Type of Review: Project Completion Review
Project Title: World Food Programme: Immediate Response
Account(200555)
Date started: June 2011
Date review undertaken: July 2012
Introduction and Context
What support did the UK provide?
1. DFID contributed£800,000 (US$1.28 million) to replenish the World Food Programme
(WFP) Immediate Response Account (IRA) in March 2011. This represents
approximately 3.4% of total replenishmentsreceived(US$38.1 million)in the IRA in 2011.
2. The IRA was established to enable WFP to provide immediate food assistance,
logistics and other non-food items rapidly in emergency situations. The IRA can either
be ‘replenished’ or ‘revolved’, which means that funds may be either be allocated as unearmarked funding for an emergency or reimbursed by donors for a specific operation.
3. The IRA allows WFP to be proactive, swift and flexible in responding to emergencies
whilst donorsdecide on the scale and type of contribution they wish to make. Allocations
to implementing partners from the IRA are made as loans in anticipation of receiving
donor contributions. If donations are not forthcoming then the loan is deemed to be a
permanent non-reimbursable grant.
4. Since its inception, the IRA has proved to be one of WFP’s most effective relief
response mechanisms and has been instrumental in enabling it to respond swiftly to
emerging or rapidly increasing humanitarian needs. The IRA compliments the United
Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) when WFP responds to life
threatening situations and under-funded emergencies. The IRAhas the advantage of
being able to release funds significantly faster than the CERF,typically within 4 days
compared with 3 to 4 weeks for the CERF.
What were the expected results?
5. The impact of DFID’s support was to save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies
(WFP Strategic Objective 1). The outcomes were:
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
Timely response to an emergency (48 to 72 hours)
Reduced or stabilised mortality in target groups
6. Through the IRA WFP was able to respond rapidly to emergencies following theArab
Spring, including in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia; the deteriorating security situation resulting
from the political crisis and violence in Côte d’Ivoire, which also affected neighbouring
Liberia; flooding in Pakistan; the drought in the Horn of Africa and the famine in Somalia.
The IRA also provided upfront funding which enabled WFP to avoid major disruption
tolife saving operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya and Niger.
What was the context in which UK support was provided?
7. WFP is entirely voluntarily funded and the scale of its operation is driven by fluctuating
humanitarian need. An insufficient amount of untied, predictable funding often
hampersits ability to respond effectively to new large, complex emergencies and
smaller relief operations. Flexible funding mechanisms, such as the IRA, are therefore
essential for WFP to save lives in emergency situations.
8. On this occasion UK support to the IRA was a one-off contribution, but in the past DFID
has allowed significant amounts of unspent balances from other projects to be
transferred to the IRA. Further funding from DFID to the IRA is unlikely as DFID now
provides predictable un-earmarked core funding to WFP,of which 83% is ring-fenced for
operational responses.
9. The IRA enables WFP to fund initial requirements - up to three months - in any one
emergency operation (EMOP) or special operation (SO) or to react swiftly to a sudden
change in the circumstances of on-going EMOPs and protracted relief and recovery
operations (PRROs).
10. Supporting the IRA is in line with the UK government priorities as outlined in DFID
Business Plan 2011-2015, the UK Government’s Humanitarian Policy “Saving Lives,
Preventing Suffering and Building Resilience”, and CHASE’s Operational Plan 20122015.
Section A: Detailed Outcome Scoring
*(This contribution does not have a logical framework as it is under £1 million threshold)
Outcome 1: Timely response to an emergency.
Outcome 1:final score and performance description: A (Outcome met expectation)
11. The IRA enables WFP to respond to the onset of an emergency swiftly, usually within
days, and when necessary pre-positioncommodities to ensure uninterrupted food
supplies.WFP is uniquely positioned to deliver in this respect and there is no other
organisation that can provide this service at scale.
Final results:
12. Allocations from the IRA in 2011 were 7% higher than in 2010 ($161.9 million),
reflectingincreased need,supporting 43 relief operations as outlined below:
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
12 Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations(PRROs) in: Bangladesh, Central
African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DPRK), Ecuador, Ethiopia,
Haiti, Kenya, Niger, Latin America / Caribbean region, Sri Lanka, Uganda,
Zimbabwe;
6 Special Operations(SOs) in: West Africa Region, Kyrgyzstan, Libya (x 2), South
Sudan, Thailand;

25 Emergency Operations(EMOPs) in: DRC, Chad, Cote D’Ivoire, Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Liberia, Mauritania, Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Mid East Region, Pakistan, Somalia (x 2), South Sudan, Sudan, Syria; of
which 11 wereImmediate Response EMOPs in: Sri Lanka, Philippines, Bolivia,
Tunisia, Libya, Ghana, Namibia, Syria, Mauritania, Togo, Cambodia.
13. The IRA also provided much-needed up-front funding to avoid major disruptions to lifesaving operations in the DRC, Kenya and Niger.
14. Due to nature of the contributions to the IRA, where donor funds are co-mingled in a
single account, WFP’s reporting systems cannot specifically attribute results delivered
or lives saved by the IRA to a specific donor country.
Impact Weighting (%): 50%
Revised since last Annual Review? N/A
Risk: Low
Revised since last Annual Review? N/A
Outcome 2: Reduced or Stabilised mortality in target groups.
Outcome 2:final score and performance description: A (Outcome met expectation)
Final results:
15. DFID’sfunding to the IRA contributed, in part, to WFP’s overall goal of reduced or
stabilised mortality in target groups. Although the Report on the Use of the IRA does
not provide detailed information on the direct impact of IRA funding on mortality
rates,itwill have played a part in increasing WFP’s ability to provide support to the most
vulnerable groups, such as children under the age of two, where it has considerably
scaled up its effort over the last two years.
Impact Weighting (%): 50
Revised since last Annual Review? Y/NNo
Risk: Low/Medium/High
Revised since last Annual Review? Y/NNo
Section B: Results and Value for Money.
1. Achievement and Results
1.1 Has the logframe been changed since the last review? Y/N
16. No logframe was required as the project was under £1 million.
1.2 Final Output score and description:
17. A (Outcomesmet expectation).
1.3 Direct feedback from beneficiaries
18. N/A
1.4 Overall Outcome score and description: A (Outcome met expectation)
19. The IRA continues to be an important funding mechanismto support WFP operations,
reflected in the breadth of operations it was able to support.
1.5 Impact and Sustainability
20. Theimpact of the IRA is clearly demonstrated by the fact that it supported 43 relief
operations in 2011. Since 2000, through the IRA over US$170 million has been
allocated to 124 operations worldwide (about US$38 million per year on average).
21. The sustainability of the IRA is mixed as it relies heavily on donor contributions, but
whilst there are humanitarian emergencies it offers WFP and donors a quick and
effective vehicle provide relief to those most in need.DFID does now provides WFP with
a significant amount of predictable un-earmarked core funding, of which 83% is
allocated for operational purposes, meaning further contributions from DFID to the IRA
will be less likely in the future.
22. WFP have begun to use the IRA to fund preparedness activities. In 2011 the IRA
supported preparedness activities in DPRK, West Africa Region, Mid East Region,
Liberia, Mauritania, Mali, Republic of Congo and Burkina Faso. This should help to
reduce reliance on emergency food aid in the longer term, which is welcome,although
there may be a question as to whether the IRA is the appropriate instrument to support
this type of activity. Building resilience to disasters is however in line with UK objectives
to move WFP from a being solely a food aid agency to providing food assistance.
2. Costs and timescale
2.1 Was the project completed within budget / expected costs: Y/N
23. Yes
2.2 Key cost drivers
24. One-off contribution.
2.3 Was the project completed within the expected timescale: Y/N
25. Yes
3. Evidence and Evaluation
3.1 Assess any changes in evidence and what this meant for the project.
26. N/A
3.2 Set out what plans are in place for an evaluation.
27. WFP has published its Report on the Use of the Immediate Response Account 2011,
presented to the WFP Executive Board at the Annual Session in June 2012. This has
been the primary source documentation for this review.
4. Risk
4.1 Risk Rating (overall project risk): Low/Medium/HighMedium
Did the Risk Rating change over the life of the project?
28. Yes. A risk identified in the Business Case was that there could be a lack of support for
the IRA from other donors (low probability, high impact). This risk rating was raised to
medium as the IRA balance at 31 December 2011 stood at US$26 million,well below
the target level of US$70 million. Current funding levels for the IRA (August 2012) stand
at just US$14.5m, with only US$2.5m of contributions received so far in 2012.
4.2 Risk funds not used for purposes intended
29. N/A
4.3Climate and Environment Impact
30. The impact on climate change was assessed as minimal in the Business Case, with the
net impact on the environment assessed as positive. The environmental costs
associated with this intervention, particularly related to the carbon footprint of a
logistical supply chain, were assessed asbeing more than offset by the positive effect of
improved mortality rates during a crisis. This assessment remains valid.
5. Value for Money
5.1 Performance on VfM measures
31. The MAR assessed WFP as offering DFID good value for money, with a strong
corporate emphasis on cost control and efficiency. The assessment for the IRA is
therefore strongly informed by this judgement.The IRA allows WFP to respond very
quickly to emergencies, providing food aid and other relief supplies to those most in
need, thereby reducing the vulnerability of people to severe acute malnutritionwhich is
much more costly to address.
5.2 Commercial Improvement and Value for Money
32. WFP has strong financial management systems in place and is addressing areas of
weakness. WFP’s procurement systems were assessed positively by DFID’s
Procurement Group in 2010.
5.3 Role of project partners
33. WFP has demonstrated that it drives cost controls with its delivery partners and seeks
to obtain good value for money through local procurement and cost-efficient delivery.
5.4 Did the project represent Value for Money : Y/N
34. Yes. The Multilateral Aid Review recognised WFP as the only agency capable of
delivering emergency food assistance at scale in difficult or dangerous
environments.The MAR assessed WFP as a critical partner for the UK and as
offeringgood value for money against DFID’s development objectives.
6. Conditionality
6.1 Update on specific conditions
35. N/A
7. Conclusions
36. The IRA is clearly an important financial instrument that gives WFP the flexibility to
respond to emergencies within a few days and pre-position supplies enabling it to reach
those most in need as quickly possible and provide lifesaving support. In 2011 the IRA
supported 43 relief operations around the world, reflectinggrowing global humanitarian
need and demonstrating the importance donors place on the fund. Current reserves are
however worrying low (US$14.5m), well below the target set by WFP (US$70m)
37. DFID now provides significant amounts of un-earmarked predictable core funding to
WFP (£100m over 4 years), of which 83% is ring-fenced for operational support. These
funds are allocated by WFPs Strategic Resource Allocation Committee and should
therefore complement the IRA and the CERF to further assist WFP to respond to
emergencies and provide better quality relief. It should also mean that future
contributions from DFID to the IRA will be unlikely.
38. A recommendation from the MAR was that WFP should do more on disaster
preparedness and it is therefore encouraging that WFP is supporting activities in this
area which should reduce dependency on emergency assistance in the long term.
Whilst this is in line with UK objectivesthe IRA may not be the most appropriate funding
mechanism to support this type of work.
8. Review Process
39. The PCR was undertaken by Programme Officers Jinal Shah (UKRep, Rome)and
Martin Hopper (Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Policy Group (HDRP), Conflict
Humanitarian and Security Department) through a desk based review and information
from WFP officials. It was Quality Assured by Eleanor Briers, Deputy Head, HDRP. Key
sources of information used include:
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Review of the IRA, 2004 (WFP)
Report on the use of the IRA(1 January –31 December 2011)
WFP Annual Accounts 2011
FAO Fact Sheet 2010