in the gill filaments. Snails and clams are also known to host
symbiotic bacteria.¶ In addition to maintaining symbiotic relationships, the bacteria also form the basis of the food
web as primary producers . Organisms such as the blind Atlantic vent shrimp, Rimacaris, feed on the
sulfur bacteria directly. Similarly, other worms and polychaetes have been observed with bacteria in
their gut, suggesting they feed directly on the mats of sulfur bacteria. Larger organisms, such as crabs
and fishes are opportunistic feeders and feed on other vent organisms. Thus, a food web is
established, consisting of primary producers (chemoautotrophic sulfur bacteria), the secondary
the tubeworm, which is a specialized organ to house the sulfide-oxidizing bacteria.
producers
(tubeworms, mussels, clams, shrimp), and predators (fishes) or detritivores (crabs).
***Solvency
AT: Solvency
5 Reason Aff Fails in long term- stabilization; sterilization; savings; socioeconomic growth; and safety
UNEP 12 (United Nations Environmental Programme, “Green Economy in a Blue World”,
http://www.unep.org/pdf/Green_Economy_Blue_Full.pdf)
The truth is that too often mining revenues have been used not for positive social transformation but for short-term or focused
political agendas. Sound
revenue management will ensure that the correct balance is narrowly struck
between saving revenue for future generations, and spending current mining revenue on with long-term benefits.
In order to better guide governments in the most appropriate way to collect projects, manage
and disburse natural-resources revenues, five issues are of particular importance and need to be taken into account
to ensure sound revenue management. These issues are stabilization; sterilization; savings; socio-economic
growth; and safety. Stabilization refers to the need to protect against mineral-resource price
fluctuations and require that incremental revenues be set aside in a Fund when the commodity prices are high
and taken out when the prices drop, so that governments have a stable revenue stream. Sterilization involves keeping a
large part of the revenue collected out of the local economy to avoid Dutch disease and excessive
inflationary pressure. Saving for future generations: since the resources are limited and will eventually
be exhausted, some of the revenues should be saved in view of intergenerational equity. Examples of savings funds include
Norway and more recently Timor-Leste Safeguarding revenue: protecting saved revenue is not always easy.
It is necessary to have a separate funding vehicle for savings which is governed by non-discretionary rules, so
that Governments are less tempted to spend these savings. Socio-economic development:
although revenue should be set aside for future generations, long-term investments in
infrastructure and socio-economic projects should be made while mining is going on. Making good
investments in health, education, roads, technology, etc. is also investing in future generations One of the main
challenges for Governments receiving substantial additional revenues from mining activity is
how to properly manage a significant increase in budget and to avoid waste. Public demands may put
government under pressure to increase expenditure in various areas. Although some socio-economic projects may have long-term
benefits, spending and investment decisions can become highly politicized. In this climate, short-term benefit projects, rather than
long-lasting ones, can often become the norm.
AT: Tech
Technology is not viable
MacDonald, 12 Alistar, Writers WSJ, “Next Frontier: Mining the Ocean Floor,”
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303395604577434660065784388
But previous attempts at deep-sea mining haven't yet proven technologically possible or
economically viable , despite more than a century of experience. Efforts date back to the 1870s, when a
British research vessel trawled up manganese nodules from a depth of almost three miles as part of a wider scientific study of the
world's oceans.¶ Commercial
efforts to raise manganese from the ocean floor in the 1970s collapsed
amid technical difficulties, among other problems. Despite recent gains in technology , some
mining analysts say the challenges ahead for economic production are still significant .¶ Costs are
still far from clear, and the limits of today's advances in technology are still largely untested. Last week's
announcement from Nautilus came as little surprise to analysts, who say delays are common in mining and particularly so in projects
pursuing new avenues.
AT: Private Companies
No mining for a decade---start up costs too high
Goodier, 11 Rob, Journalist, “Why Deep-Sea Rare-Earth Metals Will Stay Right Where They
Are—For Now,” http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/why-deep-sea-rareearth-metals-will-stay-right-where-they-are-for-now
John Wiltshire, director of the Hawaii Undersea Research Laboratory, also at the University of Hawaii,
Manoa, puts it even more bluntly. "The truth of the matter is, nobody's going to mine in the deep
sea — even if somebody massively funds this — for a minimum of a decade ," he says. The
startup cost could run from $1 to $2 billion .
No one wants to mine and mining won’t replace China for a decade—can’t
solve the advantages
Goodier 11 (Rob Goddier is a writer for Popular Mechanics’ environment and earth column, Popular Mechanics, “Why Deep-Sea Rare-Earth
Metals Will Stay Right Where They Are—For Now”, 7/8/11, http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/why-deep-sea-rare-earthmetals-will-stay-right-where-they-are-for-now)
Deep-sea rare-earth deposits aren't new, either. Wiltshire, Sansone and many other researchers have been studying mineral deposits—including rareearth mineral deposits—on the ocean floor since their careers began. "I published a paper on this 25 years ago. The first
papers that
indicated rare-earth minerals go back 30 or 35 years," Wiltshire says. "People have been
talking about mining manganese nodules since the 1960s," Manganese nodules are conglomerates of metallic
particles—rare-earth metals and others—stripped from the water over eons, and they were the hot undersea mining topic of decades past. Manganese
nodule mining even provided cover for a bit of Cold War intrigue in 1974, when a $350 million deep-sea drilling ship built by one of Howard Hughes'
companies supposedly went looking for a deposit to develop. In fact, the ship was being used by the CIA to look for a Soviet nuclear sub that had sunk
off Oahu in the 1960s. Today, though, as in the 1970s, cost and time remain enormous hurdles to mining these deposits. Wiltshire says
a
proposed deep-sea mine off the coast of Papua New Guinea illustrates the challenges that
would face anyone looking to start a rare-earth operation in the Pacific Ocean. Nautilus Minerals plans
to build a $157 million ship to support what could be the world's only deep-sea gold and copper mine. The ship, floating about three miles above the
seafloor, will need to be gigantic: 680 feet long, with a deadweight capacity of more than 20,000 tons and bunks for up to 160 people. Nautilus plans to
unleash three remote-controlled devices on the sea floor: two cutters and a collector, adapted from technologies used in the oil and cable-trenching
industries. An as-yet-undesigned pump system will lift the ore from the seafloor to the ship. "They've already spent about $400 million, the
boat
will be a couple hundred million," Wiltshire says. "A complete operation for Nautilus will easily be a
billion." The question, then, for any company that would seek to lease these areas (from the Pacific nations which possess the rights) and mine
rare earths from the ocean bottom is: Is it worth all this trouble and expense? At 0.2 percent concentration of rare earths,
the deep-sea deposits pale in comparison to ore deposits on land, which can have 5 to 10
percent concentrations. All things being equal, it's easier to collect minerals from mud than
from ore. But things are not equal, because this mud is beneath three miles of water. Experts
do not discount the notion that we may someday mine rare-earth metals in the deep sea;
perhaps the buzzwords of the year 2040 will be "Autonomous Underwater Mining Vehicle."
But if you're wondering where rare-earth components in computer chips and solar cells will
come from for the next decade, the answer is clear—China.
AT: Leasing
Leasing mechanisms fail—companies hate it and very low concentrations of
minerals.
Goodier 11 (Rob Goddier is a writer for Popular Mechanics’ environment and earth column, Popular Mechanics, “Why Deep-Sea Rare-Earth
Metals Will Stay Right Where They Are—For Now”, 7/8/11, http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/why-deep-sea-rare-earthmetals-will-stay-right-where-they-are-for-now)
The question, then, for any company that would seek to lease these areas (from the Pacific
nations which possess the rights) and mine rare earths from the ocean bottom is: Is it worth all
this trouble and expense? At 0.2 percent concentration of rare earths, the deep-sea deposits
pale in comparison to ore deposits on land, which can have 5 to 10 percent concentrations. All
things being equal, it's easier to collect minerals from mud than from ore. But things are not
equal, because this mud is beneath three miles of water. Experts do not discount the notion
that we may someday mine rare-earth metals in the deep sea; perhaps the buzzwords of the
year 2040 will be "Autonomous Underwater Mining Vehicle." But if you're wondering where
rare-earth components in computer chips and solar cells will come from for the next decade,
the answer is clear—China.
***Chinese Monopoly Advantage
AT: Chinese Monopoly
Chinese monopoly is over - it will never be consistent and always fall apart
Wortsall 13 – Tim, Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute, writer at Forbes (12/18/13, Forbes,
“Chinese Rare Earth Metals Surprise, Free Markets Actually Work,”
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/12/18/chinese-rare-earth-metals-surprise-freemarkets-actually-work/) patel
China’s virtual monopoly on rare earth elements used in high-technology applications has
been loosened, decreasing the risk that supplies to U.S. defense contractors could be
disrupted, according to the Pentagon’s latest assessment of the nation’s industrial base.
“Global market forces are leading to positive changes in rare earth supply chains, and a
sufficient supply of most of these materials likely will be available to the defense industrial
base,” said the Pentagon report by Elana Broitman, the Defense Department’s top official on the
U.S. industrial base. “Prices for most rare earth oxides and metals have declined approximately
60 percent from their peaks in the summer of 2011.” Here’s the background: back 5 years ago
95% of the world’s rare earth production came from China. The rest was in India and Russia or
ex-Soviet states (indeed, the one I deal with was almost exclusively coming from Russia). Then
China decided that they would limit exports from that nation. The declared reason was
environmental: it is indeed a messy business. The general assumption was that the reason was
rather different. They limited exports of the raw materials but not of anything made from them.
Neodymium for example, had an export limit (and serious export taxes) slapped on it, but FeNdB
magnets, made from neodymium could be exported without limits or taxes. So we all assumed
that the intention was to attract the manufacturing to China and thus increase the amount of
value added in that country. So, what actually happened? Well, just what people like me, those
with morethan a passing acquaintance with rare earths and free markets said would happen
(indeed, I said it here in Foreign Policy). Mines outside China began to open up, exploration for
new mines outside China surged (at one point there were more than 400 such projects going
on) and manufacturers started to consider whether they really, really, needed to use rare
earths or whether something else would do. Supply went up and demand went down in other
words. Thus was the Chinese monopoly broken and prices fell back. All of which teaches us
something useful about monopolies. Where a monopoly is contestable we don’t in fact have to
worry about it very much. China was selling us all of the rare earths we wanted, at prices we
were happy to pay, for decades. So, they had a monopoly? So what? As soon as they actually
tried to take advantage of that monopoly then it all fell apart for them. They actually, by
attempting to restrict supply, managed to call into being their own competition. This has
applications in other ares of current concern of course. For example, the European Union claims
that Google is misusing its dominance in search. But while Google certainly is dominant in
search this is a contestable monopoly. As soon as Google starts to throw its weight around to
the detriment of consumers then consumers will go off and use one of the myriad of
alternatives. And new alternatives will arrive as well. Where monopolies are natural ones
(perhaps because of network effects) or backed by government licence or regulation the
situation is different, but a contestable monopoly can almost certainly be left alone. Precisely
because as soon as anyone tries to profit from the monopoly that monopoly itself will be
contested.
Domestic mine in alaska solves
SEACC, 11 – (12/27, “Rare Earth Elements in Alaska TRADE OUR SALMON FOR “CLEAN”
ENERGY?,” seacc.org/mining/bokan-mountain-mine/RareEarthElementswebsitegarfsFINAL.pdf)
An all¶ -¶ but¶ -¶ forgotten uranium mine on Prince of Wales Island has is experiencing a
renaiss¶ ance of much¶ of the hype and speculation for developing a domestic source for rare
Earth Elements (REEs) is focused¶ on a small deposit on Prince of Wa¶ les Island near Bokan Mountain.¶
If you have missed the rhetoric, China controls 97% of the world’s supply¶ of REE’s and is restricting¶ exports
threatening the development of renewable energy and green technologies. Mining on POW is¶ considered neces¶
sary to break China’s control.
US companies are investing --- solves 30 percent of the the global supply
Schneider, 12 – (October 26, Howard, Washington Post, “China’s advantage erodes in a key
area: rare earth minerals,” http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-1026/business/35498936_1_rare-earth-earth-exports-europium)
Even as the United States was pursuing its WTO claim, Colorado-based
Molycorp, along with firms in Australia
and elsewhere, were reshaping the landscape. Molycorp reopened a rare earth mine in
Mountain Pass, Calif., that had been shuttered a decade ago because the supply of the minerals coming from
China was so cheap.¶ Molycorp President Mark A. Smith said the company, which has scaled up employment at the mine
from 55 to 420 in recent years, aims to produce as much as 40,000 metric tons a year by 2013 ,
accounting for about 30 percent of projected world supply.
Molycorp will solve domestic rare earth shortages
Proctor 13 (Cathy, Oct 2 2013, "Molycorp: The only US rare-earth mine is ready for prime
time," www.bizjournals.com/denver/blog/earth_to_power/2013/10/molycorps-only-rare-earthmine-in-the.html?page=all, ADL)
The last major elements of the $1.5 billion expansion and modernization of Molycorp Inc.’s rare earth mining and
processing facility in Mountain Pass, Calif., are done, according to the company. Specifically, the mine’s chloralkali plant is
“mechanically complete” and work to start up the plant has begun, the Greenwood Village-based mining
company (NYSE: MCP) said Wednesday. Also, the last unit of the mine’s “multi-stage cracking plant” also is mechanically complete
and startup procedures have begun, Molycorp said. “This means that the final construction work on the $1.5 billion rebuild of the
Mountain Pass facility is complete,” Molycorp’s spokesman, Jim Sims, told me. “The units are now in commissioning and following
that they’ll go into full-scale production,” he said. Molycorp mines rare-earth elements, which are processed
into compounds vital for a number of industrial and military applications, including electronics, oil refining, bombs and special
magnets used in wind turbines and electric cars. At Mountain Pass, Molycorp owns the biggest U.S. deposits of rare earths. The
chloralkali plant takes wastewater from the process that separates mining ore and the rare earth elements and recycles it into
feedstocks for the separation process, Sims said. “It greatly reduces the environmental footprint at Mountain Pass, and it
also
drives down our production costs,” Sims said. Molycorp hopes its process will be competitive with
the lowest cost rare earth producers in the world, the company said. The mine’s multi-stage
cracking plant is part of a chemical process that raises the amount of rare earth elements the
facility can get from the ore, speed up the production process, and also lower costs, the company
said. “About 8 percent of the ore you pull out of the ground is rare earths,” Sims said. “We’re getting increasingly
better rates of recovery, and this last unit of the multi-stage cracking unit will help us increase
that even more. It’s all about efficiency,” he said.
China is taking efforts to stabilize prices now: stockpiling and taxes
Lowder 12 - Sally Lowder of The Critical Metals Report (9/11/12, "China's Stockpile Effort
Could Stablize Rare Earth Metals Prices: Brandon Tirpak,"
www.theaureport.com/pub/na/chinas-stockpile-effort-could-stabilize-rare-earth-metals-pricesbrandon-tirpak, ADL)
Ultimately, falling prices for the metal commodities or for the rare earth oxides (REOs) directly affect money flowing into the
industry. I think the
Chinese government will take extra measures to stabilize prices or exert some
upward price pressure, such as new taxes or the stockpiling efforts it recently announced.
TCMR: Tell us more about China's stockpiling plans. BT: This past July, the Chinese government announced,
without elaboration, that it would create a stockpile of roughly 6 billion (B) renminbi-worth of REEs. That effort will
begin within the next several weeks. A lot of people expect to see some price stabilization as a result,
and if you take note of figures published by Asian Metal, the rate at which prices are falling
has slowed drastically over the last several months.
AT: Monopoly = War
It is empirically denied by the Japan disputes China will go to war when they
stop exports
Sternberg 14- Joseph, editor at the WSJ (1/8/14, Wall Street Journal, “How the Great Rare-Earth
Metals Crisis Vanished,”
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303848104579308252845415022)
patel
There was a time, not so long ago, when the world feared China was going to use its
dominance of the global rare-earth-element industry to crush Western economies and
militaries in a strategic vise. Those were the days. Recent developments highlight how wrong
those alarmist predictions were. Rare earths are the metals at the bottom of the periodic table
that are exceptionally useful in many high-tech applications, from lasers to solar panels to
electric car batteries to smartphones. China is the world's major extractor and only processor of
rare-earth ores. Beijing aroused worries in late 2010 when it apparently limited exports of the
minerals to Japan amid a territorial dispute. The episode stoked fears that China would use its
sole-supplier status for nefarious ends. Except that it turns out Beijing doesn't have the
wherewithal to execute such a dastardly plan. Consider the new plan Beijing unveiled last
week to consolidate its rare-earth industry into six large extraction and processing companies.
As a start, Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare-Earth Hi-Tech Company (yes, that's its name) is
buying nine of its smaller competitors in the north, with more mergers and acquisitions to
come. This is at least the second time in roughly a decade that Beijing has attempted rareearth rationalization. The first foundered when faced by opposition that included the local
officials who so often sponsor projects away from Beijing's watchful gaze. The consolidation
drive is a sign of weakness, not strength. The impetus is Beijing's need to resolve the problems
its past interventions in the market have created. Export restrictions kicked in three years ago,
officially justified by the need to reduce the pollution caused by mining and processing. Global
prices rose dramatically, creating an incentive for new miners to start production, and an
opportunity for them to profit from circumventing export blocks via endemic smuggling.
Meanwhile, Beijing's economic stimulus policies lowered the cost of credit, making it easier to
fund this investment. But once the global panic subsided and demand slackened, rare-earth
prices fell by as much as 60% from their 2011 peaks. Oversupply is the new worry. On a related
note, the export restrictions also have not helped Beijing mitigate the environmental damage
caused by the rare-earth industry. Processing the ores is messy work, and Beijing seems to have
hoped that whatever other mercantilist objective it might achieve, limiting export quantities
would also lead to a cleanup of the industry at home. Not so, because the restrictions
stimulated new mining by small, illegal operators with even worse environmental practices than
the big companies. Now lower global prices and the resulting thinner profit margins make costly
environmental compliance that much harder. Don't suppose for a minute that centrally
arranged consolidation will solve any of this, since consolidation doesn't fix the underlying
problem with China's approach to rare earths: Beijing still steadfastly refuses to allow the
market to operate. Just ask yourself, when is the last time that politically allocated capital;
administrative controls on price, production, export or other disposition of an output; and
centrally determined corporate structures resulted in a rational industry, in China or anywhere
else? For guidance on better options, Beijing could look abroad. The other big rare earths story
of the moment highlights the extent to which Beijing's non-market machinations have triggered
helpful market responses elsewhere. A Pentagon report leaked last month noted that reliance
on Chinese rare-earth metals, while still high, is declining. New supplies for most rare-earths are
coming online, as uncertainty over China's reliability and a period of higher prices stimulated
investment in new mining projects elsewhere. Greenland and Russia both have opened new
tracts to rare-earths exploration in the past year. China's share of global production now is
down to as low as 80% from 95% in 2010.
AT: Solvency
The US lacks domestic refining capability—still get sent to China
Kennedy 1/29 (Jim Kennedy is
an internationally recognized expert on rare earths and Thorium nuclear energy systems and
has been actively involved in consulting, advisory and legislative issues for the mining and energy industry. He is a leading industry
advocate for the development of a fully integrated rare earth value chain inside the U.S. and promoting the development of Thorium
nuclear energy., Investor Intel, “China’s Rare Earth Monopoly and its formidable impact on U.S. National Defense”,
http://investorintel.com/rare-earth-intel/chinas-rare-earth-monopoly-formidable-impact-u-s-nationaldefense/#sthash.gA1R2Gc5.dpuf)
Molycorp recently disclosed
to shareholders that much of its cerium production cannot be sold,
because of the latter material’s oversupply. Cerium and lanthanum oxides, which are typically used by the glass
polishing and petroleum cracking industries, are not critical to weapon systems or high technology
applications. It is my understanding that Molycorp sells most of its lanthanum to W.R. Grace for use in the chemical catalyst
petroleum applications. The remaining 17%* of high value rare earths that Molycorp produces from
Mountain Pass goes to China for refining and value adding, according to the acquisition agreement between
Neo Material Technologies Inc. and Molycorp.
No domestic refining capability and China is preferred by US companies.
Kennedy 1/29 (Jim Kennedy is
an internationally recognized expert on rare earths and Thorium nuclear energy systems and
has been actively involved in consulting, advisory and legislative issues for the mining and energy industry. He is a leading industry
advocate for the development of a fully integrated rare earth value chain inside the U.S. and promoting the development of Thorium
nuclear energy., Investor Intel, “China’s Rare Earth Monopoly and its formidable impact on U.S. National Defense”,
http://investorintel.com/rare-earth-intel/chinas-rare-earth-monopoly-formidable-impact-u-s-nationaldefense/#sthash.gA1R2Gc5.dpuf)
1. U.S.
mining of rare earths is pointless if it isn’t able to refine these resources into value
added DoD ready commodities: China maintains a global monopoly on all refining,
metallurgical, alloy and component technologies as well as OEM and material science
facilities. U.S., Japanese, Korean and European businesses are relocating to China to secure access to these
materials, including those used by National Defense. For instance, in 2013, GM established a new Technology
Science Laboratory in China. As an example, a Chinese corporation was granted approval to purchase the assets of A123 battery.
A123 was the centerpiece of the Obama Administration’s drive for electric vehicles. The fact that GE moved the last of its medical
imaging divisions to China provides further proof. Over
the last decade nearly every major multinational
relying on REE’s has moved its manufacturing facilities, established subsidiaries and suppliers
in China to gain access to these materials in what is a labor and technology drain that is undermining
our economic future. The U.S. should establish in my opinion – a fully integrated REE refinery value chain in North America.
AT: China Bashing
Currency manipulation causes China bashing
Hsu, 4/21 Sara, Assistant Professor of Economics at the State University of New York, “Are
Claims of Currency Manipulation Just China Bashing?,” http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/areclaims-of-currency-manipulation-just-china-bashing/
Opponents of the idea that China manipulates its currency assert that this allegation is a type
of “ China bashing ,” carried out for political purposes and containing little economic merit. These analysts
contend that the currency manipulation argument becomes a larger issue only when it is politically
convenient, as interest groups in favor of legislation against China gain ground. They also
argue that China’s chosen type of “crawling peg” exchange rate is valid since experience has
shown that other types of exchange rates, particularly a fully liberalized exchange rate, can be
harmful if the currency suddenly changes value. Some scholars have also found the currency manipulation
allegations to be counterproductive, as they result in a further depreciation of the currency.
AT: Protectionism IL
china tightening its grip on REE increase production of other REEs and increases
innovation for conservation --- internal link turns the impact
OR
US will always be able to get REEs even with restrictions
PLumer, 12 – (10/19, Brad, Washington Post, “China’s grip on the world’s rare earth market may
be slipping,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/10/19/chinaschokehold-over-rare-earth-metals-is-slipping/)
Then in
2010, China decided to restrict its export quota by 40 percent. That helped drive prices up and
suddenly made it economical for other countries to start boosting their own production again
again. Out in Mountain Pass, Calif., for instance, Molycorp is now reopening and expanding its massive
rare earth metals mine.¶ Meanwhile, Japan has rushed to reduce its dependence on rare earths over the past few years—
especially since China has a habit of restricting exports every time the two nations get into a territorial spat. Panasonic has
developed a technique to recycle neodymium from old electronic appliances. Honda is
extracting rare earths from used car batteries. TDK Corp., which creates magnets for motors, now sprays
dysprosium on its motors rather than mixing it in, in order to conserve. All told, reports the Asahi Shinbun,
Japan’s demand for rare earths dropped from 31,000 tons in 2010 to 23,000 tons in 2011.¶ So even though China is still
the world’s largest rare earths supplier, its ability to control the global market has lessened
greatly . Within two years, the market adjusted . As a result, Barber notes, “China itself also is changing its tune and has
announced a higher export quota.”
2010 empirically denies the impact --- we don’t become protectionist nor crack
down but just find new reserves
Parthemore, 1AC Author, 11 – (Christine Parthemore, Fellow at the Center for a New American
Security (CNAS), where she directs the Natural Security Program and the Natural Security Blog,
prolific author, former journalist writing for The Washington Post, Roll Call, and the Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, MA from Georgetown University's Security Studies Program, June 2011,
“ELEMENTS OF SEUCURITY: MITIGATING THE RISKS OF U.S. DEPENDENCE ON CRITICAL
MINERALS,” Center for a New American Security,
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Minerals_Parthemore_1.pdf)
Minerals are a subject of much contention. On one hand, the United States remains less prepared for supply disruptions, price spikes
and trade disagreements related to the global minerals trade than most experts realize. On the other hand, public concern over
reliable access to the minerals required in key sectors of the U.S. economy, in particular those needed to produce military
equipment, is growing. Too frequently, however, such concerns are based on inaccurate assumptions. A sober and informed analysis
suggests there are real vulnerabilities, which place critical national security and foreign policy interests at risk. In worst-case
scenarios, supplies of minerals that the United States does not produce domestically may be disrupted, creating price spikes and lags
in delivery. Even short of major supply disruptions, supplier countries can exert leverage over the United States by threatening to cut
off certain key mineral supplies. The United States may also lose ground strategically if it continues to lag in managing mineral
issues, as countries that consider assured access to minerals as far more strategically important are increasingly setting the rules for
trade in this area. China’s
rising dominance is at the heart of this growing public debate. Its 2010
cutoff of rare earth elements2 – a unique set of minerals that are difficult to process yet critical to many hightech
applications – attracted particular attention. After Japan detained a Chinese trawler captain over a skirmish in the East
China Sea, Japanese companies reported weeks of stalled shipments of rare earths from China amid rumors of an official embargo.
This may sound like a minor trade dispute, but China currently controls production of about 95 percent of the world’s rare earths,
which are critical to building laser-guidance systems for weapons, refining petroleum and building wind turbines. Coinciding with
possessing this incredible leverage over the rest of the world, China
has also reduced its export quotas for these
minerals. For its part, the Chinese government contended that it did not put any formal export embargo in place, and that its
plans to reduce exports simply reflect the need to meet growing domestic demand for rare earths. Japan-China relations
experienced further strain in their already tense relationship. In the United States, many
reporters, policy analysts and
decision makers did not foresee this challenge. Feeling blindsided, some in the United States
characterized the situation in a manner that demonized China rather than using the opportunity to better understand the true
nature of U.S. supply chain vulnerabilities. The
2010 rare earths case and others are increasing interest in
critical minerals among U.S. policymakers. Congress held hearings on the strategic importance
of minerals between 2007 and 2010, and the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act required DOD to study and report on its
dependence on rare earth elements for weapons, communications and other systems.3 During a 2009 hearing on minerals and
military readiness, Republican Representative Randy Forbes of Virginia called minerals, “one of those things that no one really talks
about or worries about until something goes wrong. It’s at that point – the point where we don’t have the steel we need to build
MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles] or the rhenium we need to build a JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] engine that the
stockpile becomes critically important.”4 In October 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated
that it would
be “in our interests commercially and strategically” to find additional sources of supply for
rare earth minerals, and stated that China’s recent cuts to rare earth exports “served as a wakeup call
that being so dependent on only one source, disruption could occur for natural disaster
reasons or other kinds of events could intervene
Protectionism now over solar panels
Cardwell, 6/3 Diane, NYT Writer, “U.S. Imposes Steep Tariffs on Importers of Chinese Solar
Panels,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/business/energy-environment/us-imposingduties-on-some-chinese-solar-panels.html?_r=0
The Commerce Department on Tuesday imposed steep duties on importers of Chinese solar
panels made from certain components, asserting that the manufacturers had benefited from
unfair subsidies.¶ The duties will range from 18.56 to 35.21 percent, the department said.¶ The decision, in a longsimmering trade dispute, addresses one of the main charges in a petition brought by the
manufacturer SolarWorld Industries America. While it is preliminary, the ruling means that the United States will
begin collecting the tariffs in advance of the final decision, expected later this year.¶ “Today is a strong win for the U.S.
solar industry,” said Mukesh Dulani, president of SolarWorld Industries America, based in Hillsboro, Ore. “We look forward to
the end of illegal Chinese government intervention in the U.S. solar market, and we applaud Commerce for its work that supports
fair trade.Ӧ The
decision comes against a backdrop of increasing trade conflict driven at least
partly by a rapidly evolving industry whose center of manufacture and installation has shifted
over the last decade from Europe to Asia. Although the European Union settled a similar dispute with China through
negotiation, tensions have still bubbled. And the United States is seeking to challenge India over the local content requirements for
its solar program through the World Trade Organization.
AT: Protectionism Impact
Trade wars won’t escalate to real conflict, let alone protectionism
Ikenson, 09 associate director for the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute
(Daniel, “A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived,”
3/12, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-037.html
A Little Perspective, Please
Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a
sturdy rules-based system of trade and the economic self interest in being open to participation
in the global economy will limit the risk of a protectionist pandemic. According to recent
estimates from the International Food Policy Research Institute, if all WTO members were to
raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates, the average global rate of duty
would double and the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent over five years.8 That
would be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth
experienced this decade.9
But, to put that 7.7 percent decline in historical perspective, the value of global trade declined
by 66 percent between 1929 and 1934, a period mostly in the wake of Smoot Hawley's passage
in 1930.10 So the potential downside today from what Bergsten calls "legal protectionism" is
actually not that "massive," even if all WTO members raised all of their tariffs to the highest
permissible rates.
If most developing countries raised their tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade
partners. But most developing countries that have room to backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers, and thus the impact on global trade flows would not be that
significant. OECD countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import value.11 Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively account for 2.4
percent of global imports) is not going to be the spark that ignites a global trade war. Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s,
and have made various pledges to avoid protectionist measures in combating the current economic situation.
In the United States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be
perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the legislation to stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent
with United States obligations under international agreements." In early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy
China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus bill.12
But even more promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce existing trade barriers. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract
and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices," the Mexican
government initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial
sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in
Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13
And Mexico is not alone. In February, the Brazilian government suspended tariffs entirely on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of
machinery and other capital equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January decision in Brazil to
scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15
Meanwhile, on February 27, a new free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020.
While the media and members of the trade policy community fixate on how various
protectionist measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is
plenty of evidence that governments remain interested in removing barriers to trade. Despite
the occasional temptation to indulge discredited policies, there is a growing body of institutional
knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one another as they choose,
regardless of the nationality or location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to
accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit
choices through policy constraints.
AT: China Impact
No China war
Robert J. Art , Fall 20 10 Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University and Director of MIT's
Seminar XXI Program The United States and the rise of China: implications for the long haul Political Science Quarterly 125.3 (Fall
2010): p359(33)
The workings of these three factors should make us cautiously optimistic about keeping Sino-American relations on the peaceful
The peaceful track does not, by any means, imply the absence of political
and economic conflicts in Sino-American relations, nor does it foreclose coercive diplomatic gambits by each against the
other. What it does mean is that the conditions are in place for war to be a low-probability event,
if policymakers are smart in both states (see below), and that an all-out war is nearly
impossible to imagine. By the historical standards of recent dominant-rising state dyads, this is no mean
feat. In sum, there will be some security dilemma dynamics at work in the U.S.-China
relationship, both over Taiwan and over maritime supremacy in East Asia, should China decide
eventually to contest America's maritime hegemony, and there will certainly be political and
military conflicts, but nuclear weapons should work to mute their severity because the
security of each state's homeland will never be in doubt as long as each maintains a second-strike capability
vis-a-vis the other. If two states cannot conquer one another, then the character of their relation
and their competition changes dramatically. These three benchmarks--China's ambitions will grow as its power
rather than the warlike track.
grows; the United States cannot successfully wage economic warfare against a China that pursues a smart reassurance (peaceful
rise) strategy; and Sino-American relations are not doomed to follow recent past rising-dominant power dyads--are the
starting points from which to analyze America's interests in East Asia. I now turn to these interests.
***Clean Tech Advantage
AT: Clean Tech (High)
The US is winning the clean tech race and has structural advantages over China
Bredenberg, 13 Al, writer, analyst, consultant, communicator, and specialist in the
investigation and articulation of complex topics “More Questions Raised About Whether U.S. or
China Dominates in Cleantech,” http://news.thomasnet.com/IMT/2013/03/25/more-questionsraised-about-whether-us-or-china-dominates-cleantech/
Conventional wisdom says that, when it comes to cleantech manufacturing, China is cleaning
the United States’s clock. We published a piece here at IMT Green & Clean Journal a few weeks ago implying exactly that.¶
So you can imagine our surprise when the Pew Charitable Trust’s Environmental Initiatives group
came out with a report this month claiming that the U.S. actually has a trade surplus over
China in solar photovoltaic (PV), wind and smart energy technologies . The report makes the contrarian
statement: “Considering all aspects of the value chain, U.S. exports and trade to China actually
exceeded Chinese exports to the United States by $1.63 billion in 2011,” 2011 being the latest year in which data were
available for the purposes of the report.¶ Overall, says Pew, the U.S. and China, the world’s leading economies, trade more than half
a trillion dollars in goods and services back and forth. In that big picture, China exported $4.00 in 2011 for every $1.00 by the U.S.,
reflecting “the reality that China is a low-cost producer and the United States a high-volume
consumer of finished products.Ӧ But in the area of clean energy technologies, the U.S. has
some advantages that aren’t reflected in that larger picture. Pew finds that, because of the country’s
expertise in innovation and entrepreneurship , U.S. firms “excel in production and sale of
complex, high-margin and performance-critical goods,” while “China’s strength is more narrowly
based on assembly and high-volume manufacturing.”
US Clean tech high and increasing with no signs of slowing down
Department of Energy 14 ("CLEAN TECH NOW," energy.gov/clean-tech-now, ADL)
America’s energy landscape is undergoing a dramatic transformation. According to a new
Energy Department report, falling costs for four clean energy technologies -- land-based wind
power, solar panels, electric cars and LED lighting -- have led to a surge in demand and
deployment. The numbers tell an exciting story: America is experiencing a historic shift to a
cleaner, more domestic and more secure energy future. That clean technology revolution is
here today -- and it is gaining force. Read the report Revolution Now: The Future for Four Clean Energy Technologies Watch a
video from Secretary Ernest Moniz and learn more about the report Read Secretary's Moniz blog post about the report and the Clean Tech Revolution
WIND ENERGY Wind
energy is the fastest growing source of power in the United States, creating
jobs opportunities for thousands of Americans and boosting economic growth. In 2012, U.S. wind
capacity topped 60 GW, enough energy to power more than 15 million homes. America's Wind Industry Reaches Record Highs Wind Farm Growth
Through the Years Blades of Glory: Wind Technology Bringing Us Closer To a Clean Energy Future Energy 101: Wind Turbines RESIDENTIAL SOLAR The
U.S. is on the verge of a major shift to solar energy, putting a clean, renewable energy source
within reach of the average American family. In 2012, rooftop solar panels cost about 1 percent of what they did 30 years
ago, and deployment is skyrocketing. Top 6 Things You Didn't Know About Solar Energy Energy 101: Solar Photovoltaics Energy
Department Support Brings Game-Changing Advancements in Solar Energy Finding Solutions to Solar's Soft Cost Dilemma Solar For Milwaukee, By
Milwaukee ELECTRIC VEHICLES Before
2010, there was effectively no demand for electric vehicles. In
2012, Americans bought more than 50,000 plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). And with battery costs falling more than
50 percent in the last four years, 2013 is set to be another banner year for PEVs. In the first half of 2013, Americans doubled the number of PEVs they
purchased compared to the same period in 2012, and last month, PEV sales reached a new record high. More than 11,000 PEVs were sold in August
2013 -- that's a 29 percent improvement in sales over the previous monthly record. Top 10 Things You Didn’t Know About Electric Vehicles The eGallon:
How Much Cheaper Is It to Drive on Electricity? Visualizing Electric Vehicle Sales Energy 101: Electric Vehicles LED LIGHTING Unlike traditional
incandescent bulbs, LED
lighting generates more light than heat and lasts as much as 25 times longer.
Once an expensive niche product, LED bulbs are becoming an affordable choice for Americans looking to reduce their electric bills. In 2012, about 49
million LEDs were installed in the U.S. -- saving about $675 million in annual energy costs. Switching entirely to LED lights
over the next two decades could save the U.S. $250 billion in energy costs and avoid 1,800
million metric tons of carbon pollution. Top 8 Things You Didn’t Know About LEDs LED Lighting Bright Lights and Even Brighter
Ideas Energy 101: Lumens A Winning Light Bulb With the Potential to Save the Nation Billions
US clean tech is at historically record highs
Clean Edge 13 (June 2013, "2013 U.S. Clean Tech Leadership Index,"
http://cleanedge.com/sites/default/files/CTLI-2013-Report.pdf, ADL)
Yet despite these negative factors, clean-tech deployment in the U.S. showed notable, and even historic, market
momentum during the year. Wind power, spurred in part by the then-looming expiration of
the federal production tax credit, grew by 28 percent with 13.1 gigawatts of new capacity installed in 2012,
bringing the U.S. past the 60 GW milestone in total wind power capacity for the first time. That
made wind energy the nation’s largest source of new generation capacity for the year, contributing 41 percent of the total – even more than
the 33 percent share of new generation capacity from natural gas. Overall, renewable energy (wind,
solar, geothermal, biomass, and others) accounted for 49 percent of the nation’s added electricity capacity,
its largest share ever. Solar PV in the U.S., spurred by continued price drops and ever-moreinnovative financing options, had its second straight banner growth year. Installed PV capacity
grew by 3,313 MW or 76 percent, with California becoming the first state to install more than 1,000 MW in a single year. The
geothermal power industry bounced back from recent doldrums, adding more than three
times as much new capacity in 2012 as the two previous years combined. This growth in clean
energy occurred with little significant new federal legislation or Congressional leadership. But clean-tech leadership at the state and metro
level tells a different, and much better, story. As we detail in the State Index, U.S. states – often politically conservative ones – are now rivaling
the world’s leading clean- tech nations for preeminence in many areas. Take Iowa and South Dakota. With
each state generating 24 percent of its utility-scale electricity from wind power in 2012, they trail only the country of Denmark (at 30 percent) for world
leadership in this critical clean-tech metric. And Iowa wind farms actually generate more power than those in Denmark – 13,945 GWh in 2012, as
compared to 11,637 GWh in Denmark (much less populous South Dakota generated 2,914 GWh from wind). An April 2013 report from the Union of
Concerned Scientists, “Ramping Up Renewables: Energy You Can Count On”, presented this type of “if states were countries” analysis. North Dakota
(with 15 percent of generation from wind) and Minnesota (14 percent) would also make this global top 10, just below Portugal’s 17 percent and Spain’s
16 percent. Global clean-tech powerhouse Germany generated 11 percent of its electricity from wind last year, but so did Kansas, Idaho, Colorado, and
Oklahoma. Germany, with a much larger population than most U.S. states, has much larger total power from wind – 61,204 GWh in 2012. The leading
U.S. state in total wind generation, Texas, reached 31,860 GWh. On peak wind days during the year, wind farms supplied 25 percent of the juice to the
grid in the Midwest, 30 percent to the Southwest Power Pool (Kansas, Oklahoma, and the Texas Panhandle), and 32 percent in the rest of Texas. The
nationwide generation percentage for the U.S., by contrast, was just three percent, although wind was the largest contributor of new capacity as noted
above. The
emergence of states as key global markets for clean-tech products and services has
not been lost on the industry, particularly with some states’ renewable portfolio standard (RPS) mandates, net-metering laws, and
other supportive policies under attack from fossil-fuel backed lobbyists and legislators. “The federal PTC is hugely important, but it is state policies that
drive our markets,” says Susan Innis, senior manager of public affairs for leading wind turbine maker Vestas North America.
AT: Clean Tech (Low)
Clean tech industry failing --- companies can’t keep up
Texier, 14 Maud, analyst on a power trading desk, she studied the market mechanisms that
can develop new demand-response models. She has been scouting new technologies such as
renewables, storage or energy efficiency for a large power utility in Silicon Valley before joining
a solar start-up., “The State Of The Cleantech Industry,”
http://cleantechnica.com/2014/02/11/state-cleantech-industry/
However, overproduction of solar cells and panels, combined with rapidly falling prices for that
and other reasons, led to the demise of numerous solar startups. Meanwhile, many European
countries, facing a financial crisis, stepped back and reduced its support for cleantech. The early growing
pains that face all industries as they mature also showed up. That included some innovators
going bankrupt or struggling to make it to their teenage years . Iconic cleantech companies
such as Fisker, Better Place, and A123 went bankrupt; a lot of other startups had poor exits
as they were struggling raising new funds.
AT: China Race
The Aff is just rhetoric – the US and China are engaged in a cooperative
framework
World Resources Insitute 12 - An issue convened by The World Resources Institute in the
ChinaFAQs (April 2012, "CLEAN TECH’S RISE, PART II: U.S.-China Collaboration in Public-Private
Partnerships," www.chinafaqs.org/files/chinainfo/ChinaFAQs_IssueBrief2_PPP.pdf, ADL)
As two of the world’s largest economies, competition between the United States and China
often obscures another reality: As the globe’s two biggest users of energy and producers of
greenhouse gases, the two nations have also long collaborated on efforts to develop and
scale-up cleaner energy technologies. U.S. business is widely engaged with Chinese businesses
in private business relations1 and also in public-private partnerships. Indeed, their overlapping
interests in clean energy have spawned a wide array of cooperative, public-private projects
that are delivering tangible benefits to both nations and the world at-large, including new markets for
U.S. companies, improvements in clean tech for both countries, lower global costs of controlling pollution and emissions, and new
opportunities for economic growth and jobs.2 A key feature of public-private partnerships is that U.S. businesses recognize the
benefits and are contributing funds to these initiatives. Government
agencies and companies in the U.S. and
China have been collaborating on energy and climate issues for a quarter-of-a-century, notes
Mark D. Levine, a senior scientist at the U.S. Department of Energy’s Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory who has been involved in U.S.-China energy partnerships for decades.3 China, for instance,
has gained key technical assistance from the U.S. that has helped it develop energy saving
standards for buildings,4 household appliances5 and autos.6 At the same time, U.S. government officials,
business executives and academics have gained extensive insight into China’s complex energy system and its
approach to policy-making, and have built working relationships with key decision-makers.7 Both nations
are gaining practical, hands-on experience developing and deploying new technologies – from carbon capture, utilization, and
storage (CCUS) to advanced wind turbines – due to China’s rapid economic growth. The
lessons learned, experts say, can help
build mutual trust and drive down the costs of these technologies worldwide.8 This
cooperation comes at a critical time for the health of the global climate. “If the Chinese don’t
dramatically reduce carbon emissions from coal, there’s no way we can make a dent in climate change globally in the time period
that matters,” says Kelly Sims Gallagher, Professor of Energy and Environmental Policy at Tufts University and ChinaFAQs expert.9
“Because the United States and China are the world’s top two greenhouse gas emitters, together accounting for more than 40% of
annual emissions, any solution requires both countries to transition to low-carbon economies,” writes Kenneth Lieberthal, a China
expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. “U.S.-China cooperation on climate change would have not only bilateral but
global benefits.” In
recent years, the two nations have expanded opportunities for collaboration
through a range of agreements and multilateral and bilateral organizations. In 2008, for instance,
building on a 30-year history of science and technology collaboration,11 the U.S. and China signed The Ten-Year
Framework Agreement on Energy and Environment, which identifies five areas of cooperation, including clean
and efficient electricity production and transmission, and clean transportation.12 In 2009, the two nations extended the Framework,
launching a wide-ranging package of cooperative efforts between private businesses, various Chinese ministries and U.S. agencies,
including the establishment of three U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Centers (focusing on electric vehicles, clean coal, and
buildings), an Energy Cooperation Partnership (ECP) working to match U.S. clean energy businesses with Chinese markets, the U.S.
China Renewable Energy Partnership, and others.13 Such efforts reflect the fact that “cooperation on clean energy and climate
change is now seen in both Washington and Beijing as a major issue in U.S.-China relations,” notes Kenneth Lieberthal. “The
world has awakened,” he adds, “to the potential for U.S.-China cooperation on clean energy and
climate change.”
The clean tech race is just politicized rhetoric – more likely that US and China
companies will cooperate
Pricewaterhouse Coppers 11 (January 2011, "The US-China cleantech connection: shaping
a new commercial diplomacy," www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/assets/us-china-cleantechconnection.pdf, ADL)
Competing “together” Behind the oft-politicized rhetoric of a so-called “cleantech race,” there also
exists a deepening, increasingly complex inter-dependence between US and Chinese cleantech
firms and the strong likelihood that more US and Chinese companies are finding intersections
of collaboration. “China and the US have become more dependent upon one another, as
greentech becomes more global—with companies from China, the US and EU working more
collaboratively,” said Ellen Pao, partner, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, a US venture capital firm which
invests in cleantech start-ups in China. The rapid growth of cleantech industries comes as China shifts as the world’s factory to a
maturing market keen on expanding its share of intellectual property assets and establishing global brands. Achieving
these
ambitions in many cases goes hand-in-hand with enlisting as partners US companies with the knowhow, technology and brands, for example companies offering higher-quality turbine technology, smart grid infrastructures, and
electric vehicle components and charging devices, to name a few. Such
partnerships are motivated by joint
ownerships and co-development of intellectual property assets, which could lead to two-way
paths of reciprocal access to markets.
US and Chinese markets are partnering in clean tech
Pricewaterhouse Coppers 11 (January 2011, "The US-China cleantech connection: shaping
a new commercial diplomacy," www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/assets/us-china-cleantechconnection.pdf, ADL)
The US and China have emerged as global leaders of cleantech, each placing big bets that aggressive
backing of emerging industries can achieve multiple goals of environmental protection, resource conservation and economic growth.
Cleantech’s quick rise among national priorities has effectively created new markets for clean energy and efficiency technologies.
Some of these may well take years and even decades to mature. Meanwhile, the
US and China are forging ahead
with ambitious build-outs in areas such as mega wind and solar plants, smart electricity grids
and green transportation infrastructures. Indeed, the potential scale and political urgency of these emerging
industries—along with ambitious national targets for roll-outs— bear a semblance of the Space Race of the 1960s. While
cleantech companies in both countries are in many cases locked in head-to-head competition to become major
players in these developments, there also exist intersections where US and Chinese companies are partnering in
ways that play to each other’s strengths while closely aligning with national clean energy
policies. Successful partnerships could potentially hold significant growth opportunities both within
and beyond US and Chinese markets.
AT: Warming Impact
No warming and not anthropogenic
Ferrara, 2012 (Peter, Director of Entitlement and Budget Policy for the Heartland Institute, Senior Advisor for
Entitlement Reform and Budget Policy at the National Tax Limitation Foundation, General Counsel for the American Civil
Rights Union, and Senior Fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis, served in the White House Office of Policy
Development, graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School , 5/31/2012, "Sorry Global Warming Alarmists, The Earth
Is Cooling," http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2012/05/31/sorry-global-warming-alarmists-the-earth-is-cooling/)
Climate change itself is already in the process of definitively rebutting climate alarmists who think human use of fossil fuels is causing ultimately catastrophic global
natural climate cycles have already turned from warming to cooling,
global temperatures have already been declining for more than 10 years , and global
temperatures will continue to decline for another two decades or more. That is one of the most interesting conclusions to come out
warming. That is because
of the seventh International Climate Change Conference sponsored by the Heartland Institute, held last week in Chicago. I attended, and served as one of the speakers,
serious natural science, contrary to the selfinterested political science you hear from government financed global warming alarmists seeking to
talking about The Economic Implications of High Cost Energy. The conference featured
justify widely expanded regulatory and taxation powers for government bodies, or government body wannabees, such as the United Nations. See for yourself, as the
you will see are calm, dispassionate presentations by serious,
pedigreed scientists discussing and explaining reams of data. In sharp contrast to these climate realists, the climate
alarmists have long admitted that they cannot defend their theory that humans are
causing catastrophic global warming in public debate. With the conference presentations online, let’s see if the alarmists really do
conference speeches are online. What
have any response. The Heartland Institute has effectively become the international headquarters of the climate realists, an analog to the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC). It has achieved that status through these international climate conferences, and the publication of its Climate Change Reconsidered volumes,
produced in conjunction with the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC). Those Climate Change Reconsidered volumes are an equivalently
thorough scientific rebuttal to the irregular Assessment Reports of the UN’s IPCC. You can ask any advocate of human caused catastrophic global warming what their
20th century
temperature record, and you will find that its up and down pattern does not follow the industrial
revolution’s upward march of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), which is the supposed central culprit for man caused global warming
(and has been much, much higher in the past). It follows instead the up and down pattern of naturally
response is to Climate Change Reconsidered. If they have none, they are not qualified to discuss the issue intelligently. Check out the
caused climate cycles. For example, temperatures dropped steadily from the late 1940s to the
late 1970s. The popular press was even talking about a coming ice age. Ice ages have cyclically occurred roughly every 10,000 years, with a new one actually due
around now. In the late 1970s, the natural cycles turned warm and temperatures rose until the late
1990s, a trend that political and economic interests have tried to milk mercilessly to their advantage. The incorruptible satellite measured global atmospheric
temperatures show less warming during this period than the heavily manipulated land surface temperatures. Central to these natural cycles is the Pacific Decadal
Every 25 to 30 years the oceans undergo a natural cycle where the colder
water below churns to replace the warmer water at the surface, and that affects global
temperatures by the fractions of a degree we have seen. The PDO was cold from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, and it was
Oscillation (PDO).
warm from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, similar to the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO). In 2000, the UN’s IPCC predicted that global temperatures would rise
by 1 degree Celsius by 2010. Was that based on climate science, or political science to scare the public into accepting costly anti-industrial regulations and taxes? Don
Easterbrook, Professor Emeritus of Geology at Western Washington University, knew the
answer. He publicly predicted in 2000 that global temperatures would decline by 2010. He made that prediction
because he knew the PDO had turned cold in 1999, something the political scientists at the UN’s IPCC did not know or did not think significant. Well, the results
are in, and the winner is….Don Easterbrook. Easterbrook also spoke at the Heartland conference, with a presentation entitled “Are
Forecasts of a 20-Year Cooling Trend Credible?” Watch that online and you will see how scientists are supposed to talk: cool, rational, logical analysis of the data, and full
All I ever see from the global warming alarmists, by contrast, is political public
relations, personal attacks, ad hominem arguments, and name calling, combined with
admissions that they can’t defend their views in public debate. Easterbrook shows that by 2010 the 2000
prediction of the IPCC was wrong by well over a degree , and the gap was widening .
explanation of it.
That’s a big miss for a forecast just 10 years away, when the same folks expect us to take seriously their predictions for 100 years in the future. Howard Hayden,
Professor of Physics Emeritus at the University of Connecticut showed in his presentation at the conference that based on the historical record a doubling of CO2 could
be expected to produce a 2 degree C temperature increase. Such a doubling would take most of this century, and the temperature impact of increased concentrations of
Easterbrook expects the
cooling trend to continue for another 2 decades or so. Easterbrook, in fact, documents 40 such
alternating periods of warming and cooling over the past 500 years, with similar data going back
15,000 years. He further expects the flipping of the ADO to add to the current downward trend. But that is not all. We are also currently experiencing
CO2 declines logarithmically. You can see Hayden’s presentation online as well. Because PDO cycles last 25 to 30 years,
a surprisingly long period with very low sunspot activity. That is associated in the earth’s history with
even lower, colder temperatures. The pattern was seen during a period known as the Dalton Minimum from 1790 to 1830, which saw
temperature readings decline by 2 degrees in a 20 year period, and the noted Year Without A Summer in 1816 (which may have had other contributing short term
causes). Even worse was the period known as the Maunder Minimum from 1645 to 1715, which saw only about 50 sunspots during one 30 year period within the cycle,
compared to a typical 40,000 to 50,000 sunspots during such periods in modern times. The Maunder Minimum coincided with the coldest part of the Little Ice Age,
which the earth suffered from about 1350 to 1850. The Maunder Minimum saw sharply reduced agricultural output, and widespread human suffering, disease and
impacts of the sun on the earth’s climate were discussed at the conference by
astrophysicist and geoscientist Willie Soon, Nir J. Shaviv, of the Racah Institute of Physics in the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Sebastian Luning, co-author with leading German environmentalist Fritz Vahrenholt of The Cold Sun.
Easterbrook suggests that the outstanding question is only how cold this present cold cycle will
get. Will it be modest like the cooling from the late 1940s to late 1970s? Or will the paucity of sunspots drive us all the way down to the Dalton Minimum, or even the
premature death. Such
Maunder Minimum? He says it is impossible to know now. But based on experience, he will probably know before the UN and its politicized IPCC.
Tech and adaptive advances prevent all climate impacts
Singer et al 2011 Dr. S. Fred Research Fellow at The Independent Institute, Professor Emeritus of Environmental
Sciences at the University of Virginia, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, a Fellow of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, and a Member of the International Academy of Astronautics; Robert M. Carter,
Research Professor at James Cook University (Queensland) and the University of Adelaide (South Australia), palaeontologist,
stratigrapher, marine geologist and environmental scientist with more than thirty years professional experience; and Craig D.
Idso, founder and chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, member of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Geophysical Union, American Meteorological Society,
Arizona-Nevada Academy of Sciences, and Association of American Geographers, et al, 2011, “Climate Change Reconsidered:
2011 Interim Report,” online: http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/2011/pdf/FrontMatter.pdf)
Decades-long empirical trends of climate-sensitive measures of human well-being,
including the percent of developing world population suffering from chronic hunger, poverty rates, and deaths due to extreme
weather events, reveal dramatic improvement during the twentieth century, notwithstanding the
historic increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations. The magnitude of the impacts of climate change
on human well-being depends on society's adaptability (adaptive capacity), which is determined
by, among other things, the wealth and human resources society can access in order to obtain, install,
operate, and maintain technologies necessary to cope with or take advantage of climate change
impacts. The IPCC systematically underestimates adaptive capacity by failing to take
into account the greater wealth and technological advances that will be present at
the time for which impacts are to be estimated. Even accepting the IPCC's and Stern Review's
worst-case scenarios, and assuming a compounded annual growth rate of per-capita GDP of only 0.7 percent, reveals
that net GDP per capita in developing countries in 2100 would be double the 2006
level of the U.S. and triple that level in 2200. Thus, even developing countries' future
ability to cope with climate change would be much better than that of the U.S. today .
The IPCC's embrace of biofuels as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions was premature, as many researchers have found
"even the best biofuels have the potential to damage the poor, the climate, and biodiversity" (Delucchi, 2010). Biofuel
production consumes nearly as much energy as it generates, competes with food crops and wildlife for land, and is unlikely to
ever meet more than a small fraction of the world's demand for fuels. The notion
cause war
and social unrest is not
that global warming might
only wrong, but even backwards
- that is,
global cooling has
led to wars and social unrest in the past, whereas global warming has coincided with periods
of
peace, prosperity, and
social
stability .
***Hegemony Advantage
AT: Naval Power Impact
Naval budget cuts extirpate naval readiness and prove no threshold exists for
their deterrence impact
Eaglen, 12 (Mackenzie, March 15th, “Obama’s Shift-to-Asia Budget is a Hollow Shell Game”
http://defense.aol.com/2012/03/15/crafty-pentagon-budget-showcases-marquisprograms-while-masking/)
Pentagon plans now retire seven cruisers and two dock landing ships at the same
time as the Navy is revising downward its 30-year shipbuilding plan. Military leaders have
been quick to point to the ten ships planned for construction over the next fiscal year. The problem is that this figure, as it
appeared in the FY 2012 budget, was supposed to be thirteen, not 10. In fact, in the 2012 budget, the Navy requested 57 ships
from 2013-2017. The new 2013 budget cuts this to 41 ships. It's hard to see how these dramatic cuts in fleet size fit into the
administration's pivot to Asia. Naval research and development do not fare much better. While the
Navy is to be commended on a getting some research initiatives right -- such as breaking out a new account for Future Naval
Capabilities focusing on advanced research and prototypes, increasing funding for the Littoral Combat Ship, and increasing
funding for the Marine Corps' Assault Vehicles -- many
of the Navy's RDT&E decisions do not
appropriately resource the rhetorical emphasis on the Pacific. The budget slices the
Power Projection Applied Research account by nearly 15%, affecting programs like
precision strike and directed energy weapons. Similarly, Force Protection Applied
Research dropped by 27%, cutting innovation in anti-submarine warfare and hull
assurance. A 28% cut in Electromagnetic Systems Applied Research affects initiatives
such as electronic attack, surface-based anti-cruise and ballistic missile defenses, and
the Surface Warfare Improvement Program, or SEWIP, which uses electronic warfare to disarm incoming missiles. Other R&D
cuts impact separate initiatives on anti-submarine warfare, undersea weapons, cyber security, electronic warfare, sensing,
SATCOM vulnerabilities, missile defense countermeasures, S and X-band radar integration, and radar defenses against
electronic attack. These programs form important parts of the Navy's next-generation arsenal, especially when it comes to the
Pentagon's evolving AirSea Battle concept. They
are exactly the type of programs the Pentagon
should be protecting if it is serious about emphasizing the unique challenges of the
Asia-Pacific. The fact that R&D money declined for these particular Navy programs is a disturbing sign for the overall
coherence of the administration's budget. While the Navy received a $4 billion increase in O&M funding from 2012, it could not
come soon enough. The
Navy has been stretched past the breaking point in terms of operational
readiness, with nearly one quarter of its ships failing their annual inspection in 2011
and cracks in the aluminum superstructure of every cruiser in the Navy's inventory.
The naval readiness crisis was so bad in 2011 that Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy told the
House Armed Services Committee that, "we're not good to go." Increased O&M funding for the Navy helps,
but more needs to be done in order to fix the fleet. It certainly does not help that the Navy is forced to pay nearly $900 million
to retire ships early while the fleet size is already too small. Various defense officials and military
chiefs
have testified recently that the services are sacrificing size of the force for either
readiness or quality. Given the rapidly rising levels of risk associated with the latest
defense budget cuts, it is likely both readiness and quality will decline despite the
Chiefs' best efforts.
Institutional alt causes outweigh
Cropsey 10 - (Seth, “The US Navy in Distress,” Strategic Analysis Vol. 34 No. 1, January
2010, pgs 35-45,
http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Cropsey_US_Navy_In_Distress.pdf)
In February 2009, the Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser U.S.S. Port Royal ran aground about
a half mile south of the Honolulu airport. The Navy’s investigation found that the
ship’s navigational gear was broken and that the ship’s fathometer wasn’t
functioning. In simple terms the bridge didn’t know where the ship was. The investigation
subsequently discovered that the
commanding officer was exhausted, sleep-deprived, and that
sailors who were nominally assigned to stand watch against such incidents were
assigned elsewhere in the ship to cover manning shortages. Two months later the Navy’s ironwilled Board of Inspection and Survey determined that problems with corrosion, steering, surface
ships’ firefighting systems, and anchoring were widespread throughout the Navy.
Asked by Defense News to comment on these findings five former commanding officers agreed that smaller crews,
reduced budgets, and fewer real-life training opportunities for over-worked crews
were important causes for this catalogue of affliction. It’s hardly a surprise. The Navy reported last
year that 11,300 sailors were supporting ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reduced budgets, efforts to
save money by cutting the size of crews, schemes to take up the slack with shore
services, and all manner of ‘labor-saving’ devices parallel and reflect the Navy’s increasingly
distressed fortunes since the end of the Cold War. The US Navy has not been as small as it is today since the administration of
William Howard Taft when the Royal Navy filled the international role that America’s naval forces eventually inherited and
currently possess. As suggested by the past two decades of declining navy procurement, the rising cost of ships, hints from the
Pentagon’s Quadrennial Review now underway that previous goals for fleet size are open to question, and the public’s focus on
the nation’s land wars in the Middle East, chances are that US naval shrinkage will continue.
The likelihood of a
much diminished navy coincides in time with every current prediction of large
global strategic change in the foreseeable future. Among National Intelligence Council estimates, Joint
Operating Environment forecasts, the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment’s studies, the UK Defence Ministry’s Development,
Concepts, and Doctrine Centre as well as similar predictive efforts undertaken by French and German national security
experts, there is a general consensus. Proliferation,
resource scarcity, environmental change, the
emergence of new international power centres including non-state actors,
significant changes in relative US power, failed states, and demographic change
point to an increasingly unstable future and challenging international strategic
environment. The common denominator in managing these problems is maritime power: force that can be applied to
the shore from the sea, used to protect against missile-borne as well as stealthier ocean-borne Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD), marshaled to alleviate the causes of massive immigration, and displayed to reassure allies and dissuade enemies .
Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have sucked the oxygen out of any serious effort to
understand the connection between the large changes that strategic planners see in
the future, Americans’ expectations that they will retain their ability to wield global
influence, the Navy’s role in maintaining such influence, and the US fleet’s slow
evanescence. No attempt to connect fleet shape and size to the unfolding strategic environment exists as a referent for
public debate. Indeed, civilian and military leadership maintains in the face of growing
demand for ships to defend against relatively low threats – like piracy – as well as very dangerous
ones – like the possibility of smuggled WMD reaching our shores – that ‘capability’ rather than number of ships is key to
accurately measuring our naval power. With
very few exceptions political leaders in both parties
do not ask fundamental questions. What role does naval power have in preserving
America’s position as the world’s great power in the middle of a fluid and troubling
strategic environment? Even with Congress and administration support how can the nation’s current maritime
strategy achieve its own goals, to say nothing of the global objectives that Theodore Roosevelt saw so clearly? The cooperative
arrangements with foreign navies envisioned by the Navy’s current maritime strategy may perhaps moderate problems of
failing states and terror. But is this enough to manage other challenges? Is the Navy’s current organization capable of
addressing both conventional and asymmetric threats? Can today’s highly structured and inflexible system for designing and
building ships adapt quickly and cost-effectively to changes in the strategic environment? What,
for example, do
globalization, the growing dependence of the United States on sea-borne transit for strategic
resources and minerals, and the likelihood of more dislocations such as continue from Somali piracy
mean for the future of US national security?
AT: Pharma Impact
Lack and R&D means pharmaceuticals fail to create innovative tech
Kessel 11 (Mark, Janurary 10th, Nature Biotechnology 29, “The problems with today’s
pharmaceutical business-an outsider’s view”,
http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v29/n1/full/nbt.1748.html)
Is there any doubt that the leading drug companies are in desperate need of reinvention?
Blockbuster drugs are coming off patent or being taken off the market for safety reasons and there
are no replacement drugs on the horizon to make up the shortfall in profits. Furthermore, healthcare reform is likely to
exacerbate the flaws in big pharma's traditional business model by imposing pay for performance, as is
already the case in Europe. To state the obvious, over the past decade, the pharmaceutical industry has brought few drugs to market
from its own development efforts. Commentators have stressed, and heads of big pharma have acknowledged, that
the
sector's R&D efforts need to be drastically changed. But alteration of the industry's culture and lumbering
decision-making process will be slow and challenging and will require bold leadership. Recognizing
that the R&D engine cannot be repaired rapidly to fuel growth, big pharma has taken several steps in dealing
with its diminished R&D productivity. First, it has looked to expand its markets geographically into developing countries; second, it
has increased its emphasis on generic drugs and biosimilars; and finally, it has sought to diversify by migrating into new product
categories. Although the foregoing steps will lessen the projected shortfall in revenues associated with the expiration of patents in
the coming years, the achievement of sustained growth in big pharma will of necessity depend to a large extent on another factor—
its ability to increase the productivity of internal R&D efforts, while at the same time bolstering the pipeline with drugs acquired
from the biotech sector. It
is clear that from its internal productivity alone big pharma is unlikely to
achieve the growth needed to fuel revenues. Successful implementation of this pipeline strategy
will require the management at each company to optimize its current internal R&D efforts and its approach to
acquiring drugs.
Loss of patents will cause pharmaceutical industry collapse
Kessel 11 (Mark, Janurary 10th, Nature Biotechnology 29, “The problems with today’s
pharmaceutical business-an outsider’s view”,
http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v29/n1/full/nbt.1748.html)
A major reason that big pharma must limit the number of compounds it introduces into its
pipeline is that spending on R&D places great pressure on earnings. The public equity markets
relentlessly focus on short-term performance and unduly punish companies that do not meet quarterly revenue
and earnings expectations. It has been reported that analyst expectations for the industry are so diminished
that they are now hoping that the pharmaceutical industry as a whole will reach a compounded
annual growth rate of 1% of revenues over the next five years. The loss of patents on blockbusters by
big pharma is a major concern. In the next five years, of the top 10 best-selling drugs in the world, 9 will go off patent,
and of the top 20, 18 will lose patent protection. As a result, ~$100 billion of sales will be lost during this period.
This number may be understated, given the recent safety issues associated with some blockbuster drugs, such as GlaxoSmithKline's
(GSK; Brentford, UK) diabetes drug Avandia (rosiglitazone). To compensate for these losses, big pharma has resorted to buying
revenues by means of acquisitions to replace declining sales. At the same time, sales of existing drugs are less likely to benefit from
direct-to-consumer advertising. Indeed, direct-to-consumer advertising will continue to garner greater scrutiny from regulators and
have less of a favorable impact on sales of new and existing products.
The pressure asserted by generics is causing
an ever-steeper decline in returns on marketing and sales on drugs coming off patent than was the
case in the past. It has not gone unnoticed by big pharma that generics sales have outpaced sales of the pharmaceutical industry
over the past ten years. This
has been driven by an increase of demand, the expiration of patents and
cost constraints imposed by governments and third-party payers. The expectation is that this trend will
continue into the future. With the patent cliff looming, generics will have many small-molecule blockbusters to target. Although
one of the anticipated benefits of healthcare reform for big pharma will be expanded coverage,
pay for performance will be an increasing issue. This legislation will put added pressure on product pricing from
government and third-party payers. GSK recently has reported a drop in profits, which it attributed to US healthcare reform and
European government 'austerity' measures that have had an impact on the drug industry1.
Regulations and scandals are an alt cause to the industry
Kessel 11 (Mark, Janurary 10th, Nature Biotechnology 29, “The problems with today’s
pharmaceutical business-an outsider’s view”,
http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v29/n1/full/nbt.1748.html)
Technology will make regulators and third-party payers better equipped to measure what
benefits patients are deriving from the drugs. The net effect is that governments and payers will continue to bear
down on prices, access, utilization and prescribing patterns. In addition, the pharmaceutical sector is going to be
faced with a more stringent regulatory pathway for approval of new drugs, as well as closer
government scrutiny of the continued marketing of existing drugs. There is little doubt that the regulators
are going to focus increasingly on patient safety and benefits when bringing new drugs to market3. The recent restrictions placed on
GSK's Avandia because of data indicating an association with heart toxicity points in this direction. The manner in which big pharma
is perceived in political circles will also have an impact on its future prospects. The US Congress portrays the industry as insensitive
to consumer safety. Indeed, the Obama Administration publicly vilified big pharma as part of its health reform initiative (while
simultaneously courting its participation in providing funds to close the so-called donut hole, a coverage gap in the 2003 Medicare
Part D health plan for prescription drugs).
Regulatory halting of sales of therapeutics for safety reasons,
poorly handled product recalls and the imposition of unprecedented criminal and civil fines (reaching $2.3 billion in
Pfizer's case), coupled with calls for CEOs to serve jail time for illegal drug promotion, settlements
relating to bilking healthcare programs by inflating drug prices and investigations of paying
bribes to boost sales and the development and marketing of drugs have also added to the
public's wariness of the sector. The net effect of a plummeting reputation—down in some surveys as low as the tobacco
and oil industries—has been to hurt the industry across numerous constituencies that have a bearing
on the prospects of its products, including governments, regulators and consumers. For these
reasons, the importance of disassociation and delineation from big pharma has not been lost on
the biotech industry.
AT: Competitiveness Impact
Even if we lose our competiveness American industry will still outpace
competitors
Qian, 2008—reporter of Yale Global [Jiang, February 29th, Is the Sun Setting on US Dominance?
– Part II, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=10435]
The proponents of such a "multipolar worldview" often confuse the immense potential of
their favored giants with their actual influences. They often overlook the immense internal
difficulties these rising giants must overcome to realize their potential. Most importantly,
they do not take full account of the strategic interactions between these giants during their
simultaneous rise and the strategic opportunities that such interactions present for the US.
Among the rising powers, the European Union boasts by far the largest economy, with a strong
currency and a comparatively large and prosperous population. However, after a long drive of expansion, Europe faces
a serious cohesion problem. It still suffers from a weak security framework that's dependent on NATO and a
legalistic rather than executive center in Brussels. Although the EU does chase strategic interests in its proximities such as the
central Asia and North Africa, it does so, not for any overreaching vision to compete globally, but mostly for parochial
economic reasons. Europe is not yet competing in any "Great Game," for the simple reason that Europe is not yet unified.
Recent rejections of the EU constitution show that serious resistance remains towards further integration. After recent
stabilization of its economy, a resurgent Russia is often mentioned as a future global power. However, Russia faces
severe long-term internal challenges. Its population is declining and aging, its vast Siberia
territories hollowing out after the end of Soviet subsidies. Extractive industries such as hydrocarbon,
mining and timber account for 80 percent of Russia's exports and 30 percent of its government revenue, whereas its
manufacturing industries are mostly outdated and uncompetitive. Russia therefore will have serious issues
with its self-image as a major world power, finding it hard to forge an assessment of its
global role commensurate with its long-term demographic and economic realities. Japan has a
similar problem of updating its self-image as the most "advanced" nation in Asia for more than 100 years. Today Japan
faces the harsh reality that, after its neighbors catch up, Japan will again find itself a
geographically small, resource-poor island nation dependent on trade, living uneasily
among large, populous continental neighbors. It has a largely pacifist, prosperous
population in a neighborhood still rife with nationalism. Unlike Europe, East Asia has yet to extinguish
historical grievances, border disputes and a taste for raw national powers. As Japan itself proved, economic rises, once
initiated, can be rapid indeed, so its current economic strength does not guarantee its future influence. Furthermore, barring a
rapid re-militarization, Japan's growth in national strengths is bound to be slower than that of its still maturing neighbors,
therefore its relative strategic position in East Asia will only grow weaker. Either re-militarization or an erosion
of its self-perceived leadership in the region is likely to require a profound reassessment of
Japan's postwar consensus of national purposes. India sees itself as an up-and-coming
power, proud to be a democracy yet simultaneously aspiring to more traditional "hard"
powers. As a diverse and still poor country, it faces immense internal challenges. Its
manufacturing base and infrastructure need major overhaul. Beyond these, India is limited
by its geographical constraint in the South Asia and the thorn in its side that’s Pakistan.
Sandwiched between Pakistan, Burma and the Himalayas, India’s ambition beyond the
subcontinent could not blossom until its geographical perimeter is secured. China borders
three of the ambitious giants – India, Russia and Japan. China's neighborhood is far tougher than that of
either Europe or the US. Like India, China is a large, poor country rife with internal tensions.
Unlike Europe or America, its current form of government does not enjoy wide ideological appeal.
Compared with Russia’s or even Japan’s, its military is still modernizing. It has recently
become fashionable in America and Europe to describe Chinese "expansions" in Africa and
South America. But the evidence is mostly economic deals over raw materials. This is not
expansionism, but mercantilism. China is indeed playing an active geopolitical game in its
immediate environment: Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Korea Peninsula. But this only
serves to show that China is still mired in local complexities.
AT: Disease Impact
Disease won’t cause extinction
Posner ‘5 (Richard, Judge 7th Circuit Court of Appeals (Richard, Skeptic, “Catastrophe”, 11:3, Proquest)
Yet the
fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the
200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on
extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death,
smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race.
There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they
are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if
the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly
natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that
AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that
would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the
past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which
would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make
it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in
medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and
cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a first time.
AT: Bioterror
No risk of a bioterror attack, and there won’t be retaliation - their evidence is
hype
MATISHAK ‘10 (Martin, Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Unlikely to Respond to
Biological Threat With Nuclear Strike, Experts Say,” 4-29,
http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100429_7133.php)
WASHINGTON -- The
United States is not likely to use nuclear force to respond to a
biological weapons threat, even though the Obama administration left open that option in its recent update to
the nation's nuclear weapons policy, experts say (See GSN, April 22). "The notion that we are in
imminent danger of confronting a scenario in which hundreds of thousands of people
are dying in the streets of New York as a consequence of a biological weapons attack is
fanciful," said Michael Moodie, a consultant who served as assistant director for multilateral affairs in the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency during the George H.W. Bush administration. Scenarios in which the
United States suffers mass casualties as a result of such an event seem "to be taking the
discussion out of the realm of reality and into one that is hypothetical and that
has no meaning in the real world where this kind of exchange is just not going to happen," Moodie said
this week in a telephone interview. "There are a lot of threat mongers who talk about
devastating biological attacks that could kill tens of thousands, if not millions of Americans," according to
Jonathan Tucker, a senior fellow with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "But in fact, no
country out there today has anything close to what the Soviet Union had in terms
of mass-casualty biological warfare capability. Advances in biotechnology are unlikely to change
that situation, at least for the foreseeable future." No terrorist group would be
capable of pulling off a massive biological attack, nor would it be deterred by the threat of
nuclear retaliation, he added. The biological threat provision was addressed in the Defense Department-led Nuclear Posture
Review, a restructuring of U.S. nuclear strategy, forces and readiness. The Obama administration pledged in the review that
the United States would not conduct nuclear strikes on non-nuclear states that are in compliance with global nonproliferation
regimes. However, the 72-page document contains a caveat that would allow Washington to set aside that policy, dubbed
"negative security assurance," if it appeared that biological weapons had been made dangerous enough to cause major harm to
the United States. "Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of biotechnology development,
the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and
proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat," the posture review report says. The
caveat was included in the document because "in theory, biological weapons could kill millions of people," Gary Samore, senior
White House coordinator for WMD counterterrorism and arms control, said last week after an event at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. Asked if the White House had identified a particular technological threshold that could
provoke a nuclear strike, Samore replied: "No, and if we did we obviously would not be willing to put it out because countries
would say, 'Oh, we can go right up to this level and it won't change policy.'" "It's deliberately ambiguous," he told Global
Security Newswire. The document's key qualifications have become a lightning rod for criticism by Republican lawmakers
who argue they eliminate the country's previous policy of "calculated ambiguity," in which U.S. leaders left open the possibility
of executing a nuclear strike in response to virtually any hostile action against the United States or its allies (see GSN, April 15).
Yet experts
say there are a number of reasons why the United States is not
likely to use a nuclear weapon to eliminate a non-nuclear threat. It could
prove difficult for U.S. leaders to come up with a list of appropriate targets to
strike with a nuclear warhead following a biological or chemical event, former Defense Undersecretary for Policy Walter
Slocombe said during a recent panel discussion at the Hudson Institute. "I don't think nuclear weapons are necessary to deter
these kinds of attacks given U.S. dominance in conventional military force," according to Gregory Koblentz, deputy director of
the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University in Northern Virginia. "There's a bigger downside to the nuclear
nonproliferation side of the ledger for threatening to use nuclear weapons in those circumstances than there is the benefit of
actually deterring a chemical or biological attack," Koblentz said during a recent panel discussion at the James Martin Center.
The nonproliferation benefits for restricting the role of strategic weapons to
deterring nuclear attacks outweigh the "marginal" reduction in the country's
ability to stem the use of biological weapons, he said. In addition, the United States has efforts in
place to defend against chemical and biological attacks such as vaccines and other medical countermeasures, he argued. " We
have ways to mitigate the consequences of these attacks," Koblentz told the audience.
"There's no way to mitigate the effects of a nuclear weapon." Regardless of the declaratory
policy, the U.S. nuclear arsenal will always provide a "residual deterrent" against mass-casualty biological or chemical attacks,
according to Tucker. "If a biological or chemical attack against the United States was of such a magnitude as to potentially
warrant a nuclear response, no attacker could be confident that the U.S. -- in the heat of the moment -- would not retaliate with
nuclear weapons, even if its declaratory policy is not to do so," he told GSN this week during a telephone interview. Political
Benefits Experts are unsure what, if any, political benefit the country or President Barack Obama's sweeping nuclear
nonproliferation agenda will gain from the posture review's biological weapons caveat. The report's reservation "was an
unnecessary dilution of the strengthened negative security and a counterproductive elevation of biological weapons to the
same strategic domain as nuclear weapons," Koblentz told GSN by e-mail this week. "The
United States has
nothing to gain by promoting the concept of the biological weapons as 'the
poor man's atomic bomb,'" he added.
AT: Industrial Base
Lack of experience and structural problems to the industrial base
Watts 8 (Barry, September 19th, “The US Defense Industrial Base: Past, Present, and
Future”, http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2008.10.15-Defense-Industrial-Base.pdf)
Design and manufacturing experience among companies has declined over the past few decades
because of the decreasing frequency of new starts, cutbacks in existing programs, retirements
from the work force, and reductions in company elaborate facilities. With declining manufacturing experience and truncate
productions runs, it has become more difficult for companies to estimate accurately the costs of
producing major systems over the course of multi-year production run For example, one tendency has been to
overestimate the savings during production as efficiency improves due to learning from one unit to the next. Learning-cm^ theory,
originally based on aircraft production experience during the 1930s an late 1940s, holds that as the number of units produced
doubles, the recurring co: per unit decreases at a fixed rate or constant percentage.123 Optimistic assumption
about
manufacturing learning curves present an obvious temptation to low-ba production costs.> Since at
least the 1960s, US companies have been inclined to over-promise and underbid on major defense
programs in order to win competitions. The decline in new starts since the 1980s seems to have accentuated this problem,
giving rise to the term "dysfunctional competitions." As a Defense Science Board task force observed in 2000. the
''remaining defense-focused companies are competing for fewer new major programs, limiting
their growth potential and making each new program a 'must win'."124 The result has been lower margins,
greater risk, and more cost overruns in major defense programs. Here both the industry and government are
at fault—the former for being unable to resist underbidding programs, and the latter for not exercising more control over major
competitions.
Industry Fails
Watts 8 (Barry, September 19th, “The US Defense Industrial Base: Past, Present, and
Future”, http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2008.10.15-Defense-Industrial-Base.pdf)
While the overall performance of US military technologies and weapon systems has been excellent, the industry has
failed, on more than one occasion, to provide systems with the promised capabilities, or only
done so after following delays, increased costs, or both. Recent examples of major program failures
stemming from cost overruns, schedule slippage, or performance include termination of the
National Reconnaissance Office's (NRO's) Future Imagery Architecture program,"6 termination of Army - Navy Aerial
Common Sensor, and the scrapping of the Coast Guard's Deepwater program to produce the first new coastguard
cutters in more than three decades."7 It is difficult to assess the full extent of these various program shortfalls because they
can often be dealt with by government actions such as making available additional funding available, altering requirements to
avoid acknowledging shortfalls, or stretching out programs until technical problems have been resolved. Moreover, program
terminations—the most glaring manifestation of acquisition difficulties — can also be chosen by the government to release
funds for other uses or because products are no longer needed. In the case of FIA, however, the government's assessment of
the two proposals was surely questionable. Whereas Boeings proposal for producing a new generation of electro-optical and
radar-imaging reconnaissance satellites was evidently superior to Lockheed Martin's, the government's judgment about
Boeing s ability to match LM's four decades of experience and success in this area appears, in hindsight, to have been poor. As
then-NRO director Keith Hall later said about the selection of Boeing, "I shouldn't have allowed it to go further.""8 The
dominant criticism of the weapons and systems produced by the defense industry is that programs either cost too much to
start with, or their costs increase during development and production. Studies by the government and others
have
identified a number of causes, including overly optimistic bidding in proposals, errors in
engineering and management, government changes in performance requirement, and the
inherent complexity of advanced military capabilities that "stretch the boundaries" of
proven technology For example: • As much as 40 percent of program cost overruns can be correlated to changes in
annual buys imposed by top-level members of the DoD/Executive branch or Congress. These factors are generally beyond the
control of government or industry program managers.119 • Significant percentages
of cost overruns result
from discrepancies or shortfalls in the program's initial baseline requirements. The need for
such changes can be legitimate responses to evolving threats and enemy capabilities. They can also reflect
bureaucratic difficulties such as the lack of coordination or foresight within the government
or contractor team.
Industrial base not key to military dominance
Watts 8 (Barry, September 19th, “The US Defense Industrial Base: Past, Present, and
Future”, http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2008.10.15-Defense-Industrial-Base.pdf)
Of course, this impression of the US defense
industry's ability to support American military strategy is not
without blemishes. The defense industry has exhibited short- falls in at least two areas. First, in certain
cases other nations—including the former Soviet Union—have produced weapon systems offering
comparable, or even superior, tactical performance at substantially lower unit costs than their US
counterparts. Most often mentioned in this regard are small arms, mortars, air defense guns and surface-to-air missiles. For
instance, the 7.62-millimeter Kalashmkov AK-47 assault rifle, initially adopted by the Soviet army in 1949, was simple and
inexpensive to man- ufacture yet provided legendary ruggedness and negligible failure rates. By compari- son, when the American
5.56-mm XM16E1 (renamed the M16 upon adoption by the US Army) entered service in Vietnam in 1966, reports of jamming and
malfunctions in combat surfaced almost immediately, and modifications of the rifle were needed to overcome these deficiencies.
Even today, assault rifles of the Kalaslmikov family are estimated to constitute one fifth of the worldwide supply of firearms and are
found in "practically every theatre of insurgency or guerrilla combat."109 Similarly, the premier US fighter of the Vietnam era, the
technologically more advanced McDonnell Douglas F-4, cost four times more than the Soviet MiG-21, but the smaller, lighter MiG
was a superior dogfighter in horizontal-plane, turning fights, especially at higher altitudes.110 To defeat the MiG-21's superior
turning ability, F-4 crews had to master the more difficult techniques of maneuvering in the vertical plane so that they could take
advantage of the F-4's superior thrust-to-weight and raw power."1 In the early 1970s, comparisons such as these led some observers
to wonder whether the United States might be pricing itself out of the competition with the Soviets by emphasizing technologically
sophisticated but more expensive weaponry.112 While
US combat experience during major operations in
1991, 2001-2002, and 2003 against Iraqi, Taliban, and al Qaeda forces suggest that the United
States produces some of the world's best weaponry the unit-acquisition price of the F-22, which
is over $300 mil- lion per jet, has limited the buy to 175 operational aircraft. Along these same lines, the US Navy's recent
decision to limit the planned buy of seven DDG-1000 Zumwalt-classdestroyers to the first two ships due to unit prices over $3 billion
only reinforces longstanding concerns about the ballooning unit costs of advanced US weapon systems."3 Second,
the
American defense industry has also been unable to develop technologies and systems to
alleviate some of the most pressing challenges of ground combat, such as jungle warfare, urban combat,
guerrilla or irregular warfare and peacekeeping. More than 80 percent of all US military personnel killed in combat during the last
fifty years have been in the ground forces of the Army and Marine Corps."4
Of course, industry's inability to achieve
much greater survivability for American soldiers and marines may stem more from the inherently
complex, messy nature of ground combat than from a failure to exploit emerging technologies
or design better equipment. Nevertheless, this vulnerability, which insurgents and suicide bombers have exploited in Iraq
and Afghanistan, has been a significant constraint on US foreign policy and flexibility since the 9/11
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon; until technologies or weapons capable of eliminating Clausewitzian friction
are discovered —which seems highly unlikely even in principle—inflicting casualties on US forces will continue to be a viable
stratagem for America's enemies."5
AT: Manufacturing
Manufacturing doesn’t solve anything- the jobs are poor-performing and they
are not capable of competing for innovation ***Read all highlighting
Yglesias 12 [Matthew Yglesias is Slate's business and economics correspondent. Before joining
the magazine he worked for ThinkProgress, the Atlantic, TPM Media, and the American
Prospect, Slate, “Forget the Factories”, April 2012]
While Facebook was buying Instagram on Monday, a couple of my favorite wonky policy journalists were hailing the
White House’s plans to revive American manufacturing. Specifically, Ed Luce from the Financial Times and Ezra
Klein of the Washington Post were both very taken with National Economic Council director Gene Sperling’s recent speech (PDF)
that attempted to put some analytic meat on the bones of President Obama’s manufacturing-heavy State of the Union address. I
don’t share their enthusiasm. The extra effort that went into Sperling’s speech raises the
troubling possibility that these ideas will actually guide policy in a second term rather than simply serve
as props in a re-election campaign. It is sensible for public policy to pay attention to the creation of great firms, to strength in
specific sectors, and to the quality of the jobs generated by different economic models.
But it should be obvious that
the path forward for America is to focus on our strengths in information technology and
media, and not compete with the Chinese for manufacturing supremacy . Klein’s gloss on Sperling’s
argument is that there's “a market failure” regarding manufacturing in which an open marketplace “is failing to appropriately
price the benefits of manufacturing firms.” So America should push for more manufacturing jobs because
such jobs are worth more than they appear to be worth. Such things can happen. An unregulated market leads
to overproduction of air pollution, so you need to tax it, and underinvestment in children’s education, so you need to subsidize it. If
an unregulated marketplace underproduces manufacturing firms or establishments, then we should subsidize factories just like
case rests on two main legs—externalities associated with r esearch and
d evelopment and externalities associated with what’s known as “agglomeration.” The basic idea in
both cases is that spillovers from manufacturing benefit the rest of the economy. On the R and D
front, it’s clear that companies that come up with great ideas can’t capture them all. New
schools. Sperling’s
inventions prompt imitators and new processes have a way of leaking out as workers switch
jobs . When flat panel high-definition televisions came onto the market, it wasn’t just one company that knew how to make them.
R and D spillover . Agglomeration spillover helps explain why
the two most successful TV makers are both in South Korea. It’s not just a weird coincidence, it’s something
Suddenly everyone was making them. That’s
you see all the time. Sperling notes that researchers have found that “spillover benefits decline with distance, indeed by over half
when they are more than 700 miles away” and tend not to cross national boundaries. That’s because spillovers are fundamentally
made of people—gossip over dinner, workers and managers drifting from one firm to another, casual inspection of the other guy’s
setup, etc.—and people don’t move around that much. Long story short, if the awesomest, most innovative widget-making factory
in the world is in your country, that gives you a huge leg up on your odds of becoming home to a disproportionate share of the next
10 awesome widget factories. The
problem is that none of this has much to do with manufacturing. If
you want to subsidize R and D, then subsidize R and D—there’s no need for the backdoor of an
across-the-board subsidy to factory owners regardless of how much R and D they actually do. On
agglomeration, the irrelevance of manufacturing per se is even clearer. It’s not a coincidence that Twitter, Apple,
Google, and Facebook are all located on a narrow corridor between San Jose, Calif. and San
Francisco, that all the movie studios are in Los Angeles, or that nonlocal journalism happens overwhelmingly in
New York and Washington, D.C. Industry clusters happen in all sectors. But if you look at America’s metropolitan
areas, it’s clear that manufacturing-oriented places are relatively poor . The wealthy clusters in
the United States are built around things like software, biotechnology and medical devices, higher
education, finance, and business services. Places like California, Minneapolis, Seattle, and the Northeast corridor are far richer than
the factory-oriented Rust Belt and Southeast. Sperling notes that “if
an auto plant opens up, a Wal-Mart can be
expected to follow,” but that opening a Wal-Mart doesn’t bring an auto plant. But, again, this
highlights the need for communities to have firms that are competitive in global markets, not
manufacturers per se. A global firm—be it Ford or Amazon or Paramount—calls into being a local economy of shops and
barbers. But the road to a more prosperous America is to learn from the most prosperous parts of
the country, not to imitate Chinese clusters that are even poorer than America’s industrial hubs.
The potential of America’s most productive places is tragically limited by restrictive zoning policies that keep the cost of living high
and population growth low. The number of American students getting degrees in computer science and other technical fields is
actually falling even as the number of people going to college grows. Short-sighted politicians are underinvesting in the
transportation infrastructure even as people need to access our most vibrant labor markets. These kinds of issues don’t do as good a
job of addressing the anxieties of Midwestern swing state voters as visits to lock-making factories, but creating new billion-dollar
software startups has a lot more to do with the future of American prosperity. The
scary thing about the factorydriven view of the American future is that it’s not totally implausible . The “insourcing” trend
where firms move production back to North America is real enough. The drivers are rising
Chinese wages and falling “unit labor costs” in the United States. But that’s just a way of
saying that America can regain factory parity with China by eliminating the prosperity
gap between our two countries —a very strange policy aspiration. Most likely there’s nothing we can
do to prevent some narrowing of the gap, which will have the consequence of bringing some jobs back. But we should
measure our success by the extent to which this doesn’t happen, and we instead build and
expand new industries that push living standards up and keep factory owners searching
abroad for cheap labor.
AT: Food Shortages
New tech and advancements means that food production will continue
to increase.
Zubrin 11 (Dr. Robert Zubrin, president of Pioneer Astronautics, Senior Fellow with the
Center for Security Policy “WHY IT’S WRONG TO AGREE WITH THE MALTHUSIANS ABOUT
ETHANOL” May 13, 2011http://www.ilcorn.org/daily-update/182-why-it-rsquo-s-wrongto-agree-with-the-malthusians-about-ethanol/)//
In an op-ed article printed in the Denver Post May 8, editorial columnist Vince Carroll endorsed the view of population control
advocate Lester Brown that the U.S. corn ethanol program is threatening the world’s poor with starvation. This endorsement is
especially remarkable in view of the fact that, as the otherwise generally astute Mr. Carroll has correctly noted many times in
the past, all of Lester Brown’s many previous
limited-resources doomsday predictions
have proven wildly incorrect. In fact, Lester Brown is wrong about the alleged famine-inducing potential of
the ethanol program for exactly the same reason he has been repeatedly wrong about the alleged famine-inducing potential of
population growth. There
is not a fixed amount of grain in the world. Farmers
produce in response to demand. The more customers, the more grain. Not only that,
but the larger the potential market, the greater the motivation for investment
in improved techniques. This is why, despite the fact that the world population
has indeed doubled since Lester Brown, Paul Ehrlich, and the other population
control zealots first published their manifestos during the 1960s, people
worldwide are eating much better today than they were then. In the case of America’s
corn growing industry, the beneficial effect of a growing market has been especially pronounced, with corn yields per acre in
2010 (165 bushels per acre) being 37 percent higher than they were in 2002 (120 bushels per acres) and more than four times
as great as they were in 1960 (40 bushels per acre.) Not
only that, but in part because of the
impetus of the expanded ethanol program, another doubling of yield is now in
sight, as the best farms have pushed yields above 300 bushels per acre. As a result,
in 2010, the state of Iowa alone produced more corn than the entire United States did in 1947. Of our entire corn crop, only 2
percent is actually eaten by Americans as corn, or 12 percent if one includes products like corn chips and corn syrup. These
advances in productivity do not only benefit the United States. America’s farmers are the vanguard for their counterparts
worldwide. New
seed strains and other techniques first demonstrated on our most
advanced farms, subsequently spread to average farms, and then go global,
thereby raising crop yields everywhere.
There is no plausible scenario for resource wars
Victor, a Senior Fellow at the Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies the Woods Institute for the
Environment, 2007 (David. “What Resource Wars?” November 1. http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-7344601/Whatresource-wars-From-Arabia.html)
THE SECOND surge in thinking about resource wars comes from all the money
that is pulsing into resource-rich countries. There is no question that the revenues are huge.
OPEC cashed $650 billion for 11.7 billion barrels of the oil it sold in 2006, compared with $110 billion in 1998, when it
sold a similar quantity of oil at much lower prices. Russia's Central Bank reports that the country earned more than
$300 billion selling oil and gas in 2006, about four times its annual haul in the late 1990s. But will this flood in rents
cause conflict and war? There
is no question that large revenues--regardless of the source--can
fund a lot of mischievous behavior. Iran is building a nuclear-weapons program with the revenues
from its oil exports. Russia has funded trouble in Chechnya, Georgia and other places with oil and gas rents. Hugo
Chavez opened Venezuela's bulging checkbook to help populists in Bolivia and to poke America in ways that could
rekindle smoldering conflicts. Islamic terrorists also have benefited, in part, from oil revenues that leak out of oil-rich
societies or are channeled directly from sympathetic governments. But
resource-related conflicts are
multi-causal. In no case would simply cutting the resources avoid or halt
conflict, even if the presence of natural resources can shift the odds. Certainly, oil
revenues have advanced Iran's nuclear program, which is a potential source of hot conflict
and could make future conflicts a lot more dangerous. But a steep decline in oil probably
wouldn't strangle the program on its own. Indeed, while Iran still struggles to make a bomb,
resource-poor North Korea has already arrived at that goal by starving itself and getting help from friends.
Venezuela's checkbook allows Chavez to be a bigger thorn in the sides of those he dislikes, but there are other thorns
that poke without oil money. As we see, what matters is not just money but how it is used.
While Al-Qaeda conjures images of an oil-funded network--because it hails from the resource-rich Middle East and its
seed capital has oily origins--other lethal terror networks, such as Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers and Ireland's Republican
Army, arose with funding from diasporas rather than oil or other natural resources. Unlike modern state armies that
require huge infusions of capital, terror networks are usually organized to make the most of scant funds. During the
run-up in oil and gas prices, analysts have often claimed that these revenues will go to fund terror networks; yet it is
sobering to remember that Al-Qaeda came out in the late 1990s, when oil earnings were at their lowest in recent
history. Most of the tiny sums of money needed for the September 11 attacks came from that period. Al-Qaeda's
daring attacks against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania occurred when oil-rich patrons were fretting about
the inability to make ends meet at home because revenues were so low. Ideology and organization trump money as
driving forces for terrorism. Most thinking about resource-lubed conflict has concentrated on the ways that windfalls
from resources cause violence by empowering belligerent states or sub-state actors. But the chains of cause and effect
are more varied. For states with weak governance and resources that are easy to grab, resources tend to make weak
states even weaker and raise the odds of hot conflict. This was true for Angola's diamonds and Nigeria's oil, which in
both cases have helped finance civil war. For states with stable authoritarian governments--such as Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, most of the rest in the western Gulf, and perhaps also Russia and Venezuela--the problem may be the opposite.
A sharp decline in resource revenues can create dangerous vacuums where expectations are high and paltry
distributions discredit the established authorities. On balance, the windfall in oil revenues over recent years is
probably breeding more conflict than would a crash in prices. However, while a few conflicts partly trace themselves
to resources, it is the other pernicious effects of resource windfalls, such as the undermining of democratic transitions
and the failure of most resource-reliant societies to organize their economies around investment and productivity,
that matter much, much more. At best, resources have indirect and mixed effects on conflict. Climate Dangers THE
THIRD avenue for concern about coming resource wars is through the dangers
of global climate change. The litany is now familiar. Sea levels will rise, perhaps a lot; storms will probably
become more intense; dry areas are prone to parch further and wet zones are likely to soak longer. And on top of
those probable effects, unchecked climate change raises the odds of suffering nasty surprises if the world's climate
and ecosystems respond in abrupt ways. Adding all that together, the scenarios are truly disturbing. Meaningful action
to stem the dangers is long overdue.In
the United States over the last year, the traditional
security community has become engaged on these issues. Politically, that conversion has
been touted as good news because the odds of meaningful policy are higher if hawks also favor action. Their concerns
are seen through the lens of resource wars, with fears such as: water shortages that amplify grievances and trigger
conflict; migrations of "climate refugees", which could stress border controls and also cause strife if the displaced
don't fit well in their new societies; and diseases such as malaria that could be harder to contain if tropical conditions
are more prevalent, which in turn could stress health-care systems and lead to hot wars.While there are many reasons
to fear global warming, the
risk that such dangers could cause violent conflict ranks
extremely low on the list because it is highly unlikely to materialize. Despite
decades of warnings about water wars, what is striking is that water wars
don't happen--usually because countries that share water resources have a lot
more at stake and armed conflict rarely fixes the problem. Some analysts have pointed to
conflicts over resources, including water and valuable land, as a cause in the Rwandan genocide, for example.
Recently, the UN secretary-general suggested that climate change was already exacerbating the conflicts in Sudan. But
none of these supposed causal chains stay linked under close scrutiny--the
conflicts over resources are usually symptomatic of deeper failures in
governance and other primal forces for conflicts, such as ethnic tensions,
income inequalities and other unsettled grievances. Climate is just one of many factors that
contribute to tension. The same is true for scenarios of climate refugees, where the
moniker "climate" conveniently obscures the deeper causal forces. The dangers of
disease have caused particular alarm in the advanced industrialized world, partly because microbial threats are good
fodder for the imagination. But none of these scenarios hold up because the scope of all climate-sensitive diseases is
mainly determined by the prevalence of institutions to prevent and contain them rather than the raw climatic factors
that determine where a disease might theoretically exist. For example, the threat industry has flagged the idea that a
growing fraction of the United States will be malarial with the higher temperatures and increased moisture that are
likely to come with global climate change. Yet much of the American South is already climatically inviting for malaria,
and malaria was a serious problem as far north as Chicago until treatment and eradication programs started in the
19th century licked the disease. Today, malaria is rare in the industrialized world, regardless of climate, and whether
it spreads again will hinge on whether governments stay vigilant, not so much on patterns in climate. If Western
countries really cared about the spread of tropical diseases and the stresses they put on already fragile societies in the
developing world, they would redouble their efforts to tame the diseases directly (as some are now doing) rather than
imagining that efforts to lessen global warming will do the job. Eradication usually depends mainly on strong and
responsive governments, not the bugs and their physical climate. Rethinking Policy IF RESOURCE
wars are
actually rare--and when they do exist, they are part of a complex of causal factors--then much of the
conventional wisdom about resource policies needs fresh scrutiny. A full-blown new strategy is beyond this modest
essay, but here in the United States, at least three lines of new thinking are needed.First, the United States needs to
think differently about the demands that countries with exploding growth are making on the world's resources. It
must keep their rise in perspective, as their need for resources is still, on a per capita basis, much smaller than typical
Western appetites. And what
matters most is that the United States must focus on how to
accommodate these countries' peaceful rise and their inevitable need for
resources. Applied to China, this means getting the Chinese government to view efficient markets as the best way
to obtain resources--not only because such an approach leads to correct pricing (which encourages energy efficiency
as resources become more dear), but also because it transforms
all essential resources into
commodities, which makes their particular physical location less important
than the overall functioning of the commodity market. All that will, in turn, make
resource wars even less likely because it will create common interests among
all the countries with the greatest demand for resources. It will transform the
resource problem from a zero-sum struggle to the common task of managing
markets. Most policymakers agree with such general statements, but the actual practice of U.S. policy has largely
undercut this goal. Saber-rattling about CNOOC'S attempt to buy Unocal--along with similar fear-mongering around
foreign control of ports and new rules that seem designed to trigger reviews by the Committee on Foreign Investment
in the United States when foreigners try to buy American-owned assets--sends the signal that going out will also be
the American approach, rather than letting markets function freely. Likewise, one of the most important actions in the
oil market is to engage China and other emerging countries fully in the International Energy Agency-which is the
world's only institution for managing the oil commodity markets in times of crisis--yet despite wide bipartisan
consensus on that goal, nearly nothing is ever done to execute such a policy. Getting China to source commodities
through markets rather than mercantilism will be relatively easy because Chinese policymakers, as well as the
leadership of state enterprises that invest in natural resource projects, already increasingly think that way. The
sweep of history points against classic resource wars. Whereas colonialism created long,
oppressive and often war-prone supply chains for resources such as oil and rubber, most resources today
are fungible commodities. That means it is almost always cheaper and more
reliable to buy them in markets. At the same time, much higher expectations must be placed on China
to tame the pernicious effects of its recent efforts to secure special access to natural resources. Sudan, Chad and
Zimbabwe are three particularly acute examples where Chinese (and in Sudan's case, Indian) government
investments, sheltered under a foreign-policy umbrella, have caused harm by rewarding abusive governments. That
list will grow the more insecure China feels about its ability to source vital energy and mineral supplies. Some of what
is needed is patience because these troubles will abate as China itself realizes that going out is an expensive strategy
that buys little in security. Chinese state oil companies are generally well-run organizations; as they are forced to pay
the real costs of capital and to compete in the marketplace, they won't engage in these strategies. The best analog is
Brazil's experience, where its state-controlled oil company has become ever smarter--and more market oriented--as
the Brazilian government has forced it to operate at arm's length without special favors. That has not only allowed
Petrobras to perform better, but it has also made Brazil's energy markets function better and with higher
security.Beyond patience, the West can help by focusing the spotlight on dangerous practices--clearly branding them
the problem. There's some evidence that the shaming already underway is having an effect--evident, for example, in
China's recent decision to no longer use its veto in the UN Security Council to shield Sudan's government. At the same
time, the West can work with its own companies to make payments to governments (and officials) much more
transparent and to close havens for money siphoned from governments. Despite many initiatives in this area, such as
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the now-stalled attempt by some oil companies to "Publish What
You Pay", little has been accomplished. Actual support for such policies by the most influential governments is
strikingly rare. America is notably quiet on this front. With regard to the flow of resources to terrorists--who in turn
cause conflicts and are often seen as a circuitous route to resource wars--policymakers must realize that this channel
for oil money is good for speeches but perhaps the least important reason to stem the outflow of money for buying
imported hydrocarbons. Much more consequential is that the U.S. call on world oil resources is not sustainable
because a host of factors--such as nationalization of oil resources and insecurity in many oil-producing regions--make
it hard for supply to keep pace with demand. This yields tight and jittery markets and still-higher prices. These
problems will just get worse unless the United States and other big consumers temper their demand. The goal should
not be "independence" from international markets but a sustainable path of consumption. When the left-leaning
wings in American politics and the industry-centered National Petroleum Council both issue this same warning about
energy supplies--as they have over the last year--then there is an urgent need for the United States to change course.
Yet Congress and the administration have done little to alter the fundamental policy incentives for efficiency. At this
writing, the House and Senate are attempting to reconcile two versions of energy bills, neither of which, strikingly, will
cause much fundamental change to the situation.Cutting the flow of revenues to resource-rich governments and
societies can be a good policy goal, but success will require American policymakers to pursue strategies that they will
find politically toxic at home. One is to get serious about taxation. The only durable way to rigorously cut the flow of
resources is to keep prices high (and thus encourage efficiency as well as changes in behavior that reduce dependence
on oil) while channeling the revenues into the U.S. government treasury rather than overseas. In short, that means a
tax on imported oil and a complementary tax on all fuels sold in the United States so that a fuel import tax doesn't
simply hand a windfall to domestic producers. And if the United States (and other resource consumers) made a
serious effort to contain financial windfalls to natural-resources exporters, it would need--at the same time--to
confront a more politically poisonous task: propping up regimes or easing the transition to new systems of
governance in places where vacuums are worse than incumbents.Given all the practical troubles for the midwives of
regime change, serious policy in this area would need to deal with many voids.Finally, serious
thinking
about climate change must recognize that the "hard" security threats that are
supposedly lurking are mostly a ruse. They are good for the threat industry-which needs danger for survival--and they are good for the greens who find it easier to
build a coalition for policy when hawks are supportive.
Adv
The auto industry needs more REE’s for Hybrids
Daily Tech 4/30/10 (Daily Tech, “China's Stranglehold on Rare Earth Metals Could Choke EV,
Hybrids,”
http://www.dailytech.com/Chinas+Stranglehold+on+Rare+Earth+Metals+Could+Choke+EV+Hyb
rids/article18274.htm) patel
The auto industry seems to be moving towards embracing hybrids and electric vehicles. One
needs only look at examples like the 2011 Nissan LEAF and 2011 Chevy Volt, or the the new
Chevy Volt MPV5 EV-crossover concept. However, there's growing concern that the industry is
casting a rather blind eye to what exactly the impact of its leap might be. While about a third
of U.S. oil comes from unstable regions like Nigeria and the Middle East, EVs present perhaps an
equally challenging geopolitical resource problem. According to Robert Bryce, author of the
book "Power Hungry: The Myths of ‘Green’ Energy and the Real Fuels of the Future", the current
third-generation TOYOTA PRIUS uses 25 lbs. (11 kg) of expensive rare-earth metals -approximately twice the amount found in a standard vehicle. That's a big problem as rare
earth metals, known scientifically as lanthanides are almost exclusively controlled by China.
Could this stranglehold slow progress of these NEW VEHICLES and hasten China's ascent to the
world's most dominant economy? These are concerns that Bryce has been voicing. Bryce
describes,"95% and 100% of the world’s supply of this entire row of the periodic table [is
controlled by China]." The biggest uses of lanthanides are in the BATTERY PACK and electric
motor of hybrids and EVs. Bryce believes that lanthanide demand will outpace supply as early
as 2013, slowing the industry's growth and allowing China to raise its resource prices. He states,
"There are no significant supplies (of lanthanides) that can come on stream in anything close to
the time span the market need." Currently, 100,000 tons (90,718 t) per year of lanthanides are
manufactured and utilized. That figure is expected to soon rise. Bryce says, "Estimates are that
within two-three years the market demand will be 120,000-130,000 tons (108,862-117,932 t)
per year." Worldwide there's 99 million tons (89.8 million t) of rare earth metals, but it's
expensive and tricky to tap these reserves. It also takes time -- up to 15 years. The U.S.
currently has no working lanthanide mines, though it does have lanthanide resources. The
bottom line is that China outguessed the U.S. and the rest of the world, wisely recognizing the
value of the resource in 1980s and early 90s and committing to the expensive up front
investment to harvest them. Now 10 to 15 years later, it is reaping the REWARDS, while the U.S.
is left wondering what to do. China is well aware of its position and plans to fully exploit it now.
Former Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping remarked some time ago, "There is oil in the
Middle East, there are rare-earths in China; we must take full advantage of this resource." Bryce
warns that the rush to EVs and hybrids may put the U.S. in a bind. He states, "In this headlong
rush to go ‘green,’ we are essentially trading one type of import reliance for another. We are
going to be more dependent on a single market, where there’s no transparency and one
dominant market player who happens to own most of our DEBT already.