Self-Regulation Strategies for Combatting Prejudice
Mason D. Burns
Laura Ruth M. Parker
Margo J. Monteith
Purdue University
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Abstract
Many individuals find themselves having unwanted evaluative or stereotypic biases toward
members of disadvantaged or stereotyped groups. Such biases are often subtle in nature and
driven by largely unconscious processes, but they result in wide-ranging discriminatory
outcomes. How can people effectively reduce their biases? In this chapter, we review various
self-regulatory strategies and their impact on prejudice reduction. As a starting point, we discuss
various types of motivations for self-regulating intergroup bias. Then, we review a number of
self-regulatory strategies, how they operate, and potential consequences. Specifically, we discuss
stereotype suppression and colorblindness as strategies aimed at avoiding stereotypical thoughts
and ignoring group-based membership, respectively. We discuss the Self-Regulation of Prejudice
Model, which entails motivational and learning processes aimed at deautomatizing biased
patterns of responding so that egalitarian responses may be generated instead. We also review
literature related to the use of implementation intentions to facilitate specific intergroup
responses that are unbiased. Although each of these self-regulatory strategies can be useful to
some extent, certain strategies have greater ability to produce sustained transformation of subtle
biases. Finally, we discuss research related to self-regulation, executive function and intergroup
contact, and also how interpersonal confrontations can encourage others to self-regulate.
WC: 198
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In September 2013, police shot and killed Jonathan Ferrell as they responded to a call
about a possible “breaking and entering” in a Charlotte, NC neighborhood (King & Stapleton,
2013). Jonathan had been in a serious car accident and sought help after escaping the car through
the back window. When he approached a nearby home, the homeowner called ‘911’ and reported
that Jonathan was trying to break in. When the police arrived, Jonathan ran toward them, likely
disoriented and seeking assistance for his injuries. As he approached, he was shot and killed by
an officer on the scene. Why were the homeowner and police officers so quick to assume that
Jonathan was dangerous? Would the evening have ended differently if Jonathan were not a
young, Black man? Perhaps. The evaluations and judgments of the officers and homeowner were
potentially swayed by the subtle but powerful influence of racial biases.
Despite the decline in overtly hostile and blatant forms of racial prejudice since the CivilRights movement in the United States, subtle forms of bias remain widespread with pervasive
consequences. Data from Project Implicit, an online demonstration website assessing people’s
implicit biases, shows that on average people visiting the website demonstrate significant antiBlack bias on a race implicit association task (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). People also
show implicit biases related to other racial groups, and based on gender, religion, and age (Axt,
Ebersole, & Nosek, 2014; Nosek et al., 2002). These widely held implicit biases can become
activated automatically, without a person’s awareness or intention, and can meaningfully
influence people’s evaluations and judgments. For example, as implicit racial bias increased,
White doctors were less likely to treat Black patients presenting with symptoms of a heart attack
with a potentially life-saving treatment to reduce blood clots (Green, Carney, Palling, Ngo,
Raymond, Iezzoni, & Banaji, 2007). In addition, once activated, these subtle biases can influence
the responses of people regardless of their levels of explicit, consciously endorsed prejudice.
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Even people who sincerely endorse egalitarian beliefs and believe themselves to be nonprejudiced may possess and be swayed by subtle biases (e.g., Devine, 1989).
If these biases are widely held and influence people’s thoughts, feelings and actions, how
can people combat them? People’s biases may conflict with social norms and/or one’s internal
standards. If people remain unaware that their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are inconsistent
with personal and societal standards, the bias will live on, unchallenged and unchecked.
Alternatively, people may become aware of the conflict between their biased response and
societal and personal egalitarian standards. In this case, awareness of the inconsistency may
prompt people to attempt to self-regulate their biased responses. In this way, self-regulation has
the potential to limit the influence of and ultimately reduce discriminatory outcomes.
Self-regulation involves goal setting and applying effort to achieve goals, often through
the exertion of self-control (Mischel, 1996). Whether the goal is to study more or eat less, in
order to achieve one’s goals, individuals must regulate related thoughts and behaviors. The
regulation of both implicit and explicit stereotyping and prejudice is no different. Like all forms
of self-regulation, the ability to regulate stereotyping and prejudice requires the detection of
discrepancies between one’s goals and actions, the initiation of behaviors to reach one’s goal,
assessing one’s progress toward the goal, and adjusting one’s behaviors accordingly (e.g., Carver
& Scheier, 1990). While different self-regulatory strategies may involve some unique processes,
all regulatory strategies highlight the importance of effort, ability, and motivation.
In this chapter, we first discuss the role of motivation in the self-regulation of bias. Then,
we turn to discussion of a variety of strategies for self-regulating outgroup bias and their
consequences. We review strategies that involve suppressing or blocking stereotypes from the
mind and the potential consequences of these strategies. We also discuss motivational and
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learning processes that facilitate vigilance against biases, inhibition of biases, and ultimately
replacement of biases with non-prejudiced responses. Self-regulation can also involve
establishing simple if-then statements that can be effective in reducing biased expressions.
Following discussion of these self-regulation strategies, we address the consequences of people’s
use of self-regulation during interracial interactions, including possible costs to regulators but
also advantages for the quality of interactions. Finally, we consider how interpersonal
confrontations of biases may spark the self-regulation of prejudice in others.
The literature concerning the self-regulation of bias, like the broader literature on
stereotyping and prejudice, is marked by an over-representation of research concerning Whites’
bias in relation to Blacks in the United States context. This is due to a variety of factors,
including the pervasiveness of this type of bias both historically and contemporarily in the
United States. Readers will find that empirical research summarized in this chapter likewise
frequently focuses on the regulation of anti-Black bias, although certainly not exclusively.
Perhaps more important, we wish to highlight that the theories and strategies relevant to selfregulation that we discuss should apply to intergroup biases broadly as long as the conditions for
regulation (e.g., sufficient motivation) have been met.
Motivation to Self-Regulate
Regardless of the specific self-regulation strategy, the ability to successfully regulate
one’s bias depends in large part on one’s motivation to do so. However, the motivation to control
prejudice is not a unitary construct that people either have or do not have. Instead, this
motivation can come from external and internal sources and vary according to their strength
(Plant & Devine, 1998). When motivation to regulate prejudice is primarily external, social
norms, fear of disapproval from others, or other pressures from external sources drive self-
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regulation. However, when motivation to regulate is primarily internal, personal egalitarian
beliefs and internal standards drive self-regulation. Low prejudice individuals are often highly
internally motivated to regulate prejudice because egalitarianism is personally important to them
(e.g., Devine, 1989). Some people are simultaneously motivated by both external and internal
sources.
Drawing from self-determination theory (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000), Legault and
colleagues conceptualized motivation to regulate bias on a continuum from non-self-determined
to self-determined (Legault, Green-Demers, Grant, & Chung, 2007). Taking a developmental
approach, this view of motivation posits that individuals start with no motivation to regulate or
respond without bias. This lack of motivation, labeled amotivation, will develop into external
regulation as individuals begin to feel external pressures to be egalitarian (e.g., social norms).
For people with external regulation, the motivation to reduce prejudiced behaviors stems from
self-presentational concerns in specific situations. Over time, individuals may begin to develop
affective reactions to self-regulatory failures. Anxiety, guilt, and fear motivate these people to
engage in introjected regulation. When individuals start to value egalitarianism as an important
societal norm, but before it becomes incorporated into their self-concept, they engage in what is
referred to as identified regulation. With the integration of egalitarian values into the selfconcept, people will engage in more self-determined prejudice regulatory efforts, or integrated
regulation. Finally, when regulating one’s bias is purely internally driven, inherently satisfying,
and a core component of one’s self-concept, people are deemed intrinsically motivated to
respond without bias.
Motivation to respond without prejudice affects when people will engage in selfregulation, and the effectiveness of their efforts. Because they are attuned primarily to external
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norms and social pressure, people with less self-determined, more external forms of motivation
are more likely to engage in self-regulation only in situations where external forces are relatively
strong and salient. On the other hand, people with more self-determined and internal forms of
motivation are likely to engage in self-regulation more consistently, and even in the absence of
external pressure, because they are driven by their personal, deeply held beliefs and standards to
avoid bias (e.g., Plant & Devine, 1998). Furthermore, people with more self-determined, internal
motivations to respond without prejudice may be more effective at regulating bias and its
negative consequences. Self-determined motivations to regulate prejudice help individuals to
buffer the negative impact of intergroup threat, whereas non-self-determined motivations
exacerbate the effects of intergroup threat (Legault & Green-Demers, 2012). In addition, when
motivation to respond without prejudice was experimentally manipulated, individuals who read
brochures emphasizing their personal autonomy in regulating prejudice reported greater selfdetermined motivations and lower levels of both implicit and explicit prejudice relative to
individuals who read a brochure emphasizing society’s expectations against prejudice (Legault et
al., 2007). Devine, Plant and Amodio (2002) likewise showed that self-reported motivations
vary with the ability to control implicit as well as explicit bias.
In sum, when people have sufficient motivation, they will engage in efforts to respond
without bias. Next, we examine a variety of strategies that people may use to regulate bias.
Strategies for Regulating Outgroup Bias
Stereotype Suppression
When faced with the prospect of having biased thoughts or engaging in biased actions,
people may attempt to avoid bias by suppressing any stereotypic thoughts that come to mind.
Unfortunately, stereotype suppression often backfires due to an ironic monitoring process in the
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mind (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Wegner, 1994). According to Wegner’s
(1994) model of mental control, efforts to actively avoid certain (e.g., prejudiced) thoughts
require active monitoring of ongoing thought processes in order to detect and then suppress the
unwanted content. This monitoring process subsequently primes individuals with the unwanted
thoughts, unfortunately increasing their accessibility. To illustrate, Macrae and colleagues (1994)
instructed participants to suppress stereotypic thoughts when writing about a day in the life of a
skinhead. On a subsequent writing task, participants who had initially suppressed stereotypic
thoughts provided more stereotypic comments about skinheads than participants who did not
initially suppress stereotypes (Study 1). Similar effects have been obtained with behavioral
measures of stereotyping (Study 2) and stereotype accessibility measures (Study 3). This ironic
stereotype rebound also emerges when people self-instigate suppression rather than being
explicitly instructed to suppress (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998).
Despite potential pitfalls, stereotype suppression can be effective if people possess
internal motivation or sufficient cognitive resources (Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998).
People who are internally motivated to avoid stereotyping and/or low in prejudice are less likely
to experience stereotype rebound, presumably because they have practice with suppression and
accessible nonbiased replacements (Monteith, Spicer, & Tooman, 1998). Stereotype rebound
may also be avoided among people who are less practiced at suppression if they possess
sufficient cognitive resources to continue monitoring their thoughts following suppression
(Gailliot, Plant, Butz, & Baumeister, 2007; Monteith, Spicer et al., 1998; Wyer, Sherman, &
Stroessner, 2000).
Colorblindness
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Whereas stereotype suppression involves the active avoidance of stereotypes,
colorblindness involves ignoring group-based differences (Goff, Jackson, Nichols, & DiLeone,
2013; Rattan & Ambady, 2013). For example, someone may claim “I don’t see color, I just see
people.” Colorblindness may appear to be an easy and straightforward way to avoid prejudice.
Unfortunately, colorblindness has limited benefits and many negative consequences. Correll,
Park, and Smith (2008) found that strategic colorblindness reduced explicit prejudice, but only
short-term. Following a 20-minute delay, adopting a colorblind ideology resulted in a rebound of
explicit bias. In addition, participants who adopted a colorblind ideology did not show any
differences in implicit bias. Other research similarly suggests that although colorblindness may
result in less stereotyping (e.g., Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000), avoiding racial
categorization may actually increase prejudice (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004), ethnocentrism
(Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007), failure to recognize discrimination (Apfelbaum,
Pauker, Sommers, & Ambady, 2010), and failure to support programs aimed at discrimination
amelioration (Mazzocco, Cooper, & Flint, 2011). Troublingly, strategically ignoring race can
impede interracial interactions and cooperative tasks. For example, participants who adopted
strategic colorblindness in an interracial interaction were perceived as less friendly by Black
interaction partners (Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton, 2008). Finally, colorblindness can impair
performance on cooperative tasks where the discussion of race can be useful or beneficial
(Norton, Sommers, Apfelbaum, Pura, & Ariely, 2006).
In sum, although stereotype suppression and colorblindness may be useful forms of
prejudice regulation in some cases, these strategies are limited forms of regulation. By requiring
individuals to suppress intrusive thoughts of stereotypes or race, these strategies often lead to the
ironic increase of these unwanted thoughts. By focusing on preventing thoughts from entering
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one’s mind, these strategies do not provide individuals with the tools to set long-term egalitarian
goals and may fail to produce lasting change.
The Self-Regulation Model of Prejudice
The Self-Regulation of Prejudice Model (SRP; Monteith, 1993) provides an alternative
self-regulatory strategy where individuals actively monitor their environment in order to detect
and replace biased thoughts rather than simply ignoring or attempting to suppress them.
As shown in Figure 1, the SRP begins by with the well-documented finding that the
automatic activation and application of stereotypes is very common, even among individuals
who are egalitarian-minded (e.g., Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows,
1996; Devine, 1989; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). For people who value egalitarianism and wish
to control prejudice because of their personal standards, reliance on stereotypes constitutes selfrelevant discrepancies. Similarly, externally motivated people can experience discrepancies
when their biased responses conflict with standards imposed by others (Monteith, Mark, &
Ashburn-Nardo, 2010; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993). When individuals become aware
of their discrepant responses, the SRP model outlines a series of consequences that facilitate
future self-regulatory efforts.
According to the SRP, once a biased response is recognized as discrepant with one’s
standards, individuals experience increased negative affect. This negative affect is directed
toward the self (e.g., guilt and disappointment with the self) if one’s biased response conflicts
with internalized personal standards, and is a more generalized discomfort if the biased response
violates external standards (see Higgins, 1987). In keeping with motivation and learning theories
(Gray, 1982; Gray & McNaughton, 1996), awareness of a discrepant response results in the
activation of the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) and in the momentary disruption of ongoing
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responding. When the BIS is activated, individuals pay more attention to the features of the
situation related to the discrepancy, called retrospective reflection. Taken together, these
consequences of a discrepant response result in the formation of associations between the
discrepancy, stimuli present, and the negative affect experienced – referred to as cues for control.
When these cues are present in future situations, they will trigger activation of the BIS. BIS
activation causes behavioral inhibition and prospective reflection, prompting a person to pay
more attention to their ongoing thoughts and behaviors. This disruption of ongoing responding
and increased attention will allow individuals to inhibit prejudiced responses before they occur
and generate alternate responses.
To illustrate, imagine Andy, a White man, is walking through a crowded mall. Like many
people, Andy thinks of himself as a tolerant, fair, and egalitarian person. As Andy is walking, he
happens to see a Black man holding a purse. The thought, “I bet he stole that purse”
automatically enters Andy’s mind. Just then, he sees a woman emerge from a store, take the
purse, and put it over her shoulder. Suddenly, Andy realizes that he stereotyped the Black man as
a criminal. Andy might wonder why he had this negative thought. Why did he assume this man
was a thief when he was just standing there? Would Andy have responded the same way if the
man was White? He feels guilty, and the natural activity of the BIS causes him to momentarily
pause and note stimuli in this situation (e.g., his location, what he was doing, the race of the
other person, etc.). Upon encountering these cues in the future when a similarly biased response
may occur, Andy’s BIS will likely become activated and he will be able to inhibit biased
thoughts while maintaining an egalitarian mindset.
Empirical Support for the Self-Regulation Model of Prejudice
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We turn now to an examination of empirical support for each aspect of the SRP model.
Central to the SRP is the idea that individuals are capable of detecting discrepancies between
their biased responses and their more egalitarian standards for responding. To understand
people’s ability to detect discrepancies, researchers have used the Should-Would Discrepancy
scale (e.g., Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993;
Monteith & Voils, 1998; Monteith & Mark, 2005). The Should-Would Discrepancy
Questionnaire asks participants to rate the extent to which they should act in a biased ways and
the extent to which they would act in a biased way across numerous situations. For instance,
participants rate the extent they should feel uncomfortable sitting next to a Black person on a bus
and the extent to which they would feel uncomfortable doing so. Research using this task
consistently demonstrates that many participants report that their shoulds are more prejudiced
than their woulds, thus revealing discrepancies.
Importantly, people attend to and are aware of discrepancies in their everyday lives.
Monteith, Mark, and Ashburn-Nardo (2010) asked White participants to recall and describe past
instances in which they thought about, felt about, or behaved toward Blacks in ways that they
recognized were discrepant from their either personal standards or social standards. Following
this interview, participants completed the Should-Would Discrepancy scale. Most participants
reported discrepancy experiences (e.g., feeling afraid of Black men on the subway). In addition,
the number of reported discrepancy experiences was positively related to the magnitude of scores
on the Should-Would discrepancy scale. Monteith and Voils (1998) examined whether responses
on the Should-Would Discrepancy scale predict actual behaviors in situations where one might
respond in a prejudiced way. White participants who had completed the Should-Would
Discrepancy scale during a separate mass testing procedure were brought to the lab for a study
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on humor. Participants evaluated many jokes, some of which played on negative stereotypes of
Blacks, while experiencing either high or low cognitive load. Low prejudice participants who
had reported larger discrepancies between their shoulds and woulds were more likely to
positively evaluate racist jokes if they were under high than low cognitive load. However, low
prejudice participants with smaller discrepancies evaluated these same racially biased jokes
unfavorably even when they were distracted. In other words, participants’ self-reported ability to
regulate biased responses corresponded to their actual ability to control biased responding to the
racial jokes.
Such discrepancy-related findings suggest that individuals are often aware of their
outgroup biases that conflict with their standards for responding. Does awareness of
discrepancies give rise to affective reactions, as the SRP suggests? Prior research has
consistently shown that individuals low in prejudice who experience larger discrepancies when
completing the Should-Would scale subsequently report elevated levels of negative self-directed
affect, relative to participants with smaller discrepancies. Importantly, this type of affect is
critical for consistently motivating subsequent efforts to control prejudice (e.g., Monteith, 1993).
Conversely, high-prejudice individuals who experience larger discrepancies when completing the
Should-Would Questionnaire subsequently report greater general discomfort, but not greater
negative self-directed affect, than their counterparts with smaller discrepancies (e.g., Devine et
al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993). Although discomfort can motivate self-regulation in some
situations, it is less likely to do so as consistently as negative self-directed affect.
The discrepancy-affect link has been demonstrated in other ways as well. Fehr and
Sassenberg (2010) had participants complete an IAT and receive feedback suggesting they held
negative attitudes toward Arabs. To the extent that this IAT feedback was discrepant from the
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individual’s self-standards, participants reported greater guilt and dissatisfaction with themselves
(see also Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001). Discrepancy-related affect has also been
induced experimentally by leading participants to believe that they have made biased responses
(e.g., Monteith, 1993; Monteith Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002). For instance, Amodio,
Devine, and Harmon-Jones (2007) provided participants with fixed feedback concerning their
neurological reactions in response to viewing images of White, Black, and Asian faces.
Participants low in prejudice were led to believe that EEG recordings indicated negative
reactions to Black faces relative to White and Asian faces. Following this fixed feedback,
participants reported greater guilt relative to baseline levels measured previously.
In addition to prompting feelings of guilt, the SRP model posits that awareness of
discrepant responses prompts behavioral inhibition, or the disruption of ongoing responses.
Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, and Czopp (2002) gave low-prejudice, White participants’
fixed physiological feedback suggesting they were reacting negatively to images of Blacks. This
feedback caused participants to pause briefly, taking milliseconds longer than a comparison
condition to advance to the next screen. Such momentary pauses theoretically facilitate
retrospective reflection, or attending closely to features of the environment associated with the
discrepancy. Furthermore, this behavioral inhibition serves an important purpose, directing
attention to the discrepancy and related information. When the low-prejudice participants in
Monteith et al.’s (2002) investigation were asked to list their thoughts about the experiment at
the end of the study, participants who believed they had negative reactions to photos of Blacks
were significantly more likely to list thoughts associated with their negative feedback, their
reactions to the feedback, and race-related topics than participants who believed they had
negative reactions to neutral pictures (see also Monteith, 1993).
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Awareness of discrepant responses leads to feelings of guilt and to behavioral inhibition;
however, these outcomes alone are not enough to facilitate effective self-regulation. If Andy
from our earlier example simply notices and reflects upon how he behaved in a prejudiced way,
he is no less likely to be biased in the future. Rather, in order to change his future behavior he
must form associations between the discrepancy, negative affect, and features of the environment
to encode cues for control. When he recognizes these relevant cues for control in the future, he
be able to inhibit or replace biased responses and prevent another discrepancy from occurring.
To examine the development and operation of these cues for control, Monteith (1993,
Study 2) gave low-prejudice participants feedback that they were prone to subtly biased
homophobic reactions. In an ostensibly separate study, these participants evaluated twelve jokes,
two of which were based on stereotypes about gays. Believing that this second task was
unrelated to their feedback, the participants recognized the cues they had established previously
(e.g., a task dealing with stereotypes of homosexuals) and inhibited their prejudiced responses.
Specifically, participants who received discrepant feedback took longer to evaluate these jokes
and evaluated the jokes less favorably than participants in a control condition. In other research,
low-prejudiced participants complete a race-based IAT and received bogus feedback that they
were biased against Blacks (Monteith et al., 2002). In a second supposedly unrelated task,
participants were presented with a single word one-at-a-time and were asked to indicate whether
they liked or disliked each word. Embedded among fillers were traditionally Black names that
had also been used earlier in the IAT. To the extent that participants experienced guilt following
IAT feedback, they took longer to evaluate the Black names (prospective reflection) and
evaluated them more favorably.
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The process of generating alternatives to prejudiced responses can involve replacement
with non-biased responses, as in the examples above, or other processes. For instance, people
may gather more information and individuate outgroup members (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990;
Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999) or initiate positive intergroup contact (e.g., Esses & Dovidio,
2002) as a means to generating non-biased responses.
Before concluding this section, we wish to underscore that self-regulating prejudice
through the steps outlined by the SRP model applies well to low-prejudice individuals who
personally value egalitarianism. However, the SRP model can also apply to high-prejudice
individuals who are externally motivated to control their prejudice. For instance, when White
participants were led through a guided interview concerning the development of cues for control,
one high-prejudice participant reported:
My roommate’s Black and sometimes when we’re watching shows they kinda like make
the Blacks look trashy, you know like on Jerry Springer… I was laughing at it but he
wasn’t really and it kind of automatically made me feel like I had done something wrong
so I felt bad… I didn’t want him to think, “Well he looks like some kind of racist.
When asked about future concern and intent to regulate, the same participant responded:
If something on TV comes up that’s like shady you know it’s like I think about it… you
know I think about it to make sure that it doesn’t happen again in case he actually was
mad about it. I wouldn’t laugh out loud if I thought maybe it would be offensive to
someone else. I’m just a little more careful now (Monteith et al., 2010).
Through external pressures such as those reported by this one participant, the SRP can help
explain how individuals high in prejudice establish cues for control - albeit for external reasons.
Implementation Intentions
For people to successfully self-regulate, they must be able to recognize cues that lead to
prejudice responses. Upon acknowledging these situational features, people can take steps to
prevent themselves from falling into similar prejudiced patterns of behavior in the future. By
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establishing implementation intentions (Fujita, 2011; Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & Sheeran,
2006) people form specific “if-then” plans of action to follow when they encounter a specific cue
for control. In the case of regulating prejudice, an individual might form the if-then plan: “If I see
a Black person at the mall, then I will think this person is shopping.” When such implementation
intentions are formed, the cues activating these statements (i.e., seeing a Black person at the
mall) become more salient and the intended then response (i.e., assuming the person is shopping)
occurs more quickly, reflexively (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997), and with less effort (Bayer,
Achtziger, Gollwitzer, & Moskowitz, 2009).
As a means of regulating bias, implementation intentions can be useful by defining
desired outcomes. For example, Stewart and Payne (2008) instructed participants to form the
implementation intention to think “good” when they saw a Black person during a race-IAT or to
think “safe” when engaging in the weapon-identification task (a task assessing implicit
associations between weapons versus neutral objects with Whites and Blacks; Payne, 2001).
Forming this simple implementation intention significantly reduced automatic stereotype bias on
both tasks. Similarly, Mendoza, Gollwitzer, and Amodio (2010) investigated how
implementation intentions affect responding on the Shooter Bias Task (Correll, Park, Judd, &
Wittenbrink, 2005). The Shooter Bias Task is a computerized program where participants are
instructed to “shoot” when an image of an armed person appears and “not shoot” when an image
of an unarmed person appears. Previous research demonstrates a consistent bias where people
incorrectly shoot unarmed Black targets more frequently than unarmed White targets.
Participants given the implementation intention to ignore the race of the target or to focus on
whether the person was armed or not made fewer errors than those without such implementation
intentions.
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Due to the specificity of if-then statements, forming specific implementation intentions
may not have generalized bias reductions effects. That is, although forming the implementation
intention “If I see a Black person at the mall, I will think they are shopping” may help in the
context of a mall or shopping centers, this implementation intention may be ineffective across
more diverse situations. Additionally, broader implementation intentions such as, “If I see a
Black person, then I will ignore their race” may result in ironic negative consequences
(Apfelbaum et al., 2008; Apfelbaum et al., 2010; Vorauer, Gagnon, & Sasaki, 2009).
Nonetheless, implementation intentions can be used effectively in conjunction with other
regulatory strategies. For instance, once a cue for control has been identified, pairing this cue
with an implementation intention to think carefully before responding can help slow down
automatic responding and encourage people to take in more information before engaging in a
behavior (Mendoza et al., 2010).
Self-Regulation, Executive Function, and Intergroup Contact
All of the self-regulation strategies discussed in this chapter require effort. Monitoring
one’s thoughts and behaviors, paying attention to cues in the environment, and inhibiting
prejudiced responses can be taxing. Because both implicit and explicit bias can affect how
interracial interactions are experienced by both White and Black interaction members (Dovidio,
Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002), effective regulation is needed. However, cognitive depletion due
to effortful regulation may reduce the quality of the interracial interaction. Consistent with this
possibility, many of the problems Whites experience in interracial interactions stem from their
desire to appear nonprejudiced, their desire to avoid offending interaction partners, and their
uncertainty about the best way to achieve these positive outcomes (Apfelbaum et al., 2008; Plant,
2004; Richeson & Shelton, 2007).
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Richeson and Shelton (2003) examined some of the difficulties associated with regulation
during interracial interactions by measuring Whites’ implicit racial attitudes (via the IAT) prior
to an interaction with a White or a Black experimenter. Interestingly, Whites higher in implicit
bias demonstrated more positive nonverbal behaviors toward their Black interaction partner
relative to Whites lower in bias. Following the interaction, participants completed a measure of
cognitive depletion. Because interracial interactions require a great deal of self-regulation among
individuals higher in implicit racial bias, these participants experienced greater cognitive
impairment after interacting with a Black, but not White, experimenter.
Increased regulatory efforts have also been induced experimentally through manipulating
concern with appearing prejudiced. In one line of research, White participants complete a raceIAT before being randomly assigned to a prejudice concern condition or a control condition
(Richeson & Trawalter, 2005). Participants in the prejudice concern condition received IAT
feedback telling them that “most people are more prejudiced than they think they are.”
Participants then interacted with either a White or Black interaction partner and completed a
measure of cognitive depletion. Participants induced to be more concerned about prejudice prior
to the interaction experienced greater self-regulatory demands and suffered greater cognitive
depletion if they interacted with a Black partner than if they interacted with a White partner.
Though interracial interactions can be cognitively depleting, research points to a number
of strategies to help reduce depletion associated with self-regulation. For instance, individuals
who adopt an approach or promotion mindset are less depleted following self-regulation relative
to individuals who adopt avoidance or prevention mindsets (Oertig, Schuler, Schnelle,
Bandstätter, Roskes, & Elliott, 2013; Trawalter & Richeson, 2006). In addition, research from
the broader self-regulation literature suggests that positive affect (Tice, Baumeister, Shmeuli, &
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Muraven, 2007), regulatory practice (Gailliot et al., 2007), and the use of implementation
intentions can reduce depletion following self-regulation (Webb & Sheeran, 2003).
Inroads to Self-Regulation: Interpersonal Confrontations
Even if individuals are motivated and able to self-regulate their biases, they may not
always notice their own biased responses. By pointing out biases, interpersonal confrontations
may encourage bias regulation. Czopp, Monteith, and Mark (2006) examined the self-regulatory
consequences of interpersonal confrontations of prejudice. At the beginning of the study,
participants generated inferences about individuals based on a single photograph and a small
amount of information about the person. For example, participants saw a picture of a White man
and the description “This person works with numbers.” Participants then freely generated a
description of this person such as “accountant” or “math teacher.” Embedded within 20
photograph-description pairs were critical trials with a photograph of a Black man paired with
descriptions likely to yield a stereotypic response (e.g., “This person can be found behind bars”
might elicit the response “criminal” rather than a nonstereotypic alternative such as “bartender”).
Then some participants were confronted about their stereotype-consistent responses. Following
the confrontation, participants reported greater guilt and self-disappointment, and provided
significantly fewer stereotypic responses on a later stereotype inference task than non-confronted
participants (Czopp et al., 2006).
Confrontations are more or less effective at reducing bias depending on the type of bias
confronted and characteristics of the confronter. For instance, confrontations of racism are often
effective in reducing subsequent racially biased responses. However, people may view
confrontations of sexism as illegitimate or unnecessary because social norms against sexism are
weaker than those against racism (Fiske & Stevens, 1993) and gender stereotypes are often
21
perceived as positive (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). Indeed, research directly comparing
confrontations of racism and sexism find that confrontations of gender bias result in less guilt,
less corrective behaviors, less concern, and greater amusement relative to confrontations of
racism (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Gulker, Mark, & Monteith, 2013).
Characteristics of the confronter similarly influence the efficacy of a confrontation. For
instance, while nontargets (e.g., males who confront sexism toward women) may have difficulty
recognizing bias or may not feel comfortable confronting racism or sexism, these confrontations
may be more effective than confrontations by target group members (Czopp & Monteith, 2003;
Drury & Kaiser, 2014; Gulker et al., 2013; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010; Saunders & Senn, 2009).
Because confronting sexism/racism has no apparent benefit for men/Whites, nontarget
confrontations are perceived as less self-interested and more persuasive (Drury & Kaiser, 2014;
Gervais & Hillard, 2014; Gulker et al., 2013).
Finally, beyond bringing to light one’s own biases, confrontations also help encourage
self-regulation by creating egalitarian norms and expectations of others. These norms may then
help motivate individuals with egalitarian self-concepts to live up to these standards and regulate
negative thoughts and behaviors in the future (e.g., Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, & Vaughn,
1994; Blanchard, Lilly, & Vaughn, 1991; Monteith, Deneen, & Tooman, 1996).
Conclusion
As we’ve seen in this chapter, the accumulated evidence of people’s ability to
successfully regulate stereotypes and prejudice demonstrates that bias can be tamed. Although
there are several strategies that may help people regulate their bias, some strategies are more
effective than others at promoting long term reduction of bias across a variety of situations.
Furthermore, people’s internal and external motivations to respond without prejudice play a role
22
in the effectiveness of their efforts to respond without bias. Importantly, self-regulation
strategies can have important consequences for people’s lives, as demonstrated by the reviewed
literature on self-regulation and interracial interactions.
Although we believe self-regulation is an effective and useful means for reducing
prejudice, it is no silver bullet. In order to successfully combat bias, people must first be aware of
the need for self-regulation of bias. For this reason, interpersonal confrontations of prejudice are
an effective way to jump start the self-regulatory process in others. Confrontations not only
increase people’s awareness of their own biased responses, but also decrease the likelihood that
they will make the same biased response in the future. Beyond awareness of the need for selfregulation, people need to know how to implement effective strategies to achieve control, and
need to be sufficiently motivated to practice self-regulatory strategies with consistency and
persistence. These factors stand between the capability for and the realization of successful selfregulation.
To the extent that subtle bias contributes to ongoing inequality and discrimination, selfregulation strategies provide useful tools for combatting both subtle bias and its pernicious
consequences. Once again, the tragic death of Jonathan Ferrell has raised concerns in the eyes of
the public that subtle biases may contribute to harsher and more punitive treatment of young,
Black men at the hands of police officers. Sadly, this is not the only event of police shootings
involving Blacks where racial biases have been implicated. The deaths of Trayvon Martin,
Michael Brown, Sandra Bland and other young Black Americans have all led to greater media
coverage of and public attention toward persisting racial prejudice and inequality in the U.S. For
example, in his piece published in the wake of Michael Brown’s death, “The Science of Why
Cops Shoot Young Black Men,” Chris Mooney explored the role implicit bias may play in the
23
shooting deaths of Black men and women at the hands of the police. Although retroactively
determining whether race actually did play a role in these types of situations is not possible, we
do know from the vast literature that intergroup biases, often very subtle in nature and
unintended, continue to support unequal playing fields and disparate outcomes. Efforts to raise
awareness of and teach strategies for effective self-regulation are sorely needed due to the
persistence of subtle bias and the potential of self-regulation to stop bias in its tracks.
24
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34
Automatic Stereotype Activation
and Use
Cues for Control Present When
Discrepant Response is Possible
Discrepant Response
• behavioral inhibition
Awareness of Discrepant Response
• prospective reflection
• negative self-directed affect
• behavioral inhibition
• retrospective reflection
establish cues for control
Figure 1: The Self-Regulation of Prejudice Model
inhibit prejudiced response
and generate alternative
response