Biocentric Ethics and Inherent Value of Life Lecture #14
Reading: DesJardins: Environmental Ethics , Chapter 6
Recap: We have seen the difficulties of ethical extensionism that takes standard human ethics and attempts to extend moral standing to selected parts of nature, always at the level of individual organisms while ignoring the larger ecological context.
Suggested
Approach: The outline here should help you distill the main points of DesJardins = transition from individualistic extension ethics to a more comprehensive environmental ethic.
I.
Extension Ethics versus Comprehensive (Systematic) Environmental Ethics:
A.
Problems with Extension Ethics (Chapters 3 to 5):
1.
Narrowly focused B only selected parts of nature ( e.g. species most like humans)
2.
Ignores systems B food chains, gene pools of populations, ecosystems
3.
Lacks comprehensiveness B no ethical guidance for big issues like climate change
B.
Comprehensive Environmental Ethics
1.
Philosophical breadth and depth to address issues on the basis of a.
Metaphysics B addressing what kinds of things exist; ontological (categories of being), relationships, etc. b.
Epistemology B logical relations between descriptive and normative claims c.
Aesthetics B critical reflections on beauty, design, art; intrinsic value d.
Political Philosophy B e.g
. civil disobedience and environmental justice
2.
Stepping back from A what is @ to reflect on values influencing A what ought to be @
Question: Why exactly are we troubled about environmental issues?
Thesis: Identification of the A full scope of values @ is essential if ethics is to play its role in providing norms of A what ought to be @ in regard to the environment. a.
Values = judgments that establish the basis for estimating worth b.
What values constitutes A the good life @ or A human flourishing?
@ c.
What other values questions should be considered B e.g
. moral, spiritual, aesthetic, scientific, and cultural?
3.
Result: a.
A broader concept of morality; one concerned with the nature of value itself b.
Example: A shift from individualistic ethics of A animal welfare @ to holistic environmental philosophy to develop a theory that accounts for all concerns c.
Or consider: Maybe no such theory is possible; instead, argue for moral pluralism (i.e. that there are a plurality of moral truths that must be considered)

4.
Instrumental value versus intrinsic value a.
Instrumental value = value based on usefulness rather than in its own right
14.2 b.
Intrinsic value = a value evident as we recognize the object for what it is
Examples: true friendship, bald eagle, Mona Lisa, life itself, wilderness c.
Either category may be moral, spiritual, symbolic, aesthetic, or cultural
C.
Challenge of Comprehensive Environmental Ethics B Develop an account of intrinsic value to counter instrumental value
1.
Muir failed to articulate intrinsic value (sequoias as cathedral); defeated by Pinchot
2.
How to articulate the account B requires a shift to a more comprehensive philosophy
3.
Recall Passmore and Sagoff (recover the aesthetic, cultural, historical)
I.
Biocentric Ethics B any theory that views all of life as possessing intrinsic value
A.
Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965) B A reverence for life @ principle; precursor of biocentric
1.
Scientific/Industrial era (nature as machine) had severed nature from ethical value
2.
Schweitzer sought to reestablish the bond via reverence for life a.
Reverence = attitude of awe and wonder; honor and fear; ethics begins here b.
Good = to preserve, promote, A value life which is capable of development @ c.
Evil = that which destroys, injures, represses A life which is capable of develop.
@
3.
Conflicts in valuing different species in relation to mankind a.
Schweitzer avoided developing a hierarchy; recognized need for killing to eat b.
Reverence for life B not basis for rules but an attitude arising from moral virtue c.
Killing is to be taken seriously, and with responsibility
B.
Ethics and Character B Virtue Ethics illustrated in Schweitzer = s reverence for life and which will become a significant part of the emerging environmental ethics we will be studying represent a shift...
...from an ethic focused upon...
1) what I should do
2) rules and principles
3) simply discovering alternatives to utilitarianism or deontology
4) justification of action toward nature in keeping with self-interest and thus connecting it to instrumental value to a virtue ethic focused upon...
1) what type of person I should be
2) character traits, disposition of a good person
3) a shift in philosophical perspective toward a concern for developing moral character
4) the character or disposition that is already settled out of a reverence for the intrinsic value of life; no need to justify in terms of self-interest

III. Paul Taylor = s Biocentric Ethics B Respect for Nature (1986)
14.3
A. Major contribution B elevates the claim that beings have a A good of their own @ from a descriptive claim to a normative claim (ethically enabled). He does this by the following progression:
1. Begins from the extensionist willingness to extend moral standing to certain individual beings out of somewhat arbitrary justifications (e.g. A feel pain @ , A rights @ ) and focusing both on the awesome nature of life and human ethical responsibility toward it.
2. He asserts that humans who study nature and consider the biological and ecological understanding will be able to see the telos of life B to see that each form of life has an objective A good of its own @ and therefore, has inherent worth by virtue of a. objective good of the being B a property of life which is i. ecological B in the sense that it is part of a dynamic of the food chain of life, it can reproduce in a population and can adapt to change over time; and these
A interests @ or purposes can be discerned scientifically and provide a basis for ethical implications (ii.). Denying this is denying what ecology has learned. ii. ethical ( telos ) B the tendency of living things to act toward some distinctive goal or end ( telos ) which can be recognized in a normative (claim) sense by those who adopt the biocentric outlook . b. biocentric outlook of the human B capacity of the human who adopts a way of thinking that includes four central beliefs: i. Humans are members of Earth = s community of life just as any other species ii. As such, humans are part of a system of interdependence with other species iii. All living things pursue their own good in their own ways ( A teleological center of life @ ) iv. Humans are understood as not inherently superior to other living things.
3. Necessary and sufficient conditions for normative claim: a. That a living thing has inherent worth is considered necessary for it to be the object of human ethical responsibility by virtue of its having an objective good, or a A good of its own @ (2.a.) but it is not sufficient. b. It is also necessary that humans adopt the biocentric outlook which represents a worldview which enables them to recognize that treating living things as having inherent worth is the only sensible way to treat them.
4. Practically speaking, Taylor sees the biocentric outlook as being manifested in human behaviors that express nonmaleficence, nonintereference, fidelity , and restitutive justice .

Comparison of Extension Ethics with Comprehensive Philosophical Ethics with Emphasis on Biocentrism
Based on your understanding of these two ethical approaches, flesh out the comparisons below, expand table as necessary. See Study Outline, page 13.5 and notes from our discussion of Ch. 5
1
2
Extension Ethics
What ethical theories?
> Utilitarian B Singer
> Deontological B Regan ( A rights @ )
> Doing duty while tied to self-interest
Boundaries (scope)?
>Reference point is life form most obviously suited to moral standing; namely, humans and A most like us @
> Therefore, arbitrary, unjustified, narrow
Biocentric Ethics
Theories?
> Teleological ( A telos of life @ ) i.e
Natural Law B nature shows an order and purpose; A good @ is that which aids in function toward that purpose.
Virtue Ethics B based on telos of growing in character; fulfilling purpose of our being
Boundaries?
> Comprehensive - A all of life @
> Supported by more intellectual rigor
and strives to be nonanthropocentric but...
14.4
individualistic approach makes conflict in
3
4
5
6
and anthropocentric
> Individualistic (limited)
Basis for value?
> Instrumental Value - useful to mankind
> Value A granted @
> A Resources @ B reflects A Instrumental @
Human reaction to A life?
@
> Aesthetic (appreciation; instrumental)
> Sympathy, empathy
> A Subject-of-a-Life @ (means)
Ethical claims (justification)?
> A Good of its own @ as a descriptive claim
without rigorous A account @ to justify
What is demanded of us?
> Acting by rules, doing duty
> What should I do?
arbitrating rights among organisms w equal
supposed equal standing
Value?
> Intrinsic Value
> Value A recognized @
- A Value in an of itself; good of its own @
Reaction?
> Reverence
> Revelation B order, purpose
> A Life Itself @ B moving toward telos
Claims?
> A Good of its own @ as normative claim
> A what ought to be @
> Paul Taylor = s A biocentric outlook @ (4 rules)
Our responsibility?
> Reflecting on telos
> Living with purpose
> What should I be?

V. Practical Implications and Challenges
14.5
A. Taylor's Biocentrism - and Problems Associated:
Note: Because biocentrism seeks to depart from anthropocentrism, it now must address the conflicts between human and nonhuman life with consistency. Here are some examples of the conflicts that arise:
1. Nonmaleficence - "do no harm" a. suggests humans are outside system, and that "natural harm" is acceptable but not if it comes from humans b. Taylor avoids anthropocentrism but is "individualistic" (no duty to species level)
(1) leads to assumption of adversarial relationships as the norm for nature
(2) adversarial tension is heightened because he is individualistic ( versus species)
(3) would require a level of attention and care far beyond most of us
2. Restitutive justice - Taylor allows us to fulfill non-basic needs by making restitution
P e.g
. if we build a patio, restore grass and soil organisms elsewhere to replace the loss a. But here, restitution would help the species but not the individual B so he has to abandon his individualistic approach to justify restitution b. Species could be granted justice if destruction of individuals in one place is mitigated elsewhere
3. Each living organism is a "teleological center of life" - basis for "objective good"\ a. But does all purposeful activity (toward an end) necessarily imply a "good" end? b. How do organs ( e.g. kidneys) or larger systems ( e.g.
wetlands) choose their goals?
B. James Sterba
1
- introduces his biocentric pluralism in which he avoids "adversarial" and conflicts by several revisions of biocentrism including:
1. Keeps biocentrism with emphasis on individual but grants moral standing to species and perhaps ecosystems
2. Lightens responsibility on humans by calling for recognition that there is a. no reason to assume that human interests always trump those of other species b. no requirement for us to assume positive duties of care (unreasonable sacrifice) if we recognize we have a general obligation to A let be @ the objects with a good of their own
1
Sterba, J. 1995. From Biocentric Individualism to Biocentric Pluralism. Environmental
Ethics 17: 191-207. http://www.cerritos.edu/tstolze/Sterba%20on%20Biocentrism.pdf