LIEUTENANT COLONEL PETE BLABER
COMMANDER, ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS
What is your view of the command structures for Task Force 11 and for Operation
Anaconda?
Are you comfortable with the battle plan?
Army Lieutenant Colonel Pete Blaber was the Delta Force officer who led the long-range
reconnaissance teams that played a large role in Operation Anaconda. Blaber’s “Advanced
Force Operations” unit was part of the larger “Task Force 11,” an agglomeration of elite covert
or “black” special operators whose prime mission was to kill or capture senior al Qaeda and
Taliban leaders. A fiercely independent commander and thinker, Blaber’s leadership ensured
that his teams collected important intelligence and called in devastating air strikes on the al
Qaeda and Taliban forces who were the targets for Anaconda. At the same time, his forceful
personality exacerbated political and personality divisions within Task Force 11, and the task
force senior commanders shut him out of crucial decisions that profoundly affected the course of
the battle.
BACKGROUND
Pete Blaber grew up in Illinois, and was an accomplished marathon runner and triathlete
in college. He was commissioned through Officer Candidate School, served as an Army Ranger,
joined the Army’s elite Delta Force in 1991, and saw combat in Panama, Somalia, the Balkans,
and Iraq. Blaber rose to serve as Delta’s operations officer, and commanded Delta’s B
Squadron. Before Operation Anaconda, he had deployed to Afghanistan once before in the early
stages of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Blaber relied on certain principles to guide his decision-making. “Listen to the guy on the
ground. Imagine the unimaginable. When in doubt, develop the situation.” His combat
leadership was marked by creativity and daring, and he stressed the ancient axiom of “audacity,
audacity, and audacity.” Blaber also considered the human element to be decisive in combat.
The previous summer, while commanding the B Squadron, Blaber took 30 Delta
operators on a hiking excursion in the wilderness of Montana. He wanted to figure out “the art of
the possible” if Delta ever had to traverse similar terrain elsewhere. The 100-mile trek was
extremely challenging, but valuable to Blaber and his team. His warriors realized they could get
over one or two snow-covered 9,000-foot mountains a day, and that packed snow actually made
some difficult terrain easier. These lessons would prove their worth during Operation Anaconda.
Blaber often felt constricted by the rigidity of military hierarchy and modes of thought,
and believed success hinged on being nimble and adaptable. In contrast to many others who had
prominent roles in Anaconda, Blaber had an aversion to using helicopters in his operations. Far
from sowing fear in the hearts of the enemy, he felt they ruined the element of surprise, and
stymied creative planning. He was a proponent of the “power of combinations,” using the
synergy of teams from various Special Forces units, conventional forces, and the CIA in
Afghanistan.
INSIDE TASK FORCE 11
Operation Enduring Freedom, the campaign to destroy al Qaeda and topple the Taliban in
Afghanistan, began on October 7, 2001. In the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom, it was
American special operations forces and intelligence operatives, in tandem with Afghan allies and
with the support of U.S. air power, that provided the main effort against al Qaeda and their
Taliban sponsors. Along with Army “Green Beret” Special Forces responsible for training and
equipping Afghan militias, elite special forces, which conduct “kill-or-capture” missions, were a
crucial part of the campaign. These so-called “black” special operations forces, grouped under
Task Force 11, enjoyed a separate, parallel chain of command. And because of the perceived
“high-value” of their targets and their mission, they often took priority over others.
The teams of Blaber’s Advanced Force Operations were part of Task Force 11, though
their reconnaissance missions relied upon stealthy scouting rather than direct action. The main
body of Task Force 11 was comprised of Navy SEALs, Army Rangers, Air Force
communications and medical experts and special operations helicopters. Advanced Force
Operations was an ad-hoc grouping, and Blaber could not have been happier with the missionfirst focus. Regional commander Gen. Tommy Franks had told Blaber simply: “Get some men
out into the frontier to figure out what’s going on. Find the enemy, then kill or capture ‘em.” For
Advanced Force Operations, however, the killing would, in all but exceptional cases, be indirect:
AFO would call upon U.S. air power to eliminate enemy positions.
Blaber had about 45 men in Afghanistan, divided among six teams. Most came from
Delta Force, the elite Army unit, but Blaber also was able to select the best operators from Navy
and Air Force Special Forces. The members of Advance Force Operations thought like their
commander, and the teams needed little oversight as they developed intelligence in concert with
the CIA, other Special Forces units, and Afghan allies. Blaber pushed his intelligence analysts
and communications experts out of Bagram air base, north of Kabul, and into local CIA “safe
houses,” where they could develop a clear intelligence picture close to the action. He also met
regularly with his CIA and Special Forces counterparts, even moving his command shop into the
CIA’s Kabul headquarters, and agreed to create pilot teams in which the CIA would produce and
process intelligence, the Special Forces teams would equip and train the Afghans, and the AFO
would conduct operations to find and destroy the enemy. Well before Operation Anaconda was
unleashed, Blaber was putting his beliefs about how to operate into practice, and getting other
agencies to work in a similar way. This approach to making the total effect greater than the sum
of the parts would repay dividends in Operation Anaconda – but when it broke down, catastrophe
resulted.
Before deploying to Afghanistan, Blaber had combed the literature from the Soviet war
of the 1980s, including the records of the CIA operatives who served with the mujahideen in the
1980s Soviet-Afghan War. Among the valuable finds was a report on Ali Mohamed, an
Egyptian-born Special Forces officer turned al Qaeda operative who was detained in 1998 for his
role in the American embassy bombings in Tanzania. Ali Mohamed revealed to his American
interrogators that shopkeepers, taxi drivers, shepherds, and money-changers would be the best
sources of information on al Qaeda. Mohamed also told the Americans that the towns around the
remote Shah-i-kot valley, located in the mountainous and remote Paktia province along the
border with Pakistan, would be the place to search for Osama bin Laden. Blaber also instructed
his men to read deeply about the history of Afghanistan and, sensing that it made for a likely
battleground, Shah-i-kot valley in particular. Through their study, the AFO soldiers learned that
the mujahideen always tried to hold the high ground, and hide their artillery in creek beds. (For
the regional location of the Shah-i-kot, see attached map of Afghanistan)
Though he was successful at instilling his methods within his teams, Blaber had much
less success with the rest of the elite special operations Task Force 11. This task force worked
directly for theater commander Gen. Franks, but also answered, indirectly but importantly, to
Joint Special Operations Command, normally based at Pope Air Force Base. Over the years,
JSOC had developed into a kind of separate service – and through the years since September 11
and the declaration of the “global war on terrorism,” its independence and influence have
continued to grow.
Through Task Force 11, JSOC Commander Major General Dell Dailey – himself a
dominant personality – would exercise a powerful influence on Operation Anaconda from his
North Carolina headquarters. The emphasis on “high-value targets” like Osama bin Laden and
his senior lieutenants remained a priority, and Task Force 11 commander Brigadier General
Gregory Trebon had established a system whereby his troops would remain at Bagram until
intelligence on a high-value target arrived, then fly to the site of the raid. Instead, Blaber wanted
forces close to enemy hideouts, where they could gather timely intelligence and reach their
targets more quickly; he believed his teams could provide important support to conventional
operations as well as in the hunt for al Qaeda leaders. (For a diagram of command arrangements,
see attached, “Chain of Command”)
For the first week in Afghanistan, Blaber met daily with the CIA Kabul station chief,
known as “Rich,” and the U.S. Special Forces commander, Colonel John Mulholland.
Mulholland’s “Task Force Dagger” directed the Green Beret detachments that worked closely
with Afghan militias, that had been at the center of Operation Enduring Freedom. Even with the
planned commitment of conventional forces in the campaign in the Shah-i-kot, the need to
emphasize anti-Taliban elements among the Afghans remained important for a host of reasons.
Blaber believed there was a large al Qaeda force in the Shah-i-kot, and likely a senior
leader with them, especially with the valley so close to Pakistan. The AFO Commander
requested more troops for aggressive reconnaissance missions in the Shah-i-kot, but JSOC
commander Dailey was skeptical. Dailey did not like Blaber personally, disagreed with his
assertion that a large enemy force was gathered in the Shah-i-kot, and felt Blaber was exceeding
his authority by pushing for bold reconnaissance missions in the valley. Others in Task Force 11
headquarters agreed, mocking Blaber as “Peter the Great,” or “Colonel Kurtz,” in reference to
the crazed “Captain Kurtz” character from Heart of Darkness.
PLANNING ANACONDA
The planning for an operation in the Shah-i-kot was done initially by Mulholland’s Task
Force Dagger. Mulholland and his staff began with the now tried-and-true mix of U.S.
unconventional and Afghan forces, backed up by U.S. air power. A local anti-Taliban leader,
Zia Lodin, who had helped organize a small band of militia within the region, would be the main
effort in the attack.
Yet, the previous battle at Tora Bora – itself still a controversial operation that became
the subject even of a Senate investigation – where the combination of U.S. air power, special
operations forces and local Afghan militias notoriously cornered but did not kill Osama bin
Laden and other high-profile al Qaeda leaders – strongly suggested to Mulholland that something
more would be needed in the Shah-i-kot if the enemy were not to live to fight another day.
Mulholland, appreciating that his Green Berets and their Afghan allies were not up to the task,
agreed with Major General Franklin “Buster” Hagenbeck, commander of U.S conventional land
forces in the area, that American light infantry would be needed to supply the steel for another
“hammer-and-anvil” style attack. Blaber, too, welcomed the arrival of conventional forces, but
he still encouraged Mulholland to retain overall command, arguing that the Task Force Dagger
leader had the most experience in Afghanistan and his troops had been working hand-in-hand
with the Afghans set to make the main effort in the fight to come. But Mulholland understood
that the task of planning, coordinating and commanding such a large, complex operation also
exceeded the capabilities of his staff.
In particular, Blaber was concerned about the use of helicopters – which would
necessarily be the means of transport for any substantial U.S. infantry force – in the valley. At a
10 February 2002 planning session, only a few weeks before the operation itself, Blaber warned
strongly against a helicopter-borne air assault. Unlike some of the enthusiasts among the
conventional forces, which included both a large element from the 101st Airborne Division but
also included others, like Hagenbeck, who had served in that unit – Blaber cautioned that the
enemy in the valley would expect, and be prepared for, an air assault, and would cover all the
likely landing zones with heavy weapons. Blaber’s study of the history of the Shah-i-kot, where
Soviet forces had repeatedly attempted helicopter assaults but had never succeeded, informed
this view. But, lacking sufficient vehicles for a ground operation and armed with intelligence
assessments that the enemy would be few and lightly armed, the air assault continued. Blaber’s
prediction of the enemy’s was prescient. Al Qaeda fighters in the Shah-i-kot manned the same
cemented anti-aircraft positions that mujahedeen had in the fight against the Red Army. Even
the American landing zones for the helicopters would be identical to those used by the Soviets.
(For an overview of the campaign plan, see attached, “Anaconda Plan”)
Nonetheless, and to the consternation of his Task Force 11 superiors, Blaber was
convinced of the need to attack the al Qaeda force gathering in the Shah-i-kot. He also had
concluded that, air assault or not, his spotters could play a crucial role and that such a large al
Qaeda force would have to be led by some high-ranking figure, even if it was not that likely to be
Osama bin Laden himself. Finally, Blaber convinced his superiors in Task Force 11, dubious as
ever of Blaber’s judgment, of the merits of playing a role in the coming campaign. Blaber would
oversee AFO missions from the safe house in Gardez, only 18 miles north of the valley, while
his deputy commander, “Jimmy,” remained in Bagram to share intelligence with Hagenbeck.
This move, too, reflected Blaber’s commitment to making even his highly independent unit part
of a larger whole; he had no obligation to dispatch Jimmy to Hagenbeck’s side—Task Force 11,
and AFO with it, did not answer to Hagenbeck— but Blaber understood acutely the helpful role
AFO could play, both in providing intelligence from his scouts and other special operations
channels and, in the battle itself, by calling in air strikes. (For a view of the Shah-i-kot and
Gardez, see attached, “The Shah-i-kot and Surroundings”)
SNEAKING INTO THE SHAH-I-KOT
On February 14, Blaber gathered his men and briefed them on their first Anaconda
mission: reconnoiter the approaches to and interior of the Shah-i-kot valley. These would be the
first American on-the-ground eyes on the target.
Blaber envisioned a two-phase initial reconnaissance mission. The first would be done by
vehicle, driving the roads south of Gardez to determine the feasibility of moving into the valley
on foot. Then Blaber planned to send two teams into observation posts around the valley, one
from the north and one from the south, before returning to prepare for Anaconda itself.
Blaber had two of his six small teams at his disposal, dubbed “India” and “Juliet.” Juliet’s
mission was to establish an observation post on the northern end of the valley, while India
reconnoitered the south. The teams set out on February 17 in two Toyota pickups, only to turn
back after encountering impassable terrain. But just as the northern routes toward Shah-i-kot too
rough for the American to drive through, so they would not be viable avenues of escape for
enemy fighters. Blaber sent the teams out again two days later, and they returned with reports
that 700 al Qaeda fighters – more than triple the number in formal intelligence assessments – had
recently passed through to the Shah-i-kot. The Juliet team was sent back a third time on
February 20 to observe the valley itself. The next day, and despite severe snow and high winds,
Blaber decided to send the India team to scout the southern approaches to the valley. The team
rode in trucks to a spot well west of the valley, and hiked the rest of the way. Even for men
trained in the mountains of the American west, the team reached limits of its endurance on the
Afghan mountaintops in the extreme weather. Still, the India men found that the southern
approaches were viable as reconnaissance posts over the valley, and that the enemy was using
trails from the southern Shah-i-kot into Pakistan. These missions also convinced Blaber that he
needed more men, and he was able to convince the newly arrived SEALs of Task Force 11 – the
SEALs had just deployed to relieve the main Delta Force units that had been doing the kill-and-
capture work up to that point – to give him a one five-man team called “Mako 31.” Blaber knew
that the SEALs would be chomping at the bit to get into the action. (For a view of the Shah-i-kot,
with its terrain and villages as well as the observation posts, see attached “The Shah-i-kot Valley,
with observation posts”)
Blaber also began sharing his intelligence directly with Hagenbeck, with whom he
quickly developed a close relationship. And unlike Trebon and Dailey, Hagenbeck quickly
trusted what Blaber had to say. The two also recognized that, though they were under formally
separate command chains, that they would be sharing a battlefield in Anaconda. Even though,
for example, they differed over the use of helicopters, having a common understanding of the
plan was critical. This back-door relationship infuriated JSOC commander Dailey, and he
contemplated bringing Blaber home. Dailey was adamant that Blaber’s units, like the rest of
Task Force 11, focus on the high-value “Big Three;” bin Laden, his number-two Ayman al
Zawahiri, and Taliban leader Mullah Omar, not spend its time supporting Anaconda.
Blaber persisted however. On February 27, his three AFO teams were set to enter Shahi-kot to stay. They had three tasks: Confirm or deny the presence of senior al Qaeda leaders,
check the designated helicopter landing zones and prevent enemy forces from concentrating near
them, and call in air strikes when targets presented themselves. His soldiers understood and
appreciated the audacity of this mission, and knew Blaber was laying his career on the line with
his willingness to go against the wishes of his superiors.
Again, the Juliet team would travel around the northern tip of the valley, this time part of
the way on all-terrain-vehicles (ATVs) rather than full-size pickups, and then on foot to occupy a
spot high in the eastern ridgeline of the valley. They were to keep watch on the northern half of
the valley, and particularly its northernmost village. The India and Mako 31 teams would creep
into the valley from the south. Again, it was painstaking and time-consuming work, always
requiring caution and stealth. It took the Juliet men nine hours to drive and walk the 8 miles
kilometers to their observation post that night, but by sunrise on February 28 they were well
hidden in the rocks. India made it in that night as well, but Mako 31 had to stop short of their
final observation post, waiting to resume the infiltration the next night. In the end, Blaber had 13
pairs of eyes – and, also critically, teams with highly sophisticated targeting and communications
gear, stationed around the Shah-i-kot.
One of the first things the teams spotted was undeniable evidence of a large-scale enemy
presence in the valley. Indeed, there were a couple of close calls when enemy fighters walked by
their positions. They noticed in particular that the ridgeline that formed the western wall of the
valley, a humpbacked formation dubbed “the Whale” by Anaconda planners, was full of enemy
fighters and bunkers.
On March 1, on the southern ridge that jutted into the Shah-i-kot and dominated the
planned landing zones in the valley south, Mako 31 made a discovery that likely averted
catastrophe for the air assault. They spotted a heavy machine gun post on their ridge, which the
planners referred to as “the Finger,” in perfect position to shoot down one of large, heavy CH-47
Chinooks that were needed for the attack. Losing a helicopter in the opening moments of the air
assault was Hagenbeck’s biggest fear, as it would have thrown off the entire operation. The
Mako 31 SEAL commander recommended attacking just before the operation started; Blaber’s
two-word reply was simply, “Good hunting.”
ANACONDA IN MOTION
By late afternoon of February 28, Blaber’s belief that there was a large enemy force in
the valley was confirmed by the AFO teams. They had seen dozens of fighters moving around
the valley. The al Qaeda forces occupied high ground on the Whale, the Finger, and the eastern
ridge of the valley that was topped by a peak known as Takur Ghar. The intelligence upon which
the Anaconda plan was based, gathered from reconnaissance aircraft and signals, was profoundly
wrong.
Blaber’s deputy Jimmy, reading the AFO intelligence reports in Bagram, understood the
danger awaiting helicopters that tried to land in the valley. “Sir,” he said to Hagenbeck’s chief of
staff, “do not land those helicopters [there]. The current plan is not going to work out for you.”
“I know, Jim,” he replied, “but it’s too late to do anything about it.”
Operation Anaconda was already underway; the Dagger teams and the Afghan militias
were already on the road to the Shah-i-kot; all Blaber’s men could do now was support the
operation. In the wee hours of the morning on March 2, D-Day, Mako 31’s five SEALs crept
forward and assaulted the al Qaeda machine gun post. With the help of an AC-130 gunship, they
killed the five enemy fighters.
As the conventional forces in the operation swung into action, reports from the three
AFO teams were especially helpful. During the battle, the spotters could clearly observe enemy
mortars and machine guns, but initially had trouble getting supporting aircraft to attack the
targets in a timely way. As the day continued, the pace of fire from U.S. aircraft accelerated.
During the daylight hours of March 2, the strikes called in by the AFO teams of India, Juliet, and
Mako 31 were devasting to the enemy, who were focused on the conventional assault on the
valley floor. Even though Hagenbeck’s infantry came under withering fire, Blaber saw this as an
opportunity. Enemy fighters exposed themselves by moving to attack the US troops in the valley,
and, when they did so, the AFO teams targeted them for the aircraft to destroy. (For an overview
of the action of March 2, see attached, “Anaconda Reality (March 2, 2002)”)
Thus, while for Mulholland and Hagenbeck’s troops the battle was going poorly, Blaber
saw an enemy being steadily eviscerated. And al Qaeda troops were reinforcing the Shah-i-kot
positions, clearly scenting what they believed was an opportunity to overrun the remaining
American positions. And this was a serious prospect: after hearing a radio conversation between
Hagenbeck and his lieutenants discussed pulling their forces out of the valley, Blaber made his
most fateful call of the operation. He radioed his deputy Jimmy, emphasizing how effective the
air strikes had been and what an opportunity was at hand. Anaconda was not following the
prepared plan, but it was achieving the desired effect.
Jimmy put Blaber on speakerphone, and Hagenbeck came over to Jimmy with his two
senior advisers to listen in. “I believe that pulling out would be a huge mistake,” said Blaber.
The AFO teams are decimating the enemy and continue to hold almost all of the key terrain
around the valley. We’ll continue to bomb the key enemy positions. We’ve identified the enemy’s
key trail networks behind the mountains, which we’ll bomb and cut off tonight. We have a
resupply scheduled for tonight that will allow the teams to stay in position and support the
[conventional] forces while continuing to destroy the enemy for another four days. We believe this
is the battlefield opportunity of a lifetime. AFO is going to stay in position and keep on killing
until there’s no more killing to be done.
Hagenbeck talked it over with his deputies, and they agreed. If al Qaeda wanted a fight to the
death, they would get it.
TASK FORCE 11 WANTS A PIECE OF THE ACTION
The night of March 2, Blaber received congratulatory calls from Trebon and even from
CENTCOM chief General Tommy Franks. But Trebon also had a shocking message for Blaber:
he wanted to turn the Anaconda mission over to the SEALs and send Blaber on to look for “the
next battlefield.” To Blaber, this decision reeked of jealousy, not professional consideration.
Blaber’s teams were just beginning to reap the rewards of their painstaking preparations. As the
moment of decision arrived, the SEALs wanted in on the action.
Seeing that the decision was already made, Blaber tried to at least ensure that the SEALs
prepared properly. And he tried to retain command of action in the valley – after all, he was the
man on the ground, who had scripted much of the battle. His bid was rebuked. On the night of
March 3, the India and Mako 31 teams left their positions, replaced by SEALs.
That same night, the SEAL team commanders showed up suddenly at Jimmy’s command
center in Gardez. Trebon then told Blaber that he wanted to know when Blaber would turn over
command of the AFO teams to the SEALs. Blaber did not know when he could transfer
command, and assumed that until he did so, he remained in charge. But Trebon had decided to
supplant Blaber with SEAL commander Vic Hyder. Trebon called to tell him the new SEAL
teams were going in that night.
In addition to replacing the AFO teams already in position, Anaconda commanders
wanted a new observation post at the peak of Takur Ghar, the highest ground of all. Spotters on
Takur Ghar could identify targets at the summit of the Whale and in dead zones around the
valley that even eluded the three AFO views. The questions were “Who?” and “How?”
The answer to the first question was clear. Blaber chose the “Mako 30” SEAL
reconnaissance team – rather than direct-action units – for the Takur Ghar mission. And again,
Blaber stressed the need for patience and stealth. He did not want to send in the MAKO 30 team
that night, before it had an opportunity to get oriented. And he certainly did not want to use a
helicopter to infiltrate them. But with the order to send them immediately, he had no choice.
Problems with the helicopters delayed Mako 30, meaning they would not have time to
land somewhere below the peak and hike up Takur Ghar before dawn. Thus the choice for
Hyder was to delay the mission for a night, or fly to another landing zone and hide out for the
day, or taking the risk of landing directly at the summit of Takur Ghar. Such a direct insertion
would be extremely risky; even if the landing zone on top of the mountain was clear, the noise
would broadcast the location of the SEAL spotters throughout the valley. The enemy would
surely come for them.
Now the flawed chain of command truly began to have fatal consequences. Blaber was
still in charge, and understood the risks better than anybody else, but Hyder ignored him, and
spoke directly to Task Force 11, 100 miles away. They wanted Hyder’s SEALs inserted that
night, so that they could participate in a battle that might well be over the next day. No one told
Jimmy, Blaber or Hagenbeck – the commanders with whom Hyder and Trebon were sharing the
battlefield – about this critical decision.
The Mako 30 mission went awry from the start. Told to land directly on the top of Takur
Ghar, the SEALs under Chief Petty Officer Britt “Slab” Slabinski could only rely on the sensors
of an overhead AC-130 to assure them that the landing zone was clear. The aircrew repeatedly
swept of the area, but failed to find dug in al Qaeda troops.
Slab and his men landed in a hornet’s nest. Their chopper was struck by a rocketpropelled grenade even before it touched down; the stricken Chinook transport helicopter bucked
as the pilots struggled to control the wounded bird. As they pulled away to make what would be
a crash landing on the valley floor seven kilometers away, SEAL Neil Roberts slipped and fell to
the snows of Takur Ghar, surrounded by al Qaeda.
The SEALs did not digest the information until they hit the valley. Seized with the idea
of saving Roberts, Slab and his team, understanding that their helicopter was out of action,
prepared to hike back to Takur Ghar until they understood how far it was and how high the
climb. A second Chinook was sent to rescue the SEALs and the aircrew, bringing them back to
the Gardez safe house.
Blaber had been monitoring the radio traffic. Once he and Jimmy understood where
Roberts had fallen out, they knew there were no friendly forces near him, and that there was not
much time to save him – there was a likelihood that Roberts was already dead. The two quickly
hatched a plan to try to clarify things: the AC-130 over Takur Ghar would fire close to what
obviously was an al Qaeda group of fighters on top of the mountain. They reasoned that if one
broke away, they should assume it was Roberts escaping. In the meantime, Mako 30 was to
return to the mountaintop by helicopter.
At that moment, Trebon came on the air and took control of the situation; Blaber and
Jimmy were no longer in charge. Task Force 11 also switched radio frequencies, meaning that
no other command would even hear their calls. Aboard the second helicopter, Slab and his
SEALs went back to Takur Ghar. Again they were hit with machine gun and RPG fire as they
attempted to land. They made it off the chopper, but found themselves immediately surrounded,
outnumbered and outgunned. An assault on what appeared to be the main enemy position failed,
and the Air Force communications specialist attached to the team, Technical Sergeant John
Chapman, was shot and killed; others were wounded. Slab ordered his team to retreat below the
crest of the mountain, hoping they could hold out and, eventually, be rescued. The rescue attempt
had only made things worse.
This action was all news to Hagenbeck. Upon reaching the difficult decision to
consolidate and reinforce the infantry trapped on the floor of the Shah-i-kot, he tried to catch his
first sleep in 72 hours. Shortly thereafter, he was awoken to the initial reports of the first shootdown. He immediately grasped that – again – his plans were in trouble. But there would be
more, and fatal, consequences to come.
It was standard Task Force 11 practice to have a “quick-reaction force” of Army Rangers
on standby when any operation was underway. That night, Army Captain Nate Self commanded
the quick-reaction force. Based at Task Force 11 headquarters at Bagram, Self also monitored
the radio traffic. While the situation was chaotic and uncertain, one thing was clear: at Bagram,
he was more than an hour’s flight from the action. To be effective in a timely way, the quickreaction force needed to get closer. Self’s platoon boarded to special-operations Chinooks and
flew toward Gardez.
The communications systems aboard the helicopter were highly sophisticated and unique
to special-mission aircraft. But they were also finicky, and the changing radio frequencies within
Task Force 11 further complicated the ability to communicate. Even as Slab’s SEALs fought for
their lives on Takur Ghar, a third Chinook headed into an ambush.
Self’s Rangers were hit worst of all. The platoon’s second Chinook was recalled to
Gardez, but Self’s chopper was struck as it flared for its landing, crashing like stone in the open
ground. One of the aircrew and two Rangers were killed in an instant. Struggling off the
aircraft, Self and the survivors would struggle to keep from being massacred, calling “danger
close” airstrikes less than 100 meters from the outcropping where they established their defense.
Saving Self’s team became the focus of all Anaconda commanders. After hours, a Hellfire
missile fired from a CIA Predator drone destroyed the last al Qaeda bunker on Takur Ghar, but
mortars and snipers elsewhere around the valley continued to be a threat. One target that could
not be protected was Self’s casualty collection point. The final American death of Operation
Anaconda was Air Force Specialist Jason Cunningham, a medic attached to the Ranger quickreaction force. Not until dark were Self and the survivors evacuated from the scene. (For an
overview of the action of March 4, see attached, “Anaconda Reality (March 4, 2002)”)
Pete Blaber entered the Shah-i-kot with Afghan forces on March 12, two days prior to the
formal end of Operation Aanconda. Yet his presence had been felt throughout the battle – and
missed most in the fateful fight for Takur Ghar that has been Anaconda’s enduring legacy.