“Necessity, Counterfactuals, and Substitutability: Looking at the Wave of Islamic Revolutions”
Harvey Starr
Department of Political Science
University of South Carolina
Roundtable Working Paper prepared for the Roundtable, “Counterfactual Analysis and Post-9/11
U.S. Foreign Policy,” for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies
Association, April 4, 2012, San Diego, CA.
Given my career-long concern with contexts and the Sproutian ecological triad, and especially
the conditionality of theory—under what conditions will a theory hold, and thus how
“contending” theories could both be correct (see Most and Starr 1989)—my career has had a
major focus on necessary conditions and, thus, on counterfactuals. It has been about the crucial
place of theory when thinking in a counterfactual way, how counterfactuals are linked to
causes, and how we can explore/validate such counterfactuals (for the lattermost point, see
Levy 2008).
Theory is crucial for identifying the key conditions, variables, or events (meaning primarily the
types of events) that could have altered outcomes by their presence or absence. That is,
following Isiah Berlin (1955), counterfactuals had to be plausible, and with some reasonable
probability of occurring. This is, then, one very useful function of Charles Ragin’s Boolean truth
table approach (QCA)—using extended or macro-case studies to generate a set of plausible
factors (or, in Ragin’s terms, “causal conditions”). In addition, we also need to think about the
factors/alternatives that were perceived as plausible at the time by decision makers and their
audiences/constituents, and not some incredible outlier that only one/few people suggested,
such as alien activity!1
Again, we need theory to find the conditions/factors/events which represent parts of
categories, functions, or broader concepts. That is, regarding short term causes we may look
for “triggers,” or “shocks.”2 We might be looking for broader concepts, factors or conditions
such as those that represent “opportunity” or “willingness.” Theory will lead us to argue that
these things are necessary, and thus, without them, other events or phenomena will not occur.
This has been my position on the jointly necessary conditions of opportunity and willingness
since Starr (1978). As a side note, Berlin was concerned with counterfactuals as one way to
combat determinism is the study of history. As I have noted in a number of places, the work of
Harold and Margaret Sprout, and their idea of the ecological triad (entity, environment, and
entity-environment relationship) was foundational to the development of the opportunity and
willingness framework. Like Berlin, the Sprouts’ development of the ecological triad, and their
concern with “man-milieu” relationships, was their way to attack determinism in geopolitics!
While complicating some matters considerably, the phenomenon of “substitutability” in dealing
with necessary (and sufficient) conditions, also works strongly against deterministic
approaches. If, as argued and demonstrated in Cioffi-Revilla and Starr (1995), opportunity and
willingness are jointly necessary (and thus make any action more difficult to achieve or occur),
then substitutability works to increase the probability of the presence of either opportunity
1
Levy (2008) notes that necessary condition counterfactuals should have specified antecedents and
consequents to be useful in teasing out the implications of the counterfactual.
2
Levy (2008) also notes that counterfactuals are central to such approaches as “powder keg” models
(Goertz and Levy 2007), “window of opportunity models” (Kingdon 1984), or path dependency and
critical junctures explanations (Mahoney 2000).
and/or willingness, and thus make some action easier to occur. It does so by identifying a
whole set of conditions that might individually (or in combination) be sufficient to generate
opportunity and/or willingness. If a model argues that we need opportunity—such as the short
term or immediate factor of a trigger—that trigger might take any one (or combination) of
forms, any one of which would be sufficient to be a “trigger” and thus provide the opportunity.
Let’s look at this another way. As noted in Starr (2011), necessary relationships often take the
form of counterfactuals, especially in case studies focusing on explaining individual events. The
necessity relationship claims that only if X can there be Y. The counterfactual claim holds that
without X, if X had not happened, Y would not have occurred.3 Substitutability may be about
different paths to the same outcome, that is, different sets of contingent conditions. Indeed, in
many cases, contingency is expressed as a necessary condition, without which some effect,
outcome, or other dependent condition could not occur. This is why necessity is a key
component of a philosophical view of causality becoming more and more prominent—the INUS
view of causation. An INUS explanation is an “Insufficient but Nonredundant [i.e., necessary]
part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition,” for which Mahoney and Goertz (2006, p. 232)
provide a succinct explanation:
An INUS cause is neither individually necessary nor individually sufficient for an
outcome. Instead it is one cause within a combination of causes that are jointly
sufficient for an outcome. Thus, with this approach, scholars seek to identify
combinations of variable values that are sufficient for outcomes of interest. The
approach assumes that distinct combinations may each be sufficient, such that there are
multiple paths to the same outcome.
Research findings with INUS causes can often be formally expressed through Boolean equations
such as Y = (A AND B AND C) OR (C AND D AND E). The logic of necessity and sufficiency, and
multiple causal paths, may thus be clearly captured by Boolean logic and methods (most fully
introduced in the work of Ragin). The conjunctive Boolean AND denotes necessary conditions.
Thus, in the above equation, A, B, and C are all necessary conditions in combination, to be
sufficient for Y. But note, so are C, D, and E in combination. The Boolean disjunctive OR
indicates that either of these two combinations is sufficient for Y—multiple paths to the same
outcome. The reader should note that the philosophy of science dealing with concepts holds a
similar position—that a good definition of a concept is one with necessary conditions that are
jointly sufficient. In essence this is the mirror image of what Cioffi-Revilla and Starr do with
opportunity and willingness (as noted above): opportunity and willingness are jointly necessary,
but through substitutability, there are multiple paths or factors sufficient to produce either
opportunity or willingness. Thus, combinations of necessary factors may be sufficient for an
3
Goertz and Levy (2007) contrast a necessary-conditions counter-factual approach (looking for
necessary conditions within individual cases) with a nomological covering-law approach (based on the
constant conjunction of covering laws stated and tested with large-n statistical/probabilistic methods).
outcome; combinations of sufficient factors (two or more, or even one) can produce a
necessary condition.
Cioffi-Revilla and Starr (1995) explicitly look at a (highly implausible) counterfactual world: one
where only one broad factor, be it opportunity or willingness, is necessary for an event to
occur. This would mean if an opportunity were present some event would occur (regardless of
willingness); or if willingness were present some event would occur (regardless of opportunity,
including capabilities). They discuss the bizarre world that would exist under such implausible
conditions. Oakes (forthcoming), however, without using these exact terms, does link different
conditions to “thought experiments” [counterfactuals] regarding the presence or absence of
necessary or sufficient conditions to foreign policy decision making.
Her argument is that contingencies or environmental conditions may eliminate options or
choices from the “menu” of a decision maker. Oakes notes: “These external factors can be
critically important causes of the final policy decision in two scenarios. The first situation is
where an environmental constraint removes an option that a leader would have preferred to
the final decision. In other words, variable X removes policy A, and so the leader pursues
substitute policy B. Here, the constraint may be a necessary condition for the decision. In a
counterfactual, if that variable had been absent, the leader would have had a broader menu of
available policies and would have chosen differently. “
Thus, Oakes provides another twist: necessary conditions can affect choices by removing
potential choices as well as adding them to the list of alternatives! Oakes then outlines one
way to use counterfactuals: “To explain government decision making then, we must perform a
thought experiment. First, we consider the leader’s ranking of the policy alternatives in a
‘perfect world,’ one absent environmental constraints. Second, we reintroduce these
constraints and determine whether they eliminate (or enable) certain alternatives.” Here, we
need to look at both preferences and constraints (that is opportunity and willingness, and how
they affect the “menu for choice”; e.g. Russett and Starr 1981). As Oakes argues, this is a
difficult task: “Where environmental constraints rule out a particular option on the policy
menu, leaders may never discuss that policy at all. Nevertheless, it should appear in our
“perfect world” ranking, and could even be in first position: a decision maker might have
pursued this avenue if the constraints had not existed. Thus, we may have to rely on
counterfactuals and circumstantial evidence to build a case for what a leader’s preferred
policies would have been.” As with the study of deterrence, we have to deal with behavior that
does not occur.4
Revolution in the Islamic World
From the end of 2010 through the first months of 2011, my first impulse, of course was to think
in terms of diffusion as a necessary factor (through contiguity or neighborhoods) in the growth
and spread of anti-regime revolutions. Taking events starting in December 2010 up to February
4
In the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, the lack of an existing (bureaucratic) plan for a “surgical strike”
against targets in Cuba, removed this option almost immediately from the ExComm discussions
23, 2011, I looked for the spread of protest along temporal (chronological) lines; that is Tunisia
to Egypt, then Egypt to Iran, then Iran to Yemen and Libya, etc. From 10 possible dyads, only 2
displayed positive spatial diffusion or contagion through contiguous borders. Still, a timeline
existed from Tunisia to Egypt, which precedes Libya, which precedes Algeria, which precedes
Morocco.
However, this approach assumes that all the states involved, or in the region, were equally
“ready” for protest, etc.—an unrealistic or implausible assumption. So, just looking to see if the
countries involved had contiguous borders with any of the others, I found that 8 of those
countries had a contiguous border with at least one other of these countries. A key point to
note is that Libya had borders with Tunisia and Egypt– both of which not only held protests but
deposed long standing rulers.5
As there is not clear evidence of positive spatial diffusion, we are led back to the usual
question: is what appears to be the “spread” of some phenomena the result of positive spatial
diffusion or simply “clustering”? Clustering is based on the units under consideration having
similar profiles or factors, and thus could possibly “react similarly, but independently to similar
domestic conditions” (Elkins and Simmons 2005, 34), or as noted by Starr, et al. (2008),
clustering can also be seen as “uncoordinated interdependence.” By investigating clustering we
might uncover a factor (or several in combination), which might be necessary for the
occurrence of revolution in a set of countries.
Since diffusion may involve simply some form of “demonstration effect” or “emulation”6
(instead of, or as well as, spatial contagion) we would have to take a demonstration effect
seriously, and look at the impact of current communication/social network technology as a key
factor (one possible component of Rosenau’s “microelectronic revolution” [1990]). Perhaps a
demonstration effect could be combined with other aspects of clustering into a broader
“regionalism” phenomenon. Clustering assumes that the units share a number of similar
factors. These states generally share many societal and historical factors: non-democracies;
long term autocratic rulers; language, and religion; as well as a general spatial proximity. Is
regionalism the necessary condition? If so, does it require all of these (substitutable) factors
that would identify a cluster, or are any of these by themselves sufficient to produce the
necessary condition of regionalism? Would the group of revolutions not have occurred without
any or all of these “regional” factors?
5
I used: Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, Yemen, Bahrain, and Libya. Also, given the protests that occurred over the
weekend of February 19-20, 2011 I also included Morocco, Algeria, Oman, Kuwait, and Djibouti. (I added
Iraq on February 25.)
6
Emulation may also force us to think of short-term triggers, shocks or various “punctuated
equilibrium” models-- that posits a “shock” can cause cascading change in interdependent systems.
Here, the “shock” could be the forcing Tunisian President Ben Ali to flee the country. As noted in the
sub-headline in a CNN story (February 23): “The fear wall broke...” Many analysts argued that this event
encouraged emulation.
Or, is regionalism only one of two necessary components? Perhaps there are major systemic
factors as well during this time period that could be seen as necessary, in that they are
“permissive” in permitting the Islamic revolutions to occur. As compared to the revolution
from below that ousted the Shah of Iran in 1979, all these events are now occurring in a postCold War world, without opposed superpowers which would move to support governments
they favored against protest/revolt, or, who would oppose the other superpower’s use of force
to help a government or an opposition. Without such superpower support, many autocratic
governments have become more vulnerable. However, where such a threat to a regime took
place also raised a set deterrent threats between the US and USSR. If the US or NATO had sent
forces to defend the Shah in 1979—in a country bordering the USSR-- we can suppose (a
counterfactual!) that the Soviet response would have been intense, and it could be argued
deterred such US/NATO action. In a non-Cold War context, NATO could send forces to support
Libyan rebels without similar military support going to Gaddafi (as occurred in Indochina), or in
the run-up to war (e.g. US and Soviet arms support to the states in the Middle East).
There is also the reverse: the growth in the number of democracies, and the growth and spread
of democratic/liberal norms (such as human rights) throughout the system including the roles
of IGOs and NGOs. Democratic norms include a clear 21st century external disapproval of, and
much less tolerance of, the use of massive governmentally organized fatal violence against their
own people (what Rummel has termed “democide”; e.g. see 1995). The upshot of all this is that
governments may/should be much less likely to use force, or to be able to get their armies to
kill their fellow citizens. Note that Qaddafi to a large extent, especially early on, relied upon
foreign mercenaries, while his air force pilots defected. Also, Libyan rebels were provided
extensive air and sea power by NATO to aid their cause.
I think this is a useful set of factors for comparing the 2010-2011 (and the current Syrian
problems) to previous revolutions, such as Iran in 1979. Counterfactual claims can be tested
against conditions in Iran in 1979. Two prominent models focus on an alternative explanation,
the presence or absence of what Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (e.g. 2011) call “free goods,” or
Girod (2012) terms “windfall profits.” Governments that can raise revenue from these sources,
it may be argued, are more likely to hold together their winning coalitions, and either prevent
revolution or emerge victorious. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith note that such goods, are “free”
in the sense that “relatively little labor is needed to generate wealth and added revenue can be
achieved with these resources without having to raise taxes on labor.” However, in the 1970s
the Shah was being provided with extensive free goods/windfall profits, as was the
contemporary example of Gaddafi in Libya.
My bottom line feeling is that a set of necessary conditions would include, (1) a successful
“shock” that could be (2) emulated by relatively proximate countries (regionalism) in (3) a
world system where a set of permissive factors would allow and encourage revolution. This
brief counterfactual story takes substitutability into account within an INUS structure—arguing
that a set of necessary conditions produces a sufficient cause for revolution (or perhaps several
different combinations of necessary causal conditions).
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