Naturalizing Content, Bogossian
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1. Though everyone thinks it so, why does it need to be that intentional realism requires
intentional reductionism; but perhaps there are nonphysical or irreducible properties.
2. Such a reduction, if it works, must be a mere supervenience claim. So, reductionist must
show how this is to work.
3. This is usually shown to work by insisting on some sort of naturalization.
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1. Bogossian says that, Fodor thinks that because he is committed to supervenience, he
thinks he needs a naturalized theory of content. But why, he asks.
2. Bogossian thinks that this supervenience idea is silly. He sees no reason to believe that
'belief that p' supevenes on neurons.
3. But, he notes, that the point for all, is that 'by supplying a property, say a synctatic x or
whatever, that is sufficient for the intentional property, then it ties the mental to the
physical.'
4. It removes all the mystification on how supervenience could be possible.
Note: There is, I must say, a burden of proof thing here. Bogossian assumes that the
burden of proof is on the superveners, for the intentional is just so different. I say that the
burden of proof is on anyone to show that the intentional is wacky, or even nonphysical.
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The Formula
1. The formula is: if its a law that 'S' is caused by P's. then 'S' express the property P.
2. The basic formula must be changed though, for it makes no sense of error. For when 'S'
is caused by non P's, then S means P or those non P's.
Note: This is because it is information theory. Information causes meaning. It is the sole
determinant. But, information changes all the time. So meaning changes all the time. End
of story.
Note: Boghossian puts the same point in terms of laws. The lawlike properties that are
sufficient, are what the symbol means. So when those properties whatever they are cause
the symbol, the symbol means them.
1
3. And, Boghossian notes, aside from perceptual errors, that tokenings are caused in
illegitimate ways according to the formula.
4. Perhaps because I am fishing, I think that cows are mammals. No cows about to cause
this.
5. Again formula one cannot make sense of this, for it says what nomic causes are meaning.
6. So on this view, then, such a thought would mean not cow, but the disjunct cow or fish.
Note: So Bogossian notes that errors are one problem. Causes are meaning. Dogs cause
cow tokens. So dogs mean cow. Another problem is that tokenings are caused in many
ways. Often no error. But still causes the tokening. Causes are meaning. Fish thoughts
cause cow tokens. So fish means cow. This is all just the disjunction problem of course.
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1. Of course, if the causal theory of meaning is to be believable, it must solve this problem.
2. If must specify, if P and Q cause 'S' why just one of them, say P, means 'S.'
3. It is common to specify a situation, say a perceptual one, n which only the actual referent
cause cause the 'S.'
4. In that situation, it is said, the meaning is fixed. This is a type one situation.
5. Teleological theories say nature specifies a normal situation in which only the referent
causes.
6. So in that nature bound situation, meaning gets fixed. No error in such situations.
7. But teleology has problems of its own. He mentions the usual Fodor stuff:
a. it assumes that teloses only track not hide truth.
b. it does not solve disjunction; functions are not exact
enough to dictate
single objects, and not disjunctive ones.
c. 'when things go right only the referent causes the token'
is not true.
Note: All these are not true, and rather narrow minded. Telos can include repression, they
can be exact so no disjunction, and when things go right, for all we know, one object may
be produced. What trips Boghossian and Fodor up here is an inability to imagine bigger
teloses etc outside what humans produce.
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Assymetric Dependence
1. Fodor notes that telos theories assume that there is in some circumstances but one cause
of meaning, assymetric dependence assumes robustness.
2. So there are no such type one situations, in which meaning gets fixed.
2
3. Instead, there is just assymetric dependence. Cows cause 'cow,' and cats cause 'cow,' and
the former grounds the latter.
4. Though, as Boghossian notes, it is hard it figure how to take this.
Note: Another problem I have thought of, though not mentioned. Assymetric dependence
says that there is a connection, on which another rests, but it does not say what the
connection is. Causing tokens is a bit underdescribed.
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1. So, the sufficient conditions for P causing 'S' or 'S' meaning P is just that if P causes to so
cause, then there is no 'S' token.
2. Yet this brings up the proximal stimulus problem. For what really causes our tokening is
just our inner neurons firing an image of 'S.'
3. And of course, since are a bit complex, there are many of such inner representations
which might cause 'S.'
4. So then, strictly P does not cause 'S' and does not mean 'S.' Rather the disjunction of
neurons sufficient for 'S,' causes 'S.' And thus, that disjunction, whatever it is, means 'S.'
5. Fodor says, though, that this is but an open disjunction of properties.
6. And, there is no way to specify an array of such proximal stimulations, on which other
things would depend.
7. In other words, we cannot so specify a group of proximals, from which robust things can
divirge. So proximals do not account for robustness.
Note: I think, maybe, Fodor is right about this. There is, for this and other reasons, a
disanalogy.
a. p1 p2 p3, .... token
b. d1 d2 d3, .... token
Now, the disanalogy is in that in the former case, we have a vague and odd predicate.
Large as it is, we must be able to say, first what it is, and then what is is not or what is robust
from it. This would establish the grounding informational meaning. The latter case is easy.
We have a single easily defined distal property like cow, and from it we judge the other
distals to be robust. So we have a informational meaning in this case.
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Assymetric Dependence and Type 1
1. Remember that natural telos theories specify type one situations where only P causes 'S.'
2. On Fodor's theory, it seems we identity content by looking that divergent non P causings
of 'S'
3. But, it implies worlds wherein such situations exist, where only P causes 'S.'
3
4. So it is subject to all the criticisms of teleology that are other theories.
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1. There is nothing, sadly, to distinguish the possibility that the base is P for 'S,' when P
varies with R and Q for 'S.'
2. It is impossible, thus, without a world in which only P causes 'S,' to break one of the non P
causes of S, without just strengthening others.
3. To eliminate this problem we need a world where only P causes S. Fodor does admit
there must be some world where this must occur.
Note: As far as I can tell, this is an epistemic problem. How do we know with other causes
like P, Q, and R, of 'S,' which is primary. We cannot just say, given that P, Q, and R causes
'S,' when P is broken, S goes too. That is no solution. Perhaps R does not go. If not, then
which is primary, P or R?
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1. There are just no type one situations, says Boghosian. No specifyable situations for
humans when only one cause makes our tokens.
2. For after all we suffer from illusions. I see a black box, and a hologram. Each type one
situation thus has counter examples.
3. It seems as though such a theory of content, thus rests on our being able to tell such
things apart.
Note: The question here, though a bit unclear, is just whether informational theories of
content presuppose verificationism. Fodor thinks they do, and so it seems, so does
Boghosian.
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Causal Theories and Natural Kinds
1. 'Water' functions to name water. Not to name anything else like twater.
2. Now supposedly there would be worlds in which you could tell such apart.
3. Imagine though, and double twater, which we or the twins, could never tell apart.
4. This then would still, as far as we are concerned, cause water tokens.
5. Yet the purely informational theory cannot handle this. For according to it, the causes of
the token are the meaning. So thus all three types of water mean the same for it.
6. Yet of course they all have completely different extensions. What to do.
4
Note: So in essence, informational theories say, if distinction, if verification, then difference
in content. If not, then same content. But the problem is that often we suffer from illusion.
So we end up with different extensions, same content.
Note: I do not think this to be a bad result really. In fact it natural. Intension does not make
extension.
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1. So Fodor in order to avoid some verification, puts in the actual history of tokenings.
2. So it is further required that 'some X's actually cause S.'
3. This would block out the double twater case; for, as it happens, it has not caused any
water tokens.
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1. Boghosian will now trump out all the fears that I had about this when reading Theory of
Content. Namely that it is costly, and does not help with verification.
2. Informational theories, remember, do well with unicorn. We can have uninstantiated
properties.
3. But with actual history, unicorn can no longer be primitive; it is now complex.
4. Though it seems that this is false; many uninstantiated properties are primitive.
Note: Though, remember my solution. Just says that instantiation needs to be redefined as
occuring outside the body. Leaving, perhaps, some primitive properties, and some not.
Say, a snipe be primitive, and a unicorn a construction from horse and horn. End of story.
6. A more serious problem with actual history is that it is just as verificationist.
7. Boghossian notes that it just happens that double twater is not round here.
8. But there are many items, though less now with actual history, which are around here,
and which are different from each other, but seem the same.
9. So this means that we are all the time being caused to token single tokens by things
which are infact different.
10. These things then have of course different extensions, but the same concept.
Note: Boghossian concludes that sure we have cut down on which properties can be
misrepresented, but alas, the problem is in principle still there. We still get many different
extensions that cause the same contents.
5
Note: I think that the problem is that we are dealing with an informational theory. The
problem there was, if cause, then meaning was basic. Then we saw that causes vary, so
meanings vary. But, now, we try to add in causal history to cut down on the varying.
Note: But, what happens is that we only cut down a bit. We still have if cause, then
meaning. And, we still have it that causes vary, and meaning varies.
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No Chance of Recognition of Type 1
Belief Holism
1. Your other x y and z judgements, mediate your judgement that p.
2. If you believe certain things about magpies you might say 'there is a magpie.'
3. If you believe that whatever the pope says is true, and the pope speaks of magpies, then
you may say 'there is a magpie.'
4. You have an innumerable number of background beliefs that mediate particular
thoughts.
5. There is literally an infinity of combinations of beliefs, and situations, under which you
may affirm or deny magpies.
6. But specifying a type one situation, remember, is one in which a magpie always results in
'there is a magpie.'
Note: The infinity or near infinity clause about the combinations of different beliefs you
have, specifically rules out ever, just by specifying a situation and human, saying when you
have such a type one situation.
Note: Then again this may not be true. Perhaps you can specify normal as a normal
situation, and generally normal beliefs. So you have a type one.
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1. Now this means that one can never specify a nonquestion begging type one situation.
2. To not beg, you would need, a specification of the situation, and the belief.
3. You would then need a specification of the proper background beliefs.
4. This will require, thus, necessary conditions for the having of those beliefs.
5. Such necessary conditions would have to be like the necessary condition for the belief in
question; it would have to be nonsemantic, nonintentional.
6. But sadly enough we could never get handle on so many conditions, and we would just
suppose, question beggingly, that we need the other semantic beliefs.
7. And this is what we cannot suppose upon pain of circularity.
6
Note: For magpies, it would go thus. We need from top to bottom: type one situation,
between magpies and 'magpie.' Specification of background beliefs. Type one situations
for each of them. But we do not have these situations, so we do not have the magpie
situation either.
Note: Then again the way out of this is just to say that we need not specify the conditions
for the other beliefs. They exist and are preconditions for magpie etc, tokenings, though
we cannot say what they are.
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1. Fodor's account of assymetric dependence as we saw, is a type one situation in disguise.
2. So if it is such, then like all such type one situations, delivers false accounts of meanings.
3. And, perhaps, if it is not one, is not at all naturalistic. Dilemma.
4. Now, looking at H2O, and XYZ. H2O causes token, for in closest world, H2O causes, not
XYZ. So H20 is primary.
5. H2O causing world, is closer that XYZ causing world.
6. Fodor says 'you have to change more things about us, in envirions, to get to XYZ world,
than H20 world. So it is closer.'
7. In other words, to get to H20 causing world, you must just change envirions.
8.To get to XYZ causing world, you must change envirions and our dispositions. So H20
world is closer, and XYZ world is farther.
9. But, Boghossian notes that you could, according to chemistry, find it easier to detect XYZ.
H20 could be deceptive.
10. So it is possible that the physical changes in a XYZ world might be small, but in a H20
world large.
Note: So Fodor said, that the H20 world is closer, because you only had to change the world
for it. Not us. Small change, equals closer. Boghossian notes though, that this is arbitrary.
Perhaps we make the XYZ so as to require less physical change. It is thus closer.
Note: So the worlds are thus equidistant as far as we are concerned. We cannot say that
the one is metaphorically closer, meaning having the same connections. Especially if you
just say closer is settled by intentional things. This is question begging. Fodor does note
that 'one does not have to mention that is is a intention; describe it nonsemantically.' But
Boghossian says that it being used that way.
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