MTG: Game Theory
Autumn 2007
Author: Jess Uhre Rakbek
Supervisor: Gordon Calleja
Introduction
In today’s game studies it is generally agreed upon, that if the player is controlling one specific entity in
order to interact with the game then this entity is of primary importance as for the player’s experience
of the given game. Judging mainly from the Digra proceedings from 2003-2007 it seems though that the
mentioned entity, the anchor point of the player, has proven to be rather difficultly to approach
analytically. Part of the problem I believe, is based on the fact that these studies have not been very
successful in naming this entity. Some refer to it as a playable character, some as an avatar, but very few
actually put in the effort as to clearly define whatever term they are using. This has lead to a fuzziness
surrounding the subject, since it’s not very clear what different people understand by avatars and
playable characters or whether these are believed to be synonymous.
In the following I will argue that the terms character and avatar carries different meanings, and that it is
crucial to define both to be able to make a distinction that allows us to utilize both terms productively in
the discussion of games. As I will go on to examine in greater detail, the academic study of the avatar
have largely discarded the notion of the avatar as being a fictional character.
I will however introduce the concept of character resistance as a way to understand the relation
between an entity as an avatar and as a character. The concept of character resistance is meant as a tool
to articulate the degree of presence of a designed fictional character in an avatar controlled by the
player. I believe this concept to be relatively useful both in terms of analyzing avatars in avatar-based
games and in a game design perspective concerning the actual making of new avatars.
The Avatar
In his article The Myth of the Ergodic Videogame - Some thoughts on player-character relationships in
videogames1 Newman elaborates what has later been labeled The Cursor Theory. In this article Newman
argues that the avatar should be understood in terms of agency and control rather than as a fictional
character. Newman represents a ludologist approach to games, and as such the article is a statement
that it’s not very useful to apply the research metology used in analysing fictional characters in literature
or cinema when it comes to avatars in computer games.
The understanding of the avatar as a tool leads Newman to draw a distinction between On-line and Offline sections of a game. “On-Line refers to the state of ergodic participation that we would, in a
1
Newman. 2002.
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MTG: Game Theory
Autumn 2007
Author: Jess Uhre Rakbek
Supervisor: Gordon Calleja
commonsense manner, think of as "playing the game".” Whereas “Off-Line describes periods where no
registered input control is received from the player”. Basically the On-line part of a game is when the
player is in control, while the Off-line sections are the possible parts of a game where the player is not in
control. A common example of the latter would be cut-scenes.
Understanding the avatar as a mediator of agency and control the distinction between On-line and Offline sections is very useful, because the avatar can only be considered an avatar during On-line play.
During Off-line play the avatar would cease to be an avatar, but could instead be considered as a
fictional character like those of traditional media. It is thus in the On-line section of a game that it
distinguish itself from other media because of the players agency.
Because of this Newman focuses on the On-line game sections. This being defined by player agency,
Newman argues that the avatar, the mediator of this agency, should be considered solely as a tool of
agency. To Newman an avatar is thus characterized by what it actually allows the player to do in the
game world. This understanding of the avatar as a vehicular embodiment, where the player embodies
the avatar, as a set of possible interactions and not as a fictional character, is the reason for the name;
The Cursor Theory, because Newman argues that a game character as for instance Lara Croft is
essentially no different from a mouse cursor during On-line play.
This quite radical understanding of the avatar as being nothing but a tool has given way for criticism. In
his resent dissertation called What is the Avatar? – Fiction and Embodiment in Avatar-Based
Singleplayer2 Games, Rune Klevjer adopts Newman’s notion that player agency is a prerequisite for a
subject to be considered an avatar. However Klevjer goes on to criticize The Cursor Theory to develop a
more refined way of understanding the avatar.
Where Newman sees the avatar only as a tool that allows for a certain number of different interactions
and navigation within the game world, Klevjer defines the avatar as;
An avatar is an instrument or mechanism that defines for the participant a fictional body
and mediates fictional agency; it is an embodied incarnation of the acting subject. It is
dependent on the principle of the model, and acts as a dynamically reflexive prop in
relation to its environment. Its capabilities and restrictions are based on the objective
properties of the model, and these capabilities and restrictions define the possibility-space
of the player’s fictional agency within the game. The avatar therefore defines the
boundaries of embodied make-believe. (Klevjer 2007: 87)
2
Klevjer. 2007.
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MTG: Game Theory
Autumn 2007
Author: Jess Uhre Rakbek
Supervisor: Gordon Calleja
Unlike Newman, Klevjer distinguishes between instrumental and fictional agency. As stated, fictional
agency implies the embodiment of the acting subject that by definition belongs to its environment.
Instrumental agency on the other hand has not to do with a subject, but is a mere extension of human
agency and as such a tool. The difference between an avatar as a subject and an instrumental tool is
constituted by the fact that the tool does not belong to the environment in the same way as the subject.
Klevjer argues that the tool has a one-way relationship with its environment because it allows the user
to alter the environment, but not for the environment to alter the tool. The acting subject or the avatar
also enables the user to alter the environment but can unlike a tool be altered or affected itself by its
environment as well. This relation is what Klevjer refers to when describing the avatar as a dynamically
reflective prop.
This distinction between instrumental and fictional agency is crucial because implies that the avatarial
embodiment lets the player inhabit the environment through the subject whereas a tool does not.
The Avatar as character
Concerning the notion on perceiving the avatar as a character, Klevjer argues that in order for us to
understand the avatar one should keep this term distinct from that of character. Klevjer points out that
the avatars might manifest themselves not as humans but also as vehicles. A car in a racing game cannot
be understood as a character, but it does have the ability to engage the player as an avatar. Whereas
Klevjer do acknowledge that character and narrative in some cases might be important in relation to the
avatar, he decides to leave this out in trying to present a general understanding of the avatar.
Accepting Klevjer’s definition of the avatar I want to examine the subset of the avatars that can also be
classified as characters. I define ‘character’ as an independent subject that has its own goals, moral and
will. In respect to the assignment as outlined in the beginning of the paper, I find it useful to consider a
character only a fictional subject and as such belonging to a narrative and part of a diegetic world. The
following will therefore be concerned with avatars that must be presumed to have a fictional life within
the environment as opposed to a racing car as in the example above. Also the avatars as well as being
fictionally alive they must be presented as somewhat intelligent in order to be considered a character.
The avatars that are of interest are thus typically avatars that are presented as humans as well as
machines or creatures that appears to have a human-like mind.
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MTG: Game Theory
Autumn 2007
Author: Jess Uhre Rakbek
Supervisor: Gordon Calleja
Klevjer can be said to open up for the discussion of how avatars can express themselves as a character in
his discussion of what he calls relative independence. Here Klevjer discusses how a third-person view of
the avatar distinguishes itself from a first-person view in terms of the relative independence that the
third-person view allows for.
…there is generally a relative independence or ‘slack’ between the player’s and the
extended avatar’s (the avatar seen in third-person view) actions anyway. This space for
independent action also gives more opportunities for the development of character,
because it allows for more elaborate and extended sequences of movement and posture,
which may be triggered by a single press of a button. (Klevjer 2007: 156)
The fact that the extended avatar might perform a sequence of movement that goes beyond the actual
input of the player gives way for the avatar to express some of its character. This is what I would refer to
as a kinetic form of character resistance. This is concerned with the looks and movement of the avatar
that I as Klevjer will argue holds some potential in expressing character.
A good example of this type of character resistance is found in God of War3. In this game the avatar
Kratos is tall, muscular, has a shaved head and always wears an angry looking face. Along with this all
player input will result in what can only be perceived as very aggressive motion. This kinetic character
resistance helps the player to perceive Kratos as being a dark, troubled and hateful person. As such the
player’s embodiment of this avatar does not give him full control as to how the avatar acts. This is yet
another reason why the avatar cannot be considered a mere tool as proposed by Newman.
As Klevjer notes, relative independence as character resistance that manifests itself through the
movement of the avatar is dependent upon the third-person view that allows the player to see the body
of the avatar. If the avatar moved somewhat independently in a first-person game, this would neglect
the player agency and the avatar would cease to be an avatar by definition. This leads Klevjer to
conclude:
The first-person avatar does not acknowledge any relative independence between action
and perception; with first person avatars, it is either full avatarial integrity, or no avatarial
relationship at all – take it or leave it. (Klevjer 2007: 157)
3
SCE Studios Santa Monica. 2005.
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MTG: Game Theory
Autumn 2007
Author: Jess Uhre Rakbek
Supervisor: Gordon Calleja
I would agree that the first-person view does not show enough of the avatar’s body to allow for a kinetic
character resistance, and that there is a much tighter relationship between player input and the avatar’s
response as Klevjer also argues. In first-person view as found in first-person shooters, the animation of
one’s avatar is restricted to animations of the hands handling the weapon - reloading for instance.
Unlike the appearance of a full body avatar including facial expressions it is very hard to decode a
character when seeing only the hands performing relatively trivial tasks.
We should however consider that character resistance is not constrained to kinetics only as it is the case
with Klevjer’s term; relative independence. I will argue that one should consider character resistance as
a broader concept that covers character resistance in terms of functionality too, what we as players are
allowed to do with the avatar, and also in terms of autonomic expression which could be oral or based
on gestures.
As an example I will compare two different first-person shooter avatars; Gordon Freeman from Halflife4, and Duke Nukem from Duke Nukem 3D5.
Initially these two avatars seem to be nearly identical. Both is presented on screen as the hands and the
gun, and both lets the player navigate and interact with the game world in a similar way. However when
we consider the character resistance, these two avatars turn out to be very different.
Gordon Freeman has been referred to as a ‘silent narrator’. Even though one might argue that he is an
avatar and not a narrator, it is a fact that he never speaks a word throughout the Half-Life series. In
terms of expression he can be said to have a very low character resistance. Duke Nukem on the other
hand will often comment on the action of the game, and has become famous among computer players
for these comments, that can actually be considered a trademark of the game. One-lines such as; “Oh
yeah!”, “Eat shit and die!” and “It’s time to kick ass and chew bubble gum – but I’m all out of gum”
establishes Duke Nukem as a cliché macho action hero. Even the player might feel sorry for the aliens
that he kills, Duke Nukem leaves no doubt that he doesn’t. The fact that Duke Nukem is an independent
character while an avatar to the player is underlined further by the fact that Duke Nukem if he is left idle
for a while will say: “What are we waiting for? Christmas?!” Not only does this add to our perception of
Duke Nukem as the cliché action hero like the other one-liners, but it also implies that Duke Nukem is
aware of the player’s agency and his own role as an avatar. Duke Nukem consists as an avatar both of
the player who has the agency that avatarial embodiment implies, and as Duke Nukem as a character.
4
5
Valve Software. 1998.
3D Realms. 1996.
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MTG: Game Theory
Autumn 2007
Author: Jess Uhre Rakbek
Supervisor: Gordon Calleja
By the concept of character resistance it shows why these two avatars are in fact not as similar as one
might otherwise expect. Also one can note that it is possible for a first-person avatar to maintain a
character resistance when we think of independence not only as kinetics.
Finally one should also consider character resistance in terms of functionality. While players have agency
over the avatar, the possible interactions and the goals that must be fulfilled to advance in the game is
always controlled by the designer. Kratos from God of War as mentioned above can only progress in the
game by killing a large number of enemies, why the possible interaction mainly consist of combat. It is
not possible for the player to decide to make peace with his enemies even though he embodies Kratos.
This functional character resistance is a very efficient way of maintaining a designed character despite
giving the player agency over this character as an avatar. If you want to portray a violent character like
Kratos not only in cut-scenes but in what Newman refers to as the On-line part of the game, allowing the
player to progress only by means of violence and restricting the possible interactions to actions of
violence is a certain way of doing this.
Even Gordon Freeman from Half-Life that otherwise has a minimum of character resistance, will
automatically lower his weapon if the player aims at an ally character. The fact that Gordon Freeman
cannot harm his allies is a functional character resistance by which the game designers ensures that
Gordon Freeman will always be a “good” character that only fights evil.
One may argue that the possible interactions will always be restricted by the designer and that the
player never can expect to be able to perform any action he might want. As such not all restrictions in
terms of possible interaction have to do with the avatar as character. Whether my avatar can jump or
not will hardly convey anything about it as a character, whereas the ability to kill civilians would be
crucial.
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MTG: Game Theory
Autumn 2007
Author: Jess Uhre Rakbek
Supervisor: Gordon Calleja
Conclusion
This paper has accounted for the relation between avatar and character. Rather than taking part in an
academic political discussion where one fraction holds that one should understand avatars as a
character and the other fraction hold that it should be understood as a tool, I have been following
Klevjers work accepted that this discussion of black and white is rather unfruitful. As such I have showed
that by separating the two terms (avatar and character) and acknowledging that they carry a different
meaning it is possible to utilize both terms together to gain a better understanding of the avatar.
By looking at the subset of avatars that must be considered to be characters by being perceived to have
a human mind, I have introduced the concept of character resistance as a tool to measure whether an
avatar during on-line play will retain a character despite the avatarial embodiment. By various examples
I have showed that the character resistance should be considered on multiple levels. As such it goes
beyond Klevjers concept of relative independence because character resistance is not only concerned
with kinetics but also encompasses expression of character as well as functional restrictions.
Using the concept of character resistance in analyzing the given type of avatars will allow one to do a
more detailed analysis since it can enable you to distinguish between avatars that considered in terms of
their ability to let the player navigate and interact with the game world alone might seem nearly
identical.
In terms of designing computer games it is relevant to consider the possible character resistance of the
avatar, because it holds the potential to be part of a designed narrative and as such an important tool in
terms of developing a narrative in games. I haven’t directly discussed this relation between designed
narrative and character resistance in this paper, but I think that it would be an interesting next step that
could develop the concept of character resistance further.
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MTG: Game Theory
Autumn 2007
Author: Jess Uhre Rakbek
Supervisor: Gordon Calleja
References
3D Realms. 1996. Duke Nukem 3D. Published by Apogee Software. PC release.
Klevjer, Rune. 2007. What is the Avatar? – Fiction and Embodiment in Avatar-Based Singleplayer Games.
[online 17/12/07]. Available from http://www.uib.no/people/smkrk/
Newman, James. 2002. The Myth of the Ergodic Videogame. Some thoughts on playercharacter relationships in videogames. [online 17/12/07]. Game Studies 2 (1). Available from
http://www.gamestudies.org/0102/newman/.
SCE Studios Santa Monica. 2005. God of War. Published by Sony Computer Entertainment America.
Playstation 2 release.
Valve Software. 1998. Half-Life. Published originally by Sierra Studios. PC release.
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