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Collection of Data on Past Reform Recommendations, Review, e.g., SIRC reports, court cases and
commission of inquiry reports for recommendations that are applicable to C-51
Contents
Bill C-51 Commission of Inquiry Reports ....................................................................................................................2
March 5, 2015 – Submission to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security of the House of
Commons – Daniel Therrien ...................................................................................................................................2
Proposed Amendments ..........................................................................................................................................2
Sharing Information:...........................................................................................................................................2
Record Keeping Obligations ...............................................................................................................................3
Information Sharing Agreements .......................................................................................................................3
Oversight and Review .........................................................................................................................................3
Subcommittee on Public Safety Act and National Security – June 1, 2005 by Jennifer Stoddart..............................4
Position Statement on the Anti-Terrorism Act – Submission to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
to the Senate Special Committee on the Anti-Terrorism Act By Jennifer Stoddart; May 9, 2005 .............................4
National Security Environment ..............................................................................................................................5
Effects .....................................................................................................................................................................5
Recommendations..................................................................................................................................................6
Impact of Anti-Terrorism Act on CSE ......................................................................................................................9
Testimony regarding Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice
and Human Rights – October 23, 2001 by George Radwanski ..................................................................................9
SIRC reports (excerpts) ........................................................................................................................................... 11
2013-2014 ............................................................................................................................................................ 11
2012-2013 ............................................................................................................................................................ 12
2011-2012 ............................................................................................................................................................ 12
2010-2011 ............................................................................................................................................................ 13
2009-2010 ............................................................................................................................................................ 13
2008-2009 ............................................................................................................................................................ 14
2007-2008 ............................................................................................................................................................ 14
Other ........................................................................................................................................................................ 15
Canadian Bar Association (2005) ........................................................................................................................ 15
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Bill C-51 Commission of Inquiry Reports
March 5, 2015 – Submission to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National
Security of the House of Commons – Daniel Therrien1
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Focus on Part 1 of the Bill, which would create a new Security of Canada Information Sharing
Act (SCISA).
o Purpose: facilitate sharing of information among federal institutions to protect Canada against
acts undermining security
Although greater information sharing may sometimes lead to identifying and suppressing security
threats, the scope of the powers of the new act is excessive and its impact on the loss of privacy of all
Canadians is unprecedented
Serious human rights abuses can occur in the name of national security
o National security information sharing lead to torture in post 9/11 environment
As a result of SCISA, 17 government institutions in national security would have limitless powers to
monitor and profile ordinary Canadians
Rule of law  National security agencies shouldn’t be allowed to determine the limits of their powers
o Law should prescribe clear and reasonable standards for sharing, collection, use and retention of
personal information
o Compliance with these standards should be subject to independent and effective review
mechanisms, including courts
Proposed Amendments
Sharing Information:
Critique: Bill C-51 sets the threshold for sharing Canadians’ personal information far too low, and broadens
the scope of information sharing far too much.
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Recommendation 1: Only information which meets the necessity standard, rather than the relevance
standard, should be shared with the 17 agencies listed in the Schedule.
Alternatively, a recipient department should be required to conduct an assessment of the
reasonableness and proportionality of the collection in achieving their mandated national security
objective.
o Relevance is a much broader standard and would have the potential to give national security
agencies virtually limitless powers to monitor and profile all Canadians
o Necessity standard should be applied, in accordance to s 12 of CSIS Act
o If necessity test seems to high, parliament should consider a proportionality and
reasonableness test
o Threshold of information sharing is important to strike the right balance in protecting privacy
rights
https://www.priv.gc.ca/parl/2015/parl_sub_150305_e.asp
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Recommendation 2: The definition of “activities undermining the security of Canada” should be
reviewed to ensure that it is not overly broad and includes only real threats to security.
 In the case of conflict between that definition and the jurisdiction of recipient institutions, it should
be clarified that the former is not intended to expand the latter.
Record Keeping Obligations
 Critique: Bill C-51 is far too permissive with respect to how shared information is handled. It sets no
clear limits on how long information is to be kept.
 Recommendation 3: Bill C-51 should be amended to include as a statutory requirement that
personal information that does not meet the recipient institution's legal collection standards should be
discarded without delay.
 SCISA should also require that information, once collected, is retained only as long as necessary.
 Reviews should be held at regular intervals, prescribed by regulations, to ensure that this principle is
respected and that the retention of information is justified.
 Finally, SCISA should require that proper documentation of all collection and retention decisions be
maintained.
Information Sharing Agreements
 Critique: Bill C-51 fails to require that information sharing be subject to written agreements.
 Recommendation 4: Bill C-51 should be amended to include an explicit requirement for written
information agreements. More detailed elements of what should be in the agreements could be set
out in Regulations. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner should be consulted in the development
of these agreements.
o New Zealand requires written agreements
o Would provide more specificity beyond core standards in legislation for what is being shared,
how, and when information is retained, when it is disposed of, and accountability measures to
assign responsibility for and review of sharing
Oversight and Review
 Critique: Bill C-51 exacerbates serious gaps in existing oversight and review mechanisms, and does
not facilitate sharing between review bodies. As for affected individuals, the privacy regime
provides no judicial recourse for improper collection, use or disclosure of their personal information.
 Recommendation 5: Bill C-51 should be amended to ensure that all 17 agencies in Schedule 3 are
subject to independent and effective review, by an expert body and by Parliamentarians;
o Mandates of parliamentarians and committee of experts should be defined to avoid
duplication
o Offers democratic accountability
o Other countries have adopted this measure
 To remove impediments for information exchange between existing review bodies;
 And to amend the Privacy Act to allow for judicial recourse in cases involving collection, use or
disclosure of personal information.
o All citizens currently have a right to is a report of non-binding recommendations with no
further enforcement mechanism and no possibility for remedy
o Should broaden Federal Court review to all grounds beyond just denial of access
 The Bill should also include a mandatory period of review after three years.
 Conclusion:
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In its current form, Bill C51 would fail to provide Canadians with legislation that protects their safety
and privacy
Proposed amendments are necessary to achieve an appropriate balance
Subcommittee on Public Safety Act and National Security – June 1, 2005 by
Jennifer Stoddart
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Lack of facts and evidence to suggest measures in Anti-Terrorism Act are necessary
Subcommittee should critically assess the issue of proportionality and consider the proposed
recommendations to address cumulative impact of anti-terrorism measures on Canadians’ privacy
rights
 Impacts of the act can be grouped under 3 broad themes:
 1. Surveillance powers of security and intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been overly
broadened.
 2. Constraints on the use of those same surveillance powers have been unduly weakened.
 3. Government accountability and transparency have been significantly reduced
Recommendations:
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Our recommendations aim to contain surveillance, as well as increase oversight and promote
transparency
Government of Canada should conduct an empirical assessment of the effectiveness of the
extraordinary powers granted to law enforcement and national security agencies and the
proportionality of the loss of established rights.
o Should include assessment of alternative models for achieving national security objectives
without encroaching on informational privacy
Need for transparency and openness of s. 38 procedures under the Canada Evidence Act.
Recommendation for a security-cleared special advocate position to carry out the function of
challenging arguments that information shouldn’t be disclosed to affected party and challenging
information that cannot be disclosed before judges
5 general recommendations for need for continuing review of the Act
Position Statement on the Anti-Terrorism Act – Submission to the Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada to the Senate Special Committee on the AntiTerrorism Act By Jennifer Stoddart; May 9, 20052
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This brief situates the Anti-terrorism Act within the larger national security environment, discusses
the Act's negative impact on informational privacy, and proposes recommendations to address the
impact.
Question: Whether the benefits in security justifies sacrificing privacy and other rights?
In the absence of evidence supporting its existence, perhaps the Act should be repealed, rather than
simply amended
Source: https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2005/ata_050509_e.asp.
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National Security Environment
 Committee should take an expansive view of its mandate and situate the Act and its implications for
informational privacy rights in the broader Canadian public policy context for public safety and
national security
 From a Privacy Commissioner's perspective, the emerging national security environment is marked
by an intensification of information sharing between organizations and jurisdictions, and by a transnational "continental integration" approach to information gathering and intelligence sharing.
o Much of this information is highly sensitive and personal.
 Review of the Act cannot be separated from examining the systems being built to support the
operations of information and intelligence gathering and sharing.
 When the bill was under review, Stoddart recommended that it included provisions for privacy
accountability but it was not accepted
 7/10 survey respondents indicate they believe they have less protection of their personal information
now than 10 years ago.
 Broad consensus that strong laws are required to protect Canadians’ personal information
 9/10 respondents see a need for on-going review of legislation to keep pace with changes in
technology
 Demonstrates Canadians are aware of informational privacy issues and expect a reasonable and
balanced approach to a national strategy to combat terrorism
 Public demand for greater accountability, transparency and control over agencies involved in national
security is increasing
Effects
 Surveillance powers have been overly broadened
o Potential to create a broader net for surveillance of organizations and individuals of all walks
of life
o Through series of amendments to criminal code, the Act made it easier for law enforcement
and national security agencies to obtain electronic surveillance warrants, imposed
requirements on individuals to report to the RCMP and CSIS about property within their
control, and provisions for AG to obtain income tax information in investigations of terrorism
o Act also amended National Defence Act to allow CSE to gather foreign intelligence under
ministerial authorization and gave it ability to intercept private communications for
protecting computer systems and networks of the government
o Changed CSE’s interception mandate  it can now intercept communications in Canada
rather than just foreign communications
o Also amended Proceeds of Crime Act, which expands the range of financial transactions that
needs to be reported by private sector to FINTRAC and increases flow of information from
FINTRAC to CSIS and RCMP
o Also expanded constraints in DNA Identification Act
o Appropriate anti-terrorism legislation should be focused on terrorism and not bleed over to
general law enforcement purposes
o Several post 9/11 legislative amendments have inappropriately blurred these distinctions
o Real risk of large scale systems of surveillance eroding privacy rights
 Constraints on use of those powers have been unduly weakened
o National security agencies no longer required to consider other investigative methods prior to
applying for judicial authorization for electronic surveillance
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o Government executives can issue security certificates and authorize interception of
communications rather than judges
o Judicial standard of “reasonable grounds to believe” has been reduced to “reasonable grounds
to suspect”
o Legislative enactments under the Act has weakened independent and judicial oversight of
surveillance activities
o No independent review mechanism for CBSA
o No parliamentary committee to review CSIS and CSE – both are overseen by SIRC and
Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment respectively
o Independent review should be the rule, not the exception
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Government accountability and transparency significantly reduced
o Mandatory closed court provisions in ss 38.02 and 38.11 go too far in requiring secrecy about
judicial proceedings
o Against SCC approach favouring discretionary and proportionate approaches to balance
between open courts and national security
o Amended s 38 to permit the AG to override a federal court order that information should be
disclosed
 Unnecessary and should be repealed
 If s. 38.13 is retained, Committee should consider recommending the legislation
allows appeals from judicial review of an AG’s certificate provided for under 38.131,
or allow the review to be conducted by 3 instead of 1 judge of the federal court of
appeal
 Would encourage greater checks and balances and possibility for the expression of
dissent
Recommendations
 Recommendation 1: The Government of Canada should conduct an empirical assessment of the
effectiveness of the extraordinary powers granted to law enforcement and national security agencies
under the Anti-terrorism Act, and the proportionality of the loss of established rights. The
examination should include an exploration of alternative models for achieving national security
objectives without unnecessarily encroaching on informational privacy.
 Recommendation 2: The ordinary requirement that a judge be convinced that other methods of
investigation have been tried or would fail should be applied to electronic surveillance for
terrorism offences under the Criminal Code.
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Recommendation 3: The Criminal Code's ordinary time limits for such warrants — 60 days
authorization and up to one year for notification — should be required, and the exceptions in
the Anti-terrorism Act for warrants up to a year and up to three years without authorization
should be repealed.
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Recommendation 4: The Anti-terrorism Act's amendments to the National Defence Act to allow
the Communications Security Establishment to intercept private conversations that may
involve people in Canada should be amended to require prior judicial authorization.
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Recommendation 5: Section 273.65(2)(d) of the National Defence Act, which purports to protect the
privacy of Canadians in the face of CSE surveillance of communications, should be amended. The
requirement for "satisfactory measures... to protect the privacy of Canadians and to ensure that
private communications will only be used or retained if they are essential to international affairs,
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defence or security" should be amended, either to require "all reasonable measures to protect
privacy" or to specify in greater detail what constitutes "satisfactory" measures.
Recommendation 6: Section 273.65(4)(d) of the National Defence Act, which permits CSE to
collect information essential to protecting the government's computer systems, places limitations on
what can be "used" and "retained". This should be amended to place limitations on what information
CSE canobtain.
Recommendation 7: Section 273.65(8) of the National Defence Act should be amended so that the
CSE Commissioner is required to ensure not only that intercepts of private conversations have in fact
been authorized by Ministerial direction, but that the direction itself is authorized by the law and
consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Privacy Act.
Recommendation 8: Parliament should undertake a systematic review of the overall mechanism for
oversight of national security activities, taking into account the existing bodies and identifying areas
where these bodies overlap, but more importantly, identifying areas where there are gaps in coverage.
Recommendation 9: The mandatory in camera proceedings and the mandatory ban on even
revealing that a s.38 proceeding is taking place found in ss.38.02 and 38.11 should be repealed,
following the principles in Ruby v. Canadaand the comments by Chief Justice Lutfy in the Ottawa
Citizen Groupcase. A more proportionate alternative is to allow the judge to hold proceedings in
camera when necessary to protect national security.
Recommendation 10: Section 38.13 should be repealed on the basis that it is superfluous to
empower the executive to trump an adjudicative order for disclosure. Section 38.06 already allows
courts to balance the conflicting interests in disclosure and national security and impose conditions
on the release of information in a manner that reconciles these two important concerns; it has been
interpreted by the courts in a way that makes generous allowance for the state's interests in national
security, national defence and international relations.
Recommendation 11: Should s.38.13 certificates be retained, they should be subject to the same
reporting and sunset requirements as the use of investigative hearings and preventive arrests (that is,
a five year renewable sunset and annual reports on the use of this power) , because they constitute
extraordinary interventions by the executive into the adjudicative process. A section 38.13 certificate
should also not last for 15 years but for 5 years, perhaps subject to renewal.
Recommendation 12: A judicial balancing of competing disclosure and security interests as
available under s.38.06 should also be available under s.38.131, which provides for review by one
judge of the Federal Court of Appeal of a s.38.13 certificate issued by the Attorney General. Thought
should also be given to allowing appeals from the judicial review of the s.38.13 certificate, or of
allowing the review to be conducted by three as opposed to one judge of the Federal Court of Appeal,
so as to encourage greater checks and balances and the possibility for the expression of dissent.
Recommendation 13: I recommend that the Committee give consideration to the creation of a
security-cleared special advocate position to carry out this function. Such an advocate could play a
useful role, both in challenging arguments by the government that information should not be
disclosed to the affected party, and in challenging information that cannot be disclosed before the
judge. This would ensure that a judge hears an advocate for the greatest possible disclosure possible
before making a decision. The special advocate could also examine any evidence that the judge
decides cannot be disclosed to the affected person and, where appropriate, challenge the
government's reliance on such secret evidence.
Recommendation 14: The Anti-terrorism Act, along with the Public Safety Act29, should be
considered extraordinary legislation. As such, they should be subject to periodic Parliamentary
review to assess their continued relevance, and to keep them in the public eye. We cannot allow these
extraordinary measures to become the new "normal" state of affairs in Canada.
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Recommendation 15: The Government should articulate the operating principles of a privacy
management framework, including the development of internal privacy audit capacity, privacy
leadership responsibilities incorporated in the performance agreement of senior executives, privacy
protection performance indicators, and a strengthened role for Access to Information and Privacy
coordinators.
Recommendation 16: Departments and agencies with an anti-terrorism role under the Anti-terrorism
Act should be required to report to Parliament on a periodic basis, perhaps at the same time as the
legislative review, with a general description of their anti-terrorism programs, and accounting of how
effective these measures have been for detecting, stopping or deterring terrorist acts.
Recommendation 17: The Government recently tabled a proposal to create a National Security
Committee of Parliamentarians. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner supports this initiative and
recommends that the Committee address as part of its mandate, the need to reconcile privacy
protection with national security requirements.
Recommendation 18: The Government of Canada should, in the context of the new national security
environment, examine the adequacy of legislation that governs personal information collected,
processed and shared by the Canadian government. This means a thoroughgoing reconsideration of
the Privacy Act , of course, something that has been seriously overdue since before 9/11. The
Government of Canada and Parliament should also assess the completeness and adequacy of the
institutional framework (including the Office of the Privacy Commissioner) to safeguard privacy
rights, and the powers and authorities of oversight bodies, including their capabilities and resources.
Parliamentary Review of the Anti-Terrorism Act – Special Senate Committee
Speaking Notes – April 11, 20053
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Under its legislated mandate, CSE engages in three broad areas of activity: collection of foreign
intelligence, protection of electronic information, and assistance to federal law enforcement and
security agencies.
The absolute prohibition against intercepting "private communications" contained in Part Six of
the Criminial Code was increasingly scripting CSE out of its basic mission - to collect foreign
communications
To appreciate this impact, it is important to understand that the Criminal Code definition of a private
communication includes any communication with a reasonable expectation of privacy that
originates or terminates in Canada.
This Criminial Code provision affected CSE in two ways.
o First, it prevented CSE from intercepting communications that an intelligence target abroad
sent to or received from Canada.
o Second, this provision prevented CSE from intercepting any communications
that might contain private communications.
The result was that, as technologies continued to evolve, CSE was increasingly unable to access
valuable intelligence sources
CSE's ability to protect electronic information and systems was being similarly eroded.
Source: https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/transparency-transparence/review-ata-examen-lat.
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Impact of Anti-Terrorism Act on CSE
 The Act thus created a mechanism - an authorization by the Minister of National Defence - which
allows CSE to intercept private communications when directing its activities against foreign entities
located abroad.
 Under the legislation, CSE is prohibited from directing its activities against Canadians or anyone
within the 12-mile limit that defines Canadian territory.
 Also prohibited from directing its activities at Canadians abroad, defined in the Act as Canadians or
permanent residents.
 However, under Ministerial authority, CSE can now conduct operations even if doing so risks
acquiring private communications as well.
 The Act allows CSE, in cases where a strict set of conditions is met, to use and retain these
communications. Otherwise they are deleted.
 CSE may now obtain a Ministerial Authorization to carry out essential IT Security activities that run
the risk of intercepting private communications.
 Ministerial Authorizations have allowed CSE to significantly increase its ability to identify and
collect communications that yield high-value foreign intelligence.
 CSE has provided intelligence on foreign terrorist targets used to protect the safety and interests of
Canadians and our closest allies.
o This was intelligence that CSE would not have been able to acquire without the AntiTerrorism Act
 Before providing a Ministerial Authorization, the Minister must be satisfied that, among other
things, the interception will not be directed against Canadians or anyone in Canada, and that
satisfactory measures are in place to protect the privacy of Canadians.
 CSE has instituted new procedures for activities conducted under Ministerial Authorization to ensure
CSE's activities are directed at foreign entities abroad and that they will only be used or retained if
they are essential to international affairs, defence or security
 CSE also works closely with an on-site legal team assigned from the Department of Justice to ensure
its practices and procedures satisfy all legislated requirements.
 The Commissioner has a mandate to review CSE's activities to ensure they are lawful. He has
unfettered access to all CSE personnel, information and documentation.
 Conclusion:
 Believes the authorities granted to CSE under the Anti-Terrorism Act provide the right foundation for
the organization's activities while protecting the privacy of Canadians.
 Allows the organization to address new threats and to keep pace with a rapidly changing
communications environment.
Testimony regarding Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act, to the House of
Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights – October 23, 2001 by George
Radwanski4
4
Source: https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/sp-d/02_05_a_011024_e.asp
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Duty to speak out against unnecessary violations of Canadians’ privacy rights in the name of
combatting terrorism
Any specific measure that is introduced that would restrict or limit privacy needs to be tested
carefully, calmly and on a case by case basis against several criteria
1. Has to be demonstrably necessary to address a specific problem
2. Must be demonstrable that it is likely to be effective in addressing that problem
3. The degree of intrusion or limitation of a fundamental right like privacy has to be proportional to
the security benefit being pursed or to be derived
4. Demonstrable that no less privacy intrusive measure would suffice to achieve the same result
“I find overall this legislation to be a well-balanced, well thought-out effort to enhance security to
give law enforcement authorities the measures they need to be able to effectively seek to combat
terrorism, while at the same time respecting privacy rights that are maximum possible.”
However, takes issue with ss. 103 and 104 - the provision enabling the Minister of Justice as
Attorney General, to issue a certificate that would prohibit the release of information, personal
information under the Privacy Act, for reasons of security, international relations, or defence
considerations
o Nothing in the law to prevent a minister from issuing a certificate pertaining not to an
individual, but to an entire agency or department, or for that matter to the government as a
whole.
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SIRC reports (excerpts)
2013-20145
Report
Review of Security Screening
CSIS’s Surveillance
Capabilities
and Functions
A Counter-Intelligence
Investigation
Operation Support and its Use
Overseas
Review of a CSIS Foreign
Station
Revocation of a Security
Clearance
Alleged Discrimination,
5
Recommendation
SIRC recommends that CSIS consult with the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner before the end of 2013 on changes affecting the internal use
of information collected for security screening purposes.
SIRC recommends that CSIS prioritize the request for legal advice
pertaining to its liability under distracted driving legislation across Canada.
SIRC recommends that CSIS devise a clear governance framework that
addresses the foundations of a national and standardized surveillance
program.
SIRC recommends that CSIS commit to reassessing the resources devoted
to an aspect of this investigation in due course to determine its continued
sustainability.
SIRC recommends that CSIS’s next warrant application include summary
information similar to that which was compiled for SIRC so as to provide
the Federal Court with additional information regarding the application and
use of the power in this investigation.
SIRC recommends that all necessary and relevant training be made
mandatory prior to an employee’s deployment abroad.
SIRC recommends that CSIS HQ ensures that all employees be properly
informed about the Critical Incident Response Plan and any responsibilities
they have under this Plan.
SIRC recommends that CSIS apply consistent measures to ensure that
personnel stationed abroad are adequately supplied with the appropriate
personal safety equipment.
SIRC recommends that CSIS develop better guidelines on the sourcing and
purchasing of weapons within dangerous operating environments, create a
clear responsibility centre for the firearms program and obtain updated
legal advice related to the reasonableness and necessity of carrying
firearms within dangerous operating environments.
SIRC recommends that CSIS update its security procedures to include
additional guidelines and that it inform the appropriate authority of the
solution it has implemented to resolve the technical problem.
SIRC recommends that CSIS enhance its validation process for intelligence
collected abroad by making increased use of the tools and techniques it
already employs domestically.
SIRC recommends that CSIS provide SIRC with a detailed update on the
changes and initiatives undertaken since the events in question in this
complaint to address the issue of rigour in assessments.
SIRC recommends that a policy directive be issued to all CSIS personnel
about the importance of the duty of proactive candour in proceedings
before SIRC.
SIRC recommends that a generic reply be crafted so that a response may be
Security Intelligence Review Committee, Lifting the Shroud of Secrecy, Thirty Years of Security Intelligence Accountability
Annual Report 2013-2014, Online < http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/ar_2013-2014-eng.pdf>, p 36.
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Improper Conduct
and Delay
Allegations of Wrongdoing and
Violations of Rights
2012-20136
Review of a New Section 21
Warrant Power
Investigating Activities Related
to Espionage and foreign
Influence
CSIS’s Evolving footprint
Abroad
CSIS’s Support to Canada’s
Northern Perimeter
CSIS’s use of a Clandestine
Methodology
Alleged harassment, Racial
Profiling and Sharing of
Misleading Information by
CSIS
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provided in those circumstances where a subject of a security clearance
enquires as to why he or she is being asked to engage in a security
clearance interview.
SIRC recommends that CSIS obtain the informed and voluntary consent
from Canadians participating in a meeting with CSIS, in Canada or abroad.
SIRC recommends that CSIS extend the use of caveats and assurances in
regards to this new warrant power to include the agencies of the entire
Five eyes community.
SIRC recommends that CSIS carry out the appropriate fine-tuning, in
policy and practice, to assist investigators and analysts in identifying
common and consistent thresholds, and in judging when an activity has
crossed over into the clandestine realm.
SIRC also recommends that CSIS develop a strategy to deliver the same
cautionary messages about foreign-influenced activities for all potentially
affected sectors.
SIRC recommends that CSIS take immediate action to ensure that Section
17 profiles are consistently accurate, complete, up-to-date and relevant.
SIRC recommends that CSIS “institutionalize responsibility” for northern
initiatives by setting out headquarters-driven liaison and operational
objectives over a multi-year period, and ensure that these objectives are
sustained with an appropriate resource commitment.
SIRC recommends that CSIS policy be changed to ensure that all
stakeholders be informed about lessons learned stemming from a
suspected or confirmed security breach pertaining to the use of this covert
methodology.
SIRC also recommends that CSIS immediately update its policy on the
use of this new program so that it is more in line with other operational
policies.
SIRC recommends that CSIS engage in outreach with minority
communities to explore the issue of racial data collection as a possible
way to reassure the public that CSIS does not racially profile individuals.
SIRC also recommends that CSIS remedy the situation by sending the
previously excluded information to the department concerned.
2011-20127
CSIS’s Role in the Security
Certificate Process
CSIS’s Role in a Counter
Proliferation Investigation
6
SIRC recommends that CSIS undertake a comprehensive, forward-looking
review of relevant court rulings to ensure a full understanding of their
implications on Service operations, processes and resources.
SIRC recommends that, in the future, risk assessments should—where
appropriate—include a more nuanced and comprehensive appraisal of
individual partner agencies.
Security Intelligence Review Committee, Bridging the Gap, Recalibrating the Machinery of Security Intelligence and
Intelligence review, Annual Report 2013-2014, Online < http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/ar_2012-2013-eng.pdf >, p 39.
7
Security Intelligence Review Committee, Meeting the Challenge, Moving Forward in a Changing Landscape, Annual Report
2011-2012, Online < http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/ar_2011-2012-eng.pdf >, p 32.
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Domestic Radicalization
CSIS Support to Emerging
Issues and Government of
Canada Intelligence Priorities
CSIS Intelligence Production
and Dissemination
Page 13 of 15
SIRC recommends that CSIS develop a new policy to govern the sharing
of information on minors with foreign partners, or amend existing policy
on information-sharing to reflect an appropriate sensitivity to youth.
To ensure that appropriate attention and sensitivity are given to
intelligence collected and retained on underage persons, SIRC
recommends that all operational reporting containing information on a
minor be flagged as such.
To enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of CSIS’s involvement in
such matters, SIRC recommends that CSIS develop appropriate
operational procedures, as well as mechanisms to enhance operational and
subject matter expertise.
SIRC recommends that CSIS develop a more accurate means of tracking
its production activity so as to accurately represent the proportions of
Section 12 and Section 16 information.
SIRC is concerned that the combination of CSIS’s attempts to emulate the
reporting and dissemination structure of foreign intelligence organizations,
its efforts to respond to broader Government of Canada intelligence
priorities, and CSIS’s more active client feedback process, may take the
focus away from its
core mandate: security intelligence.
2010-20118
CSIS’s Intelligence-toEvidence Process
CSIS’s Role in a
CounterProliferation
Investigation
To improve the quality and value of the information that CSIS provides to
its law enforcement partners, and to bring consistency to the way in which
CSIS discloses information to law enforcement, SIRC recommended that
CSIS adopt a one-letter disclosure model that incorporates the standards of
rigorous legal review currently set for advisory letters.
SIRC recommends that, in the future, risk assessments should—where
appropriate—include a more nuanced and comprehensive appraisal of
individual partner agencies.
2009-20109
SIRC suggests that it is time for a public discussion on what Canadians expect of their intelligence agencies and
on the real risks and benefits that such work entails. This should include a discussion about what role is most
appropriate for CSIS vis-à-vis foreign intelligence and overseas activities, and an acknowledgement of the
tradeoffs that may be required for security intelligence to be effective well into the future.10
The report includes some statistics available about the number of warrants, requests to CSIS for site access
screening, time to complete security assessments, etc.
8
Security Intelligence Review Committee, Checks and Balances, Viewing Security Intelligence Through the Lens of
Accountability, Annual Report 2010-2011, Online < http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/ar_2010-2011-eng.pdf >, p 31.
9
Security Intelligence Review Committee, Checks and Balances, Viewing Security Intelligence Through the Lens of
Accountability, Annual Report 2009-2010, Online < http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/ar_2009-2010-eng.pdf >, p 39.
10
Supra note 5, p 7.
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2008-200911
A CSIS’s Human Source
Operation
CSIS's investigation into
domestic extremism
CSIS should inform the Minister of Public Safety of the implications of
the
Anti-Terrorism Act as it relates to the Service’s human source program
and any future related developments.
CSIS should take steps to develop stronger definitions and a better
understanding of the multi-issue extremism environment. The objective
should be to build a more effective model to isolate and identify indicators
of activist extremism and their potential for violence.
The report includes some statistics available about the number of warrants, requests to CSIS for site access
screening, time to complete security assessments, etc.
2007-200812
Recommendations concerning reviews



CSIS should reconsider its policy structure to accommodate its increasing activities outside Canada.
Debates about whether a targeted group is in fact a terrorist organization should be included in future
targeting discussions by CSIS.
With respect to the Service’s investigation of certain individuals believed to be second-generation terrorists,
or recent converts to extremist interpretations of Islam, CSIS should clearly define this issue-based
investigation when it is next renewed and determine whether it should focus on issues of increasing concern.
Recommendations concerning complaints



11
The Canadian Human Rights Commission not investigate this complaint in accordance with Subsection 46 (2)
of the Canadian Human Rights Act.
The Minister provide the complainant with the opportunity to re-apply for the security clearance under the
new policy.
If the complainant were to re-apply, CSIS or Transport Canada should conduct an interview with the
complainant in the presence of counsel or other representative. In addition, the complainant should be made
aware of the right to record the interview, and that CSIS or Transport Canada also record the interview and
retain a copy of the recording until the complainant has had an opportunity to exhaust any review process or
until the retention period under the Privacy Act has expired, whichever is later.
Security Intelligence Review Committee, Annual Report 2008-2009, Accountability in a new era of security intelligence,
Online < http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/ar_2008-2009-eng.pdf >, p 28.
12
Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC Annual Report 2007-2008, An operational review of the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service, Online < http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/ar_2007-2008-eng.pdf >, p 61.
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Page 15 of 15
Other
Canadian Bar Association (2005)
The Canadian Bar Association recommended in 200513 that:
1. The federal government indicate clearly the adoption of Canada’s obligations under international
conventions and instruments in Canadian domestic law, and list in annual reports on the Anti-terrorism
Act cases applying Canada’s obligations under international conventions and instruments.
2. Terrorist activities be defined consistently in all Canadian laws relating to terrorism, adopting the
definition in the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism:
Any act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an
active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act.
3. The Criminal Code be amended to require the Crown to prove criminal intent to find anyone guilty of a
terrorist offence.
4. Lawyers providing legal services to those accused to terrorist offences be specifically excluded from the
ambit of section 83.18, dealing participation in or contribution to an activity of a terrorist group.
5. Criminal Code section 25.1 and related section be repealed, so that public officers are not legally justified
in committing criminal offences.
[…]
7. The federal government establish an independent oversight mechanism for all security matters not
covered by SIRC.
[…]
11. Those detained for security reasons be entitled to a detention review after 48 hours, after seven days and
then every 30 days.
[…]
17. Sections 87, 103 and 104 of the Anti-terrorism Act be repealed. In the alternative:
[set of recommendations regarding the certificates]
13
Canadian Bar Association, Submission on the Three Year Review of the Anti-terrorism Act, May 2005, Online
<https://www.cba.org/cba/submissions/pdf/05-28-eng.pdf> p 47.