Aviation Psychology
White Paper
By
Clint R. ‘Clutch’ Balog, Ph.D.
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University – Worldwide
What is Aviation Psychology?
Simply stated, aviation psychology is the application of the principles and constructs of
human psychology to the field of aviation. The goal of aviation psychology is to employ these
psychological principles for the improvement of efficiency, effectiveness, and safety of all
aviation operations. It is one of numerous subfields of the larger field of aviation human factors.
So What is Psychology?
According to the American Psychological Association (APS), psychology is the study of
the human mind and of human behavior (VandenBos, 2007).
A Research Study in the Field of Aviation Psychology
In 2011-2013, the author was the principal researcher for a study entitled “A Descriptive
Instrumental Collective Case Study of the Cognitive Processes Employed by Professional PilotsIn-Command (PICs) During Extended, Extreme In-Flight Emergencies.” Its purpose was to
develop a detailed, holistic understanding of professional pilots’ experiences of extended,
extreme in-flight emergencies which were successfully overcome. The research focus was in the
field of cognitive psychology, examining cognitive processes in general, and risk assessment,
problem solving, and decision-making specifically.
Research Question
The research question was: “How do professional pilots-in-command (PICs) describe the
cognitive processes they employed in successfully overcoming extended, extreme in-flight
emergencies?”
What is Cognitive Psychology?
Cognitive psychology is commonly defined as the study of how humans perceive, learn,
remember, and think about information (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2012). The APA defines that
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cognitive psychology explores the operation of mental processes related to perceiving, attending,
thinking, language, and memory mainly through inferences from behavior (VandenBos, 2007, p.
190).
Decision-Making Strategies
There are three predominant, broad decision-making strategies:
1. Codified Strategies – These are also known as rule-based strategies because they rely
upon previously learned rules: “If A happens, the appropriate action is B.” Codified
strategies require the least amount of cognitive processing but are also the least flexible.
They are also the most likely to induce error into the decision-making process if the
actual situation does not precisely match “A” or the rule is misapplied to the current
situation.
2. Associative Strategies – In these, the decision maker is tasked with applying (or
associating) related prior experience (predominantly in the form of a heuristic) with the
current situation. Associative strategies require more cognitive processing than codified
strategies but generally less than analytic strategies. They provide some flexibility in
decision-making, particularly by use of heuristics (analytic shortcuts) but can introduce
error into the process if the prior experiences are misassociated and subsequently
misapplied.
3. Analytic Strategies – These strategies require the decision-maker to apply his or her body
of knowledge to the current situation to render what is essentially a unique decision.
Analytic strategies require the greatest amount of cognitive processing because of the
analysis required and because of the need to select the most relevant knowledge from the
decision-makers full body of knowledge to the current situation. They provide the
greatest flexibility in decision-making, but can introduce error into the decision process
through the incorrect selection of knowledge or the misapplication of that knowledge to
the current situation.
Participant Demographics
Here is a demographic summary of the final sample population and the associated inflight emergencies:

The participant ages ranged from early 50s to late 60s.

All eight participants were Caucasian males.
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
All eight participants remained actively involved in aviation at the time of their
respective research interviews. Five of the eight remained active pilots: two in a
professional civilian capacity.

Within accepted aviation standards at the time of this emergency: one pilot was of very
low operational experience and flight time; one was of low operational experience and
flight time; one was of moderate operational experience and flight time; two were of high
operational experience and flight time; three were of very high operational experience
and flight time.

Six of the eight participants had past military flight experience.

Six of the eight emergencies involved a civilian flight operation; two involved a military
flight operation.

Of the six civilian flight operations involved, two were private flight operations
conducted under FAR Part 91 (or the non-U.S. equivalent); two were corporate
operations conducted under FAR Part 91; two were commercial operations conducted
under FAR Part 121 (or the non-U.S. equivalent), and two were conducted under military
flight operation regulations.

One of the in-flight emergencies involved a single-engine, piston powered aircraft; two
involved twin-engine, turboprop powered aircraft; one involved a twin-engine, turbojet
powered commercial aircraft; two involved four-engine, turbojet powered commercial
aircraft; one involved a twin-engine, subsonic turbojet powered military training aircraft;
one involved a twin-engine, turbojet powered supersonic military tactical training
aircraft.
Results
An extensive and precisely defined analysis of the data gathered during this research
study led to the following results and conclusions regarding the cognitive processes employed by
the study participants (PICs) in successfully overcoming the extended, extreme in-flight
emergencies:

The cognitive processing employed in these environments occurs in four definable stages
composed of variations in three characteristics of the emergency:
1. The pilot’s state of both physiological and emotional (psychological) arousal.
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2. The rate of evolution of the emergency at any point in time.
3. The pilot’s understanding of the immediate operational needs/impacts of the
emergency.

These stages are intermixed as needed based upon the immediate circumstances of the
emergency.

Despite differing specific circumstances, all of the pilots studied similarly employed
these cognitive phases methodically, logically, and in a highly organized and generally
disciplined manner.

A very complex web of both simple and complex cognitive processes and concepts were
required.

Decision-making was the principal higher order cognitive process employed. All other
simple cognitive processes were used in support of decision-making.

Risk assessment and problem solving were the two primary complex cognitive processes
used to support decision-making.

The overall process of overcoming these emergencies was, to an extent, error-tolerant.
Perfection in the application of these cognitive processes was not required.

There was a level of arousal that proved beneficial that appeared to have both upper and
lower bounds.

The ability to prioritize and compartmentalize actions proved beneficial, possibly critical.

All forms of memory were involved.

Both bottom-up and top-down processing were involved.

Greater levels of experience and training proved very beneficial.

The pilots’ ability to supplement his own knowledge with knowledge from outside the
cockpit while the emergency was in process proved highly beneficial.
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Discussion of the Results and Conclusions
The described hierarchy and interrelationship of the use of the cognitive processes; risk
assessment and problem solving in support of decision-making and simple cognitive processes in
support of complex; provides the field with insight as to where to focus attention for this future
research and these methodologies in order to most efficiently and effectively produce the desired
results. The understanding of the complexity of these interrelationships and overall processes,
including the recognition that all forms of memory are involved, helps to define the magnitude of
the task at hand. Conversely, the understanding that these processes are employed in just four
discernable and definable stages provides insight into an organizational schema that will allow
future researchers and educators to most effectively and directly attack the problem. It provides
a simplifying structure to counter the inherent complexity of the processes themselves. The
understanding that all pilots who successfully overcome these in-flight emergencies do so in very
similar ways, using the same cognitive processes and stages, and facing the same influencing
challenges regardless of the overall specific circumstances of the emergencies, further organizes
the task at hand.
The fact that the means of successfully overcoming these emergencies is, to an extent,
error-tolerant provides optimism for researchers, educators, and pilots alike that the ultimate
desired results are realistically achievable, since it is not likely that human error can be entirely
eliminated. Similarly, the understanding that some level of arousal is actually beneficial to
overcoming these emergencies is a positive result and a reason for optimism since, under
circumstances such as those that comprise an extended, extreme in-flight emergency, some
elevated emotional and/or physiologic arousal is a human inevitability.
The results of this research also included understandings that provide insight into possible
immediate actions to be taken to begin improving both pilot abilities in overcoming these
emergencies specifically as well as aviation safety in general. For instance, the understanding
that all three decision-making strategies (analytical, associative, and codified) are employed
variously as needed and appropriate in overcoming these emergencies, as well as are the three
primary risk strategies (risk homeostasis, the zero risk theory, and the threat avoidance model)
provides immediate opportunity as these are all teachable strategies. Also, the ability to
prioritize and compartmentalize actions during these emergencies involves techniques that can
be taught. In fact, such teaching techniques and strategies already exist. Similarly, both bottomup and top-down processing can likewise be taught, at least in theory, and then practiced. These
processes can be taught in the classroom and best practiced in an advanced flight simulator.
Indeed, the results of this research even illuminate opportunities for pilots themselves to
take action toward immediately improving their own abilities to successfully overcome these
extended, extreme in-flight emergencies. The understanding that greater levels of experience
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and training positively impact these abilities provides the opportunity for pilots to focus
additional priority in their own careers on obtaining such experience and training. The
understanding that a pilot supplementing his or her own knowledge during such an emergency
with additional knowledge (information from others outside the cockpit while the emergency is
in progress) provides a similar opportunity. In fact, this understanding provides further
descriptive evidence of the fundamental concept of CRM and directly relates it to successfully
overcoming these emergencies by highlighting its beneficial application in doing so.
Risk Assessment, Perception, and Tolerance Strategies
Risk homeostasis. Risk homeostasis defines that a person in any given activity has an
acceptable level (target level) of risk. Rather than attempting to minimize risk, people seek to
maintain equilibrium by adjusting their behavior to maintain their target level (Wilde, 1994;
Trimpop & Wilde, 1994). The conclusions of this research add support to this concept of risk
homeostasis, both in definition and existence. Risk homeostasis was clearly observed as a viable
risk assessment, perception, and tolerance strategy in the majority of the cases examined. In
doing so, these findings also fail to support McKenna’s (1998) conclusion that there is little
evidence in favor of the theory. In addition to supporting the strategy of risk homeostasis, this
research provided a descriptive understanding of how the strategy is applied in support of
overcoming extended, extreme in-flight emergencies in flight operations. Specifically, its
inherent quality of requiring a relatively reduced level of analytic processing made it a
particularly attractive risk strategy during high workload, high stress stages of cognitive
processing.
The zero risk theory. According to the zero risk theory, the perceived risk in a situation
is the product of the perceived likelihood of a hazardous event and the importance attached by
the individual to the consequences of the event (Ranney, 1994; Comsis Corp., 1995). As selfconfidence increases (in parallel with increasing experience), according to the theory, perceived
risk decreases until it reaches a point of zero perceived risk. The zero risk theory was also
clearly observed as a viable risk assessment, perception, and tolerance strategy in the majority of
the cases examined, and thus further supported. In addition to supporting the strategy of the zero
risk theory, this research provided a descriptive understanding of how the strategy is applied in
support of overcoming extended, extreme in-flight emergencies in flight operations. Specifically,
its inherent quality of requiring a relatively high level of analytic processing relegated it to being
a useful theory predominantly during cognitive stages when workload and stress were
comparatively low. It was also more often employed by pilots with higher levels of operational
experience.
The threat avoidance model. The threat avoidance model proposes that operators (in
this study, pilots) learn to anticipate risks and avoid them, thereby avoiding any negative
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consequences. Thus, the pilot avoids experiencing any perceived risk since those situations are
avoided (Hunter, 2002). Like risk homeostasis and the zero risk theory, the threat avoidance
model was clearly observed as a viable risk assessment, perception, and tolerance strategy in the
majority of the cases examined, and thus further supported. In addition to supporting the
strategy of the threat avoidance model, this research provided a descriptive understanding of how
the strategy is applied in support of overcoming extended, extreme in-flight emergencies in flight
operations. Specifically, its inherent qualities of requiring a relatively reduced level of analytic
processing and of being quickly and easily applied made it a particularly attractive risk strategy
during high workload, high stress stages of cognitive processing, especially with pilots of
relatively low operational experience.
Problem Solving and the Problem Solving Cycle
According to Sternberg (2006) problem solving is “… an effort to overcome obstacles
obstructing the path to a solution” (p. 392). Problem solving is a higher order cognitive process
comparable to decision-making in that it typically involves component parts. Those component
parts comprise a problem solving cycle; a formal process, but one which requires the user to
maintain a level of flexibility in its application to accommodate for the uniquenesses of any
particular problem (Smith & Kosslyn, 2007; Sternberg & Sternberg, 2012). The conclusions of
this research provide further descriptive evidence supporting these constructs regarding problem
solving. Clearly the problem solving conducted by the pilots in these cases involved component
parts. And in all cases the formal process of problem solving was conducted informally and
rapidly due to the specific circumstances of the immediate situation, thereby further supporting
the contention that its practical application requires a level of flexibility (Smith & Kosslyn, 2007;
Sternberg & Sternberg, 2012).
This research also provided further supporting evidence of both the linear and circular
characteristics of the problem solving cycle (Smith & Kosslyn, 2007). It further verified
Sternberg’s contention (2006) that the component parts of the problem solving cycle can and
often are applied out of order and/or repeatedly in practical application.
Further, these findings provided examples of both the existence and structure of wellstructured and ill-structured problems (Smith & Kosslyn, 2007; Sternberg and Sternberg, 2012).
This research showed that the well-structured problems the pilots in these cases encountered had
clear solution paths, easily identified problem spaces, and were easier to solve, requiring less
analytical processing. Conversely, the ill-structured problems they encountered did not have
clear solution paths or easily identified problem spaces, and they were more difficult to solve,
requiring far more analytical processing. The findings also clearly identified ill-structured
problems as the predominant type encountered by these pilots in experiencing extended, extreme
in-flight emergencies.
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Decision-Making Strategies
Analytic strategy. An analytic decision strategy compares all the assessment
information gathered against the individual’s desired goals by weighing the relative costs and
benefits of different actions (Bell & Mauro, 2000). As such, analytic strategies require extensive
information processing at the time of the decision and require the greatest analytic processing.
Analytic strategies are also the most flexible and are often used when facing situations outside
the individual’s realm of experience. All of these characteristics of an analytic decision strategy
were supported by the conclusions of this research. Additionally, this research provided a
descriptive understanding of how the strategy is applied in support of overcoming extended,
extreme in-flight emergencies in flight operations. Specifically, its inherent quality of requiring a
relatively high level of analytic processing relegated it to being a useful strategy predominantly
during cognitive stages when workload and stress were comparatively low. It was also more
often employed by pilots with higher levels of operational experience and training, and when the
situation required as optimal a decision as possible.
Associative strategy. When a problem develops in a familiar domain, experienced
individuals will often recognize the type of situation and implement associated “prototype”
actions successfully developed and employed in the past (Bell & Mauro, 2000). Associative
decision strategies become more prevalent as more experience in an environment develops
(Klein, 1997). They require much less information processing than do analytic strategies. All of
these characteristics of an associative decision strategy were supported by the conclusions of this
research. Additionally, this research provided a descriptive understanding of how the strategy is
applied in support of overcoming extended, extreme in-flight emergencies in flight operations.
Specifically, its inherent quality of requiring a less analytic processing than do analytic strategies
(though more than codified strategies) made it a particularly attractive and popular decision
strategy during high workload, high stress stages of cognitive processing, when codified
strategies were unavailable and the deep analysis of analytic strategies were unnecessary. Like
analytic strategies, it was also more often employed by pilots with higher levels of operational
experience and training. This is predictable given its base in experience.
Codified strategies. Codified strategies require the least creative information (cognitive)
processing of the three decision strategies (Bell & Mauro, 2000). This strategy relies on a library
of rules that specify what actions are to be taken when particular events occur. Codified decision
strategies rely on an individual’s ability to recognize cues in a situation, then to recall from
memory and employ rules appropriate to those cues (Bell & Mauro, 2000). They often result in
the least optimal decision. All of these characteristics of a codified decision strategy were
supported by the conclusions of this research. This includes the potential to result in a less than
optimal decision, or even an incorrect decision, as was demonstrated by the pilot in case 1.
Additionally, this research provided a descriptive understanding of how the strategy is applied in
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support of overcoming extended, extreme in-flight emergencies in flight operations. Specifically,
its inherent quality of requiring the least analytic processing than do the other strategies made it a
particularly attractive to, and often the first choice of, pilots with the least experience. This
decision strategy was the most often applied during high workload, high stress stages of
cognitive processing.
Selection of a decision-making strategy. While it is true that for most decisions there is
no one perfect option, more complex, more risky decision environments typically require a more
sophisticated decision-making process in order to maximize the outcome. This was found to be
true by this research. Often, in these very complex emergencies, associative and codified
strategies simply were not viable options because there were no databases of experience or rules
to be associated with the unique circumstances of the emergency. That left the pilot with no
option but to apply a unique analysis to those circumstances to arrive at a decision. Von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) contend that this strategy should result in an optimal solution.
However, people seldom use optimal procedures during the analysis, and often rely on heuristics,
which tend to yield sub-optimal outcomes (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). This, too, was
clearly seen in the conclusions of this study.
Strengths and Limitations of the Three Decision-Making Strategies
Each decision-making strategy is contended by previous research to engender specific
strengths and weaknesses, which were all further supported by this research. Analytic strategies
were demonstrated to be the most flexible and were most often used when facing situations
outside the individual’s realm of experience (Bell & Mauro, 2000). Their demand for intense
information processing, which required significant attention and short-term memory capacity,
left them susceptible to the deleterious effects of certain influential factors such as stress (Bell &
Mauro, 2000). Associative strategies depended less on short-term memory and more on retrieval
from long-term memory, and were less likely to suffer the negative effects of influential factors
(Bell & Mauro, 2000). They were also faster and more efficient than analytic strategies, but they
required a database of accurate, well-developed, and experience-based recollections. Codified
strategies were the least flexible but most resilient (Bell & Mauro, 2000). As long as the
situations to which they were applied fell cleanly into the mold of situations for which the rules
were developed, codified strategies yielded fast results and were the least effected by influencing
factors. Their utility decayed rapidly, however, as the situations to which they were being
applied deviated from those for which the rules were developed (Bell & Mauro, 2000).
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