FOR AND AGAINST GOD: A CONSIDERATION OF SOME TRADITIONAL
ARGUMENTS ON THE QUESTION OF GOD*1
SUMMARY
This paper considers that the only useful way to approach the question of God, is by
balancing grounds for belief with grounds for disbelief in his existence. The weightiest ground
for disbelief is considered to be the problem of evil, while teleological considerations are held to
provide the weightiest ground for belief. The weight of the problem of evil as an argument
against God’s existence can, however, be greatly lightened by dropping one of the supposed
attributes of God. It is argued that this can be done without any loss to the core of theistic belief.
The paper reaches the conclusion that it is more reasonable to believe that God exists than to
believe that no such being exists.
INTRODUCTION
There have been three standard approaches in Western Philosophy to the question of
proving the existence of God, viz, ontological, cosmological, and teleological. The first and
second options of this blessed trinity of classical arguments for God’s existence are now almost
generally accepted as having tried to lift themselves up by their own bootstraps – they could not
get off the ground!
Gaunilo, a contemporary of St. Anselm, the philosophical progenitor of the Ontological
Argument, had fired the first mortal shot when he argued that if the argument were granted, then
we could, by the same token, populate the world with all manner of unreal and chimerical beings
simply by conceiving of such in superlative terms. René Descartes attempted unsuccessfully to
resuscitate Anselm’s brain child by arguing that, as a supremely perfect being, God could not be
thought of except as embodying every perfection, existence being one of these. But Immanuel
This paper is derived from two earlier papers: “God and the Problem of Evil”, and “God: The Best
Hypothesis or the Argument from Design” both of which were first read before the Nigerian
Philosophical Association in 1977 and 1982, respectively.
*
Kant practically performed the burial of both the Ontological and Cosmological arguments, first,
by arguing, convincingly, against the Ontological argument that existence is not a predicate
(perfection) and that, therefore, we cannot define God into existence; second, by showing that
the Cosmological argument is the Ontological argument in a different costume1. In the same vein
Bertrand Russell can be considered to have presided over the final burial ceremony of these two
venerable arguments when he pointed out that the function of “to exist” is simply to assert the
instantiation of a given concept or description2.
All versions of the Ontological argument and some of their attempted reformulations 3
come to grief over one elementary fallacy (which is usually carefully concealed in the subtle
reformulation), namely, the fallacy of illegitimately crossing from the logical order to the
existential order, from the conceptual world of mere possible to the real world of actual existents.
The fallacy arises from a confusion between what the scholastics would have called two different
kinds of existence, viz, existence in re and existence in intellectu.
It seems very unlikely that a definitive proof or disproof4 of God’s existence would be
possible. It seems to me that the best way, perhaps the only way, to face the issue fruitfully is by
choosing or accepting only a ‘direction’ in accordance with the balance of available evidence. In
other words, if reason would buttress our faith, that is, if we want to be reasonable about our
beliefs, the question we can tackle fruitfully is the following: what good grounds do we have for
believing in God’s existence or what good grounds do we have for disbelieving in his existence?
The answer to such a question should indicate to us where to stand, if we want reason on our
side, although it may not tell us conclusively whether we are, in fact, right or wrong. In this way
we can consider God’s existence, on the one hand, and God’s nonexistence, on the other, as, to
use Popperian categories, two competing conjectures or hypotheses.
I consider that the weightiest ground for disbelief in God’s existence is to be found in
what has usually been termed ‘the problem of evil’. On the one hand, it seems to me that the
weightiest ground for belief in God’s existence is to be found in the third person of that classical
trinity of arguments for God’s existence mentioned above, namely, the argument from
teleological considerations. The ‘problem of evil’, however, can be greatly mitigated via a
reconsideration of one of what have usually been taken to be the divine attributes. Teleological
grounds for God’s existence can now be seen to stand without any serious opponent on the side
of God’s nonexistence. And this should yield the conclusion that it is more reasonable to believe
in God’s existence than to believe in his nonexistence, or that the hypothesis that ‘God exists’ is
more reasonable than the competing polar opposite that ‘God does not exist’.
The Problem of Evil
The problem of evil arises if we both admit the existence of evil in the world and also
assert the existence of a theistic God5. The statement that “God exists” and the statement that
“Evil exists” are implicit contraries in such a way that they could not both be true at the same
time. But since it is hard to deny the existence of evil which is an ever-present reality in the
world, the logical consequence is that God cannot exist.
For if God is omnipotent, then he could prevent evil if he wanted to. And if he is
omnibenevolent then he would want to prevent evil if he could. Thus, if God exists and is both
omnipotent and omnibenevolent, then there exists a being who could prevent evil if he wanted
to, and who would want to prevent evil if he could. And if this is true, how can there be evil in
the world? The existence of evil in such circumstances is conceivable if ignorance were
attributable to God; but God is also omniscient, so that the existence of evil is absolutely
inconceivable side by side with God.
When we ask how there can be evil in the world if God exists, we are asking a question
that is of the same logical status as the following: If Tangka is a bachelor, how does it happen
that he has a wife? In other words, if Tangka is unmarried how comes it about that he is married?
Such a question is not genuine. It could not have an answer. For either Tangka is married or he is
unmarried. The two terms are mutually exclusive in such a way that it is impossible to conjoin
them in this way. Similarly it is not just that evil in the world is hard to understand if one
assumes the existence of a theistic God. The point rather is that evil in the world is logically
incompatible with theism. God and evil could not exist together.
The most formidable defence of traditional theism in the face of the problem of evil is
what has been termed the ‘free-will defence’ whose most eloquent protagonist has been Alvin
Plantinga6. The gist of the free-will argument is that evil is not to be ascribed to God but to
human free will, that is, to independent actions of human beings, supposed to have been
endowed by God with freedom of the will. But the free-will defence cannot work. Firstly, it is
God who is supposed to have created human beings, and as an omnipotent being it was up to him
to endow them with whatever characteristics he considered desirable. He could, for instance, as
J. L. Makie suggests7, have availed himself of the “possibility of making beings who would act
freely but always go right”. Secondly, even if the free-will defence were granted, it would
account for moral evil, but not wholly for physical or psychological evil.
It seems to me not only that there can be no adequate solution of the problem of evil
which does not give up part of what is considered an essential component of theistic religious
belief, but also that part of what is thus considered can be given up without any essential loss to
theism.
I propose that God’s supposed attribute of ‘omnipotence’ can be dispensed with without
affecting the essential core of theistic belief. The problem with omnipotence as a concept
purporting to describe a state of affairs is that it has no intrinsic maximum or upper limit of
degree, to use an idea suggested and developed by William E. Mann8. The case is different with
the other divine attributes.
Some attributes or properties have no degrees in the sense that they do not admit of more
or less. For example, the property of being a human being or of being pregnant. If your wife is
pregnant, then she simply is pregnant and your neighbour’s wife cannot be more pregnant or less
pregnant than your wife. Other properties or attributes do have degrees such as being young or
old or being close to delivery. One man can be older or younger than another, and your wife
could be closer to delivery than your neighbour’s wife.
It is clear that the divine attributes, viz, knowledge, goodness and power are degreed
properties.
Now, some degreed properties have no intrinsic maximum while others have. The
degreed property of having numerical magnitude for example, does not have an intrinsic
maximum. For any positive whole number you care to think of, there is always a greater one ad
infinitum. The concept of the greatest possible positive integer is therefore a meaningless one in
that it applies to nothing, that is, it is not, in fact, cannot, in principle, be instantiated. Some
degreed properties, however, have intrinsic maxima. The degreed property of, say, being cloudy
has an intrinsic maximum when the sky is completely cloudy.
The divine attributes of omniscience and omnibenevolence would clearly seem to have
intrinsic maxima. An omniscient being would be one who knows all there is to know. Or, as
Mann puts it, X is omniscient or “knowledgeable to the intrinsically maximal degree if and only
if for any proposition, p, if p, then X knows that p.”9 A being who had attained this level of
knowledgeability could not improve on it and therefore it makes sense to speak of an omniscient
being. Similarly, a being can be said to be good to an intrinsically maximal degree when it is
completely benevolent to the extent that there is no good act which it wouldn’t want to perform.
It therefore also makes sense to speak of an omnibenevolent God.
But with omnipotence, the case is completely different. There is no task so great that a
greater cannot be conceived and hence there can be no being so powerful that a more powerful
could not be conceived. In other words, the degreed property of being powerful has no intrinsic
maximum and, as such, the concept of an omnipotent being, like that of the greatest possible
integer, is an incoherent and meaningless one in that it necessarily applies to nothing; it could
not, in principle, have an instantiation.
The supposed attribute of omnipotence should therefore be excised from the stock of
divine attributes. Once this is done, a strategy like the free-will defence would become more
plausible.
The Argument from Teleology
The teleological argument that I consider plausible is that which starts from consideration
of the universe as a whole rather than from individual instances of design or adaptation within
the universe. Any argument which starts from particular instances within the universe has to face
competitive alternative scientific explanations. But an argument which focuses on the universe as
a whole effectively rules scientific explanations out. Science is only committed to the
consideration of questions that can be investigated empirically. Science, therefore, would not
address itself to questions as to how the universe as a whole came about, or why it exists at all, or
exists in one form rather than another. Such questions are properly outside the domain of
science, but within the scope of philosophy. In asking the question how it comes about that there
is a universe at all and why it is the way it is, we may be said to be committing a petitio
principii by assuming that there must be a sufficient reason for the existence of the universe or
that there must be a purpose for its being or being in any particular form. But the force of this
objection is taken away by the fact that we are quite ready also to entertain the opposite
supposition to the effect that there is no reason for the existence of the universe and no
transcendent purpose for its being or being the way it is.
So if we consider the universe as a whole, we are faced with two ultimate hypotheses or
conjectures. One is the theistic hypothesis and the other is the suggestion that the universe exists
and in the way it does simply by chance.
It seems to me that the second hypothesis amounts to a refusal to entertain the question
seriously. For the question to ponder is: How come the universe in the first place, and, given the
universe, how come it has had the peculiar evolutionary development that we can discern by
hindsight? Such a question may, ex hypothesi, not have a definitive answer and the best we can
do is to select from among alternative conjectures the one that seems most reasonable. But to
answer that it is by chance is to say that things just happen to be and in the way they are for no
conceivable reason at all. It is thus a refusal to take the question seriously or to look for a
satisfying answer. Such an answer could only be satisfying to someone who prefers intellectual
casualness to seriousness but it would be ultimately deeply unsatisfying for any serious-minded
thinker.
This leaves the theistic conjecture as the only plausible one available so far. And if we
must give an answer to the question, the theistic hypothesis is the only reasonable answer so far
available to us. This does not, of course, amount to a proof of God’s existence. But this is not a
particular shortcoming. None of our scientific hypotheses, for example, as Karl Popper10 has so
convincingly argued, are provable either.
However, the detailed nature of the theos that we thus find reasonable to assume can only
be a subject for further conjecture. I have tried to argue above about the inappropriateness of
attributing omnipotence to such a being. His attributes must, for the most part, remain rather
unclear so that we could only cautiously surmise them rather than spell them out in
uncompromising dogmatic terms as is the case in most theistic religions.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have argued that the best way to face the question of God is to weigh
possible good reasons for belief in his existence against possible good reasons for disbelief. I
have singled out the problem of evil as the best reason for disbelief that God exists and
teleological considerations from the universe as a whole as the best reason for belief. I have
indicated a way out of the problem of evil via a reconsideration of one of the supposed divine
attributes. I have also tried to show that teleological considerations from the universe as a whole
show the theistic hypothesis to be more reasonable than any available alternative. I therefore
conclude that it is more reasonable to believe in God’s existence than to believe in his
nonexistence, although the detailed nature or character of this God can only be a subject for
further conjectures.
FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES
1. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, chapter III, sections 4 and 5.
2. See Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” in Logic and Knowledge ed.
by R. C. Marsh, London, 1956.
3. For some of these reformulations, see J. N. Findlay, “Can God’s Existence Be
Disproved?” in Flew and MacIntyre (eds), New Essays in Philosophical Theology,
London, SCM Press Ltd., 1955, p. 47ff.
4. For an attempted disproof of God’s existence, see J. N. Findlay “Can God’s Existence Be
Disproved?” in Flew and MacIntyre (eds), New Essays in Philosophical Theology,
London, SCM Press Ltd., 1955, p. 47.
5. This is God as paradigmatically conceived in the Judaeo-Christian tradition – the God of
monotheism – a supremely perfect being who combines the superlative attributes of
omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence. Scholars of African Traditional
Religion have usually insisted that ATR, properly considered, is also monotheistic in the
above sense. But recently, Prof. Okot p’Bitek has taken this view to task, describing such
scholars as intellectual smugglers who are dressing up African gods in borrowed robes.
p’Bitek goes on to say that Africans may describe their gods as strong, wise, old or great
but not as omnipotent, eternal or omnipresent etc. (See Okot p’Bitek, African Religions in
Western Scholarship, Kampala, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, East African Literature Bureau).
Might this help to explain why the problem of evil does not seem to be such a scandal to
practitioners of ATR?
6. See Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1974,
esp. pp. 29-64.
7. See J. L. Makie, “Evil and Omnipotence” in The Philosophy of Religion, ed. by Basil
Mitchell, London, Oxford University Press, 1971, esp. pp. 100-101.
8. See “Divine Attributes”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2, April 1975.