CSMN workshop on Adam Smith and Virtue
CSMN, Oslo, Thursday and Friday, August 27/28, 2015
Workshop Venue: University of Oslo, Blindern Campus,
Georg Morgenstiernes Hus, room 652
Adam Smith and Virtue
Current debates on the nature of human morality have led to a revival of interest in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics.
However, it was not only in ancient times that thinking about the virtues was high on the agenda of moral
philosophy. It also played an important part in the moral thought of the Scottish Enlightenment. CSMN is
hosting a workshop in which participants explore Adam Smith’s moral thought and the role he attributes to the
virtues. His virtue theory takes the shape of a kind of reflective sentimentalism and represents a contribution to
our understanding of human morality that still deserves our interest.
Organizers: Julia Annas and Christel Fricke
ABSTRACTS (in order of presentation)
Aaron Garrett (Boston):
The Irregularity of Sentiments and the Goals of Moral Theorizing –
Hume and Smith on Strength of Mind
In this essay I will argue that Smith recognizes the errors of his predecessors Hutcheson and
Hume in overstepping what a moral theory ought to do: They make questionable assumptions
about providence and the moral sense that make for a coherent moral theory at the cost of a
credible one. Smith adopts a different route, to restrict the goals of moral theorizing to moral
psychology and to reject both meta-ethical theorizing and the ultimate unity of normative
explanations. Hence the importance of the irregularity of the sentiments.
Sveinung Sivertsen (Bergen):
Love redirected: how the love of being praiseworthy can arise from the love of praise
In his book Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue (2009), Ryan Patrick Hanley, like many
other recent commentators on Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments, points to Smith's
statements about man being endowed, “not only with a desire of being approved of, but with a
desire of being what ought to be approved of” (TMS III.2.7, 136), as an important piece in the
puzzle of Smith's normative argument. But if it really is the case that the normative reading
of Smith's model of moral judgement “rests on his postulation of a love of praiseworthiness
both logically and temporally prior to a love of praise,” as Hanley puts it in connection with
the distinction between being and seeming (2009, 140), then it appears that Smith is merely
positing his way out of the worry that his model is merely descriptive or, if normative,
relativistic. If one could avoid positing an original desire for being praiseworthy and show
instead how such a desire can arise in moral development, this might be a way of
strengthening the normative, non-relativistic reading of TMS. It is my aim in the present paper
to show that this can be done, and it is my working hypothesis that one can combine this
argument with Hanley's argument about the role of virtues in TMS.
Christel Fricke (Oslo, CSMN):
The Virtue of Impartiality – On the Nature of Adam Smith’s Moral Theory
According to Smith, the moral judge is or should be an ‘impartial spectator’. ‘Impartiality’
can be understood both as a virtue and a character trait. But it is a character trait of a judge
rather than that of an agent; it is manifest in proper moral judgments. These judgments are
action guiding. But Smith’s account of these judgments is independent of whether or not there
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any actual actions that are guided by them. Thus, Adam Smith’s moral theory is hybrid in
kind: It combines elements of virtue theory (the conception of morality as an ideal and the
account of moral motivation in terms of the search for a good life) with elements of modern
moral theory such as deontology or utilitarianism (the focus on the moral judgment and the
justification of its claims to universality). Adam Smith’s moral theory challenges the all too
common categorical distinction between virtue theory on the one hand and modern moral
theories on the other.
Nir Ben-Moshe (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign):
Adam Smith and the Possibility of Universal Virtue
In this paper, I examine the possibility of universal virtue in the context of a spectator-based
account of moral judgment. In particular, I defend a novel account of Adam Smith's "impartial
spectator" as the standard of correctness for moral judgment. I make use of a complexity in
Smith’s conceptualization of the relations between sympathy and approbation, as well as a
new interpretation of his use of reflective endorsement, in order to sketch an account of a
modestly idealized, impartial standpoint which constitutes the appropriate conditions for
moral judgments, making the objects of our patterns of approval approvable (worthy-ofapproval) and our moral judgments correct. In order to avoid circularity, I provide a
developmental story that demonstrates how the standpoint of the impartial spectator is
constructed from the bottom up, from agents’ sympathetic reactions and patterns of approval
towards an impartial point of view. Once the standard is in place, these agents can also work
from the top down, from their judgments of what is morally appropriate and inappropriate
towards reshaping and broadening their sympathetic reactions. I conclude by explaining how
the standpoint of the impartial spectator can determine virtue in a manner that transcends
personal and societal points of view.
Jack Russell Weinstein (North Dakota):
Are Virtues Spontaneous?
In Adam Smith's Pluralism (Yale UP, 2013), I argue that moral sentiments are rational, and
subject to critical thinking and revision. Rational sentiments allow a deeper connection
between the moral actor and the community while still preserving moral independence. They
also support a moral progressivism that leads to historical improvement. In response, Craig
Smith argues that my account is "troubling" because it suggests that "for Smith the rules of
morality are not spontaneous." In this paper, I seek to examine his objection, calling into
doubt the role of spontaneous order in Smith's corpus.
The paper will be divided into two sections. The first will look at the coherence of
spontaneous order itself, contrasting it with natural law, constitutional governance, and
Smith's stadial approach to history. The second will ask how deep spontaneity must go to
integrate it into Smith's moral theory. In the process, I will examine what spontaneous order
might mean for the virtues and the moral sentiments.Sveinung Sivertsen (Bergen):
Love redirected: how the love of being praiseworthy can arise from the love of praise
Ryan Hanley (Marquette):
Adam Smith on Self-Command
That Adam Smith held the virtue of self-command in high regard is well known. Less well
understood is why Smith held self-command in such high regard.
This paper argues that Smith’s interest in self-command derives from his recognition of its
unique capacity to further three related yet discrete elements of his ethical project: utility,
dignity, and sympathy. First, self-command plays an indispensible role in promoting the
individual’s self-interested efforts to maximize her utility. In part, these utility-maximizing
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efforts aim at material goods. But Smith also thinks that self-command plays a key role in
maximizing our pursuits of other non-material external goods, such as esteem and tranquility.
Second, Smith values self-command for the opportunities it provides to individuals to exercise
their capacities as dignified beings. In this sense, self-command plays a crucial role both in
Smith’s substantive concept of dignity and in his concern to develop mechanisms whereby
individuals can pursue the realization of their authentic selves – a side of Smith’s moral
psychology that has not been often emphasized. Third, Smith values self-command for its
capacity to support the bonds of a society built on sympathy and dedicated to equality. In this
sense, self-command not only promotes individual well-being but also plays a social and
political role. And herein lies one of the most interesting sides of Smithean self-command.
Where classical theories of self-command often emphasize insensibility to all passions,
including sentiments towards others, Smithean self-command discriminates between
sentiments. One of Smith’s key claims on this front is that self-command properly understood
is capable of encouraging at once insensibility to self as well as sensibility to others – a
capacity of self-command that renders it particularly suited to modern polities committed to
equality. Reconsidering Smithean self-command through these three lenses of utility, dignity,
and sympathy can help us better understand Smith’s reasons for so highly admiring selfcommand, even within the context of the modern commercial state.
Lisa Hill (Adelaide):
The Poor Man’s Son and the Corruption of Our Moral Sentiments:
Commerce, Virtue and Happiness in Adam Smith
In this paper I respond to the view that, contrary to the popular perception, Adam Smith was
sceptical about the value of material acquisition. I also explore whether he believed that the
pursuit of virtue –especially beneficence--offers a superior route to happiness than the
commercial world of materialist acquisition. I approach these issues partly by considering the
role of beneficence in Smith’s system but primarily by analysing the story of the poor man’s
son related in Book IV of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. As he narrates this story, Smith
seems highly critical of the unrelenting drive for worldly success. But what is the real moral
of the story? Should people contain their ambitions for recognition and material success and
pursue virtue instead?
By way of answering this question I suggest that Smith does not really go this far;
nevertheless, his discussion in and around the story of the poor man’s son points to a
significant tension between his personal ideal of happiness and his observations and
recommendations as a social scientist. Smith seems to be suggesting that, while society may
be able to thrive without classical virtue, individual agents fare less happily in its absence. But
whether this resolves the tension adequately is unclear.
Aino Lahdenranta (Boston/Jyväskylä):
Smith’s solution to Hume’s puzzle concerning justice
There is a large debate about the relevant motive in Hume’s account of artificial virtue. Is it
enlightened self-love, blind rule-following, or sense of moral duty that motivates just acts and
gains our approval? In this paper, I examine Smith’s answer to the same question. For Smith,
vicarious resentment provides a completely natural foundation for the norms of justice but the
question of motive remains. I claim that with respect to motivation justice turns out to be
more artificial than the other virtues. Namely, fear of blame-worthiness must play a direct
motivational role in the uniform observance of justice whereas living up to the other virtues is
bound to be a matter of cultivating natural passions. I also argue that defining justice in
negative terms is the key move that allows Smith to stay true to a sentimentalist understanding
of virtue and vice.
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