Plan
The United States federal government should end its embargo on
Cuba
LEADERSHIP ADV
LEADERSHIP ADV – 1AC
SCENARIO ONE: SOFT POWER:
Anti-Americanism is growing in Latin America – extending an olive
branch to Cuba is necessary to re-establish our regional soft power
Perez JD Yale Law School 2010 David “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department” Harvard Latino Law Review lexis
Anti-Americanism has become the political chant de jour for leaders seeking longterm as well as short-term gains in Latin American elections. In Venezuela, the
anti-American rhetoric spewed by Hugo Chavez masks his otherwise autocratic
tendencies, while countries like Bolivia and Ecuador tilt further away from
Washington, both rhetorically and substantively. The former expelled the U.S. Ambassador in October 2008, and the latter
has refused to renew Washington's lease on an airbase traditionally used for counter-narcotics missions. The systemic
neglect for eight years during the Bush Administration meant that political capital
was never seriously spent dealing with issues affecting the region. Because of this, President
Bush was unable to get much headway with his proposal to reform immigration, and his free trade agreement with Colombia
encountered significant opposition in Congress. Recent examples of U.S. unilateralism, disregard
for
international law and norms, and a growing financial crisis, have all been seized
by a new generation of populist Latin American leaders who stoke anti-American
sentiment.
The region, however, is absolutely critical to our national interest and security. Over
thirty percent of our oil comes from Latin America - more than the U.S. imports
from the Middle East. Additionally, over half of the foreign-born population in the United States is Latin American,
meaning that a significant portion of American society is intrinsically tied to the region. n1 These immigrants, as well as their sons
and daughters, have already begun to take their place amongst America's social, cultural, and political elite.
Just south of America's borders, a deepening polarization is spreading throughout
the entire region. In the last few years ideological allies in Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela have written and approved new constitutions that have consolidated the
power of the executive, while extending - or in Venezuela's case eliminating presidential term limits. In Venezuela the polarization has been drawn along economic lines, whereby Chavez's base
of support continues to be poor Venezuelans. In Bolivia the polarization has been drawn along racial lines: the preamble to the new
Bolivian constitution, approved in January 2009, makes reference to the "disastrous colonial times," a moment in history that
Bolivians of Andean-descent particularly lament. Those regions in Bolivia with the most people of European or mixed descent have
consistently voted for increased provincial autonomy and against the constitutional changes proposed by President Morales.
Perhaps due to its sweeping changes, the new Constitution was rejected by four of Bolivia's nine provinces. n2 Like Bolivia, Latin
America is still searching for its identity.
[*191] Traditionally the U.S. has projected its influence by using varying
combinations of hard and soft power. It has been a long time since the United States
last sponsored or supported military action in Latin America, and although highly contextdependent, it is very likely that Latin American citizens and their governments would view any
overt display of American hard power in the region negatively. n3 One can only imagine the
fodder an American military excursion into Latin America would provide for a leader like Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, or Evo Morales
of Bolivia. Soft power, on the other hand, can win over people and governments without
resorting to coercion, but is limited by other factors.
The key to soft power is not simply a strong military, though having one helps, but rather an
enduring sense of legitimacy that can then be projected across the globe to
advance particular policies. The key to this legitimacy is a good image and a
reputation as a responsible actor on the global and regional stage. A good
reputation and image can go a long way toward generating goodwill, which
ultimately will help the U.S. when it tries to sell unpopular ideas and reforms in
the region. n4
In order to
effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its
image by going on a diplomatic offensive and reminding, not just Latin America's
leaders, but also the Latin American people, of the important relationship between
the U.S. and Latin America. Many of the problems facing Latin America today
cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and cooperation. Working
with other nations to address these challenges is the best way to shore up
legitimacy, earn respect, and repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses heavily on
Cuba, every country in Latin America is a potential friend. Washington will have to not only strengthen
its existing relationships in the region, but also win over new allies, who look to us
for "ideas and solutions, not lectures." n5
When analyzing ecosystems, environmental scientists seek out "keystone species." These are organisms that, despite their small size,
function as lynchpins for, or barometers of, the entire system's stability. Cuba, despite its size and isolation, is a keystone
nation in Latin America, having disproportionately dominated Washington's
policy toward the region for decades. n6 As a result of its continuing tensions with
Havana, America's reputation [*192] in the region has suffered, as has its ability to
deal with other countries. n7 For fifty years, Latin American governments that hoped to
endear themselves to the U.S. had to pass the Cuba "litmus test." But now the
tables have turned, and the Obama Administration, if it wants to repair America's
image in the region, will have to pass a Cuba litmus test of its own. n8 In short, America
must once again be admired if we are going to expect other countries to follow our
example. To that end, warming relations with Cuba would have a reverberating effect
throughout Latin America, and would go a long way toward creating goodwill.
US influence in Latin America is key to prevent Chinese crowd in –
the impact is cyber war
Perez JD Yale Law School 2010 David “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department” Harvard Latino Law Review lexis
The absence of a strong American presence over the last eight years has also given
China the opportunity to step in as a major player, both economically and politically, in regions all
around the world, but particularly in Latin America. The Chinese government has invested
a tremendous amount of soft power in Latin America, where it is now the continent's third largest
trading partner, with an annual trade growth of 30% since 2001. n115 American disinterest in Latin America
has convinced many countries to adopt a "Pacific view," whereby China steps in to
fill the gap left by America's absence. n116
After signing a free trade agreement with Chile, China quickly displaced the United States as that country's largest export market.
China also [*224] recently displaced the U.S. as Brazil's biggest trading partner. n117 In 2000, trade between China and Latin
America hovered around $ 13 billion, but in 2007, that number had increased to $ 102 billion, and by 2008 total trade was valued at
$ 140 billion. n118 Even despite the current financial crisis, trade between China and Latin America is likely to grow during the next
five years.
China's interest in Latin America is also based on its increasingly assertive global
political agenda. In 2007, Costa Rica dropped its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, a move heavily courted by Chinese
officials. In 2008, President Hu rewarded Costa Rica's new policy by visiting San Jose and signing a free trade agreement in 2010.
n119
China also timed the release of a new policy paper on Sino-Latin American relations to coincide with
President Hu's most recent trip to the region. It charts
China's growing relationship with Latin
America and promises increased cooperation in scientific and technological
research, cross-cultural educational exchanges, as well as political and economic
exchanges. n120 As China's role in Latin America increases, American clout
correspondingly decreases in terms of relative power. To be sure, the U.S. will remain the major
powerbroker in the Americas for decades to come, but will increasingly have to make room for a new player. Given this
diminishing economic position, Washington will have to rely more heavily on
diplomatic initiatives that shore up credibility rather than simply economic
incentives and disincentives, such as bilateral trade agreements.
(7B) China's Strategic Interest in Cuba
China's presence in Cuba is rather significant: after Venezuela, China is Cuba's second-largest trading
partner with $ 2.3 billion worth of goods exchanged. n121 In fact, China purchases over 400,000 tons of Cuban sugar, as well as half
its annual output of nickel, which is Cuba's top export. n122 In 2008, on a visit to Cuba, Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed to not
only defer for ten years some of Cuba's debt payments, but also to invest $ 80 million in the island's health industry. n123 Moreover,
as long as Taiwan is a [*225] thorny issue for U.S.-Sino relations, China will have a stake in Cuba. China is neurotic about the
functional American presence in Taiwan and has made its intentions for the island known to everyone; the only thing standing
between Beijing's re-appropriation of Taipei is Washington. An increased Chinese presence in Cuba
might be a strategic move by Beijing to later leverage their presence on the island
for a change in America's Taiwan policy.
In the unlikely event of hostile engagement with the United States, China has an incentive to develop
technological capabilities in Cuba, which can be used in tandem with cyber and
communications warfare against Washington. Development of such capabilities
may already be happening. China has a huge presence at Lourdes, a former Soviet espionage base just outside of
Havana, where in 2004 Hu Jintao visited and confirmed that most of the technology housed there, including almost all of the
computers, came from China. n124 Another former Soviet base in Bejucal may now also house both Cuban and Chinese intelligence
analysts. n125 But China's leadership is pragmatic, not ideological, which begs the question: what is China getting in return for all
this assistance? If China is cooperating with Cuban intelligence to spy on the United
States, a greater American presence on the island would be needed to fully
understand the scope of this rather disturbing operation.
Cyber-attack would destroys the US economy
Vatis, 2000 (Michael, FBI, Congressional Testimony to the Subcommittee on Crime in the
House and the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight, Federal News Service, 2/29,
l/n)
And this is not just a criminal problem; it is also a national security problem. This is because our nation's critical
infrastructures -- and by that I mean those services that are vital to our economy and to our
national security, such as electrical power, telecommunications, transportation and government operations -- are
now all dependent on computer technology for their very operations. And that
dependence makes them vulnerable to an attack which, if successful, could deny service
on a very broad scale. The same basic types of cyber attacks that therefore have
become attractive to criminals are also attractive to foreign intelligence services ,
who seek new ways to obtain sensitive government or proprietary information, and also to terrorists and hostile
foreign nations, who are bent on attacking U.S. interests.
Economic decline causes global war
Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense,
“Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of
War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213215)
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external
conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the
security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national
levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996)
work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the
rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one preeminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a
redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances,
increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain
redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising
power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles
combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he
suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on
a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a
significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour
of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic
view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult
to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be
inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the
trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by
interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and
external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong
correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during
periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are
strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the
presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and
external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline
has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, &
Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce
the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing
unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased
incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag'
effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic
decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest
that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than
autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of
domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic
performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an
increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration
with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic
decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied
connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and
deserves more attention.
The plan leads to broader cooperation and influence in the region and
globally
Perez JD Yale Law School 2010 David “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department” Harvard Latino Law Review lexis
[*195] Third, the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril. Latin
America's importance to the United States is growing by the day, and cannot be
overstated. While the issue of U.S.-Cuba relations is obviously of smaller import
than many other issues currently affecting the world (i.e., the ailing economy, climate change,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), addressing it would also involve correspondingly less
effort than those issues, but could potentially lead to a disproportionately high
return by making regional cooperation more likely. n20 In order to confront any of
the major world issues facing the United States, Washington must find a way to
cooperate with its neighbors, who generally view U.S. policy toward Cuba as the
most glaring symbol of its historic inability to constructively engage the region.
These three reasons combine for a perfect storm: to the extent that a healthy U.S.-Cuban relationship
would mean a healthier U.S.-Latin America relationship, the former should be
pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has been absent for the last fifty
years.
Aside from the strategic importance of this issue, addressing these concerns might also prevent more
serious problems in the future. Although the chances of a post-Castro Cuba becoming a failed state are slim, the
threat is nevertheless real. If the state were to collapse, the island could plunge into civil war,
face a humanitarian crisis, become a major drug trafficking center, experience a
massive migration to Florida, or endure a combination of each. However, a new
and comprehensive policy toward Cuba can help prevent these nightmare
scenarios from materializing.
There is no doubt that America's diminished image in Latin America means that it
will face additional difficulty when trying to accomplish its regional goals. n21 To
address the issues confronting the United States vis-a-vis Latin America (i.e., drugs,
the environment, trade, labor and human rights), Washington must restore its
heavily damaged image and regain its place as the region's trendsetter and leader.
Resolving America's "Cuba problem" is a low-cost/high-reward strategy that would inject new
energy and credibility into America's image. The Eight Recommendations found in this proposal are
suggestions that the Obama Administration should consider as it moves to reengage Latin America. Part of America's greatness is its
ability to inspire practical solutions in people. Any new U.S.-Cuban policy should embrace not only America's uncanny ability to
reinvent itself, but also the pragmatism that has made America so great to begin with.
This cooperation and influence is key to solve existential crisis
Inter-American Dialogue Policy Report, 2012 (IAD is a think tank hosting 100
leaders and experts from the US and Latin America, “Remaking the Relationship: The United
States and Latin America,” April, Online:
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
Many of the issues on the hemispheric agenda carry critical global ¶ dimensions. Because of
this, the United States should seek greater¶ cooperation and consultation with Brazil, Mexico, and other
countries of¶ the region in world forums addressing shared interests.¶ Brazil has the broadest
international presence and influence of any Latin¶ American nation. In recent years it has become far more active on global¶ issues of concern to the United States. The United States and Brazil have¶ clashed over
such issues as Iran’s nuclear program, non-proliferation, and¶ the Middle East uprisings, but they have cooperated when their interests¶ converged, such as in the World Trade Organization and the G-20
(Mexico,¶ Argentina, and Canada also participate in the G-20), and in efforts to¶ rebuild and provide security for Haiti. Washington has worked with Brazil¶ and other Latin American countries to raise the profile
In addition to economic and
financial matters, Brazil and other Latin¶ American nations are assuming
enhanced roles on an array of global political,¶ environmental, and security issues.
Several for which US and Latin¶ American cooperation could become increasingly
important include:¶ As the world’s lone nuclear-weapons-free region, Latin America has the¶ opportunity to participate more actively in nonproliferation efforts.¶ Although US and Latin American interests do not always converge¶ on non-proliferation
questions, they align on some related goals. For¶ example, the main proliferation challenges today are found
in developing¶ and unstable parts of the world, as well as in the leakage—or
transfer¶ of nuclear materials—to terrorists. In that context, south-south
connections¶ are crucial. Brazil could play a pivotal role.¶ Many countries in the region give priority to climate change challenges.¶
This may position them as a voice in international debates on this topic.¶ The importance of the Amazon basin to worldwide
climate concerns¶ gives Brazil and five other South American nations a special role to play.¶ Mexico
of emerging economies¶ in various international financial agencies, including the World Bank ¶ and the International Monetary Fund.¶
already has assumed a prominent position on climate change and¶ is active in global policy debates. Brazil organized the first-ever global¶ environmental meeting in 1992 and, this year, will host Rio+20. Mexico ¶
The United States is handicapped by its inability to
devise a climate¶ change policy. Still, it should support coordination on the
presumption¶ of shared interests on a critical policy challenge.¶ Latin Americans are taking more active leadership
on drug policy in the¶ hemisphere and could become increasingly influential in global discussions¶ of drug strategies. Although the United States
and Latin America¶ are often at odds on drug policy, they have mutual interests
and goals¶ that should allow consultation and collaboration on a new, more
effective¶ approach to the problem.¶ Even as Latin America expands its global reach and presence, it is important¶ that the United States and the region
increase their attention to reshaping¶ regional institutions to better align them with current realities and¶ challenges and to make them more effective. The hemisphere’s
institutional¶ architecture is in great flux, and there is growing need for decisions
about¶ priorities and objectives.
hosted the second international meeting on climate change in Cancún in ¶ 2010.
SCENARIO TWO: HARD POWER:
Lifting the embargo is essential to US-Cuba oil cooperation – key to
solve independence from Middle East oil
Benjamin-Alvadaro 10 – Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro, Report for the Cuban Research
Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of
Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence
Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, 2010, Brookings
Institution book, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”
Conclusion and Recommendations
Undoubtedly, after fifty years of enmity, there is a significant lack of trust and confidence between the United States and Cuba. This is plain from the
almost quaint maintenance of a sanctions regime that seeks to isolate Cuba economically and politically but hardly reflects the dramatic changes that
have occurred on the island since 1991, not to mention since 2008,when Fidel Castro officially stepped aside as Cuba’s president. Now, the opportunity
to advance relations in the energy arena appears to be ripe. Since 2004, representatives from American companies, trade organizations, universities,
and think tanks have had the opportunity to meet with Cuban energy officials. The scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes have
been disseminated, dissected, and discussed across a number of settings where the interested parties are now familiar with and well versed in the
agendas and opportunities that exist in this arena. In public discussions,
Cuban energy authorities have made it
clear that their preferred energy development scenario includes working closely
with the U.S. oil and gas industry and using state-of-the- art U.S. oil technologies. The assessment from
U.S. energy experts on the technical acumen and capability of Cuban energy
officials has been overwhelmingly positive.9 Should the U.S. government and the Obama
administration see fit to shift its policy so as to allow broader participation of American academics and practitioners in the energy field to
attend conferences and meet with Cuban energy officials, it may pave the way to establishing much-needed
familiarity and confidence across these communities.¶ The United States and Cuba will
have a unique opportunity to employ a highly educated and competent cadre of Cuban engineers and technicians to work in
critical areas of the energy sector. This will deploy an underused segment of the Cuban workforce, and allow U.S. oil, construction,
and engineering firms to subcontract work to an emerging class of Cuban firms specializing in these areas. The Cubans have accumulated experience
and training from past energy cooperation projects and exchanges in Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, and other countries in the region. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that these contacts and exchanges have been wildly successful because of the Cubans’ high level of competence and strong work ethic. The
Cubans have gained invaluable knowledge and experience through the operation and construction of energy facilities in collaboration with their joint-
The United States possesses few options when it comes to
balancing the various risks to U.S. energy security and satisfying energy demand,
because U.S. energy independence is not attainable, the policy tools available to
deal with energy supply disruptions are increasingly inadequate, and the United
States needs to articulate a new vision of how best to manage international energy
interdependence. In particular, even if the United States were to choose to exploit all of its domestic energy resources, it would remain
dependent on oil imports to meet its existing and future demand. The critical need to improve the integrity of
the U.S. energy supply requires a much broader, more flexible view on the quest
for resources—a view that does not shun a source from a potential strategic
partner for purely political reasons. U.S. decisionmakers must look
dispassionately at potential energy partners in terms of the role they might play in
meeting political, economic, and geostrategic objectives of U.S. energy security. The
Obama administration has signaled that it wants to reinvigorate inter-American cooperation
venture partners on the island.¶
and integration ; a movement toward energy cooperation and development with Cuba is
consistent with, and may
be central to, that objective . ¶ The energy-security environment for the United States is at a critical
juncture. The productive capacity of two of the United States’ largest oil suppliers, Mexico and Venezuela, has declined, and the supporting energy
infrastructure in both countries is in need of significant revitalization. The vagaries of the politics in the region, the variability of weather patterns, and
the overall dismal state of the global economy create a setting of instability and uncertainty that requires close attention to the national security
interests of the United States vis-à-vis energy. Cuba’s energy infrastructure, too, is in need of significant repair and modernization (its many energy
projects notwithstanding); the price tag is estimated to be in the billions of dollars. Delaying work on many of these projects increases costs, because
deterioration of the infrastructure continues and eventually pushes up the cost of renovation and replacement. It also stands to reason that the lion’s
share of the financial burden of upgrading Cuba’s energy infrastructure will fall to the United States, directly and indirectly. Changes
in
U.S. policy to allow investment and assistance in Cuba’s energy sector are a
precondition for international entities to make significant investments , yet this change
implies a large American footprint. Trade
and investment in the energy sector in Cuba have been severely
constrained by the conditions of the embargo placed on the Cuban regime. These constraints also affect foreign firms seeking
to do business in Cuba because of the threat of penalties if any of these firms use technology containing more than 10 percent of proscribed U.S.
technologies needed for oil and gas exploration and production. American private investment and U.S. government assistance will constitute a large
The longer that work is delayed, the
higher the cost to all the investors, which will then potentially cut into the returns
from such undertakings.¶ U.S. cooperation with Cuba in energy just may create an opportunity for the United States to improve its
portion of the needed investment capital to undertake this colossal effort.
relations with Venezuela, if it can demonstrate that it can serve as a partner (or at a minimum, a supporter) of the Petrocaribe energy consortium.
The United States could provide much-needed additional investment capital in the development of
upstream, downstream, and logistical resources in Cuba that simultaneously addresses Petrocaribe objectives,
diversifies regional refining capacity, and adds storage and transit capabilities while enhancing
regional cooperation and integration modalities. This does not mean that the United States has to dismantle the nearly fiftyyear-old embargo against Cuba, but the United States will have to make special provisions that create commercial and trade openings for energy
development that serve its broad geostrategic and national security goals, as it has in the case of food and medicine sales to Cuba.¶ This discussion is
intended to help distill understanding of U.S. strategic energy policy under a set of shifting political and economic environmental conditions in Cuba
and its implications for U.S. foreign policy for the near and long term. Because the policies can be considered works-in-progress, an understanding of
possible outcomes is important to those crafting future policy and making changes in the policymaking milieu.
Oil independence strengthens U.S. leadership
LeVine 11 Steve LeVine is a writer for Foreign Policy, November 1, 2011, “Is this group think,
or is the U.S. about to be energy-independent?”,
http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/01/is_this_group_think_or_is_the_us_ab
out_to_be_energy_independent?wpisrc=obinsite
What could undermine the prognoses is if the result is relatively low oil prices, and a resumption of America's gluttonous gasoline appetite, which would erode millions of barrels of oil a day. Still, Crooks finds
Even if the most optimistic hopes are not fulfilled," he
one can imagine a future in which the U.S. imports oil only from Canada, Mexico and a handful of
other friendly countries such as Brazil."¶ But what does this mean in the big picture? First, America's trade balance
would improve considerably -- currently, crude oil imports account for 44 percent of the U.S. trade deficit, Crooks writes. But according to Citigroup oil economist
Edward Morse (quoted by Crooks), it also means a new day for the U.S. as a global superpower :¶ The notion that the
solace in the volumes further afield, but still in the Western Hemisphere: "
writes, "
U.S. was a superpower in the 20th century but won't be in the 21st doesn't hold up so well now. Compare it to a country such as China, which is going to be overwhelmingly dependent on energy imports. The U.S.
is in a much stronger position.¶ I was left puzzled by that formulation of how the world works -- since oil is fungible and can be bought freely by anyone with the money, we have seen a parade of relatively
resource-poor nations carve out significant global economic and geopolitical places for themselves over the decades. Japan for example imports 98 percent of its oil; China imports much of its oil and natural gas,
why would relative American power abruptly reverse course compared
with China's simply because one has and the other lacks oil? I emailed Morse to find out. His reply:¶
Superpower status really does depend over time on lots of abilities to deliver
public goods for a wide variety of others; energy dependence is a severe handicap
for being able to do that. To be sure one can do it for a long period of time, perhaps, but not readily forever. China might or might not
have access to cheap energy feedstocks and to virtual self-sufficiency. The U.S.
stands an excellent chance of access to both; it's hard to write off an economy that
has these two pillars of long-term strength.
not to mention metals. So
US global leadership is vital to protecting the globe from wars
Khalilzad 11 – Zalmay Khalilzad, the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and
the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning
at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992, February 8, 2011, “The Economy and National
Security; If we don’t get our economic house in order, we risk a new era of multi-polarity,”
online: http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-securityzalmay-khalilzad
We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India,
and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter
the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers
continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The
closing of the gap
between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical
competition among major powers , increase incentives for local powers to play major
powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to
international crises because of the higher risk of escalation.¶ The stakes are high. In modern
history, the
longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S.
leadership . By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics
resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international
systems produced both world wars.¶ American retrenchment could have devastating consequences.
Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats.
Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation,
or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict . Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker
powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way,
hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.¶ As rival
powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition.
Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth
aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around
China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions
following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the
United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.
Soft Power – General Impacts
Soft Power is key to solving competitiveness, terrorism, war,
proliferation, disease, human trafficking, and drug trafficking.
Joshua Kurlantzick, visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowment’s China Program, Dec
2005, “The Decline of American Soft Power,” Current History, Vol. 104, Iss. 686; pg. 419,
proquest, accessed 07/10/07
A broad decline in soft power has many practical implications. These include the drain in foreign
talent coming to the United States, the potential backlash against American companies, the
growing attractiveness of China and Europe, and the possibility that anti-US sentiment will
make it easier for terrorist groups to recruit. In addition, with a decline in soft power,
Washington is simply less able to persuade others. In the run-up to the Iraq War, the Bush administration could
not convince Turkey, a longtime US ally, to play a major staging role, in part because America's image in Turkey was so poor. During
the war itself, the United States has failed to obtain significant participation from all but a handful of major nations, again in part
because of America's negative image in countries ranging from India to Germany In attempts to persuade North Korea to abandon
its nuclear weapons, Washington has had to allow China to play a central role, partly because few Asian states view the United States
as a neutral, legitimate broker in the talks. Instead, Washington must increasingly resort to the other option Nye discusses-force, or
the threat of force. With foreign governments and publics suspicious of American policy, the White
House has been unable to lead a multinational effort to halt Iran's nuclear program, and instead
has had to resort to threatening sanctions at the United Nations or even the possibility of strikes against Iran. With
America's image declining in nations like Thailand and Pakistan, it is harder for leaders in these countries to openly embrace
counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, so Washington resorts to quiet arm-twisting and blandishments to obtain
counterterror concessions. Force is not a long-term solution. Newer, nontraditional security threats such as
disease, human trafficking, and drug trafficking can only be managed through forms of
multilateral cooperation that depend on America's ability to persuade other nations. Terrorism
itself cannot be defeated by force alone, a fact that even the White House recognizes. The 2002 National security
Strategy emphasizes that winning the war on terror requires the United States to lead a battle of ideas against the ideological roots of
terrorism, in addition to rooting out and destroying individual militant cells.
US leadership is key to solving the economy, disease, and WMD
threats.
Blinken 03 (Antony J, senior fellow at CSIS, “Winning the War of Ideas,” The Battle for
Hearts and Minds: edited by Alexander T. J. Lennon, pg. 284)
Why should the United States care that some criticize its policies and others resent its power? Following U.S. military success in
Afghani- stan, concluding that unilateral might makes right, silencing critics and creating a bandwagon effect among friends, is
tempting. As Charles Krauthammer wrote, "We made it plain that even if no one followed us, we would go it alone. Surprise: others
followed. ... Not because they love us. Not because we have embraced multilateralism. But because we have demonstrated
astonishing military power and the will to de- fend vital American interests, unilaterally if necessary."2 Military power remains the
foundation of U.S. security; successfully applied, it magni- fies U.S. influence. More than ever before, however, the
transnational nature of the problems the United States faces defies unilateral solutions. Globalization is erasing borders that once protected the United States, while empowering its enemies.
Thus, trouble on the far side of the planet, such as economic disaster, outbreak of disease, or
theft of a weapon of mass destruction, can quickly become a plague on the United States'
house. Rogue states, outlaw actors, and religious fanatics use the nation's very strengths-its
openness, advanced technology, and freedom of movement-against it, as demonstrated on
September 11. U.S. lead, ership is essential to meet these threats successfully; now more than
ever, however, so is followership. Whatever response the United States chooses-engagement,
containment, or elimination-requires the help of others.
AT: Heg Bad – Hard Power Inevitable
Decline makes all their turns worse- US will be more violent and
desperate post-decline
Dupont June 2012 (Alan, professor of international security and director of the Institute
for International Security and Development at the University of New South Wales in Sydney,
Australia, An Asian Security Standoff, The National Interest, lexis)
What of the argument that America should accept the inevitable and share power
with China as an equal? Paralleling the G-2 would be an Asia-2, allowing Beijing and Washington to divide the region into
spheres of influence in much the same way as the United States and the Soviet Union managed a politically bifurcated Europe during
the early part of the Cold War. While superficially appealing because it holds out the prospect of a peaceful
transition to a new international order, power
two reasons. First,
sharing between the United States and China is unlikely to work for
no U.S. administration, regardless of its political complexion, would
voluntarily relinquish power to China, just as China wouldn’t if the roles were reversed. Second, China’s new
great-power status is hardly untrammeled. Nor is it guaranteed to last, for the country faces formidable environmental, resource,
economic and demographic challenges, not to mention a rival United States that shows no sign of
lapsing into terminal decline despite its current economic travails. Sooner than it
thinks, Beijing may have to confront the prospect of a resurgent Washington
determined to reassert its strategic interests.
Even Layne agrees- the US won’t just give up
Layne June 2012 (Chris, professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s
George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, The Global Power Shift from West to East, The National Interest,
lexis)
THE CONSTELLATION of world power is changing, and U.S. grand strategy will have to change with it. American elites must come
to grips with the fact that the West does not enjoy a predestined supremacy in international politics that is locked into the future for
an indeterminate period of time. The Euro-Atlantic world had a long run of global dominance, but it is coming to an end. The future
is more likely to be shaped by the East.¶ At the same time, Pax Americana also is winding down. The United States can
manage this relative decline effectively over the next couple of decades only if it
first acknowledges the fundamental reality of decline. The problem is that many
Americans, particularly among the elites, have embraced the notion of American
exceptionalism with such fervor that they can’t discern the world transformation
occurring before their eyes.
All their turns are inevitable - Zero Chances of willful US restraint –
we’ll inevitably be engaged globally – the only question is
effectiveness
Shalmon and Horowitz 09 (Dan, Graduate Student in the PhD Program in Political
Science - International Relations at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Mike, Assistant
Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania- Philadelphia, Orbis, Spring)
It is important to recognize at the outset two key points about United States strategy
and the potential costs and benefits for the United States in a changing security
environment. First, the United States is very likely to remain fully engaged in
global affairs. Advocates of restraint or global withdrawal, while popular in some
segments of academia, remain on the margins of policy debates in Washington
D.C. This could always change, of course. However, at present, it is a given that the United States will
define its interests globally and pursue a strategy that requires capable military
forces able to project power around the world. Because ‘‘indirect’’ counter-strategies are the rational
choice for actors facing a strong state’s power projection, irregular/asymmetric threats are inevitable given America’s role in the
global order.24
AT: Heg Bad - Transition  War
Transition from US dominance causes conflict- perception of
weakness spurs war- history proves
Friedberg 2011 (July/August, Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at
Princeton University, Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics, The National Interest, lexis)
THE UNITED States and the People’s Republic of China are locked
in a quiet but
increasingly intense struggle for power and influence, not only in Asia, but around
the world. And in spite of what many earnest and well-intentioned commentators seem to believe, the nascent SinoAmerican rivalry is not merely the result of misperceptions or mistaken policies; it
is driven instead by forces that are deeply rooted in the shifting structure of the
international system and in the very different domestic political regimes of the two Pacific powers. Throughout history,
relations between dominant and rising states have been uneasy—and often violent. Established powers tend to regard themselves as
the defenders of an international order that they helped to create and from which they continue to benefit; rising powers feel
constrained, even cheated, by the status quo and struggle against it to take what they think is rightfully theirs. Indeed, this story line,
with its Shakespearean overtones of youth and age, vigor and decline, is among the oldest in recorded history. As far back as the fifth
century BC the great Greek historian Thucydides began his study of the Peloponnesian War with the deceptively simple observation
that the war’s deepest, truest cause was “the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” The fact that the
U.S.-China relationship is competitive, then, is simply no surprise. But these countries are not just any two great powers: Since
the end of the Cold War the United States has been the richest and most powerful
nation in the world; China is, by contrast, the state whose capabilities have been
growing most rapidly. America is still “number one,” but China is fast gaining
ground. The stakes are about as high as they can get, and the potential for conflict
particularly fraught. At least insofar as the dominant powers are concerned, rising states tend to be troublemakers. As a
nation’s capabilities grow, its leaders generally define their interests more expansively and seek a greater degree of influence over
what is going on around them. This means that those in ascendance typically attempt not only to secure their borders but also to
reach out beyond them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials and transportation routes; to protect their citizens far
from home; to defend their foreign friends and allies; to promulgate their religious or ideological beliefs; and, in general, to have
what they consider to be their rightful say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world. As they begin to assert
themselves, ascendant states typically feel impelled to challenge territorial
boundaries, international institutions and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when they
were still relatively weak. Like Japan in the late nineteenth century, or Germany at the turn
of the twentieth, rising powers want their place in the sun. This, of course, is what
brings them into conflict with the established great powers—the so-called status quo states—who
are the architects, principal beneficiaries and main defenders of any existing international system. The resulting clash
of interests between the two sides has seldom been resolved peacefully. Recognizing the
growing threat to their position, dominant powers (or a coalition of status quo states) have occasionally tried to attack and destroy a
competitor before it can grow strong enough to become a threat. Others—hoping to avoid war—have taken
the opposite approach: attempting to appease potential challengers, they look for ways to
satisfy their demands and ambitions and seek to incorporate them peacefully into the existing
international order. But however sincere, these efforts have almost always ended in
failure. Sometimes the reason clearly lies in the demands of the rising state. As was true of Adolf Hitler’s Germany, an aggressor
may have ambitions that are so extensive as to be impossible for the status quo powers to satisfy without effectively consigning
themselves to servitude or committing national suicide. Even when the demands being made of them are less onerous, the dominant
states are often either reluctant to make concessions, thereby fueling the frustrations and resentments of the rising power, or too
eager to do so, feeding its ambitions and triggering a spiral of escalating demands. Successful policies of appeasement are
conceivable in theory but in practice have proven devilishly difficult to implement. This is why periods of transition,
when a new, ascending power begins to overtake the previously dominant state,
have so often been marked by war.
AT: Heg Bad - Heg Solves War
Collapse of US hegemony causes a global power vacuum resulting in
nuclear war
Ferguson 04 professor of history at New York University's Stern School of Business and
senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University (Niall, “A World without Power”,
Foreign Policy )
Could an apolar world today produce an era reminiscent of the age of Alfred? It could, though with some important and troubling
differences. Certainly, one can imagine the world's established powers—the United
States, Europe, and China—retreating into their own regional spheres of influence.
But what of the growing pretensions to autonomy of the supranational bodies created under U.S. leadership after the Second World
War? The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (formerly the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) each considers itself in some way representative of the “international community.” Surely
their aspirations to global governance are fundamentally different from the spirit of the Dark Ages? Yet universal claims were also an
integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other
civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was not a global Christendom, nor an all-embracing Empire of
Heaven. The reality was political fragmentation. And that is also true today. The
defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational
institutions, but downward. With the end of states' monopoly on the means of
violence and the collapse of their control over channels of communication,
humanity has entered an era characterized as much by disintegration as
integration. If free flows of information and of means of production empower
multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations (as well as
evangelistic religious cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive
technology empowers both criminal organizations and terrorist cells. These groups can
operate, it seems, wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global at
all. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few Page 5 strategic cities such as Kabul and Pristina. In short, it is the nonstate actors
who truly wield global power—including both the monks and the Vikings of our time. So what is left? Waning
empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified
cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower
might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age
would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth
century. For the world is much more populous—roughly 20 times more—so
friction between the world's disparate “tribes” is bound to be more frequent.
Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely
on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to
be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just
to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization—the
integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living
standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off
from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization—
which a new Dark Age would produce—would certainly lead to economic
stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11
devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work,
visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become
irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would
plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western
investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst
effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers.
The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to
Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease,
terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft
carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure.
Meanwhile,
limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the
Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle
East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders.
In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work.
The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their
privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal
more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global
hegemony— its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier—its critics at home and abroad must not
pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful
what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It
would be apolarity—a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces
than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder
Lack of hegemony  extinction
Khalilzad, Rand Corporation 1995 (Zalmay Khalilzad, Spring 1995. RAND Corporation.
“Losing the Moment?” The Washington Quarterly 18.2, Lexis.)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to
multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end
in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the
global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a
world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear
proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would
help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid
another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange . U.S. leadership
would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
AT: Heg Bad - Heg Solves Democracy
Heg promotes democracy
Thayer 6 (Bradley A., Prof of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Missouri State University, “In
Defense of Primacy.,” National Interest; Nov/Dec2006 Issue 86, p32-37)
Throughout history, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power-Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the
anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international
order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization-is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current
amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling
things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded
the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will
end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is
important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy
within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world.
During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France
and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between
Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia .
This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously
threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great
power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of
its ideology of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen
noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the
American worldview.( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed
democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced . This is not because democracies do not
have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to
resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for
advancing the interests of the United States.
Democracy solves extinction
Diamond 95 (Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December,
PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1995, p.
http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html)
Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global
ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated
with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular
sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly
democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or
glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations , and they are much
less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons
of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading
partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible
because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments .
AT: Heg Bad – Heg Solves Deterrence
Heg collapse emboldens rogues – it signals weakness
Thayer, 06 – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies,
Missouri State University (Bradley A., “In Defense of Primacy,” National Interest,
November/December, Lexis)
In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these
fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the
United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is
because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in
international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are
terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the
United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making
unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that
others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies
weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal
kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The
same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to
the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United
States is what protects the country from
Causes global wars that escalate – perception is key
Victor Davis Hanson (Senior Fellow in Residence in Classics and Military History @ Hoover
Institution, Stanford University) December 2009 “Change, Weakness, Disaster, Obama:
Answers from Victor Davis Hanson,”
http://www.resistnet.com/group/oregon/forum/topics/change-weakness-disasterobama/showLastReply
Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a
kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy
rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as
regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China,
Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s
going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as
they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess,
the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela,
Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect,
in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably
cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are
liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe , while insidiously
pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s
an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th
parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with
both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows
whom it will bite or when. BC: Can Obama get any more mileage from his perpetually played “I’m not George W. Bush” card or is
that card past its expiration date? Dr. Hanson: Two considerations: 1) It’s hard (in addition to being shameless), after a year, for any
president to keep scapegoating a prior administration. 2) I think he will drop the reset/“Bush did it” throat-clearing soon, as his polls
continue to stay below 50 percent. In other words, it seems to be a losing trope, poll-wise. Americans hate whining and blamegaming. So the apologies and bows don’t go over well here at home; one more will be
really toxic, politically speaking. Most are starting to see that our relations with Britain, Italy, Germany, or
France are no better under Obama — and probably worse — than during the Bush administration.
AT: Heg Bad - Its Sustainable
Heg is sustainable- challengers can’t make up the power differential,
and trends point toward continued unipolarity
Beckley 2012 (Michael, PhD candidate at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Columbia, The Unipolar Era: Why
American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited, Dissertation found on google scholar)
More important, the gap in defense spending likely understates the
true military gap
because U.S. economic superiority literally gives the United States “more bang for
the buck” – each dollar it spends on the military produces more force than each
dollar China spends. In a separate study, I found that developing countries systematically fail at warfare, regardless of
the size of their defense budgets, because they lack the economic capacity to maintain, modernize, and integrate individual
technologies into cohesive military systems.206 Multivariate regressions suggest that military effectiveness is
determined by a country’s level of economic development, as measured by per
capita income, even after controlling for numerous material, social, and political
factors. As noted earlier, China’s per capita income has declined relative to that of the
United States. China’s defense industry has also fallen further behind: in 2008, the U.S.
share of the world conventional arms market surged to 68 percent while China’s share dropped below 1.5 percent. If history is any
guide, this growing economic gap is also a growing military gap. The PLA may look increasingly respectable on paper, but its
performance in battle against the United States would not necessarily be much better than that of, say, Iraq circa 1991. Indeed, an
independent task force of more than thirty experts recently found “no evidence to
support the notion that China will become a peer military competitor of the United
States.…The military balance today and for the foreseeable future strongly favors
the United States and its allies.”207 Figure 3.20: Share of World Arms Transfer Agreements, 1993--‐ 2008 Source:
Congressional Research Service, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001--‐ 2008, p. 71; Ibid., Conventional
Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993--‐ 2000, p. 73. None of this should be cause for chest--‐ thumping. China can “pose
problems without catching up,” compensating for its technological and organizational inferiority by utilizing asymmetric strategies,
local knowledge, and a greater willingness to bear costs.208 In particular, some experts believe China’s “anti-area--‐ denial”
capabilities are outpacing U.S. efforts to counter them.209 There are reasons to doubt this claim – the Pentagon is developing
sophisticated countermeasures and Chinese writings may purposefully exaggerate PLA capabilities.210 There is also reason to doubt
the strategic importance of China’s capabilities because the United States may be able to launch effective attacks from positions
beyond the reach of Chinese missiles and submarines.211 It is certainly true, however, that the U.S. military has vulnerabilities,
especially in littorals and low--‐ altitudes close to enemy territory. But this has always been the case. From 1961 to 1968 North
Vietnamese and Vietcong units brought down 1,700 U.S. helicopters and aircraft with simple antiaircraft artillery and no early
warning radar.212 Sixty years ago, China projected a huge army into Korea and killed tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers. Yes,
weak adversaries can impose significant costs, but evidence of American
vulnerability is not the same as evidence of American decline. Conclusion Change is inevitable,
but it is often incremental and nonlinear. In the coming decades, China may surge out of its
unimpressive condition and close the gap with the United States. Or China might
continue to rise in place – steadily improving its capabilities in absolute terms
while stagnating, or even declining, relative to the United States. The best that can be done is
to make plans for the future on the basis of present trends. And what the trends suggest is that America’s
economic, technological, and military lead over China will be an enduring feature
of international relations , not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded
material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future .
AT: Heg Bad – No Counter Balancing
No counterbalancing- bandwagoning is more likely- maintaining the
power gap key to prevent challengers
Fiammenghi 2011 (Davide, postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Politics, Institutions, History at the University
of Bologna, The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics; A Neorealist Synthesis, International Security, Spring,
lexis)
In principle, the absolute security threshold should not pose the same problem because of the logical limits in determining it.
Ideally, the absolute threshold should represent 50 percent of the capabilities in the system, because at this level the sum of all the
forces opposing the aspiring hegemon is insufficient to successfully balance it. Still, it is useful to consider William Wohlforth's
admonition: "If balancing were the frictionless, costless activity assumed in some balance-of-power theories, then the unipolar
power would need more than 50 percent of the capabilities in the great power system to stave off a counterpoise. . . . But such
expectations miss the fact that alliance politics always impose costs." 59 It is therefore reasonable to assume that the absolute
security threshold is around 45 percent of the military capabilities in the system. This is the figure William Thompson suggests in
describing a near-unipolar system. 60 In this light, the absence of balancing against the United States
today appears less puzzling. The United States has already moved beyond the
absolute threshold, making balancing futile. 61 Levy and Thompson raise the important question of why
other states failed to balance against the United States when it was a rising power but not yet a hegemon. 62 Part of the answer lies
in the United States' unusual path to primacy. For decades, the Soviet Union maintained a rough balance with the United States. 63
U.S. primacy resulted from the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union. It may be an exaggeration to suggest that the United States
became a hegemon by accident, but the outcome was not planned. 64 The extraordinarily wide gap in
capabilities created by the fall of the Soviet Union left other states with little choice
but to acquiesce. Countries such as China, Iran, Russia, and Syria, or even Brazil
and Pakistan, may not like U.S. primacy, but they lack the capabilities to challenge
it. 65 Meanwhile, other countries benefiting from U.S. primacy appear not to be worried
about it. The next section considers hegemonic strategies that can soften opposition.
No balancing – US lead is insurmountable and is growing
Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University
of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation”
p. 19
As illustrated in table 2.1, the
United States is by far the largest military spender and has actually
United States’ lead over its
nearest competitor is actually stronger in the security arena than it was in 1988. The
increased its share of world military spending in the last twenty years. Moreover, the
Soviet Union was the closest rival in 1988, accounting for 18 percent of the world total, whereas China, the country with the second
largest share today, only accounts for 5 percent of the world total. Counting coalitions as potential
balancers, the euro area still accounts for a lower share today than did the Soviet
Union in 1988. The European Union, on the other hand, accounts for a larger share than did the Soviet Union in 1988.
But the European Union’s share does not amount to even half of the United States’
share of the world total. Without even throwing the technological sophistication of
American weaponry (or the collective action problems that many states confront when deciding to act in the national
interest) into the balance, it is clear that the United States is peerless in the security
sphere and has strengthened its lead in the last two decades. Because of the
superiority of American military power, and other states’ dependence on it for
effective action, the United States faces very few constraints in the security arena.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq is a case in point but there are plenty of other examples. As I will also show in chapter 6, there are also
economic advantages associated with this privileged position in the security field. Although some question the utility of armed force,
few will contest that the United States is in a league of its own when it comes to
security affairs. But what about the economic realm? The real test is whether the United States still towers over other
countries economically, and is able to reap economic benefits as a result of its hegemonic position. This is the claim that is likely to
be the most carefully scrutinized.
AT: Heg Bad – Link Turn
Low US soft power leads to an increase in unilateralism.
Kurlantzick 07 (Joshua, fellow at the USC School of Public Diplomacy and the Pacific
Council on International Policy and previous foreign editor at The New Republic, Charm
Offensive, pg. 194)
This unpopularity matters. Even without China on the scene, America's declining popularity
decreases Washington's soft power, and potentially makes the United States more likely to
resort to force rather than persuasion to meet American objectives. One recent bipartisan report on
American diplomacy concluded as much, warning that if the "downward spiral [in diplomacy] is not reversed, the prospect of relying
on military force to protect US national interests will increase."34
AT: Not Enough Oil
US-Cuban joint oil production is the critical key to US oil selfsufficiency---there are massive amounts of offshore oil waiting to be
tapped
Benjamin-Alvadaro 6 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida
International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at
Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at
UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future
Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissionedreports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)
Why is it important to clarify the current status of Cuban energy in the face of a
continuing opposition by the United States to anything resembling what can be construed as “good news”
for the Castro regime? Obviously, because up until this point it hasn’t cost the United States
much if anything. The current policy continues to clearly place at the forefront the sanctity and utility of a
comprehensive economic and political embargo in the hopes that it helps to foment a change in regime and a peaceful transition to a
democratic system of governance and a complimentary market economy. As energy security concerns
continue to percolate up to an increasingly important status in the realm of
national security objectives we may begin to see the erosion of the hard position
against the Cuban regime regardless of its leadership.¶ The overview of the Cuban
energy developments clearly and unambiguously reveals that the Castro regime
has every intention of continuing to promote, design and implement energy development
policies that will benefit Cuba for generations to come. Cuba is sparing no effort by instituting bottom-up
and top-down policy initiatives to meet this challenge. It has significantly increased its
international cooperation in the energy sector and continues to enhance its efforts
to ensure energy security in these most uncertain of times. But it stands to reason that no matter how
successful these efforts are, they will come up short. Two factors may alter this
present situation. First, Cuba may indeed realize a bonanza from the offshore
tracts that will allow it to possibly address its many energy challenges, from
increasing oil production and refining capacity, to improving the nation’s energy
infrastructure, ensuring a stable energy future. Second, and no less significant, is
the possibility of normalization of trade relations with the United States. This is
important not only because it will allow direct foreign investment, technology
transfer and information sharing between these neighboring states but it possibly
enhances the energy security of both states, and hence, the region, realized
through a division of labor and dispersion of resources that serve as a hedge
against natural disaster and market disruptions. Moreover, all states could derive benefit from the
public information campaigns to promote energy efficiency and conservation presently being promoted in Cuba in the face of
diminishing energy stocks and uncertain global markets. Ultimately, and only after normalization, the task still falls
to the Cuban government, but the cost will necessarily be spread through a
number of sources that are predominately American because of strategic interests,
proximity and affinity. It suffices to say that the requisite investment and assistance will
have a distinct American tinge to it, inasmuch as American corporations, U.S.
government agencies, and international financial institutions, of which the U.S. is
a major contributor, will play important roles in the funding of the effort to
revitalize the Cuban energy sector. Cuban officials are not averse and perhaps would
prefer that the U.S. be its major partner in this effort owing to the fact that most if not all of
the cutting-edge technology in energy, oil and gas comes from the United States. It is
remarkable that the Cuban energy sector is as vibrant as it presently is, absent the type
of infrastructural investment that is available to most developing states, in large part because of
the American economic embargo. ¶ Finally, the cost is significant and it stands to reason that
the longer one waits to address the challenge at hand the higher the cost of modernizing the
energy sector . For this reason alone, the American role in assisting Cuba in this effort will be
significant and every day that the task is put off, it increases the long-term cost of the
effort. This should serve as an obvious point of entry into cooperation with the
Cuban government and perhaps can serve as a catalyst for promoting confidence,
trust and cooperation in this critical issue area across the region.
AT: Environment Turn
Cuba won’t spill---they’ll be safe and U.S. involvement isn’t key
Richard Sadowski 11, J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, Fall 2011, “IN THIS ISSUE:
NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICT: CUBAN OFFSHORE DRILLING: PREPARATION AND
PREVENTION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED STATES' EMBARGO,”
Sustainable Development Law & Policy, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y 37, p. lexis
Fears that Cuban offshore drilling poses serious environmental threats because of
the proximity to the United States and the prohibition on U.S. technology transfer are
overblown. Cuba has at least as much incentive to ensure safe-drilling practices as
does the United States, and reports indicate that Cuba is taking safety seriously. n64 Lee
Hunt, President of the Houston-based International Association of Drilling Contractors, said,
"[t]he Cuban oil industry has put a lot of research, study and thought into what will
be required to safely drill," and that "they are very knowledgeable of international
industry practices and have incorporated many of these principles into their safety
and regulatory planning and requirements." n65 Thus, while the economic embargo of
Cuba restricts American technology from being utilized, foreign sources have
provided supplemental alternatives. n66
Companies investing in Cuba have extensive offshore experience---no
risk of spills
Nerurkar & Sullivan 10 – Neelesh Nerurkar, Specialist in Energy Policy at the
Congressional Research Service, and Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs at
the Congressional Research Service, November 29, 2010, “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development:
Background and U.S. Policy Considerations,” online:
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41522_20101129.pdf
It is difficult to assess the likelihood of a spill. According to Saipem, Scarabeo-9 is built to
Norwegian standards, including extra equipment to shut off blown-out wells
beyond what is required in the United States.30 Repsol has significant offshore
experience, including projects in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. It has had issues with oil spills, which is not abnormal for an oil company.31
Among other Cuban lease holders, Petrobras and Statoil have extensive offshore experience,
including projects in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, and are generally seen as accomplished offshore operators.
Petronas, ONGC, and PetroVietnam also have offshore experience. PdVSA does not, but its offshore project appears the furthest from seeing
drilling activity among existing licenses.
Oceans are resilient
Kennedy 2 - Environmental science prof, Maryland. Former Director,
Cooperative Oxford Laboratory. PhD. (Victor, Coastal and Marine Ecosystems and Global Climate
Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/marine.cfm)
There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems
are resilient to environmental change. Steele
components of marine systems are tightly
coupled to physical factors, allowing them to respond quickly to rapid
environmental change and thus rendering them ecologically adaptable .
Some species also have wide genetic variability throughout their range, which
may allow for adaptation to climate change.
(1991) hypothesized that the biological
Marine life is resilient
Dulvy 3 – Professor of Marine Science and Technology, Newcastle
(Nicholas, Extinction vulnerability in marine populations, Fish and Fisheries 4.1)
Marine fish populations are more variable and resilient than terrestrial populations Great natural
variability in population size is sometimes invoked to argue that IUCN Red List criteria, as one example, are too conservative
for marine fishes (Hudson and Mace1996; Matsuda et al.1997; Musick 1999; Powles et al. 2000; Hutchings 2001a). For the
(1996) IUCN list, a decline of 20% within 10 years or three generations (whichever is longer) triggered a classification of
'vulnerable', while declines of 50 and 80% led to classifications of 'endangered' and 'critically endangered', respectively.
These criteria were designed to be applied to all animal and plant taxa, but many marine resource biologists feel that for
marine fishes 'one size does not fit all' (see Hutchings 2001a). They argue that percent decline criteria are
too conservative compared to the high natural variability of fish populations.
Powles et al. (2000) cite the six-fold variation of the Pacific sardine population (Sardinopssagax, Clupeidae) and a nine-fold
variation in northern anchovy (Engraulis mordax, Clupeidae) over
the past two millennia
to
suggest
that rapid declines and increases of up to 10-fold are relatively common in
exploited fish stocks. It should, however, be borne in mind that the variation of exploited populations must be
higher than unexploited populations because recruitment fluctuations increasingly drive population fluctuations when there
are few adults (Pauly et al. 2002).
AT: HEALTH CARE DA
Health Care DA – 2AC
NO IMPACT – Cuban Health care cannot solve disease
National Review 7/30/2007 “The Myth of Cuban Health Care”
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/health-myth.htm
To be sure, there is excellent health care on Cuba — just not for ordinary Cubans. Dr.
Jaime Suchlicki of the University of Miami’s Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies explains that there is not
just one system, or even two: There are three. The first is for foreigners who come to Cuba
specifically for medical care. This is known as “medical tourism.” The tourists pay in hard currency, which provides oxygen to the
regime. And the facilities in which they are treated are First World: clean, well supplied,
state-of-the-art.
The foreigners-only facilities do a big business in what you might call vanity treatments: Botox, liposuction, and
breast implants. Remember, too, that there are many separate, or segregated, facilities on Cuba. People speak of
“tourism apartheid.” For example, there are separate hotels, separate beaches, separate restaurants — separate everything. As you
can well imagine, this causes widespread resentment in the general population.
The second health-care system is for Cuban elites — the Party, the military, official artists and writers,
and so on. In the Soviet Union, these people were called the “nomenklatura.” And
their system, like the one for
medical tourists, is top-notch.
Then there is the real Cuban system, the one that ordinary people must use — and
it is wretched. Testimony and documentation on the subject are vast. Hospitals and clinics are
crumbling. Conditions are so unsanitary, patients may be better off at home, whatever
home is. If they do have to go to the hospital, they must bring their own bedsheets,
soap, towels, food, light bulbs — even toilet paper. And basic medications are
scarce. In Sicko, even sophisticated medications are plentiful and cheap. In the real Cuba, finding an aspirin
can be a chore. And an antibiotic will fetch a fortune on the black market.
A nurse spoke to Isabel Vincent of Canada’s National Post. “We have nothing,” said the
nurse. “I haven’t seen aspirin in a Cuban store here for more than a year. If you have any
pills in your purse, I’ll take them. Even if they have passed their expiry date.”
The equipment that doctors have to work with is either antiquated or nonexistent.
Doctors have been known to reuse latex gloves — there is no choice. When they travel to the
island, on errands of mercy, American doctors make sure to take as much equipment and as many supplies as they can carry. One
told the Associated Press, “The [Cuban] doctors are pretty well trained, but they have nothing to
work with. It’s like operating with knives and spoons.”
And doctors are not necessarily privileged citizens in Cuba. A doctor in exile told the Miami Herald that, in 2003, he earned what
most doctors did: 575 pesos a month, or about 25 dollars. He had to sell pork out of his home to get by. And the chief of medical
services for the whole of the Cuban military had to rent out his car as a taxi on weekends. “Everyone tries to survive,” he explained.
(Of course, you can call a Cuban with a car privileged, whatever he does with it.)
So deplorable is the state of health care in Cuba that old-fashioned diseases are
back with a vengeance. These include tuberculosis, leprosy, and typhoid fever. And
dengue, another fever, is a particular menace. Indeed, an exiled doctor named Dessy Mendoza Rivero — a former political prisoner
and a spectacularly brave man — wrote a book called ¡Dengue! La Epidemia Secreta de Fidel Castro.
NOT UNIQUE - Cuban health care is struggling – the economy and the
embargo
The Economist 7/14/2012 “Cuban Health Care: Under Investigation”
http://www.economist.com/node/21558613
Until recently, Cubans were justifiably proud of their health-care system. Life-
expectancy matches that of Americans, who are eight times richer. Infant mortality ties with Canada’s as the lowest in the Americas.
Measles jabs have been near-universal for more than 20 years, putting Cuba ahead of many rich countries.
But Cuba’s crumbling economy has put this system under stress. Though the state still trains
armies of doctors, a third of these are deployed overseas in “soft-power” missions. Pharmacies
are generally illstocked. In many hospitals patients must provide their own sheets, food and
dressings. Neglect of infrastructure means that almost 10% of the population lacks
access to clean drinking water. The American embargo against the island does not
help: equipment for radiology, mammograms and cancer therapy is hard to
replace, says Julia Sweig of the Council on Foreign Relations, an American think-tank.
Raúl Castro, the president, who this month visited China and Vietnam, is trying to revive the economy by cautiously transferring
chunks of it into private hands. The next step, reported this week, will be to let transport and other service workers form cooperatives, currently restricted to farming. If the health service is to thrive again, this sort of economic
surgery will need to speed up.
NOT UNIQUE - Health care declining – supplies & staff
The Economist 3/24/2012 “The deal's off; Inequality” page proquest
And now health services and education are becoming harder to access and getting worse.
Secondary-school enrolment is below its 1989 peak. There is a surfeit of humanities graduates and a shortage of agronomists and
engineers. Although infant mortality has continued to fall, maternal mortality has
risen. Many drugs are in short supply. Hospital patients sometimes have to bring their
own sheets. There are reports of doctors starting to demand payment. On a weekday morning in a village in the
inappropriately named municipality of La Salud ("health"), south of the capital, this correspondent came across an elderly woman
who had hurt her arm and was whimpering with pain, having found no doctors in attendance at two health clinics.
In 2010, 37,000 Cuban doctors and other health workers were working in 77 countries around the world, mostly in Venezuela but
also in Africa, the Caribbean and Central America. The Cuban government also offers scholarships to 20,000 Latin Americans to
study medicine--all part of its obsessive search for international prestige. But the main reason for the shortage
of medical staff is low salaries. A woman who gave her name as Grisel says she worked as a family doctor for just
$23 a month, but now earns $40 a month in an improvised craft shop in Havana. She has two small children. A pair of children's
shoes costs $13. As a doctor "I faced a choice of buying shoes or eating."
LINK TURN - Embargo restricts Cuba from access to necessary
medicines and tech
Xinhua News 11/28/2012 “Cuban healthcare weakended by U.S. embargo”
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/health/2012-11/28/c_132004531.htm
HAVANA, Nov. 27 (Xinhua) -- Cuban medical authorities said on Tuesday a 50-year trade embargo
imposed by the United States has severely undermined the country's healthcare
system.
Cuban hospitals suffer restrictions in acquiring imported medical consumables
and medicine, advanced medical technology and latest scientific information, officials
said.
The public Institute of Cardiology and Cardiovascular Surgery, where thousands of
people receive free medical care every year from international specialists, is financially strained by
the embargo.
"We must find alternatives that sometimes include purchasing from distant markets, buying from third parties,
which means higher prices for these products," said Director of the institute Dr.
Lorenzo Llerena.
He added some equipments were simply unattainable, "because they are
manufactured in the United States."
The embargo has caused Cuba a loss of more than 200 million dollars in the
medical sector alone by 2011, representing a significant impact on the tiny Caribbean nation, according to official
figures.
John Rhodes, a patient, told Xinhua that Cuba had made a great effort for the benefit of all its
citizens.
"It provides us free medicine across the country, which is highly expensive around the world," he said, adding "due to the
U.S. embargo, sometimes we do not have all the raw materials and tools to solve certain
problems immediately."
LINK TURN - Embargo devastates health care system – supplies &
lack of information exchange
Amnesty International 2009 “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on
Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf
The negative impact of the US embargo on the Cuban health care system and on the right
to health of Cubans during the 1990s has been documented in a 1997 report by the American
Association for World Health (AAWH).45 The 300-page document is still the most comprehensive study on the
issue. Based on a fact-finding mission to Cuba, the AAWH identified that the embargo contributed
particularly to malnutrition affecting especially women and children, poor water quality, lack of access to
medicines and medical supplies, and limited the exchange of medical and scientific
information due to travel restrictions and currency regulations. The AAWH found that “a
humanitarian catastrophe has been averted only because the Cuban government has maintained a high level of budgetary support
for a health care system designed to deliver primary and preventive health care to all of its citizens… Even so, the U.S.
embargo of food and the de facto embargo on medical supplies has wreaked havoc
with the island's model primary health care system.”46
Health Care DA – N/U Ext
Health care system is crumbling – budget cuts
Associated Press 8/25/2012 “Cuba Health Care: Budget Cuts Threaten Sector”
Huffington Post http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/27/cuba-healthcare_n_1832955.html
HAVANA -- Cuba's system of free medical care, long considered a birthright by its citizens and trumpeted as
one of the communist government's great successes, is not immune to cutbacks under Raul Castro's drive for
efficiency.
The health sector has already endured millions of dollars in budget cuts and tens of
thousands of layoffs, and it became clear this month that Castro is looking for more ways to save when the newspaper
voice of the Communist Party, Granma, published daily details for two weeks on how much the government spends on everything
from anesthetics and acupuncture to orthodontics and organ transplants.
It's part of a wider media campaign that seems geared to discourage frivolous use of medical services, to explain or blunt fears of a
drop-off in care and to remind Cubans to be grateful that health care is still free despite persistent economic woes. But it's also
raising the eyebrows of outside analysts, who predict further cuts or significant changes to what has been
a pillar of the socialist system implanted after the 1959 revolution.
"Very often the media has been a leading indicator of where the economic reforms are going," said Phil Peters, a longtime Cuba
observer at the Lexington Institute think tank. "My guess is that there's some kind of policy statement to follow, because that's been
the pattern."
The theme of the Granma pieces, posters in clinics and ads on state TV is the same: "Your health care is free, but how much does it
cost?"
The answer is, not much by outside standards, but quite a bit for Cuba, which spends $190 million a year paying for its citizens'
medical bills.
Based on the official exchange rate, the government spends $2 each time a Cuban visits a family doctor, $4.14 for each X-ray and
$6,827 for a heart transplant.
It's not a luxury service though. Scarcities now are common and sanitary conditions fall short of
the ideal in decaying facilities where paint peels from the walls. Patients often bring their own
bed sheets, electric fans, food and water for hospital stays.
Cubans lack resources for necessary medicine and equipment
Global Politics 2007 “The Challenges of Health Care in Cuba” http://www.globalpolitics.co.uk/issue9/hanna/
However, challenges remain. Healthcare may be free and available for all Cuban citizens but
medication is not. Pharmacies are often very poorly stocked and rationing of
supplies is minimal. 13 There are claims that hospitals are often in poor conditions and
doctors have to bring in their own supplies and equipment to allow them to treat
their patients. 10 Despite the production of medical supplies and technology, it seems
very little of this actually remains in Cuba. Every year Cuba exports huge amounts
of medical aid, mostly to other Latin American countries for purely financial returns. 22 For example, Venezuela provides
much-needed oil to Cuba and in exchange receives Cuban doctors and medical supplies. 14
Cuba’s dual economy has a lot to do with why such disparity exists. Medication and
equipment is there and
available but only to pay for in American dollars, of which the poor and middle
classes of Cuba are very unlikely to have. 23 The ‘pesos pharmacies’ and local state
hospitals are drastically under-stocked and thus access for the poor to needed
medication is minimal, despite the service being free.
AT: Health Care DA – Link Turn Ext
Embargo prevents access to necessary tech
SurfKY News 4/15/2013 “UK Delegation Visits Cuba, Learns About its Healthcare
System” http://surfky.com/index.php/communities/303-lexington-fayette-county/29814-ukdelegation-visits-cuba-learns-about-its-healthcare-system
“Many of the problems with Cuba’s health care system are associated with the
American embargo,” Berres said. “This prevents them from having access to the latest
pharmaceutical and technological advances, so many of their facilities are very
basic.”
Embargo prevents access to tech and medicine
CNN 9/02/2009 “Report: U.S. sanctions put Cubans' health at risk”
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/09/01/amnesty.cuba.health/
LONDON, England (CNN) -- The U.S. trade embargo on Cuba is endangering the health of
millions by limiting Cubans' access to medicines and medical technology, human rights
group Amnesty International alleged Wednesday.
An Amnesty report examines the effects of the sanctions, which have been in place since 1962. Amnesty International SecretaryGeneral Irene Khan called the U.S. embargo immoral and said it should be lifted.
"It's preventing millions of Cubans from benefiting from vital medicines and medical equipment essential for their health," Khan
said.
The embargo restricts the export of medicines and medical equipment from the
U.S. and from any U.S.-owned company abroad.
Amnesty also called on President Obama to not renew the Trading with the Enemy Act, which is due for renewal on September 14.
The Act has been reviewed by U.S. presidents on an annual basis since 1978. Amnesty said that while not renewing the Act would not
in itself end the embargo against Cuba, it would send a clear message that the U.S. is adopting a new policy toward Cuba.
In April this year President Obama lifted restrictions that had prevented U.S. citizens from visiting relatives in Cuba, and sending
them remittances.
A U.S. State Department spokeswoman would not comment on the report because she hadn't read it. However, she said, "The
president believes it makes strategic sense to hold on to some inducements we can use in dealing with a Cuban government if it
shows any signs of seeking a normalized relationship with us and begins to respect basic human rights."
The Amnesty report also cites United Nations data that says Cuba's inability to import nutritional products for schools, hospitals and
day care centers is contributing to a high prevalence of iron deficiency anemia. In 2007, the condition affected 37.5 percent of Cuba's
children under three years old, according to UNICEF.
Cuba can import these products from other countries, but there are major shipping costs and logistical challenges to contend with.
Gail Reed is international director of MEDICC (Medical Education Cooperation with Cuba), a non-profit organization that
encourages cooperation among U.S., Cuban and global health communities.
She told CNN, "In general, the embargo has a sweeping effect on Cuban healthcare. Over the past
decades, I would say the people most affected have been cancer and HIV-AIDS patients."
She also said the embargo affects the way doctors think about the future. "Doctors in Cuba always worry that
an international supplier will be bought out by a U.S. company, leaving medical
equipment without replacement parts and patients without continuity of
medications," Reed said.
Gerardo Ducos, an Amnesty researcher for the Caribbean region, told CNN that although medicines and medical
supplies can be licensed for export to Cuba, the conditions governing the process
make their export virtually impossible.
Embargo restricts health care – equipment & chemicals
Amnesty International 2009 “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on
Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf
The provision of health care has also suffered from the limitations and restrictions
imposed by the embargo on the procurement of basic and specialized medical
equipment and chemical components needed for the production of generic
medicines.
Embargo hurts health care – hampers UN programs
Amnesty International 2009 “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on
Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf
The increase in the costs for purchasing the necessary medicine or medical
materials is hampering the implementation of UN development projects and
programmes. The repercussions of these difficulties are ultimately felt by the intended beneficiaries of these
programmes, who face long delays before having access to adequate medicine or
treatment.
Embargo hurts health care – infrastructure
Amnesty International 2009 “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on
Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf
The impact of economic sanctions on health and health services is not limited to
difficulties in the supply of medicine. Health and health services depend on
functioning water and sanitation infrastructure, on electricity and other
functioning equipment such as X-ray facilities or refrigerators to store vaccines. The financial burden
and commercial barriers have led to shortages or intermittent availability of
drugs, medicines, equipment and spare parts. It has also hindered the renovation
of hospitals, clinics and care centres for the elderly.64
AT: LIFT TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS
CP
Removing travel restrictions alone is insufficient to solve the soft
power advantave advantage – removing the whole embargo is key
Perez JD Yale Law School 2010 David “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department” Harvard Latino Law Review lexis
The only problem with offering more humanitarian aid to Cuba is that it seemingly contradicts current U.S. policy, which aims to
isolate and destabilize the regime through economic sanctions. The perception in Cuba is that the United
States is responsible for the chronic humanitarian crisis that has afflicted the
island since 1989. n78 While any increase in humanitarian assistance will no doubt
be viewed as a positive step in the right direction, it will still have to be reconciled
with an enduring hostile relationship between both countries. On the one hand, humanitarian
assistance is the very type of soft power engagement that might help thaw relations between Washington and Havana. However, on
the other hand, since so much of America's humanitarian soft power resources lie
outside of government in the private sector and civil society, n79 any increase in
humanitarian assistance might also require a proportional loosening of the trade
and travel restrictions - at least, as applied to humanitarian organizations.[*215]
Doesn’t solve hard power – lifting the embargo is key to cooperating
on oil drilling – that’s the key internal link to hard power