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Religion as a Source of Evil.
Peter Jonkers (Tilburg University, the Netherlands)
1. Introduction
Although religions bring messages of harmony, love, and justice, the media inform us
almost every day about all kinds of religious evil, that is, forms of evil that are directly
inspired and justified by religion. Religious people around the world make themselves
guilty of unorganized or organized intolerance against internal and external
dissenters. In reaction to these events, there is a growing body of public opinion that
we would be better off without religion, since it is the cause of the suffering and death
of innumerable innocent people. So, there are good and urgent reasons to discuss
the relation between religion and evil. In particular, the kinds of evil that will be
discussed in this paper are intolerance on religious grounds and religious violence,
including terrorism.
This paper discusses the intriguing question why religions, although preaching a
message of harmony, love, and universal brotherhood, nevertheless can be a cause
of and even justify intolerance and violence. Obviously, these manifestations of
religious evil are only two points on a sliding scale. Nevertheless, it makes sense to
distinguish them in order to get a better idea of the extent of this problem, and not to
focus exclusively on religious violence and wars, being the most explicit and
spectacular forms of religious evil. Furthermore, the aim of this paper is to investigate
into the nature of the structural factors that cause religion to be a source of evil,
since, apparently, there are reasons internal to the religious impulse itself that incite
to intolerance and violence.
It has to be noted that the question why, in a concrete situation, certain religious
people are prone to intolerance and violence is a very complex and multifaceted one.
Covering all these aspects largely exceeds the scope of this paper and the
competence of its author. In general, most experts distinguish between the
ideological and the motivational factors that are at play.1 The latter refer to the
psychological motives of an individual to join a militantly intolerant or violent group,
and these motives differ among its members. Typically, these individuals are
primarily driven by a ‘burning passion’, which arises from their perception of being
humiliated, victimized, and suffering injustice. Hence, they are motivated by a
grievance that is very real, and see no other solution to put an end to their personal
suffering than through a radical makeover of the existing order. Against this
motivational background, secular ideologies and religious doctrines have the role of
an umbrella, which enables the unification of these frustrated individuals by linking
1
See e.g. Coady, Religious Disagreement and Religious Accommodation, 184f. and Dolnik and
Gunaratna, On the nature of religious terrorism, 345-6.
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their grievances by means of an all-encompassing explanation. But at the same time,
they also justify the militant and even violent opposition to the intolerable ideas and
behaviors of others and sometimes even prescribe the use of violence as the only
possible chance for remedy. Hence, the common perception that the perpetrators of
religious violence and terrorism are irrational lunatics is incorrect, because this
explanation only pays attention to their motives and not to the ideology that unites
their actions and justifies them.2
Given the philosophical nature of this paper, I will only discusses the ideological
sources of religious evil, in particular the arguments and explanations that religions
offer to justify it. Besides examining these structural aspects of the relation between
religion and evil, I will also discuss some ideas on how this ill-fated bond can be
broken. In order to do so, I will start with discussing the two above mentioned
examples of religious evil, namely intolerance and violence. In the section thereafter,
I will examine the structural factors that are mostly put forward to explain why religion
is or at least can be a source of evil. Section four discusses some ideas on how to
respond to religious evil, thereby paying special attention to one of the most
important explanations, namely the exclusivist truth claims of religions.
2. Intolerance and violence as examples of religious evil
Let us first try to define intolerance and violence as the two forms of religious evil
under discussion in this paper. Religious intolerance can be defined as the intentional
and principled (individual or collective) decision to interfere with the intolerable ideas
and behaviors of others in situations of diversity, where one has the power to
interfere and feels justified to use it on the basis of an absolute, exclusivist idea of
religious truth. This means, first, that religious intolerance invariably has a militant
character; it results directly from the confrontation with what people find intolerable on
the basis of the absolute, exclusivist truth that they find inherently present in their
religious doctrine.3 This is why religious intolerance is so often associated with
fanaticism. Furthermore, intolerance has its origin in the reactive passion of
indignation with regard to ideas or behaviors that the adherents of a religious doctrine
find revolting. This indignation often comes the fore through expressions like: “We
don’t want to put up with all that!”4 At a later stage, people look for a rational
justification for their indignation and, consequently, for their intolerance over the
intolerable. The argument thereby often goes like this: since the opposed ideas or
behaviors of others’ run counter to the basic, well-established truths of a given
2
Dolnik and Gunaratna, On the nature of religious terrorism, 345-6.
The militant character of religious intolerance does not mean that it automatically turns into violence.
This depends on whether the faithful see their opposition against the intolerable as something
spiritual, inward, or not. See: Koller, Religious Violence, 13.
4 Ricoeur, The Erosion of Tolerance and the Resistance of the Intolerable, 197f.
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community, they are objectively intolerable.5 Specifically in the case of religious
intolerance, the intolerable is identified as the impious, sacrilegious, heretic, devilish,
etc., thereby adding to the general passion of indignation a specific, transcendent
justification, which enhances the militant character of this kind of intolerance.6 Third,
and in relation to the previous point, the intentional and principled character of the
intolerant interference with the opposed other distinguishes it from other, more
coincidental forms of such interference. In other words, religious intolerance typically
arises from people’s strong opinions about the absolute character of their religious
truths, and the exclusion of those of others.
The militant (or fanatic), transcendently justified, principled character of religious
intolerance and its exclusivist stance towards (the convictions of) others explain why
it can so easily turn into violence. Religiously fueled violence can be defined as
including “those violent acts that are intended to achieve religious objectives and that
are typically thought by the actors or their leaders to be justified by religion.” 7 In
general, the perpetrators of religious violence consider themselves as soldiers for a
great cause, which will, eventually, be beneficial for humankind.
In conclusion, I think that, although the connection between the existing religions and
concrete expressions of evil is indeed a contingent one, depending on specific social
contexts and individual feelings of grievance, religious doctrines and their
interpretation include some universal, structural elements that easily can easily incite
people to intolerance and violence. So, in order to find an answer to the central
question of this paper, we need to analyze the structural character of the relationship
between religion and evil more closely.
3. A philosophical understanding religious evil
What many people find most striking when thinking about or familiarizing themselves
with religion is the latter’s radicalism.8 To quote only one example from the Christian
tradition: “Be perfect […] as your heavenly Father is perfect.”9 Radicalism is not a
coincidental epiphenomenon or a regrettable error or lapse of some religious
fanatics, but is engrained in religion. It regularly crops up internally as well as
externally, that is in the relations of a concrete religious community with its own
5
The harm principle, stemming from John Stuart Mill, is often invoked as a guide to the appropriate
limits of tolerance. See: Powell and Clarke, Religion, Tolerance, and Intolerance, 6f; Ricoeur, The
Erosion of Tolerance and the Resistance of the Intolerable, 198f. Obviously, the delicate question is
how to determine and to justify harm objectively. For a further discussion of this problem see: Peter
Jonkers, Can Freedom of Religion Replace the Virtue of Tolerance? In: A. Singh and P. Losonczi
(ed.), From Political Theory to Political Theology. Religious Challenges and the Prospects of
Democracy. London/New York, Continuum, 2010, 82-84.
6 Coady, Religious Disagreement and Religious Accommodation, 186f.
7 Koller, Religious Violence, 2.
8 See Coady, Religious Disagreement and Religious Accommodation, 185-187, and Staf Hellemans,
De innige banden van religie met radicalisme. In: Religie en Samenleving 9, 1 (2014), 7-22.
9 Mat. 5:48.
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members and with society at large. In my view, analyzing the various components of
religious radicalism will prove to be helpful to understand the structural link between
religion and evil. In order to avoid a misinterpretation of religious radicalism, a few
preliminary remarks have to be made. First, radicalism should not be narrowed down
to intolerant and violent fanaticism. Actually, some forms of radicalism have been
very beneficial for humankind (e.g. the charitable work of mother Theresa and Father
Damien), while others have turned out to be a source of religious evil (e.g. the
crusades). In addition to this, although religious radicalism is nowadays often
identified with outbursts of extreme violence, it can also take the shape of radical
pacifism, as the examples of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King etc. show.10
Defined in a neutral way, religion stands for purity, for favoring radical reforms if
mainstream religion or society at large swerves from the right path,11 for requiring
complete devotion to the religious message, its doctrines, and leaders, for a firm
belief in its truth, and for requiring the faithful to be prepared to pay a high price for
their convictions. This means that radicalism is a concept that summarizes the
demands religion makes on the faithful, showing that the faithful take their faith
seriously. Hence, it is no surprise that the founders of religions and their most
devoted followers are exemplars of radicalism. On the level of religious doctrine, this
radicalism takes the shape of an uncompromising belief in the essential truths of
faith, because they are not ‘man-made’, but revealed by God. In the context of this
paper it is important to note that these truths are not only a purely theoretical affair,
the subject of refined and profound theological study, but also, and more importantly
have a deep impact on people’s identity.
On the basis of these preliminary remarks, let us now examine how various elements
of religious radicalism can be a source of intolerance and violence.12 First and
foremost, religion lets people hope of a different, perfect world, in which all the ills of
this world have been cured and the tensions between people have been reconciled.
In other words, religion essentially comprises the promise of eternal salvation and
bliss in a transcendent world, and a deep trust in the truth of this promise. Although
this promise will only be fulfilled at the end of times, individuals and communities can
dwell utopian energies from it to radically transform the immanent world in order to
realize this perfect order as much as possible in the terrestrial world.13 Since religions
or their leaders want to enliven this hope and strengthen the utopian energies, they
often tend to radicalize this conflict between the disorder and imperfection of the
mundane world and the perfect otherworldly order.14 Through this approach, religions
10
Coady, Religious Disagreement and Religious Accommodation, 186.
André Droogers, The Recovery of Perverted Religion. Internal Power Processes and the
Vicissitudes of Religious Experience. In: M. ter Borg and J.W. van Henten (eds.), Powers. Religion as
a Social and Religious Force, 33.
12 I take Staf Hellemans’ article on religious radicalism as a starting point. He identifies one key
element and two additional factors to explain religion’s radicalism Hellemans, De innige banden van
religie met radicalisme, 9-12.
13 Koller, Religious Violence, 3, 12.
14 Juergensmeyer, Symbolic Violence, 43-45.
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direct the energies of their adherents towards a radical reorientation of individual lives
(through conversion) and to an equally radical restructuring of society (through
revolution) in the immanent world.
This ‘eschatological antagonism’ or ‘apocalyptic confrontation’ not only explains the
radicalism of religion and the direction of the utopian energies it unleashes, but also
helps us to understand why religion can be a source of intolerance and violence.15 It
has to be kept in mind, however, that the link between eschatological antagonism
and intolerance or violence is not a necessary one, since it depends on contingent
motivational factors, as I argued above. But at the same time it is quite evident that
eschatological antagonism is a first, very important structural factor that explains why
religion can become so intolerant and violent. One can even say that the more radical
religion portrays this eschatological antagonism, the greater is the chance that it will
incite to intolerance and violence. If a radical conversion or revolution is presented as
the only option to fulfill the hope of a perfect order, one cannot tolerate any deviation
from the absolute truth; if this world is without value anyway, its (violent) destruction
is no big issue anymore.
A second structural factor has to do with the effectiveness of this utopian energy,
needed to bring about a radical change. The motivational potential of religion
becomes all the stronger as it presents eternal salvation as the ultimate goal of
human existence. If the faithful sincerely believe that their faith is the only truthful
path to the universal salvation of humankind, thereby excluding all other possible
ways of life, they will have a stronger tendency towards militant intolerance and
religious violence. Since the goal of eternal salvation is an absolute and universal
one, it overrules all other, more mundane concerns and ordinary calculations
regarding one’s own well-being and that of others. Moreover, if this goal is presented
in an exclusivist way, it becomes a very effective driving force for militant intolerance
against people of different religious stripes, and even against the lukewarm in one’s
own religious community.
The analysis of these two structural factors points to a specific dynamic that is
constitutive for religion, and offers – at least in my view – the most fundamental
explanation why religion can give rise to militant intolerance and violence. Following
Ricoeur, I propose to characterize this religious dynamic and the violence ensuing
from it as ‘symbolic’. Typically, religion is marked by a fundamental disproportion
between the excess of the groundless ground and my finite capacity of reception,
appropriation, and adaption, or, to put it in metaphorical terms, a disproportion
between the inexhaustible divine mystery as the spring that overflows and the
concrete religion as the vase that tries to contain this spring, in the double sense of
offering a receptacle but also of constraining within limits. Moving away from the
15
Most researchers conclude that the eschatological antagonism between the forces of good and evil
is a common characteristic of the secular ideologies and religious doctrines of many groups involved in
religious violence. See e.g. Koller, Religious Violence, 9; Dolnik and Gunaratna, On the nature of
religious terrorism, 349.
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tradition of ontotheology, the groundless ground does not function as the first basis,
but rather eludes any attempt to master it. But because religious people find it difficult
to accept the elusive character of the groundless ground, they try to force it to adapt
itself to the dimensions of the vase. They feel the need to protect themselves against
the threat of an overflow, the threat of excess, given the finitude of their receptive and
appropriative capacities. Since this disproportion is experienced in the heart of
religion itself, it is a threat to the core of religious identity. Especially in the current
societal context, in which all differences seem to have become indifferent, this threat
looms more than ever. In reaction to this, religions tend to shut themselves up within
the safe walls (or, to put it metaphorically again: within the constraints of the vase)
where they feel at home, in the sense that their identity is not put into question. In
other words, in order to avoid the threat of losing its identity religion may yield to the
temptation to become possessive, resulting in treating the groundless ground, the
inexhaustible spring, or the divine mystery, as an object of desire and fear.
But strengthening the walls against the intrusion of an uncontrollable otherness by
objectifying or laying hold of the divine means to contain by force those on the inside,
as well as to expel those whom religion cannot contain.16 This means that the
reductively possessive reception of the inexhaustible divine mystery has as its
flipside the exclusion of internal or external dissenters, because they are rivals in the
possessive mastery of the divine mystery. This is the core of the symbolic violence
that religion can generate. As numerous examples throughout the history of
humankind have shown, when a religion thinks it can define God’s Kingdom
unambiguously and wants to establish it on earth, such a redeeming endeavor gives
paradoxically rise to the worst kinds of intolerance and violence.
Other factors play an additional role in strengthening the eschatological antagonism
and channeling the utopian energies it generates towards intolerant and violent kinds
of radicalization against others. A first one is the role of religious organizations and
their leaders. Insufficient or inadequate institutional support not only jeopardizes the
coherence and focus of the religious message, but also, and more importantly,
makes it difficult for religions to attract people to and unite them around their
message for the simple reason that it is not heard anymore by large numbers of
(potential) faithful. Eventually, religion then loses its mobilizing potential and its
capacity to be handed down from generation to generation. This is why religions
invest so much energy in institutionalization and the training of their leaders, even
though there are major differences among the various religions. Although one can
argue that religious institutionalization softens radicalism, it also makes radicalism
possible. In this respect, one can think of the concentrated efforts of religious leaders
to inflame the masses of faithful by imbuing them with a narrative of eschatological
antagonism, by stressing the exclusivist character of (their) religious truth, and, above
Ricoeur, Religion and Symbolic Violence, 3-5. See also the analysis of Ricoeur’s views on this issue
by Moyaert, In Response to the Religious Other, 54-67.
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all, by portraying internal and external dissenters as a threat to the own religious
identity.17
A second additional factor, which is in particular responsible for widening the range of
application of religion’s utopian energies in an intolerant and violent way, is the
latter’s omnivalence. By its nature religion pervades all domains of life, giving them
meaning and orientation. Hence, religion can be connected rather easily with ongoing
social, political, cultural, and ethnic conflicts that matter at a specific moment.
Although in many cases, these conflicts are not per se religious, religion’s
omnivalence makes that they easily get a religious dimension.18 Of course, the
reverse also happens quite often: religious struggles regularly spill over onto social
and political controversies. So, the utopian energies of religion can easily be
channeled towards various kinds of conflicts, thus contributing to the latter’s
radicalization. In particular, as all religious, political, ethnic etc. leaders realize,
precisely because of its radicalism religion offers an incredible motivational potential
to individuals and groups, much stronger than regardless which political rule. It can
be used to serve various ends, for the better as well as for the worse, in a peaceful
as well as in an intolerant and violent way.19
4. How to break the ill-fated bond between religion and evil?
The overall conclusion of the previous section is that, “because religion is imbued
with radicalism, both as regards the religious ideals […] and the religious practice
[…], it can turn so easily against persons and society.”20 To be more precise, a
crucial factor in the explanation of this ill-fated bond between religion and the two
kinds of religious evil discussed in this paper appeared to be the radical
eschatological antagonism between the disorder of the immanent world and the
perfect order of the divine, transcendent realm. This radical eschatological
antagonism can be strengthened and channeled by religious organizations and their
leaders, and widened because of the omnivalence of religion. But the most decisive
factor in explaining how religion can become a source of intolerance and violence is
its temptation to lay hold on the dynamic that constitutes its very nature, viz. the
disproportion between the inexhaustible mystery of the divine and the need to
contain it. If religion yields to this temptation by reducing the divine to an object it can
define and control, it inevitably excludes internal and external dissenters, thus
17
Koller, Religious Violence, 15.
Kippenberg, Gewalt als Gottesdienst, 201.
19 In my view, the idea that the peaceful coexistence of religions could be fostered by understanding
religious conflicts as “a consequence of basically profane power processes rather than as based on
incommensurable religious experiences” does not seem very helpful, precisely since it negates the
omnivalence of religion. See: Droogers, The Recovery of Perverted Religion, 36. In a similar vein,
Juergensmeyer’s suggestion that religion should stay religion, that is that the transcendent conflict of
ultimate values should be imagined as residing on a transcendent plane, also negates this
omnivalence. See Juergensmeyer, Symbolic Violence, 50.
20 Staf Hellemans, De innige banden van religie met radicalisme, 14.
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justifying intolerance and violence against them. In the light of all this, the unsettling,
but crucial question is how religion can respond to the intolerance and violence it
structurally generates. In this paper, I want to develop only one response, which can
be summarized as disconnecting religious truth and exclusivism.
When it comes to justifying intolerance and violence committed in the name of the
divine, religions seem to appeal to an idea of absolute, revealed truth.21 Section three
regularly drew the attention to the crucial role of this idea in religious doctrine, in
particular its central role in religious orthodoxy and fundamentalism: they are based
on “the belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the
fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity.” 22
Hence, religious truth is by definition unquestionable and absolute, and has the
highest authority, because it is not man-made, but revealed by God.
Against this background, it is no wonder that some prominent political philosophers,
such as Habermas and Rawls, are very critical of the notion of religious truth, in
particular when religions enter the public space. However, taking into account that
the idea of religious truth is a keystone of religion and its doctrine, their requirement
that religions have to give up this idea and replace it by the notion of unforced,
overlapping consensus in a context of pluralism, will not be acceptable for most
religions.23 Since the idea of religious truth is so closely linked to a divine revelation
or a sacred tradition, religions perceive the requirement to give it up, especially in the
public sphere, as a betrayal of everything they stand for.
So, the question is how to accept the fact that religions refer to an absolute, divine
truth, while at the same time avoiding that they use this idea as a pretext for
intolerance and violence. The core of my argument is that the idea of religious truth
as such is not responsible for these kinds of evil, as the examples of orthodoxy and
fundamentalism show. (they hold on to the absolute truth of the religious message,
but this does not incite them to intolerance and violence), but rather the claim to
exclusivism. As noted above, religious exclusivism allows religions to expel internal
or external dissenters, to be intolerant towards them, and even to deny their right to
exist physically. Dissenters have no worth and can be dispensed of, since only those
who believe in the one and only true God will be saved. Hence, not so much
religion’s absolute truth claims, but rather its exclusivism paves the way for
intolerance and violence and justifies it.
In order to stave off religious exclusivism and its violent consequences, let us take up
again Ricoeur’s idea that symbolic religious violence stems from the incapacity of
religions to deal with the disproportion between the inexhaustible divine mystery and
the need to contain it in human language and practices. Because religious individuals
21
Koller, Religious Violence, 15.
Altemeyer and Hunsberger, Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, quest, and prejudice. In:
International Journal for Psychology of Religion, 2, 1992, 118. Quoted in: Powell and Clarke, Religion,
Tolerance, and Intolerance, 15.
23 From a Christian perspective, the problems of religious pluralism have been analyzed in Gavin
D’Costa (ed.), Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered. The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions.
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and communities feel threatened by the possible loss of identity, they tend to lay hold
of this mystery by reducing it to an object that can be defined and controlled in a
narrow and unambiguous way. Characteristic of exclusivism is that it seeks to
delineate and defend an absolute truth that provides a sense of identity and must be
protected from all compromise. In order to disconnect religious truth from exclusivism
Ricoeur proposes a new way of thinking about tolerance, which enables believing
people to hold on to their idea of absolute truth, but without having to endorse the
intolerant and violent consequences of religious exclusivism. For Ricoeur, the specific
virtue of tolerance that is needed to counter the deadlock of exclusivism consists in
distinguishing between truth and justice: “It is not in the name of truth as it appears to
me […] that one accepts (and not simply endures) the other, but in the name of his
equal right to mine to live his life as he seems fit.”24 This stage of tolerance entitles
religions to hold on to their idea of absolute truth, but requires them also to abandon
the asymmetry of power (the difference between acting and being acted upon), which
inevitably leads to the intolerance and violence of exclusivism, in favor of the
reciprocal recognition of the right of others to exert their power of existing. The virtue
that is required in this stage of tolerance is the willingness to subordinate one’s idea
of truth to that of justice, in particular, to the idea of equal human dignity, which
includes people’s individual right to religious freedom.
A further step in the virtue of tolerance starts with the reflecting on the consequences
of the disproportion between the inexhaustible divine mystery and the need to
contain it in human language and practices. Accepting this fundamental insight
implies that my conviction is not equal to the Truth (with a capital T), that I don’t
possess the Truth, but that I can only hope to be in the Truth, for the simple reason
that the Truth is inexhaustible. But if I accept this insight, I have also to admit the
possibility that there is also some truth other than for me, although I don’t know what
it is.25 Again, accepting this insight does not require me to give up the idea of
religious truth, but only refrains me from falling into the deadlock of exclusivism, and,
hence, from having recourse to intolerance and violence to safeguard my (religious)
identity.
5. Conclusion
In this contribution, I have analyzed the reasons why religion can be a source of evil,
in particular of intolerance and violence. Precisely because it defends so strongly an
absolute, divine idea of truth, it can so easily lead to exclusivism and its fateful
practical consequences. In order to break this aspect of the ill-fated bond between
religion and evil, it is vital that religions are aware of the eschatological antagonism
and the disproportion that constitutes their essence, and deal with it in a positive, not
24
Ricoeur, The Erosion of Tolerance and the Resistance of the Intolerable, 192.
Ricoeur, The Erosion of Tolerance and the Resistance of the Intolerable, 194f.; Idem, Religion and
Symbolic Violence, 2.
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in a destructive way. Many things are needed in order to realize this, not only on a
theoretical, but above all on a practical level. Although my discussion of these issues
only dealt with them on a theoretical level, I want to draw the attention to three crucial
practical requisites. The first is that that religions are (self-)reflective, meaning that
they are conscious of taking up their position in a broader societal and religious field.
Furthermore, they need to be willing to make use of their self-critical and selfcorrective potential, of which the history of religions gives ample evidence. The third
requisite is that, given the essential responsibility of religious leaders in avoiding that
religion indeed becomes a source of evil, it is imperative that they are educated and
trained in religious self-reflexivity and self-correction.