Land rights as a cause of conflict
Disputes over land rights are one of the primary causes of conflicts with South Sudan.
The most common image is of cattle camp youth from rival communities fighting over
access to pasture or water points. Access to a fishing pool during a period of food insecurity in 1993 was the flashpoint of the decades long conflict between the Lou Nuer
and Jikany Nuer. The need for Lou Nuer to have access to permanent water points has
been one of the primary reasons for their clashes with both Anuak and Jikany Nuer in
the past few decades- in both conflicts the Lou Nuer have gained important land along
the Pibor River. Conflicts over administrative borders have also been common source
of violence in the post-CPA period, often involving local politicians and government
officials. Finally, tensions exist over perceived land grabbing in rural areas.
While clashes frequently occur over resources, existing resource-sharing agreements
between local communities are often ignored. Cattle camp youth and elders have annual land-sharing agreements in place- even across ethnic lines. Despite violent clashes between 2011 and 2013, the Murle and Lou Nuer had local border sharing agreements as recently as 2010, led by the cattle camp leaders. In the annual dry season
migration by Lou Nuer to Jikany Nuer territory the White Army leaders and elders set
out an agreement for the season. Clashes between youth often take place at the cattle camps, and most of these raids take place at the end of the dry season, when cattle camp youth are ready to return home and are not risking the potential loss of access to water points or grazing lands for an entire dry season. These small scale raids
also do not necessarily mean the loss of access in the next dry season, when another
agreement is made.
Local politicization of state, county and payam borders also plays an important role in
fueling local conflicts. Schomerus and Allen found that political borders and decentralization played a significant role in land disputes in South Sudan (2010). After
fighting for decades against the centralization of power in Khartoum and the marginalization of the South, the SPLA made decentralization a priority in government documents after the CPA (Schomerus and Allen 2010:22). However, the implementation
of this policy has stalled, and power is still extremely centralized- only this time in
Juba rather than Khartoum. This is one of the areas in which South Sudan is “at odds
with itself”- the policy of decentralization is moving forward in theory, while actual
power is increasingly centralized (ibid). The policy of decentralization has led to local
power struggles at the county level, particularly regarding border lines. Increasing
tensions and conflicts between counties is occurring due to the “ethnicisation of politics at the local level, where counties are being drawn along tribal lines […] fuelling
nepotism and patronage in politics” (ibid:39). The competition for political space often occurs along borders- the north/south border, and between states, counties and
payams. The perception among many civilians is that access to development funds
and representation at the state level starts at the county level. Therefore every ethnic group, or clan, wants their own county. However, demarcating borders along ethnic lines also has the potential to increase tensions and fuel conflicts between groups.
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In addition the “selection of county commissioners […] has been shaped by tribal calculations” (ibid:41). In the interim period from 1972-1983, and later as part of
Garang’s ‘caretaker’ system, leaders were intentionally selected from different ethnic
groups or regions (ibid:41). This was used as a means of reducing tribalism, but also to
ensure administrators did not face pressure or complaints of bias for their own group.
In the current system local government leaders are accused of favoritism and potentially exacerbate tensions due to their personal loyalties, rather than act as mediators.
Aside from localized land disputes over resources or political borders, a new potential
factor in land disputes in the future will be the sale or loan of land to the commercial
sector. David Deng revealed that between 2007 and the end of 2010 over 2.5 million
hectares of land were acquired by foreign interests for forestry, biofuel and agriculture uses (2011:7). If tourism, conservation and domestic investments are included
then the figure tops 5.5 million hectares- or nine percent of the total land of South
Sudan (ibid). The acquisition of land to foreign interests is becoming more common in
recent years. It is hoped that the investments will bring in funds, and therefore jobs
and taxes, to the local economy. However, without the correct laws and regulations
in place to monitor these sales, the continual ‘land grabbing’ instead becomes a potential conflict driver. The lack of implementation, or clear regulations, regarding
land rights and tenure in South Sudan at this time means the large scale sale of land is
extremely risky and could become major conflict drivers for years to come.
Deng, David. 2011. “The New Frontier: A baseline survey of large-scale land-based investment
in
Southern
Sudan.”
Norwegian
People’s
Aid.
(https://www.dropbox.com/s/r95amy1vihjaas8/Deng%20-%202011%20%20The%20New%20Frontier%20A%20baseline%20survey%20of%20large-scale%20landbased%20investment%20in%20Southern%20Sudan%282%29.pdf?dl=0)
Nucci, Domenico. 2004. “Study on arbitration, mediation and conciliation of land and
property
disputes.”
Norwegian
Refugee
Council.
(https://www.dropbox.com/s/wf6flntccm76ph7/Nucci%20-%202004%20%20Study%20on%20arbitration%2C%20mediation%20and%20conciliation%20of%20land%2
0and%20property%20disputes-annotated.pdf?dl=0)
Schomerus, Marieke and Tim Allen. “South Sudan at Odds with Itself: Dynamics of
Conflict and Predicaments of Peace.” LSE. Pact Sudan and DFID.
(https://www.dropbox.com/s/k0fus8mxazgt5jw/LSE%20south%20sudan%20at%20odds%
20with%20itself.pdf?dl=0)
Gender Based Violence
There is no section on gender based violence but it is recognized that readers
might be interested in reports on the topic. The three below are recommended.
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Hutchinson, Sharon and Jok Madut Jok. 2002. “Gendered Violence and the Militarisation of Ethnicity: A Case Study from Southern Sudan.” In Richard Werbner, ed. Postcolonial Subjectivities in Africa. London: Zed Books
Small Arms Survey. 2012. “Women and Armed Violence in South Sudan.”
(http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/southsudan/womens-security/HSBA-women-and-armed-conflict.pdf)
Small Arms Survey. 2008. “No standing, few prospects: how peace is failing South Sudanese female combatants and WAAFG.”
(http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-13-nostanding-few-prospects.pdf)
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Socio-cultural profiles of Major Ethnic Groups in Greater Upper Nile
South Sudan is an extremely diverse country with dozens of ethnic groups and languages. Further complicating this is that many groups consist of different sub-groups
with various dialects. Anthropological studies on groups South Sudan are some of the
most well known in the field, particularly Evans-Pritchard’s seminal study on the Nuer
from the 1930s. However, decades of war have meant that most research since the
1950s occurred in the period of peace between the first and second civil wars, or
were done remotely. Most primary research therefore is either from the colonial period or from thirty to twenty years ago. The challenges of access and security have limited field studies since the mid-1980s, although many anthropologists from before
that have continued to write remotely, or have conducted research in refugee camps.
Importantly, there are a few excellent exceptions, including South Sudanese academics. In addition, much research carried out in the post-CPA period is still being written
and has yet to be published.
It is highly recommended that primary sources by anthropologists are read to complement these short profiles. Some of the better known anthropologists are listed after each profile, with some of their principal works (or at least the most accessible
for non-anthropologists), but the list is in no way comprehensive. Social structures are
extremely complex and in constant flux. The high amount of ethnic groups in South
Sudan means that many peoples have very little anthropological research written
about them. The current conflict means that this will likely continue to be the case. A
very short list of anthropologists for some of the smaller groups not profiled here is
also given. An excellent source for some of the less visible ethnic groups is the Gurtong webpage, which has profiles on dozens of people groups within South Sudan
(http://www.gurtong.net/Peoples/PeoplesProfiles/tabid/71/Default.aspx).
A list of the counties where various Nuer and Dinka clans are located is more likely to
confuse rather than clarify. Instead the UNOCHA ethnic map of South Sudan is a great
visual guide
(https://www.dropbox.com/s/s5326kcw57kqcp3/SS%20Ethnic%20Map.pdf?dl=0).
Keep in mind many of the borders given between groups are not as well defined or are
along exact lines as portrayed on the map- many of these areas are contested, shared
or both.
Any mistakes or gaps are the author’s alone. Corrections, clarifications or updates are
welcome.
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Ethnic group: Dinka (Jieng or Muony-jang)
Language group: Nilotic
Sub-groups:
There are over twenty major Dinka clans. Some of these include- Rek, Ruweng, Bor,
Twic, Nyarweng, Hol, Agar, Gok, Rek, Aliab, Ciec, Thoi, Luach, Ngok, Renk, Malual,
Abiliang, Padeng, and Atwot. The Dinka are generally found in Greater Bahr al Ghazal,
Greater Bor, and Upper Nile. See the UNOCHA ethnic map of South Sudan for locations.
Related groups: Nuer
Historic movement:
Oral traditions dictate that the Dinka migrated from Gezira between the 14th and
16th centuries due to drought and slave raids. They moved south following the Nile
into the Bahr al Ghazal region and are believed to be one of the later groups to arrive
in South Sudan.
Livelihoods: Agro-pastoralists
The Dinka peoples are very diverse. Similar to other pastoralists in rural South Sudan
and in the wider region, cattle are a central part of Dinka livelihoods and society. The
Dinka primarily rely upon livestock, but are also engaged in planting (cultivation) and
fishing during the dry season. The importance of fishing and agriculture on food security, however, varies between communities. Like other agro-pastoralists, many Dinka
communities are reliant on moving with their cattle in the dry season (usually January
to May) to the toic (swamps in the rainy season which turn into pasture in the dry season), where they set up temporary cattle camps. Here the cattle are able to access
water and grazing for part of the year. Fishing is usually best in the dry season as the
rivers and pools get low and fish are easier to catch. At the beginning of the rainy
season (June/July) the people return to their homesteads and fields are planted. This
time is often the most significant hunger period for South Sudanese agro-pastoralists,
as the cattle are not producing much milk and the fields are yet to be ready for harvesting. Once the harvest is ready people celebrate. At the end of the year drums are
often heard from marriage celebrations or dances. Once the dry season returns in
January the cattle are taken back to the cattle camps and the cycle starts again.
Historical Social Structure:
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Before the colonial era the Dinka were an acephelous society- meaning they had no
hierarchy or centralized system of coordination and control1. Instead the Dinka have
been organized into a number of major inter-linked, but independent clans. The leaders that existed before the arrival of the British were either military, religious, kin
group, or cattle camp elders who decided when to migrate. Loyalty and identity lied
primarily with kin, not with the ethnic group as a whole. This is still the case, although political conflicts have manipulated the threat of the ‘other’ to unify groups
that in the past shared little loyalty. The Dinka are incredibly diverse and the language has a number of different dialects. For example, an important system of spiritual leaders found in Bahr al Ghazal never existed among the Dinka in Jonglei (Harrigan 2012). Kinship groups are the primary means of identity and loyalty among the
Dinka. According to Harrigan, Dinka kinship is most clearly delineated by the sharing
of bridewealth, both in paying and receiving.
The system of chiefs now found across South Sudan was created by the British colonial
rule (1898-1956) as a means of civil administration (indirect rule)- primarily for the
collection of taxes and solving disputes through customary courts. Chiefs were appointed to represent particular territories, and this system of local governance was
reinforced by the GoSS after the CPA (through the Local Government Act in 2008).
There are various levels of chiefs and although terminology varies depending on the
region, the terms are usually translated to sub-chiefs/headmen, chiefs and paramount
chiefs. In modern times one can recognize the hierarchy from the sashes the various
chiefs wear when attending official events. Sub-chiefs, or headmen, are given black
sashes, chiefs red sashes, while paramount chiefs have a number of lines on their red
sashes-indicating the number of chiefs they represent. Harrigan explains that during
the second civil war the chieftain system was used as a means of providing recruits as
well as supplying food for the SPLA. Each sub-chief was expected to supply five recruits to the SPLA and supply one tin of maize for each family. This was later increased to three tins of maize for each family. The chiefs do not have any economic
control over their community members and their primary responsibility is keeping the
peace through the solving of disputes. The chiefs sit on customary courts and solve
issues such as cattle theft, murder, elopement, and adultery. The courts have the
same hierarchy as the chiefs, and if the judgment is appealed then cases move up the
chain to higher level chiefs.
Kinship groups among Dinka share cattle and food, but territory is shared among a
number of family groups. These kinship groups might coordinate for political representation, collective defense of grazing land or for ceremonies, but they do not share
food. Only members of a common kinship group share food and are responsible for
each other. The territorial groups are called wut, which literally translates from Dinka
as cattle camp. The protection and defense of the cattle in the territory is shared between the youth belonging to the family groups.
1
One major exception to this was the Ngok Dinka in Abyei. Consistent contact with the Baggara
from the north led the Ngok to develop a more centralized system (Hutchinson 2012:12)
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Relationship with SPLA and other armed elements:
The common narrative is that the SPLM/A has been “Dinka dominated” from its inception in 1983. However, much like other ethnic groups the relationship between the
SPLM/A and the Dinka civilian population has been complex and varied. In the beginning of the rebellion, many Dinka volunteered to join; however, the relationship between the SPLM/A and rural populations has not always been strong 2 . There were
frustrations in Bahr al Ghazal in the 1980s due to their perceived exclusion from military strategy and relief support compared to other parts of the country. The recruitment of children for the Red Army was also not a popular policy, and created frustration with the leadership. While the fall of the Mengistu regime, the SPLA’s primary
backer, and the subsequent 1991 split had a unifying effect, the attacks on Dinka villages by the SPLA Nasir faction at the same time led to discontent with the leadership
for not being able to provide security. The consequent arming of the Dinka youth in
Bahr al Ghazal, also known as Gelweng, led to the use of armed Dinka civilians as
proxy militias for the SPLA. The clashes between the two factions, and the arming of
civilian militias (i.e. gelweng, see White Army, Gelweng and Titweng section), were
causing resentment among the civilians caught in the middle as targets. Furthermore
after the 1999 Wunlit peace agreement the SPLA decided to disarm the gelweng to
reduce the internal clashes that were occurring. The brutality of the disarmament
process also resulted in violent clashes between the youth and SPLA, and created
strong grievances against the movement.
Key individuals:
The late John Garang Mabior
Salva Kiir
Kuol Manyang
Recommended readings:
Deng, Francis Mading. 1972. The Dinka of the Sudan. Waveland Press Inc. Illinois.
Deng, Luka Biong. 2010. “Social Capital and Civil War: The Dinka Communities in Sudan’s
Civil
War.”
African
Affairs,
109/435,
231-250.
(https://www.dropbox.com/s/w6jn4eprzkra4a8/Deng%20-%202010%20%20Social%20capital%20and%20civil%20war%20The%20Dinka%20communities%20in%20S
udan%27s%20civil%20war%282%29.pdf?dl=0)
2
For more about the complexity of Dinka civilian relations with the SPLA in Lakes State read
Leonardi, Cherry. 2007. “‘Liberation’ or Capture: Youth in Between ‘Hakuma’, and ‘Home’ During Civil War and It’s Aftermath in Southern Sudan.” African Affairs, 106/424, 391-412.
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Harrigan, Simon. “Background paper for Bor, Twic, Ghol and Nyaraweng Dinka” presented at AECOM conference, Nairobi March 2012 (https://db.tt/cusHiNtO)
Jok, M.J. and S. Hutchinson. 1999. “Sudan’s Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities.” African Studies Review 42(2): 125-45.
(https://db.tt/nkMlG74a)
Leinhardt, Godfrey. 1961. Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka. Oxford
Clarendon Press.
Ethnic group: Nuer (Nei ti naadth)
Language group: Nilotic
Sub-groups (major clans):
Some of the major clans among the Nuer include the Lou, Jikany, Gawaar, Bul, Lek,
Jegai, Adok, Nyong, Ador, Thiang and Lak. The Nuer are generally found in Greater
Upper Nile (Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile states). See the UNOCHA ethnic map of
South Sudan for locations.
Related groups: Dinka
Historic movement:
According to oral traditions the Nuer migrated south from Kordofan to Bahr al Ghazal
around 1700 due to drought. In response to slave raids by the Baggara Arabs in the
18th century the Nuer carried out a mass migration to the east across the Nile
(Hutchinson 2012). The expansion in the 19th century by the Nuer was one of the
largest expansions in Africa at the time. The Nuer moved into Dinka and Anuak lands
and assimilated some people while pushing others to migrate. By the end of the century the Nuer had reached all the way to Ethiopia and their territory expanded between three and four times what it was previously. While the Nuer did use violence to
expand their territory, marriage and adoption were often used as means of assimilating new groups. Hutchinson explains that many Nuer men would marry their daughters
to Dinka and Anuak men as a means of assimilating them (ibid). Those paying bridewealth did not just owe cattle, but also owed cooperation and respect towards their
in-laws for as much as eight generations afterwards. This expanded family groups and
loyalties and eventually sons or grandsons would break away to form his own family
group and village.
When the British definitively defeated the Lou Nuer in 1929-1930, the Nuer expansion
diminished but did not stop entirely (Hutchinson 2012). According to Nuer oral sources
and archives, Lou and Jikany Nuer both continued to expand to the east and attempted to buy land from Anuak and Murle. The Murle took the land back in the 1950s,
while the Anuak sold land to the Nuer south of Akobo. In 1982 this agreement came to
a head and clashes broke out between Anuak and Nuer over the land rights (ibid).
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Hutchinson believes the disagreement might have sprung out of differing opinions on
what the Nuer bought- either permanent land ownership or temporary access for grazing (ibid). The Nuer pushed the Anuak out of Akobo town and the Anuak are now primarily in Ethiopia, Pochalla and eastern Akobo county. The movement of thousands of
South Sudanese to Ethiopia in the 1980s expanded Nuer territory in Gambella, again
at the expense of the Anuak. Further clashes in Akobo in 2013 escalated tensions
again after the death of an Anuak chief in Akobo who was calling for the Lou to give
Akobo back to the Anuak.
Livelihood: Agro-pastoralists
The Nuer share a similar livelihood cycle with the Dinka (see the Dinka livelihood section for an explanation of the annual cycle). The Nuer dry season migratory patterns
are too complex and vast to list here. However, like most dry season migratory patterns the cattle are taken to the toic (pastures), nearby the closest permanent or
semi-permanent body of water, usually rivers. See map in index of migratory patterns.
Historical Social Structure:
Much like the Dinka, the Nuer ethnic group were historically acephelous and did not
have a centralized system of political control before the arrival of the British. Instead
the Nuer are divided into between eleven and thirteen sub-groups or clans. Within
these clans there are family groupings interlinked through either marriage or descent.
In reality this means that loyalty and identity lies with direct family primarily, and
then with more extended family units dependent on outside threats. Hutchinson explains it as “brothers should unite against cousins, unless faced with a broader threat,
whereupon cousins should all unite to face their common enemy” (2012:13). The consequence of this is very fluid alliances and loyalties outside the small familial units.
The internal Nuer wars of the 1990s and early 2000 can be better understood through
this lens. A perceived outside threat to all Nuer will unify them, but primary loyalties
ultimately lie with small family units, not the ethnic group as a whole or even the major clans.
In pre-colonial time, Nuer society did have particular individuals responsible for spiritual and ritual aspects of society, such as earth priests and prophets, but they did not
have a political role. Despite this prophets did have many followers and the songs
(prophecies) of the most influential, such as Ngundeng Bong (1846-1906), still hold
significant sway over much of the Nuer population (Johnson 1994). The spiritual leaders held influence due to their perceived powers to bless or curse and foresee the future. Current Nuer prophets are still believed to hold such powers and people go to
them for blessings and direction. The British undermined the Nuer prophets as they
were perceived as threats to colonial dominance and instead imposed a chieftain
structure. Initially weak the government system of chiefs soon became adopted and
assimilated into Nuer society.
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The authority of government chiefs was directly affected by the two civil wars. As explained in the Dinka section, the SPLA, and the later breakaway factions, initially
used the chief system as a means for recruiting as well as supporting their troops
through food and other resources. However, high level chiefs (not seen as sympathetic to the political cause) were often targeted during the war years, either by Khartoum or by opposing factions of the SPLA. The current relationship between chiefs,
the government, and the opposition varies from county to county. It is highly likely
both sides in the current conflict are relying on the chieftain system in many of the
same ways they did in the 1980s and 1990s – i.e. as sources of recruitment as well as
economic support – albeit not always voluntarily. From quite early on the SPLA-IO has
worked with Nuer prophets, such as Dak Kueth, in mobilizating and motivating the
White Army.
Relationship with SPLM/A:
The Nuer relationship with the SPLM/A is extremely complex. The below discussion
will focus on Riek Machar and his split from the mainstream SPLM/A to create his own
movement in 1991 (SPLM Nasir), his rejoining of the SPLM/A in 2002, and then the
most recent creation of his SPLM/A in Opposition (IO) after the violence broke in Juba
in December 2013. The effects of the 1991 split are analyzed more closely in the militarization section. However, while Machar has received the most attention among the
Nuer leaders, his political agenda has not necessarily been supported across the Nuer
population or leadership. Machar’s involvement in arming and directing Nuer civilians
who targeted civilians in Garang’s homeland in the notorious “Bor Massacre” still defines the political narrative surrounding him. While Machar publicly apologized for his
involvement in the Bor Massacre in 2013, in the current conflict the government has
also used this event as a means of discrediting him.
Importantly, the manipulation of ethnicity by Machar and other military leaders in the
past twenty years has clouded the nuances regarding Nuer support for Machar’s positions. Common narratives in the media oversimplify extremely complex realities. It
must be remembered that when Machar first split from the SPLM/A in 1991 to form
the SPLA Nasir faction, it was not a pure Nuer movement, but Shilluk, some Dinka and
other ethnic groups were also represented. Meanwhile, some Nuer leaders remained
loyal to the mainstream SPLM/A. The consequent manipulation of ethnicity and targeting of civilians by both sides changed the conflict dynamics from a political and
ideological contest to an ethnic one, but it did not start out as an ethnic dispute. Similarly, not only Machar and his Nuer supporters were frustrated with the current leadership within the SPLM: Dinka and Shilluk leaders who had been vocal in their criticism against the government were also arrested in December 2013. Although they
have not supported the armed movement of Machar, they are advocating for reform
within the party (commonly referred to as the Third Bloc).
Importantly a significant portion of south on south violence in the civil war was actually between Nuer factions in the 1990s. Many Nuer did not support Machar’s decisions
to sign an agreement with Khartoum (1997), while others contested him for power.
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Primary loyalty among many Nuer soldiers lied with certain commanders, often based
on kinship, not with Machar himself.
The targeting of Nuer civilians in Juba in December 2013 acted as a means of mobilizing Nuer support for the SPLM/A-IO. As Hutchinson explained, among the Nuer brothers will fight brothers unless they have a problem with the cousins - then they will
unite against their common enemy. The killings of Nuer in Juba in December 2013 by
forces of the government united the Nuer together. Importantly though, the unity is
based on the perceived threat against all the Nuer, not on the leadership skills of
Machar or the desire to support any particular political agenda. The civilians who are
fighting on behalf of the opposition prefer to fight in parallel to the military structures (Breidlid and Arensen 2014). Attempts by the opposition leadership to assimilate
them will be very challenging.
In addition the other Nuer commanders, such as Peter Gadet, are not likely to support
Machar’s political agenda or possibly even his military leadership. If the current dynamics follows a similar pattern to the 1990s, Machar will struggle to keep control
over the various commanders and armed civilians. The longer the current conflict
goes on the higher the chance that fragmentations among the opposition will occur as
commanders vie for power and soldiers and armed civilians loyalty to Machar is challenged (ibid).
Key individuals:
Riek Machar
Taban Deng Gai
Peter Gadet
Breidlid, Ingrid Marie & Michael J. Arensen. 2014. “Demystifying the White Army: Nuer armed civilians’ involvement in the South Sudanese Crisis.” Conflict Trends Issue 3,
2014. 32-38.
Evans-Pritchard, E. 1940. The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Intervention of a Nilotic People. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
_____________. 1951. Kinship and Marriage among the Nuer. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Johnson, Douglas. 2009. “The Nuer Civil Wars.” In Changing Identifications and Alliances in North-East Africa: Sudan, Uganda, and the Ethiopia-Sudan borderlands. Gunther Schlee and Elizabeth Watson (eds). New York: Berghahn Books.
Johnson, Douglas. 1994. Nuer Prophets: A History of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Oxford University Press.
Jok, M.J. and S. Hutchinson. 1999. “Sudan’s Prolonged Second Civil War and the Mili11 of 35
tarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities.” African Studies Review 42(2): 125-45.
(https://db.tt/nkMlG74a)
Hutchinson, Sharon. 1996. Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
_____________. 2012. “A Guide to the Nuer of Jonglei State, Part One: Nuer and Dinka patterns of migration and settlement” presented at AECOM Jonglei conference,
Nairobi March 2012 (https://db.tt/yaFlbZjn)
Ethnic group: Chollo (Shilluk3)
Language group: Nilotic
The Chollo are generally based in Upper Nile state around Malakal and the White Nile
and Sobat Rivers.
Related groups: Anuak, Pari, Luo
Historic movement:
According to oral tradition the Chollo originally migrated from Bahr al Ghazal around
500 years ago. The founder of the Chollo, Nyikang, separated from other Luo groups
and led his people down the White Nile. They arrived at the current location around
1500 AD and decided to settle around Malakal.
Livelihood: Agrarian
The Chollo livelihood primarily rely upon fishing and agriculture. Livestock are highly
valued, but the Chollo are not as dependent upon cattle for food relative to other
groups. In the dry season the livestock do not need to migrate far away into other territories. Many cattle camps were actually on islands in the rivers along which the
Chollo kingdom was settled4.
Historical Social Structure:
Unlike most the ethnic groups in South Sudan, the Chollo have a very centralized system of governance. After settling at the junction of the Nile and Sobat rivers around
1500 AD, the Chollo fought wars with the Dinka from 1600-1650. These wars led to the
establishment of the Chollo kingdom. The Chollo have a monarchy under a king (reth)
3
The Chollo are commonly referred to as Shilluk although that is actually an incorrect pronounciation
from the past. As a result the correct name, Chollo, will be used instead.
4 Literature does not state if this is still the case.
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who is believed to be divine. He is selected from among the sons of the current king.
It is the duty of the reth to perform sacrifices to the original leader, Nyikang, and ensure his shrines are maintained. The kingdom was divided into two political districts
(north and south) and fifteen provinces. Each province was led by a paramount chief
who reported to the king. The provinces were divided into eleven settlements, each
which were led by a chief.
The king still plays a major role in Chollo life today and is responsible for collecting
taxes and solving local disputes. The Local Government Act5 gave the king formal authority over civil administration of the Chollo areas. While the king is expected to be
politically neutral in his role as the head of the kingdom he has historically been close
to the former SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum, and been the rival of another
Chollo politician Lam Akol (head of the breakaway SPLM DC party- see below for more
details).
Relationship with SPLA and other armed elements:
Like many other groups the relationship between the Chollo and the SPLA in the past
few decades is mixed. The Chollo community has been divided between the political
leaders Lam Akol and Pagan Amum. Akol was a high level commander in the SPLA
movement but left the movement with Machar and others to form the SPLA-Nasir faction in 1991. He then left Machar to create SPLA-United in 1993 and signed an agreement with Khartoum in 1997.6 He stayed aligned to the Khartoum government until
2003, when he rejoined the SPLM/A. After the signing of the CPA Akol was appointed
Minister of Foreign Affairs between 2005 and 2007, but then left the SPLM/A again. He
founded the SPLM Democratic Change (DC) movement in 2009. While some traditional
Chollo leaders supported him, others supported the SPLM party instead, including the
king (reth) and SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum. Akol ran against Salva Kiir for
the presidency in 2010, to much chagrin from within the SPLM.
The SPLM DC party has faced major challenges from the SPLM since its inception. Due
to Lam Akol’s past alliances with Khartoum, the party has been accused of being a
branch of the NCP, and Akol’s call for unity with the north reinforced this assumption.
While the SPLM attempted to ban SPLM DC from taking part in the elections (2010)
the courts rejected the idea and Lam Akol competed against Salva Kiir for the presidency. While Akol lost, four SPLM DC parliamentary candidates won seats in the election. The SPLA refused to accept the results and arrested the candidates in May 2010.
The candidates were restored at the end of August 2010 after the Legislative Assem-
5
http://mlgi.org.za/resources/local-government-database/by-country/sudan/sub-nationallegislation/The%20Local%20Government%20Act%202009.pdf
6 SPLA-United was initially the new name for SPLA-Nasir in which both Akol and Machar were
leaders. Machar then changed his movement to SSIM (South Sudan Independence Movement)
and Lam Akol kept the United named for his own separate movement.
13 of 35
bly voted to give them back their immunity as elected members. However, by this
time violence had already erupted in Upper Nile.
A barge attack by unknown persons was blamed on supporters of SPLM DC, prompting
a quick deployment of an SPLA division to the area to “clear the area of the Lam Akol
militia.” Soon followed reports of human rights abuses against civilians by the SPLA,
who allegedly did not differentiate between the militia members and civilians from
the community. After a failed ceasefire, fighting erupted in March 2011 which saw
Malakal the target of an attack by opposition forces. Although repelled, the operation
to clear the town by the SPLA led to serious accusations of more human rights abuses
by the military against Chollo civilians.
One of the Chollo commanders involved in the SSDM/A opposition movement in the
area, Johnson Olony, accepted an amnesty offer by President Kiir in September 2013
after he received a pardon from the king for killing a Chollo chief. After violence
broke out in December 2013 Olony and his men helped the SPLA take control of Fashoda County and later in January helped the SPLA take back Malakal from opposition
forces. Because of the support of Olony’s forces to the government/SPLA, Chollo civilians’ have become targets for the SPLM/A IO forces and allied civilian fighters. Meanwhile, as elsewhere in the country, Nuer civilians in and around Malakal have been
targeted by the SPLA.
While the association with Lam Akol led to the targeting of Chollo civilians by the
SPLA in 2010, many Chollo have also supported the SPLM mainstream. As stated, the
king has politically opposed Lam Akol and has maintained close ties with Pagan
Amum, a high level Chollo politician who, until recently, was within the SPLM. However, in response to his avocation for SPLM reform and decision to run for the upcoming Presidential elections, President Kiir dismissed Amum from his position as the
SPLM Secretary General in 2013. As this was a clear violation of the party constitution, Amum took the case to court, but was arrested after the violence broke out in
December 2013, accused of plotting a failed coup attempt against the President. Pagan was eventually released and is now one of the leaders within the “third bloc”,
who are not aligned with either Machar or President Kiir. Meanwhile, as an illustration
of constantly shifting alliances in South Sudanese politics, Lam Akol has been involved
in the talks in Addis as part of the government delegation, despite being the leader of
an opposition party.
In conclusion, the Chollo relationship with the SPLA varies within the community and
frequently changes. Historically the Chollo have had more tension with the Dinka than
the Nuer due to disputes over land. But currently Olony’s forces are supporting the
SPLA against the SPLA/M IO in Malakal, which has led to Nuer retaliation against Chollo communities. On the other hand Pagan Amum, who since the civil war has been a
main propagator of the SPLM, is now opposing the president, but is not supporting
Machar. Lam Akol was a main opponent of the government, but since December 2013
is again involved with the government. The constantly shifting alliances show a desperate attempt by both sides to find support and allies. It is highly likely the Chollo
14 of 35
civilians primary concern is with protecting their community and do not support the
political agenda of either party at this time.
Key individuals:
Lam Akol
Pagan Amum
Peter Nyaba
Johnson Olony
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1948. The Divine Kingship of the Shilluk of the Nilotic Sudan.
Cambridge University Press.
Westermann, Deidrich. 2009. The Shilluk People, their Language and Folklore. Michigan University Press. (reprint of a book from before 1923, which was very well known
in its era- not sure if it holds up well now)
Ethnic group: Murle
Language group: Surmic
Sub-groups: There are four clans- Tangajon, Ngaroti, Kelenya, Nginvach & Lowland
Murle and Highland Murle
The Murle are all based in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area which includes the
former counties of Pochalla and Pibor. The Murle are all found in the former county of
Pibor.
There are four clans, or drumships, within the Murle that all Murle people are part of.
These are not as important as B.A. Lewis describes in his work, but especially among
the red chiefs the drumships are part of Murle identity. Of the four drumships there
are two major ones- Tangajon and Ngaroti- and two minor ones- Kelenya and
Nginvach.
Although not actual sub-groups, both in recent years and in the past there has been
discussion around the differences between the highland Murle of Boma and the lowland Murle of Pibor. The main differences between the groups exist around livelihoods, with the lowland Murle relying primarily upon cattle and pastoralism. In contrast the highland Murle are dependent upon agriculture. This is due to the existence
of livestock diseases around Boma, which make cattle raising untenable. The highland
Murle have historically been called “Ngalam” by the lowland Murle, which literally
translates as sugar-ants, implying they work in the dirt and lack the prestige of cattle
ownership. In recent years the SSDM Cobra Faction of David Yau Yau has escalated
tension between the SPLA and the Murle community, which has consequently seen the
highland Murle distance themselves more from his movement, and therefore the lowland Murle as a whole. This has led to political leaders and chiefs from Boma embrac15 of 35
ing the ‘Ngalam’ identity, although this is perceived by many as a mechanism to protect their community from targeting by the military. The recently created Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) will introduce new counties, including Boma, which
could further entrench differences depending on management. However, despite differences the highland Murle still identify themselves as members of the Murle group
as a whole, and very strong kinship ties exist due to frequent inter-marriage and
movement between the two areas.
Historic movement:
The Murle claim to have always lived in the Pibor County area, but academics believe
they originated from Southwest Ethiopia. The historic migration into Pibor County occurred from Eastern Equatoria, where Boma was settled first and then the Murle continued to migrate northwest. As with many ethnic groups the arrival of the colonial
powers put a halt to Murle expansion to the west towards Bor. Nuer claim that the
Murle took Nuer grazing land in the 1960s and 1970s along the Nanaam River in the
northwest of Pibor County, but major expansion halted about 100 years ago.
Livelihood: Agro-pastoralists
Like many of their neighbors the lowland Murle are agro-pastoralists and primarily depend on their livestock, which they migrate with to the toic and cattle camps in the
dry season. In addition they engage in seasonal planting along rivers, fishing and (historically) hunting of the white-eared kob migration. However, around the beginning of
the rainy season, when the cattle have stopped producing most of the milk, fishing is
exhausted and food storage is beginning to run low, the Murle faces an annual hunger
period between June and July. After the return of the rains in May or June planting is
carried out for the next harvest, but food is still a major issue as the cattle have dried
up and the harvest has yet to come. Once the harvest is ready, the new cattle are
born and the cows begin to produce milk again, the annual cycle begins again. This
carefully balanced lifestyle is easily affected by external factors, such as conflict,
raids and droughts. Missed (lost?) planting seasons in 2011-2013 among the Murle due
to conflict and raids significantly reduced their ability to cope for additional shocks.
The Murle in Boma do not seasonally migrate, as they rely primarily upon agriculture.
While less food insecure than the lowland Murle, the highland Murle also missed planting season in 2013 due to conflict between SSDM-CF and the SPLA. Stability and secure
planting seasons are key for 2014 if the Murle are going to improve their food security.
Historical Social Structure:
a. Age-sets
The key structures in Murle society are the age-sets. Male youth from a certain age
segment become members of an age-set and this is an identifier throughout life. Each
16 of 35
age-set has an animal, color scheme and a scarring pattern particular to them. Once
you learn these it is often easy to tell which age-set people belong to. Women wear
the colors or get the markings of their husband, and small girls wear the color of their
father.
Age-sets last for life, but it is when the men are young and single that they matter
most. The men want to fight and prove themselves, and through this get access to
adolescent women at the dances they hold. There tend to be two active age-sets- the
dominant one which holds dances and who are most responsible for defense and protection of the tribe (currently the Botonya), and the one below them who are trying
to establish themselves as a full-fledged age-set (currently the Lango).
Within each age-set there is no clear structure or hierarchy of leadership. Youth either look to those who are from a red chief family, and therefore have the ability to
curse, or youth with proven ability in terms of speaking, hunting or fighting. Raids are
not planned or known by an entire age-set, but by geographical proximity and personal relationships. This is also apparent by the number of Murle youth usually involved in
raids, between five and twenty.
Murle Age-sets in descending order (oldest to youngest):
Mara
Dorongwa
Muden
Titti
Botonya
Lango
b. Red Chiefs
One of the original studies of the Murle, by B.A. Lewis, focused on the existence of
four drumships, led by red chiefs. More recent academics believe these structures
were exaggerated in importance, but they still play a role in Murle society. The role
of red chief holds the most influence among the age-sets and Murle community. The
Red Chief’s power is based on his religious authority, in particular the ability to curse
people. There are four clans, two major ones- Tangajon and Ngaroti- and two minor
ones- Kelenya and Nginvach. There are “leaders” of each clan amongst the red chiefs,
but they are purely the eldest male present from the family at a time. Any male
members of the red chief families have the power to curse, which means each age-set
has descendants of the red chief clans who hold some level of influence. The role of
red-chiefs has decreased in recent decades due to increasing external influences such
as the political economy of the civil war. In addition since red chiefs identity is passed
down patrilineal lines (from fathers to sons), the high number of red chiefs in modern
Murle society seems to have reduced their influence relative to the past.
Relationship with SPLA and other armed elements:
17 of 35
The Murle have had a poor relationship with the SPLM/A in the last couple decades. In
the beginning of the southern rebellion members (including commanders) of the Murle
were involved, as illustrated by the army mutiny in Pibor in 1983, along with Bor and
Pochalla. Boma was one of the first SPLA bases, and it was never lost to the north
during the Second Civil War. However, a few years after the start of the movement a
high profile Murle leader was killed in Ethiopia by other members of the SPLA. While
the causes of his death are debated, his death led to a major reduction of support for
the movement among the Murle population, who perceived a bias against them and
other minority groups in the fledgling movement. Consequently a Murle leader (Sultan
and Red Chief), Ismael Konyi, looked to Khartoum for support in arming his local militia, Pibor Defense Force (PDF) in order to protect the Murle community against the
SPLA.
Despite the use of Boma as a major base throughout the war, the SPLA were never
able to recapture Pibor after Konyi’s PDF captured it in 1992. The historic ties with
the government in Khartoum, and their resistance against the SPLA during the war,
have increased animosity between the Murle and their historic ‘rivals’ of the Nuer and
Dinka. Despite this, it must be remembered that many Murle remained loyal to the
SPLM/A and some rose to the rank of Brigadier General. Meanwhile the highland Murle
in Boma hosted one of the main SPLA bases throughout the war, although like in the
rest of the country tension existed between the soldiers and the community ‘supporting’ (hosting) them.
In more recent years (post-CPA) the SSDF Cobra Faction, led by David Yau Yau, has
dominated the headlines on Pibor. David Yau Yau first rebelled after losing in the
2010 elections in Pibor County. At the time it was not a major movement and a peace
agreement was signed with the government in June 2011. However, after the forced
disarmament of the Murle by the SPLA in early 2012 Yau Yau went back to the bush.
The general frustration with the government among the Murle youth after the disarmament prompted a mass recruitment into his forces. SPLA positions were targeted,
culminating in the loss of Boma (when?). The SPLA, led by Peter Gadet, carried out a
counter-insurgency campaign in which they recaptured Boma, but they could not defeat the movement entirely and the campaign further damaged relations with the civilian Murle population. A peace deal was finally reached in 2014 thanks to the work
of the church as a mediator and the nation-wide conflict between the government
and SPLA-IO. The government needed to ensure the Murle did not join the opposition
and the Murle benefitted from the newly created Greater Pibor Administrative Area
(GPAA) led by David Yau Yau. While the deal is politically convenient for both the
government and Yau Yau for the time being, it remains fragile.
Key Murle individuals:
Ismael Konyi
Kennedy Gain
David Yau Yau
Baba Medan
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Further Reading:
Andretta, E. 1985. “A Reconsideration of the Basis of Group Cohesion among the Murle
of the Southern Sudan.” University Microfilms International.
Arensen, Jonathan E. 2012. “Murle Ecology” presented at AECOM Jonglei conference,
Nairobi March (https://db.tt/HRZgPkWZ)
________. 2012. “Murle History” presented at AECOM Jonglei conference, Nairobi
March (https://db.tt/b8CgJ3u6)
________. 2012. “Murle Political Systems and Age-sets” presented at AECOM Jonglei
conference, Nairobi March (https://db.tt/JdrQQYAm)
________. 1992. Mice are Men: Language and Society among the Murle of Sudan.
Summer Institute of Linguistics.
Lewis, B.A. 1972. The Murle: Red Chiefs and Black Commoners. Oxford Clarendon
Press.
Ethnic group: Anuak (Anyuak, Anywaa)
Language group: Nilotic (Luo)
The Anuak are now mostly found in East Akobo and Pochalla in South Sudan and Gambella in Ethiopia.
Related groups: Chollo
Historic movement:
The Anuak share an oral history with the Chollo, but have different names for the
leaders. The Chollo name of Nyikango, who led the Chollo people up the Nile to settle
in Malakal, is instead named Akango in Anuak. His brother, Gilo, continued to migrate
up the Sobat River and this migration is the start of the Anuak. The Anuak originally
settled in the Baro, Sobat and Gilo river areas, but were pushed further east by the
Nuer migration in the 19th century. It is said that Gilo’s grandson, Cuwai, was the
first Anuak king and his descendants are the Anuak people.
Livelihood: Agrarian
The Anuak are now primarily agrarian and rely on cultivation, not livestock. The king
even reduced the bridewealth price of Anuak women as a means of reducing the numbers of livestock they held, which reduced them as targets of raids by neighboring
19 of 35
Murle and Nuer. As a result the Anuak do not have a seasonal migratory route like
their pastoralist neighbors.
Historical Social Structure:
The Anuak also have a kingdom like the Chollo who they broke away from hundreds of
years ago. The system of rule was through a federation of villages, which had their
own headmen and court system. These headmen are under the sub-chiefs who report
to the independent king (nyie), who is above all Anuak, much like the Chollo king.
Historically the villages were constantly competing for the title of nyie, but this was
stopped by the British. The colonial powers were tired of the feuding and selected
one family to hold the title of ‘king of kings’ in a copy of the feudal system in Ethiopia
at the time. The Nyie Agada Akway and his descendants were made the permanent
holders of the title.
Relationship with SPLA and other armed elements:
As stated in the Nuer section the Anuak lost land in the 19th century due to the Nuer
expansion and then again in the 1980s when the Nuer moved further into Ethiopia
with the SPLA bases there. In the 1980s the Anuak also lost land in Akobo to the Lou
Nuer and continually are pushed further east. The Anuak are now also losing land on
the Ethiopian side of the border in Gambella. With all land being nationalized the
Ethiopian government is distributing it to major agricultural corporations and forcing
the Anuak out. This is part of the reason for an Anuak rebellion against the Ethiopian
government in the last few years. The further loss of traditional Anuak land on the
Ethiopian side of the border has also emboldened them to push back on their land
rights against the Lou Nuer in Akobo. Those living in diaspora are calling for the restoration of traditional land to the Anuak and the armed movement in Gambella has received an inflow of arms, presumably from the Eritreans. In 2013 a Lou Nuer man who
was found dead near Akobo led Lou Nuer youth to retaliate against an Anuak chief in
Akobo County who has called for the return of Anuak to their homeland in Akobo. His
consequent death at the hands of the Nuer youth escalated tensions between the Nuer and Anuak in Akobo and the Anuak moved further east towards Pochalla. In December 2013 when the fighting broke out in Juba, the Nuer SPLA were pushed out of
Pochalla to Akobo by the Dinka soldiers supported by the Anuak population. Like in
much of the country, historical local disputes, such as those between the Lou Nuer
and Anuak, are likely the primary reason the Anuak have sided with the government in
the current conflict.
Key individuals:
David Okwier
King?
Further Reading:
Evans-Pritchard
20 of 35
Feyissa, Dereje. 2011. Playing Different Games: the paradox of Anywaa and Nuer
Identification Strategies in the Gambella region. New York: Berghahn Books.
_____________. 2009. “Conflict and Identity Politics: The Case of Anywaa-Nuer Relations in Gambela, Western Ethiopia.” In Changing Identifications and Alliances in
North-East Africa: Sudan, Uganda, and the Ethiopia-Sudan borderlands. Gunther
Schlee and Elizabeth Watson (eds). New York: Berghahn Books.
Kurimoto, E. 2001. “Capturing Modernity among the Anywaa of Western Ethiopia.” In
Rewriting Africa: Toward Renaissance or Collapse. E. Kurimoto (ed.). Osaka: Japan
Centre for Area Studies.
___________. 1992. “Natives and Outsiders: The Historical Experience of the Anywaa
of Western Ethiopia.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 43: 1-43.
Perner, Conradin (‘Kuacakuoro’)
Ethnic group: Maban
Language Group: Nilotic
Sub-groups: The Maban are frequently grouped as part of the greater Burun peoples,
which consist of several other independent groups- Uduk, Jumjum, Ragreg, Ganza,
Mopo, Mayak, Mabano, and Buldid. These groups are spread across the Sudanese-South
Sudanese border between Southern Blue Nile and Upper Nile.
Related groups: Shilluk
Historical Migratory patterns:
Another Luo group the Maban are said to have separated from the Chollo at Soba
(near Khartoum). It is believed this occurred after the fall of the Makkura Kingdom.
The Maban arrived at their location between the east bank of the Nile and the Ethiopian highlands via the Baro River.
Livelihood: Agrarian
Although the Maban own livestock their primary means of livelihoods is cultivation.
Like the other agrarian groups in South Sudan they do not rely on seasonal migration
in the dry season.
Historical Social Structure:
Like most of the Nilotic groups the Maban did not have a centralized system of administration or control until the arrival and imposition of the British chieftain system.
Their split with the Chollo occurred before the latters creation of a centralized sys21 of 35
tem (i.e kingdom) and therefore the Maban do not share it. Spiritual leaders had influence historically, but no political influence.
Relationship with SPLA and other armed groups:
The recent appearance of the Mabanese Defense Forces (MDF) has brought the Maban
into the current conflict. The MDF has targeted Nuer NGO staff in an apparent retaliation for losses from clashes against SPLA-IO in July.
Anthropologists of additional people groups not profiled above:
Atuot people- John Burton
Bari, Tenet and Lutuho peoples- Simon Simonse
Didinga people- J.H. Driberg
Mundari people- Jean Buxton
Pari people- Eisei Kurimoto
Uduk people- Wendy James
22 of 35
Glossary
Major armed groups in South Sudan
SPLM/A- Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army
The SPLM/A, formed in 1983 after the Bor mutiny, was engaged in more than two
decades of civil war against the Khartoum regime. John Garang was the leader of the
movement, until he was killed in a helicopter clash in July 2005. As part of its official
rhetoric of the “New Sudan”, the SPLM/A called for a secular and democratically reformed state. It initially received support from the Ethiopian Mengistu regime until its
collapse in 1991. The same year tensions in the leadership saw the creation of the
breakaway SPLA-Nasir faction led by Riek Machar, Lam Akol and Gordon Kong (Machar
re-joined the SPLM/A in 2002). Tensions within the SPLM leadership in 2013 prompted
President Kiir to dismiss Riek Machar from his position of Vice President, and later Pagan Amum was removed from his post of SPLM Secretary General. These tensions
came to a boil in late 2013 after top politicians walked out of a SPLM meeting, after
which violence broke out within the Presidential guards in Juba, escalating into a nation wide conflict.
Anyanya and Anyanya II
Anyanya was the name of the Southern rebel movement involved in the first civil war
between 1955 and 1972.
The Anyanya II uprising started in the late 1970s, and was initially made up of a number of independent Nuer groups pushing for independence from Sudan. Support from
the Mengistu regime (Ethiopia) in 1982 helped organize the movement, but Mengistu
later decided to support Garang and the newly formed SPLA in 1983. Clashes occurred
between the SPLA and Anyanya II in the years that followed. The Anyanya II forces
were largely integrated into the SPLA between 1988 and 1990, although not all- the
most significant exception being Paulino Matiep. Despite joining forces with the SPLA,
many of the Nuer Anyanya II stayed in their areas of origin, and then joined the side
of the SPLA-Nasir faction after the 1991 split.
SSDF- South Sudan Defense Force
The South Sudan Defense Force was the name given to the southern rebel groups who
signed the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement with the government in Khartoum. These
groups included Riek Machar’s forces (SSIM) and other independent commanders.
Machar left in 2000 to form the SPDF and the SSDF was then led by Gatluak Deng until
late 2002 and afterwards Paulino Matiep.
23 of 35
SSDM/A- South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army
Former SPLA General George Athor began SSDM/A after losing the election for governor of Upper Nile in 2010. See the post-2005 insurgency section for more.
SSLM/A- South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
Peter Gadet began the SSLM/A in 2011 when he defected from the SPLA. After a few
attacks he signed a ceasefire later that year, but other splinter factions who disagreed with his decision to sign a ceasefire continued to use the name.The SSDM/A and
SSLM/A later joined into one movement around 2012, which can lead to confusion as
the acronyms are often interchanged when speaking of movements such as Yau Yau’s.
SSIM/A- South Sudan Independence Movement
The South Sudan Independence Movement was the name taken by Machar’s faction in
late 1994 (the earlier names being SPLA-Nasir and SPLA-United). The name was taken
to highlight the group’s political goal of southern independence from Sudan, which
was different from the official rhetoric of the SPLA. SSIM/A was a signatory to the
Khartoum Peace Agreement in 1997 and it became part of the newly formed SSDF.
Machar later left in 2000 to form the anti-government SPDF.
SPLA-United
The name SPLA-United has been used by two different groups, neither which exists
today, which leads to confusion. Initially it was the new name for Riek Machar’s SPLANasir faction between March 1993 and 1994. The addition of new individuals in the
leadership led to a name change, and SPLA-United was selected to replace SPLANasir. However, in 1994 the name changed again to SSIM/A.
The second usage of SPLA-United was for the Shilluk movement of Lam Akol. Akol was
expelled from the original SPLA-United by Machar in February 1994. When Machar
changed the name of his movement to SSIM/A, Lam Akol took on the SPLA-United
moniker for his own movement. The Lam Akol SPLA-United later joined the government in 1997 as part of the Khartoum Peace Agreement.
SPDF- Sudan People’s Democratic Front/Defense Forces
The Sudan People’s Democratic Front or Sudan People’s Defense Forces (the political
branch and the military branch) were a rebel movement formed by Riek Machar in
2000. It later merged with the SPLM/A in January 2002.
SPLA-Nasir
24 of 35
The faction that split from the SPLA, led by Riek Machar, Gordon Kong and Lam Akol,
in 1991 was initially called SPLA-Nasir, from the town in Upper Nile where they had
their main base. This group later changed its name to SPLA-United in 1993, and then
Riek Machar changed it to SSIM/A in 1994.
SPLA-Torit/Mainstream
After the 1991 split, those who remained loyal to John Garang came to be called SPLA
Mainstream, to differentiate them from those who were loyal to the new faction(s).
They were also called SPLA-Torit, as the town of Torit in Eastern Equatoria was the
main base of Garang´s faction at the time.
Red Army
The Red Army, or Jesh Amer, was part of a military unit within SPLA, consisting of
boys from many parts of the country. The boys received military training by the SPLA
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This occurred in refugee camps in Ethiopia, where
only boys were placed, as well as schools within South Sudan - both of which were
administered by the SPLA. (see Child Soldiers section for more details)
White Army
The White Army, or dec bor in Nuer (alternatively dech bor or dech en bor), is the
term used to describe armed Nuer civilians who mobilize for defense and aggression.
The White Army is primarily made up of untrained fighters, and is led and coordinated
by youth leaders from within the community structures. The White Army first gained
notoriety as a proxy militia in the wars within the SPLA in the 1990s on the side of the
SPLA Nasir faction. In recent years it has been used as a means of defense and aggression in inter-ethnic clashes between the Nuer and Murle ethnic groups in Jonglei. Currently it has sided with Riek Machar’s SPLA-in-Opposition due to the perceived threat
towards Nuer, but once again it is largely independent and has its own parallel leadership structures.
Titweng/Gelweng
The titweng, or gelweng, literally translate as “cattle guards” in Dinka. After SPLANasir raids into Dinka territory in the early 1990s the community demanded protection
or weapons for self-protection. They received the weapons and training in how to use
them. What began as a community defense structure turned into a proxy militia for
SPLA-Torit/Mainstream. The group fought alongside the SPLA in 1997 in its push to
capture Bahr al Ghazal. After the Wunlit Peace agreement between the Nuer and Dinka in 1999, the gelweng began to use the guns to fight amongst themselves, which led
to a consequent SPLA disarmament in 2000.
SSUM/A- South Sudan Unity Movement/Army
25 of 35
The South Sudan Unity Movement/Army was started by Paulino Matiep in 1998. It included his earlier Anyanya II and SSDF forces and was supported by the Sudanese government. It was based in Mayom and was primarily made up of Bul Nuer.
Smaller militia groups:
Gabriel Tanginya, Gordon Kong and Simon Gatwich all had individual armed movements. They were supported by Khartoum and were made up of different Nuer sections. Tanginya’s militia was primarily Lak Nuer and was based in Fangak, Kong’s was
primarily Jikany Nuer and was based in Nasir, and Gatwich’s was primarily Lou Nuer
and was based in Waat.
Johnson, Douglas. 2003. Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: Currey.
Human
Rights
Watch.
2003.
Sudan,
Oil
and
Human
Rights.
(https://www.dropbox.com/s/6wctp9hmacqksq1/Sudan%20Oil%20and%20Human%20Ri
ghts.pdf?dl=0)
Small Arms Survey (www.smallarmssurvey.org)
Key People
John Garang de Mabior- Garang was the head of the SPLM and Commander-in-chief of
the SPLA. He was shortly a member of Anyanya I but then was integrated into the Sudanese army at the end of the first civil war (1972). He rose to the rank of colonel
and was initially sent to put down the Bor mutiny but then joined them. He was one
of the founders of the SPLA in 1983 and received support from the Ethiopian Mengistu
Regime over his southern rivals Anyanya II. Garang called for a secular and united Sudan, in contrast to Anyanya II’s demands for independence. He tragically died in July
2005 in a helicopter crash and Salva Kiir took over as the head of the SPLM and First
Vice President of Sudan.
Salva Kiir- Kiir was the chief of military operations for SPLA-Torit/Mainstream after
the 1991 split and escorted thousands of children, and those accompanying them, to
Kenya. Later Kiir was commander for Bahr al Ghazal in 1999 and strongly supported
the Wunlit Peace agreement between the Dinka and Nuer. He was made SPLA Chief of
Staff in late 1999 and then took over in 2005 as the head of the SPLM and commanderin-chief of the SPLA after Garang’s death. He won the first election for president and
has held the position ever since. In December 2013 he accused his former Vice President Riek Machar, and others, of an attempted coup. The consequent violence in Juba
escalated into the current conflict.
Riek Machar- the first Vice President in South Sudan, but was dismissed by Salva Kiir
in July 2013. Machar has historically had a tumultuous relationship with the SPLM/A
and has been behind a number of factions over the years. Machar has been involved in
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SPLA-Nasir (which became SPLA-United and then SSIM/A), SSDF, SPDF and SPLA-IO.
See the Nuer profile section for more details.
Kuol Manyang- previously Manyang was the Governor of Jonglei state until his appointment in July 2013 as the Minister of Defense. As with many high level SPLM politicians Kuol Manyang was previously a high ranking official in the SPLA and was at one
time in charge of the Bahr al Ghazal region.
Gordon Kong- Kong was a veteran of Anyanya from the first civil war and was an original founder of the SPLM/A. He then joined the Anyanya II movement calling for independence between 1983 and 1988. He was central in the reconciliation of Anyanya II
and the SPLA in the late 1980s when most of Anyanya II was integrated. He left the
SPLA in 1991 as a leader of the SPLA-Nasir faction. After the 1997 agreement he was
made a commander in the SSDF movement (pro-government umbrella group) and was
based in Nasir.
Lam Akol- Lam Akol was one of the leaders of the SPLA-Nasir faction in 1991 along
with Gordon Kong and Riek Machar. He was expelled from the movement by Machar in
1994, after which he created his own SPLA-United group made up of Shilluk forces.
His SPLA-United was a signatory to the 1997 Fashoda peace agreement. In 2009 he
formed the SPLM-Democratic Change (DC) political party and ran against Salva Kiir for
the presidency. See Shilluk profile section for more.
Kerubino Kuanyin Bol- Kerubino was an Anyanya officer who was integrated into the
Sudanese army after the 1972 agreement. He led the Bor mutiny and was part of the
formation of the SPLA in 1983. He was put in prison by Garang in 1987 but escaped in
1992 and joined the SPLA-Nasir faction of Machar in 1993. Kerubino had a Dinka militia group under him that was supported by the Khartoum government from 1994. He
later joined the SPLA in 1998 but then defected again later the same year and fled to
Matiep’s SSUM/A in Mankien for safety. He was killed in September 1999 by Gadet’s
forces who captured Mankien after defecting from Matiep that month.
Peter Gadet- Gadet was originally a member of the Sudanese Army and was sent to
fight on behalf of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq regime against the Iranians in the 1980s. He
later joined the SPLA but joined the SPLA-Nasir faction after the 1991 split. He was
then given an officer’s post under Paulino Matiep’s Bul Nuer forces. After the Khartoum Peace Agreement in 1997 Gadet became a key commander in Paulino Matiep’s
SSUM/A militia. He then left the SSUM/A in September 1999 and fought against the
Sudanese government. In early 2000 he joined the SPLA and then began to fight the
SPDF forces under Machar later that year. In 2002 he then rejoined the government.
Gadet was slow in accepting the Juba Declaration in 2006 which created suspicion
when he began integration later. His brutal reputation while fighting with Paulino
Matiep, then with the SPLA, and later with the SSDF also preceded him. Civilian populations were devastated in some of his attacks and many Bahr al Ghazal Dinka and Nuer in Unity hold significant grievances towards him to this day. Small Arms Survey believes his defection is related to the perception that former militia leaders were being
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overlooked for promotions, instead given to younger Dinka SPLA loyalists. He left the
SPLA in March 2011 and started the SSLM/A movement. After attacks on Mayom and
Mankien, in which more than 250 people were killed, he signed a ceasefire and later
joined the government in August 2011. Gadet was one of the first to defect in December 2013 to the SPLA-IO and has been the commander for Jonglei, and more recently
Unity state.
Paulo Matiep- Matiep is unusual as he was never a member of the SPLA. Originally a
member of Anyanya in the first civil war, Matiep was not integrated into the Sudanese
Army after 1972, as many others were. He rebelled again in 1975 and went to Ethiopia
and returned in 1985-1986 as Anyanya II. The reconciliation in the late 1980s between
the SPLA and Anyanya II by Gordon Kong did not include Matiep, presumably due to
attacks by the SPLA on Anyanya II in 1983. Matiep was supported by the government
and fought alongside Omar Bashir (before the 1989 military coup that would put him
in power until today) while recapturing Mayom in 1989 from the SPLA. He joined the
SPLA-Nasir faction in 1991 and was integrated into the SSDF after the 1997 agreement. However, he fought against Machar´s SSDF forces from 1997 over the governorship of Unity, which was won by Taban Deng Gai. In 1998 he started the SSUM/A which
was again supported by Khartoum. He then expelled Taban Deng from Unity in 1999.
Taban Deng Gai- Twice governor of Unity, under both Sudan (1997-1999) and South
Sudan (2005-2013). Taban Deng joined the SPLA in the 1980s but joined the SPLANasir breakaway faction in 1991. He is related by marriage to Riek Machar. After the
1997 agreement with Khartoum, he became the leader of the new UDSF political party. He won an election to be governor of Unity in 1997 but was expelled in 1999 by
Paulino Matiep. In 2000 he joined Machar’s new movement which then reunited with
the SPLA in 2002. He was appointed as the governor of Unity again in 2005 and was
seen as President Salva Kiir´s close ally. He won the contested elections in Unity state
in 2010 against Angelina Teny, the wife of Riek Machar. However, over the last years
he had a fall-out with the President who dismissed him from the governorship in 2013.
Since December 2013 he has been a member of the SPLA-IO and represents them in
the Addis peace talks.
Ismael Konyi- Former governor of Jonglei and ally of Sudan as head of the Pibor Defense Forces (PDF) during the second civil war. Signed an agreement in 2006 with the
GOSS and became a peace and reconciliation adviser to the president.
David Yau Yau- After losing the 2010 parliamentary elections (state assembly) David
Yau Yau began a rebellion in his home county of Pibor. Unlike many of the other
movement leaders, Yau Yau had no previous military experience. He signed a peace
agreement in 2011, but defected in 2012 after the brutal SPLA disarmament of the
Murle at the beginning of the year. This time he received much more support from the
youth, and his movement changed its name to SSLA- Cobra Faction. Interestingly, Gadet was the commander sent to lead the counter-insurgency operation against David
Yau Yau in 2013 and captured the main base (in Boma?), but failed to kill Yau Yau
himself. Yau Yau signed a new peace agreement with the government in 2014 provid28 of 35
ing for a newly created Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA)7 that does not report to the state governor in Jonglei but to the president’s office instead. Yau Yau has
been made the head of the GPAA.
Johnson, Douglas. 2003. Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: Currey.
Human
Rights
Watch.
2003.
Sudan,
Oil
and
Human
Rights.
(https://www.dropbox.com/s/6wctp9hmacqksq1/Sudan%20Oil%20and%20Human%20Ri
ghts.pdf?dl=0)
Small Arms Survey (www.smallarmssurvey.org)
Terms and Acronyms
acephelous- applying to a society that has no hierarchy or centralized system of coordination and control. Acephelous societies are ones that are ‘flat,’ not ‘vertical,’
when it comes to social structures. For example, rather than a king, or even chiefs,
the ‘highest’ social structure is often the head of a family.
agrarian- cultivators, or agriculturalists. Primarily reliant upon planting and growing
crops for food security and livelihoods, most agrarian cultures also own livestock, but
are not reliant upon it for food or income.
agro-pastoralist- anthropological term for those who are reliant on both livestock and
cultivation. Very few societies are completely pastoralist and also rely on some level
of planting or fishing as part of the annual food cycle. Many societies in South Sudan
are agro-pastoralists- cattle are the primary focus, but as they rely on planting as well
as fishing and hunting at different times of the year.
age-set- a peer group shared across a society. Young men from a certain age range
from across the entire ethnic group identify primarily with their peers from the same
generation. Loyalty is highest with one’s age-set, not with clans or regions. Each ageset has identifiers to differentiate from the others, and age-sets often compete between themselves for influence and power. Girls identify with the age-set of their father, and later their husband or boyfriend’s age-set.
brideprice (bridewealth)- payment made to the family of the bride by the family of
the groom in order for a marriage to be approved socially. Among pastoral communities it is most frequently paid in the form of cattle, but also goats, money, guns and
other items can be included. Bridewealth is the more current term (anthropological
term).
7
The new GPAA has seen two counties (Pibor and Pochalla) divided into seven new counties.
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CPA- Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government of Sudan and the
SPLA in 2005.
pastoralist- herders. Primarily reliant upon livestock (sheep, goats, camels, cattle) for
livelihoods and food security.
toic- grazing land or pasture for livestock. The toic is where cattle are taken in the
dry season to access water and food. In the rainy season it often turns to swamp.
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Maps
Major Seasonal Migration Routes by State- OCHA state maps with known migratory routes
added
UNDP
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Community Consultation Report Unity State 2012- Seasonal Migration and Cattle Raids
(link)
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UNDP Community Consultation Report Unity State 2012- Seasonal Migration and
Cattle Raids (https://www.dropbox.com/s/dvsud0ymnozkm5p/UNDP-SS33 of 35
Unity-consult-12Read.pdf?dl=0)
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For larger versions:
Ethnic
Map:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/s5326kcw57kqcp3/SS%20Ethnic%20Map.pdf?dl=0
Jonglei
Map:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/ie32oh6n0yhmks3/Jonglei%20State%20Migrations.pdf?dl
=0
Upper
Nile
Map:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/rgcd97s5qqmqedw/Upper%20Nile%20Migrations.pdf?dl=0
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