Macintyre’s Hume: A Critique of Modern Morality
ELİF NUR ERKAN BALCI1
As the title of the presentation implied, I will deal with a particular discussion about the
morality of David Hume in Macintyre’s works, especially After Virtue, Whose Justice Which
Rationality and Introduction to Hume’s Ethical Writings. By discussing this, I do not intend to
explain every aspect of Hume’s moral philosophy, which could exceed the scope of this
paper. I have only three questions to answer: First, what is the problem of modern morality
according to Macintyre? Second, what is the role of David Hume in this problem? Third but
not less important, how does Macintyre criticize Hume through Aristotle?
What is the problem of modern morality for Macintyre?
Macintyre says: “the problems of modern moral theory emerge clearly as the product of the
failure of the Enlightenment project”2. For Macintyre, the roots of this moral project
historically go back to Aristotelian moral schema but it is inherited deficiently. That’s why, as
Macintyre asserts that, modernity failed in realizing “the project of justifying morality”.3 To
explain what does “justifying morality” mean, Macintyre cites from Richard Hare as
following:
“Thus a complete justification of a decision would consist a complete account of
its effects together with a complete account of the principles which it observed,
and the effect of observing those principles… If the enquirer still goes on asking
“But why should I live like that?” then there is no further answer to give him,
because we have already, ex hypothesi, [following from the hypothesis] said
everything that could be included in the further answer” (Hare 1952 p. 69.) 4
The failure of justifying morality presents itself both in the structure of arguments and in the
moral agent. For Macintyre, we can see two fundamental features in the structure of
arguments: “the conceptual incommensurability of the rival arguments” and “assertive use of
ultimate principles in attempts to close moral debate”.5 Because each of rival arguments uses
very different normative and evaluative versions from each other, we cannot claim rationally
1
PhD Candidate at Sakarya University, Philosophy of Religion.
Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue, London: Bloomsbury, 2011, p. 75.
3
Ibid., p. 62 and 58.
4
Ibid., p. 23.
5
Ibid., p. 41.
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the validity one of these arguments against others. Thus the clash of moral arguments seems
to us as infinite and unsolvable. As for the moral agent, the result of failure in justifying
morality is the following: the agent does not have chain of moral hierarchy and of teleology in
his life anymore. So the moral philosophers treat the agent as a sole authority in moral life. 6
For Macintyre, the distinctive feature of this “failure and corrupt moral project” lays on its
“emotivist” character.7 The claims of emotivism in morality, as stated by Macintyre, is “all
evaluative judgments and more specifically moral judgments are nothing but expressions of
preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in
character.”8 Therefore, the emotivism “rests upon a claim that every attempt, whether past or
present, to provide a rational justification for an objective morality has in fact failed”. 9
As a result of this emotivist character of moral philosophy, Macintyre identifies that the
“modern self” is an “emotivist self” and “emotivist” self has no limit in transition from one
state of moral commitment to another. This is the case because the “emotivist self” “utterly
distinct on the one hand from its social embodiments and lacking on the other any rational
history of its own”. In short, emotivist self is a “ghostly character”. Let me give you an
example, modern individuals can be one day a human rights activist and the day after a
Sufism follower. This is the case, for Macintyre, because moral self is “detached from all
social particularity”. To put it differently, Macintyre says; “since it is in the self and not in the
social roles or practices that moral agency has to be located”, anyone can be a moral agent in
every occasions.10
Hume was one of the most important architects of the above project (justifying morality).
According to Macintyre, Hume has a deep philosophical understanding in morality and he
puts a strong frame in the morality.11 Therefore, Macintyre gives Hume a central place in his
narrative of problems in grounding ethics in the individual. For that reason, I think, to
understand Hume properly is crucial for the criticism of Macintyre towards modern morality.
So I will turn to my second question, what is the role of Hume in the problem of modern
morality?
6
Ibid., p. 9 and 75.
Ibid., p. 62 and 16.
8
Ibid., p. 13.
9
Ibid., p. 22.
10
Ibid., p. 36-37.
11
Ibid., p. 57-58.
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David Hume is known as a central philosophical figure in transition to the modernity. 12 As
stated by Macintyre modern emotivist moral philosophers assert that they are heirs of Hume
in order to justify their emotivist theories13 because Hume re-formulated the moral
philosophy, detached the reason from the sphere of morality, and laid the foundations of an
emotion-based morality.14 Moreover, Hume sees cleverly intersection points of anthropology
and psychoanalysis with philosophical ethics and understands it as a larger project, in order to
find “the science of man.”15 This is the fact, for Macintyre, what distinguishes Hume from
other moralists.
Although Macintyre appreciates Hume’s moral project, he sees the failure of Hume in his
argument that either morality is the work of reason or is the work of passions and desires. 16
Hume says: “Morality… is more properly felt than judged of; though this feeling or sentiment
is commonly so soft and gentle, that we are apt to confound it with an idea, according to our
common custom of taking all things for the same, which have any near resemblance to each
other.”(Treatise III, 1, ii) This new moral sketch also established a framework for the modern
morality. In this manner, Macintyre refers that; Hume repudiates a ‘religious foundation for
morality’ and puts ‘in its place a foundation in human needs, interests, desires, and
happiness’.17
Now, we can look the details of the moral sketch of Hume. For this I will try to deal the role
of reason and passion in his theory of action, or moral action.
What Hume says us about reason and passion is the following: He believes that the “reason is
practically inert”.18 Reason is only related to ideas and so it cannot move us to an action. In
this way we can never say that morality rises from reason. The morality is just a matter of
passion. Reason cannot be used to reach for inductive arguments or any beliefs. These are just
our natural dispositions, settled in us. We have no chance to follow our natural dispositions.
But here it should not be thought, that our ratio and sentiments direct us to same direction,
because Hume disassociates the sentiments from rational realm. If the reason employs itself in
12
Ibid., p. 57.
Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice Which Rationality, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989, p.
305.
14
Macintyre, After Virtue, Ibid., p. 57.
15
Alasdair Macintyre, “Introduction”, Alasdair Maicntyre (edit), Hume’s Ethical Writings, Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1965, p. 16.
16
Macintyre, After Virtue, Ibid., p. 58.
17
Macintyre, “Hume on "Is" and "Ought"”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Oct., 1959), pp. 451-468, p.
464.
18
Macintyre, Whose Justice Which Rationality, Ibid., p. 285.
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these inclinations, it ought to be just for an agreeing position these inclinations. Reason can
operate us when it only behaves in this sense. This is the psychology of Hume.19
At this point, Macintyre remarks here that Hume’s psychology, as it is often wrongly
assumed, is not about a description of the cause of movement or a behavior, but about the
logic of his practical argument, which is opened up with his well- known statement:
“.. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with,… that the author
proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a
sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions,
is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or an
ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence.
For as this ought, or ought not, express some new relation or affirmation, this
necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a
reason should be given for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new
relation can be a deduction from others which are entirely different from it”...
(Treatise III, İ, 1.)
For Macintyre, this statement of Hume has been described as a “truth of logic” by some moral
philosophers after Hume. Thus, this statement is reformulated as the following: from factual
premises cannot be derived any moral conclusions.20 The results of this perception in morality
can be seen in a three points: First, the supporter of this argument for Macintyre “took it for
granted that no moral arguments involve functional concepts” conclusively.21 This means, for
Macintyre, a sign for how impoverished moral vocabulary we have. Second, this is also “a
sign of a deep lack of historical consciousness”.22 That is to say, it is a break of Aristotelian
and medieval moral tradition. Third, “moral judgments change their import and meaning”.23
This “is and ought” problem cannot be explained without the difference of practical
rationalities between Hume and the inherited moral schema from Aristotle. Let me show you
this difference briefly:
19
Macintyre, “Introduction”, Ibid., p. 11-12.
Macintyre, After Virtue, Ibid., p. 67.
21
Ibid., p. 69.
22
Ibid., p. 70.
23
Ibid.
20
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As we observed earlier, reason, for Hume, cannot motivate us to an action. But still we can
discuss the practical rationality in Hume. Although there is no place for the reason in the
motivating and promoting an action, we are not precluded “reason about the passions”.
However reason can be just in the role of informing about the activity, which stands on the
passion.24 So the reason is not in a crucial role in the generating an action.
Then what is the role of practical rationality in the generating an action for Hume?
Hume mentions two practical roles which are related to passion. First, reason answer the
question, at which passion motivate the agent to an action? Second, reason appoints the means
for the ends, which are predetermined by the passions. Then we can easily see that Hume does
not distinguish theoretical reasoning from practical one.25
But, unlike Hume, practical rationality in Aristotle is a kind of a particular action. And in
contrast to Hume, in Aristotle’s practical reasoning a passion cannot be itself a reason.26
“…rationality is exercised in its own specific forms of activity with its own goods, its own
ends internal to that activity”.27 But Hume denies such ends. For him, if there is an end; it
must be appointed by a passion.28 So for Hume, passions come first because they are
“preconceptual and prelinguistic”.29
In Aristotelian practical reasoning, the moral agent must pass through four stages: first, moral
agent in the beginning of an action has wants and goals, which are not yet expressed. These
provide a context for the reasoning. Second is doing such and such is good for the agent, or
needed by the agent. Third is the agent thinks that this action is requisite for itself. And finally
the agent act. 30
For Aristotle, these three phases in practical reasoning is related to the judgments of agents
like what is good for itself to do or to be. 31And to identify something as good, we must take
into account its function, purpose or in Aristotelian vocabulary its telos. For this, we need the
virtues. But it does not indicate that the virtues are means for this telos, because, in Aristotle
24
Macintyre, Whoose Justice Which Rationality, Ibid., p. 301.
Ibid., p. 304-305.
26
Ibid., p. 305.
27
Ibid., p. 301.
28
Ibid., p. 301.
29
Ibid., p. 302.
30
Macintyre, After Virtue, Ibid., p. 189-199.
31
Macintyre, Whose Justice Which Rationality, Ibid., p. 189.
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world, there are no such distinctions as means and ends like Hume. Virtues as itself are a
fundamental and vital part of moral life.32
As for Hume, the virtue is based on passion: “there is nothing to judgments of virtue and vice
except the expression of feelings of approval and disapproval,”33 “the distinction of vice and
virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.” (Treatise
III, İ, 1.)
If the virtue is based on passion in Hume’s thought, it must be always proper for the agent’s
desire. Macintyre asks here, what about the virtues like justice, which it would, not always, be
demanded by agent itself in the case of self-interest? For Macintyre, Hume escapes this
problem cleverly by dividing the moral judgments into natural and artificial virtues. For
Hume, the natural virtues are such; they are useful and agreeable for the man. And then the
artificial virtues are for the inhibiting the human desires, which can be destructive for a
society. For example, the virtue of generosity in others always is accepted by every person as
useful and agreeable, but the artificial virtue, like justice, do not always serve our interest,
although we teach each other to respect this principle of justice and find it agreeable. But
Macintyre asks here again, why we find useful these artificial virtues, if there is no
satisfaction of our self-interest? Hume is self-confident that we find it useful. In Enquiry, he
cultivates “the communicated passion of sympathy”34 to this question. With this
“communicated passion of sympathy” we find some principles like justice, agreeable because
we sympathize with others by nature. By saying this, for Macintyre, Hume has contradiction
with himself because Hume accepts only the expressions of feelings of approval and
disapproval for the virtues and vices. But here as in the case of artificial virtues, he has to
recognize an adherence to a social structure.35
By this, Hume, according to Macintyre, wants to invent a supplementary element in the gap of
between the any set of reasons which support absolute and unconditional adherence to the
rules and the any set of reasons which spring from our desires and interest. But Macintyre
sees this as an artificial and vain attempt because this gap is so wide, that it could not be filled
with such sympathy, which could be just a “philosophical fiction”.36
32
Macintyre, After Virtue, Ibid., p. 69 and p. 173-174.
Ibid., p. 268.
34
Ibid., p. 267.
35
Ibid., p. 267-269.
36
Ibid., p. 57-58.
33
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For Macintyre, these constrained explanations render all psychological theories in ethics to
problematic37 and also they determine the destiny of moral philosophy after Hume. In order to
understand how the character of morality in Hume and after Hume has been problematic, we
need to look at the critique of Hume by Macintyre through Aristotle. So this brings us to my
last question, why Macintyre criticize Hume through Aristotle?
First critique of Macintyre in respect to Aristotle is Hume’s rejection of the teleological and
functional aspect of morality. In Aristotle, the moral arguments involve functional concepts. If
it is said, from any “is” premises are not deduced any “ought” premises; it would be denied
that no moral arguments have functional concepts. 38
This perception manifests itself especially in the concept of a man.39 In Aristotelian tradition,
the concept of a man involves the essential nature of man and essential purpose or function.40
In the Aristotelian schema, a person is thought as “man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-histelos.”41 This means that the concept of a man corresponds to the concept of a good man.42
Thus the Aristotelian understanding of a human includes a transition from the former state to
the latter state.43 In contrast to Aristotle, in modern morality a person is thought, as “man-ashe-happens-to-be”.44 And unlike Aristotle, modern perception of a human is in an “untutored
state”.45 Modern morality sees the man just an individual, depart from his/her all purpose and
function, so man is a nonfunctional concept. According to Macintyre, this perception in
morality proves us how the modern morality has the “impoverished moral vocabulary”. This
perception did not affect only the philosopher at that time, but still it continues to affect a lot
of philosophers, who has no deep historical consciousness.46
Second critique of Macintyre is about the social context in practical reason. The major
premise of human practical reasoning is the agent’s want while Aristotelian agent’s want is
37
Macintyre, “Introduction”, Ibid., p. 15.
Macintyre, After Virtue, Ibid., p. 69.
39
Ibid., p. 69.
40
Alasdair Macintyre, “After Virtue A Study in Moral Theory (extracts)”, Kelvin Knight (edit), The Macintyre
Reader, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998, pp. 73-81, p. 77.
41
Macintyre, After Virtue, Ibid., p. 64.
42
Ibid., p. 69.
43
Macintyre, “After Virtue A Study in Moral Theory (extracts)”, Ibid., p. 77.
44
Macintyre, After Virtue, Ibid., p. 64.
45
Macintyre, “After Virtue A Study in Moral Theory (extracts)”, Ibid, p. 77.
46
Macintyre, After Virtue, Ibid., p. 70.
38
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bound to a particular agent in particular circumstances. The agent in Aristotle has to want
some particular type of good, just qua good, because of depending on context of utterance.47
Hence Aristotle requires one specific type of context, in which the society is structured by the
systematic forms of activity. In so structured society there are specific goods acknowledged
and persuaded. And the social order assists to the inhabitants in achieving these goods by
understanding and pursuing them. In contrast to Aristotle, Hume has a very different type of
context. For Hume, a society is structured not by the systematic forms of activity, but the
satisfaction of desire. And the social order formally or informally enforces or encourages the
inhabitants to have relationship in this account of the desire. While, for Aristotle, an activity is
evaluated in account of the ends of activity, an activity, for Hume, is evaluated in terms of
satisfactions of individual. 48
Third critique of Macintyre is about the concept of virtues. Macintyre lists two fundamental
features of Hume’s treatment of the virtues in the schema of morality in modernity. First is
about the characterization of particular virtues. In Aristotelian tradition, there is a shared
conception of the community’s good, which is specified by the conception of good for a man,
in the concept of virtue. But with Hume, the lack of this shared perception of virtues, like
honor and desert, are detached from the original context. Honor is just an aristocratic status. A
degree of virtue is depended on the degree of its utility. Second critique is the relationship
between virtues and rules. While in Aristotle, virtues unlike the rules or laws have a role or
function, for Hume, the virtue of justice is nothing but to obey the rules.49
I wish to argue through all this points that the problems of Hume’s ethic and modern ethic
cannot be understood without comparison. We need to compare this fallacious picture of the
ethic with a complete picture of morality in Aristotle. At this point, Macintyre manifests us
the problem and solutions in a thought-provoking way.
47
Alasdair Macintyre, "How moral agents became ghosts or why the history of ethics diverged from that of the
philosophy of mind." Synthese 53.2 (1982): 295-312, p. 300 and 304.
48
Macintyre, Whose Justice, Which Rationality, Ibid., p. 298.
49
Macintyre, After Virtue, Ibid., p. 269-270.
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