KEY RISK CONTROL AREA/COMPONENT:
Emergency Preparedness and Response
RISK BASED CONTROL(s) / HSSE-MS EXPECTATIONS
CP 122-2.5
It is PDO’s responsibility to ensure those plans, procedures and resources are in place to respond swiftly and
efficiently to any emergency situation and to minimise any consequential losses.
STATUS OF CONTROL (+/-)
Observations (current controls in place):
 It was observed that the main office CECC well laid out with suitable work
stations, information boards and comms systems in place. Checklist for each
key role observed.
 It was reported that oil spills exercises tier 1, 2 and 3 were performed as
per MOSAG
 It was observed during a visit to the tug boats that ER musters and drill
have been carried out, evidence in the register and captains log. An
exercise was carried out on board to a satisfactory nature.

At the Haima West Power Station, the emergency contact number was last
updated 23/2/2011.
 (Marmul lab Supv): Absorbent is available in Marmul Lab to clean-up spills.
 Al Ghalbi: UIP drill for the South is managed with the main contractor AlGhalbi. Saw record for November 2011-Feb 2012. Gaps identified is input
into a single action tracker managed by Al Ghalbi.
 Good housekeeping at the Qarn Alam Power Plant Project Site with clear
indication of emergency escape routes.
Observations (gaps in controls):

Observations on ER in lab at MAF: H2S alarm system last calibrated in
17/7/2009 with due date pasted on the panel as 11/1/10. No record
available after that. One detector (H2S detector #5) was at fault but no
schematic to identify the affected detector in the lab. No record available
for last alarm testing for the H2S Alarm. No drill done wrt H2S release and
therefore, whether the H2S alarm which is located outside the 3 labs (Oil,
Water, Cement) can be heard by staff working in lab is unknown.

Lab in MAF. During the visit, could not locate spill recovery kit.
 (Marmul lab Supv): The lab is located within the overall South Directorate
office building. The drill is therefore together with the office building
which is mainly evacuation drill. No record of previous lab emergency drill
with scenario on lab chemical fire etc.
 Two H2S monitors used by the PDO lab staff in Fahud (UIK) were outside
their calibration period (e.g. detector no. 0074 expired 23/6/2010). No
register of H2S monitor calibration records could be found.

General awareness level of PDO lab staff in Fahud (UIK) were inconsistent
e.g. no detailed knowledge of H2S levels found at different sites,
requirements for use of BA sets, escape sets, buddy system.
UIK/x (Fahud
Lab)
check reference indicator
 Fire Extinguishers at the Yibal Power Station overdue their inspection date
-due January 2011 (UIE/3Y interpreted tag as stating date of last
inspection rather than the due date). UIE/3Y Assets (Yibal)
 Fire extinguisher inspection frequency in MaF is 6 months while in the

frequency in Yibal, Fahud and Qarn Alam is every 3 months
MaF vs
Interior
NA
Smoke detectors installed in the offices used by the Qarn Alam Power
Station Projects, did not work. Jahnpars & Mapna (MD2) Consortium (UIE/53
Contractor) NA
POTENTIAL FINDINGS
There are gaps in the preparedness to respond in case of emergencies at the
lab. There are also improvements for fire equipment maintenance. This was
evidenced by





Overdue calibration of H2S monitors and alarms in the lab
Lack of spill recovery kit in lab
Emergency drills not covering relevant potential scenarios for
the lab
Inconsistent identification of inspection dates of portable
fire extinguisher maintenance
Smoke detectors in Contractor office not working.
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Degree of weakness / materiality of flaw in control :
Is control completely missing or is flawed to extent that it is effectively
not functioning? No
Is a control in place but has a material flaw? Control is in place, but gaps
exist.
Is there a gap likely to have a measurable undesirable impact on the
achievement of one of the entity’s HSSE&SP objectives and therefore warrants
remedial actions to be taken.
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Rating: MEDIUM
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Cross checks:
To what sort of incident could such a gap in controls lead e.g. has a material flaw in
application of MoC for organization played a key contributory role in prior incident(s)
that could be classified in the RAM Yellow or RAM Red categories?
Or What does the auditees risk register rank as?
Does such a control gap warrant remedial actions to be taken in a short term time frame
with oversight of the follow-up of these actions at the level of Business Leadership
Team (i.e MDC level)?
IMPLICATION(S)
Laboratories may not detect and respond to emergencies to make timely response
if the detectors, alarms are not in good calibration/ maintenance.
Confusion in fire extinguishers inspection status may leave the response
RECOMMENDATION(S)
1) Identify safety critical elements including detectors and alarms in
the laboratory and include in SAP for maintenance and monitoring.
2) Evolve procedure for inspection, maintenance and identification of
inspection status tagging of Portable fire extinguishers.