The Emerging Three-Tier System in K-12 Education Finance in BC: A Policy
Study
Draft: Please do not distribute or quote without the permission of the authors
Wendy Poole
Associate Professor
Department of Educational Studies
University of British Columbia
wendy.poole@ubc.ca
Gerald Fallon
Assistant Professor
Department of Educational Studies
University of British Columbia
gerald.fallon@ubc.ca
Abstract: This paper examines increasing privatization of education in the province of
British Columbia, Canada. Using analysis of policy documents and financial records
from government departments and written critiques from non-governmental
organizations such as teacher unions, other public sector unions, and stakeholder
groups in BC, the paper critically examines education policy that has enabled the
emergence of private sources of revenue (tuition fees and for-profit revenue) and the
establishment of school choice and education program choice that, the authors argue, are
leading to the development of a three-tier education system in British Columbia. The
article concludes with a discussion of implications related to equity and social justice in
education.
Introduction
Canadians have had an historical acquaintance with a two-tier education system
and British Columbia (BC) is no exception. Private and public schools have co-existed in
BC for a century and a half. The percentage of BC school children attending private
schools (called “independent schools” in BC) has doubled over the past two decades
(Federation of Independent School Associations, 2012), marking a trend toward
privatization of K-12 education. Another form of privatization is creeping into the system
-- increasing privatization within the public education system. Facilitators of this latter
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trend are market-driven and enrolment-based forms of funding, school and program
choice policy, and structural funding shortfalls.
Since 2001, the BC government has initiated policies designed to download more
costs to school districts and increase competition between public schools, including:
opting not to finance inflationary and new costs to school districts; moving to a per-pupil
Block Funding formula that makes revenue dependent upon the number of students
enrolled in the school district; removing boundaries between catchment areas and
allowing parents to choose the schools where they enroll their children; and enabling
school boards to create ‘school district business companies’ that operate at arms length.
Schools and districts have responded by competing with each other to create special
programs to attract students and thus generate a greater share of enrolment-based
government grants. They have established other programs with fees attached.
These policies, we argue, introduce increasing levels of privatization1 within
school districts. Such privatization is problematic as it enables systemic funding and
programming inequities to grow between schools and school districts since their
respective capacity for participating in a competitive education market-place varies
substantially.
Using document analysis, this paper will elaborate on the facilitating factors,
critically examine the education policy direction, and discuss implications related to
education programming, levels of funding, and equity/social justice. The first part of our
paper introduces the theoretical and contextual framework, highlighting common policy
1
Privatization refers to a process that represents a move toward competition for government and nongovernment funding under conditions when markets should be expected to work efficiently in terms of
choice of suppliers-schools and distribution of public and private sources of funding (Ball, 2007; Starr,
1989).
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themes that emerged as part of the phenomenon of globalized neoliberalism. The second
part describes aspects of government policy (structural shortfalls; school and program
choice; enrolment-based public funding; and market-driven private funding) that have
shaped an entrepreneurial approach to public school finance. The third part of our paper
discusses issues of emerging inequities of funding and educational programming among
public school districts in BC that, we argue, give rise to a three-tier education system in
BC.
Theoretical and Contextual Framework: Globalization and Neo-liberalism
The phenomenon of competition for governmental and non-governmental sources
of funding needs to be viewed in the context of the rise of globalized neo-liberal policy.
Globalization refers to “the rapid movement of ideas, goods, and people around the
globe, radically transforming relations among people and communities across national
boundaries” (Rizvi, 2008, p. 63). Rizvi adds: “Through major advances in information
and communication technologies, educational ideas and ideologies now circulate around
the world at a more rapid rate resulting in global educational policy networks which are
often more influential than local political actors” (p. 63-64). Through globalization, Rizvi
argues, education policy has displayed a “major shift to neo-liberal policy thinking,
manifested most clearly in privatization policies, and in policies that assume the validity
of market mechanisms to solve most of the crises facing nation-states and civil society”
(p. 64). The latter quote from Rizvi is reflected in the BC policy landscape over the past
decade, where neo-liberal policy, increasing privatization, and market mechanisms are
transforming public education.
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Olssen (1996) details the differences between liberalism and neo-liberalism as
follows:
Whereas classical liberalism represents a negative conception of state power in
that the individual was to be taken as an object to be freed from the interventions
of the state, neo-liberalism has come to represent a positive conception of the
state’s role in creating the appropriate market by providing the conditions, laws
and institutions necessary for its operation. . . In the classical model the
theoretical aim of the state was to limit and minimize its role based on postulates
which included universal egoism (the self-interested individual); invisible hand
theory which dictated that the interests of the individual were also the interests of
the society as a whole; and the political maxim of laissez-faire. (p. 340).
The role of the state, then, has shifted from the classical liberal conception where private
and public domains are distinct, to a social democratic notion of liberalism that
conceptualized the state as service provider, and now, to the latest iteration where the
state is an enabler of the market.
Neo-liberalism emerged from the Chicago School, promoted by economists like
Milton Friedman and Frederick von Hayek, and later globalized by transnational
institutions such as the World Bank, the OECD, and APEC. Key aspects of neoliberalism included: Deregulation of business to free the market of bureaucratic fetters;
competition policies across public and private sectors aimed at efficiency; privatization of
activities formerly managed by the state; and a process of decentralization coupled with
recentralization (Robertson, 2011). Education is a key public sector institution in the neoliberal worldview because of its importance in developing workers and consumers
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suitable for globalized competition and the new knowledge-based economy. Markets and
competition are, in the neo-liberal mindset, appropriately applied to education (Ball,
2007).
According to Ball (1998), two complexly related policy agendas are evident in the
restructuring of public education systems:
The first aims to tie education more closely to national economic interests, while
the second involves a decoupling of education from direct state control. The first
rests on a clear articulation and assertion by the state of its requirements of
education, while the second gives at least the appearance of greater autonomy to
educational institutions in the delivery of those requirements. The first involves a
reaffirmation of the state functions of education as a public good, while the
second subjects education to the disciplines of the market and the methods and
values of business and redefines it as a competitive private good. (p.125).
Commodification is the result of these two paradoxical policy agendas that are achieved
through both decentralization and recentralization. As Karlsen (2000) contends:
Decentralization was perceived more and more as a governance strategy for
achieving rationalization and efficiency. The argument was that local authorities
and the individual schools had the competence needed to use existing funding in a
more flexible and efficient way and even obtain new local resources.
Decentralization was understood in a more market-oriented way and the argument
was that schools should be more like the market system. Therefore, independence
and local autonomy should give schools the same opportunity as other businesses to
compete in the marketplace. Decentralization was characterized as a strategy for a
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more privatized and commercialized school (p. 528)
Neo-liberalism, then, uses the processes of decentralization/recentralization to make it
appear as if commodification and privatization are the result of local initiatives.
Transnational institutions and state governments are encouraging privatization of
education in insidious ways. Robertson (2011), for example, describes how the World
Bank’s Education Strategy 2020, “redefines the meaning of an education system to now
include, and enclose the private sector (for profit/not for profit) as key actors within, as
opposed to outside, the education system” (p. 14, emphasis included).
In BC, the private sector operates outside of public education in the form of
privately funded independent schools. Private schools have existed in BC since the mid1800s, before the province joined Canadian Confederation and they continue to exist
today. All are tuition-driven schools, some of which cater to elite groups while others
focus on career preparation and language acquisition (e.g., business schools; French and
English language acquisition).
A middle category of schools operates both outside and within public education.
Beginning in 1977, the province partially funds schools that qualify by offering the B.C.
curriculum. These schools are divided into two categories: Group 1 schools receive 50
percent of the operating grant received by local public boards from the province on a per
FTE student basis; Group 2 schools receive per-student operating grants at the 35 percent
level, because the school’s per-student operating costs exceed the ministry grants paid to
the local boards of education. As of 2011, there were 249 Group 1 schools and 67 Group
2 schools. In addition, 14 Distributed Learning Schools were operating in the province
(12 in Group 1; 2 in Group 2) (Ministry of Education, 2011).
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The Ministry of Education justifies this public support of private schools as
follows: “To educate the 72,014 independent school students in the public system would
cost $564 million in operating grants to public school districts (based on the average
2010/11 school district per student operating grant of $7,833) plus capital costs. This is
$306 million more than the total current operating grants allocated to independent
schools” (BC Ministry of Education, 2011, p.3). Thus, government is justifying the
continuing subsidization of Group 1 and Group 2 schools using the rhetoric of efficiency.
The government is spending fewer dollars per capita in these independent schools than
they are spending per capita in public schools. Public subsidization of some independent
schools creates a quasi-public level within the education system.
If tier one comprises fully independent, privately funded schools, and tier two (the
quasi-public education system) comprises independent schools that are partially funded
by public grants, then one would expect tier three to mean schools that receive full public
funding. However, a structural funding shortfall and the emerging importance of marketdriven revenue generation have fragmented the public school system such that another
tier is developing. The following section of the paper focuses on factors that are driving
this fragmentation of what was formerly a fully publicly funded school system. First, we
discuss the development of a structural funding shortfall in the province; then we
examine three aspects of market-driven funding at the local level—school and program
choice, enrolment-based public funding, and market-driven private funding.
Structural Funding Shortfall
The BC Liberal Party (not to be confused with the federal Liberal Party) is a
fiscally conservative political party and it has formed the government since 2001. Like
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other right-of-centre parties before it in BC, particularly the Social Credit government
that imposed severe fiscal restraints in the 1980s, the Liberal government places a strong
emphasis on fiscal “prudence” and balanced budgets (BC Liberal Party, 2013). One of
their first acts upon forming the government in 2001 was to freeze funding for the
Ministry of Education (as well as for other government Ministries) and to legislate
mandated balanced budgets for school districts across the province. In the 2013 budget,
announced on February 19, the BC government has once again virtually frozen education
spending for the next three years (Budget and Fiscal Plan 2013/14 - 2015/16).
In addition, over the past decade, government’s operating grants to school
districts have failed to keep pace with inflation. Meanwhile, school districts have been
saddled with new costs resulting from government initiatives, including class size and
composition arrangements, carbon tax compliance, and full-day kindergarten, yet the
province has not provided additional funding to cover these extra costs (Malcolmson &
Kaiser, 2009).
As a result of cost increases and budget restraints, school districts have struggled
to balance their budgets over the past decade. A survey conducted by Beresford and
Fussell (2009) revealed that for the 2008-2009 school year, 32 out of 45 school districts
who responded expected operating costs to exceed provincial funding, and more than half
of the districts (18) had already used up their reserve funds to balance budgets in previous
years. It is now common to hear educators in the province speak about the
“underfunding” of education, however Malcolmson and Kaiser (2009) argue that
“structural shortfall” is a more appropriate term to describe the reality of education
funding in BC. According to these authors: “A structural funding shortfall occurs when
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revenue lags consistently and chronically behind that which is required to pay for the
delivery of publicly-mandated programs and services” (p. 2). We argue that a structural
shortfall will, over the long term, coerce school districts into seeking increasing levels of
private funding to support core educational programs and services. As we discuss later,
differential capacities among school districts to compete for private funding will
inevitably lead to inequities in education in the long term.
Market or Enrolment-Driven Public Funding/School and Program Choice
In 2002, the School Amendment Act (Bill 34) removed the boundaries between
school catchment areas within and between districts. As a result, students were no longer
restricted to attending their neighbourhood school, and could now attend the school of
their choice, provided space was available. At the same time, government revised the
funding formula so that public operating grants to local school boards were based almost
exclusively on student enrolment. This move made it imperative for school districts to
maintain student enrolment numbers in order to retain the same level of public funding; it
also provided an incentive to school boards to increase student enrolment as a means of
increasing their level of public funding. The policy of open catchment boundaries
amounted to the implementation of school choice across the province, while enrolmentdriven public funding policy led school districts to develop unique programs to keep and
attract students, amounting to the implementation of program choice. Both school and
program choice are now realities across the province and the result has been increased
student mobility.
In the decade since 2002, students have moved within and across school districts
quite readily. Such movement has been more pronounced in urban areas where there are
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many schools within reach by public transit or by car. In rural areas where distances
between schools are far greater, there has been less physical movement of students, but
Distributed Learning enables virtual mobility. As an example, the Vancouver School
Board reports the following regarding enrolment of secondary students:
Our data for secondary schools indicates that approximately 34% of students do not
attend their neighbourhood school. These data are consistent on both the east and
west side of the city. There is, however, a migration from east to west. With Main
Street as the divide, 35% of students on the east side of Vancouver do not attend
their neighbourhood school. Of all students in the east, 13.5% choose a school west
of Main. For the students east of main, 33% of all students do not attend their
neighbourhood school with 3% choosing a school east of Main. Overall, as a
district, at the secondary level, this means that we have approximately 8500
students who do not attend their neighbourhood school. (Vancouver School Board,
2012, p. 15)
Vancouver’s west side comprises a more affluent population, predominantly middle
and upper class professionals of Western European heritage. The east side, in contrast,
has a greater proportion of low-income people, with a large percentage of immigrant and
refugee families from non-European and non-English speaking cultures. Thus, student
mobility within the Vancouver School District demonstrates social class and cultural
dimensions.
Yoon (2011) conducted a study of school choice (mini schools) within the
Vancouver School District (VSD). Mini schools are “small and selective public schools
within larger urban public secondary schools” (p. 253). Twenty-seven mini schools exist
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in the VSD and “what mini schools offer is an upgraded alternative to the standard,
comprehensive secondary school curriculum in neighbourhood public schools” (p. 255).
In the market for these elite and competitive programs of choice, Yoon describes how
west side mini schools in Vancouver are privileged in relation to east side mini schools:
“Currently the demand for West side mini schools is so markedly high that the schools
can not accommodate all interested families—from across and outside the city—in their
auditoriums during information nights. . . . In contrast, East side schools are less popular.
Their auditoriums are rarely full during mini school information nights, and they attract
students mostly from the East side neighbourhoods” (p. 255). Yoon’s study is evidence of
greater capacity to attract students enjoyed by affluent communities of European descent
in relation to lower income communities of non-European background.
With the advent of Distributed Learning programs (such as E-bus operated by the
Nechako School District) students have moved virtually or have opted to take some
courses in one school or district while taking Distributed Learning courses from another
school or district. According to the BC Ministry of Education (2012), the number of
public school students enrolled in Distributed Learning increased from 1.2% to 3.8%
between 2001/02 and 2010/11. Since government operational grants are determined by
enrolment, Distributed Learning choices impact the level of funding received by the
school district. For example, if a secondary student in District A takes some of her or his
courses through Distributed Learning in District B, the funding District A receives will be
reduced by (and District B’s funding will be increased by) the proportion of the student’s
FTE enrolment in District B. Distributed Learning is a manifestation of school and
program choice that has racheted up virtual mobility, funding volatility, and competition
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between school districts.
Market-Driven Private Funding
Thus far, we have discussed school and program choice as tools for maintaining or
increasing levels of public funding within the context of a structural funding shortfall. We
now shift to a discussion about a second response to a structural funding shortfall--the
generation of private sources of revenue by public schools.
In 2002, the BC government amended the School Act (Bill 34), which introduced
a unique feature in the K-12 education finance system in BC and in Canada--for-profit
“school district business companies (SDBC)”. School boards acquired the legal capacity
to incorporate separate private entities to engage in for-profit entrepreneurial activities
while protecting their assets from legal and financial liability associated with the SDBC’s
business operations. This change devolved part of the authority and responsibility for K12 education finance to the local school board level with the assumption that marketdriven means of resourcing school districts would enhance “the school boards’ ability to
generate revenue through other sources and allow them to better meet local educational
needs” (British Columbia Hansard Services, 2002, 7(7), p. 3250).
With the introduction of the for-profit funding mechanism, the BC government
sent a message to school districts that they needed to become more financially selfreliant, and more innovative and adaptive in order to maintain or increase their level of
financial resources and flexibility. By enabling school districts to create school district
business companies, the government created a competitive arrangement between school
districts that they hoped would serve as an incentive to improve their fiscal situation by
being responsive to various local, provincial, and international communities of
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educational consumers. By promoting financial self-reliance, the BC government
reframed its role in the K-12 education finance system: From that of exclusive provider
of funding to that of enabler responsible for providing opportunities to school districts to
compete for both public and private funds. The motive was to limit the cost of education
for the government.
In 2002, 15 school districts chose to create school district business companies to
engage in private-sector activities such as opening and operating BC accredited schools
overseas, marketing curricula and software, or providing online educational services to
foreign students (Bell, 2006; Steffenhagen, 2010). Several school districts in BC
experienced challenges, including cost over-runs as they struggled to develop their
capacity to act efficiently in a free market environment, and by 2010 only eight SDBCs
were still operating. Most school districts have concentrated on low risk entrepreneurial
initiatives, such as establishing tuition generating international student programs, selling
advertising space on school property, renting space, selling course materials for onlineeducation, or providing educational or administrative consulting services.
As a result of the introduction of market-driven finance, funds generated through
private sources increased from $156 million to $190 million (expressed in Canadian
dollars) between 2002 and 2012. During the fiscal year of 2011-12, private sources
counted for approximately 2.7% of total operating budgets in BC.
Equity Implications of Market-Driven Funding
Table 1 shows the level of school-generated funding (including international
student tuition fees) for all 60 school districts in BC for 2002-03, 2007-08, and 2011-12.
School-generated funds include:
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
Revenues from vending machines, cafeterias, field trips, yearbook sales, school
fees, graduation fees and band fees.

All other funds collected at the school level including those donated for school
use by a Parents' Advisory Council (PAC).

Market-driven private revenues, including international student tuition and profits
from school business district companies (SDBCs).
Because all of the funds listed above come from non-government sources we will refer to
them as private sources of funding. While data is available to enable us to determine how
much of total private funding per district is generated by international student tuition, we
are unable to disaggregate further.
Private funding proves to be volatile because of unpredictable events (e.g., global
recessions; contagious disease epidemics; global conflicts) and variation in global
competition. As a general rule, the operation of SDBCs has proven to be less profitable
and riskier than other means of generating private funding. “When Rocky Mountain
district closed its company, it forgave a $265,000 loan. New Westminster and Surrey
districts have yet to collect on loans worth close to $1 million and $100,000 respectively.
Langley district lost $166,246 when it folded its company last year” (Steffenhagen,
2010).
International student tuition has been the most lucrative source of private funding
for school districts. For example, in 2011-12, West Vancouver received $9.8 million in
private funding, of which 87% came from international student tuition. In the same year,
Vancouver’s private-source revenue amounted to $23.3 million, of which 61% was
derived from international student tuition. Both are urban school districts located in the
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Greater Vancouver Metropolitan area. Even for a few small districts, international student
tuition generated over 60% of private revenue from international students in 2011-12:
62% for Gulf Islands (1671 students); and 86% for Vernon (8497 students).
Table 1(see appendix 1) reveals that the amount of funding generated from private
sources varies substantially between school districts (0.07% - 15.6% of total operating
budgets for 2011-12). With the exception of West Vancouver, no other district in the
province generated more than 7.9% of its total operating budget in 2011-12 from private
sources. Among the 60 school districts in the province, 17 (28%) generated more than 4%
of their total operating budgets from private sources in the 2011-12 school year; and 12
(20%) generated no income at all from international students. The latter group comprises
some of the smallest and/or most geographically remote districts. Even among the larger,
urban districts, the level of locally generated non-governmental funds varies from district
to district. For example, in 2011-12 Surrey district (with the highest student enrolment in
the province) earned $8.1 million in international student tuition, while Vancouver
district (with 10,000 fewer students) earned $14.1 million. The data reveal that the
variation in the level of private funding generated is linked to the relative size and
geographical location of school districts, and to intersections between these two
characteristics.
Table 2 (see appendix 2), in part, compares levels of funding generated across
school districts in relation to socio-economic information—average before tax household
income, according to 2006 census data; and indicators of cultural diversity—size of the
Aboriginal population, and size of the English Language Learners population. This table
compares nine school districts, organized into three categories reflecting equivalent
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student enrolment; thus, we have endeavored to compare levels of private funding across
school districts of equivalent size. Two additional patterns emerge from an analysis of
these data.
First, the most affluent school district in the province, West Vancouver (average
household income $114,121 in 2006), consistently generated the highest level of private
funding from 2002-2012 (15.6% of total operating revenue or $1472 per student). In
contrast, the North Okanagan Shuswap, which is equivalent to West Vancouver in terms
of numbers of students enrolled, is far less affluent (average household income $22,000 $66,260 in 2006) and generated private funding at a level near the bottom of the scale
(0.18% of total operating revenue or $30.67 per student). Based on the nine school
districts we compared in Table 2, there appears to be a hierarchical pattern based on
socio-economic status, in which the more affluent school districts generate higher levels
of private funding. We need to conduct an analysis of a larger number of districts to
confirm whether or not this pattern persists across the province.
Second, a distinct cultural pattern emerges within these data. Those districts with
larger Aboriginal student populations generate lower levels of private funding compared
to districts with smaller Aboriginal student populations. As per Table 2, North Okanagan
Shuswap, Prince George, and Vancouver Island North (15%, 26%, and 38% Aboriginal
enrolment respectively) generate far lower levels of private funding per student ($31,
$45, and $32 respectively) compared to West Vancouver, Maple Ridge, and Gulf Islands
(0.7%, 7.8%, and 7.7% Aboriginal enrolment respectively) that generate higher levels of
private funding per student ($1472, $704, and $576 respectively).
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Cultural heritage intersects with socio-economic status to exacerbate the
differences between school districts. According to Table 2, districts with higher
Aboriginal student populations also have lower household incomes. These data reflect a
pan-Canadian pattern: Aboriginal communities tend to live on federal reservations, earn
lower incomes, and experience higher unemployment in relation to non-Aboriginal
communities (Center for Social Justice, 2013).
The patterns identified previously reflect inequities across school districts in terms
of the level of private funding they generate. However, the inequities we have uncovered
go beyond the mere fact that some districts tend to generate more private funding than do
others; they reflect structural differences. We argue that the differences reflect variations
in capacity to generate private funding. More affluent districts have greater capacity to
generate higher levels of funds through donations from parents, community members,
and local businesses. Metropolitan districts or districts within close proximity to popular
cultural or recreational facilities (e.g., ski resorts, museums, international film festivals)
may have greater capacity to attract international students.
Local conditions influence district capacity to generate private revenue. As we
have discussed above, differences in local conditions relate to things such as size,
geographical location, affluence, cultural composition of the school district, and
proximity of cultural and recreational amenities that not only exist separately but also
intersect in complex ways. These are characteristics that are difficult, and in some cases
(such as geographical location) impossible, to change. This means that differential
capacities to generate private revenue lead to funding inequities that are endemic and are
likely to persist in the long term.
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Furthermore, such funding inequities across districts correspond to inequitable
access to educational program choice in the province of BC. As Table 2 indicates,
districts that generate lower levels of private funding also provide a smaller number and
variety of programs of choice for district students. For example, North Okanagan
Shuswap and Okanagan Skaha districts generate lower levels of private funding and
provide fewer programs of choice in comparison to West Vancouver, which is equivalent
in terms of student enrolment numbers (6200-6700 students). Similar patterns are found
across the three enrolment size categories: The more private revenue per student school
districts are able to generate, the larger the number and the greater the variety of
educational programs over and above core programming. Additional revenue generated
from private funding correlates positively with the number and variety of above-the-core
programs available.
These data do not necessarily suggest a cause-effect relationship, however,
market-driven private funding and market-driven public funding are interdependent.
Districts that have greater capacity to generate market-driven private funding also
provide more programs of choice. The provision of educational programs above and
beyond the core curriculum enable school districts to attract greater numbers of students;
and because public funding is enrolment-driven, districts that can offer more programs of
choice can also generate increased levels of public funding. This interdependence
between public and private aspects of market-driven funding exacerbates inter-district
inequities.
Discussion
Tier Three Privatization
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Inequities in funding and program offerings within the public school system
contribute to the development of a three-tier education system in BC. Tier 1 consists of
those schools that are fully funded by private sources. Tier 2 consists of those
independent schools that receive a mixture of private and public funding in ratios ranging
from 50:50 for Group 1 schools and 65:35 for Group 2 schools. These schools were
originally fully private schools before 1977 when government began to subsidize them.
Hence, we use the term quasi-public to denote that they have moved along a continuum
from the private toward the public, in financial terms.
Tier 3 constitutes public school districts that are becoming quasi-private, since
they are becoming partially funded by private sources. Public school districts are
privatizing themselves, albeit in response to conditions establish by government; so
although government is not directly mandating privatization, government is indirectly
responsible for this trend. The term quasi-private signifies that these school districts are
moving along the private-public continuum toward privatization, in financial terms.
Tier 3 privatization is manifested in two forms. The first is related to the
dynamics of market-driven private funding. A monetary valuation is directly attributable
to this privatization—the services and programs are offered at a price and for a profit. We
refer to this as profit-oriented privatization. The second form of privatization stems from
market-driven public funding and is connected to programs of choice. These programs
are designed to increase public funding for the district through an increase in enrolment.
Although the generation of revenue is the catalyst for districts to offer not-for-profit
programs of choice, there is a low price or no price to the student. Their value to the
student/parent ‘consumer’ is primarily symbolic; thus, we refer to this as symbolic
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privatization. Market-driven finance is leading to the development of both profit-oriented
and symbolic privatization. Programs of choice contribute to the school district’s
movement along the continuum from the public toward the private, but in symbolic
terms. School districts with the most powerful symbols win in the educational market
(Gerwirtz, Ball & Bowe, 1995), so districts with the most valued cultural capital in the
eyes of choice-conscious parents are the most successful in the educational marketplace,
leaving those districts whose cultural capital is less valued with far less market power.
Robertson (2000) argues that competition could lead school districts and schools to act
more and more as entrepreneurial accumulating units rather than as institutions with
social interests and responsibilities (Robertson, 2000).
School districts in BC are at different places along the privatization continuum.
Some school districts, like West Vancouver, receive a greater share of their total
operating budgets from private sources or programs of choice and therefore, have moved
further toward privatization than have other districts, in financial and symbolic terms.
Some districts receive virtually nil in terms of private source funding and offer few, if
any, programs of choice, and they can be perceived as not having moved at all.
The Social Justice Implications of Funding Inequities
Market-driven private funding may help a minority of school districts to address
the structural funding shortfall in public grants, but the majority lacks the capacity to
achieve this and will likely continue to suffer from budget shortfalls; therefore, marketdriven funding reinforces structural inequalities among school districts. These inequities
run counter to the traditional values of the provincial education finance system, which has
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built-in equalization mechanisms to address local realities such as geographical
dispersion and unique student needs.
Inter-district inequities are quite pronounced and this is worrisome, not because of
the relative ability or inability to privatize (indeed, we question whether privatization, in
itself, is ethical or just), but because of the implications for accessing quality education
and enhancing social mobility. Some districts offer many programs beyond the core,
while others offer few or none.
Inequities mean more than differential opportunities to access education; they also
perpetuate structural social injustices associated with socio-economic and cultural
differences, and colonialism. As we have demonstrated previously, market-driven
funding reproduces hierarchies along socio-economic and cultural lines. Because
communities with significant Aboriginal populations tend to be disadvantaged in terms of
accessing higher levels of funding and programs of choice, colonial marginalization of
Aboriginal communities is reinforced or goes unchallenged. As Yoon (2011) shows in
her study of mini schools in Vancouver, programs of choice are elite and competitive
programs that imbue students with cultural capital that facilitates their participation in the
globalized employment and advanced education markets. Districts that lack capacity to
offer such programs may disadvantage their students. These dynamics reproduce
hierarchies of social privilege and marginalization and fail to question structural
injustices.
The issue of adequacy needs to be addressed, not only in financial, but also in
educational and symbolic terms. Market-driven funding may diminish or eliminate local
district budget crises, however not all districts have the capacity to accomplish this;
21
therefore, the province-wide structural shortfall remains and perpetuates educational
inequities. As long as these exist, school districts will be compelled to compete and the
dynamics we have described will persist. The negative effects of competition can be
mitigated by taking away districts’ legal capacity to engage in market-driven private
funding activities and by removing the structural shortfall that coerces districts to
compete for public funding. We need to challenge the assumption that market
mechanisms are legitimate and appropriate means to solve financial crises in public
education.
22
References
Ball, S. J. (1998). Big policies/small world: An introduction to international perspective
in education policy. Comparative Education, 34(2), 119 - 131.
Bell, J. 2006. “Overseas education initiatives not losing money.” Times Colonist, April
11. Retrieved January 7th, 2013, from
http://www.canada.com/victoriatimescolonist/news/capital_van_isl/story.html?id=
955a214d-aba6-45fa-bac2-d2829dcb61fb
British Columbia Hansard Services. (2002). Official report of debates of the Legislative
Assembly, 3rd session, 37th Parliament. Hansard, 7(12), 3377-3424.
BC Liberal Party, 2012. Today’s BC Liberals. What we believe. Retrieved February 12,
2013, from:
http://www.bcliberals.com/our_party/what_we_believe/party_principles.
BC Ministry of Education. (2011). Overview of independent schools in British Columbia.
Victoria, B.C.: Province of British Columbia.
http://www.bced.gov.bc.ca/independentschools/geninfo.pdf
BC Ministry of Education. (2012). Provincial Reports. 2010/11 Summary of Key
Information. http://www.bced.gov.bc.ca/reporting/docs/SoK_2011.pdf.
BC Ministry of Finance, (2013). Budget and Fiscal Plan 2013/14 -2015/16. Retrieved
February 22, 2013, from:
http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2013/bfp/2013_Budget_Fiscal_Plan.pdf
23
Beresford, C., and Fussell, H. 2009. When More is Less: Education Funding in BC.
Centre for Civic Governance. Retrieved January 7th, 2013, from
http://www.columbiainstitute.ca/sites/default/files/resources/WhenMoreisLess.pdf
Centre for Social Justice, (2013). Struggling to Escape a Legacy of Oppression.
Retrieved February 28, 2013 from:
http://www.socialjustice.org/index.php?page=aboriginal-issues.
Federation of Independent Schools Association. (2012). Enrolment comparing public and
independent-Historical. Retrieved February 20, 2013, from
http://www.fisabc.ca/sites/default/files/Enrolment%20Ind%20Public%20Compari
son%20%202012.pdf.
Gerwirtz, S., Ball, S., & Bowe, R. (1995). Markets, choice and equity. Buckingham, UK:
Open University Press.
Karlsen, G. 2000. Decentralized Centralism: Framework for a Better Understanding of
Governance in the Field of Education, Journal of Education Policy, 15(5), 525538.
Malcolmson, J., and Kaiser, J. 2009. Death by a Thousand Downloads . . . A Structural
Funding Shortfall for BC Schools. Canadian Union of Public Employees.
Olssen, M. (1996). In defence of the welfare state and publicly provided education.
Journal of Education Policy, 11, 337 - 362.
Rizvi, F. (2008) Rethinking educational aims in an era of globalization. In P. D.
Hershock, et al. (Eds.), Changing education—leadership, innovation and
development in a globalizing Asia Pacific, 63-91. Comparative Educational
Research Centre.
24
Robertson, S. L. (2000). A class act: Changing teachers' work, globalization and the
state. New York, NY: Falmer Press.
Robertson, S.L. (2011) The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberal Privatisation in the World
Bank’s Education Strategy 2020. Centre for Globalisation, Education and Societies,
Bristol, UK: University of Bristol. http://susanleerobertson.com/publications/
Steffenhagen, J. 2010. “School District Business Companies – Fading to Red” Vancouver
Sun, May 7th. Retrieved January 12, 2013, 2012, from:
http://blogs.vancouversun.com/2010/05/07/school-district-business-companiesfading-to-red/.
Vancouver School Board. 2012. Vancouver School Board Sectoral Review: Our schools,
our programs, our future. Vancouver: Author.
Yoon, Ee-Seul. (2011). Mini schools: The new global city communities of Vancouver.
Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 32(2), 253-268.
25
Appendix 1
Table 1: School-Generated Funds and Off-Shore Tuition-Fee Revenue as a Percentage of Total Operating Funds, 2002–03/2007-08/2011-12 2
2011-12
Average Across the
Three fiscal Years
Districts
Total local
revenue ($)
Local
PerLocal
PerLocal
PerAverage
Average
revenue Student
revenue Student
revenue Student as % of Per-Student
as % of Revenue
as % of Revenue Total local as % of Revenue operating Revenue
operating
Total local operating
revenue
operating
funds
funds
revenue ($)
funds
($)
funds
1721.70
9,767,729
15.6%
1472.00
16.9%
1441.63
1
8.6%
761.03
9,888,582
7.9%
643.24
7.9%
661.58
2
652.40 19,950,073
8.3%
676.48
19,374,936 7.2%
616.70
8.03%
648.52
3
564.55 1,163,250
7.5%
783.86
868,224
4.9%
576.50
6.22%
641.64
4
7,441,565
6.0%
525.50
9,832,296
7.6%
703.82
6.41%
581.13
5
3,498,231
6.36%
526.68
3,554,421
6.14%
512.75
5.05%
567.05
6
45 West
Vancouver
7,404,010
16.57%
44 North
Vancouver
9,048,470
7.20%
580.46
12,142,943
43 Coquitlam
17,989,892
8.61%
6.26%
64 Gulf Islands 998,104
Ranking
2007-08
2002–03
1131.20 10,461,073
18.5%
42 Maple
Ridge-Pitt
Meadows
5,564,278
5.63%
514.08
40 New
Westminster
3,905,398
9.02%
661.73
48 Howe
Sound
1,708,794
5.13%
368.89
3,084,254
8.7%
764.94
2,337,011
5.9%
556.03
6.57%
556.29
7
35 Langley
10,135,498
7.78%
605.84 9,741,058
6.6%
531.25
7,981,721
5.6%
429.47
6.66%
522.19
8
39 Vancouver
24,709,026
6.12%
520.70 25,471,827
5.6%
462.76
23,314,765 4.8%
416.38
6.4%
466.61
9
5.9%
504.21
10,183,913 5.9%
523.16
5.56%
464.45
10
61 Greater
Victoria
7,159,351
4.89%
365.98
9,496,372
2 This table is based on the statistics provided by the Ministry of Education Website under Actual Sources of Other Operating Revenue by School District” (see:
http://www.bced.gov.bc.ca/accountability/district/revenue/0809/ and by the BCTF for the year 2002/03 (see: Lowry, M. (2004). Fee-generation as an indicator of
developing funding inequities in the B.C. school system available at: http://www.bctf.bc.ca/ResearchReports/2004ef01/report.html
26
22 Vernon
653,558
1.05%
77.03 4,397,553
6.19%
500.00
5,131,282
6.77%
608.98
4.67
395.34
11
37 Delta
6,212,592
5.48%
389.64 5,644,424
4.2%
354.28
6,996,850
4.90%
436.21
4.86%
393.38
12
41 Burnaby
5,319,885
3.45%
276.96 10,558,332
5.5%
447.71
14,438,640 6.8%
445.49
5.25%
389.75
13
63 Saanich
837,573
1.49%
130.16 2,734,001
4.06%
361.35
5,130,474
7.21%
668.29
4.25%
386.60
14
69 Qualicum
1,028,844
2.72%
201.32 2,141,340
4.9%
447.14
2,188,014
5%
508.49
4.20%
385.65
15
38 Richmond
6,203,462
4.01%
352.96 6,151,556
3.5%
279.50
9,886,855
5.3%
452.98
4.27
361.81
16
34 Abbotsford 6,919,013
5.57%
445.03 5,210,543
3.6%
284.73
4,830,420
3.02%
252.88
4.06%
327.55
17
62 Sooke
2,359,740
3.81%
310.77 2,631,410
3.7%
314.24
3,030,813
3.8%
325.89
3.77%
316.97
18
47 Powell
River
758,480
3.56%
289.99
848,787
3.8%
354.40
880,247
3.82%
271.10
3.72%
305.16
19
08 Kootenay
Lake
793,200
1.68%
135.12
1,588,700
3.16%
321.99
1,740,401
3.33%
339.39
2.72%
265.55
20
75 Mission
955,349
1.99%
156.48 2,326,122
4.2%
341.07
1,504,106
2.73%
248.28
2.73%
248.61
21
06 Rocky
Mountain
1,070,174
3.22%
223.30
0.26%
26.05
1,431,306
4.25%
465.01
2.6%
238.12
22
36 Surrey
12,852,676
3.32%
274.06 17,359,082
3.5%
269.00
12,081,513 3.0%
171.71
3.27%
238.26
23
71 Comox
Valley
2,090,294
3.23%
223.37
2.5%
209.24
2,335,356
3.1%
278.31
2.95%
236.95
24
87 Stikine
198,315
3.31%
268.57 102,138
1.54%
383.97
6,484
0.1%
32.74
1.65%
228.42
25
59 Peace River
1,046,036
South
2.60%
198.51
1,463,054
3.3%
338.43
582,358
1.3%
143.83
2.41%
226.92
26
84 Vancouver
Island West
68,170
1.07%
87.64
119,685
1.82%
272.63
126,544
1.57%
285.65
1.48%
215.30
27
68 NanaimoLadysmith
1,927,887
1.82%
144.38
3,578,019
3.0%
249.25
3,241,569
2.6%
240.78
2.47%
211.47
28
05 Southeast
Kootenay
323,677
0.69%
54.23
1,253,534
2.55%
235.18
1,630,959
3.11%
304.96
2.12%
198.12
29
74 Gold Trail
608,767
2.89%
210.77 444,486
2.07%
293.39
48,635
0.28%
37.81
1.74%
180.65
30
82,489
1,782,743
81 Fort Nelson 80,194
0.86%
66.23 190,720
1.85%
195.40
207,459
2.04%
241.51
1.58%
167.71
31
19 Revelstoke
155,388
1.49%
128.64 145,542
1.42%
128.91
221,845
2.16%
217.29
1.69%
158.28
32
28 Quesnel
370,899
1.08%
89.15 676,272
1.84%
170.00
713,578
1.94%
199.49
1.62%
152.88
33
27
79 Cowichan
Valley
1,322,642
1.96%
149.79
1,011,883
1.41%
115.80
1,427,391
1.95%
175.16
1.77%
146.92
34
50 Haida
Gwaii/Queen
Charlotte
132,131
1.37%
122.43
18,889
0.18%
25.42
187,455
1.8%
289.73
1.11%
145.86
35
33 Chilliwack
2,466,467
3.09%
221.25 825,521
0.86%
68.52
1,892,275
1.7%
141.91
1.88%
143.89
36
49 Central
Coast
15,676
0.34%
63,443
1.19%
233.24
36,838
0.60%
159.47
0.60%
141.24
37
92 Nisga’a
347,148
4.43%
359.00 21,695
0.25%
49.30
5,843
0.07%
13.01
1.58%
140.44
38
60 Peace River
174,665
North
0.41%
37.03
747,524
1.47%
132.61
1,405,227
2.55%
248.75
1.47%
139.46
39
93 Conseil
scolaire
francophone
463,810
1.37%
115.82
756,900
1.15%
190.51
277,071
0.42%
60.13
0.98%
122.15
40
73 KamloopsThompson
1,022,636
0.91%
71.12
1,941,973
1.65%
137.77
1,469,623
1.18%
103.71
1.24%
104.20
41
23 Central
Okanagan
1,384,075
1.01%
72.10
1,275,810
0.78%
61.24
3,725,670
2.5%
168.73
2.5%
100.74
42
72 Campbell
River
434,879
0.90%
69.42
802,039
1.55%
138.00
479,991
0.94%
90.17
1.13%
99.19
43
82 Coast
Mountains
901,156
1.76%
138.90
247,032
0.47%
46.44
514,353
0.96%
101.27
1.06%
95.54
44
10 Arrow
Lakes
48,324
0.67%
53.83
72,386
0.97%
121.24
53,300
0.74%
104.92
0.79%
93.33
45
57 Prince
George
1,677,648
1.35%
114.12
1,793,856
1.4%
120.32
608,608
0.47%
45.14
1.07%
93.19
46
53 Okanagan
Similmakeen
364,738
1.60%
133.90
235,972
0.86%
86.34
144,000
0.58%
58.18
1.01%
92.80
47
70 Alberni
331,313
0.89%
69.18 484,983
1.27%
114.35
341,810
0.86%
80.63
1.00%
88.05
48
52 Prince
Rupert
327,039
1.28%
105.82
105,469
0.38%
41.52
236,603
0.86%
107.20
0.84%
84.84
49
78 Fraser
Cascade
147,562
0.81%
64.31
358,864
1.83%
174.12
21,166
0.10%
11.88
0.91%
83.40
50
31.01
28
67 Okanagan
Skaha
516,279
1.04%
72.13
578,469
1.02%
85.69
526,759
0.90%
84.20
0.90%
80.67
51
91 Nechako
Lakes
307,325
0.71%
59.30
355,526
0.71%
70.69
350,518
0.65%
69.59
0.69%
66.52
52
20 KootenayColumbia
330,621
0.86%
68.48
293,867
0.79%
68.59
203,016
0.54%
51.33
0.73%
62.80
53
51 Boundary
142,177
0.91%
69.42 101,066
0.60%
66.01
67,678
0.41%
50.28
0.64%
61.90
54
132,095
0.34%
37.36
120,872
0.34%
37.22
0.62%
56.68
55
318,031
0.60%
54.32
200,039
0.36%
37.42
0.57%
51.94
56
158,334
0.61%
64.23
49,516
0.19%
19.95
0.19%
51.81
57
41,013
0.18%
16.29
77,933
0.32%
34.07
0.44%
38.60
58
37,425
0.20%
22.80
39,273
0.20%
26.18
0.29%
32.60
46 Sunshine
Coast
364,914
1.17%
95.46
27 Cariboo
Chilcotin
407,042
0.76%
64.10
58 Nicola
Similkameen
207,013
0.93%
71.27
54 Bulkley
Valley
173,010
0.82%
65.44
85 Vancouver
Island North
97,988
0.49%
48.82
83 North
OkanaganShuswap
288,682
0.50%
51.13
Totals
$155,853,954
3.82%
59
169,151
0.27
270.75 186,830,394 3.40%
23.59
116,107
0.18%
273.37
190,068,241 2.87%
17.31
0.31%
30.67
266.91
2.87%
253.83
60
29
Appendix 2
Table 2
School Districts
West Vancouver School District #
45


Group 1



2011/2012 Per-Student
Revenue from SchoolGenerated Funds and
Off-Shore Tuition-Fee
6728
$1,472.00
The West Vancouver School
District is an urban district
located in Metropolitan
Vancouver.
9.8% of the student population
are English Language Learners
while 0.7% are Aboriginal
students.
The average household income
before tax is $114,121.00
(Statistics Canada, 2006)
Okanagan Skaha School District #

The School District is located in
the Okanagan Valley in the
interior of British Columbia
around the towns of Penticton
and Summerland.

1.6% of its student population
are English Language Learners
while 11.7% are Aboriginal
students.

The average household income
before tax is $71,000 in
Penticton and $62,126 in
Summerland (Statistics Canada,
2006).
Okanagan Shuswap School District

2011/12
School‐Age
Funded FTE
Enrolment
North Okanagan-Shuswap
School District is located in a
rural area around Shuswap
1.7% of its student population
are English Language Learners
while 15% are Aboriginal
students.
The average household income
before tax is between $22,000
(Sicamous) to $66,260.00 in
Salmon Arms (Statistics Canada,
6208
$84.20
Description of programs of choice offered in each school
district
Primary and Elementary Programs

French Immersion (Early)

French Immersion (Late)

IDEC (Inquiry-based Digitally Enhanced
Community) Program (Caulfeild Elementary)

International Baccalaureate Primary Years
Programme

Montessori Program
Secondary Programs

ACE-IT (Accelerated Credit Enrolment to
Industry Training)
Advanced Placement

French Immersion (Secondary)

International Baccalaureate Diploma
Programme

International Baccalaureate Middle Years
Programme

International Student Programs

Super Achievers
Sports Academies

Baseball Academy

Hockey Academy

Soccer Academy

Tennis Academy
Primary and Elementary Programs

Gifted program - one session per week
Secondary Programs

Late French Immersion (For Grades 6 – 12)



6451
$ 30.67
Advanced Placement (AP) is a program of
university level courses and examinations for
high school students.
Okanagan Hockey Academy
International Student Programs
Primary and Elementary Programs

Early French Immersion

Late French Immersion (Grades 6 – 7)

Gifted Program (Grade 3 to 7)
Secondary Programs

Late French Immersion

International Student Programs
30
2006).
School Districts
Maple-Ridge School District


Group 2



2011/2012 Per-Student
Revenue from SchoolGenerated Funds and
Off-Shore Tuition-Fee
$703.82
13540
$240.78
Maple-Ridge School District is
located in the urban areas of
Maple Ridge and Pitt Meadows
in the rural area of the Fraser
Valley.
2.1% of its student population
are English Language Learners
while 7.8% are Aboriginal
students.
The average household income
before tax is between
$$84,799.00 (Pitts Meadow) and
$89,112.00 (Maple Ridge)
(Statistics Canada, 2006).
Nanaimo-Ladysmith School
District

2011/12
School‐Age
Funded FTE
Enrolment
14123
The Nanaimo-Ladysmith School
District is a urban district located
in mid-Vancouver Island.
4.2% of its student population
are English Language Learners
while 16% are Aboriginal
students.
The average household income
before tax is $57,841.00
(Statistics Canada, 2006).
Prince George School District



Prince George School District is
situated where the Nechako
River joins the Fraser River near
the center of British Columbia.
9.3% of its student population
are English Language Learners
while 26.3% are Aboriginal
students.
The average household income
before tax is $88,494.00
(Statistics Canada, 2006).
13225
$45.14
Description of programs of choice offered in each school
district
Primary and Elementary Programs

French Immersion (Early)

Montessori Program

One-to-One Laptop Program (Grades 6/7)

K-7 Environmental School Project

Literacy: iPod Program (Grades 3/4)

Odyssey - Self-Directed Learning Community (Grades
K-7)
Secondary Programs

ACE-IT (Accelerated Credit Enrolment to
Industry Training)
French Immersion (Secondary)

International Baccalaureate Diploma
Programme

International Student Programs
Academies

Equestrian Academy

Digital Arts Academy

Hairdressing Academy

Hockey Academy

Soccer Academy

Interdisciplinary Arts Academy
Primary and Elementary Programs

French Immersion (Early)
Secondary Programs

Career Technical Centre (Grades 11/12)
French Immersion (Secondary)

International Student Programs
Academies

Jazz Academy

Performing Arts Academy

Hockey Canada Skills Academy

Pacific Soccer Academy
I
Primary and Elementary Programs

French Immersion (Early)

Traditional Program

Montessori
Secondary Programs

Career Technical Centre (Grades 11/12)
French Immersion (Secondary)

International Student Programs
31
School Districts
2011/12
School‐Age
Funded FTE
Enrolment
2011/2012 Per-Student
Revenue from SchoolGenerated Funds and
Off-Shore Tuition-Fee
1671
$576.50
1787
$83.40
1475
$32.20
Description of programs of choice offered in each school
district
Gulf Island School District



The Gulf Islands School District
is located on seven major islands
situated in the Georgia Strait,
between the BC mainland and
the east coast of Vancouver
Island.
1.2% of its student population
are English Language Learners
while 7.7% are Aboriginal
students.
The average household income
before tax is $54,840.00
(Statistics Canada, 2006).
Fraser Cascade School District
Group 3



Fraser-Cascade School District
is located in the Eastern Fraser
Valley of British Columbia
3.7% of its student population
are English Language Learners
while 35.4% are Aboriginal
students.
The average household income
before tax is $22,870.00
(Statistics Canada, 2006).
.
Vancouver Island North School
District



Primary and Elementary Programs

French Immersion (Early)
Secondary Programs

Career Technical Centre - Secondary
ApprenticeshipProgram (Grades 11/12)

French Immersion (Secondary)

International Student Programs
Academies

Gulf Islands School of Performing Arts
(GISPA)

Gulf Islands Centre for Ecological Learning
(GICEL)

Saturna Ecological Education Centre (SEEC)
Secondary Programs

Fraser-Cascade Mountain School Program

International Student Programs
No choice or International Student Programs
Vancouver Island North School
District is located on the
northern tip of Vancouver Island
which includes the town of Port
Hardy, Port McNeill and Woss
as well as the adjacent smaller
islands such as Alert Bay.
9.1% of its student population
are English Language Learners
while 38.2% are Aboriginal
students.
The average household income
before tax is between $25,123.00
in Alert Bay and $72,445.00 in
Port Hardy (Statistics Canada,
2006).
Data excerpted from Table 1b Provincial Overview of Funded FTE Enrolment (Full-Year), 2011/12:
http://www.bced.gov.bc.ca/k12funding/funding/11-12/operating-grant-tables.pdf.
Statistic Canada, 2006. Profile for Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Divisions and Census Subdivisions, 2006
Census: http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/prof/rel/Rpeng.cfm?TABID=1&LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=0&GC=0&GK=0&GRP=1&PID=
94533&PRID=0&PTYPE=89103&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&Temporal=2006&THEME=81&VID=0&VNAME
E=&VNAMEF=
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