Geometric Nexus Method of Knowledge: Deductive Proof
Andrew S. Drazdik Jr
8th October 2013
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The rational justification of which are then known as a general principle or standard, which as
normative quality brings forth a sense of knowledge. Which as a sense of knowledge is then known as
prescriptive or normative to the majority in an ethical perspective. The issue of a common knowledge
that questions epistemological science in these regards are then the logical propositions which bring
forth the sense as the rational justification1, or reason for action. 2
The process and methods of such rational justification when knowledge is judged and made into
a justification involves analysis. Analysis, the process of breaking up a concept, proposition, linguistic
complex, or fact into its simple or ultimate constituents3. The issues of formal and informal logic which
can be the case to offer an explanation into how and why the cognitive and intuitive nature of the
intangible and tangible connection (L. Nexus) is made.
If A then B, If A and B then C
B and C then D
A then D
Axiom
D is either True or False
A is tangible
therefore D is tangible only if True or False
If A then B
If not A
Then not B
D is either True or False
A is intangible
therefore B and C may also be intangible
By denying the antecedent the formal logic may be true but the informal logic may exist only as an
existential fallacy argument (L. argumentum).
As a second form of formal logical understanding by nature of the argument may also be
ontological dependence.4 That If A exists then B must exist by nature of A, then by that very nature and
dependence the existence of any other part of B may also exist. Therefore those of C and or then D if
not a part of A or B can not exist. Figure 1.1
A
B
C
D
Fig. 1.1
A’ B’ C’ D’
The informal fallacy to be valid by argument then must conform to such rules of inference. As a
notion of causality which conditional probability would label as a counter-factual, that do not
1
Richard B. Brandt. “Epistemology and Ethics, Parallel Between.”The Encycylopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 3 1967 pg 5-8
Reasons for Action, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 1995 pgs 677-678
3
Analysis, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 1995 pg 22
4
“Ontological”, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 1995 pg 192
2
Andrew S. Drazdik Jr,
National Writers Union, UAW Local 1981/AFL-CIO, ID: 92743
Page 2
“back track”.5 The argument to justify the issue must be justly set forth by proposition, that such
premises may validate the conclusions. The intuitive nature of such justification could be part of such
fallacy that the relevancy as a cause to such argument is part of the causality of conditional probability.
If the relevancy of the argument then is not part of the norm by such cause to initiate such argument
then all that is not known to exist, as knowledge, may be a cause fallacy6 from the viewpoint of those
who are the audience in the communication process.
The causal relationship which the audience and those who the process is communicated then
must accept the issues of the intuitive nature that may be theory as explained and understood as a
process of analysis. The process begs the identity of the cognitive and intuitive nature to be well
defined as virtue7 judgments, which should be given to the decision of relevant propositions. The
question of virtue (L. Modus Cogitoare), or parameters, that can give such definition.
The rational justification (L. Modus) then as such a manner (L. Ars) that can, or could, be used to
further question the issue of analysis that sets forth limits as intuitive parameters (L. Modus Cogitoare).
How the analysis is a question, as boundary or connection, and its rules of natural deduction which
must be known somehow within the rational (L. Cogitatio). The issue once justified and understood in
such terms and conditions then becomes an issue of when the method will, or would, be applied and by
whom.
"an argument may be more or less correct depending on whom or what its audience
happens to be".8
The informal logic depending on the audience, as a theory proven upon its own completion of
premises, due to the audience that terms within the premises as tools to communicate the manner of
those virtue judgments must be used. If not, then the previous logical notions that support such virtue
can not be measured by validity of the rules set by the rational justification in such manner. If when the
analysis, also thought of as “probability trajectories”9, are performed then persons as agents of change
would (L. Animus) intuitively understand by what is made to connect (L. Nexus) such premises.
The normative quality of such knowledge of virtue by all who apply these methods have allowed
their judgments to then mutually acknowledge those arguments by such rules also as intuitive. The
normative quality of which terms and conditions are then common knowledge, in society, in the
communication process, in the manner of argument as ethical judgment. The universal proposition of
causality having such analysis, can not be moral but for that moral intuitive to be the analytical personal
view of knowledge that must be condoned within a personal sense of virtue (L. Ex Animo) in the
everyday society (L. Actus; Quid Agam), which by ethical standards must be universal as
knowledge.
5
Eells, Ellery. Rational Decision and Causality. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1982 pgs 98
Tindale, Christopher W. "Fallacies and Argument Appraisal". New York: Cambridge Univ. Press 2007 pgs 173-188
7 Laird, Charlton G. Webster’s New World Thesaurus. 2nd Ed. New York: Warner Books, Inc. 1987 pg 488-489
6
8
See. Weddle, Perry. 1985 "On Theory in Informal Logic", Informal Logic 7, 119-26. from Levi Don S. "In Defense of Informal
Logic". Vol. 2 Boston: Kluwer Academic Pub. 2000 pgs 51-53
9
Eells, Ellery. Probabilistic Causality. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991 pgs 352, 356
Andrew S. Drazdik Jr,
National Writers Union, UAW Local 1981/AFL-CIO, ID: 92743
Page 3
If the knowledge by degree of terms is not understood then this is the part of the
communication which by ethical standards must be understood, or known. When ethical and moral
issues of such knowledge are not known then the expert advice is most prudent as the initial virtue. The
issue of such initial virtue to know such knowledge as a form of knowing is questioned by science the
scientist using such methods performs their skill (L. Scientia). Their audience may be general10, as the
public by political scientist, or specific expert: as the accountant, doctor, judge, lawyer, scholar, ect., to
those who seek to understand and comprehend how and why those methods of argument are used with
such knowledge to be ethical.
The rational justification involving how the formal and informal methods are the sense
(L. Animus) from the ethical and normative perspective of knowledge is proven by such arguments
(L. Argumentum; Documentum). The judgment of such knowledge being virtuous when the issue of
knowledge as a form of exploitation of how knowledge is perceived as to its proof (L. Probatio) by truth
and falsity, then the audience that is willing to accept those facts and deeds or exploits (L. Factum) as
true as an ethical, communication argument in reality and society.
10
Tindale, Christopher W. Ibid pgs 127-143
Andrew S. Drazdik Jr,
National Writers Union, UAW Local 1981/AFL-CIO, ID: 92743
Page 4
Works Cited:
Analysis, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 1995 pg 22
Cassell's New Latin Dictionary. Funk & Wagnalls Co. 1960
Eells, Ellery. Rational Decision and Causality. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1982 pgs 98, 102, 105,
106-134, and 150-169
Eells, Ellery. Probabilistic Causality. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991 pgs 35, 37, 22-55, 289-308, 352, 366
Laird, Charlton G. Webster’s New World Thesaurus. 2nd Ed. New York: Warner Books, Inc. 1987 pg 488-489
“Ontological”, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 1995 pg 192
Reasons for Action, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 1995 pgs 677-678
Richard B. Brandt. “Epistemology and Ethics, Parallel Between.”The Encycylopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 3 1967 pg 5-8
Tindale, Christopher W. "Fallacies and Argument Appraisal". New York: Cambridge Univ. Press 2007 pgs 57-75,
127-143, 173-188
Walton, Douglas. "A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy". Univ. of Alabama Press. 1995
Weddle, Perry. 1985 "On Theory in Informal Logic", Informal Logic 7, 119-26. from Levi Don S. "In Defense of Informal Logic".
Vol. 2 Boston: Kluwer Academic Pub. 2000 pgs 51-53
Andrew S. Drazdik Jr,
National Writers Union, UAW Local 1981/AFL-CIO, ID: 92743
Page 5
Latin Glossary:
"Actus" 2.a. doing, action, presentation of a piece on the stage pg 10
"Ago (trans. metaphorical sense) 1. to drive, or incite to action. 2.a. to keep in movement,
be engaged upon; hoc agere, to attend to the matter in hand 2.c. quid agam, to do or
perform pg 31
"Animus" 1. the spiritual, or rational principle of life in man 2. the soul, 2.a. the seat of
feeling the heart: animus aeger; from the heart ex animo, 2.c. the seat of the will: ad
omnia et animo et consilio paratus, 2.d. the seat of thought, intellect, mind: animo et
cogitatione pg 46
"Argumentum" 1. an argument proof 2. subject, contents, matter 1.a. literary work 1.b.
subject of a work of art pg 57
"Ars" skill, way, method 1. an occupation, profession, art 2. skill, knowledge as shown in
arts: ex arte, according to rules of art; bad sense (negative conotation) cunning; or as
theory to practice: facultas pg 59
"cogitatio" thinking, act or faculty of thinking conception; "cogito-are" to turn over in the
mind, to think, reflect, consider pg 114
"documentum" example, pattern, warning, proof pg 200
"facio", n."factum" a deed, act, exploit pg 238
"Modus" Lit. a measure, standard of measurement (transf.)1. limit, boundary, 2. rule,
manner, mode, way, method pg 377
"Nexus" a binding, tying together, entwining, connecting pg 392
"Notitia" 1. a being known; (transf.) fame, celebrity 2. Knowledge, aquaintance pg 396
"Probatio" 3. Proof, demonstration, "Probabilitas" probality, credibility pg 473
"Scientia" a knowing, knowledge of , acquaintance with, skill in pg 538
Andrew S. Drazdik Jr,
National Writers Union, UAW Local 1981/AFL-CIO, ID: 92743
Page 6