On the Material Constitution of Organizations
Abstract
It has been suggested that stone walls are constituted by stones, the statue of David is
constituted by a piece of clay, and that flags are constituted by pieces of cloth. But are
organizations such as Amnesty, IMF or UN constituted entities?
The main aim of this paper is to explore the potential prospects of applying a Constitution
view on organizations. R. Wasserman has suggested that any account of constitution must
fulfill two principles and three formal properties. These minimal constraints are used in this
paper as a guideline for deciding whether organizations are to be classified as constituted
entities or not.
It will be argued that if Wasserman’s minimal constraints capture the minimal conditions
which any account of constitution must fulfill – then organizations cannot be constituted
entities. However, it will be pointed out that even if the Constitution view is not applicable on
organizations, questions raised by the attempt to apply it on institutional reality are worth our
attention.
1
1. On the Material Constitution of Organizations
It has been suggested that a stone wall is constituted by stones, the statue of David is
constituted by a piece of clay and a flag is constituted by a piece of cloth. But is an
organization such as Amnesty a constituted entity? More specifically, is the relation between
an organization and its members, buildings and other related objects the same kind of relation
as the relation between a statue and a piece of clay? This is the main question of this paper.
According to R. Wasserman (2004), in order for an account to be classified as a Constitution
Account, it must fulfill some minimal constraints. These constraints consist of two principles
and three formal properties: First, constitution requires that there is spatial and material
coincidence between the constituting and the constituted object. The idea is that although a
piece of clay and a statue are distinct objects (they have different existence and persistence
conditions) they are still united by being co-located (spatially coincident) and by sharing parts
(materially coincident). Second, the relation of constitution must be transitive, irreflexive and
asymmetric in order to guarantee that constitution is not a case of “mere coincidence”.
The Constitution View just described is popular when it comes to analyzing objects such as
stone walls, statues and flags (L. R. Baker, P. Simons, J.J Thomson, D. Wiggings1). However,
it has recently been claimed (explicitly by Hindriks (2011, 2013) and Baker (2000, 2007))2
that certain social or institutional entities, which seem very different from the entities
discussed by adherents of the Constitution View, are also constituted entities. It is claimed
that organizations, universities and other everyday objects are related to material objects by a
relation of constitution. The question is whether such an application of the Constitution View
on institutional reality can successfully be made?3
This paper explores the potential prospects of applying the Constitution View, as formulated
by Wasserman, on organizations. Wasserman’s description of the view aims at being general
in the sense that it captures what all constitution accounts must minimally accept. The general
character of his description of the Constitution View, makes it appropriate to use it as a
1
See further Wasserman (2013).
Note also that many philosophers in the debates on collective agents and collective responsibility use the
word “constitution” to describe the relation between individuals and collectives without defining the
constitution relation any further. M. McKenna (2006:20), when discussing the possibility of there being
collective agents, writes: “Philosophy is now sufficiently comfortable with various supervenience, constitution,
or emergence theses to permit serious consideration of the thesis that some collective agents and their shared
intentions might in some way or other be dependent upon an adequately complex arrangement of individual
agents, yet not reducible to them”. P. Sheehy (2006: 82-82?) argues for the relevance of groups being
constituted by relations rather than individuals: “Through the relations which constitute it [i.e.” the network of
relations which bind (changing) individuals through time into the group”], a group may have a capacity to
process or handle information that is greater than the sum of its individuals’ capacities, or conscious agent […]
The group as such has a reflective capacity within the relations through which it is constituted.“ M. Gilbert
(2006:102) describes a “plural subject” as constituted by persons being jointly committed: “any population of
people who are party to a given joint commitment – thereby constituting a plural subject – constitutes a
collective […] collectives are constituted by joint commitments”.
3
While Hindriks (2013) explicitly discusses the constitution of universities, corporations and organizations,
Baker is foremost interested in artefacts and other everyday objects. However, she claims that her theory is
generalizable to all kinds of “intention-dependent objects” (among the entities which she counts as ID-objects
are for example the national bank – an institution. See Baker 2007:11)
2
2
guideline for deciding whether an account is to be classified as an account of constitution or
not.
Rather than paying attention to details of specific accounts which have tried to apply the
Constitution View on social and institutional entities, the main aim of this paper is broader in
character. It will be argued that if Wasserman’s constraints capture the minimal conditions
which must be fulfilled for an account to be a constitution account, then organizations cannot
be constituted entities. More specifically, it will be argued that organizations do not fulfill the
spatial or the material coincidence principles, and therefore, whetever the relation is between
an organization and material objects, it cannot be a relation of constitution.
The paper begins with an introduction to Wasserman’s principles (part 2.) and it also tries to
specify in more detail what the object of investigation of this paper – an organization – is
(part. 3). Sections 4. and 5. are the main parts of this paper – Wasserman’s principles are
applied on organizations. I present two categories of criticism which arise when the principles
are applied on organizations. In the last section a summary of the main problem with applying
the Constitution View on organizations is presented. It will also be claimed that even if
constitution cannot explain the unity between an organization and the material objects related
to it, the very question raised by constitution accounts is very important to discuss in order to
clear out other issues in social ontology.
2. Wasserman’s principles of constitution
According to Wasserman (2004), the controversy between different accounts of constitution is
over how one should spell out the exact necessary and sufficient conditions for an x to
constitute a y. However, there are two standard assumptions and three formal properties of the
relation of constitution which every account of constitution must respect (See Wasserman
2004:693f). The two standard assumptions will be spelled out in terms of two principles in
this paper4:
Principle I. Spatial coincidence: “x constitutes y at t only if x and y have the same spatial
location at t” (Wasserman 2004:694)
Principle II. Material coincidence: “x constitutes y at t only if x and y have all the same parts
at t” (Ibid.)
The standard example of a constitution relation is the relation between a lump of clay
(“Lump”) and a statue (“Statue”). According to Principle I, although Lump and Statue should
be considered as two distinct objects, since they differ in their persistence and existence
conditions, they are united by being located in the same region of space. Since Lump and
Statue, according to the constitution theorist, share the same spatiotemporal location it is also
assumed that they share all the same parts at t, in accordance with Principle II. For example,
if Statue is constituted by Lump, and is thereby co-located with Lump, and Lump has a
4
Wasserman believes that only the second principle on Material Coincidence is a necessary condition on
constitution. See his (2002). However, since other constitution theorists, for example Baker, denies any analysis
of the constitution relation appealing to mereology, I discuss both principles separately here.
3
certain microphysical structure, then Statue has the same microphysical structure by being
located at the same place as Lump (Wasserman 2002, 2004).5
The two principles taken in isolation do not guarantee that the relation between a constituting
and a constituted object is not a relation of “mere coincidence” though. It could be argued that
Lump and Statue, by being co-located in accordance with Principle I and by sharing all the
same parts in accordance with Principle II, are in fact identical. Coincidence is both reflexive
and symmetrical (Wasserman 2004). In order to avoid this conclusion, Wasserman claims, the
constitution theorist must accept that three formal properties apply to the relation of
constitution. The relation must be transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric. Accepting these
formal properties, the constitution theorist can claim that Lump constitutes Statue, but Statue
does not constitute Lump since the relation only has one direction – it is asymmetric. Further,
the constitution theorist can explain how the microstructure of Lump can also be the
microstructure of Statue – the relation is transitive.
According to Wasserman, the two principles and the formal properties just presented make up
“minimal constraints” that any account of constitution must respect. Let us assume that
Wasserman is correct in his claim, could organizations be constituted entities?
3. What is an organization?
Before the question whether organizations are constituted or not can be answered, a few
comments must be made about our object of investigation – what is an organization?
First, an organization is an institutional entity6. The term “institutional” should be understood
as a restriction of the broader category of “social” entities. How should one distinguish
institutional from social entities? I will not try to define what an institutional entity is in this
paper, but here follows some preliminary ideas and examples:
J. Searle (1995) claims that one difference between social and institutional entities7 is that the
latter, but not the former “require institutional structures” (Searle 1995:32) for its existence.
However, this answer just moves the question, because – what is an institution? One way to
make sense of Searle’s claim which does not require a thorough discussion how to define an
institution, is to proceed from P. Simons idea of “ontological anchoring” (2013). Simons
claims8 that the difference between social and institutional entities9 is that institutional
5
The idea that Lump and Statue have the same microstructure has given rise to objections on the constitution
account. The problem for the constitution theorist is to explain in virtue of what Lump and Statue have
different de re properties if they have all the same parts, in the sense that they share the same microstructure.
(See further Wasserman 2002)
6
The term “entity” should be understood ontologically neutrally – it can refer to various categories such as
objects, events, processes, states etc. I think one important part of the discussion of the ontology of the
institutional world is to categorize the various entities distinguishable in it. To take an example, a war or a
lawsuit seems to be some kinds of institutional processes, while an id-card or paper money rather belongs to
the category of institutional objects. So, “entity” is a neutral way of speaking of all things there are in the
institutional world.
7
Searle’s discussion on the issue is made in terms of social and institutional facts. However, since the word
“entity” is used neutrally here, nothing I say really contradicts Searle’s views.
8
At a talk given at workshop in Lund (2013-10-11): Social Complexes and Wholes.
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entities, but not social entities, are “ontologically anchored” in statutes and laws10. Exactly
what kind of relation (if it is a relation) such “ontological anchoring” amounts to, and exactly
which the relata of this anchoring-relation are can of course be discussed. P. Simons have not
yet offered any account of it.
One way to understand this anchoring is to appeal to the work it does for the identity of an
institutional entity. In order to say what Amnesty, UN or IMF are, ontologically speaking, it is
not sufficient to look at the identities of the people working at, or being members of these
entities. In other words, we cannot find out what Amnesty, UN or IMF are just by looking at
the people related to these entities. Rather, their identity seems to be dependent on there being
documents of different kinds (for example, statutes and laws) where it is specified what kinds
of entities they are. Compare these institutional entities just discussed, with social entities
such as families and different social groups. The identity of “The Working Class” or
“Academics” does not seem to be dependent on the existence of some document where it is
specified what kinds of entities they are. It rather seems to be the case that social groups are
more randomly gathered by having some property or other feature in common (a certain
amount of income, a certain kind of work etc.)11
Organizations are institutional entities but there are institutional entities which are not
organizations. For example, the identity of entities such as churches, lawyers and money seem
to be dependent on there being some kinds of documents specifying their being the entities
they are (so they are institutional entities). However, they are not organizations. Organizations
are a subclass of institutional entities; entities such as clubs, associations and corporations are
examples of organizations.
Second, there seems to be two important aspects to take into account when one discusses the
metaphysics of an institutional entity such as an organization. First, organizations are
somehow mind-dependent entities.12 Institutional entities would not exist at all, if there were
no human beings. It is controversial exactly how the details of this mind-dependence should
be spelled out, and if all institutional entities are mind-dependent – but it is not controversial
that (most) institutional entities are somehow dependent on minds. There is a huge ongoing
discussion under the heading “Collective intentionality”, dealing with questions about the
relation between our minds and the social or institutional world.13 Second, organizations are
9
Simons discussion is made in mereological terms between social and institutional wholes.
B. Smith seems to have a similar idea, underlining the importance of documents for the existence of certain
entities. (See further, Smith 2013)
11
P. French (1979), among others, makes a distinction between aggregate collectives and conglomerate
collectives, where the former is “merely a collection of people” while a conglomerate collective is an
“organization of individuals such that its identity is not exhausted by the conjunction of the identities of the
persons in the organizations” (quotes in Smiley 2011). I think this distinction could help to understand the
intuitive distinction between social and institutional entities.
12
For a critical discussion of the simple distinction between mind-dependence and mind-independence, see
Thomasson (2002). For a denial of the claim that all social or institutional entities are mind-dependent, see
Smith (1992), Zaibert (2004).
13
Questions discussed in the debate are for example whether there are some primitive collective (but
individual) intentional acts (Searle 1995), whether collective intentional acts should be reduced to individual
10
5
clearly related to other material objects such as buildings, people (individually and
collectively), and importantly, to documents and statutes. It is this second aspect on the
metaphysical question what an organization is, which is the focus of this paper. One way to
make sense of the notion of “ontological anchoring” presented above, is to analyze it as a
relation of constitution. According to this interpretation, organizations are ontologically
anchored in material objects, by being constituted by these objects.
Third, the aim of this paper is not to discuss the ontological status of organizations per se. The
aim is neither to discuss whether organizations really exist or not. The metaphysical question
at stake here is not an existence question but rather a question how an organization is related
to other material objects, given that it exists in some sense. At a very general level at least, I
think few would deny that there are such things as laws, nations, money, organizations and so
on. The controversial issue is rather how we should characterize these entities. So, given that
organizations exist in some sense – can they be considered as constituted entities?
4. Arguments against applying Principle I on organizations
Let us discuss whether organizations fulfill Wasserman’s first principle on constitution. Here
it is once again:
Principle I. Spatial coincidence: “x constitutes y at t only if x and y have the same spatial
location at t” (Wasserman 2004:694)
The first obvious difference between the standard example of constitution between Lump and
Statue, and between material objects such as buildings, people etc., and an organization is that
the former case amounts to a relation between two individual objects, while the latter case
amounts to a relation between a plurality of objects and an entity14. The “x” in the first
principle must therefore be interpreted as a plurality when discussing the assumed constitution
of an organization. However, there are at least two possible ways to interpret what a plurality
is, and depending on which interpretation one goes for, different problems will arise when
applied on organizations.
a. Plurality as Many. The first option is to analyze the constitution base, or the “x” in
Principle 1, as an aggregate of buildings, people and documents. An aggregate is an
unstructured collection of entities, which is genuinely plural in its nature. This means that
even if we can talk about an aggregate as one collection, the collection is made up of many
individual entities – an aggregate is by its very nature plural. We get the following result
when applying this idea on Wasserman’s first principle:
Principle I*. Spatial coincidence: the aggregate (of buildings, people, documents) (x)
constitutes an organization (y) at t only if the aggregate (x) and the organization (y) have the
same spatial location at t.
intentional acts (See for example M. Bratman), or whether collective intentional acts are irreducible (See for
example M. Gilbert) .
14
I use ”entity” ontologically neutrally here, since it is not clear what ontological status an organization has.
6
In order for Principle I* to come out correct, the organization would have to be located at the
same place where all the buildings, people and documents of the aggregate are located.
However, this proposal is problematic for at least two reasons.
On the one hand, if organizations are located at all places where buildings etc. are located, it
seems that all changes which affect these buildings etc. should also affect the organization.
Ruben (1983) writes that there are strong reasons to be skeptical to the idea that organizations
have spatial locations at all:
Suppose for instance that we say that the actors' union, Equity, can be
located in all those theatres which have duly constituted branches. Suppose
one such branch is in the Aldwych Theatre, so that the branch of Equity has
that location. Suppose then that a part of the theatre is destroyed, but part
remains intact. Although the location of that branch of Equity was the
theatre, and part of the theatre has been lost, no part of the branch of Equity
is lost thereby. (Ruben 1983:224)
Perhaps organizations are not located at all places where buildings etc. are located, but only at
some of these places? Perhaps the organization is located where its members or workers are
located? Well, this proposal gets similar problems as the recent one – let us say that all
members and workers but one, of the local Amnesty office in Gothenburg, travels to Finland
for a conference. Would we say that Amnesty (as an institutional entity) is mostly located in
Finland, but a small part of it is located in Gothenburg?15 Another problem for this suggestion
is that an organization could outlive individual members, and it is also possible to imagine an
existing organization with no members at all.16 For reasons of this kind, it seems wrong to
locate the organization where its members and workers are17.
Perhaps the organization is located at the same address where the headquarters of the
organization are located? Intuitively, this seems to be the most plausible option if one believes
that an organization has a spatial location at all. It is also the option which Ruben seems to
prefer but he never develops his thoughts on this matter18. However, the same way as an
organization can outlive individual members, it seems possible for an organization to persist
even if it is temporarily without any specific address. Let us say that all major buildings
related to an organization burns down so that there are no buildings at the addresses where the
buildings once was, does the organization thereby cease to exist? I believe it does not. The
reason is that an organization might somehow be dependent on there being certain buildings,
people, or more importantly, documents of certain kinds, but the fact that organizations are
related to, and dependent on these material objects, does not imply that they are spatially
located at the same place as these objects.19
15
This example is inspired by Ruben’s example with the Red Cross (1983:225)
This point has been made by many critics: (Ruben, Jansen, Simons etc.)
17
For more arguments against this view, see Ruben (1983, 1985)
18
Although Ruben never develops this idea, Hindriks (2013) proposes one way to analyze this.
19
There is no space to develop these thoughts in this paper. However, ideas on like matters put forward by R.
Ingarden, according to whom many social and cultural entities are dependent both on there being material
16
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On the other hand, if an organization cannot be said to be located at the same place as some,
or all of the objects related to it, then an organization cannot be constituted by these objects.
This is simply the consequence of Principle I*.
b. Plurality as One. The other option is to analyze the constitution base, the “x” in Principle I
as a sum20 of buildings, people and documents. In that case, we get the following result when
applying this idea on Wasserman’s first principle:
Principle I**. Spatial coincidence: the sum (of buildings, people, documents) (x) constitutes
an organization (y) at t only if the sum (x) and the organization (y) have the same spatial
location at t.
By analyzing a plurality as a sum, one could get closer to the standard example of constitution
where the relata of the relation of constitution is taken to be a relation between two individual
objects. According to a common view, Unrestricted Composition, or Universalism, every sum
of entities makes up a new whole. According to this this view, a sum can be considered as one
object. Perhaps we could analyze the relation of spatial coincidence as a relation between the
sum of buildings etc. which are related to an organization, and the organization per se? The
relation would come out as a relation between two individual objects, just as it does in the
standard example between Lump and Statue.
One advantage of this view is that it escapes one problem which hunted Principle I* above;
the problem was to decide exactly where an organization is located. We asked: Is the
organization located where all of its buildings etc. are located? Or, is it located at some of
these places, but not all taken together? If the answer to the latter question is “yes”, the further
question is at which of these places the organization is located. But now, if the constitution
base or the “x”, is an abstract entity (by being a sum) and if the organization is located at the
same place where the “x” is located (according to Principle I), then the organization is also an
abstract entity. We could, for the sake of argument, allow that the requirement of a location in
Principle I** need not be a requirement of a spatial location. This opens up the possibility of
the constitution base and the constituted object sharing the same “location”, i.e. no location at
all.
Although this second option comes closer to the standard example of constitution and even if
it does not run into the same kinds of trouble that option a. did, there are at least two problems
with Principle I**.21 First, the nature of a sum differs from (what seems to be) the nature of
an organization. Given a sum of parts, these can only compose one sum. However, given a
sum of individuals, or members of an organization, it seems that these can compose more than
one organization.22 Two sums with the same parts would be identical, while two sums of the
same individuals need not imply that the organizations, of which they are members, are
objects of different kinds and of there being certain collective intentional acts directed at these material
objects, seems to be the correct starting point for an analysis also of institutional reality.
20
It seems that the arguments against sums are also applicable to the idea of sets as making up the
constitution base.
21
Both problems are inspired by F. Schmitt’s introductory discussion in Schmitt (2003).
22
This point is also made by Ruben (1983, 1986) among others.
8
identical. Maria, Lars and me could be (the only) members of the Philosophical Society at
University of Gothenburg, but the three of us could also be (the only) members of a local
boxing club in Gothenburg. Second, a sum and an organization have different counterfactual
existence conditions.23 The idea is that the Philosophical Society or the local boxing club
could have had entirely different members than the members it actually has, but still remain
the same organizations. However, a sum could not have had different parts than it has without
also being a different sum.
5. Arguments against applying Principle II on organizations
Let us continue to discuss whether Wasserman’s second principle on constitution is applicable
on organizations. The second principle on constitution was the following:
Principle II. Material coincidence: “x constitutes y at t only if x and y have all the same parts
at t” (Ibid.)
Once again it is possible to direct two different kinds of criticisms against Principle II when
applied on organizations, depending on how one interprets the “x”.
c. Plurality as Many. The first option is to analyze the constitution base, or the “x” in
Principle II, as an aggregate of buildings, people and documents. We get the following result
when applying this idea on Wasserman’s second principle:
Principle II*. Material coincidence: the aggregate (of buildings, people, documents etc.) (x)
constitutes the organization (y) at t only if the aggregate (x) and the organization (y) have all
the same parts at t.
In order for Principle II* to come out correct when applied on organizations, the aggregate of
buildings etc. would have to have all the same parts in common with the organization. How
should we understand this claim when applied on organizations? In the standard example of
constitution, as we have already noticed, the relation between Lump and Statue is a relation
between two individual objects. At least according to one interpretation of this standard case,
Lump makes up the part of Statue – Statue has Lump as its only part. However, according to
Principle II*, the organization does not just have one, but many, parts. More specifically, it
would have buildings, people, documents and all, and only those objects related to the
organization, as its parts24.
The problem with this proposal is that the aggregate as an aggregate and the organization as
an institutional entity, does not seem to have all parts in common. For consider the aggregate
related to an organization – it consists of a variety of different objects being parts of it –
buildings, people, documents etc. Now, it seems that the parts of the aggregate could also be
parts of an organization in some derived sense. At least, organizations are clearly related to all
of these material objects, and perhaps they could be said to make up “parts of” an
organization in this very broad sense. However, on the other hand, there seems to be parts of
23
See further F. Schmitt (2003:5f)
Of course, one can discuss what ”a part” really is. In this context “part” should be understood the broadest
possible way.
24
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organizations that are not parts of the aggregate. Consider such entities as The Board of
directors of Amnesty, or The Swedish section of Amnesty, or consider even more abstract
entities related to Amnesty such as the goals, or achievements of Amnesty. If we use a very
broad understanding of “parts” it seems that the entities just mentioned are applicable to the
organization, but not to the aggregate of objects related to Amnesty. If this is correct,
Principle II* does not apply to the relation between an x considered as an aggregate, and an
organization y.
Perhaps the analysis just made is too strong. There seems to be another way to interpret
Wasserman’s original Principle II. If one combines Principle II with transitivity and if we
specify what we mean by the notion of a “part”, we could claim that: x constitutes y at t only
if x and y have all the same material parts at t (since the relation of constitution is transitive),
but y can have other parts than the material parts of x. According to this interpretation, the
organization has all the same material parts as the aggregate since the relation of constitution
is transitive. However, this proposal allows the constituted entity to have parts which are not
derived from the entity constituting it. Unfortunately, there are at least two problems also with
this proposal.
First, the transitivity-claim seems to get things wrong at a higher level of analysis. Let us say
that I am a member of a boxing club in Sweden, and let us say that this local boxing club is
member of an international boxing federation. Now, even if I am a member of the local
boxing club and this local boxing club is a member of the international boxing federation – I
am not a member of the international boxing federation. The reason is that no individual can
be member of the international boxing federation, only clubs can. Ruben (1983, 1985) has
pointed out that while the mereological parthood relation is transitive, the relation of “being a
member of” is non-transitive.
Second, if there are other relations that contribute with non-material parts to an organization
(a view which seems to be correct), and if the reflection made earlier is correct – that
organizations can outlive individual members, and even temporarily exist without any
members, building etc. being related to it at all – then Wasserman’s claim of the necessity of
sharing material parts does not apply to organizations. Jansen (2009) and Baker (2000, 2007)
both claim that essential parts of social, institutional and cultural entities lies in relations these
entities have to such things as collective intentionality, obligations and other entities not being
material. Jansen writes that:
[…] social constitution often involves non-material constituters or at least
such constituters that are not overtly material, like interaction events,
individual or collective intentions, individual or collective commitments, or
obligations. […] Social constitution, however, can be a non-spatial issue,
not least because some social entities are non-spatial. (Jansen 2009:XX)
If Jansen is correct in his claim that those entities constituting social entities are not material,
then the whole idea of sharing material parts is misguided from the start.
10
d. Plurality as One. The other option is to analyze the constitution base, the “x” in Principle
II as a sum of buildings, people and documents. In that case, we get the following result when
applying this idea on Wasserman’s first principle:
Principle II**. Material coincidence: the sum (of buildings, people, documents etc.) (x)
constitutes the organization (y) at t only if the sum (x) and the organization (y) have all the
same parts at t”.
The initial attraction of this view might be that it has in common with the standard example of
constitution that the relation is a relation between two individual objects. However, this option
is hunted by the same problems as Principle I, which was discussed under b. above: Given a
sum of parts, these parts can only compose one whole. However, given a group of individuals
(considered loosely as parts), the very same sum of individuals can compose two or more
organizations. If Principle II** was correct, it would not be possible to say that the same
individuals made up different organizations since these individuals make up a sum, and can
therefor only make up one organization.
6. Concluding Remarks
If Wasserman’s constraints capture the minimal conditions which must be fulfilled in order
for an account to be classified as a constitution account – then organizations cannot be
constituted entities.
The main problem with The Constitution View seems to lie in the very idea of it being a
material constitution account. This idea is built into Wasserman’s two principles – spatial
coincidence requires that something is located in space, and sharing parts in space seems to
require that at least some of the parts are material. This is a consequence of the spatial
coincidence-principle. All the traditional discussions on constitution – the Growing
Argument, the Ship of Theseus, the Body-minus Argument and Lumpl and Goliath25 – have
in common that there is a single, or a plurality of material stuff which somehow make up
persons, ships, cats and statues. The puzzle of material constitution is to explain the relation
between this material stuff and the entities which this stuff somehow makes up. The puzzles
include discussions on composition and identity. (Rea 1995) However, in the case of an
organization it is unclear from the start which, if any, material objects organizations would be
“made of”. As we have noted, there are many material, but also non-material objects and
other entities which are clearly related to organizations – people, buildings and documents of
various kinds, but these objects does not seem to “make up” an organization in the sense a
lump makes up the material base for a statue.
It could be argued that although organizations are not directly made up of, i.e. constituted by,
the material objects related to it, they are indirectly or derivatively dependent on there being
material objects on which these entities somehow bottoms out26. J Searle, when discussing the
25
For a discussion of these puzzles, see Rea (1995).
This option requires that we can give up on the spatial coincidence principle, and therefore it is questionable,
at least from the starting-point we are taking based on Wasserman’s principles, if this option would really
count as a case of constitution
26
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social or institutional world, is very careful pointing out that all of the social and institutional
reality is dependent on brute, or basic facts. He claims that entities in the social world
“money, universities, cocktail parties, and income tax – are dependent on more basic
phenomena [facts given by physics and other natural sciences][…] everything we say is not
only consistent with but in various ways derived from and dependent on the basic facts”
(Searle 2010:4)27 However, even if this would be the case, even if organizations bottom out in
material objects, these material objects are not sufficient for answering the broader
metaphysical question what an organization is. In order to answer this question, it seems that
other things must be considered such as how organizations are created, maintained in
existence and how they cease to exist. And these questions in turn seems to require answers
on what collective intentionality is, how minds can create and maintain such robust entities as
organizations, and an explanation how minds, institutional entities and material object are
related in order to succeed with this. Simply claiming that organizations are constituted by
material objects, in the watered-down sense that an organization is related to or bottom out in
material objects does not help us understanding the ontology of organizations.
But, even if the Constitution View is not applicable on organizations, questions raised by the
attempt to apply it on institutional reality are worth our attention. We have seen that
organizations, considered as institutional entities, bear very complex relations both to human
minds and to different kinds of material and non-material objects. A detailed investigation
into these relations could help us clarify other important questions discussed in social
ontology. It seems that some central controversies regarding collective responsibility and the
possible existence of collective agents, are really controversies how one should understand the
relations between social/institutional entities and the objects that are somehow related to
them. One much debated issue is whether there exists such an entity as a Collective Agent
which is something “over and above” the individuals which are related to it. On the one side,
the claim is negative – we might speak of a collective agent, but there is no ontological reality
of such an agent. On the other side, the claim is positive – but this agent is either reducible to
or somehow dependent on the individuals related to the agent. Exactly what this reduction or
dependency really amounts to is seldom discussed though. As far as I know the metaphysical
question what these positions really amount to, is often waved off in the following way:
Philosophy is now sufficiently comfortable with various supervenience,
constitution, or emergence theses to permit serious consideration of the
thesis that some collective agents and their shared intentions might in some
way or other be dependent upon an adequately complex arrangement of
individual agents, yet not reducible to them” (McKenna 2006:20)
However, as this paper has hopefully shown, it is unclear exactly what the relation of
“constitution” amounts to when applied on organizations, and there is reason to believe that
the other relations mentioned in this quote also meet new problems when applied on
institutional reality.
27
F. Hindriks (2013) takes a similar position but he points out people as making up the material base for entities
such as universities and organizations.
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