Further Reources: Week Two
Plato’s Eudaimonia
Let us begin by considering the distinction between happiness
and pleasure, and the language that Plato uses to describe the two.
The word used most often in the text to describe happiness is
eudaimonia, which may also be translated as ‘flourishing’. In
contrast to the English word ‘happiness’, this suggests an ongoing
process or activity, rather than a particular state of mind or
emotion. However, it would be a mistake to read too much into
this linguistic distinction as Plato uses eudaimonia more or less
interchangeably with ‘pleasure’, and it carries the same hedonistic
connotations. Unlike ‘happiness’, however, eudaimonia can be
ascribed both to the state and the soul in accordance with the
central thesis of The Republic that these two entities share a
common structure. Indeed, Socrates states several times that
societal flourishing is more important than the happiness of any
individual class or citizen, implying that personal happiness is a
means to an end rather than an end in its own right. This runs
contrary to the tradition of ancient Greek thought, in which
happiness is seen as the ultimate end and motivation behind all
human activity. This suggests that Plato has his own, more novel
conception of happiness in mind.
Despite the lack of a consistent terminology, the distinction is
made between pleasures of the flesh arising from bodily desires
for food, sex, etc., and the superior pleasures of the intellect
enjoyed by the guardian class. Indeed, when Glaucon suggests
that pleasure may be the Form of the good, he is soundly rebuked
by Socrates who tells him to ‘Be silent … Do not even mention the
word.’ The descriptions of the pleasure seeking nature of
democratic individuals and the just man, who pursues a balanced
and harmonious lifestyle, not surrendering himself to ‘savage and
unreasoning pleasure’ show that Plato’s view was that pursuit of
happiness and pleasure for its own sake leads only to injustice and
enslavement. This amounts to a clear condemnation of hedonism,
and is illustrated by the example of the tyrant who is not only
unhappy but is a ‘true slave’ to his own desires.
In defence of pleasure, Plato has two different accounts to offer.
The first arises from the distinction between ‘necessary’ and
‘unnecessary’ desires or appetites, which are said to produce
corresponding types of pleasure. The desire for bread and simple
food, for example, is seen as both productive and necessary,
whereas the desire for Sicilian à la carte and Attic pastries is
considered extravagant, unnecessary and therefore to be avoided.
However, this distinction fails to take into account the happiness
or pleasure of the philosopher, which cannot be described as
‘necessary’ in any ordinary sense, and so the analysis must be
rejected as incomplete. This defect is resolved in the second
account, which identifies three forms of pleasure that correspond
to the three different elements of the soul: reason, spirit and
appetite, or desire. Here, the distinction between pleasures of the
intellect and pleasure resulting from the pursuit of desire or
honour—victory in war, for example—is clear, with the
philosopher falling into the first category. However, although this
provides us with a way of categorising pleasure, it does not bring
us any closer to a theory of happiness, as there is no suggestion
that it too has three different forms. From this I conclude that Plato
considers the notion of pleasure to be insufficient as an
explanation of happiness, and that these instead represent two
different, but interrelated, concepts.
Happiness in its pure or ideal Form is a state of absolute peace, joy
and contentment that results from having a perfectly harmonious
and balanced soul. This complete absence of inner conflict and
turmoil effectively renders the individual immune to all forms of
suffering, regardless of their physical circumstances. Such a state
of mind may reliably be obtained in one of two ways. Firstly, by
acquiring the virtue of justice, where each part of the soul is
performing its proper function under the dominion of reason.
Secondly, through the practice of philosophy, which brings the
soul into equilibrium through the contemplation of what is eternal,
beautiful and good. Conventional happiness, as with conventional
justice, is a mere image or ‘shadow-picture’ of this Platonic ideal or
Form that depends upon the pursuit of transient physical
pleasures, and so is itself fleeting and unreliable, consisting at best
of a temporary respite from pain and suffering. When described in
this way, Platonic happiness bears a striking resemblance to the
Buddhist notion of enlightenment—a word whose etymology
would not have been lost on Plato—and other spiritual teachings
of the East, which presumably both Plato and Socrates would have
been exposed to.9 In each case, the important point is that far from
depending upon external factors, true happiness arises from
within as a result of cultivating the correct state of mind, and
cannot be destroyed for as long as the individual continues to
maintain their internal balance and harmony, even in the face of
great adversity.