Do all roads lead to Rome?
Explaining the differences in the political desires of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Romania
C.W. Verheijen
3354164
MA International Relations in Historical Perspective
Utrecht University
Master’s thesis
16-09-2013
Dr. J Pekelder
1
Table of content
Introduction
3
§1 Of people and politics
4
§2 Dynamics of being
7
§3 Dynamics of belonging
10
§4 Dynamics of dissemination
13
Chapter 1. Twin histories
16
§1.1 The birth of Hungary
16
§1.2 The kingdom’s termination
18
§1.3 A new kingdom
20
§1.4 The Dual monarchy and the birth of nations
22
Chapter 2. Different paths
25
§2.1 World War II
25
§2.1.1 Dawn
25
§2.1.2 The annexation
26
§2.1.3 The occupation
26
§2.1.4 The reclamation
27
§2.2 Post World War II
29
§2.2.1 Czechoslovakia and the Soviet sphere
29
§2.2.2 Socialist Romania
31
Chapter 3. Similar ends?
35
§3.1 Czechoslovakia
35
§3.1.1 The elopement
35
§3.1.2 Marriage counseling
37
§3.1.3 A smooth divorce
38
§3.1.4 Alimony and minority support
41
§3.1.5 Myth and reality
43
§3.2 Romania
44
§3.2.1 Velvet and violent
44
§3.2.2 Revolution or restoration?
46
2
§3.2.3 Internal struggles
48
§3.2.4 External difficulties
50
Conclusion
53
Reflection: Do all roads lead to Rome, or are these different cities?
57
Bibliography
58
3
Introduction
On the 4th of June 1920, count Albert Apponyi, head of the Hungarian delegation sent to
Versailles to discuss the peace negotiations with the Allied powers, signed the Treaty of Trianon. In
so doing, Hungary agreed to the secession of two thirds of its pre-war territory. Apponyi had been in
a dire position: the Dual Monarchy collapsed after the war, the French troops liberated Greece and
Romania, and several ethnic groups within the Hungarian territory called for autonomy; being on the
losing end of the war, the negotiations had been decided before they had started. The Treaty of
Trianon de facto gave birth to new nations such as Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Almost
a hundred years later, many Hungarians refer to the treaty as the Hungarian Tragedy, recalling it as
the moment Hungary lost itself.1 Czechoslovakia itself was a multi-ethnic state; a result of the
wedding of the Czechs and Slovaks.
The Treaty of Trianon is a part of the historical canon, for Hungary, as well as for the nations
that were created with the signing of the treaty. After the 1920, the 1.7 million Hungarians living
outside Hungary became the ethnic minorities of these new states. This study differentiates between
ethnic Hungarians in Hungary and ethnic Hungarians abroad. After Hungary had been reduced to a
small Central European state, Magyars close to the borders were minorities in their new states. This
research is focused on two of the biggest Magyar national minorities: in Romania, Magyars represent
6,5% of the total Romanian population, in Slovakia, Magyars represent 8,5% of the total population.
In both countries, the ethnic minority is represented by several political parties. Interestingly, the
biggest Magyar party in Romania advocates autonomy, while the biggest Magyar party in Slovakia
advocates intercultural cooperation. How is it that two political parties, representing similar
minorities in states with a shared history until Trianon and a similar history under communist rule,
pursue different political objectives? Last year both states organized parliamentary elections in which
the Magyar parties participated: UDMR2 in Romania won 5,25% of the votes, in Slovakia Most-Híd
won 6,89% of the votes. Statistics thus show that the vast majority of the Hungarian minority –taking
into account that in the total Magyar population, minors are included as well- vote for the biggest
minority party. What, then, makes it that Magyars in Romania and Slovakia seem to pursue different
objectives?
Hungary, Slovakia and Romania extensively have to cooperate with one another, not only as
bordering states, but also as members of intergovernmental organizations such as NATO, the
1
‘The Treaty of Trianon: A Hungarian Tragedy - June 4, 1920’ The American-Hungarian Federation on
http://www.americanhungarianfederation.org/news_trianon_tragedy-dissolution-remedy.htm, 24/03/2013.
2
Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România, The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, a political body
advocating Magyar minority rights in Romania.
4
European Union and the Council of Europe. The treatment of the ethnic Magyars however, creates
friction between Romania and Slovakia on one side, and Hungary on the other side. Recent events
have made studies into this matter more pressing, but the difference in political goals has never been
fully looked into. By better understanding the history of the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and
Romania, and further study into the matter will pave the way to better cooperation between the two
host states and Hungary. In extracting both the good and the bad in both approaches, hopefully a
working model can be created to insure basic human rights in states with ethnic minorities. The study
is framed by theories on identity, ethnic groups and nationalism. Analysis of these theories
beforehand, the reader will be able to identify certain patterns in political rhetoric and legislation. To
my understanding, the matter of the ethnic Hungarians in both states is often looked at from a
nationalistic point of view, either analyzed by members of the ethnic community, or citizens of the
host states. I advocate a perspective focused on human rights, rather than nationalism.
In taking the reader by the hand, I will pinpoint important occurrences in Hungarian,
Czechoslovak, Slovak and Romanian history that might or might not explain while the Magyars in
Romania distinguish different political aims from their kin in Slovakia. In underlining several episodes
in Hungarian, Romanian and (Czecho)Slovak history, I am to prove that, although nothing is set in
stone, the situation of the Magyars in Slovakia and Romania came to life as a result of path
dependency. The conclusion of this research will contribute to the discussion on minority rights,
minority political representation and the significance of seemingly ancient history to modern-day
society.
§1 Of people and politics
Slovakia, Hungary and Romania are bordering nations in East and Central Europe. History has
often linked these territories together, while the situation of today has often set these states apart.
The history of the ethnic Hungarians, or Magyars, dates back to the first millennium, when Asiatic
horsemen crossed the Carpathians in search of a new home. A thousand years later, the descendents
of these horsemen, the modern day Magyars, are visible in several European states, representing
both the minority and majority in different regions. After centuries, these ethnic groups have evolved
in distinctive branches that seem similar in history, but are different in reality. The Magyars in
Slovakia represent 8,5% of the total population and inhabit a broad strip of land bordering Hungary.
The Magyars in Romania represent 6,5% of the population, concentrated in an enclave in the
Romanian heartland.
Both ethnic groups have organized themselves politically and have met success and loss in
the democratic elections. While the groups are similar in size and in location –both are the largest
5
minority, concentrated in former Hungarian territory, their political representation shows only a few
similarities. Slovakia experienced a change of power in the Magyar political representation: the SMKMKP, the Party of the Hungarian Coalition, used to represent the Magyars in the National Council.
Currently, the SMK-MKP represents Slovakia in the European Parliament. In 2009, disappointed SMK
members founded a new ethnic party, Most–Híd, which means bridge in Slovak and Hungarian. The
bridge party focuses on interethnic cooperation, rather than Magyar minority only. Accusing the
SMO-MKP of being too focused on autonomy, the Bridge party aims to leave the past in the past and
focus on cooperation and reconciliation. The newly emerged party experienced success in the last
Slovak elections, winning three seats on the National Council. Most–Híd receives praise from many
EU officials, noting the party is moderate, modern, and cooperative.3 Stating that it has no desire to
open offices in Hungary, the party underlines that where if focuses on “… where it has its voters and
that is Slovakia”.4 It is important to note, however, that not all is well in Slovakia. With the new
citizenship law, which stipulates that Magyars applying for Hungarian citizenship are bound to lose
their Slovak citizenship, relations between the ethnic groups have tensioned. Béla Bugár, leader of
Most-Híd, stresses to fight this law, noting that “none of these people expressed any desire to lose
their Slovak citizenship.”5
In Romania, the largest party representing the Magyars is called UDMR, or the Democratic
Alliance of Hungarians in Romania. UDMR has been the largest party since the democratic regime
change in 1989/1990. Since a few years, however, five smaller Magyar parties were created by
discontented Magyars. In Slovakia, Magyars fear the oldest Magyar party was too focused on
autonomy; in Romania, many Magyars fear the oldest party is not focused enough. The newly
emerged parties actively advocate autonomy or even a split from Romania all together. Still, UDMR
remains the largest party; the five smaller parties have not been able to reach the 5% electoral
threshold.
2012 was an important year for both states. Slovakia’s parliamentary election was held in
March, the Romanian parliamentary election was held in December. In both elections, nationalistic
rhetoric dominated the playing field. In Slovakia, the Slovak National Party (SNS) campaigned with
3
Z.a. ‘Ethnic Hungarian party heads in Slovakia debate elections at open university’ Politics.hu on 12/09/2013
on http://www.politics.hu/20130718/ethnic-hungarian-party-heads-in-slovakia-debate-elections-at-openuniversity/.
4
Z.a. ‘Slovakia’s ethnic Hungarians not planning to set up “branch parties” in Hungary’ Politics.hu 05/05/2012
on http://www.politics.hu/20120705/slovakias-ethnic-hungarians-not-planning-to-set-up-branch-parties-inhungary/.
5
Z.a. ‘Ethnic Hungarian party appeals against Slovak citizenship law’ Politics.hu 09/08/2011 on
http://www.politics.hu/20110809/ethnic-hungarian-party-appeals-against-slovak-citizenship-law/.
6
anti-Roma billboards, advocating to “(…) not feed those who don't want to work.”6 SNS also targeted
Magyars, stating the party has “(…)been defending Slovak land for 140 years. Orbán's boat is
sinking." The message refers to Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s Prime Minister, and his failing economic
policy.7 The anti-Magyar rhetoric was used by nationalistic politicians, to sway away from the real
issues, according to the chairman of the Public Affairs Institute, Grigorij Msesnikov. “This new
episode in Slovak-Hungarian tension comes at the worst time for the democratic opposition which
was doing well – it fosters the populist and nationalist parties by feeding an anti-Hungarian
discourse. (…)What better than to play the Hungarian card which makes people forget the affairs of
corruption and economic difficulties!"8 Robert Fico, leader of the Social Democratic Party, Smer,
openly expressed his fears of ‘the Hungarian army’ and ‘Orbanization’, after Hungary’s PM, Viktor
Orbán and his international policy aimed at Magyars abroad.9 Change, it seems, is an unwelcome
guest in Slovakia; Fico expressed no desire to push for changing the structure of the state. For the
Magyar parties, the election was not a success. SMK stressed that “any result over 5% of the vote will
be a success.”10 This did not happen. Most-Híd barely made the 5% threshold, and became the only
party representing the minority in the National Council. The party’s leader, Béla Bugár, is praised for
his working towards reconciliation and cooperation in building bridges and breaking new ground.
Presseurop estimates that 25% of Most-Híd-voters are Slovaks. Cooperation, according to Bugár, will
only be achieved when Magyars feel at home in their own country. "Today we are only on the
starting line." Following Bugárs initiative, similarly structured parties are being set up for the Magyar
minority in Serbia.11
Romania’s election in December 2012 were important for the Magyars. The Magyar
population in Romania has been declining ever since the communist take-over after World War II.
Romania too demands a 5% electoral threshold, and with only 6,5% of the total population being
Magyar, the minority fears for its political survival. Another danger that lurks in the shadows of
Romanian politics is the internal divide between the Magyar parties. Where in Slovakia, the bridge
party became the leading minority party without really harming the Magyar cause –Magyars are still
6
Z.a ‘Slovak nationalists using anti-Romani billboards in electoral campaign’, Romea 07/02/1990 on
http://www.romea.cz/en/news/world/slovak-nationalists-using-anti-romani-billboards-in-electoral-campaign.
7
Ibidem.
8
P. Joannin, ‘General Elections in Slovakia, a round up one week before the vote’ The European Elections
Monitor 07/06/2010 on http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/eem/1033-general-elections-in-slovakia-a-roundup-one-week-before-the-vote.
9
T. Vasalek, ‘Oh no, Orban clone? The EU ponders Slovak elections’ Centre for European Reform 23/03/2012 on
http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/oh-no-orban-clone-eu-ponders-slovak-elections.
10
P. Joannin, ‘The leftwing opposition running favourite in the early general elections in Slovakia’ The European
Elections Monitor 13/02/2012 on http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/eem/1287-the-leftwing-oppositionrunning-favourite-in-the-early-general-elections-in-slovakia.
11
M.M. Šimečka, ‘Béla Bugár, bridge builder’ 29/06/2010 on
http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/284181-bela-bugar-bridge-builder.
7
represented in the National Council- the possible transference of power is less smooth in Romania.
With UDMR being criticized by five smaller Magyar parties, both Romanian Magyars and Hungarian
political parties do not know what party to vote for. The internal difficulties drew Viktor Orbáns
attention, who called on ethnic Hungarian political organizations operating there to seek cooperation
with each other.”12 Not all Hungarians agree, Fidesz, Hungary’s rightwing party were divided
between two of the smaller parties, MPP and EMNP.13 Eventually, only EMNP participated in the
elections. Despite Fidesz’s lack of confidence in UDMR, the oldest Magyar party was the only one to
overcome the threshold. For the Magyars, the options came down to two: either a vote for cultural
autonomy (UDMR) or Territorial Federalism (EMNP). The majority of Magyars voted UDMR, favoring
cultural autonomy.14
What makes an ethnic group stick together? The following section aims to explain how
people come together and form a group. Consequently, it discusses the creation of this group as a
response to the Other, the group to which they do not belong. Finally, the process of the political
organization of these groups is elaborated on. The sections correspond with the following chapters:
Dynamics of being describes the creation of the Magyar, as does chapter 1. Dynamics of belonging
explicates the creation of the Self as a minority group within an alien state. Dynamics of
dissemination lays the basis for the political participation of these minority groups, as chapter 3 does
for the Magyars in Slovakia and Romania. By discussing several theories on being, belonging, and
dissemination, I aim to underline how the Magyars in Slovakia and Romania came to be, how their
rhetoric differs, and how this is influenced by Slovak and Romanian politics.
§2 Dynamics of being
1989, Francis Fukuyama states that the idea of the West would triumph over the idea of
communism, making Western liberalism the only viable political system.15 Communism, in his view
had long been an alternative to Western ideals. When the Eastern European political system fell,
history smiled on liberalism. During the Cold War, the legitimacy of the communist ideology was
challenged many times. After every challenge, Fukuyama claims the system becomes less and less
credible. As with many ideologies that flourished before communism, for instance Nazism, the
12
Z.a. ‘Orbán urges ethnic Hungarians in Romania to join forces’ Politics.hu 14/05/2012 on
http://www.politics.hu/20120514/orban-urges-ethnic-hungarians-in-romania-to-join-forces/.
13
Z.a. ‘Fidesz internal politics and the Romanian Hungarian parties’ Hungarian Spectrum 09/062012 on
http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2012/06/09/fidesz-internal-politics-and-the-romanian-hungarianparties/. Magyar Polgári Párt: Hungarian Civic Party. Erdélyi Magyar Néppárt: The People’s Party of Magyars in
Transylvania.
14
Z.a. ‘Cultural autonomy and territorial federalism: two voting options for Hungarians in Transylvania’
Nationalia 13/11/2012 on http://www.nationalia.info/en/news/1255.
15
F. Fukuyama, ‘The End of History’ The National Interest 16 (1989) 2.
8
expiration date was getting closer and closer. 16 Nationalism would no longer be a European force to
be reckoned with; ideology will, according to his 1992 book, fade away from the political sphere or
life; it will move into the cultural sphere. Nationalism will be pushed into the private sphere, where,
as he puts it, the French can idolize their wine, the Germans their sausage, and nationalism only
erupts during football matches.17 Fukuyama advances that there will only be minor nationalistic
conflicts: never again will nationalism lead to the events it had led to in 1914. Stable democracies will
encounter internal struggle and issues, but none of these will lead to the destabilization of the
political system; the liberal democracy, he says in his preface, cannot be improved any further.18
History -with a capital H- over the years has evolved into something called Universal History.
Universal History started with Plato and Aristotle, and evolved when Saint Augustine of Hippo wrote
about the shared destination of all Christians. Universal histories are by nature teleological, according
to Fukuyama, because their common goal or achievement fulfils the historical process. With the end
of these things comes the intelligibility of these historical episodes.19
Fukuyama’s statements regarding create history Avant la lettre: linking together major
episodes in history, seemingly unrelated. Chaos theory states that if Cleopatra’s nose had not been
the way it was, Marc Anthony would not have fallen for her, changing not only the outcome of the
Battle of Actium in 31 BCE, but our whole history dating as far back as Rome. Chaos theory combined
with Fukuyamaen history would, then, state that because Cleopatra’s nose was so big, history
happened the way it happened, making her nose indirectly responsible for Hitler coming to power. In
this respect, Fukuyama is an optimistic chaos theorist: events lead to a certain apotheosis that was
intended all along –in this case it was a liberal democracy, and every seemingly minor detail has an
overly grave impact on the course of events.20 This teleological, optimistic version of the chaos
theory that Fukuyama presents us with, is not only impossible to prove or disprove, it would render
history unacademic, impervious to empirical analysis and every historian jobless.21
Following in the footsteps of Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Fukuyama
distinguishes patterns in history, patterns of creation, maturation and completion. Hegel is often said
to have completed the work of Kant, asserting History lies at the end of the dynamic between
passion and power.22 History is seen as a sequence of conflicts between political systems; when
freedom, both politically and socially, is reached, history ends. Looking at past Histories, Fukuyama
16
F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York 1992) xiii.
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 271.
18
Ibidem, xi.
19
Ibidem, 56.
20
Y.M. Sadowski, The Myth of Global Chaos (Washington DC. 1998) 31.
21
G. Lively, ‘Cleopatra’s Nose, Naso and the Science of Chaos’ Greece & Rome 1 (2002) 27-43, 27.
22
Fukuyama, The End of History, 60.
17
9
observes a continuous cycle of rise and decline; with freedom as the End of it, he stated the liberal
democracy would prevail, being the political system that supported freedom the most. Both Hegel
and Fukuyama were very optimistic in their analysis of the world: with liberalism as the end goal of
both Hegelian and Fukuyamaen history, it would only become a better place to live. The notion of
progression can easily be refuted by asking a simple question: ‘does everything get better over time?’
Comparing today’s world with the one we knew before the economic crisis of 2008, with hesitation
one ought dexterously to say no. Fukuyama later recanted many of his own statements, insisting that
the main theme of his book was not to imply that large, grave events would no longer occur in
history. He intended to say that History, as a single, coherent –and almost teleological process- had
come to an end.23 Yet, one wonders if this statement is a true recantation, or a mere correction of
the main thesis.
Another prodigy of the chaos theory came forth in reply to Fukuyama’s statements in an
article in Foreign Affairs: in 1993, Samuel Huntington wrote that next pattern of conflict, would not
have its foundations in ideology or economy, but in culture.24 Huntington simplified the matter by
dividing the world in several different cultures. He posits in the book he later wrote on the matter,
culture and cultural identities are the main force behind national identities, and are ever present in
the shaping of (social) cohesion, as well as disintegration of states and societies; Huntington argues
culture is the driving force behind conflict in the post-communist world.25 Although dividing the
world into eight different distinctive cultures, Huntington does note that several countries are in fact
divided within themselves. He notes that conflicts will divide certain ethnical or cultural groups, and
align states with similar cultural identities.26 Looking at the past twenty years, it is difficult to say if
both these labels and these statements are correct: for instance, the United States and Israel are
both labeled as being Western, and have been allies ever since the creation of the latter state. On
the other hand, several states of the European Union, and, even the United States, have become
somewhat critical regarding the Israeli expansion onto Palestinian soil. Although these nations are
not at war with or against Israel, they have become more critical in their contribution of the violation
of Human Rights in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.27
One can accept to a certain degree that conflicts are rooted in cultural and societal
differences, but it is too much of a leap to accept Huntington’s proposal fully, as the case of Israel has
shown. Huntington’s statements on conflicts are both universal and vague: they are applicable to
23
Ibidem,, xiii.
S.P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (1993) 22-49, 22.
25
S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York 1996) 20.
26
Huntingon, The Clash of Civilizations, 29.
27
‘Kritiek VS op schending mensenrechten in China en Israël’ One World (2001).
24
10
almost all armed conflicts in the world, but, the assumption that their characterization is adequate
prevents researchers from doing a proper in depth analysis of the conflict. Smaller regional conflicts
passed the scope of media and many politicians. They have occurred within the specter of one of
Huntington’s cultures. What the American political scientist fails to note is that seemingly small
differences in culture, can have great repercussions in modern-day society. Nationalism in Eastern
Europe might not at the center of global attention, where conflicts compete with nuclear threats
from North-Korea, or armed conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. In Orientalism, AmericanPalestinian literary scientist Edward Said notes that the division of the world into different subgroups
or cultures is an expression of the idea that the West is all-powerful and all-understanding. In
dividing the world into different groups, in Us and Them, in the Self and the Other, based on the
West’s perception of radical difference, the West fails to see what is really going on in the world. 28
Huntington’s description of the world is an expression of neocolonialism, according to Saidist
thinking; the Western world stretches from the USA, through Europe all the way to the Philippines
and Papua New Guinea, making a large part of the world a giant Western crucible. Yet Papua New
Guinea is one of the most culturally diverse states in the world, with over 800 different languages
spoken.
Said’s notion of the West and the Rest is an oversimplification of the whole truth: by labeling
cultures, we forget that the Anyone is an important and necessary figure. The classification of the
Anyone as either part of the Self or the Other, is an expression of the liberal democratic
bureaucratization, according to Nigel Rapport. In doing so one culturally constructs the idea of a
common denominator, a common social life and a common logic, and one erases the individual.29
While both Huntington and Said oversimplify the world in order to make it more understandable,
Nigel Rapport makes it humane again: the world consists of a conglomerate of different cultures, in
which Anyone is unique. Power and history have influenced the depiction of the world, making
cultural indexation an overly Western activity. Although states might seem culturally similar and at
peace, it is Anyone, the individual human actor, causes clashes to occur. Consequently, in analyzing
the Magyars in Romania and Slovakia, one has to take into account that both the perceived group
and the individual are real actors.
§3 Dynamics of belonging
In order to cast aside Huntington’s notion of cultural homogeneity in areas such as Central
Europe, and to discard Fukuyama’s notion that there is no conflict after the victory of liberalism, and
28
E. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London 1978) 45.
N. Rapport, ‘Apprehending Anyone: the Non-indexal, Post-cultural, and Cosmopolitan Human Actor’ Journal
of the Royal Anthropological Institute 16 (2010) 84-101, 87.
29
11
that ideology and nationalism play no major role in 21st century conflicts, it is important consider the
philosophy of ethnicity. What is ethnicity, and what are the indicators of belonging to a certain
ethnicity? Although social-Darwinists will probably state that ethnicity is found deep within the
biological make-up of individuals, and that several individuals share a common set of genes, this
theory has been resolutely dispatched to the realm of 19th century pseudo-scientific thinking.
Research shows in historically or geographically tied regions, only 10% of the total population
genetically matches the ethnic group that inhabits it.30 The genetic explanation of ethnicity is the
new kid in town: before we knew how genes work, we would simply identify ourselves on the basis
our historical, cultural and social connections with the region of our origin. Looking at genes as a
scientific basis for ethnicity is not only redundant, but also useless. Ethnicity is the sense of
belonging; it makes the belonging real. Ethnicity is not a biological fact, but an identity, a construct.
The construct of ethnicity and ethnic identity rests on several pillars: first of all, people
belonging to the same ethnical group believe they have a shared history. We are being told there are
certain events, character traits and dynamics that have shaped our society. One does not think about
the truthfulness, until he is called out on these notions, he simply accepts it; he was its truth.
Benedict Anderson calls these groups imagined communities, because the relation between the
members of these communities only exist inside their heads. The state, and in this process becoming
a nation, invents the essence of the nation to unify its subjects. This fabrication of communion is
what brings people, who have had no earlier relation to one another together. Identity, and
therefore ethnicity, is a creation, an imagination, that are so truthfully believed by their followers,
that it becomes true –rather than is true- for them.31 As perception becomes reality, it is important
to treat is as such: if we believe it to be true, we will act as if it’s true. Debating the validity is futile.
Members of a certain ethnical group might not share a common history, they might not even share a
common culture, but they feel as if they do; ethnicity is intangible, yet something that has to be dealt
with accordingly. Ethnicity is not a static matter, and as perception changes, ethnicity might change
too, according to political scientist Brian Shoup.32 Although fluid, one perceives his ethnicity as solid.
Ethnicity is the assemblage of several social factors binding a certain group. But ethnicity as a
concept has another facet to it: the creation of the Other, or as coined by Swiss linguist Ferdinand
the Saussure the binary opposition. It includes the creation of both the Self and the Other. The Self is
everything the Other is not, and vice versa; in creating the Self, one immediately created the Other.
The Other is mostly created due to prejudice, while the Self is mostly created by projection
30
P. Wade (ed.), Race, Ethnicity, and Nation: Perspectives from Kinship and Genetics (Oxford 2009) 3.
B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London 1991) 7.
32
B. Shoup, Conflict and Cooperation in Multi-Ethnic States: Institutional Incentives, Myths and CounterBalancing (Oxford 2008) 5.
31
12
mechanisms, i.e. “The Other is bad, I’m not the Other, therefore I must be good.”33 In societies where
several different ethnic identities live together, the process of creating the Other can imply several
different cultures, although some cultures are included in the Self, and some are banished to be the
Other. Difference therefore, is an impersonal collective system that is not based on individual choice:
one simply joins this system of identity and values, and translates those impersonal values to one’s
personal identity. The transference of values is top-down only: one can accept the values of the
system, but cannot add or omit values of the system one joins.34
Nothing is set in stone: the criteria that define the insiders and the outsiders vary from
society to society. Yet the national myth is perceived as solid, it is undeniable and undisputable.
Roland Barthes states that the national myth is a secondary sign, or a sign of a sign. Words and
historical events are mythified, not only representing what they are, but what they represent and
embody.35 For instance: the 4th of July in the United States not only signifies the date on which the
Declaration of Independence was accepted, it represents freedom in both stately and mental
matters. Linked with the national myth, a both well-demarcated and vague ethnic group is defined
by frontiers that can be redrawn, withdrawn and expanded, rather than by borders.36 Visible or not,
these distinctions are social constructions of groups that feel they hold a biological explanation of
belonging together. Although ethnicity is a social construct, Thomas Hylland Eriksen notes in his book
that “[…]we must not assume that the actors themselves have the same ideas about the way in
which the world is constituted […].”37 Eriksen articulates that membership to an ethnic identity can
be both voluntary, and imposed by an external dominant group.38 Based on the existence and the
denial of difference, ethnicity can only exist in multi-ethnic societies, according to Eriksen.39
Definitions of ethnic group can vary widely. Ever since Tacitus scholars have debated the
criteria for being an ethnic group, says Walter Pohl. The criteria that are seen most often are
language and culture, yet even culture can be a somewhat unclear criterion.40 Also territory, customs
and political organization might be included as criteria for ethnic identities, yet all are somewhat
vague. Swiss people speak several languages, but are seen as one group; they live in the same
33
N. Sakai, ‘Ethnicity and Species: On the Philosophy of the Multi-Ethnic State In Japanese Imperialism’ in: P.
Osborne and S. Sandford (ed.), Philosophies of Race and Ethnicity (New York 2002) 115- 131, 115.
34
R.J.C. Young, ‘Race and Language in the Two Saussures’ in: P. Osborne and S. Sandford (ed.), Philosophies of
Race and Ethnicity (New York 2002) 63-81, 64.
35
F. Castaños, ‘Understanding Mexico’s Master Myth: a Case for Theory’ in: G. Bouchard (ed.), National Myths:
Constructed Pasts, Contested Presents (Oxford 2013) 76-93, 77.
36
T.H. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives (London 1993) 113.
37
Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, 17.
38
Ibidem, 32.
39
Ibidem, 34.
40
W. Pohl, ‘Telling the Difference: Signs of Ethnicity’ in: W. Pohl and H. Reimitz (ed.), Strategies of distinction:
the construction of ethnic communities, 300-800 (Leiden 1998) 17-70, 19.
13
country. But while Jewish people are scattered around the world, they are also considered an ethnic
group. Pohl states that the notion of ethnicity is based in common origins, or the myth of a common
origin. This work employs the myth of a common origin is the main criterion for ethnicity.
§4 Dynamics of dissemination
With social distinction comes political distinction. Ethnic Others are in several, if not all
societies equal to the ethnic self, in practice the Other might not be able to attain this level of
equality.41 Especially in nation-states, where society is perceived to be homogenous, (ethnic)
minorities might feel left out. Also, when this nation-state provides ethnic rights on an individual
basis instead of on a collective basis, minority rights can be ignored. Minorities living in such a nationstate do not feel that they belong to the dominant culture and society of the state. Francis Nyamnjoh
researched citizenship and belonging in South Africa; he concludes that minorities living in nationstates feel excluded from society. The stronger that feeling, the more nostalgic one is toward its
homeland. Exclusion invigorates the desire to belong.42 The Magyars of Upper-Hungary and
Transylvania are living in the territory they feel connected to, both socially and historically; this
territory, however, belongs to a nation to which they do not feel connected. Politicization of ethnic
groups can be attributed to these feelings. Andreas Wimmer states that this politicization is based on
three different notions of people hood. First of all, the people as a sovereign entity in a democratic
system have the right to some power, when they unite themselves and are represented. Second, as
part of a state, people are equal under and protected by law. These laws apply to all people of a
state, and are therefore also applicable to ethnic minorities. Third, Wimmer states that the cultural
identity of a group, based on what he calls a shared political destiny, are entitled to certain things. 43
In this context, political destiny is a shared myth of belonging.
Another process has been noticed by political scientist Vladimir Tismaneanu, who states that
several, post-communist, democratically functioning states scapegoat ethnic minorities. This process
is not something to take mildly, according to Tismaneanu, it has the deceptive appearance of being a
natural process, essential if the state has to “catch up with Western modernity”. Ethnicity in this
context is seen as something anti-Western: the Western world is portrayed as a successful crucible,
where many ethnicities are being replaced by capitalism, the market-economy and liberty. Holding
41
F.B. Nyamnjoh, Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa (London
2006) 228.
42
Nyamnjoh, Insiders and Outsiders, 229.
43
A. Wimmer, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity (Cambridge 2002) 2.
14
onto one’s ethnic identity is seen as holding on to authoritarian states, inequality and socialism.44
Minorities are targeted because their claim to ethnic rights is an anti-Western and anti-progressive
statement. Demands for rights based on ethnicity are seen by the culturally dominant group as a way
of thwarting the progress of the new state. According to Jonathan Stein, the post-communist thaw of
Europe reignited old primordial group conflicts and border disputes.45 Ethnic identity as a part of the
creation of the new state is often seen as a zero-sum game, and in founding a new state, it is
perceived as dangerous for both the construction and the continuation of the state. Another issue
that arises in the new post-communist states is that many ethnic minorities –due to
internationalization- can get in touch with their external homelands; this makes it easier to choose to
which government to adhere. Because the politics of the external homeland are so accessible, there
can be friction between the external homeland and the home state.46
The creation of minority parties is another feature: Stein notes that there are generally two
ways of creating an ethnic minority party. In Romania, UDMR serves as an umbrella for several
ideological tendencies and political aims. By representing various political thoughts one would
generally find, in several parties of the majority, UDMR appeals to many Magyars. Yet when it comes
to political ideology related to non-minority issues, UDMR’s position changes with the season. The
case of Most-Híd, the Hungarian minority party in Slovakia, represents the alternative. Even though it
serves as an umbrella party for the Magyars, their stance on non-minority related issues is fixed on
one political ideology.47 Stein argues that minorities feel the need to organize themselves politically
after years of repression during the communist era, because they have the right to do so. Secondly,
majority parties that devote themselves to interethnic cooperation are politically not as successful:
they either never get hold of power, or do not stay in power very long. Majority parties tend to
cooperate on an ad hoc basis with minority parties, making it easier to sever ties with the minority
parties when their own survival is at stake.48
Minority parties come to life as a result of majority and minority nationalism, according to
Stein. In areas with large concentrations of ethnic minorities such as Upper-Hungary and
Transylvania, minority nationalism is often met with greater majority nationalism. Although
nationalism is not necessarily a negative influence, yet in ethnically heterogeneous communities,
nationalism often evolves into something greater. Ultra-nationalism strictly defines a community and
44
V. Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe
(Princeton 1998) 41.
45
J.P. Stein (ed.), The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe: State-Building,
Democracy, and Ethnic Mobilization (New York 2000) 2.
46
Stein, The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe, 14.
47
Ibidem, 18.
48
Ibidem, 20.
15
its territory, viewing all who do not fit into this description as inferior and dangerous. According to
Janusz Bugajski, minorities and their neighboring majorities are to blame for what is wrong in the
home state. Interestingly, political parties representing ultra-nationalists have been perceived as
more dangerous to the state than minority parties, as is the case in Romania.49 Although the political
elite in the capital might not be enthusiastic about granting ethnic groups minority rights, they are
even less excited about a political party that conjures up images of the consecutive Nazi and Soviet
occupation. What is left in these new states is an interesting dynamic between minority parties,
majority parties and ultra-nationalist parties, that all have to secure their own existence on the new
political stage.
Nationalism plays a major role in the state-building of new, post-communist,
European powers. Nationalist mobilization is used to acquire a stable and homogeneous state. Social
scientists distinguished two types of nationalism, both used in charged political rhetoric: civic
nationalism, often attributed to Western states, and ethnic nationalism, attributed to Eastern
European states.50 Western nationalism is perceived as good; based on citizen participation and
equality, civic nationalism is described as deeply-rooted, based on human rights and modernity, and
as constructive towards the state. It is often linked to liberal democracies. Ethnic nationalism is the
binary opposite of civic nationalism, rooted in mythical notions of being, the veneration of ethnic
identity instead of equal participation, and is seen as a possible destruction of the state. Ethnic
nationalism is often linked with totalitarianism.51 With the creation of new states, the political elite
often impose the idea of civic nationalism: to ‘catch up with the West’, a perception of Western
nationalism is imprinted on the post-communist society. Civic nationalism focuses on the people’s
identification with the new state, rather than the individual’s origin. In this race to catch up, national
minorities are labeled as dangerous to the continuation of the state, because they identify with
ethnicity rather than with the state.52 Often, in new states, ethnic minorities are ignored by the
majority, because their claims to ethnic identity are perceived as old-fashioned, backwards,
totalitarian, and malignant. Political elites use these nationalistic labels as a justification their policy,
and as an opposition minority policy. Civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism are perceptions, rather
than realities, paving the way for racism to enter the political domain.
49
J. Bugajski, ‘Nationalist Minority Parties: The Anatomy of Ethnic Domination in Central and Eastern Europe’
in: J.P. Stein (ed.) The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe: State-building,
Democracy and Ethnic Mobilization (New York 2000) 65-99, 76.
50
M. Spinner, Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in East and West (Norderstedt 2002) 4.
51
K. Jaskułowski, ‘Western (Civi) versus Eastern (Ethnic) Nationalism. The Origins and Critique of the
Dichotomy’ Polish Sociological Review 171 (2010) 289-303, 290.
52
D. Burdyte, Taming Nationalism?: Political Community Building in the Post-Soviet Baltic States (Aldershot
2005) 20.
16
Chapter 1. Twin Histories
Here, the history of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary, and the creation of the Hungarian
identity is explored. Focusing on the origin of this identity, the mythical origin of the Magyar people
is explored. Although Hungarian prehistory leaves much to be debated, this canonical history
provides people with the foundations on which they claim to exist. It highlights the split of the
Hungarian kingdom due to the Ottoman occupation, focusing on the partition of the Hungarian and
Transylvanian identities. Furthermore, the reattachment of the Hungarian kingdom and the
Habsburg rule. Finally, the revival of ethnic identities, giving attention to the relation between the
Hungarians, Austrians, and the ethnic minorities.53
§1.1 The birth of Hungary
Though there are limited sources, the prehistory is based on traditional oral stories. ProtoMagyars lived south of the Ural for centuries before migrating to the south. The Hungarian birth
myth tells us that the seven legendary tribes, the Hétmagyar, lived on the Pontic-Caspian steppe in
the 7th century. Expelled by a Turkic tribe called the Pechenegs, the Proto-Magyars moved south,
crossing the Carpathians in 895. Although medieval chronicles disagree on exactly who became
Grand Prince, the princedom of Hungary established itself in the following decades. 54 In an attempt
to expand their territory in Central Europe, the Hungarian army raided the East Francian Empire.55
Their expansion to the north-west ceased when Emperor Otto the Great defeated the Hungarians at
the Battle of Lechfeld.56 Either in 1000 or 1001, Grand Prince Stephen was crowned king of Hungary.
While the expansion to the north halted, the kingdom of Hungary still expanded southward:
Transylvania fell under Hungarian rule in the 11th century, and in 1102 Croatia was added to the
crown.57 Transylvania was a semi-autonomous region of the Kingdom from the start. Before 1199,
the region was mentioned as a ban, a separately governed smaller unit at the borders of the
53
Treaties signed in cities that, at that time belonged to Hungary, as well as cities will be addressed by their
Hungarian name, and a Romanian and sometimes German name for those places will also be provided. I’ve
chosen to do so, firstly because most of the literature uses the Hungarian names, and secondly, because
Hungarian has been the official language since the end of the 18th century, and thirdly it is to avoid any further
confusion with the different names. The choices do not reflect my own opinion of which name is better, more
appropriate or more fitting for the towns and cities; I do not believe one can make such a distinction.
54
K.A. Brook, Jews of Khazaria (Lanham 2002) 142.
55
P. Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary (New York 2001) 2. / L. Makkai, ‘Hungary
Before the Hungarian Conquest’ in: P.F. Sugar, P. Hanák, T. Frank (ed.) A History of Hungary (Bloomington
1990) 1-8, 7.
56
C.R. Bowlus, The Battle of Lechfeld And Its Aftermath, August 955: The End of the Age of Migration in the
Latin West (Aldershot 2006) 168.
57
B. Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Cambridge 1983) 20.
17
kingdom. After 1199, Transylvania was dubbed a voivode, a title used for Transylvania only.58 It had a
separate diet, which was mentioned for the first time in 1288, yet the voivode could also participate
in all Hungarian affairs.59 Thus, since the birth of the kingdom, Transylvania, while being the first
European territory visited by the tribes, was semi-autonomous. In this, history seems to support the
theory of path dependency.
Since the birth of the kingdom, two ethnic Magyar groups were distinguished: the
Hungarians, and the Szeklers, living at the borders of the kingdom. While Szeklers are seen as a
Finno-Ugric group, belonging to the Magyar ethnic group, much remains uncertain regarding their
origin.60 Despite this uncertainty, the Szeklers fulfilled a distinctive role, while keeping their ethnic
identity and culture alive. George W. White states that Transylvania’s isolation attributed to the
preservation of its Hungarian and Szeklers identity; many Hungarian Romantics regard Transylvania
as the Hungarian cradle of life and believe the myth of origins is embedded into the Transylvanian
lands.61 Depicted as a warrior tribe, the Szeklers protected the kingdom from external threat. A
Dutch source emphasizes the warrior identity, noting that the Szeklers were exempt from paying
taxes in return for their bravery.62
Although Transylvania was sparsely populated in the 12th century, it was inhabited by several
ethnic groups. The medieval chronicler Anonymus mentions the area being ruled by a certain Vlach
before the Hungarian invasion.63 Romanians view Vlachs as their ancestors. Responding to King Geza
II’s invitation, more ethnic groups moved to the Hungarian borderlands. In exchange for economic
58
C.J. Rogers (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Modern Technology, Volume 1 (Oxford
2010) 117.
59
Sedlar, East Central Europe in the Middle Ages, 290.
60
J.W. Sedlar, East Central Europe in the Middle Ages, 1000-1500 (Seattle 1994) 406.
61
White, Nationalism and Territory, 97.
62
The exact quote (“De Szeklers zijn zeer dapper en buitengemeen krijgszuchtig. De Hongaren leverden geen
slag, waarbij de Szeklers niet tienvoudig hun bloed deden stromen, en eeuwen achtereen waren zij van alle
belasting ontheven, onder de enkele verplichting om de grenzen te bewaken.”) loosely translates to: “The
Szeklers were very brave and extremely bellicose. The Hungarians never fought, without the Szeklers losing
blood ten times more, and for centuries they were relieved from paying taxes for their sole responsibility of
defending the borders.” Taken from: Diederichs Brothers, Onze Tijd: Gebeurtenissen onzer dagen op het gebied
van staatkunde, geschiedenis, land- en volkenkunde, kunsten, wetenschappen, nijverheid, enz. mitsgaders
levens- en karakterschetsen van vermaande tijdgenoten (Amsterdam 1849) 259
63
An ethnic group consisting of Latinised peoples in East central Europe; G.W. White, Nationalism and
Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe (Oxford 2000) 120; Exact quote: “Et dum ibi
diutius morarentur, tunc tuhutum pater horca sicut erat uir astutus dum cepisset audire ab incolis, bonitatem
terre ultra siluane, ubi gelou quidam blacus dominium tenebat.” Translated into: And while they tarried there
some while, Tuhutum, father of Horca, as he was a shrewd man, when he learned from the inhabitants of the
goodness of the land of Transylvania, where Gelou, a certain Vlach [quidam Blacus], held sway (…)” from M.
Rady, ‘The Gesta Hungarorum of Anonymus, the Notary of King Béla. A Translation.’ Slavonic and East
European Review, 87 (2009) 681 – 727, 708.
18
and political privileges, Saxons were invited to move there as well.64 In total, three ethnic groups
were officially recognized: the Szeklers, the Saxons, and the Magyars. These people were referred to
as Transylvanian. 65 The Vlachs were excluded from this group, having no privileges at all. Szeklers
and Saxons lived in a relatively autonomous region of the kingdom, first as a part of the
Transylvanian voivode, and from the 13th century as a separate voivode.66
§1.2 The kingdom’s termination
Hungary was plagued with instability in the 14th century: the Árpadian dynasty, descending
from the Hétmagyar, died out in 1301. The throne fell to the hands of the Capetian House of Anjou,
and the situation in Hungary became unstable. While the Ottoman Empire became restless after
Osman I died, Hungary neglected to fortify the southern frontiers of the Hungarian kingdom. 67 The
Hungarian and Ottoman armies met repeatedly on the battlefield, but the Hungarian kings failed to
realize the danger of a possible invasion. The Ottomans were occupied with threats for the East, and
did not advance onto Hungarian soil. The last Capetian queen, Mary, and the son of the Holy Roman
Emperor, Sigismund of Luxemburg, were wed, linking Hungary with Europe´s leading power.68 Mary
died childless before her husband came to power. Sigismund envisioned Hungary as a buffer state
between the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottomans.69 In 1396, the Ottomans defeated a coalition of
the Holy Roman Empire, Hungary, and France at the Battle of Nicopolis. The Ottoman Empire did not
advance into Hungary, fearing an invasion from the east by the hastened Tamerlane.
70
Internal
struggle troubled Hungary: King Matthias Corvinus died childless in 1490, leaving the succession of
the throne to the already powerful landed nobility. The new king, Vladislaus II Jagellion, had little
power over them. Without his permission, the nobility was able to levy taxes, that were, in turn, used
for themselves instead of the kingdom.71 A frail king, an economically challenged country, and a
64
Saxons is a collective term, used for settlers from several north-western European region such as Flanders
and the Low Countries, Saxony, and France. The word Saxon is used to describe people of Germanic ethnic
origin.
65
Erdély in Hungarian
66
I. Keul, Early Modern Religious Communities in East-Central Europe: Ethnic Diversity, Denominational
Plurality, and Corporative Politics in the Principality of Transylvania, 1526-1691 (Leiden 2009) 22; I. Lázár,
Transylvania, A Short History (Budapest 1996) 47.
67
G. Pálffy, ‘The Origins and Development of the Border Defense System Against the Ottoman Empire in
Hungary (Up to the Early Eighteenth Century), in: G. Dávid and P. Fodor (ed.) Ottomans, Hungarians and
Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest (Leiden 2002) 3-71, 8.
68
R. Patai, The Jews of Hungary: History, Culture, Psychology (Detroit 1996) 68
69
M. Molnár, A Concise History of Hungary (Cambridge 2001) 59; Patai, The Jews of Hungary, 68.
70
C. Tyerman, God’s War: a New History of the Crusades (London 2006) 856.
71
N. Housley, Religious Warfare in Europe 1400-1536 (Oxford 2002) 69.
19
powerful landed nobility; to keep the kingdom financially stable, peasants were pushed back into
servitude and burghers lost their social mobility.72
Hungary grew restless, while the Ottoman Empire had their eyes on it. The kingdom was
recovering from a peasant rebellion that deepened the rift between the nobility and the common
people.73 Its position worsened when King Louis II died childless in the Battle of Mohacs. The throne
was disputed by two candidates: John Szapolyai, married to Louis’ cousin, and Ferdinand, the brother
of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, and Louis’ brother-in law.74 The kingdom split over the investiture:
Ferdinand took the throne with support from his brother, while John Szapolyai crowned himself king
of Hungary in Transylvania. Hungary’s authority over Transylvania had long been very weak, which
enabled Szapolyai to take over.75 Despite being powerful in Transylvania, he needed a strong partner
to maintain his position. In Suleiman the Magnificent, John Szapolyai found one; the Sultan would
support Transylvania, and, in return, John would become his vassal. The kingdom split in 1528;
Ferdinand ruled in Royal Hungary, and John reigned in the Eastern Hungarian Kingdom, both kings
disputing the other’s investiture.76 In 1538, they met at Nagyvárad77, agreeing that after John’s
passing, the kingdoms would be reunited.
78
When John died two years later, the Transylvanian
Estates crowned his infant son king. His mother, Isabella Jagiellon, and the bishop of Nagyvárad,
George Martinuzzi, acted as regents during the king’s infancy.
Suleiman marched on Buda in 1451, taking the capital and decimating what was left of
Ferdinand’s kingdom. Royal Hungary now stretched from Zagred, to Upper-Hungary, incorporating
only the western part of Transdanubia. Ottoman Hungary’s territory was shaped like a triangle with
Bihać, Belgrade and Esztergom as its angles, including important fortified cities like Buda, Pécs,
Szeged and Temesvár.79 Isabella and Martinuzzi fostered conflicting visions for the kingdom: the
mother of the king believed in a firm alliance with the Sultan, while the bishop preferred to focus on
Hungary, orchestrating John’s first abdication in 1551, in favor of Ferdinand. In a little under twenty
years, the Eastern Hungarian Kingdom was both under Habsburg/Hungarian and Ottoman suzerainty,
72
Molnár, A Concise History of Hungary, 82.
Housley, Religious Warface in Europe, 119.
74
A.W. Ward e.a (ed.) The Cambridge Modern History, Volume 1: The Renaissance (London 1902) 97; Engel, The
Realm of St Stephen, 365.
75
I.A. Pop, Romanians and Hungarians from the 9th to the 14th Century: The Genesis of the Transylvanian
Medieval State (Cluj-Napoca 1996) 198.
76
Ward e.a, The Cambridge Modern History, 98.
77
Oradea, Romania
78
Keul, Early Modern Religious Communities in East-Central Europe, 40.
79
Timişoara, Romania; K. Hegyi, ‘The Ottoman Network of Fortresses in Hungary’ in: G. David and P. Fodor
(ed.), Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: the Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman
Conquest (Leiden 2000) 163-194, 164.
73
20
and it was also mentioned as an independent state for the first time. 80 John was reinstalled as king
in 1556, and ruled until 1570, when he abdicated for the second time in favor of Ferdinand’s son,
Maximilian II. In return, the king and Holy Roman Emperor dubbed Transylvania an autonomous
principality, and elected John prince.81 The Reformation swept through Europe, but did not touch
upon the religiously heterogeneous kingdom. Fearing the Protestant Transylvanian nobles might
support a protestant revolt in Hungary, it advocated a policy of religious freedom.82 The Habsburgs
were less tolerant. The Principality of Transylvania became an Ottoman vassal state in 1604, when
the Habsburgs attempted to enforce religious homogeneity in Hungary.83 The consequent wars
resulted in the reaffirmation of the status quo and the creation of an unstable settlement.84
The unstable peace ended in 1683 when the Ottomans initiated the Third Siege of Vienna.85
The siege proved to be too ambitious for the Sultan: Hungary was backed by Poland, the Holy Roman
Empire, Venice, and the Papacy. From 1683 and on the Great Turkish War proved that the Ottoman
Empire had lost its prime position in Hungary. Not only was the Holy Alliance able to defend Vienna,
in the years that followed, Buda, Transylvania and Belgrade were retaken by the Habsburgs.86
Realizing the Ottoman Empire might lose the war; Transylvania declared itself independent from the
Empire and joined the league in 1686. The Treaty of Karlowitz, signed in 1699 both concluded the
Ottoman rule in Central Europe and initiated the role of the Habsburgs as one of Europe’s major
powers.87 With this new debut of the Habsburg monarchy on the European stage, Hungary entered a
new period of wars, revolutions, and nationalist sentiment.
§1.3 The new kingdom
The Archduchy of Austria took control of Hungary when the Ottomans retreated in 1699. For
Hungary, the 18th century was marked by financial difficulties, anti-Habsburg rhetoric, and the
creation of the Hungarian identity. The wars against the Ottoman Empire left Hungary in financial
80
G. Kármán, ‘Transylvania Between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires’ in: L. Eriksonas, L. Müller (ed.)
Statehood Before And Beyond Ethnicity: Minor States in Northern And Eastern Europe (Brussels 2005)151-158,
152.
81
Keul, Early Modern Religious Communities in East-Central Europe, 100.
82
Ibidem, 98; G. Murdoch, ‘Eastern Europe’ in: A. Pettegree (ed.), The Reformation World (London 2000) 190210, 198.
83
G. Kármán, ‘Transylvania Between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires’ in: L. Eriksonas, L. Müller (ed.)
Statehood Before And Beyond Ethnicity: Minor States in Northern And Eastern Europe (Brussels 2005)151-158,
152; F. Szakály, ‘The Early Ottoman Period, Including Royal Hungary, 1526-1606’ in: P.F. Sugar, P. Hanák and T.
Frank (ed.) A History of Hungary (Bloomington 1994) 83-99, 97.
84
Molnár, A Concise History of Hungary, 115
85
K. Péter, ‘The Later Ottoman Period and Royal Hungary, 1606-1711’ in: P.F. Sugar, P. Hanák and T. Frank
(ed.) A History of Hungary (Bloomington 1994) 100-120, 116.
86
Bideleux and Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe, 213.
87
Ibidem, 214.
21
trouble; to pay for the losses of the Great Turkish War, the population was heavily taxed. The
Habsburg overlords imposed religious homogeneity in the heterogeneous kingdom. Already in 1703,
Hungary revolted during Rákóczi's War of Independence, lead by Transylvanian Prince Francis
Rákoczi. Although the Habsburgs were occupied with the War of the Spanish Succession, the
Hungarian rebels were too weak to attain independence.
88
With the Treaty of Szatmár89, a
compromise was reached: Hungary received a special status within the Habsburg monarchy, and the
nobility attained special liberties. 90 Hungary lost the right to appoint their king; Transylvania became
a Grand Principality, ruled by an imperial governor. Hungary remained troubled; in 1740, Emperor
Charles died without a male heir. Although he secured the Hungarian throne for his daughter, Maria
Theresa, by pragmatic sanctions in 1713 and 1723, her investiture was disputed by the European
powers. 91 The ongoing War of Austrian Succession resulted in Maria Theresa’s survival as monarch,
making her a popular ruler, but the war burdened the kingdom financially.92
The Holy Roman Empire met its end by Napoleon’s hand at the Battle of Austerlitz. Holy
Roman Emperor Francis II created the Austrian Empire, making himself emperor. Financially struck
because of the war against Emperor of the French, Francis laid heavy taxes on the Hungarian nobility.
Compared to other European powers, Hungary’s system of tax and class were old-fashioned. The
Hungarian Reform Period began in 1825; reformers such as István Széchenyi and Lajos Kossuth
pushed to bring about social and political changes, such as the abolishing serfdom, equality before
the law, and the modernization of the Hungarian media, in order to catch up with Hungary’s
European contemporaries.93 As in other European powers, advancement was achieved through
homogenization of its people; with reform came the renewal of the Hungarian national identity. In
the 1840s, Hungary developed a policy of magyarization in its ethnically diverse regions.94 However,
Hungary’s ethnic minorities were also occupied with cultural homogenization. Slovaks fostered ideals
of Pan-Slavism. According to Alice Freifeld, the Slovak identity was based on ideals of a Slavic one;
the Slovaks lacked the political organization to advocate a separate sentiment. 95 The Slovak gentry
were magyarized, while the burghers were Germanized by the Austrians: the Slovak identity was one
of the mind, solely hanging on to the Slovak language.
96
The Slovaks codified their history and
88
Ibidem, 215.
Satu Mare in Romanian.
90
Bideleux and Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe, 214.
91
J.O. Lindsay (ed.) The New Cambridge Modern History: VII The Old Regime 1713-63 (Cambridge 1957) 397.
92
R. Browning, The War of Austrian Succession (New York 1993) 68.
93
A. Gerö, Modern Hungarian Society in the Making: The Unfinished Experience (Budapest 1993) 60.
94
Bideleux and Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe, 217.
95
A. Freifeld, Nationalism and the Crowd in Liberal Hungary, 1848-1914 (Baltimore 2000) 67.
96
Freifeld, Nationalism and the Crowd in Liberal Hungary, 68.
89
22
language, noting that the Czech culture was similar, but not the same. While Czech nationalism was
actively felt in Upper-Hungary, Slovak nationalism was linked to Pan-Slavism.
The ghost of 1848 haunted the multi-ethnic Hungarian kingdom in two ways: Hungarians
revolted against the Austrian Empire, and the ethnic minorities fought against the Hungarians.
97
In
March 1848 the Hungarian Diet proclaimed Hungary a sovereign state, compromising all of the lands
that fell under the crown of Saint Stephen. However, not all this land agreed with the proclamation:
the Slovak, Croatian and Transylvanians felt they did not belong to this newly proclaimed Hungarian
state. Thus, 1848 was the year of two revolutions. 98 While the Transylvanian Diet, dominated by
Hungarians and Saxons, agreed with Hungarian independence, the Romanians and Serbs living in
Transylvania revolted, preferring Austrian overlordship.99 The Slovaks created a Slovak National
Council during the revolution, hoping to achieve some autonomy.100 Unable to do so, they joined the
Austrian army and fought against the Hungarians.101 In September 1848, the Croats also rebelled. The
war initially seemed successful for the Hungarians, but the Austrians received support from the
Russian Emperor, Czar Nicolas. Nicolas positioned himself as the protector of conservative Europe,
dedicating himself to the protection Concert of Europe. With this support, the Austrian Empire
regained control. 102 After the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-49 and the internal revolutions, Austria
imposed a policy of germanization, albeit Hungarians were allowed to use their mother tongue. The
ethnic minorities opposing Hungarian rule were magyarized.103 The revolution halted, but the
discontent remained.
§1.4 The Dual monarchy and the birth of nations
After 1849, Hungary continued to oppose Austrian rule and ethnic groups struggling for
autonomy internally took hold of the kingdom. In 1867, Hungary and Austria came to an agreement
which created a new empire on its old foundations. The compromise or Ausgleich founded the
Habsburg Empire, consisting of the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary.
104
United in
foreign affairs, defense and finances, but sovereign in other matters, the newborn Dual monarchy
became a powerful European state.
105
Hungary benefited from the arrangement, due to the
improvement of infrastructure and communication networks, and the establishment of modern
97
Ibidem, 217.
I. Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century (Budapest 1999) 9.
99
T.F.X. Noble (e.a.) (ed.) Western Civilization Beyond Boundaries (Boston 2008) 676.
100
M. Teich, D. Kováč, and M.D. Brown (ed.) Slovakia in History (Cambridge 2011) 125.
101
Teich, Kováč, and Brown (ed.) Slovakia in History, 126.
102
Noble, Western Civilization Beyond Boundaries, 677.
103
Ibidem, 761.
104
Bideleux and Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe, 241.
105
Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 11.
98
23
credit arrangements.106 Although constitutionally a full partner, Hungary economically remained
junior.107 The compromise underlined Hungary’s position as a secondary Herrenvolk, a master race,
after the Austrians.108 In 1868, the Law of Nationalities legally supported this claim, in pronouncing
the Hungarian legal superiority over the ethnic minorities, and denying minority rights.109 The
Ausgleich gave birth to feelings of Hungarian superiority that were not expressed before because
Hungary’s near constant state of occupation. Also, the Ausgleich degraded Slovaks, Romanians and
other ethnic minorities to second-class citizens. Aristotle Kallis describes how the law deepened the
rift between the Hungarians, and the ethnic minorities: “ […] the post-Ausgleich trend toward a
Herrenvolk Hungarian nationalism fused selective historical, ethnological, and anthropological ideas
in a type of race-ethnic synthesis that chartered a way out of the agony of degeneration and
prefigured subsequent discourses of national rebirth.”110 The Hungarian birth myth was ‘discovered’
in the 19th century.
The 20th century began in crisis: in reaffirming its status as a nation-state, Hungary refused to
recognize minority rights or to permit the use of minority languages.111 Instead of allowing national
language education on a small scale, the Hungarian state pushed through policies of further
magyarisation.112 Hungary found itself in a stalemate: the minorities were becoming restless, while
granting those groups rights would paralyze Hungary itself. Ideas of federalism were perceived as
even worse: if all minorities of Hungary would be recognized, fifteen autonomous republics would
emerge. Only two of those, the Hungarian and the Szekler, would be Hungarian speaking. The crisis
grew with the annexation of Bosnia, which irritated the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Serbia.
The Old man of Europe, the Ottoman Empire, was unable to maintain its borders, and with the
growth of Pan-Slavism, Russia had proclaimed itself the protector of the Slavic people of Europe.113
With the killing of the Austrian heir-apparent Franz Ferdinand in 1914, the tensions reached a critical
point.
The First World War broke out. It was a seventeen year old boy who shot the heir to the
Austrian throne, but it was just a candle compared to the coming conflagration. Even before Gavrilo
106
Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 19.
N. Swain, Hungary: the Rise and Fall of Feasible Socialism (New York 1992) 34.
108
R.A. Kahn, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918 (London 1974) 288.
109
S. Czeitscher, ‘Discourse, Hegemony, and Polyglossia in the Judicial System of Trieste in the 19th Century’ in:
R. Rindler Schjerve (ed.), Diglossia and Power: Language Policies and Practice in the 19th Century Habsburg
Empire (Den Haag 2003) 69-105, 78;A. Kallis, Genocide and Fascism: The Eliminationist Drive in Fascist Europe
(New York 2007) 70.
110
Kallis, Genocide and Fascism, 72.
111
Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 64.
112
P.C. van Duin, Central European Crossroads: Social Democracy and National Revolution in Bratislava, 18671921 (Pressburg 2009) 28.
113
Bideleux and Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe, 246.
107
24
Princip shot the Archduke, the European powers were at the brink of war. National minorities
wanted the right to self-determination, major powers wanted to tilt the balance of powers in their
favor, and the scramble for the already dying Ottoman Empire motivated the war. For the Dual
monarchy, it meant siding with the Germans, who had supported the monarchy financially.114 When
the war was over, American President Woodrow Wilson urged Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the
other minorities of the monarchy to create their own states. 115 The peace accords that followed tried
not to create a new Europe of old empires, but envisioned a Europe where states were made up of
nationalities. New borders were drawn between 1919 and 1920, creating a new Poland, Italy,
Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Greece and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (or
Yugoslavia).116
On the 4th of June 1920, the Treaty of Trianon was signed by Hungary, settling the disputed
borders with the Republic of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Romania secured several
Hungarian regions, including Transylvania, as was stipulated when it joined the Triple Entente in
1915.117 The Czechs and Slovaks agreed on creating a unitary state; the marriage of Czechoslovakia
was performed at the dismantlement of Hungary, which lost two thirds of original territory.118
Minority issues however, did not end with the creation of these states. Czechoslovakia had a large
population of Germans in the north and Hungarians in the south; around 35% of the population was
neither Czech nor Slovak.119 The 1.8 million Hungarians living in Transylvania became an ethnic
minority in Romania.120 In 1910 almost one third of the total Transylvanian population was
Hungarian, while around 53% was Romanian.121 But with the end of one ethnic conflict came the
making of a new one.
114
D.G. Hermann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton 1996) 211.
Ibidem, 89
116
Bideleux and Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe, 321.
117
Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 83.
118
Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century 90.
119
W.J. Reisser, The Black Book: Woodrow Wilson’s Secret Plan for Peace (Lanham 2012) 106.
120
K. Kocsis, E. Kocsis-Hodosi, Ethnic Geography of the Hungarian Minorities in the Carpathian Basin (Budapest
1998) 21.
121
E. Árpád Varga, Hungarians in Transylvania between 1870 and 1995 (Budapest 1999); Romsics, Hungary in
the Twentieth Century, 121.
115
25
Chapter 2: Different paths
Here a further overview of the events leading up to World War II is presented. The matter of
Sudetenland is considered as it was a conflict based on ethnicity. The run of the war is also discussed,
given the fact that Hungary has attempted to retake the possessions it lost in 1920. The second
subchapter discusses the position of the Magyars in the Socialist Republic of Romania: attention is
paid to Autonomous Szeklerland, the policy of Romanization and forced migration, and the creation
of Magyar political parties. The third subchapter discusses the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the
Slovakization that occurred after the creation of the socialist republic, and the matter of ethnicity:
Czechoslovakia was suspicious of both the German minority and the Hungarian minority. The chapter
ends with a discussion of the roads to revolution for Romania and Czechoslovakia.
§2.1 World War II
§2.1.1 Dawn
While the events leading up to World War I might have been difficult to name, the events
leading up to World War II were straightforward: Germany was punished by the Treaty of Versailles
of 1919. It was the first step towards WWII, and with demands made by French Prime Minister
George Clemenceau, it comes as no surprise. Clemenceau was a hardliner, envisioning a Europe in
which Germany would be permanently paralyzed and inferior to France. The Allies forced Germany
to dub itself the aggressor of the war, ignoring the fact that Europe was already at the brink of war
before the Archduke was shot.
Germany had to hand in the Alsace-Lorraine, and its army was not allowed to be bigger than
100,000 men. Finally, the Treaty obligated Germany to pay an enormous amount of reparations to
the Allies. Versailles frustrated many Germans, who suffered under the conditions of the peace.
Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist Party (NSDAP) became the biggest single party in the 1932 elections,
but the German parties could not agree on who should become Chancellor. President Hindenburg
did not invite Hitler. Kurt von Schleicher became chancellor; his Cabinet fell within two months. A
year later, an election later, the NSDAP won again, making it almost impossible for the old
Hindenburg to refuse Hitler again.122 Only weeks after Hitler became chancellor, a perfect storm, a
Dutch communist burned down the Reichstag. Hitler declared a state of emergency, and, with the
support of the Nationalists and the Catholic Center Party, he was granted the right to make laws for
the next four years. Bypassing the president and Reichstag, Hitler consolidated his power, suddenly
unchallengeable.
122
J. Giblin, The Life and Death of Adolf Hitler (New York 2002) 87.
26
§2.1.2 The annexation
In the following years, Hitler moved toward realizing his European vision. He remilitarized the
Rhineland in 1936, and moved forward to ignore other stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, such as
the Anschluss of Austria in 1938 and the annexation of Sudetenland in 1939.123 The annexation of
these territories had long been discussed by Nazi-Germany, Benito Mussolini’s Italy and the Kingdom
of Hungary: in 1937, several German leaders met with their Hungarian counterparts, assuring
German support in the recapture of Upper-Hungary.124 In 1938 the three powers met in Vienna and
agreed on the annexation of Czechoslovakia, to restore partially pre-Trianon borders.125 The First
Vienna Award, the annexation of Upper-Hungary, was anything but a bargain: in order to annex the
region, Hungary had to submit to anti-Semitic legislation. Hungary’s people were obsessed with
regaining these lost territories. They agreed.126 Irredentism, it seems, was an issue very close to the
Hungarian heart. After negotiations with the British Prime Minister, Hitler was allowed to incorporate
Sudetenland.
In 1940, Hungary and Germany agreed on a Second Vienna Award; Hungary was promised a
part of Northern Transylvania, in exchange for more anti-Semitic legislation.127 During the SlovakHungarian War of 1939, Hungary annexed Upper-Hungary. Czechoslovakia collapsed; Hitler divided
his new territory in zones of occupation: Bohemia and Moravia became a single German
protectorate, Poland and Hungary were rewarded with small strips of land, and Slovakia became a
client state to Fuhrer. Immediately following the war’s end, Czechoslovakia tried to rid itself of ethnic
minorities, expelling the Germans living in the country.128 By 1948, Czechoslovakia was a communist
state.
§2.1.3 The occupation
Something similar happened in Romania; while trying to remain its neutrality, Romania was
in a dire position, bordering states interested in annexing its territory. Both Hungary and Bulgaria had
their revisionist eyes on the country; Germany, and the Soviet Union recognized the vast oil reserves
in Romania to merit invasion.129 In June 1940, the Soviet Union occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina.130
123
Sudetenland was a territory in the north-west of Czechoslovakia in which several national minorities
inhabited.
124
Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 197.
125
White, Nationalism and Territory, 103.
126
Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 199.
127
White, Nationalism and Territory, 157.
128
Noble, Western Civilization Beyond Boundaries, 896.
129
Noble, 893.
130
C. King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia and the Politics of Culture (Stanford 2000) 93.
27
In November 1940, Romania had no choice but to join the Axis.131 Romania even supported Germany
during Operation Barbarossa.132 The political climate of Romania was becoming increasingly rightwinged, and when Octavian Goga became prime minister in 1937, anti-Semitic laws were passed.
Goga’s minister of deference was Ion Antonescu. The minister had developed close ties with the Iron
Guard, the Romanian far-right party, King Carol, however, opposed the Guard, took heavy measures
against the organization, and in so doing overthrew his own democratic system. Yet, in 1940 the King
was foced to ask Antonescu to form a new government, when his own popularity evaporated.
Antonescu became prime minister and de facto dictator of Romania, establishing an alliance with
Germany.133 During that alliance, the country still lost many territories: northern Transylvania was
given to Hungary, and the southern part of Romania to Bulgaria, also a member of the Axis. The
Jewish population suffered under the Romanian-German alliance: of the 800.000 Jews originally
living in Romania, by 1944, only 350.000 survived.134 Romania was rich in oil, a resource Germany
lacked.
King Michael executed a successful coup d’état in 1944 against the Antonescu regime, and
Romania sided with the Allies. The declaration of war made the state’s situation grim. Bordering
Bulgaria, Hungary and Germany meant that Romania would have to fight on several fronts. The
Soviets responded by accelerating their Romanian advance. Together with the Red Army, national
forces purged the Hungarian threat. When the war ended, Romania was on the winning side, yet the
Treaty of Paris did not recognize them as such: Transylvania was given back to Romania, declaring
the Vienna Accords null, but Romania did not reunite with Bukovina and Bessarabia. These territories
became Soviet. After the end of WWII, the Soviet Armies remained in Romania, where the
communist party won the first elections after the war. In 1947, King Michael was forced to abdicate;
after that Romania was declared a People’s Republic.135
§2.1.4 The reclamation
Hungary’s stance toward the war was ambiguous: on the one hand, Hungarian president Pál
Count Teleki made a vain effort to maintain Hungary’s position of neutrality; on the other hand, he
wanted to fulfill the revisionist ambition that had kept Hungary busy since Trianon.136 Despite his
efforts, Hungary was slowly but steadily drawn into the Axis: in November 1940, Hungary signed the
131
G.L. Weinberg (ed.), A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge 1994) 184.
C. Hartmann, Der Deutsche Krieg im Osten, 1941-1945 (München 2011) 30.
133
K. Hitchins, The Oxford Modern History of Europe: Rumania, 1866-1947 (Oxford 1994) 452.
134
I.C. Butnaru, The Silent Holocaust: Romania and Its Jews (Westport 1992) xvi
135
J.P. Niessen, ‘Romania’ R. Fucht (ed.), Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture
(Santa Barbara 2005) 735-790, 759.
136
Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 200.
132
28
Tripartate Pact with Germany, Italy and Japan, ending the country’s neutrality.137 In 1940, Hungary
and Yugoslavia signed a treaty of eternal friendship. They promised not to attack one another, but
when Hitler launched an attack on Yugoslavia in 1941 and had to go through Hungary to do so,
Hungary had two evils to choose from: they could either be occupied by Germany, or they could
assist Germany. Teleki committed suicide. With Hungary joining the Axis powers, it received many of
the territories the country had lost in 1920: once again, Hungary was a multiethnic state.
In June 1941, Hungary joined the Germans in Operation Barbarossa. Hardly a few days after
the surprise attack, the Soviet Union recuperated. In the months that followed, the Hungarian
economy focused fully on the production of aircrafts, tanks, bullets and other materials of war; in
order to make up for imbalances in the state budget, the state printed money. The Hungarian people
suffered under war, but the Jewish population faced ghettoization and execution. Following the
Vienna Awards, the government passed several anti-Semitic laws. Hungary send Jews to labor camps
and even those they did not were unable to practice the faith. But their faith in Hungary, until 1944,
was relatively good compared to the Jews in Slovakia, Romania and Croatia. Hungary was able to
remain relatively autonomous while being an Axis power.138 This changed in the winter of 1942-43.
When first minister Miklós Kállay established contact with the Western Allies, Hungary would switch
sides if the Allied powers would assist them in overthrowing the Nazis. When Hungary tried to
capitulate, Germany invaded.
The German occupation initiated a new phase of Hungary’s history. Although Horthy was
officially still the regent of Hungary, government officials were right-wing puppets of Nazi
Germany.139 The Arrow-Cross party, the Hungarian fascist party, intensified the Holocaust in Hungary.
In November 1944, it became obvious that the war was unwinnable for the Germans. The Red Army
advanced on Budapest. While almost no blood was shed in Hungary during WWI, WWII proved a
taxing affair: more than 50% of the nation’s income and 40% of its wealth had been destroyed
between 1939 and 1945. After Germany surrendered, Hungary had to accept the borders as
stipulated by Trianon once again. Not every Hungarian perceived the Soviet liberation as such; still,
between 1945 and 1949 Hungary fell under the sphere of the Soviet Union. It took the Hungarian
communist party some cunning to gain its lead. During the 1948 election, the Communist party was
unable to get the majority of votes. Communists infiltrated the Social Democratic Party and were
137
Ibidem, 201.
ibidem, 208.
139
Ibidem, 211.
138
29
able to add it to the Communist party; by becoming the biggest party, the communist were able to
pass a new constitution in 1949, making Hungary, de facto, a Soviet State.140
§2.2 Post World War II
§2.2.1 Czechoslovakia and the Soviet sphere
After the war ended, the exiled Czechoslovakia government returned from London to resume
its role. Edvard Beneš, Czechoslovak president, issued a decree during his exile regarding the future
of Czechoslovakia: he stated there would be no place for the Germans and Magyars when the war
was over; Beneš gave way to a period of forced deportation.141 Beneš believed that the war proved
multi-ethnic states were doomed for failure. The only acceptable future of Czechoslovakia thus lay in
a country solely inhabited by Czechs and Slovaks.142 One of the reasons for Beneš issuing such a
decree had to do with the question of guilt: although Czechs and Slovaks had fought alongside the
German army, and the country had assisted the Nazis in their pogrom against the Jews, the Germans
and Hungarians were held accountable for the atrocities of the war. The Germans living in
Czechoslovakia, both in and outside of Sudetenland, were being punished for the offences
committed by the Germans in WWII.143 In 1942 the Allies had already approved Beneš’ plan to expel
the Germans, yet he could not find any Allied support to also expel the Magyars.144 The Germans
weren’t exchanged for Slovaks living in Germany, they were simply removed. In the end, roughly 2.5
million Germans were deported from the country. Roughly two-thirds of them ended up in the
Western zones of occupation; the other third went to the Soviet zone.145
In order to rid the state of Magyars, Beneš’ government was able to make all Czechoslovak
political organs agree on an exchange of citizens: Magyars would be traded for Slovaks living in
Hungary.146 Beneš was unable to deport the Magyars, but he was able to relocate the minority from
the south to Bohemia and to Sudetenland. The areas saw a decrease in labor force after the
140
Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 269.
F. Tapon, The Hidden Europe: What Eastern Europeans Can Teach Us (Dehli 2012) 198.
142
D. Kusá, ‘Historical Trauma in Ethnic Identity: the Years of Homelessness of the Hungarian Minority in PostWar Slovakia’, in: E. Breuning, J. Lewis and G. Pritchard (ed.) Power And the People: A Social History of Central
European Politics, 1945-56 (Manchester 2005) 130-152, 137.
143
U. Merten, Forgotten Voices: The Expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe after World War II (New
Brunswick 2012) 4.
144
Kusá, ‘Historical Trauma in Ethnic Identity’, 137.
145
E. Hahn, H. Henning Hahn, ‘Between ‘heimat’ and ‘expulsion’: the Construction of the Sudeten German
‘Volksgruppe’ in post-war Germany’ in: E. Breuning, J. Lewis and G. Pritchard (ed.) Power and the People: A
Social History of Central European Politics, 1945-56 (Manchester 2005) 79-85, 82.
146
K. Kaplan, The Short March: The Communist Take-over of Power in Czechoslovakia 1945-1948 (London 1987)
28.
141
30
deportation of the Germans.147 Since the Treaty of Paris had declared ethnic problems to be an
internal affair, the state was unhindered in the forced repopulation of Bohemia and Sudetenland. In
1946 and ’47 several hundred thousand Magyars were deported to Hungary, while only a few Slovaks
returned to Czechoslovakia. Those Germans and Magyars lost all their civil rights and even their
Czechoslovak citizenship.148 The deportation of Magyars from one area in the state to another has
been labeled as an internal colonization by Czech historian Karel Kaplan. In spreading out the
Magyars over the state, the minority was destroyed as a compact and coherent territorial group.149
The policy of de-Magyarization was complemented by a policy of Slovakization.150 Since
Magyars were deprived of their rights immediately following WWII, Magyars could not organize
political opposition. Although the process of assimilation was portrayed as voluntary, for the Magyars
of Czechoslovakia it was mandatory; however, by renouncing the Magyar identity, people could
regain citizenship and civil rights.151 The Magyars remained second class citizens until Beneš left the
Czechoslovakian political scene in 1948, when the communists committed a coup d’état. After their
regime was installed, the Beneš decree was revoked, granting the remaining Germans and Magyars
in the state Czechoslovakian citizenship.152 After a few years, Magyars were allowed something that
was forbidden in the Beneš era, to openly use their own language and receive education in their
mother tongue. Two bodies represented the needs of the Magyars in Czechoslovakia, the Cultural
Organization of Hungarian Workers in Czechoslovakia (Csemadok) and the Hungarian daily Új Szó. 153
Csemadok organized evenings of dance, music, theatre and other cultural activities. Csemadok
focused on the Magyar’s cultural identity, rather than their political identities, hoping this would
satisfy the needs of the Magyar for cultural expression, yet keep them from moving into the political
sphere.154 Csemadok was organized on Czechoslovak state level; the state facilitated something
similar for the Slovak national culture. Language was seen as an expression of difference, and while
Czech, Slovak and Hungarian were all used in education, the curriculum was the same. Media were
147
Kusá, ‘Historical Trauma in Ethnic Identity’, 140.
E. Bakker, ‘The Economic Situation of Slovakia’s Minorities’ in: S. Trifunovska (ed.), Minorities in Europe:
Croatia, Estonia and Slovakia (The Hague 1999) 189-210, 199.
149
Kaplan, The Short March, 29.
150
A.J. Rieber, Forced Migration in Central and Eastern Europe, 1939-1950 (2000
151
Kusá, ‘Historical Trauma in Ethnic Identity’, 143.
152
No Author ‘Human Rights for Minorities in Central Europe: Ethnic Cleansing in Post World War II
Czechoslovakia: The Presidential Decrees of Edvard Beneš, 1945-1948’ Migration Citizenship Education
(http://migrationeducation.de/15.1.html?&rid=14&cHash=944ca081bb) on 29-05-2013.
153
T. Puskás, “We Belong to Them”: Narratives of Belonging, Homeland and Nationhood in Territorial and NonTerritorial Minority Settings (Brussels 2009) 20.
154
B.A. Schwegler, Confronting the Devil: Europe, Nationalism, and Municipal Governance in Slovakia (Chicago
2008) 43.
148
31
compelled to give a common portrayal, regardless of language. The preferred historical myth was
codified.155
During the Prague Spring of 1968, Csemadok tried to further expand its influence by making a
public entrance.156 They called for the redefining position of the country’s different nationalities,
territorial reorganization, and the amending of the existing constitution, in order to promote
minority rights.157 Csemadoks initiatives were met with mixed enthusiasm: while the Slovak Union of
Writings joined the initiative, recognizing it would also be advantageous for the Slovaks, others
rejected it. When the Prague Spring came to an end, Csemadok was punished for its liberal stance: it
was kicked out of the National Front, and its leadership was purged. The Spring ended with the
invasion of Czechoslovakia in august that year. Autumn came: political life stagnated, and Magyars
were only able to express their ethnic identity through culture and education; political expression
was forbidden until the Revolution. The taboo of ethnic identity remained until revolution.158 The
cases of Csemadok and the non-violent Spring underline the presumed Czechoslovak adherence to
path dependency.
§2.2.2 Socialist Romania
Romania’s spoils from WWII were little, if existent. After the Treaty of Paris, it was decided
that Transylvania would remain under Romanian authority, while Bessarabia was given to the Soviet
Union. Although the Magyars of Romania represented roughly 7% of the total population, its
concentration in Transylvania made their presence conspicuous and necessary to deal with. The
Communist takeover in Romania proved to be beneficial for the Hungarian minority: right after the
coup, Hungarian secondary schools were created, and the Bolyai University in Cluj was reopened.159
In 1952 the Romanian government established Magyar Autonomous Province (MAP) in Szeklerland;
cultural activities were promoted and the Hungarian language was allowed to be used both in private
as well as in public.160 Although seemingly innocent, the MAP was criticized for housing only one
third of the total Magyar population, and being very small and very far away from the Hungarian
border.161 In creating the MAP, Romania claimed that the ethnic question had been solved, trying to
155
Schwegler, Confronting the Devil, 44.
J. Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations and Parties (New
York 1994) 343.
157
G. Gôlan, Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubček Era, 1968-1969 (Cambridge 1973) 95.
158
Puskás, “We Belong to Them”, 21.
159
P.C. MacMahon, Taming Ethnic Hatred: Ethnic Cooperation and Transnational Networks (Syracuse 2007)
104.
160
R. Brubaker e.a. (ed.), Nationalist politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town (Oxford 2006) 82.
161
D. Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989 (London 1995) 109.
156
32
fend off any meddling from outside.162 The Province was autonomous in name only. This period was
characterized by Stalinism, nationalization, expropriation and liquidation for both the Romanians and
the Magyars.163
A turning point in Romanian policy was found, at least toward the Magyars, in the Hungarian
Revolution of 1956. The Communist Party feared that the nationalist sentiments of the Revolution
would cross the border and make a conflagration of the Magyar minority. It was not worth risking.
Fear of territorial claims, the spread of the revolution, and the break of the relative isolation in which
the Magyars in Transylvania lived, occupied the Romanian political elite.164 In response to the
revolution in Hungary, poor Romanians protested for a more popular economy. Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, cut short a working visit to
Yugoslavia to tame the crowd.165 The communist party supported a Soviet intervention in Hungary,
fearing that the Magyars in Romania might be inspired to revolt when Hungary left the Warsaw pact,
which would lead to anti-communist revolts in Romania, after which Hungary could lay claims on
Transylvania again.
The period of Romanization slowly but gradually started: in 1959 the Hungarian language
Bolyai University of Cluj was forced to merge with the Romanian Babeș University.166 All technical
educations in minority languages were abolished. In 1960, the MAP was enlarged when small parts of
the Braşov and Cluj region: this enlargement of the region actually decreased the total population of
Magyars living in it from 77 to 62%.167 When Nicolae Ceauşescu came to power in 1965, the days of
the autonomous province were almost over. The repressive regime of the new leader of Romania
targeted Magyars. The MAP was dissolved in 1968, making Romania a nation-state.168 The Hungarian
language was forbidden, and Magyars were forced to assimilate. Under Ceauşescu, privileges
bestowed on the Magyars were diminished and the political representation of Magyars was
hindered. The process of Romanization was advanced by the exodus of the Magyar intelligentsia
from Transylvania, who were coerced to take on jobs in non-Magyar areas.169 While Transylvania
experienced a brain-drain, Ceauşescu also promoted the relocation of Moldovan and Wallachian
162
MacMahon, Taming Ethnic Hatred, 104.
Brubaker, Nationalist Politics, 82.
164
Ibidem, 83.
165
Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate, 110
166
S.P. Ramet, Whose Democracy? Nationalism, Religion and the Doctrine of Collective Rights in Post-1989
Eastern Europe (Lanham 1997) 69.
167
MacMahon, Taming Ethnic Hatred, 105.
168
R.F. Staar, Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe (Stanford 1984) 206.
169
Bugajski, Ethnic Politics, 201.
163
33
Romanians to Transylvania. The relocated Romanians often carried out the anti-Magyar measures
imposed by the General Secretary.
Ethnicity was not the only difference between the Magyars and the Romanians; while the
large majority of Romanians was of the Orthodox faith; many Magyars were either Protestant or
Catholic. During communist rule, religion was a matter bearing little weight. To Ceausescu, even
ethnicity did not matter, because he believed all ethnic groups shared a common future: the
communist Romanian future.170 The Romanization worked to certain extent; the Magyar population
in Transylvania had dropped a few percent as a result of forced migration. The Magyars lay dormant
for a little over a decade. In the early 1980s ethnic revivalism stirred in Transylvania. Illegal
underground press emerged and several Magyars defected. Minority identity was on the agenda
once again, when many of the Transylvanian Saxons left Romania for West-Germany and Austria.171
The Magyars kept their eyes on the Hungarian homeland. To them, Romanian citizenship meant little
or perhaps nothing. Ceauşescu feared the reemergence of Magyar nationalism; in 1985 he expanded
the program of Romanization, closing the Hungarian language television station. Romanization
became a heavy burden to bear for the entire population, due to its costs and effects on society.
The General Secretary created the re-housing and redevelopment plans, or systematization, to
destroy villages and make way for cities focused on factory labor and production. The execution
started in March 1988 and targeted several small Magyar villages in Szeklerland.172 Similar plans
wiped out many historically rich villages everywhere in Romania, making way for concrete buildings,
and grey factories. Magyars, the Hungarian State and Human Rights watch feared that the plans
targeted Magyar and Saxon villages the most, as an “[...] assault on culture and history […]” and “[…]
yet another incursion on the unique history and life-ways of Transylvania’s German and Magyar
populations.”173 Yet as Anita Inders Sing, professor at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution in
New Delhi, states, the systematization ‘[…] lead to the destruction of Magyar and Romanian enclaves
in Transylvania, but Magyar minorities construed systematization as an attack on their identity and
culture.”174 Thus, in the creation of the Transylvanian or Romanian Magyar, Magyars claim the
monopoly on suffering.
The Romanian communist regime permitted the practice of religion in churches, as long as
the scale was small. Churches became a hotbed of anti-Communist ideas when Magyar pastor Istvan
170
Kurti, The Remote Borderland, 40.
Ibidem, 39.
172
Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate, 135.
173
D. Kideckel, Help Romanian Cities: David Kideckel solicits our support in the cause of Romanian cities (New
Britain 1986), 1.
174
Singh, Democracy, Ethnic Diversity, and Security in Post-Communist Europe (Westport 2001) 108.
171
34
Tökes wrote a letter to the Western world. He complained about the lack of freedom in the country.
His son László was equally upset with the situation. Dismissed as a pastor, he dedicated his life to
promoting the Magyar cause to the outside world. In 1986, he was appointed pastor of Timişoara,
where he spread his message of solidarity among the Magyars and the Romanians. In 1989, Tökes
appeared on National Hungarian Television, expressing his outrage at the government’s systematic
plan to eradicate the Magyars from Transylvania. Through Hungary, Magyars were able to view the
broadcast. With his words came the dawn of the Revolution.175
175
Ibidem, 147.
35
Chapter 3. The same end?
This chapter analyzes Czechoslovakia, Slovakia and Romania of the past 25 years. Divided in
two parts, the first part further elaborates on the Velvet Revolution that occurred in 1989 in
Czechoslovakia. The non-violent uprising paved the way to the creation of the new federal
Czechoslovak state. The new state did not last long. After the Velvet Divorce, the Czech Republic and
the Slovak Republic emerged, the Magyars living in the latter. Their position in Slovakia post-Velvet
Divorce, and their political representations, are also discussed. Secondly, the Romanian case is
explicated, beginning with the outbreak of the Romanian Revolution. The upheaval originated in
west- Romania, and brought about the fall of the communist regime. The creation of the Republic of
Romania is discussed, focusing on the minority issues that came with state building. Finally, the
political representation of the Magyars in Romania is illustrated, focusing on the position of UDMR
and the current Romanian policy.
§3.1 Czechoslovakia
§3.1.1 The elopement
In Czechoslovakia’s premarital agreement, Czechs and Slovaks had agreed on a semi-federal
but highly centralized state structure. Dominated by Czech politicians, the federal government was in
charge. 176 The Slovak National Council relegated affairs in the Slovak Republic. Slovaks represented a
national minority, just as the Germans and Magyars. At an increasing pace, Czechoslovakia’s national
minorities felt left out of the political elite.177 Following its creation, the Czechoslovak political system
sparked nationalism among its ethnic minorities; Slovaks desired an egalitarian federal structure. 178
The discussion on the foundations of the state brought about discussions of its national identity.
With little or no notion of a shared Czechoslovak identity, the country was divided into several small
ones. The division of wealth deepened the rift between the federal partners: distributed according
to the population, Czechs received twice as much as the Slovaks, while Slovaks were poorer.179
Czechoslovakia experienced both political liberty and suppression. In 1968, First Secretary
Alexander Dubček opened the state, allowing all to be critical of the communist party and its leaders.
176
P. Kopekcý, ‘From “Velvet Revolution” to “Velvet Split”: Consociational Institutions and the Disintegration of
Czechoslovakia’ in: M. Kraus, A. Stanger (ed.) Irreconcilable Differences?: Explaining Czechoslovakia's
Dissolution (Oxford 2000) 69-87, 73.
177
S. Brown, ‘Prelude to a Divorce? The Prague Spring as a Dress Rehearsal for Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Divorce’
Europe Asia Studies 10 (2008) 1783-1804, 1784.
178
N. Nedelsky, Defining the Sovereign Community: The Czech and Slovak Republics (Philadelphia 2009) 157.
179
R.A. Young, The Breakup of Czechoslovakia (Kingston 1994) 47.
36
Although the First Secretary was a Slovak, the Spring that followed was a mostly Czech affair.
180
Moscow kept a close eye on Czechoslovakia. 181 The Politburo reluctantly agreed on an intervention,
although fearing an outcome similar to that of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, which resulted in
war. 182 The invasion put an end to the policy of ‘communism with a human face’, crushing the hopes
of many dissidents that the country would ever change. 183
Life in Czechoslovakia changed after 1968. Dissidents had been acquiesced, and open
demonstrations rarely occurred.
184
One of Dubček’s changes in policy survived the invasion: he
changed the constitution, revising Czechoslovakia’s federal structure, making it more egalitarian. 185
Nationalism reemerged, predominantly in the Slovak Republic. In the Slovak Socialist Republic (SSR)
nationalism was antithetical to both Czech nationalism and Magyar nationalism. The Magyars,
compromising 10.76% of the SSR’s total population, feared that the possible split of Czechoslovakia
would ignite discrimination in an independent Slovakia. Magyars were depicted as the Other, a
threat to Slovakia’s national interest and territorial integrity.186
Although the policy of Normalization, aimed at restoring Czechoslovakia to its pre-Spring
situation, was initiated from 1969, the spirit of the Spring remained. On January 1st, 1977, a human
rights organization called Charter 77, was born. Signed by over 240 Czech and Slovak human rights
activists, the Charter listed the state’s wrongdoings in past and present times. Signatories demanded
a dialogue on the improvement of human rights.187 Inspired by the Helsinki Final Act, signed in 1975,
the signatories identified themselves as gatekeepers of human rights, rather than a political
organization.188 Their focus was both domestic and international, their approach both overt and
covert, their goals clearly defined. Many members of Charter 77 were persecuted by the state,
although they behaved non-violently. Fearing a repression similar to that of the Prague Spring, and
hoping their character would make the operation more credible, the Charter focused on civic
180
D. Brook, Modern Revolution: Social Change and Cultural Continuity in Czechoslovakia and China (Lanham
2005) 95.
181
R. Service, The Penguin History of Modern Russia (London 1997) 386.
182
Service, Modern Russia, 387.
183
V.M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Charlotte 2007)
209.
184
J.P.D. Dunbabin The Cold War (Harlow 1994) 568.
185
Kopekcý, ‘From “Velvet Revolution” to “Velvet Split”’, 73.
186
Singh, Democracy, Ethnic Diversity, and Security in Post-Communist Europe, 106.
187
D.C. Thomas, ‘Political Change in Eastern Europe’ in: T. Risse, S.C. Ropp and K. Sikkink (ed.) The Power of
Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge 1999)205-233, 223.
188
O. Tüma, ‘Czechoslovakia’ in: D. Pollack, J. Vielgohs (ed.) Dissent And Opposition In Communist Eastern
Europe: Origins Of Civil Society Democratic Transition (Aldershot 2004) 29-50, 38.
37
imitative, correspondence with Western nations, and collaboration between states.189 Charter 77
was mostly active in the Czech Socialist Republic (CSR), finding less support in the SSR.
In 1988, the Slovaks organized a non-violent demonstration in Bratislava. The Candle
Demonstration took place on the 25th of March, and it advocated religious freedom and tolerance.190
While religion was banned, underground religious movements prevailed despite heavy suppression.
As the protesters were mostly Catholic, they sang hymns. The Czechoslovak police brought the
demonstration to a halt using water cannons, street sweepers and many police vans. Padraic Kenny
acknowledges that the demonstration brought together the divided Slovak people: communists,
Catholics and other citizens angered the police response, called upon the right to freedom of
assembly.191 Before, Slovaks were always silent partners, yet in 1988, their voices were heard across
the republic.
§3.1.2 Marriage counseling
The Prague Spring and Charter 77 were Czech affairs, focusing on human rights and civic
participation. The Candle Demonstration in Slovakia was organized to draw attention to the religious
suppression of the country. All three were non-violent. In this character, Daniel Brook sees a pathdependency when it comes to the Czechoslovak history: the independence, the communist takeover, the Spring and the constitutional reform of 1968, Charter 77, all show the same features.192 The
communists seized power in 1948 after the so-called Third Defenestration of Praue, during which
Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk was believed to be pushed out of a window; in this respect, the takeover was not fully velvet.193 Disregarding any historical narrative, the marriage of the Czech and
Slovak Republics was about to be put to the test.
The year 1989 was coming to an end, and so was the reign of the Communist Party in
Czechoslovakia. On November 17th, the International Students Day in Prague was celebrated with a
peaceful demonstration in favor of reconstructing the pre-communist state. The police violently
brought the demonstration to an end; a new demonstration followed the next day. The
demonstrations were led by Václav Havel, one of the signatories of Charter 77 who had already
gained notoriety for his support of the Prague Spring during the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the
189
J.S. Isaac, ‘The Meanings of 1989’ in: V. Tismăneanu (ed.) The Revolutions of 1989 (New York 1999) 121-160,
132.
190
Czechoslovak Helsinki Committee, Human Rights in Czechoslovakia (Prague 1989) 6.
191
P. Kenney, A Carnival of Revolutions Central Europe 1989 (Princeton 2002) 216.
192
Brook, Modern Revolution, 35.
193
A. Hyde-Price, International Politics of Eastern Europe (Manchester 1996) 40.
38
Warsaw Pact states.194 Havel became the face of the Revolution. Two days after the demonstrations
started, the Civic Forum was called into life by Havel and the other demonstrators. On the 20th of
November, a similar organization was created in the Slovak republic, called Public Against
Violence.195 News of a possible death urged more people to join in.196 Despite being velvet, the
revolution was not completely without violence; on a few occasions, protestors and police clashed.197
The fact that little violence was used, did not change the character of the revolution: the aims, the
means and the outcome were achieved through non-violent resistance. Patrick van Inwegen
observes that velvet revolutions are not the binary opposite of violent revolutions, they are
intrinsically different.198 The Velvet Revolution was again, mostly a Czech affair.
Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec initially stated that there would be no discussion about the
political system of Czechoslovakia.199 Despite that, communism was quickly losing the support it still
retained. The demonstrations and strikes brought Czechoslovakia to a standstill, and the communist
party leaders resigned shortly after. President Gustáv Husák resigned on December 9th; Civic Forum
and Public Against Violence nominated Václav Havel as their candidate for the presidency.200 On the
29th of December, he was elected president by the Federal Assembly. Havel was charged with the
challenging task to re define the Czechoslovak marriage. The end of the revolution had called into
question the grounds on which the spouses were united. On March 1st, the SSR was branded the
Slovak Republic.201 The name of the republic was changed on the 29th, from the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic to Czechoslovak Federal Republic. Yet 22 days later, the state became known as
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.202 The name change initiated heated discussions on the
constitutional arrangement of the state.203
§3.1.3 A smooth divorce
The Czechs and Slovaks married when the Habsburg Empire collapsed. Deeply rooted in the
principle of self-determination, the victors of WWII supported their claim for independence. Their
194
J.K. Glenn, ‘Competing Challengers and Contested Outcomes to State Breakdown: The Velvet Revolution in
Czechoslovakia’ Social Forces 78 (1999) 187-212, 192.
195
Glenn, ‘Competing Challengers and Contested Outcomes to State Breakdown’ 192.
196
Ibidem, 193.
197
P. van Inwegen, ‘Velvet Revolution: An Actor-Based Model’ Peace and Change 31 (2006) 175-203, 178.
198
Patrick van Inwegen also describes the Romanian Revolution of 1989 as a Velvet Revolution, in the second
subchapter I will try to refute this statement, focusing on the violence used both by the state and the
revolutionaries. Van Inwegens statements are viewed as just, while his examples might be called into question.
199
Glenn, ‘Competing Challengers and Contested Outcomes to State Breakdown’, 194.
200
J. Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study in Civil-Military Relations (Ofxord
2004) 5.
201
J. Bartl, Slovak History: Chronology & Lexicon (Bratislava 2002) 169.
202
Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics, 5.
203
Bartl, Slovak History, 169.
39
marriage lasted almost 75 years, for richer and poorer, for better and worse. But in 1993, it came to
an end. The Velvet Divorce took place on January 1st. Irreconcilable differences had caused the split.
This section investigates this no-fault divorce, focusing on nationalism, economy and statehood.
Nationalism operated on several levels in the new Czechoslovakia. The top layer represented
nationalism on the federal level; both Czechs and Slovaks experienced a resurgence of nationalism
and optimism after 1989.204 Czech nationalism had a long history. Slovak nationalism was less clearly
formulated. Their union heightened tensions between the two national identities. Nadya Nedelsky
states that the fact Czechs represented the political, demographic and socioeconomic senior partner
in the union meant they were less concerned with the concept of nationalism and nationhood than
the Slovaks were.205 The lack of expressed nationalism was the glue that held the union together,
according to Paal Sigurd Hilde. Without Slovak nationalism, the difference in political preferences and
economic drift would not have tilted the state into a divorce.206 The question of identity had long
been an issue in Czechoslovakia: the feeling of Czechoslovakness was imposed by the Czech political
elite in an attempt to promote cultural homogeneity: many Slovaks felt they were a part of the
Czechoslovak state, but not of the common identity. The Czechoslovak state was perceived as an
expression of Czech dominance. Many believed the union was called Czechoslovakia -not CzechoSlovakia or Slovakoczech, without the hyphen- because it underlined Czech dominance.
207
This
hyphen war, the discussion on the name, was at the base of Slovak national sentiment.208 Slovak
nationalism was both secessionist and revisionist, but it did not lead to the divorce. Although no
agreement was reached, it was at least agreed that the state should exist.
The economy might have been ground for the divorce. The Czech (Socialist) Republic was
more viable than its Slovak counterpart. In the 1930s and during the communist era, many arms
factories were built in the Slovak Republic to bolster its economy.209 Despite the heavy
industrialization, Slovakia was still poorer than the Czech Republic. In 1980s the Slovak arms industry
was far from modern, efficient, or profitable, making the Slovak Republic depend on financial support
from the Czechs. After the Velvet Revolution and the subsequent fall of communism, the difference
between the two economies was seen as a reason to end the marriage; the Czech economy was hit
by the transition to a market-economy, but not as heavily as was the Slovak economy. While Czechs
204
P.S. Hilde, ‘Slovak Nationalism and the Break-up of Czechoslovakia’ Europe Asia Studies 4 (1999) 647-665,
647.
205
Nedelsky, Defining the Sovereign Community, 21.
206
Hilde, ‘Slovak Nationalism and the Break-up of Czechoslovakia’, 648.
207
Brown, ‘Prelude to a Divorce?’, 1797.
208
B.R. Chouplek, Young Czechs' Perceptions of the Velvet Divorce and the Modern Czech Identity (Ann Arbor
2007) 65.
209
R.C. Frucht (ed.) Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture () 320.
40
demanded less money be spent on the Slovak industry, Slovaks demanded even greater financial
aid.210 This drove a wedge between the two federal partners. Many Czechs believed that the 2:1
division of assets was already beneficial for the Slovak Republic and disadvantageous for the Czech
Republic; the economies were moving at different paces. Consequently, many believed a divorce
would allow the Czech economy to boom and bloom, while allowing the Slovak economy to catch its
breath and gradually improve.211
The structure of the state might also have caused the split. The union showed both partners
to be very different from one another. In need of different approaches, Slovaks increasingly felt
suppressed: Czechs ruled in Prague; Czech national symbols were used to represent the state, and
Czechs received two thirds of the annual budget.212 Czechoslovakia was an asymmetrical state, both
in the division of assets, and in the federal make-up. The structure was linked to ethnicity. In the
federal state, Slovaks represented the biggest national minority. The Slovak Republic, however,
housed several ethnic minorities such as the Magyars and the Roma.213 National minorities in the
Czech Republic represented a bigger percentage of the total population than in the Slovak Republic.
In the Czech Republic, 95% inhabitants listed Czech as their mother tongue, but in the Slovak
Republic, the percentage of native Slovak speakers was comparatively low.214 Many Slovak advocates
only applied federalism to what suited them: federalism and symmetrical representation were only
for the two ‘state-forming’ nations, the Czech and Slovak Republics. Magyars were not a part of this
equation.215 Czechs of course, were less enthusiastic about this plan. This interpretation would give
Slovaks an oversized importance in the union, while numerically inferior.
Scott Brown states that the break-up occurred due to a different interpretation of
democratization, I deduce that the eventual split had long been foreseen. Former Czech Prime
Minister Petr Pithart said there had been an illusion of harmony in Czechoslovakia, making the union
210
J. Minahan, Miniature Empires: A Historical Dictionary of the Newly Independent States (Westport 1998)
244.
211
J. Svejnar, ‘Explaining Czechoslovakia’s Dissolution: Assessing Economic Preformances before and after the
Breakup’ in: M. Kraus, A. Stanger (ed.) Irreconcilable Differences?: Explaining Czechoslovakia's Dissolution
(Oxford 2000) 183-198, 195.
212
Brown, ‘Prelude to a Divorce?’, 1787.
213
Censuses show that the percentage of Slovak as a mother tongue is declining: in 2001 83,9% listed Slovak as
their mother tongue, in 2011 78,6% listed Slovak as their mother tongue. Although in previous censuses
mother tongue was not investigated, it is assumed that the percentage is similar to that of 2001, since the
Slovak total population has been very stable since 1950. From: Demographic data from population and housing
censuses in Slovakia, Time Series 1848-2001 at http://sodb.infostat.sk/scitanie/eng-text/1848-2001/tab.III.22B_en.htm
214
J. Nekvapil, J.V. Neustupný, ‘Linguistic Communities in the Czech Republic’ in: C. Bratt Paulston, D. Peckman
(ed.) Linguistic Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, 116-134, 121.
215
Brown, ‘Prelude to a Divorce?’, 1787.
41
a workable arrangement.216 This arrangement was controlled from above: within the Warsaw Pact, it
was impossible to change the structure of the state, as the Prague Spring had shown. Rather, the
Warsaw pact had held it together, creating a notion of togetherness, quelling requests for a change
in structure. The Velvet Revolution was the solvent. The notion of togetherness made the revolution
and the velvet. The lack of glue made it happen none the less.
§3.1.4 Alimony and minority support
The new Slovak Republic was a nation-state, with Slovak as the national language. In an
attempt to create a new state -Slovakia had never been an independent entity before- any form of
nationalism other than Slovak nationalism was discouraged. National rhetoric was aimed against the
Magyars, depicting them as dangerous fur the survival of the new state.217 To counteract the lack of
Slovak national identity, a new identity was shaped against the Magyar Other, according to Anita
Inder Singh. Pluralism could not be tolerated during the settling of the new state. As Nadia Kaneva
describes, nationalism was the tool to acquire modernization by imitation: many successful modern
states were nation-states exalting nationalism to a certain extent. By imitating these states, newly
emerging ones tried to catch up.218
Slovakia became a parliamentary republic with a multi-party system. The legislative branch is
based on proportional representation, with a 5% electoral threshold for political parties. The Slovak
constitution mentions that minorities are entitled to use their mother tongue in official
communications; in 1995 a law was adopted stating Slovak is the national language and thus should
be used in public and official life.219 It also mentions that minority rights are only guaranteed when
they do not threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Slovakia.220 In areas were a minority
represents 10% or more of the total population, it is allowed to use the minority language. The
constitution refers to the Slovak nation, which could imply non-Slovaks are not owners of the state,
while their Slovak counterparts are. Many Magyars have accused the state of trying to limit their
political influence by territorial reforms. Although serving as more than 8% of the total population of
Slovakia, and live in a very concentrated area, Magyars not represent a majority in any of the eight
self-governed regions or the 79 districts. These administrative units were stretched in a north-south
216
G. Campbell, ‘Scottish independence: Lessons from the Czech/Slovak split’ BBC News, 20/01/2013.
Singh, Democracy, Ethnic Diversity and Security in Post-Communist Europe, 106.
218
N. Kaneva (ed.), Branding Post-Communist Nations: Marketizing National Identities in the New Europe
(Oxford 2012) 8.
219
E. Harris, ‘Moving Politics Beyond the State: The Hungarian Minority in Slovakia’ Perspectives 28 (2007) 4362, 50.
220
Constitution of the Slovak Nation, Chapter Two: Basic Rights and Freedoms, Articles 33 and 34. English
translation on http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/europe/SK/Constitution_slovakia.pdf on 30/06/2013.
217
42
division, while the Magyar area stretches in an east-west division.221 In joining the European Union,
Slovakia had to distribute minority rights to the Magyars. Slovakia also joined the Council of Europe,
and consequently signed and ratified European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The
charter states that national minorities are to be protected by the state by encouraging and
facilitating the use of minority languages, and by education of and in those languages.222
The Magyars of Slovakia, represent 8,5% of the total population, and are concentrated along
the Slovak-Hungarian border. During the Czechoslovak union, there were many political parties
representing the Hungarian minority. The largest Magyar party during the last years of
Czechoslovakia was Együttélés, which means coexistence in Hungarian. When the Velvet Divorce
drew near, Együttélés called for a federal structure in which Magyars could live in an autonomous
republic within the Slovakia.223 To meet the electoral threshold, Együttélés merged with the two
smaller Magyar parties, creating the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK-MKP). SMK-MKP was a
part of the government in 1998, which enabled them to remove some of the laws that restricted
national minorities. While it describes itself as a liberal party, it mostly fights for (Hungarian) minority
rights and focuses less on liberal policies.
Erika Harris notes that many Magyars felt dissatisfied with SMK-MKP, considering themselves
obligated to vote for the party. It was the only body representing the minority. Many Magyars stated
that it was too busy defining nationalistic rhetoric rather than trying to tackle real issues.224 In 2009, a
new party emerged, created by SMK-MKP’s former president Béla Bugár. Most–Híd accused SMKMKP of being too nationalistic, and racist towards Roma.225 Also, they accused the party of
destabilizing the state instead of working towards a better Slovakia.226 Most-Híd is an interethnic
party, focusing on the cooperation between ethnic Hungarians and Ethnic Slovaks.227 While SMKMKP sometimes touched upon territorial autonomy, the interethnic party renounces any claims of
autonomy or irredentism. Rather it looks forward to further cooperation, reconciliation and
cohabitation of the two major ethnic groups in Slovakia.228 While Most-Híd has thirteen seats on the
221
D. Bochsler, E. Szöcsik, ‘The Forbidden Fruit of Federalism in Central-Eastern Europe: Evidence from
Romania and Slovakia’, West European Politics 2 (2013) 17.
222
Council of Europe, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Strasbourg 1992)
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/148.htm on 30/06/2013.
223
Singh, Democracy, Ethnic Diversity, and Security in Post-Communist Europe, 106.
224
Harris, ‘Moving Politics Beyond the State’, 51.
225
Most is the Slovak word for bridge, híd is Hungarian word for it.
226
Z. Jozwiek, ‘Top European: Béla Bugár’ Europe & Me Magazine 10 (2010).
227
‘Neue Partei der "Ungarischen Koalition"’ Der Standard, 30/06/2009.
228
S. Stroschein, Ethnic Struggle, Coexistence, and Democratization in Eastern Europe (Cambridge 2012) 223;
z.a. ‘Lessons of the Slovak elections’ Budapost 19/03/2013 on http://budapost.eu/2012/03/lessons-of-theslovak-elections/.
43
Slovak National Council, SMK-MKP has 2 seats in the European Parliament. Neither of the political
parties has ties with other Hungarian minority parties in the EP.
The economy of Slovakia was hit hard by the Velvet Divorce. While the Slovak economy was
previously run from Prague, after the Divorce, Bratislava was held responsible.229 Before the breakup,
it was expected the Czech economy would boom and eventually catch up with Western economies.
The Slovak economy would have time to recuperate from the split, redefine its structure, and
gradually grow. Exactly the opposite happened. When Bratislava became responsible for its own
affairs, the Slovak economy boomed following a grave economic depression after the split, making
Slovakia the ‘Central European Tiger’ or the ‘Tarta Tiger’. The Czech Republic experienced difficulties
catching up.230 Especially the heavy arms industry enabled Slovakia to climb out of the recession.
Although the Czech Republic has a higher GDP, Slovakia’s is the fastest growing in the EU. The split
made both the Czech Republic and Slovakia economically stable countries. The wealth of Slovakia is
mainly focused around Bratislava, while the territory inhabited by Hungarian minorities has lower per
capita purchasing power.231 The southern, overwhelmingly Hungarian regions also have a high
unemployment rate of 13 to 20%.232
§3.1.5 Myth and reality
After the Ausgleich of 1867, Hungarians reaffirmed its position as the dominant ethnic group
in the kingdom. Slovak nationalism, reemerging after the Velvet Divorce, was aimed against the
Slovak Magyars, who were seen as dispossessed former masters, as the Other.233 This idea embodies
that, although they have the right to be there, they are seen as former tyrants. The Slovak-Hungarian
relationship is thus founded on two pillars, one being the interstate relationship, the other being the
interethnic relationship.234 These relationships operate on two different levels, and are completely
detached from each other. The political, interstate relations between Slovakia and Hungary are
classified as warm: both cooperate within the European Union. The interethnic relationship,
however, threatens the political bond. It constituted by two issues. The first issue relates to the
treatment of ethnic Magyars in Slovakia, the second relates to claims made by the Hungarian
229
Brown, ‘Prelude to a Divorce?’, 1788.
Campbell, ‘Scottish independence: Lessons from the Czech/Slovak split’; H.M. Smith-Cannoy, Insincere
Commitments: Human Rights Treaties, Abusive States, and Citizen Activism (Washington DC 2012) 99.
231
M. Votruba, ‘Regional Wealth: Q: What is the regional distribution of income in Slovakia?’ Slovak Studies
Programme, University of Pittsburg (Pittsburg zj) on
http://www.pitt.edu/~votruba/qsonhist/regionalwealthslovakia.html on 30/06/2013.
232
Harris, ‘Moving Politics Beyond the State’, 51.
233
J. Connely, ‘Hungary, Slovakia and Romania: International Relations Examined Through Minority Language
Education’ Organon 41 (2009) 51-58, 54.
234
I. Kollai, ‘Shattered Past. Socio-Psychological Aspects of Slovak-Hungarian Relations’ 27-43, 28.
230
44
Republic. Polls show that 68% of Slovak Magyars claim that Slovakia is their homeland, while noting
that their ethnicity is Hungarian. It seems that the myth of being is felt less in Slovakia, and Slovak
Magyars are able to differentiate between where they belong, and to whom they belong.235
In 1995, the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Hungary and the
Slovak Republic was signed.236 Both signatories pledged to respect the existing borders and state
sovereignty, and uphold and implement minority rights. In the following years however, Slovakia
adopted several laws that restricted the use of the Hungarian language. Mariusz Bocian describes the
relationship between the two states as radicalizing: the economic crisis paved the way for radical
political parties, both in Slovakia and in Hungary. As Slovaks increasingly cling to anti-Hungarian,
nationalist Slovak parties, Hungarians increasingly adhere to Jobbík, Hungary’s far-right, and
irredentist political party.237 Hungary’s irredentist claims are solely based in citizenship. UpperHungary houses almost 500,000 ethnic Hungarians, around 8,5% of the total population. As the first
democratically elected Prime Minister of Hungary, József Antall declared he would, in spirit,
represent the interests of all 15 million Hungarians.238 In 1990, when the Prime Minister expressed
this desire, Hungary did not have 15 million inhabitants; clearly, he was referring to the Magyars
abroad. The claim on citizenship was further underlined when Hungary extended citizenship to
Magyars abroad. Slovakia feared this would create a Hungarian enclave, rather than just a Magyar
enclave in Slovakia.239 Those Magyars acquiring Hungarian citizenship in Slovakia have to report it, or
face a fine of over $4000. The minority issue in Slovakia has pushed Slovak-Hungarian relations to a
stalemate.
§3.2 Romania
§3.2.1 Velvet and violent
The Romanian Revolution erupted far away from the capital, Bucharest. Magyar pastor László
Tőkés, already known by the Romanian authorities as a troublemaker, lit the fire of protest. Religious
leaders were forced into teaching the doctrine of Ceauşescuism: a nationalistic doctrine based both
235
Z.a. ‘Most ethnic Hungarians happy to stay in Slovakia, survey shows’ Politics.hu 20/06/2011 on
http://www.politics.hu/20110620/most-ethnic-hungarians-happy-to-stay-in-slovakia-survey-shows/
12/09/2013.
236
‘Slovakia Profile: A chronology of key events’ BBC News 2/05/2012.
237
M. Bocian, ‘Cold war between Slovakia and Hungary’ CE Weekly 8 (2009).
238
E. Becket Weaver, National Narcissism: The Intersection of the Nationalist Cult and Gender in Hungary (Bern
2006) 98.
239
‘Pandora's passport: Hungary extends citizenship beyond its borders; Slovakia retaliates. Nasty.’ The
Economist 3/06/2010.
45
on Romanian life and Marxism.240 Before being appointed in Timișoara, Tőkés already preached
minority rights in Transylvania. When Tőkés moved to Timișoara in 1986, his preaching started to
include anti-Romanian rhetoric as well. Relatively far away from the Magyar heartland in
Transylvania, the Romanian authorities agreed the pastor could not be able to bring the Magyars to
protest; instead of arresting the pastor for breaking the law, he was allowed to preach his ‘sermons
of liberation’ and focus on interethnic cooperation.241 In 1988, this attitude changed, when a
parishioner from another deanery sent an open letter of accusation to the authorities. Although
Tőkés did not write or sign it, the Securitate, the Romanian secret police, suspected the pastor from
Timișoara. Unrest grew, and the authorities decided to evict Tőkés early 1989. Tőkés fought this
eviction, and was able to stay in his parish another six months.
During the Sunday service before his eviction, he invited his parishioners to come and watch
the event as it would take place next Friday. Fearing this would lead to a demonstration, the
authorities demanded Tőkés to rescind the invitation. On Friday December 15th, 30 to 40 elderly
parishioners showed up and blocked the path to the pastor’s house. Because of its close proximity to
a metro stop and a square, many passers-by witnessed the protest of their cities retirees, and
decided to join.242 The Securitate was called to the scene, but it was too little too late: the secret
service had not been monitoring the pastor’s activities, and when the authorities finally decided to
send the secret police, they were heavily outnumbered by the ever growing group of protestors. Only
after the army was called in, and after the use of guns, tanks and other weapons, the protest was
ended. It is believed that around 100 people lost their lives.243 The riot started as a protest organized
by the Magyar community, but escalated into a city-wide protest by people from different ethnic
backgrounds. When Tőkés tried to calm the crowd, it was noticeable that the riot was no longer
about his eviction; it was about changing the regime.244 Tőkés was arrested on the 17th. The same day
the first victims of the riot died, the revolution started.
Meanwhile in Bucharest, Nicolae Ceauşescu did not see the importance of the riots in
Timișoara, in fact, he left for a visit to Iran on the 18th. Since the revolution in Timișoara started as a
Magyar protest, Ceauşescu believed the riot was orchestrated by the Hungarian government in
Budapest. Relations between Hungary and Romania had been tested throughout the communist
240
T. Gilberg, ‘Religion and Nationalism in Romania’ in: P. Ramet (ed.), Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and
East European Politics (Durham 1989) 349.
241
P. Siani-Davis, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (Ithaka 2005) 56; Kürti, The Remote Borderland,
126.
242
Siani-Davis, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, 58.
243
A.Selwyn-Holmes ‘Timisoara Massacre’ Iconic Photos 30/08/2010 at
http://iconicphotos.wordpress.com/2010/08/30/timisoara-massacre/.
244
Siani-Davis, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, 61.
46
regime, with Hungary demanding its counterpart to take better care of the Magyars. In the case of
the protests in Timișoara, he could not have been more wrong: what started as a Magyar protest,
ended as a city-wide riot.
The General Secretary returned from his trip on the 20th, when the revolution had already
spread to several other cities in Romania such as Arad, Iasi, Brasov and Bucharest. Many Securitate
officers were in the crowd of protestors, wearing civilian’s clothes. They opened fire on the
unsuspecting crowd. The revolution turned bloody again, just as in Timișoara a few days before. A
day later, Ceauşescu tried to calm the crowd with a speech; his audience was less than favorable and
booed him off the stage. He offered to raise the wages of his country’s workers; he offered to raise
the scholarships of the students; nobody took him up on his offer. Instead, the General Secretary fled
the capital.245 Ceauşescu and his wife were captured in Târgovişte, a hundred kilometers north of
Bucharest. Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu were sentenced to death by the Military tribunal on the 25th
of December, and were executed right after the verdict. Footage of trial and execution was spread
around the country. Ion Iliescu and other ex-communists formed the National Salvation Front (FSN);
after the death of the two faces of communism, Ion Iliescu was declared interim president or
Romania, promising elections in 1990.246
§3.2.2 Revolution or restoration?
Defining the nature of the Romanian Revolution is challenging: it was neither velvet, nor
extremely violent. Although it started as a non-violent protest for human rights, it escalated to a
state of violence. The end of the regime was sealed with violence: the execution of Nicolae and Elena
Ceauşescu marked the end of communism in Romania. After Ion Iliescu formed the FSN and a
provisional government, he invited a few dissidents to join his organization. He did include many
former communists, who only now were critical of the deceased General Secretary.247 Many scholars
however believe that Romania did not witness a revolution, but a coup d’état. As David Berry writes
in his book on the influence of media on the revolution, it certainly looked like a fundamental
change.248 Berry states that the formation of the FSN was a significant moment in Romanian history,
as it decided on the future and the formation of a new, democratic Romania. On Christmas day,
1989, a few days after the violent demonstrations, another political organization was founded. Tőkés
and other Magyar dissidents created the UDMR, which advocates the use of Hungarian in both the
public and education character, and the federalization and decentralization of Romania. The party
245
V. Sebestyen, Revolution 1989: The Fall Of The Soviet Empire (London 2009)
K. Crawford, East Central European Politics Today: From Chaos to Stability? (Manchester 1996) 69.
247
Crawford, East Central European Politics Today, 70.
248
D. Berry, The Romanian Mass Media and Cultural Development () 23.
246
47
positioned itself as a valuable alternative to FSN.249 FSN declared it would protect individual and
collective rights for minority groups in Romania, stating that the new Romania would not repeat the
mistakes of the former regime when it came to the treatment of the state’s minorities.250
The termination of the communist regime did not settle the unrest in Romania. During the
1990 elections, students protested against the FSN for stealing the revolution away from them.
Iliescu ignored their protests. To many Romanians, Iliescu increasingly resembled his predecessor.
After the 1990 demonstrations, he hired miners from outside of the capital to end the protests
violently and through threats. In this, Iliescu copied Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu, who had routinely
used terror and intimidation to acquiesce the Romanian people.251 FSN won the 1990 elections,
amidst widespread accusations of electoral fraud. The Magyar party, making it past the 5% electoral
threshold, received twelve seats, becoming a major opposition party during the first democratic
government.252 Article 4.2 of the Romanian constitution guaranteed nine other ethnic minorities
each one seat, while eighteen national minorities were recognized by the government.
FSN guaranteed individual and collective rights for Romania’s ethnic minorities. When FSN
was in parliament and the Romanian constitution was drafted, no mention was made of collective
rights, only individuals rights were mentioned in the draft.253 Article six of the Romanian constitution
guarantees the rights of ethnic minorities, and the preservation of their heritage, culture, language
and customs.254 Article 13, however, states Romanian is the only official language of the state. The
post-communist thaw in Romania thus reignited old primordial conflicts, as is explained in the
introduction. Codified by law, ethnicity became a zero-sum game once more. Romania’s constitution
is similar to the Slovak constitution, acknowledging the existence and rights of national minorities,
and pledging to protect these rights, but also underlining that the state is a nation-state, maybe more
in an idealistic sense than in reality. Later amendments to the constitution guaranteed individual
minority rights only, such as the right to using the minority language in the public sector in areas
249
M. Shafir, ‘The Political Party as a National Holding Company: The Hungarian Democratic Federation of
Romania’ in: J.P. Stein (ed.), The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe: StateBuilding, Democracy and Ethnic Mobilization (Armonk 2000) 101-128, 101.
250
Shafir, ‘The Political Party as a National Holding Company’, 103.
251
Crawford, East Central European Politics, 70.
252
C. Flores Juberías, ‘Post-Communist Electoral Systems and National Minorities: A Dilemma in Five Paradigms’
in: J.P. Stein (ed.), The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe: State-Building,
Democracy and Ethnic Mobilization (Armonk 2000) 31-64, 44.
253
Singh, Democracy, Ethnic Diversity, and Security in Post-Communist Europe, 108.
254
Constitution of Romania, General Principles, Right to Identity, article 6. English translation on
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=371 on 30/06/2013.
48
where the minority represents more than 20% of the total population.255 In these areas, street signs
are also bilingual.
§3.2.3 Internal struggles
In Romanian politics, UDMR holds a special position: after 23 years of service, the party has
been in six of the sixteen cabinets that have existed, thus being present there for over thirteen
years.256 This makes UDMR one of the most successful political parties of Romania. Although never
winning any election, because of its small size, the Magyar party is often invited to complete a
coalition. UDMR focuses on Magyar minority issues, rather than a political ideology. As an umbrella
for all ideologies of the political spectrum, UDMR easily adepts to the coalitions inviting it to join.
UDMR fulfills the role of kingmaker, and positions itself as such during elections.257 Both blessed and
cursed by this, UDMR has been able to influence the Romanian government for the better part of its
democratic existence, but, owing to its smallness, UDMR has not been able to achieve many of its
initial goals. UDMR voters criticize the party for being caught up in the political power play of
Bucharest, being too occupied with staying in power and appeasing its coalition partners, when it
ought to be working toward achieving minority rights. Hungarian House Speaker Laszlo Kover
expressed his fear that the rift between the leaders and the voters of UDMR is deepening, stating
that leaders create “… quite a strong hegemony, a dictatorship over their own communities.”258 The
last elections were, he said, a last warning.
The majority of Magyars vote for UDMR, but many feel trapped in this vote because there is
no alternative. Some politicians with an ethnic Hungarian background joined majority parties, hoping
to achieve minority rights through interethnic cooperation. In the 2012 elections, UDMR received
5.25% of the total votes.259 Given the fact that 6.5% of the total population is Magyar, one can
naturally conclude that the vast majority of Magyars vote for UDMR. In the 2012 election, another
Magyar party, called the Hungarian Peoples Party in Transylvania (PPMT), also tried to reach the
electoral threshold, but only got around 0.8% of the votes. In Transylvania, several smaller Magyar
255
S. Constantin, Linguistic policy and national minorities in Romania (zp 2004) 9.
Romania’s cabinets tend to fall quickly, it is often portrayed that UDMR has been in the government
between 1996 and 2008, yet between 2000 and 2004, UDMR was one of the opposition parties.
257
‘Hungarian alliance ruthlessly hunting votes’ Eurotopics 14/03/2012.
258
Z.a. ‘Köver says rift widening between ethnic Hungarian leaders, voters in Romania’ Politics.hu 03/01/2012
on: http://www.politics.hu/20130103/kover-says-rift-widening-between-ethnic-hungarian-leaders-voters-inromania/ 12/09/2013.
259
J. Tucker, ‘Post-Election Report 2012 Romanian Parliamentary Elections: How Much of a “Mandate” Does it
Really Represent?’ The Monkey Cage (2012).
256
49
parties came to life; none of these were active in national politics. 260 UDMR was the first party to
represent the Magyars, yet already after a few years, the first criticism from inside created new
parties. The four younger parties accuse UDMR of not fully working on behalf of the minority; after
being in the cabinet for over thirteen years, only small victories have been achieved on behalf of the
minority. Most times, the UDMR has little to say in the coalitions, being the smaller partner. Of these
five parties, only two participated in the last elections, and while UDMR met the threshold, PPMT got
less than 1% of all votes.
The division within the Magyar community underlines the problems the community has
when it comes to politics: it is too big to be ignored, but too small to make a difference. In an essay,
the Center for Human Rights proposed an alternative to UDMR’s approach. Instead of exclusively
focusing on minority rights, the writers suggest to promote inclusive human rights. Politically, the
Magyars are on the brink of extinction.261 Minority rights focus on the preservation of culture and
traditions, protecting minorities from cultural homogenization. According to the authors, in
protecting minorities, states and political bodies should be committed to humanism, cooperation,
mutual understanding, and democracy. For the Magyars, cultural survival could be achieved by
cooperating with other ethnic minorities in Romania. The second biggest ethnic group of Romania,
the Roma, represent 3.3% of the total population. It is suggested this number is actually higher,
because many Roma conceal their ethnic identity in fear of persecution.262 Still, minority parties have
not expressed the desire to cooperate with each other.
Romania is divided in 41 districts, Bucharest being a separate district as capital. In seven
districts of Transylvania, Magyars represent more than one fifth of the total population, which
entitles them to minority rights as stipulated in the Romanian constitution.263 When entering the
European Union, the EU demanded Romania work toward the administrative rearrangement of the
Romanian districts. According to the EU, Romania should create eight rather than 42 administrative
districts, advocating for transparency, the diminishing of bureaucracy, and lowering the state’s
bureaucrat budget. Current president Traian Băsescu is an advocate of the administrative
rearrangement, believing it will decentralize the heavily centralized state, hoping it will allow for
better absorption of European funds. Many Magyars, their NGO’s and political parties, however, fear
the new districts will not be constructed around historical borders, but will be created based on
260
The five parties are: UDMR, Hungarian Civic Party (PCM), Szekler National Council (CNS), Hungarian National
Council of Transylvania (CNMT) and Hungarians Peoples Party in Transylvania (PPMT).
261
G. Andreescu, V. Stan and R. Weber, Study on the Conception of Democratic Alliance of Hungarians In
Romania on the Rights of National Minorities (Bucharest 1994) 38.
262
Central Population and Housing Census Commission, Provisional Results of the 2011 Romanian Census, 5.
263
Provisional Results of the 2011 Romanian Census, 5.
50
ethnicity. In the Magyar heartland of Szeklerland, which currently lies in the districts of Harghita and
Covaşna, Magyars represent an absolute majority of 84,8% and 73,6% respectively.264 While UDMR
advocates for the autonomy of first Szeklerland and then Transylvania, Magyars fear that the new
division of the districts will tear apart these regions, so that Magyars will not even make the 20%
threshold.265
Financially, Transylvania plays an oversized role in the Romanian economy. While the south
of Slovakia is one of the poorest parts of Slovakia, Transylvania is the richest part of Romania. On
average, Transylvania generates about 35% of Romania’s Gross National Product, making
Transylvania the richest historical region. The GNP per capita in Transylvania is as much as 10%
higher than the Romanian average.266 The region is prosperous because of its resources of precious
metals, natural gas, and timber. Due to easier access, several big companies such as Continental AG
are located in Transylvania. Thanks to its rich history and what is still visible of it, Transylvania alone
hosts around 40% of all Romanian tourists, both national and international. If Transylvania were ever
to become autonomous or even independent, Romania’s economy would be severely struck.
§3.2.4 External difficulties
Hungary’s nationalistic and irredentist rhetoric has gravely affected the relations between
the two states. Both states agreed on respecting state sovereignty with relation to minority issues.
Hungary houses a small population of Romanians close to its borders. Magyars in Romania, however,
live further away from the border in Transylvania. Although a cordon sanitaire between the minority
and Hungary was created during the Romanization, Magyars feel connected to their ancestor’s
homeland. Prime Minister József Antall’s declaration of representing all Magyars, has influenced the
relationship between both states.267 In response to Antall’s statement on representing, in spirit, all
ethnic Hungarians, Magyars in Romania, in spirit, adhere to Hungary’s political leaders. This
statement was reaffirmed in 2013 by Zsolt Németh, Hungarian Minister of Foreigh Affairs, when he
stated that Hungary has a constitutional responsibility to care for all ethnic Hungarians.268
264
Ibidem.
UDMR advocates for the autonomy of all of Transylvania, yet due to tactical reasons, the autonomy of
Szeklerland is seen as the first step in achieving this goal, since Szeklerland is predominantly Magyar, and the
entire Transylvanian area is predominantly Romanian.
266
‘Software Offshoring in Transylvania’, Code Spring (2011) on http://www.codespring.ro/news/softwareoffshoring-in-transylvania 25/07/2013.
267
L. Varadarajan, The Domestic Abroad:Diasporas in International Relations (Oxford 2012) 22.
268
Z.a., ‘State secretary responds to Romanian President’s comments on ethnic minorities’ Politics.hu
14/08/2013 on http://www.politics.hu/20130814/state-secretary-responds-to-romanian-presidentscomments-on-ethnic-minorities/ 12/09/2013.
265
51
In the summer of 2012, Romanians were to vote on the impeachment of president Băsescu.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán hinted at what the Magyar electorate of Romania had to do,
that is to do “nothing at all”. 269 Orbán and Băsescu are partners on a European level. The majority of
voters, 87%, desired to see the president removed, yet the turnout failed to meet the required 50%,
since 46% of eligible voters showed up. Although the majority of Romanians also did not show up,
possibly believing it wouldn’t change Romanian politics, many blamed the Magyars for Băsescu
surviving the vote. Indeed, in the traditional Magyar communities, only a few people voted, which
made many Romanians believe Magyars only adhered to Hungarian politicians. As is discussed in the
introduction, many Romanians believe the Magyars and Hungarians are to blame for what is wrong
in Romania.
Small incidents have tensioned the relationship between both states. Magyars organized the
reburial of József Nyírő -in Hungary venerated as a national poet, in Romania despised as an
irredentist and pro-Nazi writer and poet- in Odorheiu Secuiesc270 in Transylvania.271 The speaker of
the Hungarian Parliament, László Kövér, expressed his wish to attend the funeral. UDMR urged any
official from the Hungarian government not to do so, for this would worsen the relations between
the two states. The plans angered many Romanians, who still remembered the writer for his
involvement in the Arrow Cross Party. The reburial was cancelled, a commemoration was held
instead. The involvement of the Hungarian government in the planning of the reburial was heavily
critized by Romanian politicians, saying it “would violate Romania's dignity and its stability as a
European nation.”272 Hungary’s involvement was seen as shameful, not only for interfering in a
Romanian village, but also for venerating a writer associated with Nazism. Although UDMR officially
removed itself from the planned reburial, stating Nyírő was a Facist, the reburial created tension
between the several political parties, and between Romanians and Magyars.
Hungary’s involvement in minority issues in Romania has had a positive and a negative effect.
Firstly, Hungary is very active in promoting minority rights in Europe, advocating language and
education rights both in the EU and the Council of Europe. However, as Helsinki Watch observes, the
motivation to do so, and the outcomes, can be described as less than favorable. Due to nationalist
domestic pressure, Hungary has made controversial remarks regarding Romania’s treatment of the
269
‘Romanian PM claims “outrage” over Hungarian counterpart’s comments on impeachment referendum’
Politics.hu 30-07-2012.
270
Székelyudvarhely in Hungarian.
271
J. Kirchick, ‘Transylvanian Drama Over Fascist's Ashes: Why Does Hungary Want to Honor Arrow Cross
Leader?’ The Jewish Daily Forward 06-06-2012.
272
‘Nyiro re-burial postponed, commemoration held in Romania.’ European Intelligence Wire 27/05/2012 on
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-291120292/nyiro-re-burial-postponed.html.
52
Magyars.273 Secondly, Hungary’s involvement can have negative effects on the Magyar people and
the ethnic parties, as the case of the reburial has shown. In 2012 Hungary adopted a new
constitution, making it possible for Hungarians abroad to become Hungarian citizens, and
consequently be allowed to vote in Hungary and receive Hungarian state benefits.274 Many Magyars
became Hungarian citizens. With dual citizenship come dual benefits; in Romania and Hungary alike,
the dual citizenship is seen as egotistical: for many Romanians, it is proof that Magyars prefer
Budapest over Bucharest. For many Hungarians, Magyars becoming Hungarian citizens are more
interested in the rights that come with the citizenship, than the obligations: they pay taxes in
Romania, but vote in Hungary.275
Demography and the birth myth play important roles. The 2011 census showed Magyars
make up 6.5% of the total Romanian population. It also shows the general Romanian population has
been declining for several years. The Magyar population is declining faster than the total
population.276 Romanization during the communist era effectively removed Magyars from the Banat
area, creating a cordon sanitaire at the Hungarian-Romanian border. The process of Romanization
however, did not eradicate the Magyar community in Transylvania. The forced migration and
assimilation of Magyars in Romania, and the consequent Romanization of Transylvania, reheated the
discussion of historical claim making. In their nationalist rhetoric, both states list Transylvania as their
cradle. Hungary’s claim to Transylvania is not solely based on citizenship, as is the case in Slovakia.
The region of Transylvania itself plays an important role as well. Hungarians canonized Transylvania
as the region where their ethnicity remains purest, where Magyars first landed after the century-long
migration from the Ural. For Romanians, Transylvania plays an equally important role, basing their
claim on Anonymus’ writing on a certain Vlach (see chapter 1). The Romanian birth myth is based on
the idea that, after the Roman Empire had withdrawn its influence over Dacia, the remaining Romans
mixed with the Vlachs.277 Both states also claim history is on their side: Hungary points to the several
hundred years it ruled Transylvania, Romania bases its claim on the Treaty of Trianon, and the postWWII restoration. In their claims, Hungary and Romania are alike, listing demography, history and
the myth of origins as their main reasons for the right to own the Carpathian plains.
273
Human Rights Watch, Struggling for Ethnic Identity. Ethnic Hungarians in Post-Ceausescu Romania (New
York 1993) 112.
274
M. Gniazdowski, A. Sadecki, ‘Constitution for a new Hungary – the domestic and regional implications’
Center for Eastern Studies (2011).
275
B. Kiss, J. Furjesz, ‘The Hungarian dual citizenship’ Duel Amical 20/12/2011 on
http://www.duelamical.eu/en/content/the-hungarian-dual-citizenship.
276
ibidem, 5
277
Frucht (ed.), Eastern Europe, 744.
53
Conclusion
In the previous chapters I have shown how the histories of Slovakia and Romania have several
similarities, and several differences. In this section, I will explain what made the message of the
Hungarian minority parties of Slovakia so different from the message of the Hungarian minority
parties of Romania.
1. Prehistory and history
Slovakia and Romania share a common history. Both states used to be a part of the Hungarian
Kingdom, which lasted from roughly the year 1000 until 1920. Yet when looking at history more
closely, as I have done in the first chapter, several differences can be noted. While Slovakia, as a part
of Upper-Hungary, remained a part of the kingdom from its conquest until the Treaty of Trianon,
Romania has had quite a different history of rule. After the Ottoman occupation of Hungary, the
now Romanian territory was partly ruled directly by the Turks, partly through a Hungarian vassal.
When the Ottoman rule ended after 150 years of occupation, Transylvania became an autonomous
province within the kingdom. Only when Hungary was incorporated into the Habsburg Empire,
Transylvania was re-introduced to Hungary. Although these events happened more than a hundred
years ago, one might wonder whether it explains the difference in demands of the political parties;
some Magyars in Transylvania would like to see an autonomous Magyar or Székler region, while
more irredentist Magyars would even like to split from Romania and join a newly created federal
Hungary. The key stone of the Magyar demands in Romania is autonomy, while the Magyar parties in
Slovakia are working for cultural cooperation.
The history of the Second World War shows how Hungary was focused on irredentism and the
reconstruction of the pre-Trianon Hungarian state. Both Romania and Slovakia were brought into the
war because of Hungarian irredentism, making the minorities in those states less favored. After WWII
ended, all three states aligned with the Soviet Union: Hungary became a communist state after the
Soviets took over the Social Democratic Party. In Romania, the communist party won the elections
and forced the king to abdicate. Czechoslovakia became a communist state after a putsch in 1948.
Again, Czechoslovakia and Romania show interesting similarities: the Magyar minorities in both
states lived in rather concentrated areas, yet the communist leaders of those times tried to spread
the Magyars over the entire state, weakening their collective political power. Policies of Slovakization
and Romanization were imposed to further weaken the Magyar population. Magyars had little or no
rights in the communist states, since Magyars were seen as a herrenvolk, the bourgeoisie of the
previous era. Magyars could discard their former identity by renouncing their Magyar identity and
assume a Slovak one. The same principle applied for Romanization: Hungarian language education
54
was banned, the Transylvanian brain-drain reduced the centralization of the ethnic community and
the use of the Hungarian language and traditions was forbidden.
During Communism, Romania was able to steer away from the Soviet dominance without any
difficulty, while when Czechoslovakia tried to free itself from Soviet rule, it was invaded by the
Warsaw Pact states and the Soviet Union. During the Prague Spring, the wants and desires of the
Magyars were carefully voiced: Magyars feared federalization would threaten their existence in
Slovakia. Magyars in Romania experienced a period of autonomy; one can wonder whether or not
this was real autonomy, be it that the region was still heavily controlled by the Romanian
government. In Romania, the Hungarian minority voiced its demands through religion: while most
Romanians were Romanian Orthodox, many Hungarians were either Catholic or Protestant. This
religious struggle dates back to the times of the Reformation, as is shown in the first chapter. In
Slovakia, both the minority and the majority were Catholic, thus religion played less of a role. The
prehistory of Slovakia and Romania shows several differences and similarities. The importance of this
prehistory is small, yet worth mentioning, for it exemplifies path dependency: Magyars in Romania
and Slovakia, despite adhering to the same ethnic group, do not share the same history fully. These
disparities pave the way to a difference in political thought and being in the 21st century.
2. Nationalism
History teaches us that nationalism is a powerful sentiment. The Hungarian myth of origin
acknowledges Transylvania as the cradle of life. No sources were found suggesting Upper-Hungary
represents a similar role in the Hungarian birth myth. This calls into question the notion of nationality
and the sense of belonging. While Transylvania has not always been a part of the Hungarian
kingdom, Magyars in Transylvania feel that their region is in fact the embodiment of the Magyar
spirit. Slovakia on the other hand, has belonged to Hungary since its occupation until Trianon ended
the 1000 year rule. In both regions, Magyars never represented an absolute majority, in fact: when
Trianon transferred Transylvania to Romania, Magyars represented a slight minority. To the outsider,
this might seem odd, yet when looking at the Hungarian notion of nationalism, when the Hétmagyar
presumably crossed the Carpathians and claimed Transylvania as theirs; it became the most
important region of the future kingdom. Hungarian nationalism heavily focuses on history, thus
attributing more importance to the mythical cradle of the kingdom. This might explain why Magyars
in Transylvania might feel more strongly connected to Hungary; they’re living in the cradle of state to
which they no longer belong. The case of Kosovo is similar: Serbs represent a small minority in the
region, still it is seen as the cradle of Serb life, dating back to the Battle of Kosovo in 1389.
Throughout history, Transylvania preferred autonomy within the kingdom. This exhibits path
55
dependency: current Magyar politics in Romania emphasize the desire to become an autonomous
province.
3. Revolution
The Velvet Revolution and the Romanian Revolution were anything but similar. The Velvet Revolution
was characterized by a peaceful demonstration following police brutality. In this, it seems that
Czechoslovakia depicts signs of path dependency: major episodes in its history have all been violent.
The Romanian Revolution was – despite many scholars calling it velvet- anything but peaceful; over a
thousand people lost their lives during and after the events. Geography also plays a role: while the
Velvet Revolution ignited in the capital of Prague and found some kindred spirits in Slovakia, it was
mostly a Czech affair. In Romania, the revolution started in Timișoara, and gradually spread to other
cities and eventually the capital. The Velvet Revolution brought about the peaceful dissolution of the
communist state, through a dialogue between dissidents and government officials. A new state was
born. The revolution in Romania came to an end when Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu were publicly
executed after a fake trial. The state that arose from the ashes of the ashes truly resembled its
predecessor, many scholars wonder whether what happened at the close of 1989 was a revolution of
a coup d’état.
While Romania could pick up where it had left its affairs before the regime change, Slovakia had to
deal with a revolution and a divorce. In 1993, Slovakia became a sovereign state for the first time in
history. Slovakia had to build itself up from scratch: many parts of the Czechoslovak constitution
emphasized Slovakness. Minority rights, it seemed, were dangerous for the new state’s struggle for
survival. The Romanian national identity had already existed before the revolutions. Romania simply
went back to its pre-revolution state, where the Hungarian minority was fighting for more rights.
Many scholars have called into question whether the Romanian revolution was a revolution, or a
coup d’état. The necessity of constructing a new state may also have contributed to the demands of
the Magyars and their parties: while the Romanian rules were almost set, the Slovakian rules could
still be influenced. This could explain why Magyars in Slovakia are more in favor of cooperation
instead of secession. Interestingly, the fact that many Magyars in Romania ignited and contributed to
the revolution, did not give them a say in the establishment of the democratic Romanian republic.
The revolutions were different in outcomes for both states, yet for the Magyars the outcomes were
the same: they represented a minority in a state that preferred to refer to itself as a homogenous
nation state.
56
4. Representation
In both states, several parties desire to represent the Magyars politically. In Slovakia, SMK-MKP first
represented the Magyars in the Slovakian parliament, yet when Béla Bugár left the party and created
Most-Híd, SMK-MKP lost its influence. Bugár criticized the party for being too nationalistic, and even
downright hateful towards other national minorities such as the Roma. Most-Híd underlines the
multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual nature of Slovakia, with an appeal wider than the Magyar
electorate. In Slovakia, the first Magyar party was accused of being too nationalistic, being too
focused on the Magyar case and overlooking the fact that it has to operate within a Slovakian
framework. In Slovakia it seems, political parties are working towards reconciliation, burying the
past. Exactly the opposite happens in Romania, where it seems that the past is constantly stirred up.
UDMR is the first post-revolution Magyar party, and has been able to remain the biggest party, even
though several minor Magyar parties have tried to break the hegemony. UMDR has only been in the
opposition for a few years, making it the most successful political party of Romania. The smaller
Magyar parties in Romania criticize UDMR for being too caught up in the political play of Bucharest,
and forgetting to focus on regional autonomy. Officially the key stone of UDMR’s policy is autonomy,
yet in the sixteen years that the party had been in the government, this was never attained. The
smaller parties are more radical, calling for an autonomous Székler province. The Magyar electorate
in Romania is declining, and many fear that within the next few years they will be unable to maintain
the requisite 5% threshold. When this happens, Magyars are still entitled to a seat in the Chamber of
Deputies, yet this will decrease the minorities influence. The Magyars in Slovakia represent 8,5% of
the total population, and by being multiethnic, Most-Hid’s survival is more secure.
5. Territory and economy
Territory and economy partly explain the differences in the positions of Magyars in Slovakia and
Romania. While the south of Slovakia, where most Magyars live, is one of the less prosperous areas
of the state, Transylvania is the richest historical region of Romania. In Slovakia, the economy is
concentrated around Bratislava and some of the factories in the country. In Romania, Transylvania is
the most prosperous region thanks to its tourism, its natural resources such as wood, precious
metals and natural gas. Unemployment in Slovakia is the highest in the region inhabited by Magyars,
while unemployment in Romania is the lowest in Transylvania; losing Transylvania would be
devastating for the economy.
57
Reflection: Do all roads lead to Rome, or are these different cities?
What, then, explains the difference in rhetoric? Looking at Slovak and Romanian history, I can state
that similar events have taken place, yet the seed of autonomy might have been planted earlier in
Transylvanian soil. Yet prehistory is too far in the past to be of any conclusive significance;
teleologists might enjoy drawing lines, but I will discard this historical explanation. The Hungarian
birth myth plays a minor role in the matter, and will be discarded as well. Rather, I will look at the
history. During communist times, Magyars in both Slovakia and Romania have been repressed and
persecuted; Magyars felt they had been separated from their homeland after Trianon, and many
wanted the situation to go back to the way it was before WWI. The history of Czechoslovakia shows a
tendency for peaceful solutions: the Velvet Revolution and Divorce both were peaceful affairs, yet in
both, there is little or no Magyar influence noticeable. Slovakia was less tied in Czechoslovak politics,
and Magyars even less. The Magyar in Czechoslovakia did not walk the path of politics, as Csemadok
and other initiatives show: Magyars tried to achieve progress by cultural organizations. Additionally
the national Hungarian sentiment is a lot weaker in Slovakia than it is in Romania. The Romanian
Revolution was initiated by Magyars, however Magyars had little or no influence in the shaping of
the state they helped be free. The politics of Most-Híd have been praised throughout Europe, which
grants the party more support. Economy does play a role. Simply put: Romania can’t afford to lose
Transylvania. If the region became autonomous, the Romanian economy would suffer because of it.
The Magyar strip in Slovakia is economically less interesting. This explains why the Magyars in
Romania can be so reactionary and the Magyars in Slovakia feel the need to cooperate: the Magyars
in Romania possess a lot of the country’s wealth, while the Magyars in Slovakia need financial
support from Bratislava.
What it all comes down to is the struggle for survival, and how that survival is secured. Through
interethnic cooperation, the Slovak Magyar minority party hopes to establish a stable Slovakia of the
same character. Appealing to more minorities and people of different backgrounds, Most-Híd has a
relatively secure future. UDMR is anything but sure: the Magyar population in Romania is declining,
and many fear the 5% threshold will not be secured at the prospected 2016 elections. UDMR and the
other parties struggle for survival is solely focused on the Hungarian minority, and therefore its
tactics are more radical and irredentist. After being in parliament for sixteen years, autonomy wasn’t
achieved: if this was impossible through parliament, what else is there? The struggle for survival of
the political representation of the Magyars in Slovakia and Romania is an interesting one, which
shows that although all roads might lead to Rome, similar roads may also lead to places unknown.
58
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