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This reifies a fundamental fear of alterity that is the enabling condition
for violence
Jabri, 6 – Director of the Centre for International Relations and Senior Lecturer at the
Department of War Studies, King’s College London (“War, Security and the Liberal State,”
Security Dialogue, 37;47) //RGP
How, then, do we begin to conceptualize war in conditions where distinctions
disappear, where war is conceived, or indeed articulated in political discourse, in
terms of peace and security, so that the political is somehow banished in the name of governmentalizing practices whose purview knows no
bounds, whose remit is precisely the banishment of limits, of boundaries and distinctions. Boundaries, however, do not disappear. Rather, they
become manifest in every instance of violence, every instance of control, every
instance of practices targeted against a constructed other, the enemy within and
without, the all-pervasive presence, the defences against which come to form the legitimizing tool
of war. Any scholarly take on the present juncture of history, any analysis of the dynamics of the present, must somehow render the narrative in measured tones,
taking all factors into account, lest the narrator is accused of exaggeration at best and particular political affiliations at worst. When the late modern condition of the
West, of the European arena, is one of camps, one of the detention of groups of people irrespective of their individual needs as migrants, one of the incarceration without
due process of suspects, one of overwhelming police powers to stop, search and detain, one of indefinite detention in locations beyond law, one of invasion and
language itself is challenged in its efforts to contain the description of what
is. The critical scholarly take on the present is then precisely to reveal the conditions
of possibility in relation to how we got here, to unravel the enabling dynamics that
led to the disappearance of distinctions between war and criminality, war and
peace, war and security. When such distinctions disappear, impunity is the result, accountability shifts
beyond sight, and violence comes to form the linchpin of control . We can reveal the operations
of violence, but far more critical is the revelation of power and how power operates in the present. As the article argues, such an exploration
raises fundamental questions relating to the relationship of power and violence, and
their mutual interconnection in the complex interstices of disrupted time and space locations. Power and violence are hence separable
occupation, then
analytical categories, separable practices; they are at the same time connected in ways that work on populations and on bodies – with violence often targeted against the
latter so that the former are reigned in, governed. Where Michel Foucault sought, in his later writings, to distinguish between power and violence, to reveal the ssubtle
workings of power, now, in the present, this article will venture, perhaps the distinction is no longer viable when we witness the indistinctions I highlight above The
article provides an analysis of the place of war in late modern politics. In particular, it concentrates on the implications of war for our conceptions of the liberty–security
problematique in the context of the modern liberal state. The first section of the article argues the case for the figure of war as analyser of the present. The second
section of the article reveals the con- ditions of possibility for a distinctly late modern mode of war and its imbri- cations in politics. The final section of the article
concentrates on the political implications of the primacy of war in late modernity, and in particular on possibilities of dissent and articulations of political agency.
The aim through- out is to provide the theoretical and conceptual tools that might
begin to meet the challenges of the present and to open an agenda of research that concentrates on the
politics of the present, the capacities or otherwise of contestation and
accountability, and the institutional locations wherein such political agency might
emerge. The Figure of War and the Spectre of Security The so-called war against terrorism is constructed as a
global war, transcend- ing space and seemingly defiant of international conventions. It is dis- tinguished from previous global wars, including the first and the
second world wars, in that the latter two have, in historiography, always been analysed as interstate confrontations, albeit ones that at certain times and in particular
locations peripherally involved non-state militias. Such distinc- tions from the old, of course, will be subject to future historical narratives on the present confrontation
and its various parameters. What is of interest in the present discussion is the distinctly global aspect of this war, for it is the globality1 of the war against terrorism that
renders it particularly relevant and pertinent to investigations that are primarily interested in the relation- ship between war and politics, war and the political
war, rather than being confined to its own
time and space, permeates the normality of the political process, has, in other
words, a defining influence on elements con- sidered to be constitutive of liberal
democratic politics, including executive answerability, legislative scrutiny, a public
sphere of discourse and inter- action, equal citizenship under the law and, to follow liberal
thinkers such as Habermas, political legitimacy based on free and equal communicative practices
processes defining the modern state. The initial premise of the present article is that
underpinning social solidarity (Habermas, 1997). War disrupts these elements and is a time of crisis and emergency. A war that
has a permanence to it clearly normalizes the exceptional , inscribing emergency
into the daily routines of social and political life. While the elements of war – conflict, social fragmentation, exclusion –
may run silently through the assemblages of control in liberal society (Deleuze, 1986), nevertheless the persistent iteration of war into politics brings these practices to
the fore, and with them a call for a rethinking of war’s relationship to politics. The distinctly global spatiality of this war suggests particular challenges that have direct
impact on the liberal state, its obligations towards its citizenry, and the extent to which it is implicated in undermining its own political institutions. It would, however,
be a mistake to assume that the practices involved in this global war are in any way anathema to the liberal state. The analysis provided here would argue that
while it is crucial to acknowledge the transformative impact of the war against
terrorism, it is equally as important to appreciate the continuities in social and
political life that are the enabling conditions of this global war, forming its conditions of possibility.
These enabling conditions are not just present or apparent at global level, but
incorporate local practices that are deep-rooted and institu- tionalized. The mutually reinforcing
relationship between global and local conditions renders this particular war distinctly all-pervasive, and poten- tially, in terms of implications, far more threatening to
the spaces available for political contestation and dissent. Contemporary global politics is dominated by what might be called a ‘matrix of war’2 constituted by a series of
transnational practices that vari- ously target states, communities and individuals. These practices involve states as agents, bureaucracies of states and supranational
organizations, quasi-official and private organizations recruited in the service of a global machine that is highly militarized and hence led by the United States, but that
nevertheless incorporates within its workings various alliances that are always in flux. The crucial element in understanding the matrix of war is the notion of ‘practice’,
for this captures the idea that any practice is not just situated in a system of enablements and constraints, but is itself constitutive of structural continuities, both
discursive and institutional. As Paul Veyne (1997: 157) writes in relation to Foucault’s use of the term, ‘practice is not an agency (like the Freudian id) or a prime mover
violence,
exclusion, intimidation, control and so on) become structurated in the routines of
institutions as well as lived experience (Jabri, 1996). To label the contemporary global war as a ‘war against terrorism’ confers
upon these practices a certain legitimacy, suggesting that they are geared towards the elimination of a direct
threat. While the threat of violence perpetrated by clandestine networks against civilians is all too real and requires state responses, many of these responses
(like the relation of produc- tion), and moreover for Foucault, there is no agency nor any prime mover’. It is in this recursive sense that practices (of
appear to assume a wide remit of operations – so wide that anyone interested in the liberties associated with the democratic state, or indeed the rights of individuals and
security becomes the overwhelming
imperative of the democratic state, its legitimization is achieved both through a
discourse of ‘balance’ between security and liberty and in terms of the ‘protection’ of liberty.3 The implications of the
communities, is called upon to unravel the implications of such practices. When
juxtaposition of security and liberty may be investigated either in terms of a discourse of ‘securitization’ (the power of speech acts to construct a threat juxtaposed with
the power of professionals precisely to so construct)4 or, as argued in this article, in terms of a discourse of war. The grammars involved are closely related, and yet that
of the latter is, para- doxically, the critical grammar, the grammar that highlights the workings of power and their imbrications with violence.
What is
missing from the securitization literature is an analytic of war, and it is this analytic that I want to
foreground in this article. The practices that I highlight above seem at first hand to constitute differ- ent response mechanisms in the face of what is deemed to be an
emergency situation in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001. The invasion and occupation of Iraq, the incarceration without due process of prisoners in
camps from Afghanistan to Guantánamo and other places as yet un- identified, the use of torture against detainees, extra-judicial assassination, the detention and
deportation – again without due process – of foreign nationals deemed a threat, increasing restrictions on refugees, their confine- ment in camps and detention centres,
the construction of the movement of peoples in security terms, and restrictions on civil liberties through domestic legislation in the UK, the USA and other European
states are all represented in political discourse as necessary security measures geared towards the protection of society. All are at the same time institutional measures
targeted against a particular other as enemy and source of danger. It could be argued that the above practices remain unrelated and must hence be subject to different
modes of analysis. To begin with, these practices involve different agents and are framed around different issues. Afghanistan and Iraq may be described as situations of
war, and the incarceration of refugees as encompassing practices of security. However, what links these elements is not so much that they constitute a constructed
what links them is the element of antagonism directed
against distinct and particular others. Such a perspective suggests that the politics of security,
including the production of fear and a whole array of exclusionary measures, comes
to service practices that constitute war and locates the discourse of war at the heart
of politics, not just domes- tically, but, more crucially in the present context, globally. The implications for the late modern state and the distinctly liberal state
taxonomy of dif- ferentiated practices. Rather,
are monumental, for a perpetual war on a global scale has implications for political structures and political agency, for our conceptions of citizenship and the role of the
The matrix
of war is centrally constituted around the element of antago- nism, having an
state in meeting the claims of its citizens,5 and for the workings of a public sphere that is increasingly global and hence increasingly multicultural.
association with existential threat : the idea that the continued presence of the
other constitutes a danger not just to the well-being of society but to its continued
existence in the form familiar to its members, hence the relative ease with which European politicians speak of migrants of particular origins as forming a
threat to the ‘idea of Europe’ and its Christian origins.6 Herein lies a discourse of cultural and racial
exclusion based on a certain fear of the other . While the war against specific clandestine organiza- tions7 involves
operations on both sides that may be conceptualized as a classical war of attrition, what I am referring to as the matrix of war is far more complex, for here we have a set
of diffuse practices, violence, disci- plinarity and control that at one and same time target the other typified in cultural and racial terms and instantiate a wider remit of
operations that impact upon society as a whole. The practices of warfare taking place in the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001 combine with societal processes,
reflected in media representations and in the wider public sphere, where increasingly the source of threat, indeed the source of terror, is perceived as the cultural other,
and specifically the other associated variously with Islam, the Middle East and South Asia. There is, then, a particularity to what Agamben (1995, 2004) calls the ‘state of
exception’, a state not so much generalized and generalizable, but one that is experienced differently by different sectors of the global population. It is precisely this
differential experience of the exception that draws attention to practices as diverse as the formulation of interrogation techniques by military intelligence in the
All are
practices that draw upon a discourse of legitimization based on prevention and preemption. Enemies constructed in the discourses of war are hence always potential, always abstract even when identified, and, in being so, always drawn widely
Pentagon, to the recent provisions of counter-terrorism measures in the UK,8 to the legitimizing discourses surrounding the invasion of Iraq.
and, in consequence, communally. There is, hence, a ‘profile’ to the state of exception and its experience. Practices that profile particular communities, including the
citizens of European states, create particular challenges to the self-understanding of the liberal democratic state and its capacity, in the 21st century, to deal with
difference. While a number of measures undertaken in the name of security, such as proposals for the introduction of identity cards in the UK or increasing surveillance
of financial transactions in the USA, might encompass the population as a whole, the politics of exception is marked by racial and cul- tural signification. Those targeted
by exceptional measures are members of particular racial and cultural communities. The assumed threat that under- pins the measures highlighted above is one that is
now openly associated variously with Islam as an ideology, Islam as a mode of religious identi- fication, Islam as a distinct mode of lifestyle and practice, and Islam as a
particular brand associated with particular organizations that espouse some form of a return to an Islamic Caliphate. When practices are informed by a discourse of
antagonism, no distinctions are made between these various forms of individual and communal identification. When communal profiling takes place, the distinction
between, for example, the choice of a particular lifestyle and the choice of a particular organization disappears, and diversity within the profiled community is sacrificed
in the name of some ‘pre- cautionary’ practice that targets all in the name of security.9 The practices and language of antagonism, when racially and culturally inscribed,
place the onus of guilt onto the entire community so identified, so that its indi- vidual members can no longer simply be citizens of a secular, multicultural state, but are
constituted in discourse as particular citizens, subjected to particular and hence exceptional practices. When the Minister of State for the UK Home Office states that
members of the Muslim community should expect to be stopped by the police, she is simply expressing the condition of the present, which is that the Muslim community
is particularly vulnerable to state scrutiny and invasive measures that do not apply to the rest of the citizenry.10 We know, too, that a distinctly racial profiling is taking
place, so that those who are physically profiled are subjected to exceptional measures. Even as the so-called war against terrorism recognizes no boundaries as limits to
its practices – indeed, many of its practices occur at transnational, often indefinable, spaces – what is crucial to understand, however, is that this does not mean that
The paradox of the current context is
that while the war against terrorism in all its manifestations assumes a boundless arena,
borders and boundaries are at the heart of its operations. The point to stress is that these boundaries and the
boundaries are no longer constructed or that they do not impinge on the sphere of the political.
exclusionist practices that sustain them are not coterminous with those of the state; rather, they could be said to be located and perpetually constructed upon the
is indeed the corporeal removal of such subjects
that lies at the heart of what are constructed as counter-terrorist measures, typified
in practices of direct war, in the use of torture, in extra-judicial incarceration and in judicially sanctioned detention. We might, then, ask if such
corporeality of those constructed as enemies, as threats to security. It
measures constitute violence or relations of power, where, following Foucault, we assume that the former acts upon bodies with a view to injury, while the latter acts
upon the actions of subjects and assumes, as Deleuze (1986: 70–93) suggests, a relation of forces and hence a subject who can act. What I want to argue here is that
violence is imbricated in relations of power, is a mode of control, a technology of governmentality. When the population of Iraq is targeted through aerial bombardment,
the consequence goes beyond injury and seeks the pacifica- tion of the Middle East as a political region. When legislative and bureaucratic measures are put in place in
the name of security, those targeted are categories of population. At the same time, the war against terrorism and the security discourses utilized in its legitimiza- tion
are conducted and constructed in terms that imply the defence or protection of populations. One option is to limit policing, military and intel- ligence efforts through the
it is the limitless construction of the war against terrorism, its
targeting of particular racial and cultural communities, that is the source of the challenge presented to the liberal
democratic state. In conditions constructed in terms of emergency, war permeates
discourses on politics, so that these come to be subject to the restraints and
imperatives of war and practices constituted in terms of the demands of security
against an existential threat. The implications for liberal democratic politics and our conceptions of the modern state and its institutions are
targeting of particular organizations. However,
far-reaching,11 for the liberal democratic polity that considers itself in a state of perpetual war is also a state that is in a permanent state of mobilization, where every
aspect of public life is geared towards combat against potential enemies, internal and external. One of the most significant lessons we learn from Michel Foucault’s writings is that war, or ‘the distant roar of battle’ (Foucault, 1977: 308), is never quite so distant from liberal governmentality. Conceived in Foucaultian terms, war and
counter-terrorist measures come to be seen not as discontinuity from liberal government, but as emergent from the enabling conditions that liberal government and the
modern state has historically set in place. On reading Foucault’s renditions on the emergence of the disciplinary society, what we see is the continuation of war in society
and not, as in Hobbes and elsewhere in the history of thought, the idea that wars happen at the outskirts of society and its civil order. The disciplinary society is not
simply an accumulation of institutional and bureaucratic procedures that permeate the everyday and the routine; rather, it has running through its interstices the
constitutive elements of war as continuity, including confrontation, struggle and the corporeal removal of those deemed enemies of society. In Society Must Be Defended
(Foucault, 2003) and the first volume of the History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1998), we see reference to the discursive and institutional continuities that structurate war in
society. Reference to the ‘distant roar of battle’ suggests confrontation and struggle; it suggests the ever-present construction of threat accrued to the particular other; it
suggests the immediacy of threat and the construction of fear of the enemy; and ultimately it calls for the corporeal removal of the enemy as source of threat. The
analytic of war also encompasses the techniques of the military and their presence in the social sphere – in particular, the control and regulation of bodies, timed precision and instrumentality that turn a war machine into an active and live killing machine. In the matrix of war, there is hence the level of discourse and the level of
institutional practices; both are mutually implicating and mutually enabling. There is also the level of bodies and the level of population. In Foucault’s (1998: 152) terms:
‘the biological and the historical are not con- secutive to one another . . . but are bound together in an increasingly com- plex fashion in accordance with the development
of the modern technologies of power that take life as their objective’. What the above suggests is the idea of war as a continuity in social and political life. The matrix of
war suggests both discursive and institutional practices, technologies that target bodies and populations, enacted in a complex array of locations. The critical moment of
war is not simply an isolated occurrence taking place as some form of interruption to an
this peaceful order is imbricated with the elements of war, present
as continuities in social and political life, elements that are deeply rooted and
enabling of the actuality of war in its traditional battlefield sense. This implies a continuity of sorts
this form of analysis is to point out that
existing peaceful order. Rather,
between the disciplinary, the carceral and the violent manifestations of government.
The alternative is a critique of the affirmative’s fear driven politicas - this
creates a new political vocabulary to challenge state security policies
Giroux, 13 – Henry Giroux 13, Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University,
Violence, USA, monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa
In addition, as the state is hijacked by the financial-military-industrial complex, the “most crucial decisions regarding national policy
are not made by representatives, but by the financial and military elites.”53 Such
massive inequality and the
suffering and political corruption it produces point to the need for critical analysis in which
the separation of power and politics can be understood. This means developing terms
that clarify how power becomes global even as politics continues to function largely at
the national level, with the effect of reducing the state primarily to custodial, policing, and punishing functions—at least for
those populations considered disposable. The state exercises its slavish role in the form of lowering taxes for the rich, deregulating
corporations, funding wars for the benefit of the defense industries, and devising other welfare services for the ultra-rich. There is
no escaping the global politics of finance capital and the global network of violence it has produced. Resistance
must be
mobilized globally and politics restored to a level where it can make a difference in
fulfilling the promises of a global democracy. But such a challenge can only take place if
the political is made more pedagogical and matters of education take center stage in the
struggle for desires, subjectivities, and social relations that refuse the normalizing of
violence as a source of gratification, entertainment, identity, and honor. War in its expanded incarnation works in
tandem with a state organized around the production of widespread violence. Such a
state is necessarily divorced from public values and the formative cultures that make a
democracy possible. The result is a weakened civic culture that allows violence and punishment to circulate as part of a
culture of commodification, entertainment, distraction, and exclusion. In opposing the emergence of the United States as both a
warfare and a punishing state, I
am not appealing to a form of left moralism meant simply to
mobilize outrage and condemnation. These are not unimportant registers, but they do not constitute an adequate form of
resistance. What is needed are modes of analysis that do the hard work of uncovering the
effects of the merging of institutions of capital, wealth, and power, and how this merger has extended the reach of a
military-industrial-carceral and academic complex, especially since the 1980s. This complex of
ideological and institutional elements designed for the production of violence must be
addressed by making visible its vast national and global interests and militarized networks, as
indicated by the fact that the United States has over 1,000 military bases abroad.54 Equally important is the need to highlight how
this military-industrial-carceral and academic complex uses punishment as a structuring force to shape national policy and everyday
life. Challenging
the warfare state also has an important educational component . C. Wright
is impossible to separate the violence of an authoritarian social
order from the cultural apparatuses that nourish it. As Mills put it, the major cultural apparatuses not only
Mills was right in arguing that it
“guide experience, they also expropriate the very chance to have an experience rightly called ‘our own.’”55 This narrowing of
experience shorn of public values locks people into private interests and the hyper-individualized orbits in which they live.
Experience itself is now privatized, instrumentalized, commodified, and increasingly militarized. Social
responsibility
gives way to organized infantilization and a flight from responsibility. Crucial here is the
need to develop new cultural and political vocabularies that can foster an engaged
mode of citizenship capable of naming the corporate and academic interests that
support the warfare state and its apparatuses of violence, while simultaneously
mobilizing social movements to challenge and dismantle its vast networks of power. One
central pedagogical and political task in dismantling the warfare state is, therefore, the
challenge of creating the cultural conditions and public spheres that would enable the
U.S. public to move from being spectators of war and everyday violence to being
informed and engaged citizens. Unfortunately, major cultural apparatuses like public and
higher education, which have been historically responsible for educating the public, are becoming little more
than market-driven and militarized knowledge factories. In this particularly insidious role,
educational institutions deprive students of the capacities that would enable them not
only to assume public responsibilities, but also to actively participate in the process of
governing. Without the public spheres for creating a formative culture equipped to
challenge the educational, military, market, and religious fundamentalisms that dominate U.S.
society, it will be virtually impossible to resist the normalization of war as a matter of
domestic and foreign policy. Any viable notion of resistance to the current authoritarian
order must also address the issue of what it means pedagogically to imagine a more
democratically oriented notion of knowledge, subjectivity, and agency and what it might
mean to bring such notions into the public sphere. This is more than what Bernard Harcourt calls “a new
grammar of political disobedience.”56 It is a reconfiguring of the nature and substance of the
political so that matters of pedagogy become central to the very definition of what
constitutes the political and the practices that make it meaningful . Critical
understanding motivates transformative action, and the affective investments it
demands can only be brought about by breaking into the hardwired forms of common
sense that give war and state-supported violence their legitimacy. War does not have to
be a permanent social relation, nor the primary organizing principle of everyday life, society, and foreign policy. The
war of all-against-all and the social Darwinian imperative to respond positively only to one’s own self-interest represent the death of
politics, civic responsibility, and ethics, and set the stage for a dysfunctional democracy, if not an emergent authoritarianism. The
existing neoliberal social order produces individuals who have no commitment, except to profit, disdain social responsibility, and
loosen all ties to any viable notion of the public good. This regime of punishment and privatization is organized around the
structuring forces of violence and militarization, which produce a surplus of fear,
insecurity, and a weakened culture of civic engagement—one in which there is little room
for reasoned debate, critical dialogue, and informed intellectual exchange . Patricia Clough and
Craig Willse are right in arguing that we live in a society “in which the production and circulation of
death functions as political and economic recovery.”57 The United States understood as a warfare
state prompts a new urgency for a collective politics and a social movement capable of
negating the current regimes of political and economic power, while imagining a different and more
democratic social order. Until the ideological and structural foundations of violence that are pushing
U.S. society over the abyss are addressed, the current warfare state will be transformed into a
full-blown authoritarian state that will shut down any vestige of democratic values,
social relations, and public spheres. At the very least, the U.S. public owes it to its children and
future generations, if not the future of democracy itself, to make visible and dismantle
this machinery of violence while also reclaiming the spirit of a future that works for life rather than death—the future
of the current authoritarianism, however dressed up they appear in the spectacles of consumerism and celebrity culture. It is
time for educators, unions, young people, liberals, religious organizations, and other groups to connect the dots,
educate themselves, and develop powerful social movements that can restructure the
fundamental values and social relations of democracy while establishing the institutions
and formative cultures that make it possible. Stanley Aronowitz is right in arguing that: the system
survives on the eclipse of the radical imagination, the absence of a viable political opposition with roots in
the general population, and the conformity of its intellectuals who, to a large extent, are
subjugated by their secure berths in the academy [and though] we can take some solace in 2011, the year
of the protester…it would be premature to predict that decades of retreat, defeat and silence can be reversed overnight without a
commitment to what may be termed “a long march” through the institutions, the workplaces and the streets of the capitalist
metropoles.58 The current protests among young people, workers, the unemployed, students, and others are making clear that
this is not—indeed, cannot be—only a short-term project for reform, but must
constitute a political and social movement of sustained growth, accompanied by the
reclaiming of public spaces, the progressive use of digital technologies, the development of democratic
public spheres, new modes of education, and the safeguarding of places where
democratic expression, new identities, and collective hope can be nurtured and
mobilized. Without broad political and social movements standing behind and uniting the call on the part of young people for
democratic transformations, any attempt at radical change will more than likely be cosmetic. Any viable challenge to
the new authoritarianism and its theater of cruelty and violence must include developing
a variety of cultural discourses and sites where new modes of agency can be imagined
and enacted, particularly as they work to reconfigure a new collective subject, modes of
sociality, and “alternative conceptualizations of the self and its relationship to others.” 59
Clearly, if the United States is to make a claim to democracy, it must develop a politics that
views violence as a moral monstrosity and war as virulent pathology. How such a claim to politics
unfolds remains to be seen. In the meantime, resistance proceeds, especially among the young people who now carry the banner of
struggle against an encroaching authoritarianism that is working hard to snuff out all vestiges of democratic life.
links
1nc terror link
Their terrorism discourse replicates a friend enemy distinction and creates a
state of exception that justifies imperial violence
Karampampas, 9 – The University of Sheffield, Department of Politics (Sotirios, “The Role of
Discourse in the Social Construction of Security and Terrorism: Deconstructing the ‘War on
Terror,’” Academia, 2009,
https://www.academia.edu/2536216/The_Role_of_Discourse_in_the_Social_Construction_of_S
ecurity_and_Terrorism_Deconstructing_the_War_on_terror) //RGP
4. 0 Deconstructing the “War on Terrorism” At this point is considered necessary to
analyse the “war on terrorism”
and its discursive construction through the lens of securitization theory and
identity/difference concept; especially due to the fact that it was “the dominant political narrative in America” ,
certainly during the Bush administration, and also because some claim that it still is highly influential under the
new presidency . Thus the events of 9/11, which according to the majority of people, and former president Bush as
well , changed drastically the world and redefined the notion of terrorism , have been
interpreted as an act of war against USA, which accordingly declared the “war on
terrorism”. Subsequently, the response of USA is known: the construction of a global
campaign against terrorism, two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a vast military
expansion of the capabilities of the country around the globe, to name just a few. In this sense, it
seems understandable when Richardson claims that “ it was our reaction to September 11 that changed
the world .” Indeed, the massive response of the America to the attacks has engendered various readings ranging from an
attempt for hegemonization to “the single most ambitious reordering of America’s foreign policy objectives since the Second World
War.” Nonetheless, the interpretation which I side with is that America’s
reaction was constructed through
an intertwined and complex combination of different security narratives, as a response
to the inherent necessity of every state to produce and reproduce discourses of threat
and danger. Therefore, terrorism has been the last “enemy” to USA’s sovereignty, in a
continuum that includes states, like Germany and USSR, groups of states, like the “rogue states” and
the “axis of evil”, and also notions, like the “war on anarchism”. Indeed, on the word of Ivie,
“terrorism as the legitimizing sign of American empire…grew out of a long tradition of war discourse deeply embedded in the
nation’s political culture.” In this sense, “terrorism
now occupies the place and function that fascism
held in World War II and that communism held within the discourse of the cold war .”
Indeed, the “war on terrorism” discourse has been characterized by certain features that clearly demonstrate its interconnection
with previous security narratives. At first, it has a significant sense of hybridity and intertexuality, given that encompasses a diverse
array of other discourses, such as the “clash of civilization”, the “rogue states” and cold war discourses . Thus, according to Gadinger,
“the
new common threat to the West was successfully stabilized as dominant narrative
through the dynamic interplay between practices and discourses” . Besides, it has a profound aspect
of continuity. Especially, noteworthy has been its articulation in terms of a struggle between
civilization and savagery, which oversimplifies the conflict and generates “a stereotyped
image of evil religious fanatics” . Indeed, the designation of the “war on terrorism”, at least in its beginning , as “a war
between good and evil” and a “civilization’s fight”332, clearly served as an inclusion/exclusion barrier
between civilized and uncivilized . Thus, the “discourse of savagery, deeply rooted in the
American political lexicon, its culture and collective psyche” , was deployed framing
“terrorists”, or simply those who are against USA, as evil and inhuman . Fortified during the cold
war, this discourse declared that “the frontlines [of the fight against terrorism] are everywhere” , and was expanded all
over the world as a process of “othering” , forcing in consequence “many to verbally
negotiate and assert who they are, who they allied with, and who they are against .” Indeed,
the language of “war on terror”, enunciated in a Manichean “us” versus “them” rhetoric , seemed analogous to the language of Al
Qaida and Bin Laden, in a somewhat “mutual pathology in operation” 39 and “a mimetic war of faundamentalisms.” Besides, the
designation of the “terrorist” as the different “other”, had as an effect the elevation of
the American “self”, signified by a patriotic and heroic attitude so as “to defend freedom
and all that is good in the world.” Apart form this, another characteristic of this dominant discourse has been its
reflexivity, namely its capability to “continuously reconstruct and reinvent earlier discursive formations in order to maintain
coherence in the face of internal and external contradictions and challenges.” Thus, its capability to remake the first interpretation
of the attacks on September 11 as an act of war, into a “new” kind of combat against a “new” kind of foes - thus creating the new
category of “enemy combatant”, to disengage the terrorists from the Geneva conventions authority - proves its highly reflective
nature. Afterwards, it has been distinguished by opacity, as the main notions of the discourse, along with the very idea of a war
against terrorism itself, has remained nebulous up to nowadays. Hence, it is obvious “that from the beginning the ‘war on terror’ has
been a vague generic term”, something that has made it extremely adaptable, due to its ability to “loosely relating to different
ideological aspects” and former security narratives. On the other hand, it
has also been interpreted as a major
securitization move from the USA, in order to legitimize its global supremacy . Thus, terrorism
was delineated as an existential threat to the identity of the county, aiming to endanger its fundamental
values, its civil society and its way of life. Besides, the former was framed also as a threat to the global
democracy, freedom and civilization, at the same time as terrorists have been seen as “enemies of human freedom”, and the
counterterrorist campaign as a “fight to save the civilized world”. Accordingly, the American president’s “speech acts”, with USA
playing the role of the most important securitizing actor, were followed by a vast number of other state leaders, and also the NATO’s
decision to invoke the article 5 of the Treaty, for the first time in its history. As a consequence, “the
War on Terrorism
has securitized the problem of terrorism, elevating it above normal politics.” In this sense, the
campaign against al-Qaeda and the war in Afghanistan can be seen as legitimate
emergency actions approved by the acceptance of the securitization , at least to a
large extent, from the global audience. Besides, the success of the securitizing move, along with a narrative of
legitimacy for the American response to terrorism, were additionally facilitated by several visual representations, such as the TV
images or photographs of the attacks of 9/11 . Thus, albeit the securitization theory focuses only in the security as a “speech act”,
the various forms of “non-verbal communication” play an important role in the construction of security and the securitization
process, as several authors have underlined. In contrast, to the previous securitization, the attempt from the USA and the UK to
securitize as well the “threat” of Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s regime, before the invasion on 2003, had been successful only in the
American soil ; indeed, the unwillingness, of the global audience, to accept this securitization move provoke a substantial opposition
to the invasion . At the end of the day though the
“war on terrorism” has been recognized as a
successful securitization in the global system or, as Buzan asserts, a “world-organizing macrosecuritization”. Obviously, the fact that terrorism still “remains the defining and existential threat against United States and
globally” displays the salience of the theory. At this instant is essential to highlight the existence of another security narrative, that
of “Islamic terrorism”, which although has been lately reappeared, in relation to the notions of “new terrorism”, “has a long history
and is already deeply embedded in the broader cultural, institutional and discursive structures of Western society.” Indeed, based in
a stereotypical understanding of Islam, as an inherently violent religion, and in the premises of “orientalism”, understood as the use
of the “orient” as the other in identity formation, has greatly facilitated the construction of the “war on terror” discourse. Therefore,
the existence of the “orient” has been central to the identity formation of the West, which through hundreds years of prejudice has
“turned [Islam] into the great ‘external reality’…and the most common object of its ‘metaphysics of representation’.” Moreover, this
discourse has various functions in both the literal and figurative world, as numerous constructed labels and notions are used to
delegitimize and marginalize the Muslim “other”. Thus, the perceived identification of “Islamic terrorism” with religious terrorism as Rapaport first coined it – engenders deceptive assumptions about the motives and the attitudes of “Islamic terrorists”, who are
usually dismissed as nihilists and inhuman367. Besides, the recurrent practice of Western media reporting on “Muslim” terrorists,
but no “Christian” terrorists is evident for the discrimination towards Islam. Another example of the embedded bias against Islam in
the West is the case of the Oklahoma City Federal Building explosion, in which the US state imminently blamed the attack on Muslim
terrorists, without even having the necessary evidences. As a consequence, on the word of Oliverio and Lauderdale, today
“‘terrorism’ [in the USA] has become virtually synonymous with Middle Eastern religious fanaticism”. In fact this has been a universal
trend, since the 80 per cent of the list of the groups identified as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) on 2003 constituted
groups with Islamic affiliations. The same year, the per cent of “Islamic groups” in the US list of terrorist organizations was close to
95. On the whole, the several functions of the “Islamic terrorism” discourse have major effects in the social, cultural, and political
level, as well as in the counterterrorism practice, through which they reify the strategic interests of the West and further empower
the “war on terror” discourse373. Consequently, the securitization
of terrorism through the “war on
terror” discourse, intertwined with the “Islamic terrorism” discourse that I have just
outlined, has as first result the elevation of terrorism, as an existential threat, all over
the world. Besides, as I have already argued, any issues seen through the lens of securitization
process, gets further militarized and activates a vicious circle of insecurity. In this context,
“war on terror” affected drastically a number of regional and local conflicts, which
although involve “previously considered indigenous terrorist groups are now often
perceived to be linked to the worldwide but nebulous al-Qaeda organisation.” In the same
line, it promotes a definition of terrorism, which merges and marginalizes notions such as insurgency and guerrilla warfare in one
pejorative and evil idea. Furthermore, framed partly in a “clash of civilization” logic, deteriorates the already negative relationship
between “Islam” and the “West”, as it sometimes seems as a war against Islam, and not against terrorism. Apart from that, it
simplifies terrorism and enables a perception of it as a monolithic phenomenon;
something that has significant causes itself to the counterterrorism praxis. Indeed, by
relegating every non-state actor in a conflict to a terrorist “other”, who has as his only
aim to annihilate the western civilization, leaves no place for any other policy except
from its eradication . Besides, this demonization of the enemy, in conjunction with a feeling of impunity, created the
conditions for the abuse and torture of the detainees in the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo prison camps. From this point of view it is
clear that the current counterterrorism framework, on the word of Fierke, “has contributed to the further construction of conflict.”
Actually, the
Bush’s doctrine of pre-emption was recognized as a source of further
instability and served “as a convenient pretext for American imperialist ambitions .”
Likewise, the current counterterrorism discourse has been evidently associated with vast human rights violations and increases in
state repression to the states of the Global Coalition against terrorism, and to a number of other states as well, especially in the
Third World, which have introduced new anti-terrorism legislations. Furthermore, the
human rights abuses and the
unwillingness of the USA to conform to the international laws and institutions had as a
result the alienation of its allies, and at the same time a moral justification of the views
of its adversaries. Corresponding to those facts, the “war on terrorism” can been a seen as a great
failure, with reference to several statistic overviews; according to them, it had not only
failed to decrease terrorism globally, but also deteriorated the situation, as an upsurge on its
levels after 2001 has been noticed . Despite though the recent increase in numbers of terrorism, the terrorist threat in
general has been overtly exaggerated in many case to fulfil political aspirations 387,
and as a mean to promote a state-centric agenda of rule and law and to enhance
state’s support.
Altogether, “even the most ardent supporters of the war against terrorism would find it difficult to claim
…that has been a success.” Subsequently, I think that a rather sincere conclusion for the “war on terrorism” and its effects should be,
with reference to Der Derian, that “facing the multiple pathologies of the global war on terror… [with no] doubt…the cure has
proven worse than the disease.”389
2nc terror link
Their identification of certain groups as “terrorist threats” justifies military
intervention against any radical groups
Karampampas, 9 – The University of Sheffield, Department of Politics (Sotirios, “The Role of
Discourse in the Social Construction of Security and Terrorism: Deconstructing the ‘War on
Terror,’” Academia, 2009,
https://www.academia.edu/2536216/The_Role_of_Discourse_in_the_Social_Construction_of_S
ecurity_and_Terrorism_Deconstructing_the_War_on_terror) //RGP
The “politics of naming” After presenting the definitional quagmire of terrorism, it is evident that, according to Richardson, “the
only universally understood connotation of the term is that it is pejorative.” Besides, one of the
reasons the latter is still elusive, as I have already mentioned, is its indiscriminate use against any “politically
motivated violence of which we disapprove”; in fact, “the words ‘terrorism and ‘terrorist’
are not terms of scientific classification…[but] they are imprecise and emotive.” Thus, in this
sense terrorism is recognized, as indicated by Chomsky, as “the weapon of those who are against ‘us’ whoever ‘us’ happens to be.”
In accordance with that, it is frequently observed that researchers
use to define as terrorist only groups
that are opposed to Western interests22 , as well as states use to acknowledge as “terrorist attacks” only those
committed against them, even if sometimes they do not fall into their own definitions , or those in which their citizens are between
the victims . Moreover, since
terrorism is socially constructed through dominant discourses,
“has as its ultimate function a general process of delegitimization .” Actually, today terrorism,
especially after 9/11, has become a “negative ideograph of Western identity”, participating in this way in the
process of “othering” in which terrorist is identified with the “evil other ”; “the wild man” of our
contemporary era. As a consequence, terrorism can be seen as a fundamentally delegitimizing
concept, exploited to delegitimize too the actor who perpetrates it . Then again, I don not argue for
the non-existence of terrorism or of the people who are taking part to it, but for the manipulation of the term, mainly, from the
states, in order to authorize themselves and their actions. Furthermore, terrorism is commonly performed as a part of a wider
political struggle or a strategy integrated into a conflict; without dismissing the existence of groups utilizing it as their single method.
In this sense, it should not be seen as an ideology or a form of politics in itself, which would assign to the perpetrators a particular
identity, as terrorists, and thus relegating them to “others”. In contrast, the term should be principally acknowledged as a form of
violence undertaken to “advance or retard any number of causes”. Nevertheless, the
label of terrorism has as an
initial result to greatly discredit either a group or even a whole struggle for
selfdetermination or national liberation, since the deployment of terrorist tactics, by no
more than elements of the former or the latter, can be exploited to condemn them . Thus,
through the deployment of a naming strategy states endeavour to prevail over their non-state adversaries, in a dispute over
legitimacy and power. In addition, owing to the fact that terrorists through their deeds challenge the monopoly of violence of the
state, they
are partaking with the latter in a “war of words”, in which “those accused of
terrorism will respond by labelling their accusers as the ‘real’ terrorists.” In fact, that is
noticeable in the self-labelling process of the several groups, where the notion of
terrorism is consciously eschewed and several euphemisms are employed, in order to
project their aims and image. As a consequence, discourse can be seen as “a tool for armed
movements and a battleground and contested space in contemporary conflicts ”, when to win
means “to attain a victory of interpretation and ensure that a particular viewpoint triumphs.” Besides, owing to this struggle for
discourse dominance there are great effects towards the two enemy sides. First, for a
government to achieve
tagging its opponents as terrorists verifies its own legitimacy and the illegal nature of
the other side, which is constructed as legitimate target of military intervention . Therefore,
denying the legality of a group, because “to call one’s opponent as a ‘terrorist’ is regarded as the
ultimate condemnation of their political strategy”, has as result to prioritize the need to
maintain law and order, to stimulate support for state policy and to rationalize state’s
violence. Hence, the demonization of the enemy as terrorist dehumanizes him/her “as
to mitigate responsibility, in the perception of both ‘our’ forces and ‘our’ public, of
killing ‘them’.” For instance, the characterization of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua as “communists” during the cold war era, a
label that was associated more than anything with terrorism then , by the Somoza dictatorship was employed to “denounce,
delegitimize and destroy organized opposition” against its rule242. On the other hand, names have the power to identify certain
groups with features, motives and behaviours, either they characterize one group or not. Thus, a
name even though
may partly provide truth about an organization; it marginalizes some characteristics, and
at the same time highlights those that form the relationship between the two sides as
hostile. For example, simply relegating Hamas and Hezbollah to the status of a terrorist group
obstructs the production of real knowledge about them as multifaceted political
organizations. Besides, once an act is categorized as terrorist, predictably the whole group is recognised as
terrorist, along with the subsequent acts of the group, either the can classified as such
or not246. In this sense, Herring states that the noun ‘terrorist’ is “the most useless word of all…due to its reductionist,
essentialising character.” Furthermore, the description of a group as terrorist can possibly lead to its
polarization between moderate and extremist elements, which can provoke in some cases its further
radicalization. What is more, labelling a group as terrorist may curtail the peace operations between a state and the group, as the
cases of MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) and LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) clearly demonstrate; another possible
effect is to generate legal and financial problems for the group, on the account of its classification as an FTO (foreign terrorist
organization) in the lists of USA and UK, something that can also hinder possible peace negotiations. All things considered, it is
evidently validated that the most of the times the politics of naming instigate the process of “naming-isolating-radicalizing”, which,
with reference to Toros, permanently deteriorates the circumstances of a conflict. In
order to, understand
holistically the situation around the war of discourse between the state and the
“terrorists”, someone has to consider as well the role of contemporary mass media, which
“by covering… [and] transmit[ing] both terrorist and government messages to the audience…are central to terrorism and
counter-terrorism as political action.” Besides, taking into consideration that “every act of terrorism is
by its very nature an act of communication”, everyone can understand the importance of media in the stateterrorists relationship. Moreover, the evident “media-dependent objectives” of terrorists, in conjunction with the “soft power” and
“information warfare” strategies that both the two sides implement, display the, sometimes referred as, “symbiotic relationship” of
terrorism and the media. Furthermore, someone
has to appreciate also the media ability to intervene
in the social construction of reality, and thus terrorism, through “conventional news
frames of terrorism”. Indeed, researches have proved that “even subtle differences in the language used to describe acts
of violence” may engender dissimilar understandings of these acts, either as terrorism or patriotism. In addition, the function of the
media after the 9/11 has ominously elevated, in an era described as the “Age of Infoterror”, in which information became “the tool
and force-multiplier of anxiety, fear, and hatred”, as well as of dominant discourses of inclusion and exclusion.
1nc china/heg
Their China advantage relies on a false perception of a “Chinese threat”
and presupposes the US as the indispensable nation – this creates
violent world ordering and orientalism
Pan 4 – professor school of international and political studies, Deakin U. PhD in political
science and IR (Chengxin, “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive
construction of other as power politics,” 6/1/2004,
http://www.articlearchives.com/asia/northern-asia-china/796470-1.html) //RGP
Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want
to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents
a discursive construction of other, instead of an
"objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than
with its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts
or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the
discursive construction of China as a threatening other
cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist, ahistorical framework of analysis within which
global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have
noted, (neo)realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the
modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the
sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of
anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo)realists argue, "the
gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other," (45) and "All other states are
potential threats." (46) In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In
doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of
universality/particularity and self/Other." (47) The
(neo)realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline
in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a
whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic
studies or international relations than China itself." (48) As a result, for those experts to know China
is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few
questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the
regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or
capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most
prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of
the United States and other East Asian regional powers." (49) Consequently, almost
by default, China emerges as
an absolute other and a
threat thanks to this (neo)realist prism. The (neo)realist emphasis on survival
and security in international relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because
for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to
demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual
condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy." (50)
And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and
uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is
unpredictability. The enemy is instability." (51) Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking
Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result?" (52) Thus understood, by its very uncertain
character, China
would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For example,
Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall
into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger. (53) In like manner,
Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a
sigh of relief? Not entirely.... Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but
it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences.... U.S. efforts
to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all.
(54) The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and
hence, a threat. In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies,
overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and
international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment,
China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more
democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China," (55) argues
Samuel Kim. And such an archetypical uncertainty is crucial to the enterprise of U.S. self-construction, because it seems that only an
uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world dominance.
In this sense, Bruce Cumings aptly suggested in 1996 that China (as a threat) was basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive
Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable 'renegade state' to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and
Iran lacks necessary weights)." (56) It
is mainly on the basis of this self-fashioning that many U.S. scholars
have for long claimed their "expertise" on China. For example, from his observation (presumably on Western TV
networks) of the Chinese protest against the U.S. bombing of their embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, Robert Kagan is
confident enough to speak on behalf of the whole Chinese people, claiming that he knows "the
fact" of "what [China] really thinks about the United States." That is, "they consider the United
States an enemy--or, more precisely, the enemy.... How else can one interpret the Chinese government's response to the
bombing?" he asks, rhetorically. (57) For Kagan, because the Chinese "have no other information" than their government's
propaganda, the protesters cannot rationally "know" the whole event as "we" do. Thus, their anger must have been orchestrated,
unreal, and hence need not be taken seriously. (58) Given
that Kagan heads the U.S. Leadership Project at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is very much at the heart of redefining the United States as the benevolent
global hegemon, his confidence in speaking for the Chinese "other" is perhaps not surprising. In a similar vein, without
producing in-depth analysis, Bernstein and Munro invoke with great ease such all-encompassing notions as "the
Chinese tradition" and its "entire three-thousand-year history." (59) In particular, they repeatedly speak of what China's "real" goal
is: "China is an unsatisfied and ambitious power whose goal is to dominate Asia.... China aims at achieving a kind of
hegemony.... China is so big and so naturally powerful that [we know] it will tend to dominate its region even if it does not intend to
do so as a matter of national policy." (60) Likewise, with the goal of absolute security for the United States in mind, Richard Betts
and Thomas Christensen argue: The truth is that China can pose a grave problem even if it does not become a military power
on the American model, does not intend to commit aggression, integrates into a global economy, and liberalizes politically. Similarly,
the United States could face a dangerous conflict over Taiwan even if it turns out that Beijing
lacks the capacity to conquer the island.... This is true because of geography; because of
America's reliance on alliances to project power; and because of China's capacity to harm U.S.
forces, U.S. regional allies, and the American homeland, even while losing a war in the technical, military sense. (61) By now, it
seems clear that neither China's capabilities nor intentions really matter. Rather, almost by its
mere geographical existence, China has been qualified as an absolute strategic "other," a
discursive construct from which it cannot escape. Because of this, "China" in U.S. IR
discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own subjectivity and exists mainly in and for the U.S. self.
Little wonder that for many U.S. China specialists, China becomes merely a "national security concern"
for the United States, with the "severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable
neglect of China's [own] security concerns in the current debate." (62) At
this point, at issue here is no longer
whether the "China threat" argument is true or false, but is rather its reflection of a shared
positivist mentality among mainstream China experts that they know China better than do the
Chinese themselves. (63) "We" alone can know for sure that they consider "us" their enemy and
thus pose a menace to "us." Such an account of China, in many ways, strongly seems to resemble
Orientalists' problematic distinction between the West and the Orient. Like orientalism, the
U.S. construction of the Chinese "other" does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction.
is enough for 'us' to set up these distinctions in our own minds; [and]
'they' become 'they' accordingly." (64) It may be the case that there is nothing inherently
wrong with perceiving others through one's own subjective lens. Yet, what is problematic with mainstream
U.S. China watchers is that they refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the inherent fluidity of
Chinese identity and subjectivity and try instead to fix its ambiguity as absolute difference from "us," a kind of certainty that
denotes nothing but otherness and threats. As a result, it becomes difficult to find a legitimate space for
alternative ways of understanding an inherently volatile, amorphous China (65) or to recognize that
Indeed, as Edward Said point out, "It
China's future trajectory in global politics is contingent essentially on how "we" in the United States and the West in general want to
see it as well as on how the Chinese choose to shape it. (66) Indeed, discourses of "us" and "them" are always closely linked to how
"we" as "what we are" deal with "them" as "what they are" in the practical realm. This is exactly how the discursive strategy of
perceiving China as a threatening other should be understood, a point addressed in the following section, which explores some of
the practical dimension of this discursive strategy in the containment perspectives and hegemonic ambitions of U.S. foreign policy.
1nc bioterror
Their bioterror discourse results in bio political ordering of society
Long, 14 – Associate Dean for Graduate and Undergraduate Education in the College of the
Liberal Arts and Professor of Philosophy and Classics (Christopher, “Project BioShield, BARDA
and Bioterrorism: Molecular Pre-Emption and Enhancement,” 6/13/2014, School of Global
Studies, University of Sussex) //RGP
Abstract: To
deal with the threat of bioterrorism the US government in 2004 through the creation of
Project BioShield, implemented the first national defence strategy against biological threats .
This strategy was modified in 2006 with the creation of the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA).
Project BioShield and BARDA were set up to partner with pharmaceutical companies to create medicines or medical
countermeasures (MCMs) that will protect the general population from a bioterrorist attack. These
collaborations have
led to the commercialisation of vaccines such as the anthrax vaccine BioThrax which is available in the US and
certain international markets. The production and sale of vaccines such as this is one site in the arena of biodefence research that
in seeking to pre-empt future threats is increasingly making us more vulnerable . This paper,
through an empirical investigation into these partnerships seeks to understand the drivers behind the turn to pharmaceutical
companies in this security policy and their theoretical significance. It will argue that
the activities of BARDA and
Project BioShield represent a biopolitical security tool that is attempting to pre-empt
the emergence of biological threats at the molecular level . Further, these processes seek
to protect the fixed properties of health and well-being at the level of the corporeal
through adding enhanced auto-immunising capabilities at the molecular. Introduction This paper
looks specifically the attempts of Project BioShield and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) to
partner with pharmaceutical companies in order to produce new medicines or medical countermeasures (MCMs) to protect the
population from a bioterrorist attack. In doing so, this
biopolitical security tool is critically assessed to
understand the new economies and partnerships it forms and the vulnerabilities it
contributes to. In order to do this, the events that led to the creation of Project BioShield are detailed, followed by the
theoretical relationship between developments in biology and political economy. Recent developments in the knowledge of life at
the molecular level are then outlined in relation to the development of the new economic partnerships that Project BioShield is
trying to create. The workings of Project BioShield and BARDA are then discussed including the incentives, adaptations, tensions and
drivers. The
way this security tool transforms life at the molecular level is then assessed in
addition to the vulnerabilities it contributes to. President Clinton and the Threat of Bioterrorism In the United
States (US) serious thought on civilian biodefence began with President Bill Clinton in the late 1990s. The bombing of the World
Trade Centre (WTC) in 1993 and the capture of one of the perpetrators, Ramzi Yousef along with his plans to cause further acts of
violence intensified the Clinton administration’s concerns regarding terrorism. The events of 1995 which included the attacks of the
Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan with sarin nerve gas in addition to the Oklahoma City bombings, killing 168 and the acquisition of plague
bacteria by a member of a neonazi organisation influenced the view in the White House that terrorists were developing interests in
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons (CBRN). The news that the Aum group had attempted attacks with anthrax
supported the worry that WMDs could be used against an American city. Indeed, the US government’s interest in CBRN terrorism
was said to have ballooned after the attack. In response, Clinton issued Presidential Directive PDD/NSC39 in 1995 which recognised
the threat of asymmetric warfare, delineated the roles of various agencies in dealing with a terrorist incident and significantly,
designated the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) as the agency responsible for planning
and preparing a medical response to a major terrorist attack. In 1999 the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, (reformed the Strategic
National Stockpile (SNS) in 2002)7 a new division of the Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was created to store
medicines in case of attack. Initially, funding for this stockpile was fairly minimal with only 15 million doses of smallpox vaccine held
in the summer of 2001. The
terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 in addition to the anthrax letters sent on
a considerable response to the
perceived US vulnerability to biological and conventional terrorism. After the terrorist attacks of
the 18th of September and 9th of October10 that year generated
2001, the federal government made civilian biosecurity a national priority. In response to the catastrophic threat of bioterrorism,
civilian biodefence funding rose from $633 million in 2001 to $4.095 billion in 2002. This spending led to the creation of Project
BioWatch - a national early warning system aimed primarily at detecting a biological attack using an aerosolised agent, Project
BioSense - a webbased software programme that collects public health data from across the US on a daily basis and Project
BioShield. Project BioShiled, created by the Project BioShield Act of 2004 was created to deliver $5.6 billion over 10 years to
encourage the private sector to develop medical countermeasures (MCMs) against CBRN terrorism agents and to provide a novel
mechanism for the federal acquisition of those newly developed countermeasures. MCMs represent a new discursive category of
medicines that exist at the intersection of health and security policy and have been created for the purpose of meeting the needs of
the civilian population during an emergency. Population, Economy, Security The
political need for MCMs arising
from the threat of bioterrorism has facilitated the development of new economic sites
and partnerships between governments and pharmaceutical companies. Crucially, these
economic sites have been made possible by the advances in the understanding of life at
the molecular level. Foucault in The Order of Things describes the transition from the
Classical episteme that based knowledge upon the ordering of representations to a new
Modern epistemological arrangement that distinguishes between a psychology of needs
represented and an anthropology of natural finitude. The Modern age analysed man’s
natural finitude through the quasi transcendentals of life, labour and language . Man in the
analytic of finitude is an empirico-transcendental doublet, a being such that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all
knowledge possible. In the Modern age, scientific
understanding transitions from the taxonomic to
the synthetic notion of life, giving rise to the conditions of possibility of a biology .19
Correlatively, Ricardo's analysis, for the first time, understands labour as the worker’s energy, toil and time that are bought and sold
and that form the origin of the value of things.20 With these developments the historical apriori - the internal conditions of
possibility to a history of thought foundational to an epsiteme - of the Classical Age are overthrown and renewed.21 New
understandings form the basis of entire classifications of thought, accepted uncritically
they are considered necessary only to be seen as entirely contingent when new
knowledge arises. The transition then is from representation to the production of labour,
this relocates wealth in the creative forces of human biological life rather than the fruits
of the land.22 As Melinda Cooper notes, the first point of articulation between economics and the modern life sciences occurs
in the concept of "organic structure".23 'The organic becomes the living and the living is that which
produces, grows, and reproduces.'24 As the economy grows so does life begin to be understood as a process of
evolution and ontogenetic development.25 Life produces and reproduces, population growth becomes
inseparable from economic growth and political economy now analyses labour and
production alongside the processes of human and biological reproduction .26 The key features
of the Western European liberal state in the 1970s and 80s, as Foucault saw it, are now comprised of a triad of
technologies of power: sovereignty, discipline and governmental management, which
have population as its main target, political economy as its major form of knowledge
and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism or technical instrument.27 We see
that the development of the modern life sciences and classical political economy should
be understood as parallel and mutually constitutive events.28 These new forms of
knowledge have also supported the development of new forms of power and strategies
of security. The emergence of the population as a political subject and its study through statistics revealed its naturalness and
constancy of phenomena. The physiocrats employed freedom of commerce and the circulation
of grain as a fundamental principle of economic government in order to overcome the
scourge of scarcity. Through an understanding of the population as a productive entity that can support greater economic
exchange when allowed greater freedom of movement and circulation, a system of security is employed that seeks to protect and
cultivate life through its natural processes. Facilitating the free movement and circulation also increases the likelihood that "crises"
will emerge. The sudden, circular bolting of phenomena such as pandemic influenza highlights the (in) security dynamic in such
strategies. Biopower
and biopolitics, a new technology of power, develop from these
advances in knowledge and aim to optimise states of life and support their productive
elements. In doing this strategies of security are employed such as those carried out by the
physiocrats above which work through and upon natural elements in the population to
aim for a 'progressive self-cancellation of phenomena by the phenomenal themselves.'
Biopolitical strategies also focus on the limiting conditions of reproduction – sex and race – in their exercise of power.
Biopolitical strategies aimed at securing economic and biological growth have inspired
the biopolitics of security, an area of study which has focused critically on the role of
circulation as the modality of governance and the transformation of life in the
governance of security.33
1nc tech enviro
Tech solutions to environmental crises merely masks the problem – guarantees
extinction
Godhaven, 9– environmental writer and activist (Merrick, “Swapping technologies fails to
address the root causes of climate change,” Guardian, 7/15/2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2009/jul/15/technofix-climate-change)
//RGP
Technology is part of the solution to climate change. But only part. Techno-fixes like some of those in the Guardian's
Manchester Report simply
cannot deliver the carbon cuts science demands of us without being
accompanied by drastic reductions in our consumption. That means radical economic and social
transformation. Merely swapping technologies fails to address the root causes of climate
change. We need to choose the solutions that are the cheapest, the swiftest, the most effective and least likely to incur dire side
effects. On all counts, there's a simple answer – stop burning the stuff in the first place. Consume less. There
is a certain level of resources we need to survive, and beyond that there is a level we
need in order to have lives that are comfortable and meaningful. It is far below what we presently
consume. Americans consume twice as much oil as Europeans. Are they twice as happy? Are Europeans half as free? Economic
growth itself is not a measure of human well-being, it only measures things with an assessed monetary value. It values wants at the
same level as needs and, while it purports to bring prosperity to the masses, its tendency to concentrate profit in fewer and fewer
hands leaves billions without the necessities of a decent life. Techno-fixation
masks the incompatibility of
solving climate change with unlimited economic growth. Even if energy consumption
can be reduced for an activity, ongoing economic growth eats up the improvement and
overall energy consumption still rises. We continue destructive consumption in the
expectation that new miracle technologies will come and save us. The hope of a future techno-fix
feeds into the pass-it-forward, do-nothing-now culture typified by targets for 2050. Tough targets for 2050 are not tough at all, they
are a decoy. Where are the techno-fix plans for the peak in global emissions by 2015 that the IPCC says we need? Even within the
limited sphere of technology, we have to separate the solutions from the primacy of profit. We need
to choose what's the most effective, not the most lucrative. Investors will want the maximum return for their money, and so the
benefits of any climate technologies will, in all likelihood, be sold as carbon credits to the polluter industries and nations. It would
not be done in tandem with emissions cuts but instead of them, making it not a tool of mitigation but of exacerbation. Climate
change is not the only crisis currently facing humanity. Peak oil is likely to become a major issue within the coming decade.
Competition for land and water, soil fertility depletion and collapse of fisheries are already posing increasing problems for food
supply and survival in many parts of the world. Technological solutions to climate change fail to address most of these issues. Yet
even without climate change, this
systemic environmental and social crisis threatens society, and
requires deeper solutions than new technology alone can provide. Around a fifth of emissions come
from deforestation, more than for all transport emissions combined. There is no technological fix for that. We simply need
to consume less of the forest, that is to say, less meat, less agrofuel and less wood. Our
level of consumption is inequitable. Making it universal is simply impossible. The scientist Jared Diamond calculates
that if the whole world were to have our level of consumption, it would be the equivalent of having 72 billion people on earth. With
ravenous economic growth still prized as the main objective of society by all political leaders the world over, that 72 billion would be
just the beginning. At 3% annual growth, 25 years later it would be the equivalent of 150 billion people. A century later it would be
over a trillion. Something's got to give. And indeed, it already is. It's time for us to call it a crisis and respond with the proportionate
radical action that is needed. We need profound change – not only government measures and targets but financial systems, the
operation of corporations, and people's own expectations of progress and success. Building
a new economic
democracy based on meeting human needs equitably and sustainably is at least as big a
challenge as climate change itself, but if human society is to succeed the two are
inseparable. Instead of asking how to continue to grow the economy while attempting to cut carbon, we should be asking why
economic growth is seen as more important than survival.
alt/fw
1nc alt vs terrorism
The alternative is an epistemological critique of counterterrorism – this reveals
the flaws in the rhetoric and processes behind the status quo “war on
terrorism”
Karampampas, 9 – The University of Sheffield, Department of Politics (Sotirios, “The Role of
Discourse in the Social Construction of Security and Terrorism: Deconstructing the ‘War on
Terror,’” Academia, 2009,
https://www.academia.edu/2536216/The_Role_of_Discourse_in_the_Social_Construction_of_S
ecurity_and_Terrorism_Deconstructing_the_War_on_terror) //RGP
6. 0 Conclusions: Towards a reconceptualization of counterterrorism At
this point, after the examination of the
role of discourse in the social construction of security and terrorism, through the analytical lens of
securitization and identity/difference theory, I have demonstrated the problematic nature of the current
counterterrorism approach. Actually, affected by the state’s exploitation of the “politics of
naming”, a state-centric approach of terrorism that acknowledges state as always the
victim of it, and the dominant narrative of “war on terror”, the current counterterrorism praxis seems not only
ineffective, but also as a source of further conflict. Besides, the significant influence that both securitization
of terrorism and the functioning of a binary logic, as a process of inclusion/exclusion, through their inherent violent nature have on
counterterrorism, have induced it to the utilization of constantly more brutal practices. In this sense,
it is vital to
reconceptualize the current counterterrorism approach. A first step towards
reconceptualization would be the recognition that terrorism is primarily a tactic pursued
from different actors and for different goals; thus it can be never eliminated, but only
contained. Besides, a “successful counterterrorism almost invariably requires a
combination of coercive and conciliatory policies.” In fact, the only countries, such as Argentina,
Chile and Uruguay, that had exterminate terrorism solely by military means, have engaged in
state terrorism practices. Thus, to handle terrorism means the implementation of both counterterrorist and antiterrorist
practices, the first of which are specified only in security issues, while the second promote the use of political, economic and legal
instruments.
Another step would be the desecuritization of terrorism and terrorist
identity . Indeed, the desecuritization of terrorism relocates it from a securitized and
militaristic stance back to “normal politics”, in which it is dealt not as an existential
threat anymore, but as another issue of everyday politics; therefore promoting a more
holistic and less violent approach against it, given that “what is sure is that violence invariably
breeds counterviolence .” Besides, the deconstructivist strategy of desecuritization,
introduced by Huysmans, in which the “other” is presented as a person with multiple
identities, and not as a threatening individual, can be prominent in the deconstruction
of terrorist as the “evil other”. Indeed, this strategy deconstructs the perception of terrorist as fanatic and inhuman,
while promotes the idea of terrorism as a human option and a tactic. What is more, counterterrorism needs to
disengage from the use of an “us” versus “them” language, which dehumanizes the
enemy, endorses military intervention, and downgrades any non-violent solution.
Moreover, a counterterrorist approach should promote dialogue and engage with the
grievances of “terrorists”. Actually, according to Toros, negotiations can be very useful into offering alternative paths to
violence for the terrorists, by reversing the “naming-isolating-radicalizing process”, which dominates
nowadays, to another characterized as “negotiating-including-legitimizing” . Furthermore, a conscious attempt to move beyond the
use of terrorism, owing to the negative connotations that the term has acquired through the years, is considered requisite. Thus,
the term should be used by great caution, as “terrorism is a concept that mystifies
rather than illuminates” . Indeed, the powerful associations that the term carries can
possibly obstruct the understanding of a certain case, and dehistorize it from its cultural
and political environment. All things considered, there is an urgent need for a reflective and
sceptical orientation towards both counterterrorism and current terrorism
knowledge . Therefore, this essay endorses a “critical turn” in terrorism studies, although without discrediting the whole body
of the “traditional terrorism studies”, in order to unveil the processes behind the constant reproduction
of the terrorism discourse. A discourse which delegitimizes and marginalizes the voices of
the powerless, and authorizes and empowers the predominant state-centric structure of
international system.
1nc/2nc discourse first
Interrogating the discourse behind counterterrorism is a prior quuestion
Karampampas, 9 – The University of Sheffield, Department of Politics (Sotirios, “The Role of
Discourse in the Social Construction of Security and Terrorism: Deconstructing the ‘War on
Terror,’” Academia, 2009,
https://www.academia.edu/2536216/The_Role_of_Discourse_in_the_Social_Construction_of_S
ecurity_and_Terrorism_Deconstructing_the_War_on_terror) //RGP
1. 0 Introduction Several years after the events of September 11, 2001, the effects of the attacks and the subsequent “war on
terrorism”, which former President George W. Bush declared some days later, can still be traced globally. Evidently, nowadays, and
after two US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the deaths they generated, the
repression of civic liberties in a vast number of countries under new anti-terrorist
legislations , the human rights violations in Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay prison camps , and the gigantic
influence which the “war on terrorism” had in certain other ongoing conflicts around
the world (Israel, Russia, China, Philippines, etc) , no one can disagree with the view that the “war on
terrorism” discourse has been the “hegemonic political discourse” , at least, for the greatest part of
the 21st century . As a consequence, in a world where obviously “words, rhetoric and discourses are more important than ever
before”, a study of their role in the field of security is considered indispensable. Indeed, having as a starting point the well-known
division of Cox between “problem-solving” and “critical theories”, this essay will argue for the social constructed nature of security.
In view of this, I will employ two different theories, securitization and identity/difference theory, which can be considered as parts of
an inclusive definition of critical security studies. Therefore, I will first outline securitization/desecuritization framework, especially
giving emphasis to the concept of desecuritization, which, in my opinion, may be very useful in the combat of terrorism, especially
owing to its further and profound securitization after 9/11. Afterwards, through an examination of the role of identity/difference in
the formation of USA’s, and additionally in West’s, foreign policy and security, I will try to answer, based in the “discursive practices
approach” , how the “war on terror” became the dominant discourse globally. At this point, is considered necessary to provide a
definition of discourse, in consideration of its significance to the objectives of this essay. Thus, with reference to Shepherd,
“discourses
are understood here as systems of meaning-production rather than simply
statements or language, encompassing narratives, texts and images, systems that ‘fix’
meaning, however temporarily, and enable us to make sense of the world.” Besides, this essay
will be structured on the premises of critical discourse analysis, which “…aims primarily to illustrate and describe the
relationship between textual and social and political processes.” Indeed, according to Foucault,
discourse analysis “consists of not – of no longer – treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or
representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.”
Particularly, this essay will be based in secondary sources, in order to demonstrate and deconstruct the dominance of the current
security narratives. However, discourse
is central also in the understanding of another socially
constructed notion, the notion of terrorism; something that is one of the central arguments of this essay.
Therefore, I will first try to depict the debate over the definition of terrorism, presenting the different approaches to define it
through the years, as well as the most crucial obstacles towards a common definition. Actually, as maintained by Toros “any article
on terrorism must enter the labyrinthian debate on what ‘terrorism’ means and how it is to be defined.” Apart from this, the
negative connotations that terrorism has acquired through the years, has turned it into ,
as indicated by Badiou, a term with no “neutral readability”, but “intrinsically propagandistic” .
Indeed, “since ‘terrorism’ is a term of condemnation”, is used regularly by states and non-state actors to delegitimize each other. In
fact, in the struggle for discourse dominance, the
“politics of naming” play a vital role throughout the
evolution of the conflict for public’s “hearts and minds” in the modern “media-saturated
environment”. Moreover, I will explore the notion of state terrorism, one of the most controversial subjects throughout the
history of terrorism studies, which has also been “…one of the most well-trodden issues of contention between most orthodox or
mainstream Terrorism Studies and proponents of critical approaches.” After this, I will portray the framework of critical approaches
on terrorism, in order to criticize the “traditional terrorism studies” along with the current counterterrorism paradigm. In addition to
this, I will argue for a definition of terrorism “…as a strategy or tactic of political violence that can be, and frequently is, employed by
both state and non-state actors and during times of war and peace.”25 Besides, I will describe the major events in the American
“war on terrorism”, from its declaration and its reformulation to a ‘long war’ rhetoric26 till the end of Bush administration, owing to
the fact that has been the archetype of the current securitization of terrorism27 and the escalation of identity/difference
narrative28. Moreover, I will display the
reason behind the construction of the “war on terror”
discourse, which impelled the whole world in a “good versus evil” binary logic. Thus, I will pose a
“how – possible question”, to deconstruct the dominance of the “war on terror” discourse and to show “…how the subjects, objects,
and interpretive dispositions [of the discourse] were socially constructed such that certain practices were made possible.29” In
addition to this, I
will illustrate the counter-productivity of the current counterterrorism
approach, which was “…the single agenda [of Bush administration] in its global policy ”30.
In addition to this, I will try to What is more, I will try to illustrate the significance of the language of the
“war on terror” in the case of Chechnya and Russia’s conflict. Indeed, through a description of the modern history of the
conflict, namely after the demise of the USSR and up to the end of Putin’s administration, I will try to show the
importance of discourse and the exploitation of the “Islamic factor” after 9/11, to what
has become known as “Russia’s ‘war on terror’” . Thus, with Chechnya’s instance as an example I will indicate
the failure of the contemporary counterterrorist approach, which is still grounded extensively in the war on terrorism logic,
principally in cases of “conflict-related terrorism”. The latter has defined by Stepanova, as the “terrorism [which] is systematically
employed as a tactic in assymetrical local or regional armed conflicts [and]… is tied to the concrete agenda of a particular armed
conflict and terrorists identify themselves with a particular political cause (or causes) – the incompatibility over which is fought.” On
the whole, this
essay aims first to demonstrate the importance of discourse in the social
construction of security and terrorism. Furthermore, it will try to deconstruct the “war on
terrorism”, along with the two major security narratives, those of “traditional terrorism
studies” and “Islamic terrorism”, which have been very influential and in continuous
interaction with the former. Needless to say, these two narratives had not only facilitated the creation and final
supremacy of the “war on terrorism” as a global phenomenon, but also continue to dictate the international studies on terrorism.
Moreover, I will call for a desecuritization of the
“terrorist threat”, which of course “is real but exaggerated,
due to its…random nature, and is evoking an unrealistic - and costly- quest for perfect
immunity from it.” In this sense, Huysmans “deconstructivist” strategy of desecuritization may be found very useful. In
addition, I will argue for a paradigm shift in the counterterrorism approach , which will be able to
“see terrorism as a strategy, [and as] a human choice”38, to facilitate “acts of dialogue”
and to “reverse [the]… naming-isolating-radicalising process, creating in its place a
negotiating–including–legitimizing one.” Last but not least, this essay will join those voices calling for a “critical
turn” in the terrorism studies, which will widen the terrorism studies current agenda and challenge the dominant security
discourses.
1nc/2nc epistemology
Ontology and epistemology come first
Cavalcante, 11 – Ph.D. Candidate at the Centre for Social Studies, Coimbra University, Portugal
(Fernando, “The Underlying Premises of UN Peacebuilding: Ontology, Epistemology and
Methodology,” 3/16/2011, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p501820_index.html) //RGP
Before presenting how ontological,
epistemological and methodological aspects influence
„concrete‟ policies, it is important to discuss how they are defined and their relationship. According to the Cambridge
Dictionary of Sociology, ontology “refers to metaphysical issues concerned with the nature of existence and the structure of
inquiries thus relate to assumptions about the nature,
the structure, the components (units) and the dynamics that are to be known, which are
all within what is generally referred to as „reality‟. Ontological questions, therefore, relate to what one
assumes to constitute reality. However, how can we know something? The answer to this
question is related to epistemological claims. Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, “tries to
answer questions about the nature, sources, scope and justification of knowledge” (ibid.:
reality at large” (2006: 423). Ontological
171). Hence, when one speaks of epistemology one speaks of what s/he considers as knowledge, of what s/he considers as the
basis for that knowledge, of what can be known and of what criteria matters to justify his or her knowledge as knowledge –
and not a belief or something else. Epistemology, therefore, relates to claims about what is knowledge and how can one know
about something. As
abstract as such concepts may be, they provide a deeper and more
thorough understanding of theories since they explore the assumptions adopted prior
to the very creation of theories. For instance, it is a specific ontological position – that the
„reality‟ of international politics is constituted by a (materialist) structure made of
states – that allows Waltz (1979) to explain that anarchy is a constant state of being of
the „international system‟: a Hobbesian state of “war of all against all”. However, by adopting an
ontology in which the „reality‟ of international politics is understood to be constituted by a
(social) structure made of states‟ intersubjective practices, Wendt explains that anarchy is
not a constant state of being of the „international system‟, but rather “anarchy is what states make of it”
(Wendt, 1992; see also Wendt, 1999). The ontological choices made by those theorists, therefore,
have a significant influence on both Waltz‟s neorealism and Wendt‟s constructivism, as
well as on any other theoretical discussion supported by each of those theoretical models. Although adopting different
ontological positions, both Waltz and Wendt have relied on the same (positivist) epistemology. Epistemological
choices nevertheless affect how a theory is created and applied. Regarding issues in the realm of
epistemology, examples abound in IR, since the different epistemological positions adopted by IR scholars are at
the core of the “fourth debate” of the discipline (on IR 'grand debates', see Wæver, 1996). Feminist theories are only
one of such examples.1 Their theorists have firmly pointed out how minorities and marginalised
groups have been excluded from international relations “not only at the level of
discrimination but also through a process of self-selection [conducted by elite males
in Anglo- and Euro-centric contexts] which begins with the way in which we are
taught about international relations” (Tickner, 1988: 430). Still related to epistemology and ontology,
methodology deals with how actual research is, or should be, conducted. According to
Norman Blaikie, methodology also deals with logics of enquiry, of how new knowledge is
generated and justified. This includes a consideration of how theories are generated
and tested – what kind of logic should be used, what a theory looks like, what criteria a theory
has to satisfy, how it relates to a particular research problem, and how it can be tested. (Blaikie, 2000: 8)2 However, how
do epistemological, ontological and methodological choices relate to each other? Grix‟s answer to the question is based on the
following scheme: [Figure 1 omitted] According to Grix, alongside methods and sources, such choices are the “building blocks”,
the core components of research.3 They are interrelated according to a specific directional pattern: the fundamental
and starting point of research, he argues, is an ontological claim, since “research necessarily
starts from a person‟s view of the world” (Grix, 2002: 179). That claim is then followed by an
epistemological assumption on how that same person can gather knowledge about
that same world, and by a methodological question about “how to go about
acquiring it” (ibid.: 179). Whilst the rationale involves a rather controversial discussion,4 I adopt such a logical sequence
in this paper as a starting point anyway – since this is a work in progress, this initial assumption might be challenged and
criticised in a more advanced stage of research. Considering
the role of ontological, epistemological
and methodological options in shaping theories and concepts, as well as the influence
of these theories and concepts, either explicitly or implicitly, in policymaking and in the
implementation of policies, I thus suggest they have fundamental importance for
understanding the theoretical and conceptual bases of policies and subsequent courses
of action. I now turn to the concrete case of UN peacebuilding as an illustration for that conceptual framework.
Advantage CPs
port security
The united states federal government should sufficiently update cargo
screening processes
Solves terrorism
Ramsay, 13 – member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation (Brett, “Port
Security: Prioritizing Technology and Funding,” The Daily Signal, 12/10/2013,
http://dailysignal.com/2013/12/10/port-security-prioritizing-technology-funding/) //RGP
U.S. ports are thought to be secure from both radical transnational organizations and aggressive foreign nations, but, earlier this
month, an
unlocked door and surveillance equipment failures enabled a homeless man
with “some mechanical aptitude” to commandeer a 132-foot yacht in Seattle, Washington.
This incident highlights the need to strengthen U.S. port security in the face of traditional and 21stcentury threats. Maritime transportation is a vital component of the U.S. economy . U.S. ports move
over two billion tons of cargo annually, a number that will likely increase when the Panama Canal’s expansion is completed in 2015.
As the flow of goods and capacity increase, vulnerability will also increase along the entire American coastline. U.S. maritime assets
face numerous traditional challenges including smuggling, volatile weather, and internal corruption. One of the most pressing
security concerns since 9/11 has been terrorism. With this in mind, the
U.S. government has instituted
measures to prevent a terrorist attack through cargo shipments, such as the U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol’s risk-based Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism.
More risk-based programs—rather than unrealistic mandates—are needed to build an effective
homeland security strategy. The first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review recognized the need to safeguard the
way U.S. citizens’ interact with the world. Homeland security and continued prosperity necessarily demand an all-inclusive approach
to U.S. port security. Adapting
port infrastructure to 21st-century threats is a necessary step
not only in securing public safety, but also in securing economic vitality. In 2011, organized
criminals in Antwerp utilized sustained cyber attacks to breach port security. After infiltrating the port’s IT system, they were able to
locate and steal cargo containing hidden illicit material before the legitimate freight owners or customs authorities arrived. With the
proliferation of cheap cyber abilities, the Port of Long Beach’s director of security warns a successful cyber attack on the ports of Los
Angeles and Long Beach would likely cost $1 billion per day. In
response to these changing threats, U.S.
ports—namely Baltimore and Los Angeles—are preparing. The federal government, however, has not
prioritized port security as it should. The Coast Guard is an integral cog in port order and security and requires
increased funding for readiness and vessel modernization. Congress should ensure that the Coast Guard has
the resources necessary to fulfill its mission of protecting America’s shores. The use of cyber
attacks to bypass normal screening and pick-up procedures at shipyards further displays the futility of the current 100 percent cargo
screening mandate. Instead of creating a backlog of cargo shipments, Congress
should instead update cargo
screening requirements based on high-risk manifests and other data triggers. As
transportation security is one of the main focuses of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Congress and DHS Secretary
nominee Jeh Johnson should carefully consider all of the critical threats facing American maritime security.
Federal funding solves
Wanio, 12 – Port Director and CEO, Tampa Port Authority, AAPA rep (Richard, “Ensuring the
Efficiency, Effectiveness and Transparency of Homeland Security Grants (Part II),” House
Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response and
Communications Hearing, 4/26/2012,
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Wainio.pdf) //RGP
The Port of Tampa is the largest port in Florida, both in terms of cargo tonnage and in terms of land area, as the port covers about
5,000 acres throughout our county. The security issues faced by the Port since September 11, 2001 have presented as daunting a
challenge as this port has ever faced. We
have gone to extraordinary lengths to implement a layered
security approach that provides efficient and effective port security in a manner that is
also as cost-effective as possible. That layered approach involves contracting with the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s
Office for 24/7 patrols of the port, as well as augmenting the Port Authority’s own security department with private security
services. Since September 11, 2001, the Tampa Port Authority has spent approximately $86 million for security infrastructure and
operating costs. Although
state and federal funding helped to defer some of these costs, the
majority of this total has been borne by the Tampa Port Authority. I will say that the
partnerships we have with federal agencies such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection
and in particular the U.S. Coast Guard have been absolutely indispensable in our ability
to address the security needs of our port. That security protocol must be flexible enough to not choke off the
very business it is designed to protect. So far we have been successful in that regard in not implementing measures that bottleneck
the commerce of the Port. This is important, as the Port of Tampa is West Central Florida’s largest economic engine, contributing
almost $8 billion in annual economic benefit to the region and supporting in some fashion almost 100,000 jobs. Port
Security
grants are an essential component in assisting ports to meet important mandates under
Federal law. These mandates assure a safe/secure environment required of the modern,
and ever-changing, intermodal transportation system. These grants also support
terminal operators and local first responders in their mission to work in partnership with
ports to assure safe and secure port operations. Many systems employed to support efficiently operated
secure port operations are expensive to procure and maintain. With this in mind, the trend of reducing port grant
allocations is troubling and counterproductive. It should be noted that much of this
money also goes to projects that directly, or indirectly, support parallel Federal
enforcement issues, such as cruise terminal security and monitoring of high value cargo .
adaptation cp
the united states federal government should increase its funding of NOAA’s
adaptation research strategies
USFG adaptation research solves
UBC, 14 – University of British Columbia Science (“Ocean acidification research should increase
focus on species’ ability to adapt,” 1/27/2014, http://science.ubc.ca/node/748) //RGP
Not enough current research on marine ecosystems focuses on species' long-term
adaptation to ocean acidification, creating a murky picture of our oceans' future, according to an international study
led by a UBC zoologist. "We can't measure evolutionary responses in all organisms, so we need
to choose carefully to get the most bang for our buck," says UBC post-doctoral research fellow Jennifer
Sunday, who conducted the study with experts from Germany, Australia, the United States, Great Britain and Sweden. "Species of
ecological and economic importance, or species that will allow us to make useful
generalizations, should be studied so we can project changes in our ocean ecosystems ."
The paper, published this week in Trends in Ecology and Evolution, reviews 18 studies
on ocean acidification from 2004 to 2013. It summarizes approaches that researchers
can use to increase the evolutionary focus of their work, potentially offering a clearer snapshot of the
health of our future oceans. While most studies of ocean acidification’s impact do not take into account the potential for
evolutionary responses, Sunday’s
team sought to highlight the small but growing list of studies
that do. They found researchers have used two general approaches: either raising
organisms for multiple generations to recreate evolution in the laboratory, or measuring
genetic variation in natural populations. “Both approaches have demonstrated some
capacity for evolution, and now we must focus on the details of that process ,” says Sunday.
“Research must turn to actually estimating rates of evolutionary change in different species.” Future work should zero
in on ecologically important species, find models that represent taxonomic or functional
groups, and consider interdependencies within the food web, according to the experts .
They also advise researchers to incorporate investigations of responses to additional
stressors, such as rising water temperatures, to studies.
New research funding is key
Woglom, 14 – Vice President, Conservation Policy and Programs, for Ocean Conservancy (Emily,
“Obama Pushes for Needed Boost in Ocean Funding,” The Blog Aquatic, 3/4/2014,
http://blog.oceanconservancy.org/2014/03/04/obama-pushes-for-needed-boost-in-oceanfunding/) //RGP
The White House released President Obama’s budget proposal for fiscal year 2015 today. The proposal appears to be good news for
the ocean and a great first step toward strong funding for ocean-health programs next year. Of course, the budget documents that
the administration released today are only part of the picture. They detail the big-picture, top-level budget numbers with only a
small number of details, and individual program budgets won’t be released until later. So what can we tell from what has been
released so far? Last year,
we focused on some key questions to help decide how the ocean is
faring in the federal budget process. In particular, we asked whether the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s (NOAA) top-line budget number is sufficient, and whether there was appropriate balance between NOAA’s “wet”
ocean and “dry” non-ocean missions. When
it comes to NOAA’s overall budget numbers, things look
pretty good. Regarding the balance between wet and dry missions, the single biggest increase goes to the satellite line office,
but the National Ocean Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service both see healthy increases as well. We will not know
details until additional numbers are released, but we do not see any red flags to suggest that things are way out of balance. Here are
some key takeaways based on what we know today: Overall
NOAA Funding Looks Strong: The White
House demonstrated support for increased funding at NOAA. NOAA programs lead
cutting-edge research on ocean health and support smart ocean management. NOAA is
also the central agency tasked with ending overfishing. While NOAA’s FY 2014 funding level is an
improvement over FY 2013’s abysmal sequestration level, the proposal from the White House shows how far we still have to go: It
calls for a $174 million increase over FY 2014, recommending $5.5 billion in funding for NOAA in FY 2015. Ocean
Acidification Research Funding Sees a Big Increase: Notably, the president’s budget
would provide a much-needed $15 million for ocean acidification research, an increase
of $9 million. As the ocean absorbs the carbon dioxide we put into the atmosphere by burning fossil fuels, the carbon
dioxide is changing the chemistry of the ocean and adversely impacting marine life . This
is already having serious economic effects on shellfish growers and others who make
their living from the sea. This money would help us better understand the problem and
devise solutions that protect coastal economies. Administration-Wide Attention to Climate Change: The
new budget also establishes a Climate Resilience Fund. While we have yet to see specific details on how
this fund will be distributed, it is designed to help states and citizens adapt. NOAA should have a
critical role to play here. NOAA provides the services coastal communities need to be
storm-ready and prepared for changing ocean conditions as well as changing economics.
NOAA should be at the frontline of the Administration’s resilience efforts. We hope to
see resources from the Climate Resilience Fund support NOAA initiatives and
partnerships. Gulf of Mexico Restoration: This is also the first budget that reflects money coming into NOAA under the
RESTORE Act, which directs certain fines and penalties from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil disaster to restoration and science in the
Gulf of Mexico. NOAA will manage 2.5 percent of overall RESTORE funding for science, monitoring and technology needs, consistent
with the Science Plan Framework just released in December 2013. NOAA, along with other federal agencies and the Gulf states, is
steadily making headway toward implementing the RESTORE Act. This work will provide a solid foundation as restoration of the Gulf
under RESTORE moves forward. It may be a few weeks before we know more about the president’s proposals for specific ocean
programs, from fisheries stock assessments to grants for Regional Ocean Partnerships. But considering
the top-line
NOAA funding proposal, we feel confident that ocean priorities will be strongly
supported in the coming year. While NOAA’s FY 2014 funding level is an improvement over FY 2013’s abysmal
sequestration level, the proposal from the White House shows how far we still have to go: It calls for a $174 million increase over FY
2014, recommending $5.5 billion in funding for NOAA in FY 2015.
Case
Solvency - OTEC
Energy Conversion
OTEC is inefficient at energy conversion
Matsutani and Takahashi 01 [S. M. and P. K. University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu
Copyright ^ 2001 Academic Press “OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION (OTEC)”
http://curry.eas.gatech.edu/Courses/6140/ency/Chapter2/Ency_Oceans/OTEC.pdf //]
OTEC power systems operate as cyclic heat engines.¶ They receive thermal energy through heat transfer¶ from surface sea water
warmed by the sun, and¶ transform a portion of this energy to electrical¶ power. The Second Law of Thermodynamics precludes the
complete conversion of thermal energy in¶ to electricity. A portion of the heat extracted from¶ the warm sea water must be rejected
to a colder¶ thermal sink. The thermal sink employed by OTEC¶ systems is sea water drawn from the ocean depths¶ by means of a
submerged pipeline. A steady-state¶ control volume energy analysis yields the result that¶ net electrical power produced by the
engine must¶ equal the difference between the rates of heat transfer from the warm surface water and to the cold¶ deep water.
The limiting (i.e., maximum) theoretical¶ Carnot energy conversion efficiency of a cyclic heat
engine scales with the difference between the temperatures at which these heat
transfers occur. For¶ OTEC, this difference is determined by ¶ ∆T and is¶ very small; hence, OTEC efficiency is
low. Although¶ viable OTEC systems are characterized by Carnot¶ efficiencies in the range of 6}8%, state-of-the-art¶ combustion
steam power cycles, which tap much¶ higher temperature energy sources, are theoretically¶ capable of converting more than 60%
of the¶ extracted thermal energy into electricity.¶ The
low energy conversion efficiency of OTEC¶ means
that more than 90% of the thermal energy¶ extracted from the ocean’s surface is
‘wasted’ and¶ must be rejected to the cold, deep sea water. This¶ necessitates large heat
exchangers and seawater¶ flow rates to produce relatively small amounts of¶ electricity.¶
In spite of its inherent inefficiency, OTEC, unlike¶ conventional fossil energy systems, utilizes a renewable resource and poses
minimal threat to the¶ environment. In fact, it has been suggested that¶ widespread adoption of OTEC could yield tangible¶
environmental benefits through avenues such as reduction of greenhouse gas CO2¶ emissions; enhanced¶ uptake of atmospheric
CO2¶ by marine organism¶ populations sustained by the nutrient-rich, deep¶ OTEC sea water; and preservation of corals and¶
hurricane amelioration by limiting temperature rise¶ in the surface ocean through energy extraction and¶ artificial upwelling of deep
water.¶ Carnot efficiency applies only to an ideal heat¶ engine. In real power generation systems, irreversibilities will further
degrade performance. Given
its¶ low theoretical efficiency, successful implementation¶ of OTEC
power generation demands careful engineering to minimize irreversibilities. Although OTEC¶
consumes what is essentially a free resource, poor¶ thermodynamic performance will reduce the¶
quantity of electricity available for sale and, hence,¶ negatively affect the economic
feasibility of an¶ OTEC facility.¶ An OTEC heat engine may be configured following designs by J.A. D’Arsonval, the
French engineer¶ who Rrst proposed the OTEC concept in 1881, or¶ G. Claude, D’Arsonval’s former student. Their designs are
known, respectively, as closed cycle and¶ open cycle OTEC.
Not feasible—too much energy waste
Masutani and Takahashi, 2001
[S. M. Masutani and P. K. Takahashi, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, HI, USA, Ocean
Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC),
http://curry.eas.gatech.edu/Courses/6140/ency/Chapter2/Ency_Oceans/OTEC.pdf]
The low energy conversion efficiency of OTEC¶ means that more than 90% of the
thermal energy¶ extracted from the ocean’s surface is ‘wasted’ and¶ must be rejected to the cold,
deep sea water. This¶ necessitates large heat exchangers and seawater¶ Sow rates to produce relatively small amounts of¶
electricity.¶ In spite of its inherent inefRciency, OTEC, unlike¶ conventional fossil energy systems, utilizes a renewable resource and
poses minimal threat to the¶ environment. In fact, it has been suggested that¶ widespread adoption of OTEC could yield tangible¶
environmental beneRts through avenues such as reduction of greenhouse gas CO2¶ emissions; enhanced¶ uptake of atmospheric
CO2¶ by marine organism¶ populations sustained by the nutrient-rich, deep¶ OTEC sea water; and preservation of corals and¶
hurricane amelioration by limiting temperature rise¶ in the surface ocean through energy extraction and¶ artiRcial upwelling of deep
water.¶ Carnot efficiency applies only to an ideal heat¶ engine.
In real power generation systems,
irreversibilities will further degrade performance. Given its¶ low theoretical efficiency,
successful implementation¶ of OTEC power generation demands careful engineering to
minimize irreversibilities. Although OTEC¶ consumes what is essentially a free resource, poor¶
thermodynamic performance will reduce the¶ quantity of electricity available for sale
and, hence,¶ negatively affect the economic feasibility of an¶ OTEC facility.¶ An OTEC heat
engine may be configured following designs by J.A. D’Arsonval, the French engineer¶ who Rrst proposed the OTEC concept in 1881,
or¶ G. Claude, D’Arsonval’s former student. Their designs are known, respectively, as closed cycle and¶ open cycle OTEC.
Costs
OTEC operation costs tons of money
Matsutani and Takahashi 01 [S. M. and P. K. University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu
Copyright ^ 2001 Academic Press “OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION (OTEC)”
http://curry.eas.gatech.edu/Courses/6140/ency/Chapter2/Ency_Oceans/OTEC.pdf //]
Studies conducted to date on the economic feasibility of OTEC systems suffer from the
lack of reliable¶ cost data. Commercialization of the technology is¶ unlikely until a fullscale plant is constructed and¶ operated continuously over an extended period to¶
provide these data on capital and personnel and¶ maintenance expenses.¶ Uncertainties in
financial analyses notwithstanding, projections suggest very high first costs for¶ OTEC power system
components. Small land-based¶ or near-shore floating plants in the 1}10 MW range,¶ which would probably be constructed in
rural¶ island communities, may require expenditures¶ of $10 000}$20000 (in 1995 US dollars) per kW¶ of installed generating
capacity. Although there¶ appears to be favorable economies of scale, larger¶ floating (closed cycle) plants in the 50}100 MW¶ range
are still anticipated to cost about¶ $5000kW¶ 1¶ . This is well in excess of the¶ $1000}$2000kW¶ 1¶ of fossil fuel power stations.¶ To
enhance the economics of OTEC power stations, various initiatives have been proposed based¶ on marketable OTEC by- or coproducts. OTEC¶ proponents believe that the first commercial OTEC¶ plants will be shore-based systems designed for use¶ in
developing Pacific island nations, where potable¶ water is in short supply. Many of these sites would¶ be receptive to opportunities
for economic growth¶ provided by OTEC-related industries.
Cost¶ The
high construction and maintenance cost are the major deterrents in using OTEC
as a renewable power source. The cost of producing electricity by an OTEC unit is
approximately $0.07 per KW-hour. Developing countries lack the resource for
constructing OTEC plants.¶ Political concerns¶ The floating OTEC plants are essentially artificial islands. Location of
these facilities on the sea might lead to political debates regarding the jurisdiction of the
region. The boundary disputed that might erupt would inhibit utilization of the solar
energy trapped in the seawater.¶ Why are we so critical?¶ The major criticism against the OTEC plant is the
exorbitant cost of constructing the infrastructure for the facilities. The huge investment needed for building
the OTEC plants would create a dearth of resources that might be otherwise used for
financing the social sector.
Super expensive and commercialization is farther off than 2020
The Economist, 7-7-12
[Power from the sea Second time around…, http://www.economist.com/node/21542381]
The actual experiment, though, is on Hawaii, where Lockheed
is collaborating with a smaller firm, Makai
Ocean Engineering, to build a ten megawatt (MW) pilot plant that should be operational
by 2015. If that goes well, the idea is to follow it with a 100MW power station by 2020.¶
For this, however, a new piece of kit will be needed. The heat exchangers and pipework required to make a 10MW
plant already exist, but the 100MW facility will need a pipe that is not only 1km long (in order to reach the
cold water at depth) but ten metres in diameter (in order to bring enough of that cold water to the surface).
This is quite some pipe, and it will also have to be rugged enough to survive for decades in the
open ocean. Nor will it be cheap. Kerry Kehoe, the current head of OTEC activities at NOAA, estimates such a
facility could cost $1 billion.
Building a OTEC plant isn’t financially sound due to high overhead costs.
Economist ‘12(January 7. “Second time
around…”http://www.economist.com/node/21542381)
EVEN by the standards of American bureaucracy, an organisation that operated for 13 years
without achieving anything is impressive. Yet that was the fate of the Ocean Thermal Energy
Conversion (OTEC) permit office, which opened its doors in 1981 and closed them in 1994,
having issued not a single OTEC permit.¶ The office was part of NOAA, America's National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration—a marine counterpart of the country's space agency,
NASA. And the idea of OTEC was to exploit the difference in temperature between the top of
the ocean and the bottom, in order to drive turbines and generate electricity. The incentive was
the oil-price spike of the 1970s. But once that incentive went away, so did interest in alternative
sources of power and, eventually, so too did the office.¶ Alternative power sources are back in
fashion, though, and OTEC is one of them. A range of companies, from giants such as Lockheed
Martin to minnows like the Ocean Thermal Energy Corporation of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, are
working on the technology, and this time it might actually come to pass. Most of the bits and
pieces required can be borrowed from other areas of engineering, such as deepwater oil drilling.
And the idea of a power station whose fuel is free is attractive, as long as the capital cost is not
too high.¶ The most common OTEC design uses a fluid with a low boiling point—typically
ammonia—which circulates through a network of pipes. First, it is vaporised in a heat exchanger
that is warmed by surface water with a temperature of around 25°C. That puts the gas under
sufficient pressure to spin a turbine and thus generate electricity. When it has done so, the gas
is sent to a second heat exchanger, where it is cooled by seawater that has been pumped from a
depth of a kilometre or so, where the temperature is about 5°C. That condenses it back into a
liquid, and the whole process can be repeated. Theoretically, then, an OTEC plant can be built
anywhere that the ocean has a surface temperature above 25°C and is more than 1km deep.¶
Fortunately for the technology's supporters, that state of affairs pertains in several places of
interest to America's Defence Department. These include Guam, in the Pacific Ocean, and Diego
Garcia, in the Indian Ocean. Both islands host American bases, and even in these straitened
times the Pentagon's budget can stretch to an experimental technology that might reduce a
base's fuel consumption.¶ The actual experiment, though, is on Hawaii, where Lockheed is
collaborating with a smaller firm, Makai Ocean Engineering, to build a ten megawatt (MW) pilot
plant that should be operational by 2015. If that goes well, the idea is to follow it with a 100MW
power station by 2020.¶ For this, however, a new piece of kit will be needed. The heat
exchangers and pipework required to make a 10MW plant already exist, but the 100MW facility
will need a pipe that is not only 1km long (in order to reach the cold water at depth) but ten
metres in diameter (in order to bring enough of that cold water to the surface). This is quite
some pipe, and it will also have to be rugged enough to survive for decades in the open ocean.
Nor will it be cheap. Kerry Kehoe, the current head of OTEC activities at NOAA, estimates such a
facility could cost $1 billion.¶ A more modest project is planned by the Ocean Thermal Energy
Corporation. It has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Bahamian government to
build a fully commercial OTEC plant. Initially, cold water will be pumped from the ocean depths
to provide cooling for a holiday resort—a project that will cost $100m. Eventually, the plan is to
turn this into a full-fledged 10MW power station. Bolting cooling facilities onto an OTEC
generator, and also using some of the resulting power for desalination on islands like the
Bahamas that are short of fresh water, helps tip the economic balance in favour of OTEC.¶ The
Caribbean, indeed, seems a popular place to try the technology out. The first OTEC plant, built in
1930, was at Matanzas Bay, just across the Florida straits from the Bahamas, in Cuba. That
successfully produced 22kW, though it was eventually destroyed by wind and waves. A mere
eight decades later, the technology may at last come to fruition.
Costs inhibit OTEC from being a viable market option
Choi, writer for Live Science, 8 (Charles Q. Choi, 12/12/08, “The Energy Debates: Ocean
Thermal Energy Conversion,” Live Science, http://www.livescience.com/3155-energy-debatesocean-thermal-energy-conversion.html, Terry Penney is a lab program manager at the National
Renewable Energy Laboratory in Golden, Colorado.)
Ocean thermal energy conversion requires a lot of money up front since the devices are
massive undertakings, Penney explained. The pipes have to be wide or else the deep seawater
rushes up too fast, heating up as it rubs against the sides — an intolerable consequence, since
it needs to be cold. To get the cold water necessary, the pipes also have to extend down
thousands of feet. Keeping the plants operating in the face of the corrosive saltwater
environment and organic matter that inevitably clogs up the works could prove challenging
also. "And for all that investment, you don't know if two months after you deploy it whether a
tropical storm will then wipe it out," Penney said. Still, "the oil industry clearly knows how to
put structures in place in the ocean and drill down to 15,000 feet. The technology is there — it
could just be very costly." The environmental impact of OTEC remains murky. While nutrients
in cold water from the deep could help aquaculture farms prosper, one question is whether they
might also help unwanted life to grow as well. "And if you're pumping up billions of gallons
from the depths, what might it change there?" Penney asked. "There's life down there too."
Equipment
Temperature differential limits OTEC, not viable everywhere
Upshaw, 12
[Charles Roberts Upshaw, B.S.M.E., “Thermodynamic and Economic Feasibility Analysis of a 20
MW Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC) Power Plant,” Master’s thesis for Master of
Science in Engineering at University of Texas, May 2012, http://www.otecnews.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/OTEC-thesis-university-of-Texas-UPSHAW.pdf]
Generally, for
OTEC to be a viable power generation option for a location, there are a few basic constraints.
The first and most important is the temperature differential of the ocean water nearby; even
if the surface temperature is very warm, OTEC might not be viable if there is a lack of a
cold water heat sink. The lack of cold-water resources is the limiting factor for areas such
as the Middle East, where water temperatures can approach 90 ̊F on occasion, but the seas
are shallow and so the water near the bottom is still quite warm. Another constraint is the cost of electricity for
the area. For an island community like Hawaii, which is in a very remote location, the cost of generating power is much higher than
the cost on the main land because fuel and equipment must be shipped halfway across the Pacific ocean. The high cost of power for
island communities offers a potential opportunity for OTEC developers to build a smaller-scale pilot plant that would still be
financially viable for electricity generation.
Placement
OTEC use is limited by a laundry list of location requirements
DOE 12
(Department of Energy: Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP), "Ocean Energy," 8/24/2012,
http://www.wbdg.org/resources/oceanenergy.php)
Economics¶ The following provides specific information on the economic factors to consider for each type of ocean energy system.¶
Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion:¶ The economics of energy production have delayed
the financing of a permanent, continuously operating ocean thermal energy conversion
plant. Scientists are developing new, cost-effective turbines for open-cycle ocean thermal energy conversion systems.¶
Favored locations for ocean thermal energy conversion plants include those with narrow
shelves, steep offshore slopes, and smooth sea floors. These sites minimize the length of the pipes, and
create easy access for construction and maintenance, which helps to lower the cost of ocean thermal energy conversion-generated
electricity. Ocean thermal energy conversion processing plants that produce methanol, ammonia, hydrogen, and other chemicals do
not require a power cable, and station operation and maintenance (O&M) costs are reduced.¶ Wave¶ Economically,
wave
power systems have a hard time competing with traditional power sources. However, the costs
to produce wave energy are coming down. Some European experts predict that wave power devices will find lucrative niche
markets. Once built, they have low operation and maintenance costs because the fuel they use—seawater—is free.¶ It has been
estimated that improving technology and economies of scale will allow wave generators to produce electricity at a cost comparable
to wind-driven turbines, which produce energy at about $0.45 per kilowatt hour. For now, the best wave generator technology in
the United Kingdom is currently producing energy at an average projected / assessed cost of $0.75 per kilowatt hour.¶ Resolving
intermittency problems to attain reliable energy output can double and even triple the
cost of power. The key to reliability and economy of operation is site selection based on good site research.¶ Tidal¶ There
is a high capital cost for a tidal energy project, with possibly a 10–year construction
period. The capital required to start construction of a barrage is the main economic
barrier, with long payback periods. The optimum design would produce the most power while minimizing the size
of the barrage.¶ Tidal stream technology is still in the development stages, and therefore is not economically feasible.
The cost of using these technologies is very site specific and dependent upon the
turbine technology used. Maintenance costs are significant throughout the lifetime of
tidal stream technology.
OTEC fails – requires large temperature differences that are rare around the US
Combs 8 (Susan, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, The Energy Report 2008,
http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/energy/pdf/20-OceanPower.pdf, May 2008)
Finally, ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC)¶ is the least accessible form of ocean power,
and¶ perhaps the least useful for the U.S. To work,¶ OTEC needs an optimal temperature diff
erence¶ between warm water on the surface and colder¶ water below of about 36°F—a range
found only in¶ tropical coastal areas near the equator. In the U.S.,¶ OTEC research and testing is
taking place in¶ Hawaii. Th e cold water is brought to the surface¶ by a deeply submerged intake
pipe.¶ Researchers have developed two diff erent types¶ of OTEC and a third that is a hybrid of
the other¶ two; all use the thermal energy stored in seawater¶ to power a steam turbine. Closedcycle OTEC uses¶ warm seawater to vaporize a low-boiling point¶ liquid that then drives a turbine
to generate electricity.¶ (Th is approach is similar to the binary cycle¶ method of geothermal
generation.) Th e vaporized¶ liquid then is cooled and condensed back to liquid¶ with cold
seawater, and the cycle repeats. Open-cycle¶ OTEC gets warm seawater to boil through lowered¶
pressure and uses the resulting steam to drive the¶ turbine. Once again, cold water from the
deep converts¶ the steam back to (now desalinated) water.¶ Th e hybrid method uses the steam
from boiled seawater¶ to vaporize a low-boiling point liquid, which¶ then drives the turbine.11 In
concept, these systems¶ are quite simple, but in practice the depths and¶ scale that are required
to eff ectively harness¶ OTEC have been prohibitive.
OTEC unfeasible – not enough proper sites in the US for it, and too expensive
Crews, 97 (Richard Crews, financial specialist and writer, 12/28/97, “OTEC Sites,”
http://www.trellis.demon.co.uk/reports/otec_sites.html)
An OTEC facility requires a substantial initial capital outlay (in the range of $50 to $100 million
for a “small” ten-megawatt plant). OTEC has not been demonstrated at full scale over a
prolonged period with integrated power, mariculture, fresh-water, and chill-water production.
OTEC is only feasible at relatively isolated sites (deep tropical oceans); from such sites, the
power and marine products must be transported to market. (In general, the fresh water--and
certainly the chill-water--cannot be transported more than a few miles economically.) OTEC is
ecologically controversial --at least untested--in large scale and over a long period.
Misc
NOAA has no credibility with the hill
Cuddy 12 [Don, “NOAA comes under criticism again, this time over National Weather Service
funding” June 5, 2012,
http://www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20120605/NEWS/206050318/101
8/OPINION //]
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and its embattled head Dr. Jane Lubchenco are
again the target of criticism after the director of the National Weather Service, Jack
Hayes, resigned abruptly on Memorial Day weekend.¶ An environmental watchdog group, Public
Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER), informed the Washington Post when it learned that Hayes had
been replaced and the story has since been widely reported.¶ An internal investigation has uncovered
ongoing financial irregularities at the weather service, according to a NOAA memo. In fiscal 2012
alone, up to $35 million may have been "reprogrammed," the term employed by NOAA to describe what
has taken place, the memo said.¶ "This is a case of robbing Peter to pay Paul," said Jeff Ruch, executive director of PEER, a national
organization of federal, state and local employees who work in the environmental field. Structural deficits were built into the
National Weather Service budget according to Ruch. "They
were using appropriated funds to backfill
general operations in a sort of budgetary Ponzi scheme," he said.¶ A 60-page report produced by NOAA
found that, for at least the past two years, the agency has been shifting appropriated funds
from a number of its designated programs and using them to cover other expenses and
to help avoid employee furloughs, according to Ruch.¶ Using appropriated funds for any
purpose other than what is intended is a violation of the Anti Deficiency Act and that is a
crime, he said.¶ Previous investigations into NOAA's handling of fishery management in
New England and a further scandal surrounding widespread misuse of funds at its Office
of Law Enforcement led Sen. Scott Brown, among others, to call for Lubchenco's removal as NOAA chief.
Brown, R-Mass., renewed that demand Monday.¶ "It's clear that Administrator Lubchenco's failure to lead and hold her agency
accountable goes beyond fisheries issues," said Brown in an email to The Standard-Times. "This is more proof of the need for change
at NOAA. As I have said repeatedly over the last several months, Administrator Lubchenco should be fired."¶ Harry Gural, a
spokesman for U.S. Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., said the congressman was "disturbed" over the latest revelations. Gural said Frank,
who has been a frequent critic of Lubchenco on fisheries issues, would withhold further comment until he learned more.¶ NOAA
has released a number of statements to contain the fallout from the latest scandal but
continues to withhold the contents of the report.¶ "The investigation found no evidence of corruption or
personal financial gain," said Scott Smullen, NOAA's deputy director of communications, in an email. Expenses were transferred
improperly, he acknowledged. "But those expenses were used for legitimate NWS services and functions. We do not believe any
money was moved out of the National Weather Service."¶ National Weather Service employees were attempting to protect parts of
the budget that, in their mind, were chronically underfunded, he said. NOAA is citing privacy issues for its failure to make the report
public. "It is now being redacted and will be released later," Smullen said.¶ Ruch speculated that NOAA's
fiscal woes
stem from the cost of operating a new generation of weather satellites. "It sounds like they have
a hungry cannibal in their fiscal closet," he said. "NOAA has been having a disastrous budgetary season
and with this on top of it, their credibility on the Hill is less than zero."¶ Smullen also declined
comment on whether any disciplinary action is contemplated against National Weather Service employees.¶ "Due to Privacy Act
restrictions, I am unable to discuss specifics of any current personnel actions or those that may happen in the future. Appropriate
disciplinary actions are under way," he said.¶ NOAA also announced it will now hire an independent accounting firm to conduct an
audit covering the last six years of the National Weather Service budget.
NOAA’s climate report is false
Corneliussen 1/16 [Steven T., media analyst for the American Institute of Physics, monitors
three national newspapers, the weeklies Nature and Science, and occasionally other
publications. He has published op-eds in the Washington Post and other newspapers, has
written for NASA's history program, and is a science writer at a particle-accelerator laboratory.
January 16, 2013 “NOAA’s climate overview for 2012 draws media skepticism” Physics Today
http://www.physicstoday.org/daily_edition/science_and_the_media/noaa_s_hot-48states_announcement_for_2012_draws_media_skepticism //]
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's 8 January "State of the Climate National Overview" began, "In 2012, the
contiguous United States...average annual temperature of 55.3 °F was 3.2 °F above the 20th century average, and was the warmest
year in the 1895–2012 period of record for the nation." A graph vividly illustrated the second sentence, which said, "The 2012 annual
temperature was 1.0 °F warmer than the previous record warm year of 1998." NOAA's
news drew lots of media
attention, including criticism on statistical and technical grounds from a Wall Street
Journal columnist and from Fox News.¶ The WSJ columnist, Holman W. Jenkins Jr, has long objected to scientists' climate
consensus. His recent column even mentions his belief that "global warming has ceased in our time ." That
column argues two main points under the headline "Our 'hottest year' and Al Gore's epic failure: Its moment has come, but the
global warming lobby is too discredited to seize it."¶ One main point is that former vice president Al Gore allegedly has many
deficiencies—he asserts moral superiority, denounces people, makes false assertions, and exhibits self-delusion, sanctimony, selfdiscrediting hysteria, exaggerations, self-righteousness, and foolishness. The headline's scare quotes on the phrase hottest year
telegraph the other main point. Jenkins charges that consensus-enthralled
journalists have hyped the
significance of NOAA's news. He neither uses nor mentions any graphs, but his argument amounts to an attempt to
debunk the vividness in NOAA's graph showing that 1.0 °F jump.¶ Online, the column has a video sidebar in which editorial
writer Anne Jolis tells "what conclusions to draw" from NOAA's report. With the title "Climate-change hot air" superimposed,
Jolis amplifies Jenkins's skepticism about the import of NOAA's news. ¶ She also adds
skepticism about data validity, the criticism emphasized by Fox News under the headline "Hottest year ever? Skeptics
question revisions to climate data."¶ Unlike Jenkins, Fox grants that scientists, and not just reporters, say that "breaking such records
by a full degree is unprecedented." But the network quotes Roy
Spencer, a climatologist at the University of Alabama
[wasn't] necessarily warmer than it was back in the 1930s...NOAA has made
so many adjustments to the data it's ridiculous." Fox also quotes:¶ * A climate blogger, Steve Goddard, who
charges that the "adjusted data is meaningless garbage."¶ * Blogger and meteorologist Anthony Watts, who
asserts that in "the business and trading world, people go to jail for such manipulations of
data."¶ At Ars Technica, the article "False balance: Fox News demands a recount on US' warmest year" mocks the Fox report with
in Huntsville: "2012
the allusive subhead "Is that just math you do as a skeptic to make yourself feel better?" The sarcasm operates by calling to mind a
much-lampooned election-night question posed by Fox's Megyn Kelly.¶ The Ars Technica article charges that by news-policy
directive, Fox automatically questions temperature data in climate reporting even if the only other questioners "are out past the
fringes of the scientific community." It calls the Fox report "a classic example of what's been termed 'false balance'" in that Fox
"presents experts with relevant experience and the official word from NOAA,
but...simultaneously surrounds them with quotes from several people who aren't
scientists—as well as one scientist who is a notable contrarian about other fields of
science."¶ At the blog RealClimate.org in 2005, scientists began criticizing what they called "the false objectivity of 'balance,'"
condemning as "indefensible" the allotment to "contrarians" of "equal time or space in public discourse on climate change out of a
sense of need for journalistic 'balance.'" But it's clear that in this case, Ars Technica sees false balance arising out of something less
innocent than routine journalistic instinct.
Costs, risks, and lack of public support prevent OTEC success
Friedman 14
Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion,” source from Harvard Political Review, Ocean Energy
Council, 03/14, http://www.oceanenergycouncil.com/examining-future-ocean-thermal-energyconversion/)
Despite the sound science, a fully functioning OTEC prototype has yet to be developed. The
high costs of building even a model pose the main barrier. Although piecemeal experiments
have proven the effectiveness of the individual components, a large-scale plant has never been
built. Luis Vega of the Pacific International Center for High Technology Research estimated in an
OTEC summary presentation that a commercial-size five-megawatt OTEC plant could cost from
80 to 100 million dollars over five years. According to Terry Penney, the Technology Manager at
the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, the combination of cost and risk is OTEC’s main
liability. “We’ve talked to inventors and other constituents over the years, and it’s still a matter
of huge capital investment and a huge risk, and there are many [alternate forms of energy]
that are less risky that could produce power with the same certainty,” Penney told the HPR.¶
Moreover, OTEC is highly vulnerable to the elements in the marine environment. Big storms or
a hurricane like Katrina could completely disrupt energy production by mangling the OTEC
plants. Were a country completely dependent on oceanic energy, severe weather could be
debilitating. In addition, there is a risk that the salt water surrounding an OTEC plant would
cause the machinery to “rust or corrode” or “fill up with seaweed or mud,” according to a
National Renewable Energy Laboratory spokesman.¶ Even environmentalists have impeded
OTEC’s development. According to Penney, people do not want to see OTEC plants when they
look at the ocean. When they see a disruption of the pristine marine landscape, they think
pollution.
Storms and tech issues prevent OTEC development
Coastal Response Research Center 9 (The Coastal Response Research Center, a
partnership between the National¶ Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Office of
Response and Restoration¶ (ORR) and the University of New Hampshire (UNH), develops new
approaches to¶ marine environmental response and restoration through research and synthesis
of¶ information. In 2009, the center partnered with NOAA’s Office of Ocean and Coastal¶
Resource Management (OCRM) to host a series of workshops to gather information¶ about
Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC)., “Technical Readiness of¶ Ocean Thermal Energy
Conversion (OTEC),” November 3 – 5, 2009,
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/otec/docs/otectech1109.pdf)
One of the most important challenges with the platform mooring is preventing marine fouling
of the mooring line and hardware. Excessive fouling may impact the integrity of the mooring
lines, and increase drag resulting in higher loading. Most platform moorings are near shore,
while OTEC platforms are likely to be in very deep water and are exposed to high sea
conditions, which may present design challenges. Another significant challenge will be the
requirement to disconnect and recover the moorings in case of extreme storms. Mobilization
and deployment were identified as the riskiest part of the platform mooring life cycle.
Potential issues include: inability to deploy effectively and safely, significant delay in startup,
additional costs, or complete system failure. Cost drivers include need for spare components,
site conditions, weather, water depth, installation complexity, material costs, performance
requirements, installation risk and insurance, labor costs, permitting and regulations, removal
and decommissioning costs and requirements. Cost savings could be realized through mooring
optimization (single point vs. multipoint), coordination and optimization of platform design, less
stringent motion and survivability requirements, citing, mitigating high cost factors, and the
ability to self-install.
Biofouling will destroy OTEC
Satpathy et al. 10 (from Environmental and Industrial Safety Section, Indira Gandhi Centre
for Atomic Research, Loyola Institute of Frontier Energy, “Biofouling and its control in¶ seawater
cooled power plant¶ cooling water system - a review,” www.intechopen.com,
http://www.intechopen.com/books/nuclear-power/biofouling-and-its-control-in-seawatercooled-power-plant-cooling-water-system-a-review-, 08/17/10)
Biofouling may be defined as the attachment and subsequent growth of a community of¶ usually
visible plants and animals on manmade structures exposed to seawater¶ environment. Man has
long been aware of this problem. In the fourth century B.C., Aristotle¶ is reported to have stated
that small “fish” (barnacles) were able to slow down ships.¶ Fouling of ship hulls, navigational
buoys, underwater equipment, seawater piping systems,¶ industrial or municipal intakes, beach
well structures, oil rigs and allied structures has often¶ been reported. In the past few decades,
the list of affected structures has expanded. Now,¶ reports are common regarding the
biofouling that affects Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion¶ (OTEC) plants, offshore platforms,
moored oceanographic instruments and nuclear and¶ other submarines. The impact of
biofouling on sea front structures is staggering. Ships show¶ a 10% higher fuel consumption
caused by increased drag and frictional resistance resulting¶ from hull and propeller fouling.
Water lines lose their carrying capacity and speed of flow¶ owing to biofouling growth along
pipe systems. The heat exchanger performance declines¶ due to attachment of biofoulants.
Many marine organisms themselves face the constant¶ problem of being colonized and
overgrown by fouling organisms. Immobile plants and¶ animals are generally exposed to
biofouling and consequent loss of species and community¶ assemblages. Biofouling also
promotes corrosion of materials. The money and material¶ needed for fouling protection
measures are indeed exorbitant. It is estimated that the marine¶ industry incurs an
expenditure of 10 billion sterling pounds a year to combat the situations¶ arising from
biofouling worldwide (Satpathy, 1990). A lot of research effort has been¶ devoted to understand
the fundamental ecology and biology of fouling environments,¶ organisms and communities in
diverse settings.¶ The huge requirement of cooling water as well as accrescent demand on the
freshwater has¶ led to the natural choice for locating power plants in the coastal sites where
water is¶ available in copious amount at relatively cheap rate. For example, a 500 MW (e)
nuclear¶ power plant uses about 30 m3sec-1 of cooling water for extracting heat from the
condenser¶ and other auxiliary heat exchanger systems for efficient operation of the plant.
However,¶ use of seawater, brings associated problems such as colonization of biota which
stands in¶ the way of smooth operation of the plant. Unfortunately, every cooling system with
its¶ concrete walls forms a suitable substrate for marine growth. Some of the conditions which¶
favour the development of a fouling community in power plants are (a) continuous flow of¶
seawater rich in oxygen & food, (b) reduction in silt deposition, (c) lack of competition from¶
other communities and (d) reduction in the density of predators. Broadly speaking the¶ effects
of marine growth on the power plant are (a) losses in plant efficiency, (b) mechanical ¶ damage
and (c) problem for the integrity of the cooling circuits needed for safety of nuclear¶ plants (Nair,
1987). Hence biofouling control aims to achieve efficient operation of the¶ power station at all
times. It is therefore necessary for power plant designers to make a¶ rational choice regarding
the most suitable control method to combat biofouling problem in¶ a practical, yet economically
feasible & environmentally acceptable manner.
Poor licensing process prevents OTEC development
Combs 8 (Susan Combs, The Energy Report: Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts May 2008,
http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/energy/pdf/20-OceanPower.pdf)
Ocean power generation falls under the Federal¶ Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC)¶
jurisdiction. Because the technology is so new,¶ however, applications for pilot projects have
been¶ anything but routine, with companies asking¶ for waivers of some licensing
requirements. In¶ particular, the applications require some data that¶ cannot be gathered
without installing and operating¶ the devices.¶ In 2005, FERC granted limited licensing
exceptions¶ for pilot projects, one in New¶ York, and preliminary permits for the study of
potential¶ sites off the Florida coast. The commission¶ also began to streamline its process for
permitting¶ ocean power projects.21 State regulations for such¶ facilities are similarly immature
and are likely to¶ be drawn from existing laws governing conventional¶ power plants and
electricity transmission.
Possible complications with equipment would prove detrimental
Finney, Environmental and Water Resource Analyst, 8 (Karen Anne Finney, “Ocean Thermal
Energy Conversion,” Guelph Engineering Journal,
http://www.soe.uoguelph.ca/webfiles/gej/articles/GEJ_001-017023_Finney_Ocean_Thermal_Energy.pdf)
Because the warm seawater is flash evaporated, it becomes desalinated and becomes pure
fresh water. This is a major advantage to this type of system as it can provide fresh water to
communities who are in shortage. Another major advantage is the fact that the working fluid is
not a potential threat to the environment. However there are several disadvantages to this
type of system. The first one being that the system must be carefully sealed to prevent leakage
into the system of atmospheric air. This would be detrimental to the system as it relies
completely on the pressure gradient to flash evaporate the warm seawater. The second
disadvantage is that the volume of working fluid required is much larger then that of the
closed-cycle as the actual usable steam produced is about 0.5% of the warm seawater used.
The final disadvantage is due to the gasses that are naturally present in the seawater.
Although this type of system is beneficial for removing the salt from the pure water, the system
also removes the gases that are dissolved into the water including carbon dioxide and
nitrogen gas. These gasses do not recondense when introduced to the cold seawater and
therefore become trapped in the system. This greatly reduces efficiency (Takahashi and
Trenka, 1996).
OTEC Warming Turn
OTEC is detrimental to the environment
Wilde 12 [P. “ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL OF OTEC ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS”
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 7/12/12
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4cj2h4t8 //]
The potential changes
in the oceanographic properties of sea water due¶ to OTEC pumping
operations are a major environmental concern" Because¶ large amounts of cold, deep water and warm
shallow water will be pumped¶ to the heat exchangers, likely at some third depth; parameters such as¶ temperature,
salinity, density, dissolved oxygen, nutrients, carbonates,¶ particulates, etc", will be
modified by mixing with ambient ocean water in¶ the vicinity of the eventual discharge"
Discharges in the photic zone¶ may cause biostimulation due to the increased nutrient
contribution from¶ the deep waters, with potential changes in either the size, relative abundance¶ or
species composition with respect to the resident marine population ¶ resulting in
secondary effects on the food web. Displacement of sea water¶ also could have toxic
effects on ambient species by the introduction of¶ trace chemical substances such as
trace metals, organic decay products,¶ etc", from other depths. Certain species, particularly
those with low¶ mobility, will be harmed by impingement/entrainment in the pumping system ¶
either by contract with the screens and walls of the pipe-heat exchanger¶ system or by
the pressure and temperature changes encountered in transit ¶ of the system from
intake to discharge. Surface discharges may produce¶ climatic effects by alteration of the
air/surface water temperature ratio"¶ Such an alteration, at sufficient scale such as in an OTEC park,
could affect¶ the microclimate by modification of locally generated winds and currents.¶
Long-term operation of a large number of OTEC plants could result in reduced ¶ available
heat due to the thermal extraction. Surface discharges also¶ could enhance the release
of CO2 and other gases dissolved in cold deep¶ waters with potential climatic effects for large scale
operations" This¶ is particularly true for open cycle systems where gases, even normally¶ dissolved in the surface ocean, must be
separated from vaporized sea water¶ so that gas bubbles do not impede plant efficiency" Such gases will be¶ vented into the
atmosphere potentially modifying the local microclimate¶ as discussed above. However, subsurface discharges below the surface¶
mixed layer in the pynocline could mitigate all or most of the potential¶ problems associated with surface discharges"¶ Chemical
pollution could result as functions of various OTEC plant¶ operations and maintenance procedures. Of
major concern are
biocides proposed to keep the system components clean of biological growth. There are
alternative¶ ways (various mechanical systems) to clean heat exchanger systems,¶ but these may not clean surfaces to the extent
necessary for efficient¶ operation. The major problem with biocides is the levels of concentration¶ needed to impede biological
growth in the system which
unquestionably¶ will affect organisms in the vicinity of the
discharge. Furthermore, if¶ chlorine is used as a biocide and ammonia as a vworking fluid, accidental¶ combinations
of these chemicals can produce compounds even more toxic to¶ ambient organisms than
the separate chemicals. Leaks of the working fluid¶ of a closed cycle system also will pollute
ambient ocean water. The¶ effects and chemical fate of proposed working fluid leaks into sea water¶ are not well
understood. Ammonia, for example, is a nutrient in proper¶ amounts and could stimulate marine growth complicating the
biofouling¶ problem. However, the excessive doses associated with a major leak is¶ is both toxic to marine and human life.
Chemical pollution also will be¶ produced by the corrosive effect of sea water passing
through the heat¶ exchanger system. Corrosion would produce metallic ions, and scale
particles¶ which could have direct toxic effects or long term effects through ¶
incorporation of corrosion products into the particulate food supply of ¶ marine
organisms through ·the process of bioaccumulation. The physical presence in the ocean of a structure the
size of an OTEC¶ system itself has an impact on the ocean. The structure of whatever configuration¶ will become an attractive
habitat for a wide range of organisms based¶ on experience from artificial reefs. The long-term effects of the structure¶ on the
environment will depend on the types, size, and abundance of the¶ organisms attracted to or attached to the structure and this will
modify¶ the local population. Regional effects on populations might occur by¶ either interference with, or modification of, nesting
habits or migration¶ pathvJays.¶
OTEC contributes to emissions and causes socio-legal- economic issues for
humans
Wilde 12 [P. “ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL OF OTEC ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS”
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 7/12/12
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4cj2h4t8 //]
The first three major classes of concerns chiefly dealt with impacts¶ on marine life. However, there
are human
consequences of OTEC operations¶ which are grouped here as socio-legal-economic issues. Worker safety is¶ of
prime concern regulated by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration¶ (OSHA) and the Coast Guard for strictly marine
occupational concerns.¶ Potential
work hazards are the chemicals used or produced by the OTEC
system¶ such as ammonia, chlorine, foul weather during marine operations, collision, ¶
and systems accidents. Because of the novelty of OTEC operations standard¶ safety procedures will be augmented by
procedures unique to OTEC. The¶ siting of OTEC facilities either in international waters or where
the downstream¶ effects of OTEC operations might intrude into international waters,¶
will raise the issues of international rights and responsibilities beyond ¶ those treated by
conventional maritime law and treaties. At present the ·law¶ of the sea is in a state of flux so that the resolution
of potential international¶ issues may be complicated and time-consuming. Probably multilateral¶ agreements or treaties among
concerned parties, as is done for fishing¶ rights, may be the interim solution of potential legal problems which may¶ impeded OTEC
operations. Finally, the
construction and operations of an¶ OTEC facility may affect existing
social and institutional structures. New¶ jobs will be created and shore-based 'boomtown" growth may occur with
its¶ associated impacts on housing, education, sanitation, etc. The electrical¶ energy produced by OTEC plants may be transmitted to
consumers either by A.C. or D.C. transmission lines. The
cable needed to transmit this power¶ could have
impacts on marine ecosystems at the sea bed and at the shoreline.¶ D.C. transmission will require
two converter facilities, one at sea and¶ one on shore, causing land use problems. If OTEC systems are used to¶
produce energy-intensive products, they will produce air/water emissions¶ typical of
those produced in similar land based industries.
OTEC causes massive CO2 release
NOAA, 1980
[U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office of
Ocean Minerals and Energy, Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Environmental Issues,
September, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CZIC-tk1056-o3-1980/html/CZIC-tk1056-o31980.htm]
Any effects
of ocean thermal energy conversion on the C02 balance between¶ the oceans and
atmosphere are of concern because of the role of C02 in long-¶ term weather changes. The C02 molecule serves a unique
role regarding the heat¶ balance of the Earth, having little effect on short wavelength solar radiation¶ teaching the Earth yet
absorbing longer wavelength radiation reemitted by the¶ Earth. This
is the basis of the concern referred to as
the "greenhouse" effect¶ when higher atmospheric C02 levels would result in a warming of global tempera-¶ tures due
to increased absorption of the longer wAvelength radiation. It is a¶ major concern regarding continued use of fossil fuels.¶
Atmospheric C02 exists in equilibrium with dissolved C02 in the oceans and ¶ other
aquatic systems. Within the ocean and other waters, carbon dioxide exists¶ in
equilibrium with the carbonate system which is composed of carbonic acid¶ (H2CO3), bicarbonate (HC03), and
carbonate (C03)¶ The saturation concentration of c02 is greater in the deeper, colder waters ¶
of the ocean than in the surface waters Thus, the operation of an OTEC plant¶ will bring
large Volumes Of C02 rich water to the surface where it may have a¶ potential effect the
amount Of co2 efflux from a 400-MW OtEC configuration¶ has been estimated to be about onefourth of
that which would be released from¶ a coal-fired plant of equivalent capacity. Although there is some concern that¶ the release
could have potential regional effects large-scale climate effects¶ are not anticipated.
Turns the advantage—causes warming and ocean acidification
CRRC, 2012
[Coastal Response Research Center, University of New Hampshire, Ocean Thermal Energy
Conversion: Information needs assessment,
http://www.crrc.unh.edu/publications/OTEC%20Needs%20Assessment%20Revision%20FINAL.p
df]
The transport of water from the deep ocean to the surface will also likely result in the
release of ¶ dissolved gases due to the change in partial pressure. Of most concern is the
release of carbon ¶ dioxide, resulting in localized ocean acidification and consumption of
buffering agents. Very ¶ little is known about the long-term impacts of transport of water from the deep ocean to the ¶ surface and
resultant changes to the chemical properties of the water. Thorough analysis and ¶ modeling may be required to gain a better
understanding of the
volume of carbon dioxide ¶ released to the atmosphere as a greenhouse
gas, the extent of ocean acidification, and ¶ consumption of buffering agents.
OTEC study proves upwelling causes warming and ecosystem change
Krishnakumar and Nihous 13
[Krishnakumar Rajagopalan, Post Doctoral Researcher, National Marine Renewable Energy
Center in Hawaii, and Gérard C. Nihous, Associate Professor Dept. of Ocean and Resources
Engineering University of Hawaii, “Estimates of global Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC)
resources using an ocean general circulation model,” Renewable Energy, February 2013,
ScienceDirect]
While under maximal OTEC net power production, a cooling of the upper ocean across tropical regions may
be viewed as potentially beneficial, the corresponding warming trend elsewhere is worrisome. Regions of intense
coastal upwelling appear to experience a significant warming, as shown in Fig. 4 along the
west coasts of the Americas and, to a lesser degree, of Africa. Significant warming periodically occurs in Peruvian and
Chilean coastal waters during El Niño events, with equally significant environmental consequences for the local food web. During El
Niño, however, local
upwelling processes weaken considerably and relatively warm offshore
water moves (horizontally) toward the coast; this water is also depleted of nutrients
(oligotrophic) and the normally very productive food web found along the coasts of Peru and
Chile cannot be sustained. The warming occurring under maximal OTEC net power
production in these regions does not correspond to a shutdown of the local upwelling
processes; instead, it indicates that deeper water has considerably warmed up, as shown in
Fig. 5. Under such a scenario, the availability of upwelled nutrients theoretically would persist, although significant
ecosystem changes are still likely to take place. A credible assessment of such changes clearly is beyond the scope of
this study.
OTEC facilities harm oceans on multiple fronts- impingement, biocides,
pollution
Koerner 12
(Jacqueline Koerner, B.S. in Environmental Studies @ the University of North Carolina, 6/25/12 Energy and the Environment-A Coastal Perspective
http://coastalenergyandenvironment.web.unc.edu/ocean-energy-generating-technologies/ocean-thermal-energy-conversion/environmental-impacts-2/ )
Withdrawal and Discharge Water: Given a 100MW facility, 10-20 billion gallons of warm surface
water and cold water from depths around 1000 meters would be used each day. The impacts of
large water volume discharge need to be studied. The discharged water would be cooler,
denser, and higher in nutrients because of the differing compositions of the deep cold water the
the receiving waters. Water rich in nutrients like nitrogen and phosphorus would most easily be
discharged into warm, oligotrophic water lacking these nutrients. How this change in
compositions would affect ecosystem dynamics could yield positive or negative outcomes.
Impingement/Entainment: Screens are installed in OTEC intake systems to keep large
debris and species from getting into the facility. However, it can be assumed some organisms
would get trapped in the intake screen (impingement) and organisms small enough to
pass through the intake screen would end up trapped in the system (entrained). Both
situations may result in the death of the organism. Biocides: The warm water in OTEC
facilities requires a biocide treatment to keep efficiency in heat exchangers high. An example
of such a biocide is chlorine. While the amount of such a biocide would be low and meet the
standards of the Clean Water Act, the toxin would still cause some environmental
impact. OTEC systems have cables emitting electromagnetic fields in the process of
bringing the generated electricity to shore. The EM field could impact navigation and
behavior of marine species. The physical platform of the system could attract or deter
organisms, and its mooring would pose the threat of entanglement to marine organisms.
OTEC facilities would emit an amount of noise pollution.
OTEC causes laundry list of environmental impacts
Robin Pelc and Rod M. Fujita 11/02
(“Marine Policy” Volume 26 Issue 6
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X02000453)
Though fairly benign in environmental impact compared to traditional power plants, OTEC poses
some potential environmental threats, especially if implemented on a large scale. Data from
existing electric generating stations on the coast provide insight into possible impacts of OTEC
plants. These stations impact the surrounding marine environment mainly through heating the
water, the release of toxic chemicals, impingement of organisms on intake screens, and
entrainment of small organisms by intake pipes, all of which are concerns for OTEC. Large discharges of
mixed warm and cold water would be released near the surface, creating a plume of sinking cool water. The
continual use of warm surface water and cold deepwater may, over long periods of time, lead
to slight warming at depth and cooling at the surface [6]. Thermal effects may be significant, as
local temperature changes of only 3–4°C are known to cause high mortality among corals and
fishes. Aside from mortality, other effects such as reduced hatching success of eggs and developmental inhibition of
larvae, which lower reproductive success, may result from thermal changes [14]. Increased nutrient loading
resulting from the discharge of upwelled water could also negatively impact naturally lownutrient ecosystems typical of tropical seas.
Toxic chemicals, such as ammonia and chlorine, may enter the environment from an OTEC plant and kill local marine organisms. Ammonia in closed-cycle systems would be designed not to contact the
environment, and a dangerous release would be expected to result only from serious malfunction such as a major breakdown, collision with a ship, a greater than 100-yr storm, terrorism, or major human error
[6]. The impact of chlorine will likely be minimal, as it would be used at a concentration of approximately 0.02 ppm daily average, while the EPA standard for marine water requires levels lower than 0.1 ppm [6].
Impingement of large organisms and entrainment of small organisms has been responsible for the greatest mortality of marine organisms at coastal power plants thus far [14]. The magnitude of this problem
depends on the location and size of the plant; however, if marine life is attracted to OTEC plants by the higher nutrient concentrations in the upwelled cold water, large numbers of organisms, including larvae or
juveniles, could be killed by impingement or entrainment. For floating plants, victims of impingement would be mainly small fish, jellyfish, and pelagic invertebrates, while for land-based plants crustaceans would
be the most affected [6].
Finally, a small amount of
CO2 is released to the atmosphere by OTEC power generation. Bringing deepwater to the surface where
pressure is lower allows some of the sequestered CO in this deepwater to outgas, especially as the water is warmed, reducing the solubility of CO . However, this carbon emission is very minute compared to the
emissions of fossil fuel plants.
2
2
OTEC disrupts marine environments - displacement.
Howell ’10, Staff Writer for the New York Times, quotes a report from the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy,
(Katie, February 24, 2010, “Wave Technologies Could Harm Marine Resources -- DOE Study”, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/02/24/24greenwire-wave-technologies-could-harm-marine-resources-95837.html)//HH
"There are well over 100 conceptual designs for converting the energy of waves, river and tidal
currents and ocean temperature differences into electricity," the Office of Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Energy report says. "However, because the concepts are new, few devices have
been deployed and tested in rivers and oceans. Even fewer environmental studies of these
technologies have been carried out, and thus potential environmental effects remain mostly
speculative."
But those effects could be significant. The report suggests projects could displace
bottom-dwelling plants and animals or change their habitats by altering water flows and
waves. And noise generated during installation and operation of energy conversion
devices could interfere with communications of marine animals.
Ocean thermal energy conversion, a technology that uses the temperature differences
between warm surface waters and cold deep waters to generate electricity, could have
additional impacts stemming from the intake and discharge of large volumes of water.
Such operations could change water temperature and capture fish in intake and
discharge plumes.
Politics Links
Plan is bureaucratically unpopular - costs and empirics.
Friedman ’14, staff writer for OTEC News, cites a Harvard Political Review, cites a report by Luis Vega from the Pacific
International Center for High Technology research, quotes the Technology Manager at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory,
(Becca, March, 2014, “EXAMINING THE FUTURE OF OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION”, Ocean Energy Council,
http://www.oceanenergycouncil.com/examining-future-ocean-thermal-energy-conversion/)//HH
Despite the sound science, a fully functioning OTEC prototype has yet to be developed.
The high costs of building even a model pose the main barrier. Although piecemeal
experiments have proven the effectiveness of the individual components, a large-scale
plant has never been built. Luis Vega of the Pacific International Center for High Technology
Research estimated in an OTEC summary presentation that a commercial-size fivemegawatt OTEC plant could cost from 80 to 100 million dollars over five years.
According to Terry Penney, the Technology Manager at the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory, the combination of cost and risk is OTEC’s main liability. “We’ve talked to
inventors and other constituents over the years, and it’s still a matter of huge capital
investment and a huge risk, and there are many [alternate forms of energy] that are less
risky that could produce power with the same certainty,” Penney told the HPR.
Moreover, OTEC is highly vulnerable to the elements in the marine environment. Big
storms or a hurricane like Katrina could completely disrupt energy production by mangling the
OTEC plants. Were a country completely dependent on oceanic energy, severe weather
could be debilitating. In addition, there is a risk that the salt water surrounding an OTEC
plant would cause the machinery to “rust or corrode” or “fill up with seaweed or mud,”
according to a National Renewable Energy Laboratory spokesman.
Even environmentalists have impeded OTEC’s development. According to Penney, people
do not want to see OTEC plants when they look at the ocean. When they see a
disruption of the pristine marine landscape, they think pollution.
Given the risks, costs, and uncertain popularity of OTEC, it seems unlikely that federal
support for OTEC is forthcoming. Jim Anderson, co-founder of Sea Solar Power Inc., a
company specializing in OTEC technology, told the HPR, “Years ago in the ’80s, there was a
small [governmental] program for OTEC and it was abandoned…That philosophy has
carried forth to this day. There are a few people in the Department of Energy who have
blocked government funding for this. It’s not the Democrats, not the Republicans. It’s a
bureaucratic issue.”
OTEC is not completely off the government’s radar, however. This past year, for the first time
in a decade, Congress debated reviving the oceanic energy program in the energy bill,
although the proposal was ultimately defeated. OTEC even enjoys some support on a state
level. Hawaii ’s National Energy Laboratory, for example, conducts OTEC research around the
islands. For now, though, American interests in OTEC promise to remain largely academic. The
Naval Research Academy and Oregon State University are conducting research programs off the
coasts of Oahu and Oregon , respectively.