Meow Meow
Issue of Free Will
What did you eat for breakfast today? Why are you here right now? Why did you decide to read this paper? Did you choose to have eggs this morning, did you choose to be where you are right now, and did you choose to read this paper. Yes, all of these answers are possible; however, you could analyze all of these things in an entirely different way. Your urge to make eggs this morning, the events that led you here, and the fact that you are reading this paper are all the result of pre-existing events that don’t allow you to choose otherwise. Now the question comes into play, which case do we believe? This metaphysical question has been a catalyst for inspiring philosophers to construct arguments to persuade our views on free will and determinism. Do we take the side of the incompatabilist who advocates the truth of determinism entails no free will: so there are no possible worlds where determinism is true and someone has free will. The compatibilist would argue that determinism could be coexistent with free will: that there are possible worlds where determinism is true and someone has free will.
The purpose of this paper is not meant to convince you on what to believe. Rather, it is my hope that you gain an understanding of the views of the incompatabilist and compatibilist, as well as philosophers arguments that are for and against these topics.
Then I plan to provide evidence for why I stand where I do on the debate of free will.

Incompatibilists believe that it is not possible for free will and determinism to coexist. The definition I have provided is rather vague; in order to fully comprehend incompatabilism we must analyze the two varieties of the argument. One-idea states that having free will is a matter of having a choice about certain actions, and that having a choice is a matter of having genuine options or alternatives about what one does. The other is built around the idea that the truth of determinism would mean that we don’t cause our actions in the right kind of way. The truth of determinism would mean that we don’t originate our actions in a significant way and our actions are not ultimately controlled by us. So in a word, we lack the ability for self- determination. Now that we have a clear understanding of what the incompatabilist believes and the two sides of their viewpoint, we will take a look at some of the most famous arguments against compatabilism.
One of the most influential arguments for the first view of incompatibilism was published by Peter van Inwagen and is known as “The Consequence Argument” The building blocks for the argument rely on the fundamental distinction between the past and the future. Most of us can relate to sayings such as “there is no use in crying over spilt milk.” The meaning in this gives us a sense in which the past is done and we can’t change it; however, the future seems to be more open for possibility than the remote past. Lets consider an informal layout of an argument that renders the concept of the
Consequence Argument. It would appear to most that there is nothing I can currently do to change the fact that James Earl Ray assassinated Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., mostly because it happened before I was born. This even holds true if we allow the possibility

of time travel to be a variable. Say that I influence what the past became, but I still can’t literally change the past. We must look at this argument. 1. “Martin Luther King was assassinated in 1968.” 2. If I travel to the past, I could prevent MLK from being assassinated in 1968. 3. If I were to travel to the past and prevent MLK from being assassinated in 1968 (which would mean he wasn’t assassinated in 1968). Since a proposition can’t be both true and false, we see that the past is fixed even if time travel is a variable. Now that we have addressed the past, we must look at the possibility of the outcome being different for the future. It appears that I could, at some point in the future, develop a time machine that could take me back to the night Dr. King was shot. I can’t change the fact that he was shot that night and all my attempts to do so would inevitably fail. This demonstrates that my control of the future is just as limited as my control of the past, saying that I don’t have free will. A famous analogy used to explain the consequence argument is called “The Garden of Forking Paths.” Whenever we are faced with a decision it is similar to coming at a fork in the road. The road we have been traveling on is our past, the point of the fork is at the exact point where we make our decision, and the different roads are the paths of our future based on the decision made. So, if determinism is true, our journey through life can just be compared to traveling on a road with no forks. The path we take is the only path we could have taken the entire time. If determinism is false, we are still going to have limited choices of the roads to pick. So in a word, we don’t have free will.
The second set for arguments promoting incompatibilism stresses the importance of the source of volition for free will. An agent is acting freely only if they

originate their actions, or if they are the ultimate source or first cause of their action.
(Kane) So a agent isn’t held morally responsible for their actions if they aren’t the originator of their actions. Lets suppose that I am manipulated into going for a run as the direct result of brainwashing, my idea for going for a run doesn’t originate with me rather in the brainwashing. So in this situation if determinism is true, I could have chosen to run based on a causal chain of events that have been happening for millions of years up until that point. The truth of determinism would mean that agents don’t cause their actions in the kind of way needed for free will and, moral responsibility. The formal arrangement of this argument is as follows: 1. An agent acts with free will only is he is the originator ( or ultimate source) of her actions. 2. If determinism is true, then everything any agent does is ultimately causd by events and circumstances outside her control. 3. If everything an agent does is ultimately caused by events and circumstances beyond her control, then the agent is not the originator ( or ultimate source) of her actions. 4. Therefore, if determinism is true, the no agent is the originator ( or ultimate source) of her actions. 5. Therefore, if determinism is true, no agent has free will.
We have just mapped arguably the two most famous arguments that advocate incompatibilism. The next thing I would like to do is discuss are the arguments in favor of compatibilism. The most effective way to do this is to address problems found in the incompatibilists arguments. Then we will go over two arguments that just support compatibilism.
Now that we have reached this point, lets critique the “Origination Argument.”
The only way for the compatibilist to reject the conclusion of the Origination Argument

is to reject its first premise. The compatibilist will do this by rejecting that free will requires an agent to be the originator of their actions. We are able to do this as compatibilists by rejecting the “ultimacy condition” of free will. If all that is required for free will, for example, is that a certain mesh between an agent’s 1st-order volitions and
2nd-order desires, then events do not require an agent as the main originator of those actions. So, if an agent has free will if he has the necessary level of reasons that they would have willed differently had she had different reasons, ultimacy is again not required. Thus, if one adopts certain accounts of free will, one has reason for rejecting the central premise of the Origination Argument.
Now that we have defined the compatabilists critique of the Origation Argument, we now need to take a look at the compatibilists argument. Lets say that I have no choice about a particular action and I couldn’t have performed another one. Incompatibilists can easily account for this ability to do otherwise. According to incompatibilists, an agent can be free only if determinism is false. If determinism is false, even though you didn’t choose to go for a run, you could not have done otherwise than go for a run.
Compatibilists, however, can give their own account of the ability to do otherwise. For them, to say that you could have done otherwise is simply to say that you would have done otherwise had you willed or chosen to do so. So an agent could have done otherwise is to say that the agent would have done otherwise in a different counterfactual condition. But saying this is entirely consistent with one way of understanding the ability to do otherwise. Thus compatibilists are saying that you have the ability to do something such that, had you done it, either the past or the laws of

nature would have been different than they actually are. This shows that the consequence argument cant provide a sufficient argument for incompatibilism.
Most philosophers have tried to justify free will if the choice to do otherwise is presented as an option. It was not until Harry Frankfurt came along that the idea of having freedom and not being able to choose otherwise was even brought into the subject of discussion. To help illustrate this idea, we will return to the example of going on a run. Say you are debating on whether or not to go for a run today. Unbeknownst to you, your body has been tampered with where if you decide to go on a run, your body will begin to cramp and you will not be able to run regardless. You decide that you would rather not run and you just go back into your house and relax the rest of the day.
In this case, you are morally responsible for the decision to not go on the run; however, even if you wanted to you couldn’t have done otherwise. Frankfurt proposes the fact that you are morally responsible despite the fact you lack the ability to do otherwise.
Here we see that free will and determinism can co exist in the same world.
Philosophers will always continue to have debates about the metaphysical question of freewill. Like I stated earlier my purpose of this paper is not to persuade you, rather just inform you of the many arguments of both sides for this argument. My personal opinion is that compatibilist is the best view. My reasons being are that they have strong counter examples to the incompatibilists argument. The second reason I am a compatibilist is due to Frankfurts argument. Though the case is somewhat unlikely, the concept is so clever I cant believe anything else.