AN EXAMPLE OF A TURNITIN ORIGINALITY REPORT
Instructor’s comments in blue textboxes
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Fake Student's Assign 1 Paper
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Processed on 01-29-10 19:12 EST
ID: 122309478
Word Count: 1977
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Similarity Index
Similarity by Source:
Internet Sources:
Publications:
Student Papers:
Sources:
Match #
1
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Source found by Turnitin
3% match (student papers from 02/07/06)
Submitted to ----- University on 2006-02-07
paper text:
Students will see a list of matches,
numbered, and in different colors of
font.
The total unoriginal text came to 3% of
the paper.
There is only one source match; it is
Match #1.
It matched a paper submitted to ---University in 2006; the matching text
will be in red font.
Does this mean that the writer of this
paper copied the student’s paper from
York, over three years ago? NO.
o It means that both students used
the same source and copied the
same text.
o If you provide your source in a
citation and reference, and you
format it as a quote, I can figure it
out. If you do not, then you have
plagiarized (even if unintentional).
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Now, look in the paper for all the
textboxes with the number “1” and in
Evaluation of Alan Donagan’s Fundamental Principle of Morality
red font.
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There are six (6); are any of them in
Sudent Name
quotation marks? Only one…
In The Theory of Morality, Alan Donagan defines and defends his fundamental principle of morality for the
Hebrew-Christian tradition. After rejecting a few other possible fundamental principle candidates, Donagan uses
Immanuel Kant’s Principle of Ends,
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act always so that you respect every human being, yourself or another, as
being a rational creature,
as his fundamental principle. However, he redefines Kant’s principle in terms of the concept of permissibility. Donagan
believes that the fundamental principle of morality for the Hebrew-Christian tradition says, “It is impermissible not to
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respect every human being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature.”
What
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does it mean for this to be
the fundamental principle of morality? This is sole first principle of common morality. All other moral precepts or
principles fall under this one fundamental principle. Specific precepts develop under the fundamental principle, and they
are used in our daily lives when we are faced with a question dealing with morality. These “specificatory” precepts all
build up to tell us how we should respect every human being, including oneself, as rational creatures. There are two
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types of precepts, first-order and second-order, that fall under the fundamental principle. First-order moral precepts tell
us whether an action is right or wrong. Second-order precepts deal with the interior of the agent, and tell us whether he
is culpable or inculpable for his action. These moral precepts are where we find how to act to
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respect every human being as a rational creature. For example, the
principle of veracity tells us that it is impermissible
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when
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to express an opinion you do not hold
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These three matches are only separated by a few
words. There are no quotation marks.
This tells me that the writer changed a few words
to avoid quoting.
There is no citation; so, technically, this is viewed
as plagiarism.
in conditions of free communication between responsible persons
are freely communicating. This particular first-order precept tells us that lying violates the fundamental principle
because it fails to respect the person you are communicated with as a rational creature. This and many other moral
precepts give us a moral “code” by which we should live our life as rational creatures. By living by these moral precepts
Donagan presents to us, we not only respect others as rational creatures, but we also show respect for oneself by
developing our own psychological and physical powers. So, the fundamental principle of morality plays a very vital role
in the Hebrew-Christian tradition because it lays the foundation on which all other moral precepts are built in the system
and gives us the directions on how we should respect every human being as rational creatures.
Despite the fact that Donagan has accepted this fundamental principle and defended it in the early part of
section 7.4, two objections still arise that challenge Donagan’s fundamental principle. The first objection is a
metaphysical objection that Kant himself found to be very difficult. This objection says that since human beings belong
to the realm of nature, in which every occurrence is purely physical, it is completely impossible that humans should be
agent-causes. Basically, there are no agent-causes. Donagan does not try to refute this objection completely because it
goes beyond the scope of a study of moral theory. However, he does give us a couple of strong points to allow us to
continue with the fundamental principle. One remark says that neither the neither the determinist nor the purely
physicalist interpretations of human actions result from modern science. They are only expectations of what may result.
This concept of human action as agent-caused is neither scientifically nor philosophically indefensible. The second point
Donagan makes says that since human beings are regarded as human, it is necessary to think of them as beings who can
deliberate and choose between two possible actions not merely as beings whose behavior can be so simply explained in
terms of reasons. Donagan believes that these two strong points are enough to forget about the first objection and
continue using his fundamental principle.
The second objection to Donagan’s fundamental principle of morality is a bit more difficult to grasp because of
its structure. It is a two- fold objection that deals with the concept of rationality. The first part of the objection is brought
forth by Philippa Foot’s argument that says that the only rational imperatives are hypothetical. She argues that human
beings may or may not wish to comply the prescription that no action be done in which every rational creature is not
respected. She also believes that to choose not to comply is by no means contrary to reason. If Foot’s analysis of
rationality is sound, then it cannot be true that a rational being must prescribe that no rational being is to be used
merely as a means. In this sense, one can reject the fundamental principle without being either inconsistent or
irrational. However, Donagan believes that this first fold on the second objection can be met by a counter definition of
rationality that uses more persuasive terms. This should be enough to meet the second objection. However, Donagan
does say that Foot would then just recalibrate her objection in response to the first fold being met.
The second fold of the second objection to Donagan’s fundamental principle deals with the new definition of
rationality and how it is supported by persuasive considerations. If the new definition turns out to a “persuasive
definition,” then it can be more easily argued against. Donagan says that no dispute that ultimately turns solely on
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persuasive definitions can be rationally decided. This situation would be similar to the argument against R. M. Hare’s
universal prescriptivism theory when he resorts to a persuasive definition of a “fanatic” in deriving his moral principles.
So, Donagan tries to show that his definition of rationality really is the definition of rationality without persuasive terms
and that he accurately captures the nature of this faculty.
In order to accomplish this, Donagan needs to show that the definition of reason is fixed. Before he shows that
reason is fixed, Donagan brings us back to the discussion in section 2.3 about the interpretation of moral precepts. In
this section, he tells us that moral precepts are true if and only if practical reason, functioning without error, would
make certain prescriptions. Unlike precepts, prescriptions cannot be true or false. At first glance, you cannot define
reason by people’s actions. Basically, reason cannot be looked at viewed on an individual basis, only under the domain
of logic. Donagan believes that you can define reason in many different ways, including his persuasive definition from
the first fold of the second objection, but it always comes back to the domain of logic. The domain of logic makes reason
fixed. Donagan believes a priori that the essence of reason is the same for all definitions of reason because its reason is
fixed.
After stating that the essence of reason is the same for all definitions of reason, Donagan brings in the discussion
of necessity de re. Necessity de re says that certain things, by virtue of their natures or essences, have certain
properties. A good example of necessity de re is water. If we discover that water is H2O by means of essence, we can
then say that anything that is not H2O is not water. Donagan believes that reason is a term, like water, because if he
figures out the essence of the term, he can argue that the definition he uses is not persuasive. Since Donagan believes
the essence of reason is the same, he has proven that his revamped definition does not affect the nature of reason. So,
Donagan now has rejected the second fold of the second objection to the fundamental principle.
How Kant justified the fundamental principle is done in a similar fashion similar to Kant’s reasoning. Kant did
not demonstrate a priori that reason must, by its very nature, prescribe for free and rational beings what the
fundamental principle says it should. Instead, he drew attention to certain characteristics about being a rational
creature. First, rational creatures are negatively free because they exhibit a kind of causality by virtue of which their
actions are not determined to any end by their physical or biological nature. Second, they are creatures of a higher kind
than any other in nature because of that causality. These characteristics provide rational creatures with an end that their
own reason must acknowledge: their own rational nature. This is how Kant supported the fundamental principle.
After reviewing the objections to the fundamental principle and Donagan’s responses to these objections, I will
now evaluate each of Donagan’s responses to the objections. I will start by analyzing the response to the first objection,
that there are no agent-causes. The response to this objection seems reasonablye weak because Donagan basically tells
us to accept the fact that this objection goes beyond the scope of moral study. The fact that even Kant found this
objection difficult to respond to in his The Critique of Pure Reason shows me a sense of weakness in Donagan’s
argument. However, the two remarks he provides for the reader does enough for motivate me to continue to
investigate the fundamental principle of the Hebrew-Christian tradition. Overall, the first response to the objection in
section 7.4 seems weak or incomplete, but not to the point of saying the fundamental principle needs to be rejected.
The response to first fold of the second objection seems fairly simple. Donagan simply redefines the meaning of
rationality by using more persuasive terms. Again, Donagan seems only to be beating around the bush and avoids the
objection for the moment. It seems to me that Donagan does more harm than good by using the persuasive definition.
This response seems similar to the response to the first objection because Donagan again seems to be using a “get-outof-jail” card again. However, Donagan does enough to set up his response to the second fold of the second objection to
his fundamental principle. The positive part of his response is that Donagan does anticipate that his response would be
met by another part of the same objection, and he quickly moves on to tackling that objection.
The final response of section 7.4 was completely different than the previous two responses. Donagan is faced
with the possibility that if Foot’s analysis of rationality is correct, then his fundamental principle is false. Not only does
he have to prove that his fundamental principle is true, but Donagan must do it after being accused of using a persuasive
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definition (something he used to disprove Hare’s argument in previous sections). In order to prove his reasoning is
correct, Donagan begins by going all the way back to section 2.3. This section goes on to presuppose that the word
“reason” has a reference that is fixed for all possible worlds. I believe that his depth of the earlier part of his argument is
his main strength. Going back to chapter two to prove a point in the last chapter of his book shows how well Donagan
has tied all of his work together to make his final argument for his fundamental principle. After proving that reason is
fixed, Donagan mentions necessity de re in order to further his response to the objection. The example about gold really
clarifies the use of this term and sheds light on the essence of reason. This enables Donagan to prove that since he has
discovered the essence of reason, he has discredited the objections to his fundamental principle on the basis that all
definitions of reason refer to the same reason. Not only does Donagan justify his principle in his own manner, he shows
how Kant does it differently to show his readers how strong his fundamental theory is. I believe that Donagan pulled out
all his tricks at the end of section 7.4 to prove that his fundamental principle of common morality withstands numerous
objections thrown towards him and his fundamental principle.
Note that the References list has been
removed from this paper.
In this example:
Since the matching text is minimal (3%), and it is only from one source, I would
point this out to the student and tell him/her to either put these matches in
quotation marks with a citation or paraphrase the entire thing, and still include
a citation.
Had there been several of these (or a lot), that would garner a different
response.
In any paper submitted:
In the HR field, there are many common phrases that we use that will match a source, but
cannot be stated any other way. Some examples:
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (or any other employment law’s
name)
Essential Job Functions
Perform other duties, as assigned
Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Other Characteristics (KSAOs)
…up to and including termination
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
…illegal to discriminate against someone on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin, or sex.
Voluntary Protection Program (VPP)
…provide a safe working environment (or a non-hostile work environment)
When these types of phrases are matched, I disregard them. Use your common sense.
Courtesy Dr. Karen Smola
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Jan, 2010