Disaster Management in Southeast Asia-Issues and Challenges
By -Tan Teck Boon and Allen Yu-Hung, Lai |
http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/05/15 May 15, 2012
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Photo by Samuel Lippke
When several countries in Southeast Asia announced their intention to develop nuclear
power recently, many inhabitants of that region were spooked. Even as developed
countries are shutting down their nuclear power plants, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand
and Vietnam have indicated that they will be building their first nuclear power
plants. The biggest concern is that Southeast Asia is prone to frequent natural disasters
such as earthquakes and tsunamis.
If a major earthquake or tsunami set off a nuclear disaster equal to that which struck
Japan in March 2011 were to hit any one of those countries mentioned above, the
devastation for the region as a whole will almost certainly be much greater since
countries in Southeast Asia are located in close proximity to one another.
For example, a nuclear disaster in Malaysia or Indonesia will almost certainly place the
five million inhabitants of Singapore in serious peril. Even worse, Southeast Asian
countries have yet to develop the capacity to mount effective disaster relief operations.
Southeast Asia is made up of 11 countries and in terms of landmass, the region is
roughly half the size of the United States. With a total population of approximately 620
million and an average per capita GDP of US$2,500 (in 2009), Southeast Asia has
experienced two major natural disasters in the last decade: the 2004 Indian Ocean
Tsunami and the 2008 Cyclone Nargis.
The two natural calamities claimed the lives of more than four hundred thousands and
caused tens of billions in damages in an already impoverished region.
But despite the devastation, most Southeast Asian countries remain ill-prepared today
to deal with major calamities for three crucial reasons.
Firstly, state interference remains a major stumbling block to the timely delivery of aid
relief in the wake of disasters. Cyclone Nargis is a case in point. In the aftermath of that
disaster, the military junta in Myanmar rejected international offers of assistance for
fear that foreign militaries might gain access to the hermitic state. So instead of granting
the US military permission to deploy its impressive airlift capabilities to the disaster
relief effort, the military junta in Myanmar opted to shutter the country.
But with few helicopters and roads to disaster areas destroyed, it was impossible to
deliver aid supplies to the victims without foreign military assistance. As a result, scores
of victims perished due to dehydration, hunger and hypothermia even though they had
survived the initial onslaught of Cyclone Nargis.
Only after Washington threatened to intervene in the humanitarian crisis did the
military junta in Myanmar finally relent. US military aircrafts were at last permitted to
deliver aid supplies to victims in hard to reach areas. But unfortunately for many,
international aid relief arrived too late.
In the end, the delay in aid delivery had exacerbated a natural disaster into a man-made
catastrophe. The military junta remains in power in Myanmar today.
Secondly, many disaster relief agencies operating in Southeast Asia still lack the capacity
to accurately assess a disaster situation and this limitation can severely hamper their
ability to mount effective relief operations. As a case in point, in the immediate
aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, disaster relief agencies delivered to Aceh
aid supplies that could not be consumed or used by many of the survivors because they
were Muslims. In the end, those aid supplies had to be re-directed elsewhere while fresh
ones had to be brought in. Such intelligence errors can prove deadly for disaster
survivors since the first 48 hours of a disaster is when the most number of lives can be
saved.
Ultimately, disaster relief operations are effective only when aid supplies fit for
consumption are delivered to disaster survivors in a timely manner. Delivering aid
supplies that cannot be consumed or used (for religious reasons or otherwise) only adds
insult to injury. The fact that relief agencies operating in Southeast Asia do not even
understand their own backyard is indeed troubling. And there is no indication that this
state of affairs is any better today.
Thirdly, coordination between disaster relief providers (military and civilian) and
national governments in Southeast Asia remains wanting. This is partly due to the fact
that disaster relief providers prefer their autonomy and working closely with other key
stakeholders involved in disaster relief is likely to run counter to that imperative. On the
other hand, national governments in that region may be averse to working closely with
disaster relief providers for fear that they may lose operational control of the relief
effort. But for any disaster relief operation to be effective, all stakeholders involved must
coordinate their efforts regardless of their imperatives and differences.
As witnessed in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, key stakeholders
were pre-occupied with carving up disaster zones among themselves, flying their own
flags and showcasing their involvement to the world instead of working together.
This ego-centric approach to disaster relief even prompted some experts in the field to
compare it to a beauty contest where participants compete ferociously for recognition.
While some competition between the stakeholders may benefit disaster victims in the
sense that it drives the former to be more responsive, it is typically the case that
excessive competition only results in poorly coordinated disaster relief operations.
To improve Southeast Asia’s response to major disasters, the following initiatives must
be taken by key stakeholders involved in disaster management in that region.
In Southeast Asia, the responsibility for collecting disaster-related information falls
squarely on national governments. Meanwhile, disaster relief agencies are barred from
engaging in such activity for national security reasons. As such, disaster relief agencies
are completely dependent on national governments in the region for information vital to
their work. But given the bureaucratic tendency to hoard information, disaster relief
agencies are typically given less than what they need to accurately assess a disaster
situation. Consequently, their disaster relief efforts are affected. To improve the region’s
response to disasters, national governments in Southeast Asia must be prepared to
share information with disaster relief agencies on a routine basis. As opposed to
withholding information from them, national governments must be open to regular
informational exchanges with disaster relief agencies so as to enhance their assessment
of a disaster if it were to occur. A better understanding of cultural nuances, topography,
weather patterns and even local security issues by disaster relief agencies will only
benefit the victims.
While government concerns over the mishandling of shared information is legitimate, it
is also important to point out that since World War II disasters have killed far more
people in Southeast Asia than armed conflicts in the region ever did.
If history is any guide, then the main focus of national governments in Southeast Asia
should be on effective disaster management rather than on the risk of sensitive
information being exploited by external powers.
Steps must also be taken to enhance cooperation between all the stakeholders involved
in disaster management in Southeast Asia. They include national governments, disaster
relief agencies, local civil society groups and major external powers such as China, the
US and Japan. The role of civil society groups in disaster relief is often overlooked due
to their minuscule size. Indeed, these groups are mostly constrained by limited
manpower and funds. But local civil society groups can contribute meaningfully to
disaster relief efforts since they are often the ones that are able to gain access to disaster
areas in the immediate aftermath. An added benefit of working closely with local civil
society groups is that they are a valuable source of information since these groups are
typically embedded in the disaster zones.
If anything, these groups will be the first to know what kind of aid supplies are truly
needed, road conditions in disaster areas, and whether the disaster relief effort should
focus on recovery rather than rescue.
Meanwhile, disaster relief efforts must also be closely coordinated with major external
powers.
While the US continues to be a major contributor of humanitarian aid in Southeast Asia,
China and to a lesser extent, Japan, have emerged in recent years to rival the US in that
role. Indeed, China managed to gain access to Myanmar even before the US did in the
aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami underscoring Beijing’s growing influence
in a region that the US has dominated since World War II. Until Southeast Asian
countries develop the capacity to mount effective disaster relief operations, they must be
prepared to work closely with these external powers.
Lastly, the people of Southeast Asia must be open to external assistance in times of
humanitarian crises. As pointed out earlier, state interference prevented the timely
delivery of aid to Myanmar in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and
scores of victims perished as a result. To a large extent, that incident clearly undermines
traditional notions of state sovereignty. Indeed, when a national government rejects
foreign assistance even as it lacks the capacity to response to a disaster, then the state
for all intent and purposes has failed and the responsibility to aid disaster victims ought
to shift to the international community.
While traditional notions of state sovereignty will undoubtedly challenge this
proposition, there is no question that the disaster victims themselves would not have it
any other way.
In summary, we have highlighted herein three crucial factors that continue to hamper
Southeast Asia’s ability to response effectively to major disasters. State interference in
disaster relief efforts, inadequate assessment capacity of disaster relief agencies and
loose coordination between all stakeholders involved in disaster management remain as
major obstacles. While not exhaustive, these three factors are significant enough to
warrant swift policy action. Moving forward, national governments in Southeast Asia
must be prepared to share information with disaster relief agencies on a routine basis
and work with them in disaster relief operations.
Lastly, the people of Southeast Asia will benefit as a whole if international humanitarian
assistance is welcomed by them. Admittedly, these prescriptions are not easily
acceptable to many in the region. But if there is indeed a silver lining to the two major
disasters that struck Southeast Asia in the last decade, it is the recognition that bold
initiatives must be taken to improve the region’s response to disasters.
The severe devastation brought on by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and 2008
Cyclone Nargis was indeed a wake-up call. Now one just wonders how severe the next
disaster must be before the region as a whole commits itself to hard choices.