Lezione 2
Summary
Deontological and Axiological Moral Theories. Actions and states of affairs. Norms or laws
and goodness or value.
Two ways of getting to something which is in itself or for its own sake morally
praiseworthy: avoiding the regress of moral norms; setting a limit to the mind-dependence of
values. Grundnorm and intrinsic value are two completely different ways of satisfying this
requirement. (It is a requirement of realism; we are assuming moral realism.)
The Development of Moore’s Metaethics
(a) The Metaethical Innocence of Principia Ethica
In Principia Ethica (PE) Moore holds (but this is a constant feature of his reflection on the
foundations of ethics) that the subject matter of ethics consists of judgments that have the character of
answers to the question:
What kind of things ought to exist for their own sake? (PE 33)
The substantive aim of ethics is to provide evidence or to give reasons for holding true certain of
these judgments of intrinsic value. Intrinsic value thus is central to ethical enquiry.
Ethics as a Systematic Science
But it is important to individuate precisely its theoretical role within ethics as “the general enquiry
into what is good” (PE 54). The structure of ethics as a “systematic science” (PE 58) can be specified in
terms of three tasks. The first one is to give a logical (in Moore’s broad sense: concept- or meaningtheoretical) and metaphysical characterization of the predicate or property of Good. I will follow Moore in
using "predicate" and "property" interchangeably, it must be clear from the outset that the enquiry into the
meaning of the predicate Good is also and indissolubly an enquiry into the ontology of the property of
goodness:
What is the nature of that peculiar predicate, the relation of which to other things constitutes the object
of all other ethical investigations? Or, in other words, What is meant by good? (PE 89)
The second one is to determine what things have this property, or satisfy this predicate:
To what things and in what degree does this predicate directly attach? What things are good in
themselves? (PE 89)
To have correct answers to these questions is, obviously, to have evidence for fundamental ethical
judgments, judgments about what things ought to exist for their own sake or have intrinsic value. But
ethics does not stop at judging what things are intrinsically good. Judgments of this kind (“So and so is
good in itself”, “So and so ought to exist for its own sake”) are fundamental to ethics because they provide
a halting point and a ground for all investigation and all judgments about what kinds of actions we ought
to perform. This forms the third task of ethics:
What kinds of actions ought we to perform? (PE 34)
By what means shall we be able to make what exists in the world as good as possible? What causal
relations hold between what is best in itself and other things? (PE 89)
As it figures in Principia Ethica, the concept of intrinsic value finds its proper application in
connection with the second task of ethics, that of establishing what things are ultimately, “directly” good;
and with the third one, that of assessing the rightness of actions. The proper understanding of the notion of
intrinsic value, that is, presupposes that the logic and metaphysics of the good have been appropriately
articulated. It does not primarily and directly consist in framing the logic and metaphysics of the good
itself.
The Metaethical Agenda of Principia
It is noticeable how few (if important) are the things Moore wants to say, in Principia Ethica,
about the logical and metaphysical character of Good. Good is simple. This means that the property of
goodness cannot be analyzed, resolved into simpler, independent components. The point is metaphysical:
the reality of goodness does not consist in the obtaining, in the reality of any simpler and independent
component. (Like, for instance, the reality of weight can be resolved in the simpler, independent
components of mass and of location in a gravitational field.) The point is also logical: good is simple in
that it cannot be defined in any interesting, informative way (as the concept horse can be); in that "it is not
composed of any parts, which we can substitute for it in our minds when we are thinking of it" (PE 60).
“Good is good, and that is the end of the matter” (PE 58): this, therefore, is not a refusal to take up the
question of the composition and definition of good, but a full answer to it. Good is logically and
metaphysically atomic and this is the ground for Moore's standing commitment to ethical propositions
being all synthetic (PE 58). It is primarily in the sense of being non-analyzable and non-definable that
Moore holds the Good to a property which is real in itself and a concept which has content and validity in
itself. 1
Non-naturalness is a more complex matter. This is the thing Moore really wants to say about the
Good. While he will end up being self-critical about the importance he ascribed to the simplicity of the
Good, he never retreated from his commitment to its non-naturalness. However, Moore also never
refrained from revising his conception of what is natural and non-natural; and it is precisely one of my
tasks to outline a certain reading of the development of his views in this regard. In Principia Ethica Moore
seems to suggest a dual criterion for identifying natural properties - in terms of possible independent
existence in time and in terms of their constituting the substance of things. The two criteria (which sit
uneasily together) are put forward almost in the same breath:
Can we imagine ‘good’ as existing by itself in time, and not merely as a property of some natural
object? For myself, I cannot so imagine it, whereas with the greater number of properties of objects –
those which I call the natural properties - their existence does seem to me to be independent of the
existence of those objects. They are, in fact, rather parts of which the object is made up than mere
predicates which attach to it. If they were taken away, no object would be left, not even a bare
substance: for they are in themselves substantial and give to the object all the substance it has (PE 93)
I have quoted this text at length because it contains Moore’s most comprehensive distinction of
natural and non-natural properties. While he later retreats from the idea that natural properties (as opposed
to non-natural ones) can exist in time by themselves (RMC 581-582) and from identifying properties with
parts, he modifies, but does not retract the idea that good can be distinguished from other, natural
properties in reference to whether or not they constitute the nature of things or states of affairs. After
Principia Moore abandons the idea that the substance of things consists of or is exhausted by their
properties and adopts a more robust concept of individual substances which have natural properties as
aspects or features of their intrinsic nature. Thus the reference to substantial nature remains constant; this is
the sense of “natural” which will be fundamental for my discussion.
In later texts, after having remarked that his previous attempts to define “natural property” were
“hopelessly confused”, Moore introduces a different criterion for distinguishing natural and non natural
properties: a natural property is a “property with which it is the business of the natural sciences or of
Psychology to deal” (2PE 13). But he then (quite reasonably) complains that this criterion lacks precision,
unless what it is meant by “natural science” is made more precise; and he doubts that this is an easy task
For a sympathetic criticism of the Moorean view of the simplicity of goodness, see P. StrattonLake, “Introduction”, in Stratton-Lake (2002), pp. 12-3.
1
(2PE 15). As a modification of this view it has been suggested to identify natural properties in terms of
their causal powers and causal roles (since it is arguable that natural sciences deal with their subjectmatters in terms of their causal interactions).2 There is something to this suggestion. But it has the flaw of
failing to give justice to the comprehensive scope of Moore’s non-naturalism. Properties which are to kept
distinct from the non-natural ones include not only empirical, but also metaphysical, supersensible
properties. These latter cannot be captured in terms of causal powers; and considerations drawn on
analogy (which Moore himself broaches, 2PE 13) are even less apt in regard of causation than in regard of
the methods of natural science. By contrast, the most general concept of a natural property can well be
captured in terms of forming the substance of empirical or of metaphysical things. This view of
naturalness is the one which plays the most important role in the development of Moore’s metaethics.
Intrinsic Value and What Things Are Good
As it figures in Principia Ethica, the concept of intrinsic value does not primarily occur within the
context of these logical and metaphysical considerations concerning Good. The distinction between
intrinsic and non intrinsic value, against the background of the ontology of simple and non-natural
goodness, has rather to do with what is for something (some substantial item or some state of affairs) to be
good, to have that property. That is, what can intelligibly count as intrinsic is not the property of goodness
as such (which is, of course, a thing in itself and of its own kind) but how or the way this property is
possessed by a particular or a state of affairs (in time or outside time). Certain things (including states of
affairs), not all things but only some of them, have finally and invariantly the (simple, non-natural)
property of goodness. No matter what the circumstances are, no matter what we think of them or how we
respond to them, they have goodness as a property; this mode of having goodness, not any feature of
goodness as such, comes to expression in the concept of intrinsic value. We can also say that
intrinsicalness forms part of a general and rather strong position of moral realism; but that it contributes to
this position by investing the relation certain things or states of affairs stand into with goodness, their
possession of goodness; not as a trait of the metaphysics of goodness itself; it is a property of the property
of being good not of the property of goodness. We can accordingly distinguish two theses of realism about
value in Principia Ethica. One is that goodness is a ‘thing in itself’, a simple, unique property. The other is
a thesis about a way things can be good: in a necessary, final and invariant way, simply because of the
things they are (PE 271). The two theses are independent: one might hold that value is a simple, unique,
non-natural property and reject the idea of intrinsic value: for instance, natural and metaphysical things
might be too remote from goodness for instantiating it except accidentally. (This would be a sort of radical
Platonism or Neo-Platonism about value.)
2
See T. Baldwin, “Editor’s Introduction”, in Moore (1993), pp. xxii-xxiii.
The Uses of Intrinsic Value in Principia
What is striking is how non problematic the notion of intrinsic value seems to be in Principia
Ethica, especially if we have present the amount of effort that Moore dedicates to detailing and defending
the logic and the metaphysics of the Good. The concept of intrinsic value finds application mainly in two
contexts.
Firstly, it is employed to distinguish and set in order different forms of value possession and to
prevent the confusion (prevalent in moral philosophy, PE, 271) between final value and value as a means.
Good as a means and final good are distinct as different ways in which goodness can be said to be related
to a thing:
They may either assert that this unique property does always attach to the thing in question, or else
they may assert only that the thing in question is a cause or necessary condition for the existence of
other things to which this unique property does attach (PE 73)
These two modes of value-possession, once the confusions have been dispelled, are perfectly
consistent and ethics cannot do without either. Certain of our ethical judgments involve knowledge both of
what has value in itself and of what has value for its causal connections with what has value in itself. The
first is what has value as end, the second what has value as a necessary condition for the first. The first
form of value-possession reformulates, in Principia Ethica, the Aristotelian concept of what is worth
having for its own sake and is self-sufficiently good (PE 237).3 This form of value-possession is intrinsic,
as it is made clear by the qualification that the “unique property” of goodness in this case “does always
attach” to a thing. This form of value-possession is invariant because it is independent of contingent states
of affairs involving the thing; in particular, it is independent of its causal relations (as value as means is
obviously not). This is a plausible notion of intrinsicalness in terms of isolation: the intrinsically valuable
thing would be valuable also if it were causally isolated from the rest of the world and in this way it is
valuable as an end. It is important to observe that while this distinction between forms of value-possession
is not merely pragmatic, still it is especially relevant in connection with the "practical questions" ethics has
to deal with; it is appropriate primarily when we ask how what is valuable is connected with what we can
do. This is of course an utterly important ethical consideration; but the point is that this practical question
3
See the Chapter "Intrinsic Value" in Moore (1912) especially pp. 144-155; and "The Nature of
Moral Philosophy", in Moore (1922), pp. 323-327, for Moore's identification of intrinsic value with
Aristotelian good. To be precise, the concept of final good is in Moore more exacting than that of
good as end and of intrinsic value: all final good is good as end and intrinsic good, but not all good
as end and intrinsic good is final value: a thing which is finally good must be intrinsically good
through and through, must be without parts which are bad or indifferent. See Moore (1912), pp. 3032; and W. Rabinowicz and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000), p.1 fn.2.
is a perfectly familiar matter which we seem to have a conceptual mastery of, even though collecting the
relevant information may be often difficult. Therefore, no hard metaethical question seems to be raised by
this use of the notion of intrinsic value in Principia Ethica.4
The second area of discussion in Principia Ethica where the concept of intrinsic value finds
particular and important application is that of the theory of organic unities and of the various forms of ideal
- things that are good in themselves to a high degree. These are highly controversial issues and Moore is
ready to recognize this. But it is remarkable that he does not individuate the source of the difficulties in
the concept of intrinsic value. Rather, the problems seem to arise, on his own account, from the
paradoxical character of the parts-whole relationship in organic unities (PE 79) and from the complex,
asymmetric way in which "the Universe" satisfies the property of goodness (PE 270-271). The underlying
concept of intrinsic value is, again, the basic one of value which is possessed invariantly; which things
have across different circumstances. That there is such intrinsic possession of value is simply taken for
granted. It is the background for the issue of the structure of organic unities even to possibly arise, since
this issue presupposes that their constituents have values that are invariant across their figuring or not as
parts of wholes (PE 81). Moore’s treatment of the ideals as well as the distinction between goods which
are final in that they have no parts which are not goods themselves and goods which are not are, very
simply, discussions of principles involved in the mereological determination of intrinsic value that is,
intrinsic value-possession. These discussions assume that there is value-possession of this sort and that it is
amenable to principles (and, for that matter, also to very detailed ones), it is clear that the concept of
intrinsic value per se does not come at all in question, in regard of its metaethical warrant (PE 256).
No Metaethical Drama
4
The interpretation of final value (value as end) as intrinsic value is controversial in the contemporary
debate; in fact, it has been denied that final values must be intrinsic, since something might be valuable for
its own sake because of its relational properties (like its uniqueness). The sharp distinction between final
and intrinsic value has been introduced by Korsgaard (1983). I agree that the two concepts are different;
but the difference I draw is different. Final value is a concept of theoretical ethics; it is a way of being
valuable. Intrinsic value (post-Principia) is a concept of metaethics (and of metaphysics); it is what is for
value to be. Notice therefore that the possibility that final value supervene on contingent properties has
only ethical-theoretica, not metaethical or metaphysical import (this is remarked in passing by Rabinowicz
and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000), p. 16). It remains a possibility that final value is also necessarily intrinsic
value, that finality and intrinsicalness are necessarily coinstantiated, at least for the case in which final
value is nonderivative (see M.J. Zimmerman (2001b), pp.194-195). This might be right, although it raises
complex questions about the bearers of final and intrinsic value. Still, the two properties, even if necessarily
coinstantiated, are conceptually different.
My conclusion is that, in Principia Ethica, the concept of intrinsic value belongs primarily not to
metaethics but to theoretical ethics, in particular to the theory of value or axiology. It gives shape to the
principles of the normatively significant application of the concept of the Good, not to its logic or
metaphysics. There is a form of possession of value which is invariant or for its own sake. This form of
possession is important, has a crucial, structural role for the whole space of value-properties and
predicates. But the ontological commitments of this form of value possession are minimal and left
unexplained: it is value of Good as it is possessed in isolation and which can be discovered by the method
of “absolute isolation” (PE 142, 236). This is all there is to say about the ontology of intrinsic value. This
concept is applied in raising and answering questions about what is for actions to be right or wrong and
about what is for complex states of affairs to have value dependently on the values of their parts. But it is
not discussed in terms of its own possibility and metaphysical structure. It would be exaggerated, mistaken
in fact, to interpret Principia Ethica as putting forward only a first-order, substantive-normative
understanding of intrinsic value. There is such an understanding; it is perfectly legitimate; and it is pro
tanto common ground to moral realists and antirealists. But this is not Moore’s only way of addressing
intrinsic value in Principia Ethica. I think that there is room for realistic axiology as a form of theoretical
understanding of value-concepts which addresses the structure of their contents and their general roles and
conditions of application and which places us midway in moral realism between the recognition and
defence of substantive values (normative ethics) and the logic and metaphysics of value (metaethics). This
is anyway how things are with Principia. In this work there is no metaphysical or metaethical drama about
intrinsic value; even though it has an important theoretical role and is framed in terms that anticipate those
in which will become metaethically problematic. Ultimately, the intrinsicalness of value-possession is only
introduced, non-problematically, as the background of invariance and for-its-own-sakeness; these latter are
what matters philosophically. It is true that in order to grasp these concepts and that of intrinsic valuepossession we must know something about the property, value, which is intrinsically possessed. But this is
not to say that being intrinsic is something that characterizes Good in itself, on a par with simplicity or
non-naturalness.5
This difference of the theoretical levels which the two notions of Good and of intrinsic value
belong to is in its turn connected to other differences in their structure or ‘logic’ and in the nature of their
contents:
5
As Peter Geach famously pointed out, one might suspect that keeping apart goodness as simple
and non-natural from the intrinsic value of things betrays a misunderstanding of the attributive,
rather that predicative, role of “good”; see Baldwin (1990), pp. 73-4; but see also Zimmerman
(2001), pp. 21-26, who rejects this criticism (at least in general terms). In any case, Moore is aware
of the issue (“all things which are good are also something else”, PE 62); but does not regard it as
contradicting the simplicity and non-naturalness of the Good.
(a) Rightly in the sense in which Good is considered by Moore to be indefinable (“it is not
composed of any parts, which we can substitute for it in our minds when we are thinking of it”, PE 60)
intrinsic value is definable (it is composed of goodness and of intrinsicalness);
(b) While Good is a content which is primarily the object of a single act of thought, intrinsic value
is a content which is only apt to be expressed in the mode of a judgment (PE 72-73 and passim).
Therefore, the two notions seem to be perfectly distinct in themselves, apart from their figuring at
different levels in the argument of Principia Ethica. There are (at least) two sources of possible confusions
here. One is mistaking the idea that of goodness being in itself (which according to Moore is a simple,
non-natural property) with that of goodness being intrinsic (which is a way for such property to be
possessed). This suggests a third difference
(c) Being in itself is a second-order property of the property of goodness; being intrinsic is a
second order property of the relation of value-possession.
The other source of confusion is mistaking: it is necessary that, if Good is instantiated, something
is intrinsically good, with: it is necessary that, if Good is, something is intrinsically good. The first claim is
true and the second one is false in the theory of Principia Ethica: nothing would instantiate goodness
unless something intrinsically instantiated goodness; but goodness would be also if nothing existed which
were intrinsically good (this includes goodness itself, which is real but not as a natural or metaphysical
existent, while only such an existent can be intrinsically good). That is, a world where no good thing or
state existed would still be a world which included goodness, Good in itself. What one can thus say is that
Good is intrinsic in the sense that it would be itself also if nothing at all existed; but since (as we will see
presently) Good is not an existent, this is intrinsicalness merely by equivocation. Once these thoughts are
kept apart, the inclination to regard intrinsicalness as the ontological, realistic mark of goodness or value
simply wanes. 6
6
Therefore, in reporting Moore's views, we should be wary of how we are using expressions like “intrinsic
value” or "bearers of intrinsic value". Moore occasionally refers to the simple Good or goodness as
“intrinsic value” (PE 109, 222). But overall there is no intrinsic Good in the sense in which there is simple,
non-natural Good; and to bear intrinsic value is not to bear a certain kind of value or value under a certain
aspect; but to bear it in a certain way. Only natural or metaphysical things can intrinsically bear value by
standing into a relation of intrinsic possession with non-natural simple goodness. Even careful interpreters
occasionally slip in this respect, see Baldwin (1990), p. 69 (“Moore, of course, takes goodness to be the
fundamental value (he standardly calls it ‘intrinsic value’)”); Baldwin (1993), p. xxii (where apparently nonnaturalness is discussed in connection with intrinsic value); Zimmerman (2001), pp.18-21, while recognizing
that Moore distinguishes between the question: “What is good?” and “What is intrinsically good?”, does
not regard this as an important distinction – while (at least for understanding Principia Ethica) it certainly is.
Appendix
Bibliographical References
Works by G.E. Moore
PE: Principia Ethica, T. Baldwin ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993
Moore (1912): Ethics [****]
CIV: “The Conception of Intrinsic Value” (1922), in PE, 281-298
2 PE: “Preface to The Second edition of Principia Ethica” (1922) in PE, 2-27
Moore (1922): Philosophical Studies [****]
RCM: “A reply to My Critics” (1942): The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, P.A.Schilpp, Open Court, La Salle
(Ill.) 1942, vol. 2, 535-627
Other Works
T. Baldwin (1990): G.E. Moore, Routledge, London and New York
T. Baldwin (1993): “Editor’s Introduction”, in Moore (1993)
S. Blackburn (1993): Essays in Quasi-Realism [****]
S. Blackburn (1998): Ruling Passions [****]
J. Broome (1999): “Normative Requirements” [****]
D.J. Chalmers (2005): “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”, in M. Garcia-Carpintero
(2006), 55-140
R. Chisholm (1981): “Defining Intrinsic Value”, in Rønnow-Rasmussen and Zimmerman (2005), 15-16
J. Dancy (2000): “The Particularist Progress”, in Rønnow-Rasmussen and Zimmerman (2005), 325-347
S. Darwall, A. Gibbard, P. Railton (1997): Moral Discourse and Practice [****]
S. Darwall (2003): ‘Moore, Normativity, and Intrinsic Value”, in Ethics [****]
M. Davies & I.L. Humberstone (1980): “Two Notions of Necessity”, in Philosophical Studies, 38, 1-30
M. Davies (2004): “Reference, Contingency, and the Two-Dimensional Framework,” in Philosophical
Studies, 118, 83-131
(Taking and adapting a different clue from Zimmerman, we might say that goodness in itself is virtually
intrinsic value, meaning by this that it existence is entailed by the existence of a state with actual intrinsic
value, see M.J. Zimmerman (1999), p. 407; but this is a very loose sense in which something is intrinsic.)
That intrinsicalness is not a property of properties (a fortiori of an abstract property of value) but of
exemplications of properties of value is well grasped by N.M. Lemos (2005b), p. 184.
D. A. Denby (2006): “The Distinction between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties”, Mind, 115, 1-17
J. Dreier (2006): “Was Moore a Moorean?” [***]
J.M. Dunn (1990): “Relevant Predication 2: Intrinsic Properties and Internal Relations”, in Philosophical
Studies, 60, 177-206
F. Feldman (1998): “Hyperventilating about Intrinsic Value”, in Rømmow & Zimmerman (2005), 45-58
M. Garcia-Capintero (2006): [***]
A. Gibbard (2003a):“Normative Properties”, in Horgan & Timmons (2003), 319-337
A. Gibbard (2003b): Thinking How to Live, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)-London
T. Horgan & M. Timmons edd (2003): Metaethics After Moore, Clarendon Press, Oxford
I.L. Humberstone (1996): “Intrinsic/Extrinsic”, Synthese, 108 [****]
F. Jackson (1998), From Metaphysics to Ethics, Clarendon Press, Oxford
S. Kagan [***]
C. Korsgaard (1983): ‘Two Distinctions of Goodness” [****]
S.Kripke (1980): Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)
R. Langton and D. Lewis (1998): “Defining ‘Intrinsic’”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58,
333-345
N.M. Lemos (1994a): “The Concept of Intrinsic Value”, in Rømmow & Zimmerman (2005), 17-31
N.M. Lemos (1994b): “The Bearers of Intrinsic Value” (1994b), Rømmow & Zimmerman (2005), 181190
M.J. Loux & D.W Zimmerman edds (2003): The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford University
Press, Oxford
E.J. Lowe (2003): “Individuation”, in Loux & Zimmerman (2003), 75-95
J. Mackie (1977): Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong [****]
A. Miller (2005): An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics [****]
F. Orsi (2006): Reasons and Values. A Study, PhD Dissertation, The University of Reading
C. Peacocke (2004): The Realm of Reason, Clarendon Press, Oxford
W.Rabinowicz and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000): “A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own
Sake”, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society [****]
W.Rabinowicz and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen (2003):
“Tropic of Value”, in Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 389-403
W. Rabinowicz and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004): “The Strike of the Demon: On fitting Pro-attitudes
and Value”, in Ethics, 391-423
T. Rønnow-Rasmussen and M. Zimmerman, edd. (2005): Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, Springer,
Dordrecht
W. D. Ross (1930): The Right and the Good [****]
T. Scanlon (1998): What We Owe To Each Other, Harvard University Press, Cambridge(Mass.)-London
R. Shafer Landau (2003): Moral Realism. A Defence [****]
S. Soames (2005): Reference and Description, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford
R.S. Stalnaker (2004): “Assertion Revisited: On the Interpretation of Two-Dimensional Modal
Semantics”, in Philosophical Studies, 118, 299-322
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties”; “Supervenience”
P. Stratton-Lake (2002): “Introduction”, in P. Stratton-Lake ed. Ethical Intuitionism [****]
P. Stratton Lake and B. Hooker (2006): “Scanlon versus Moore on Goodness” [****]
J.J. Thomson (2006): “The Legacy of Principia” [****]
M.J. Zimmerman (2001a): The Nature of Intrinsic Value
M.J. Zimmerman, “Virtual Intrinsic Value and the Principle of Organic Unities” (1999), in RønnowRasmussen and Zimmerman (2005) 401-413
M.J. Zimmerman, “Intrinsic Value and Individual Worth” (2001b), in Rønnow-Rasmussen and
Zimmerman (2005) 191-201