US South Asia Policy Needs a Focus
Jon P. Dorschner, PhD.
5,528 words
US South Asia policy has been scattershot. It has not had overlying long-term
policy objectives, but has rather been reactive, reflecting radically shifting
priorities. The policy lacks long-term goals and a consistent plan for realizing
these goals. What is the explanation for this strange and counterproductive
inconsistency?
I would argue that the principal explanatory variable is the attempt to make
the policy fit within realist parameters. This orientation has been both
counterproductive and inconsistent. Realism dictates a foreign policy based
on US national interests. Realism dictates that a successful policy must
ensure that the US obtains maximum benefit from its relationship with the
nations of the South Asian subcontinent. A serious examination of US foreign
policy in the region confirms that this orientation has provided mixed results
at best.
Selected American business and economic interests have benefitted from US
policy, and the US has benefitted from the hard and productive labor of
generations of South Asian immigrants. However, the US has also expended
billions of dollars and thousands of American lives in the region pursuing
undefined policy objectives.
The US would be better advised to pursue a liberal rather than a realist
foreign policy. Such a shift in orientation would not only benefit the United
States, but the South Asian region as a whole.
Structural Problems with Realism
One explanation for this lack of cohesion is that the South Asian region was
neglected for many years by the US foreign policy establishment. Throughout
the cold war the region played second fiddle to Europe and East Asia. South
Asia only came to the forefront of US foreign policy on an intermittent basis,
depending on US domestic political considerations (change in
administrations), and shifting priorities, most notably the war on terrorism.
In South Asia, the US government has thrown lots of attention and resources
at specific issues while they are on the front burner, only to withdraw
precipitously as soon as the issue has been “solved,” or there is a shift in
priorities.
Over the course of a series of relatively rapid and serious escalations and deescalations, the State Department has not taken the initiative to play a key
role in South Asia policy deliberations. As a result of this lack of input, the
State Department has little or no influence over policy formulation and has
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been relegated to implementing policies devised and driven by the White
House and the Defense Department.
Until relatively recently, South Asia did not receive a lot of attention within
the United States. This resulted in a deficiency of South Asia area experts
within the government and academia. Their input and policy
recommendations were routinely given short shrift. South Asia policy
formulation was left to political movers and shakers with little or no regional
background or experience, who were more concerned with shifting political
concerns than regional interests.
Domestic Political Constraints
For example, Republican policy makers pursued counterproductive policies
in the region due to their ideological orientation. Viewing South Asia through
the prism of anti-Communism, they excluded other factors. This ideological
mindset labeled India’s secular socialist government as “pro-Communist,”
and branded Pakistan’s Islamic government as “anti-Communist.” In fact,
Communism was of little concern to either country.
Many Republicans continued to focus on Communism even after the demise
of the Soviet Union, by turning their attention to China. They wanted to move
India out of the “pro-Communist” column and engineer an Indian shift to the
“pro-American” column. At the outset of the Bush administration, members
of this camp entertained fond hopes of enlisting India in a grand alliance to
“contain” China. It was not clear what role Pakistan, with its close defense;
political and economic ties with China would play in this construct.
After the 9/11 attacks, much of the obsession with defeating Communism
was routed into a “war on terrorism.” GOP over-reaction to the 9/11 attacks
was profound. The attacks were directed and funded by al Qaeda
headquartered in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda was in Afghanistan as a guest of the
Taliban, which had defeated most of its Afghan opponents and established an
“Islamic Emirate” in Afghanistan. The Taliban was a creation of Pakistan and
its Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI), in pursuit of military
objectives. Obsessed with India, the Pakistani military believed it needed a
pliable government in Afghanistan to provide “strategic depth.” Fully aware
of its inability to defeat India in a conventional conflict, the Pakistan Army
concluded that control of Afghanistan would provide it additional battle area
to extend an India/Pakistan conflict and increase Pakistan’s chances of
survival if not victory.
US policy makers with little or no exposure to the region, focused on the
Taliban/al Qaeda nexus as the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. Faced with
an American ultimatum after 9/11, Pakistan purportedly shifted sides and
joined the “anti-terror” alliance. Many American policy makers accepted this
shift at face value, even though subsequent events proved it was
opportunistic rather than genuine.
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This is not to imply that the GOP is the sole architect of US policy blunders in
South Asia. Both Democrats and the Republicans subscribe to the realist
worldview when it comes to South Asia and attempt to implement a realist
foreign policy. The difference between the two parties is that the GOP is
much more nationalistic and espouses a more doctrinaire version of realist
doctrine.
The Democrats try to have it both ways, by mixing liberal elements into the
realist policy. This means that Democrats are not averse to espousing and
trying to implement foreign policies based on liberal objectives not strictly in
the American national interest. These include support for human rights,
environmental concerns, world peace, and disarmament and nonproliferation policies. The GOP’s more dogmatic approach often rules out
liberal objectives.
Nonproliferation
Perhaps nowhere is this contrast more apparent than in the area of nonproliferation policy. Both India and Pakistan spent decades pursuing nuclear
weapons arsenals. Realist doctrine argues that the US should not be
concerned with this potential proliferation unless it works against US
interests. The GOP’s doctrinaire opposition to non-proliferation controls
resulted in a willingness to accept India and Pakistan as nuclear weapons
states, and view this development as a way to undermine the international
nonproliferation regime.
US administrations, both Democratic and Republican were fully aware of
nuclear programs in both India and Pakistan for many years. In the case of
Pakistan, the US made a realist trade-off. It chose to overlook the Pakistani
program as long as Pakistan supported the US covert war in Afghanistan.
This enabled Pakistan to develop its own nuclear arsenal.
Pakistan then proliferated nuclear technology to rogue states intent on
building their own nuclear weapons. By the time this became apparent,
Pakistan was enlisted into the “war on terror,” and the US concluded that it
could not conduct the war in Afghanistan without Pakistani assistance. The
US then continued to support Pakistan despite its proliferation and did not
support the implementation of serious sanctions against the Pakistani
government.
Human Rights
The GOP’s adherence to a strict realist doctrine also downplays human rights
concerns. Realism asserts that moralistic concerns play no role in foreign
policy formulation as they undermine the national interest. Both Democratic
and Republican administrations supported dictatorships, when they
determined that such support benefitted American national interest. This is a
perfect example of how realism is implemented.
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This is certainly true in South Asia. For example, the US has allied itself with
military dictatorships in Pakistan, and the right-wing Hindu nationalist BJP
government in India despite their poor human rights records. US support to
the BJP government continued even after it conducted anti-Muslim pogroms
in Gujarat. The US government did not allow human rights concerns to
interfere with its active alliances with these governments.
Ignoring Environmental Concerns
Realist doctrine has also consigned environmental issues to the back burner.
Although the South Asian region faces extreme environmental degradation,
these issues are seldom raised. The GOP is not concerned about
environmental/climate change issues. GOP administrations oppose actively
measures to combat climate change, and encourage the development of
alternative or sustainable energy production. This adherence to realism has
resulted in weak or non-existent programs to enlist the region in cooperative
efforts to address environmental issues of worldwide concern.
Even the GOP Deviates
Just as the Democrats occasionally stray from realist doctrine to promote
“liberal” ideas, the GOP has also been sidetracked by ideological concerns
away from a dogmatic adherence to realism. This is particularly evident
when it comes to the involvement of lobbying groups in the formulation of
population policy. The GOP’s “right to life” ideology leads it to implement
policies that undermine international population policies, even when these
policies are clearly in the US national interest.
Explosive population growth underlies much of South Asia’s widespread
poverty. This poverty prevents South Asian countries from entering the
economic mainstream and participating fully in globalization. The many
South Asians living in absolute poverty cannot consume products produced
by American corporations, making it more difficult for American companies
to make productive investments in the region.
This poverty also contributes to regional instability and increases the
likelihood of military conflict and terrorism. In today’s interconnected world,
conflict in South Asia could quickly spread and destabilize the world
economic and political system. The existence of nuclear arsenals in India and
Pakistan makes this particularly dangerous. A realist would argue that the
United States would over the long-term gain huge benefits for relatively little
cost by supporting population control efforts in South Asia. In this instance,
however, the GOP has subordinated national interest and realist principles to
ideological concerns.
Realists also see no role for religious groups in the formulation of foreign
policy, as this would include the unnecessary introduction of morality.
Realists would see no plausible reason to introduce religious concerns into
South Asian policy.
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The British East Indian Company learned this lesson well in the 19th Century.
When it tried to “reform” Indian society by espousing the Christian faith, it
contributed directly to the 1857 mutiny by Hindu and Muslim “sepoys,”
placing Company rule in serious danger. When the British Crown took over
the administration of India after the mutiny it removed religious concerns
from governance.
Just as evangelical Christians played a strong role during the reign of Queen
Victoria, evangelical Christians play a strong role in the GOP. The potential
consequences are just as grave for the US in the 21st Century as they were for
the British Empire in the 19th. South Asia has been a long term and
consistent focus of American evangelical groups, which view the
subcontinent as an opportunity to propagate the Christian religion. Their
powerful influence prompted the GOP to make not so subtle policy shifts
during the Bush administration in favor of Christian groups. The Bush
Administration looked the other way when these groups pursued an antiHindu and anti Muslim missionary agenda, assisting missionaries who got
into trouble for their activities, even when it caused problems in US relations
with countries in the region.
The Anti-Islam Alliance
The evangelical lobby influenced US relations with the BJP government, and
contributed to US reaction to the 9/11 attacks. Already hostile to Islam, these
groups contributed to a wave of Islam phobia after the 9/11 attacks. This has
an enormous impact on South Asia. The BJP government had long called for
the creation of an anti-Pakistan alliance with the US and Israel, arguing that
all three countries were targets of Islamic terrorists based in Pakistan and
supported by the Pakistan government.
The BJP and American evangelicals were strange bedfellows. The
evangelicals have long denigrated Hinduism, with many calling for its
eradication and replacement by Christianity. Likewise, the BJP’s Hindu
nationalist ideology has long identified Christian missionaries as the enemies
of Hindu civilization and the Indian Christian community as a fifth column.
Despite this, the Bush administration pursued close ties with the BJP
government, and attempted to convince it to dispatch Indian troops to the
war in Iraq, while subtly encouraging BJP dreams of an anti-Pakistan alliance.
These efforts clouded the US/Pakistan relationship, with Pakistan objecting
to what it called a Christian/Jewish/Hindu axis devoted to its destruction.
The controversy faded away when the BJP and the Bush administration were
voted out of office and replaced by governments with a more secular
orientation.
United on Economics
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While Republicans and Democrats diverge on implementing a strict realist
foreign policy in South Asia, both parties strongly support doctrinaire liberal
economic policies espousing globalization and promoting American
commercial and business interests. Promotion of free markets, international
investment and deregulation has dominated American foreign policy
worldwide. This is particularly true in South Asia, which has been touted as
one of the world’s largest untapped markets. Both parties have subordinated
South Asia policy to US commercial/business interests reducing this complex
region of complex problems to a potential market that must be opened to US
sales and investment.
US commitment to these principles has caused serious foreign policy
problems throughout the region. This is particularly evident in India.
Because of its colonial heritage, Indian policy makers have been inordinately
concerned with preserving Indian independence and sovereignty. Indian
political leaders from across the political spectrum view strong US espousal
of liberal economic policies as an infringement of Indian sovereignty. The
BJP by contrast embraced liberalization and called for quick and widespread
“reform” of the Indian economy.
India’s ruling Congress Party embraced economic liberalization with
reservations. It wanted to liberalize at its own pace, maintain much of the
public sector, and reserve the right to reject economic policies it deemed too
“radical” or “inconsistent” with Indian circumstances. Many within the
Congress party and other Indian political parties rejected American
assertions that liberal economic principals have universal application. Under
both GOP and Democratic administrations the US pressured India to seed up
the pace of economic liberalization, and institute economic policies that
Indian policy makers did not believe were in India’s best interest.
Liberal Economics and Poverty Reduction
This strong faith in liberal economics has shaped US poverty reduction
policies. While both the GOP and the Democrats promote liberal economic
principals and believe they are universally applicable, the GOP’s conservative
ideology has resulted in a more adamant Republican version. American
conservative philosophy identifies government as the enemy of progress and
is devoted to reducing its role in the economy. Conservatives see the private
sector as the legitimate engine for poverty reduction.
South Asia has the largest concentration of poor people in the world, and
poverty reduction should its number one concern. Both Democrats and
Republicans believe that economic liberalization will result in large-scale
poverty alleviation anywhere in the world. They point to the fact that liberal
economic policies have lifted millions out of poverty, while creating growing
middle classes not just in India, but also in countries throughout the region.
However, it is not clear whether economic liberalization alone or a mix of
liberalization and other policies will be the key that lifts the South Asian
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region out of poverty. Events in the United States have dampened South
Asian enthusiasm for liberal economic reform, causing many South Asians to
conclude that liberalization is not the magic bullet as claimed by its
adherents. The US has implemented widespread deregulation, tax and
spending cuts and shrinking of government. Most economists agree that
these policies touched off the most serious economic crisis in the US since the
great depression. Instead of promised poverty alleviation, the US has seen
increased concentration of wealth, increased poverty, and a degradation of
public services, the social safety net and national infrastructure. American
conservatives argue that the private sector will provide needed services once
carried out by government and with more efficiency. American policy
makers, believing in the universal applicability of these economic ideas,
urged their Indian counterparts to jump on the bandwagon and adopt these
policies wholesale. When Indian policy makers refused to comply, they
became objects of official American hostility.
Up to half of the Indian population lives in absolute poverty, trying to subsist
on incomes of $2 per day or less. Liberalization has provided some mobility
for these individuals out of absolute poverty and in some cases into the
middle class. However, some economists now argue that liberalization has
reached its limits and is becoming more counter-productive. They argue that
the government is still the most effective agency to deliver basic services to
the poorest of the poor. For example, the Indian government feeds the
children of the poor by providing free mid-day meals at school, encouraging
school attendance and improving school performance of children who are
often under-nourished. No private sector program would take this on, as it
provides no possibility of making a profit.
Class Orientation
India’s embrace of liberal economic policies benefitted the Indian middle
class, which could participate in the liberal economy by supplying an
educated workforce and embracing entrepreneurship. India’s poor often do
not have the necessary education and capital.
Proponents of liberal economics proscribe universal privatization of the
economy, reductions in the power of labor unions, and dismantling of
“inefficient” public services provided by the government. The US policy
establishment has painted economic liberalization as an unqualified success
by pointing to the gains of the Indian middle class and elites. They dismiss
the limited positive impact on the poor by calling for patience while the
benefits “trickle down.”
Denigration of Nehruvian Economics
For ideological reasons American economic thinking denigrated the socialism
espoused by India’s first Congress government under the leadership of
Jawaharlal Nehru, dismissing them “Nehruvian economics” and a brake on
progress. These critics have been unwilling to acknowledge the
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achievements of the Nehru government in the economic area as to do so
would call their unqualified faith in liberal economics into question. For
example, Nehru and his economic team insisted that a vibrant public sector is
necessary to address India’s extensive and deeply rooted poverty.
Who is Responsible for Corruption?
Liberal economic orthodoxy blames Nehruvian economics for India’s
widespread corruption, stating that corruption is inherent in economic
systems with a strong public sector. Liberal economics asserts that
privatization will reduce this high corruption rate. Despite these claims,
economic liberalization has not reduced corruption in India. Rather, despite
years of intensive privatization, India is embroiled in a series of high-level
corruption scandals and Indian media accounts assert that corruption is
more widespread than ever. Economic analysts confirm that corruption is
one of the most daunting problems inhibiting Indian economic progress. It is
now apparent that Indian private sector interests are as much or more prone
to corruption as their public sector counterparts and that India’s deeply
corrupt private sector interests have undermined the democratic process and
the Indian economy in pursuit of their own narrowly defined interests.
And Nehruvian Foreign Policy
American critics of the Nehru era are also highly critical of Nehru’s foreign
policy. Nehru was the architect of India’s non-alignment policy. Despite
considerable pressure from the United States, the current Congress
government has shown little inclination to significantly modify or abandon
this policy. It has resisted American overtures to become an active ally of the
United States. In the American view, India must jettison its Nehruvian
heritage and construct an alliance with the United States with both economic
and military components. Many Indians view this insistence as American
interference and dictation. Indian policy makers often wonder why the US
criticizes India for pursuing an independent economic or foreign policy.
Over Emphasis on Military Policy
The dominance of military concerns in US foreign policy is also the object of
considerable criticism in the subcontinent. Critics have long argued that the
US has allowed its military industrial complex to acquire too much influence
over policy making. In South Asia, this military emphasis has led to US
attempts to recruit India and Pakistan into active military alliances and active
marketing of US weapons systems to South Asian militaries. This emphasis
on military alliances and arms sales fits squarely within realist policy
objectives. It places American military and economic interests foremost and
does not allow poverty alleviation or other liberal concerns to enter into the
picture. As long as American arms producers can open new markets and
extend their profits, the policy is considered beneficial to US national
interests. Likewise, this policy promotes the realist premise that security is
assured through a system of “balancing” military alliances.
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Liberal critics argue that while this foreign policy emphasis may provide
short-term benefits to American industry, it will undermine the region over
the long term. This policy subordinates other concerns to arms sales in a
region suffering from widespread poverty. Most economists agree that arms
purchases do little or nothing to alleviate poverty other market segments are
more productive investments. Regional governments have few resources.
American weapons systems are very expensive. It is difficult to argue that
this is the best investment of scarce resources.
American willingness to sell weapons to both India and Pakistan (as well as
other governments in the region) would make the US the region’s principal
arms supplier. It is debatable whether this is the best way to assure security.
India and Pakistan are locked in a bitter rivalry. Pakistan has traditionally
viewed American weapons systems as “force multipliers” that enable
Pakistan to achieve a level of parity with India on the battlefield. When both
countries use American weapons, the US is drawn into the unenviable role of
becoming arms supplier to belligerents. This undermines US credibility and
its potential to play a constructive role in preventing conflict. In the event of
active warfare the US must supply both sides. If the US refuses to supply one
or both of the belligerents, it loses its credibility as a reliable arms supplier.
The US is sacrificing long-term goals in exchange for short-term ones.
Tying the US in Knots
When it comes to US/Pakistan policy, the United States has tied itself into
knots based on slim premises. The US used realist principals to justify its
support of military dictatorship in Pakistan. Having made this initial
decision, the US found itself facing increasing contradictions. The Pakistani
military uses terrorism as an instrument in foreign policy. The US, already
committed to a complex mutually dependent relationship with Pakistan,
decided to downplay or overlook these facts and insist that Pakistan is an ally
in the war on terror. As a result, the US refused to sanction Pakistan for its
support of terrorism. Pakistan continues to receive billions of dollars in
American military and economic aid, further undermining US credibility in
the region and around the world.
The same pattern emerges in regards to human rights. In the name of realist
expediency, the United States continued its relationship with the Pakistani
military after it overthrew civilian elected governments. The Pakistani
military viewed this as American acquiescence. It then cultivated Islamic
extremist elements as agents of its foreign and domestic policies and used
them as surrogates. The Islamic elements dismantled secular ideals
espoused by Pakistan’s founder Mohammad ali Jinnah and his
contemporaries that were enshrined in the Pakistani constitution. This
resulted in massive human rights setbacks for Pakistan’s religious minorities
and women, who become victims of widespread discrimination.
Furthermore, the Islamic extremists refused to uphold their part of the
bargain and play the role of loyal surrogates for the Pakistani military.
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Instead, they unleashed a terror campaign in Pakistan, locking the Pakistan
Army into a deadly combat with its own clients, while thousands of innocent
Pakistani civilians become victims of sectarian violence and terrorism.
Accepting Responsibility
The United States invested considerable resources to cultivate Pakistan as an
ally and bears some responsibility for this state of affairs. However, the US
refuses to acknowledge the foreign policy errors that resulted in the
destruction of Afghanistan and the undermining of Pakistan. The United
States tried to view Pakistan through a cold war prism and enlist Pakistan in
a crusade against Communism, when Communism was not an essential
concern of the Pakistani population.
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the US felt compelled to take
steps to oust it, even though this ran counter to realist principals. Realism
would dictate that Afghanistan is not sufficiently important to American
interests to justify intervention there. In this instance, the US viewed
resistance to Soviet expansion as a moral principal rather than a cold realist
calculation. The US was reluctant to enlist Islamic extremists as clients in the
anti-Soviet war and funneled covert aid to Islamic “moderates,” with little
military capability.
When Soviet forces were on the verge of winning, the United States decided
to abandon its allies and turn the conflict into an Islamic holy war (jihad). It
recruited new allies from among Afghanistan’s Islamic extremist groups as
well as Islamic volunteers from other countries, most particularly the Middle
East, and most particularly Saudi Arabia.
After the Soviet withdrawal, the US decided to withdraw from Afghanistan,
leaving a political and economic vacuum to by filled by the Islamist groups.
They unleashed a reign of terror and destruction on Afghanistan. The US
then acquiesced to Pakistani support for its own surrogate group, the
Taliban. This led to the al Qaeda/Taliban nexus, the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
and the longest war in American history.
Sometimes it is More Beneficial not to Intervene
Despite this sad trail of foreign policy misjudgments, the US failed to
acknowledge its responsibility for the prolonged covert war against the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Without American intervention, Soviet forces
would have won. However, the victory would have had no impact on the
outcome of the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the regime it
installed in Afghanistan would have followed the same route taken by the
Soviet Republics. It would have renounced Communism while embracing a
quasi Islamist ideology. The Afghan people would have been spared decades
of merciless conflict and the harsh Islamic regime of the Taliban. The
Communists would have encouraged secular thinking and expanded rights
for women and ethnic and religious minorities, while implementing an
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economic development strategy that would have left a functioning
infrastructure. This would have been better outcome than that engineered
by American policy.
Pakistan cultivated Islamic extremists and helped install the Taliban regime
in Kabul. These same extremists conducted a string of deadly terrorist
attacks against India resulting in the death and injury of thousands of
innocent people. The attacks pushed India and Pakistan to the brink of war
on several occasions. Although fully aware of Pakistan’s role in these attacks,
Washington did not take a strong stance in opposition. By this point, the US
was so closely involved in Pakistan and had compromised its principals so
many times, that it was incapable of applying the measures necessary to
compel Pakistan to abandon its support for terrorism. American inaction
appeared as acquiescence and gave the impression that the United States was
not concerned. It undermined American credibility in India.
When the United States fell victim to Islamic extremists on 9/11, it turned to
both India and Pakistan for help and demanded that both countries join the
“war on terror.” At this point, many in India asked why the United States did
not initiate a “war on terror” when India was the victim. Many within India
asked whether the US was outraged only when innocent Americans were
killed. Many Indians also asked how Pakistan, which sponsored terrorist
attacks against India as a matter of policy, installed the Taliban in
Afghanistan and has a spotty record regarding al Qaeda, could be expected to
make a 180 turn and join an anti-terror alliance against its own clients.
US Policy Should Be More Liberal – Less Realist
US foreign policy in South Asia has been so counter-productive because it has
relied on an inconsistent realism. We have seen that while both Republican
and Democratic administrations purport to follow a realist orientation
regarding the region, both have let ideological, religious, and idealistic
concerns divert them from a strict realist path. Neither party is willing or
able to implement a strictly realist foreign policy. There is no possibility that
the US can adopt the detached perspective called for by realism. This makes
it impossible for the US to implement a classic realist strategy there.
Republican administrations have been the most committed to realism and
their policies have been the most disastrous. Indians and Pakistanis are now
migrating to the US in record numbers. As they become American citizens
and become more politically active, their emotional attachment to the region
will make a cold-blooded realist policy even more unlikely.
The growing ideological rifts between the GOP and the democrats compound
this. Democrats have veered from realism to support liberal concerns such as
nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, and democratization. Republicans,
by contrast, have tried to remain true to realism by pursuing classic military
alliances, while downplaying human rights concerns. Even the GOP,
however, has allowed itself to be diverted by ideological concerns such as
anti-Communism and anti-terrorism.
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The realist agenda has largely failed. A reorientation of US South Asia policy
towards more liberal foreign policy concerns would pay heavy dividends in
the region while restoring damaged American credibility and prestige.
Specific foreign policy changes would include a more cooperative stance
towards India. The US reassure India’s political and foreign policy
establishments that it will not interfere in Indian domestic political and
economic affairs. The US should also make it clear that it will no longer
dictate Indian defense and foreign policy, but respect India’s independent
policy decisions. It should also stop attacking Prime Minster Nehru and his
policies and acknowledge India’s right to its own unique economic, defense
and foreign policy agenda.
The US should acknowledge that poverty is the number one problem in the
entire South Asian region and state its commitment to work closely with
governments in the region on a cooperative anti-poverty agenda. The US
should stop promulgating liberal economic orthodoxy and urging South Asian
governments to embrace privatization, deregulation, and foreign investment.
It is time for the US to stop telling the region that it can only address poverty
by liberalizing its economies and adopting “reforms,” such as selling off the
public sector, restricting union rights, and establishing export zones. The
sovereign governments in the region should make these decisions. The US
should stop trying to reshape the region’s economies and political set-ups to
mirror those found in the US.
The US should not make the promotion of American commercial sales and
investments the number one priority in the region. The US government
should assist American businesses and investors without dictating to
regional governments. The US should recognize that the promulgation of
American economic interests is not always in the best interests of the people
in the region. For example, India has resisted the expansion of Walmart into
the country, arguing that it is not the right retail model for India and would
dispossess many thousands of small Indian retailers. India has stated its
case. The US should respect the Indian position.
What is best for US interests does not always result in poverty reduction.
Nowhere is this more apparent than when it comes to military sales. Once
the United States defines poverty reduction as the region’s number one
priority, it should not promote policies that divert precious resources from
this goal. Classic liberalism espouses a common humanitarian interest in
place of a narrow national interest. Sometimes this means that the US will
have to forego a potentially lucrative military contract. Critics will argue that
other countries with a more realist agenda will simply step in and grab these
contracts. However, it is in the US national interest to stop viewing the
region as a market for US military hardware and urge regional governments
to reduce military spending, seek diplomatic avenues to provide regional
security, and invest in economic development and poverty alleviation.
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US attempts to implement a realist foreign policy in South Asia led it to
acquiesce to Indian status as nuclear weapons state and defacto acquiescence
to Pakistani nuclear weapons state status. The US should have taken
nonproliferation more seriously and made it a cornerstone of its South Asian
policy. It should have done everything possible to keep nuclear weapons out
of the region. If the US had consistently followed this policy, it would have
succeeded. The US can still urge India and Pakistan to sign international nonproliferation accords. The US should not have signed the nuclear deal. The
US should be a strong advocate for nuclear disarmament and work with other
nuclear weapons states towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
This would establish a climate in which India and Pakistan could join a
universal initiative and begin nuclear disarmament.
The US embrace of realist principals allowed it to acquiesce to Pakistani
support for terrorism aimed at its neighbors. The US should not ally with
governments that support international terrorism. The Pakistani military is
not a suitable partner for the United States as long as it abuses human rights
and supports terrorism as an instrument of national policy.
If Pakistan does not change, the US should start disengaging. Once American
forces leave Afghanistan, Pakistan will have little to offer. The US can then
start ending funding to the Pakistani armed forces. The US cannot engage
with the Pakistani military until it has been subordinated to a genuine
democratic civilian government.
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