Special Sciences, Fodor
127
1. They hope to reduce special sciences to physics, 'in the long run.'
2. Physics, because, it is the most general science. The most basic.
3. Thus, special sciences have their laws. But, really, any science must follow the laws of
physics.
4. Yet, says Fodor, that we can say that physics is the most basic, but still hold to no
reductionism, the validity of special sciences.
128
1. It is held, thus, that the more success special sciences have, the more they will just be
physical, and just be physics.
2. Fodor's four laws:
a. S1x to S2x (if rejection, then depression)
b. S1x to P1x (if rejection, then some neurons)
c. S2x to P2x (if depression, then other neurons)
d. P1x to P2x (some neurons, to other neurons)
3. The 'to' must be transitive. It is so all the down to physics.
4. Two readings of the 'to.' If we read it as cause, which we don't, then perhaps no
physicalism.
5. For, say, and particular S1x need not be physical. Cartesianism. Or, perhaps property
dualism.
6. But, if we read it as an identity, then all is fine. We get token physicalism.
Note: The reason why this does not mean type phyiscalism must be made clear. The reason
is, that, let us say, an S1, causes an S2. Simultaneously, a P1 causes a P2. This happens via a
bridge law. Now, perhaps, the S1 to S2 connection could be realized by many Ps.
130
1. Identity then. This guarentees that 'every event that falls under any scientific law is a
physical event, thereby expressing the ontological bias of reductionism...'
2. This token physicalism:
a. weaker than materialism: one need not hold that, all
properties fall under
some science; could be nonmaterial properties.
b. weaker than type physicalism: that is, that every
property is a physical
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property; one need not hold that all properties physical.
c. weaker than reductionism; reductionism says that natural kinds of psychology
correspond to natural kinds of physics; need not hold this.
131
1. Thus, reductionism entails token physicalism.
3. And, any event which consists of an instantiation of a psychological property is the same
as an neurological event.
3. There are bridge laws too.
4. There is also the generality of physics.
Note: So via reductionism, psychology and physics are hooked up. But no types.
132
1. Still, we can do with token physicalism, and need not the reduction for it. It is too strong
for 'the unity of science.'
2. Now, all sciences have taxonomies for all their terms.
3. Many statements, though, do not fall under laws. Like the Eiffel tower is three miles
away.... type things.
3. This 'transported three miles' does not, thus, determine a natural kind.
4. Kinds are bound in laws.
5. Laws, Fodor admits are obscure what they are.
133
1. But, if reductionism is true, every psychological kind is coextensive with a physical kind.
2. The special kinds, are linked via bridge laws, to the physical kinds.
3. Fodor believes this can be right, but he notes that this is an empirical issue, so anyone
might turn out to be wrong.
4. It could be that three miles from Eiffel is a kind, linked to other kinds.
5. This is unlikely, for
a. generalities of special sciences do not depend on
physics; they are true or
false regardless of physical
descriptions.
b. the interestingness, confirmation, epist, etc of such generalizations,
hold,
regardless of whether they are
subsumed by physics.
c. special sciences hold such generalizations.
2
Note: It seems to me that these are three ways of making the same question begging point:
that, special sciences have generalizations which have multiple physical descriptions.
134
1. Fodor cites Gresham's law. It is about monetary exchange. If it has a physical realization,
it is wildly disjunctive.
2. Gresham's law says what money stuff has in common. But, this is not physical stuff.
3. There is a physical description, but is not a physical kind,
Note: This a an inappropriate example. Economics is not science. So of course there seems
a great gap between physics and it. It is more appropriate to speak of real science.
4. Reductionism needs even more: the special laws, bridges, to physics, must be lawlike.
5. The problem is, especially for economics, there is no such law.
135
1. Even if there were a single physical description for 'is a monetary exchange' there are
problems.
a. nothing but brute enumeration would convince us of what
it is.
b. it would not be a physical kind term.
c. it would not be lawful.
Note: Then again this is question begging. True, about enumeration. But, alas, that is
because humans are in such a weak epistemic position. But, kind terms according to us do
not matter, and neither do laws. As far as we know, both are true. Just because we have
not called them kinds or laws does not make them not kinds or not laws. Such are not
dependent upon us.
2. Now, Fodor takes all this to show that economics is not reducible to physics, and neither
is psychology to neurology.
3. There are psychology departments that have stakes their existence on type type
reductions being found.
4. Fodor rightly notes that the same neurons might have different psychological states by
different means.
5. Or different neurons might have the same psychogical states at different times.
6. Thus, the reductionsist program cannot be defended ontologally. All we get is token
identity.
7. We do not get any match in kinds between disiplines.
3
136
1. Physiological psychology confuses reductionism, which is what they think they need, with
mere token identity, which is what they have.
2. In fact, as we see with computer simulation, robots have the same psychology, and no
physiology. So thus, there is no logically necessary relation between psychology and
physiology.
3. Again, especially because of this robot case, token physicalism does not lead to
reductionism. Tokene is all you get.
Note: Then again, just because robots are possible, that does not affect human psychology,
to physics correlations.
137
1. We have type correlations, when and only when, for every bunch of one type of kinds,
psych for example, there is a corresponding other type of kinds from another system,
neurology.
2. Imagine a world of the same psych kinds, but distinct neurological kinds.
3. Sometimes the same psychological events are paired with different neurological kinds.
4. Then, there is no type physicalism, but only token physicalism.
5. For token, we need only show that all the distinct neuro kinds that handle one
psychological property, have some psychological propereties in common.
6. Those, that identify the psychological property.
7. We could, of course, have this kind of evidence. That many neuros handle one psych.
138
1. Point of reduction, is not, or, for Fodor, should not be, to look for physical kinds
coextensive with the special science.
2. The point, rather, is to explain the physical mechanisms whereby events conform to the
rules of the special science.
3. Perhaps those mechanisms are not anything but physical, but no kind matches.
4. This second project is good enough for the unity of science; on needs not the first.
139-140
1. It may be then, of course, any special science is satisfied by an open disjunction in
physics.
4
2. Like: S iff P1 v P2, etc.
3. When, this is P stuff is not a kind predicate, but just an infinite possibility.
4. So, thus, this P stuff is not laws, for laws are about kinds, but just disjunction.
5. Thus, Fodor notes, that 'it is enough for the unity of science that the special sciences be
reducible, only via generalizations.'
6. So the idea that a predicate in a special science S is bridged to a disjunction of P's is true.
This is but a generalization.
Note: This is all key. We have done away with kinds and laws, via a restrictive definition of
of kinds and laws, and kept gereralizations. For, that is all we have left.
Note: Fodor gives a schematic to illustrate this. Tis a fine thing indeed.
S1, to S2
P1, P2, P3, etc. P'1, P'2, etc.
On the top level is the special science; on the bottom is the reducing physics. This latter is
disjunctive. There are connections between every predicate of the top, and a list of
disjunctions on the bottom. Then there are connections between the P1 antecedents, and
the P'1s consequents.
Note: But, it is indeed possible to have an S1 satisfy something not P1 etc, yet still physical.
Here is the multiple realization.
7. Thus, there must be exceptionless laws for each predicate of S, to each disjunction of P.
8. Now, this means that anything, and list of disjuncts, is a law.
9. But this shows that 'not all truth functions of kind predicates, are themselves kind
predicates.'
10. Example: if irradiation, then synth; if friction, then heat. So, if irratiation or friction, synth
or heat.
11. Now, true this is, sure. But it is no law the way the separate things were.
12. The disjucts are not kinds either.
Note: Moral here, is that one cannot just add up physical things, and then call the new
things also kinds or laws.
141
5
1. Fodor says, if one denies this, then one cannot, in a principled way, identify kinds and
laws.
2. Who knows which or what is the antecedent and consequent.
3. Thus you inherit a need for a reconstrual of kind and law.
4. Now, there is a new problem. Special science laws have exceptions.
5. Yet, bridge laws are not supposed to. Remember they are identity.
6. And, also, physics is not supposed to.
7. So it seems, because the whole relation is transitive, that we are inconsistent here. The
special science and physics conflict.
142
1. One might say, that special sciences are exceptionless too; but this is not true.
2. One might say, that physics has exceptions; that is not true either.
3. One figure 1, though, all is fine. For all we need to happen is that the S1 happen not by a
P1. Because, as it happens, something else.
4. So it breaks the rule. The S's are still exception having. The P's are still exceptionless.
5. I think Fodor is saying that generalizations are not themselves lawlike.
143
1. We could require that special sciences be lawlike. By force.
2. By making special sciences taxonomies correspond as best we know to physics taxonomy.
3. But we would ruin the generalizations special sciencees are supposed to express.
4. We could not do this anyway since 'is a monetary system' etc. does not correspond to
any physical predicate
5. Actually, we do the opposite. We preserve the exception fraught generalizations of
special sciences. Explain away exceptions at a lower level.
144
1. Special sciences ignore that they are physics in the long run.
2. Is it because 'physics so small?'
3. No, rather 'not all kinds correspond to physical kinds.'
4. They are true nonetheless.
5. But, even when the physical is heterogenious, still, such properties converge on a
psychological property.
6. These converging properties are the ones that support the generalizations of the special
sciences.
7. They cross clasisfy physics.
6
8. So all taxonomies, psychology, sociology, physics, etc apply to the same things.
9. But, that does not mean that they all reduce to the same physical taxonomy.
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