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Mohamed Bushra
UNIV 112
11/23/2015
Professor Dempster
Research Question:
Was Sudan the cause of the secession of South Sudan from Sudan? If so, what political and
economic actions did they take to drive South Sudan away?
We always looked different from them. Our skin tones and dialect are noticeably
dissimilar. It was always coming, the Northern and Southern parts of Sudan were never
compatible and the secession was inevitable. There had always been conflict between the
Northern and Southern region which date back to colonization. Tension boiled until a
referendum in January of 2011 was finally called. A whopping 99.62% of nearly four million
voters chose to split the county apart. This investigation seeks to answer the question, “was
(North) Sudan the cause of the secession of South Sudan from the whole country and if so, what
political and economic actions did they take to drive South Sudan away?” It is very important to
investigate this problem as the secession caused drastic geographical changes in the Horn of
Africa. It is important to pinpoint what exactly caused the conflict in order to predict any other
civil conflicts in other parts of that region. This paper will also address who favored the
secession and who did not. The political impact will also be discussed in order to emphasize the
magnitude of the issue. This paper will mainly focus on the actual failures of both sides in
maintaining piece. What could both sides have done to prevent the conflict? Did the North play a
larger role in the separation than the South?
In order to understand the conflict and who to blame, we must look at who wanted to
secede. In “Strife and Secession in Sudan,” Dr. Khalid Mustafa Medani, an assistant professor of
Political Science and Islamic Studies at McGill University, talks about the referendum and its
results. “Between 9 and 15 January 2011, the people of the southern states of oil-rich Sudan—
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Africa's largest country by land area—voted almost unanimously (about 98 percent of the South's
eight-million voters) to become formally independent of the North as of 9 July 2011 (Medani
135).” Dr. Medani then goes on to discuss a vital reason why most, if not all, Southerners wanted
to secede. “Not surprisingly, the regime in Khartoum has been reluctant to hand over oil revenue.
So far, South Sudan has received only half its allotted share, and the lack of transparency
surrounding these transfers has badly strained relations between Khartoum and the SPLM
(Medani 148).” This is a huge economic cause of the secession. The South was basically cheated
of its oil supply by the North which caused the economy to suffer. This added tension between
the two sides and was one main fault of the North.
One significant downfall of the North was that it did not take maintaining a peaceful
relationship with the South seriously. In “Toward a new Republic of Sudan,” Jonathan Temin, a
senior program officer in USIP’s Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution, and Theodore
Murphy, who holds degrees from McGill University and the School for Oriental and African
Studies (SOAS) in London, talk about the North’s political failures. The article states, “Northern
Sudan is at a turning point. Its leadership needs to articulate a vision of what the country will
look like in the years to come…If goodwill and serious efforts are not exerted in the first stage of
settling local Darfur issues, the chance for a wider national process will be lost (Temin 1).” It
seems that the North never really cared to keep a relationship with the South. Being born second
generation in this country to two Northern Sudanese parents, I am looking at the situation
unbiasedly. From my experience, it always seemed that the South was deprived somehow. Now
that I am finding credible research, it seems even more the North was very much to blame. In the
article, the view of Former South African president Thabo Mbeki is shared, who “suggested that
such a vision could be more African in orientation: We hold firmly to the view that northern
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Sudan is no less “African” than southern Sudan, and that Islam is a religion of Africa, just as the
Arabs of Sudan and the Maghreb are people of Africa. As pan-Africans we are proud of the
achievements of the Arab and Muslim civilizations on this continent, which we regard as an
integral part of our heritage (Temin 1).” This direct quote from the face of South shows that it
was more proactive when it came to maintaining peace. In many ways, the South was a victim of
unfair treatment from the North; therefore, the North failed politically as well as economically
when it came to preserving harmony.
The secession of South Sudan had a huge impact geographically. In “Secession and
precedent in Sudan and Africa,” Jonathan Temin, who travels to Sudan frequently and has a lot
of experience in other regions of Africa, talks about the 2011 referendum. Since the article was
written prior to the referendum, Temin was predicting the future stating, “If Southern Sudanese
vote to secede and gain their independence, it will be the most significant redrawing of African
borders since decolonization…Sudan is the largest physical country on the continent and borders
nine other states. Dividing it in two would be a seismic cartographic shift (Temin 1).” It is vital
to understand the consequences of the secession in order to understand the magnitude of the
issue. People living on both sides new what kind of effect it would bring but, as mentioned
before, the vote in favor of secession was almost unanimous. This shows that the feud between
the two was serious and separation was inevitable.
Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan both failed when it came to finding settlements.
Another article written prior to the referendum addressed the issues that should have been
resolved between the two sides. In “Improving Natural Resource Management in Sudan a
Strategy for Effective State Building and Conflict Resolution,” Dr. Paul J. Sullivan, who teaches
at National Defense University and Georgetown University, and Natalie Nasrallah, a consultant
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for the United States Institute of Peace on this study and has an MS in violence, conflict, and
development, look at both sides’ failures in cooperating. The article reads, “Both North and
South should engage community and regional leaders in resolving some of the many difficult and
tension-filled issues likely to arise over land and water. Needed steps include developing national
land and water policies that better enforce oil, land, and water management laws; investing in
research to improve water delivery systems and environmental management; making
commitments not to instigate or support proxy land grabbing; initiating land demarcation
processes as a confidence-building measure; land demarcation processes as a confidencebuilding measure; and preparing draft proposals for modifications to the Nile Basin Agreement
(Sullivan, Narsallah 15).” It is obvious that there were many issues that should have been
addressed. People already knew that the secession was going to happen; that fact is obvious
because this article was written before the referendum even took place. Although the North’s
actions were the cause of the worsening relationship of the two sides, the failure of the two sides
working together towards peace and prosperity was the overall cause of the secession.
The Sudanese referendum became a huge topic as it approached. In “Learning From
Sudan's 2011 Referendum,” Jonathan Temin and Lawrence Woocher, a senior program officer in
the United States Institute of Peace’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, talk about the
international status the conflict brought. The article addresses how “The referendum rose to a
level of international importance that is rare for African issues. The culmination of international
engagement was probably the high-level meeting in September 2010, on the sidelines of the UN
General Assembly, convened by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, which emphasized the
primacy of the referendum (Temin 1).” The matter became so problematic that other countries
had to get involved. The two sides obviously could not settle the issue themselves. Because
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Northern and Southern Sudan spent more time fighting and less time trying to reach a solution,
scheduling a referendum became a must.
Overall, (North) Sudan was mainly to blame for the secession. The regime in Khartoum
deprived the South of its oil supply and caused it to suffer economically. The North also did not
take any efforts to cooperate with the South and therefore failed politically. The South, however,
was not merely a victim. Both sides did not take efforts to stay together. Because of the unfair
treatment from the North and the nonstop fighting of both sides, the secession was expected.
Earlier, I asked the question “what could both sides have done to prevent the conflict?” After
doing research on the matter, I have found that that question is difficult to answer. On one hand,
the North could have been fairer to the South. I discussed the political and economic actions the
North took to drive the South away. On the other hand, both sides were not willing to reach a
solution so they were both partially to blame for that reason. In conclusion, the North instigated
the preexisting conflict and hindered the already shaky relationship. Had the political power and
leadership been righteous, perhaps Sudan would still be one country today.
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Bibliography
Khalid Mustafa Medani. "Strife and Secession in Sudan." Journal of Democracy 22.3 (2011):
135-149. Project MUSE. Web. 4 Nov. 2015.
Sullivan, Paul J., Nasrallah, Natalie, and United States Institute of Peace. Improving Natural
Resource Management in Sudan a Strategy for Effective State Building and Conflict
Resolution. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2010. Special Report (United States
Institute of Peace) ; 242. Web.
Temin, Jonathan, and United States Institute of Peace, Issuing Body. Secession and Precedent in
Sudan and Africa. 2010. Peace Brief ; 68. Web.
Temin, Jonathan, Murphy, Theodore, and United States Institute of Peace. Toward a New
Republic of Sudan. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2011. Special Report
(United States Institute of Peace) ; 278. Web.
Temin, Jonathan., Woocher, Lawrence, and United States Institute of Peace. Learning from
Sudan's 2011 Referendum. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2012. Special
Report (United States Institute of Peace) ; 303. Web.