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1ac- Morality Version
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
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Plan
Text: The United States federal government should remove economic sanctions
against Cuba.
The embargo is a relic of Cold War policy that serves to oppress citizens and uses the
Cuban people as a means to an end.
Lesser, Financial Director at the George Washington Pre-Law Student Association, 10
(Max, November 9th 2010, Penn Political Review, “The End of the Embargo Era,”
http://pennpoliticalreview.org/2010/11/the-end-of-the-embargo-era/, accessed 7/12/13, AS)
It has now been five long decades since the American embargo on Cuba was first implemented. In the
early 1960s, with the Cold War raging, the United States imposed severe eco­nomic sanctions on the
Caribbean na­tion in the hopes that it would curtail communist revolutionary Fidel Cas­tro’s reign. The
goal of this measure was clear: to starve Cuba into a new revolution that would restore a proAmerican government. In the midst of the Cold War, this embargo seemed justifiable as a temporary
method to prevent the establishment of a com­munist stronghold so close to the con­tiguous United
States. But today, in a changed global landscape, a complete economic embargo on Cuba no longer
serves the purpose it once did. The Soviet Union is no more. The Cold War threat of communism is no
more. The reign of Fidel Castro as President of Cuba is no more. Yet the plight of the Cuban people
continues. A recent report by the Cuban govern­ment suggests that the American em­bargo has cost
Cuba $751 billion since it went into effect. While some of that money possibly would have gone
to­ward Cold War anti-American efforts, most of it would have instead found its way to the Cuban
populace, especial­ly following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Rather, the embargo has re­sulted in
greatly inadequate supplies of medicine, food, and potable water for a large portion of the island’s
popula­tion. As a consequence of this failure, it is time to reassess an act that, rather than liberating
Cuban citizens from the perils of communism, has only doomed them to impoverishment. Cuba, to its
credit, has begun to reassess its own economic strategies. Currently, about 85 percent of the Cu­ban
workforce – approximately 5 mil­lion people – is part of the public sec­tor. That number is down from
over 90 percent before the end of the Cold War, and is certain to fall to a far lower level in the coming
months. Due to the effects of the global economic crisis, Cuba, under current President Raúl Castro, has
announced its intention to terminate almost 500,000 public sector workers by March 2011, a stag­gering
10 percent of its workforce. To compensate, 250,000 self-employment licenses will be granted so that
many of those who find themselves out of a job will be able to begin working in the private sector. The
issuance of these licenses coincides with an expansion of the number of job fields that can be privatized,
meaning more Cubans will now be able to maintain their own businesses. While certainly not a
capi­talist revolution, these reforms exem­plify an effort on the part of the Cuban government to adapt
economically in a changed landscape; a similar will­ingness by the United States to adapt its policies
would serve to ameliorate some of Cuba’s financial woes. Despite the importance of the in­creased
welfare of the Cuban people, however, it is not the only benefit that would result from a change in the
American government’s attitude toward Cuba. Last April, President Barack Obama, addressing the
Sum­mit of the Americas, stated that it was time for “a new beginning with Cuba.” With promises of
improving America’s image abroad in mind, a change in the US government’s embargo policy would go
a long way toward achieving that goal. In fact, global sentiments against the United States embargo
on Cuba have risen steadily in the past two decades. A vote in the United Na­tions General Assembly
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last year con­demned the embargo for the 18th time in a row. Furthermore, the vote was nearly
unanimous at an astounding 187 to 3, with only the United States, Israel, and Palau voting in favor of the
embargo. This overwhelming dis­approval should come as no surprise. Most other nations have long
main­tained an economic presence in Cuba, and even American allies like Canada have been vocal
against US legislation that imposes fines on foreign corpora­tions that do business within Cuba. If
President Obama is serious about his intentions to repair perceptions of the United States across the
globe, he must listen to his own words and reexamine a policy that the vast majority of na­tions in the
world have condemned. The stumbling block for change lies in a lack of understanding of the goals of
the embargo. In essence, the plight of the Cuban people that resulted from the embargo was a crucial
component to its intended goal. While an unfortu­nate means to an end, the idea was to create
popular discontent within Cuba so that citizens would enact change for themselves. The regrettable
economic hardship in Cuba was thus seen as a sign that the embargo was working. Yet those who
continue to champion Cuban travails as an American victory seem to ignore the simple reality that
even with decades of troubles, no up­rising has taken place. Clearly, the for­mula must be
recalculated.
Specifically, sanctions require the US to oppose any loans to Cuba, financial
restrictions prevent normal banking transactions, and dual-use restrictions prevent
importation of critical medical supplies.
Bolender, 13
[Keith, 4-22-13, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “The Terrorist List, and Terrorism as Practiced Against
Cuba,” http://www.coha.org/22355/, accessed 6-25-13, YGS]
Of all the components to the United States hostile strategy against Cuba, nothing raises the ire of the
Castro government more than its inclusion on the State Department’s list of states that sponsor
terrorism. The designation is seen by Havana as an impediment towards improving relations and as a
cruel hypocrisy that provides political cover for Washington to justify the imposition of economic
penalties along with the perpetuation of anti-revolutionary propaganda.¶ There is an opportunity to
eliminate that stumbling block in the next few weeks, if newly appointed Secretary of State John Kerry decides to recommend
Cuba’s deletion from the list to President Obama. Kerry has until the release of the State Department’s annual terror report on April 30 to make
the determination of whether Cuba will remain on the terrorist list. High
ranking Cuban officials are closely watching this
the removal could offer an opportunity to re-engage with the United States. [1]¶
The history of Cuba’s controversial inclusion goes back to 1982, the same year Iraq was taken off the list by the Reagan administration.
Besides Cuba, only Sudan, Iran, and Syria continue to be labeled as state sponsors of terrorism. North
Korea was dropped in 2008, while Pakistan, long the home of Osama Bin Laden and recognized as a
haven for Islamic terrorists, has never been considered. Saudi Arabia, where the majority of the 9/11
terrorists came from, is looked upon as a staunch ally of the United States.¶ There are numerous
reasons why the Castro government finds its insertion on the list so galling. First are the real economic
consequences to the designation. By law the United States must oppose any loans to Cuba by the
World Bank or other international lending institutions. Obama administration officials have been
using Cuba’s inclusion to make it increasingly difficult for Havana to conduct normal banking
transactions that involve U.S. financial establishments, regardless of which currency is being used.
Furthermore, the United States has imposed an arms embargo against all parties placed on the list
(which the Castro government has experienced since the triumph of the Revolution) as well as
prohibiting sales of items that could be considered to have both military and non-military dual use,
including hospital equipment. For example, the William Soler children’s hospital in Havana was
labeled a ‘denied hospital’ in 2007 by the State Department, bringing with it serious ramifications.
Various medicines and technology have become impossible to obtain, resulting in the deaths of
children and the inability of staff to properly deal with a variety of treatable conditions. [2] For Cuba,
development, indicating
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these restrictions are additionally damaging as the island continues to suffer from the comprehensive
embargo the United States has imposed since the early 1960s.
This direct violence against the Cuban people is a form of economic terrorism, but is
concealed by an ethically bankrupt form of consequentialism that excuses this
violence in the name of national security.
Kauzlarich, professor of sociology @ Southern Illinois, et al, 01
[David, Rick A. Matthews, Ohio University, William J. Miller, professor @ Carthage College, 2001, Critical
Criminology, “Toward A Victimology of State Crime”,
http://jthomasniu.org/class/781/Assigs/kauzvictimology.pdf, accessed 7-1-13, GSK]
Propositions about the victimology of state crime can be developed from this review to help shed light on the larger phenomenon of state
crime victimization, although a caveat is in order because
state crime takes a variety of forms. For instance, it is difficult
to compare the victimology of international economic terrorism against the people of Cuba and Iraq to
institutionalized racism, sexism, and classism, or the suffering of human radiation subjects to unjust criminal
justice system practices. Nevertheless, several general propositions about the victims of state crime may be
formulated based on current and prior research in the area.¶ (1) Victims of State Crime Tend to be among the Least
Socially Powerful Actors¶ Even a cursory examination of state crime reveals large power differences between the victim and
victimizer. The authority of the state extends well beyond crude asymmetries in the ability to control
others, and constitutional and due process protections also vary relative to the power of subjects.¶ State officers,
agencies, and organizations often exploit scarce resources to advance larger agendas through the use of
specialized terminology, scientific knowledge, and information technology. Clearly the victims of the human radiation
experiments, those harmed by environmental degradation, atomic and nuclear weapons tests, and the
COINTELPRO, did not have the resources to marshal commensurate levels of technological,
terminological, or scientific expertise. The state also has the ability to conceal illegalities and
immoralities by privileging concerns about “national security” over humane, fair, and due processes. In
the case of those victimized by criminal justice and the prison experiments, one senses a great deal of dehumanization and
ideology, which allows unjust practices and policies to flourish.¶ Victims of other state crimes – such as civilians in war,
people targeted for genocide, workers, and the homeless – also have less social power than state agencies and officials. Scapegoating,
stereotyping, profiling, and typifying people belonging to these groups is far easier for the state
because of broad asymmetries in power. It is therefore not surprising that galvanizing support for unethical and
illegal practices and policies against these groups is not difficult for the state. As a result, the likelihood of the legitimation of a crisis
or substantial social protest movements is diminished. It also militates against conceptualizing unjust state actions as
crime. One can see evidence of this process at work in the cases of economic and domestic terrorism and
the support of terrorism abroad.¶ More broadly, there seems to be a positive relationship between the
unequal distribution of power and the level and frequency of state crime, both domestically and internationally. Clearly,
social power is unevenly distributed among states as well, providing further opportunities for state crime.¶ The United States has more
control over the definition, enforcement, and prosecution of state crime than most countries. The World
Court, the United Nations’ Security Council, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund are likely to support
U.S. interests. With few exceptions, peripheral and semi-peripheral states are less likely to have any victimization
by the U.S. acknowledged and redressed. There is a direct link between U.S. supported and enforced sanctions against Iraq and
the death of innocent Iraqi children because of starvation. Sanctions against the Cuban people have also resulted in
social and physical harms.¶ Authority-subject relationships (Turk 1969) in an international context help
explain how these harms are marginalized in popular U.S. discourses:¶ The claims-making and legitimation exercises
of the authority (the U.S. state) are seldom met with organized opposition by subjects. If there is a sizeable movement against
U.S. policy and practice, citizens might either be unaware of its existence or may perceive opposition as the work of
radicals disconnected with reality (Iraqi politicians, Castro, prisoners’ rights, welfare rights, and anti-nuclear weapons groups).
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Social harms and higher immoralities might therefore be overlooked, or even worse, supported because of the
apparent lack of overt conflict over the policy or practice. This makes it appear as though the harms are actually necessary,
fair, and consensus-based.¶ U.S. public support of the Gulf War is most illustrative of this point.¶ (2) Victimizers Generally Fail
to Recognize and Understand the Nature, Extent, and Harmfulness of Institutional Policies. If Suffering and Harm
are Acknowledged, It Is often Neutralized within the Context of a Sense of “Entitlement”¶ The most important
difference between victimizers and their victims is the power to exert their will. Victimizers often do not acknowledge the degree
to which their policies have caused harm while assessing the effectiveness of their policies to bring about
desired change, maintain hegemony, or promote other forms of dominance. Unjust and deleterious domestic and
international policies can also be downplayed by neutralizing reasonable categorical imperatives (e.g. do no
harm) by employing bankrupt consequentialism, perhaps guided by ethnocentric paternalism. Following
Sykes and Matza¶ (1957), others have found evidence of this at work in the wider problem of elite deviance. Denying responsibility,
dehumanizing the powerless for purposes of exploitation, and appealing to higher loyalties (i.e. the capitalist political economy and national
security) are often employed in the victimology of state crime. Specialized vocabularies may also be used to aide in the
dehumanization.¶ Tifft and Markham (1991) have noted that the way policy makers neutralize the destructive and harmful effects of their
policies is similar to the manner batterers view their victims. Noting
the long history of U.S. abuses in¶ Latin and Central
America, they argue that:¶ U.S. policy makers have consciously decided (1) that the U.S. is entitled to control
Central America and that the peoples of Central America are obligated to acquiesce in this power exercise; (2) that
violence is permissible, and policy makers can live with themselves and conclude that they are
ethical/moral persons and that these policies are ethical/moral even if they involve violence; (3) that the
use of violence, intimidation, and threat of violence will produce the desired effect or minimize a more negative
one; and (4) that the policy of violence and control will not unduly endanger the United States, and the country will
neither sustain physical harm nor suffer legal, economic, or political consequences that will outweigh the benefits achieved through this
violence (Tifft and Markham¶ 1991: 125–126).¶ Similarly, Cohen (1996) has documented how governments construct offi-cial responses to
allegations of human rights violations. Cohen (1996: 522) contends that the forms of denial on the part of governmental officials to such
allegations typically include one of the following: “a literal denial (nothing happened); interpretive denial (what happened is really something
else); and implicatory denial (what happened is justified).” ¶ At the domestic level, few
policy makers have recognized that the
cumulative effects of the policies supportive of institutionalized racism and structural inequality have
caused considerable harm to various minority groups and women. Often times, the victims are viewed as
undeserving or unworthy of the social, political, or economic rights bestowed to others.¶ (3) Victims of State Crime are
often Blamed for Their Suffering¶ Victim blaming is unfortunately a common reaction to those most wounded by state crime. The
poor, minorities, the homeless, and women become targets of criticism because of the false belief in the ease of achieving vertical
intergenerational mobility in the U.S., even in the face of overwhelming structural odds. Prisoners and those
accused of crimes are
less likely to be treated sympathetically because their assigned master status solipsistically leads to a
marginalization of their human worth, morality, and potential. Subjects in the prisoner experiments were viewed as less
deserving of informed consent at best and expendable at worst.¶ Harms caused by economic terrorism and the support
of anti-democratic governments can be neutralized by popular audiences (and victimizers) as a part of the
United States’ interests in national security or the previously mentioned technique of neutralization, “appealing to higher
loyalties.” The harms caused by sanctions in Cuba and Iraq are good examples because, while they are easy to see,
there is a tendency to assume victim responsibility on the part of citizens because they have not
waged successful civil insurrections against their oppressors.¶ (4) Victims of State Crime Must
Generally Rely on the Victimizer, an Associated Institution, or Civil Social Movements for Redress¶ Theoretically,
the U.S. criminal justice system carries out the criminalization process in the name of the state, not the particular victim. The “people” are
identified as the abstracted victim. What
happens, however, when “the people” or a group of peoples are victimized by
the body who holds dominion over them and the law? What institutionalized justice process is available to the victim?¶
Often times, as in the case of the prisoner and plutonium experiments, and some instances of racial and gender discrimination, reparations may
come about in civil court, and often involve the efforts of special interest groups, people in social movements, and of course private attorneys.
In other cases, appeal
may be made to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, through the United Nations General
the International Court of Justice. The opportunities for international redress of domestic
victimi-zation, to some extent, depend on the primary state’s membership status.¶ For example, the United States
Assembly, or
did not ratify the Genocide Convention for decades because it sought to limit “foreign intrusion” into what were defined as domestic affairs.
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Citizens victimized in countries with tenuous or marginal standing in the international community as it pertains to human rights may therefore
find little in the way of assistance.¶ The most potentially dangerous act that could ever by undertaken by a state, the use of nuclear weapons,
has recently been criminalized through this latter avenue. Six billion people still live under the nuclear threat, but at least one organization of
legitimate authority, the World Court, has conceptualized the entire world population as potential victims of state crime by declaring the use
and threat to use nuclear weapons illegal under international law (see Kramer and Kauzlarich 1999). More often than not, however,
international organizations like the U.N. have been slow to enforce existing laws or to punish nationstates that are powerful. For example, each year, the U.N. General Assembly has voted to condemn the U.S.
embargo on Cuba, but no official action has been taken by the U.N. to end it. In short, there is little hope of formal
intervention on the part of the international community when the offending state is powerful like the U.S. On another level, U.S.
opposition to international agreements because of the state’s fear of the loss of sovereignty (no matter
how slight) also thwart the materializing of democratic and restorative justice.¶ In any case, the process of helping
victims or even ending the victimization of state crime is very different than in cases of traditional or white-collar crime. This stems from
problems related to the identification of the actors, organizations, and institutional forces responsible for state crime, if the policy, actions, or
(5) Victims of State Crime Are Easy
Targets for Repeated Victimization¶ The manner in which victims of state crime are harmed may
change over time; however, the harm incurred by most victims of state crime does not decrease – rather it merely
omissions are even recognized as unethical, harmful, criminal, or worthy of resistance.¶
takes another form. Additionally, some victims are continually victimized by the same organization. Examples include women, minorities, the
poor, workers, and those living in less developed countries, in much the same manner as some victims of traditional street crime (e.g., domestic
violence and child abuse) who are targeted for repeat victimization.¶ In the cases of the poor, there have been few genuine attempts to
alleviate the structural conditions that create abject poverty (Bohm 1993). Women have faced institutional sexism and the “glass ceiling” in
spite of superficial efforts designed to give them equal status in society. Minorities have long been the targets of overt and institutionalized
racism. While some have argued that affirmative action policies have eliminated the effects of racism, institutionalized racism persists in spite
of the progress which has been made. Native Americans have been repeatedly victimized throughout U.S. history, and remain one of the most
repressed minority groups in our society (Churchill¶ 1995).¶ Another example is the repeated victimization of the plutonium subjects and their
families, who continued to be treated unethically by state agencies for decades. Several years after the deaths of many of the plutonium
subjects, the families were sent a letter from the Atomic Energy Commission, which exhumed the bodies for additional research:¶ The purpose
of the exhumation was to examine the remains in order to determine ...residual radioactivity from past medical treatment, and that the
subjects had an unknown mixture of radioactive isotopes (Advisory Committee on Human. Radiation Experiments 1995: 260).¶ Two willful lies
are told in this memo: (1) that the subjects were treated, and (2) that they had received an unknown quantity of radiation. The truth is this: (a)
the subjects were guinea pigs not expected to react favorably to the injections, and (b) internal records clearly showed how much plutonium
had been injected into their veins (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998). Rowland provides further evidence of higher immorality when he wrote to his
colleagues about the exhumation project:¶ Please note that outside the Center ... we will never use the word plutonium in regard to these
cases. “These individuals are of interest to us because they may have received a radioactive material at some time is the kind of statement to
(6) Illegal State Policies and Practices, while Committed
by Individuals and Groups of Individuals, Are Manifestations of the Attempt to Achieve Organizational,
Bureaucratic, or Institutional Goals¶ A recurrent theme has been that the harms caused by the state are due to the actions of
be made, if we need to say anything at all” (Markey¶ Report 1986: 27).¶
individuals or groups of individuals who are pursuing the larger goals of their respective organizations. These larger institutional goals may or
may not be consistent with the goals of particular individuals. Rather
than viewing the harm to the victims of state
crime as the result of a few people engaging in immoral, unethical, and/or illegal behavior, it is more
instructive to conceptualize state crime as the product of organizational pressures to achieve organizational
goals. Many forms of state crime persist for long periods of time (e.g., Iran-Contra, the economic embargo
against Cuba, institutionalized discrimination in the criminal justice system), and are carried out by many different actors. If
the unethical, immoral, and/or illegal behavior in question were the result of a handful of people, then one would presume that either the
activities would desist once those people left the organization or that there would be other people waiting to fill those roles.¶ Since
many
different people filling various roles, one can only presume that either there
are a lot of immoral people who come into positions of power to carry out the immoral or unethical behavior, or that there is
something about the organizational culture itself which fosters such immorality. In the best case, the
organization itself has a problem screening out immoral/unethical decision-makers. In the worst case,
the organizational climate itself fosters, facilitates, or encourages such behavior (e.g., see Braithwaite 1989: Ermann and
Lundman 1996).¶ Also, to reduce state crimes to the individual level is to ignore the social, political, and
historical contexts which shape the nature, form, and goals of state agencies. Even a cursory examination of the
various forms of state crime reveals that these larger contexts are macrologically linked to state crime
victimization and offending. Sometimes these contexts are exigent, such as when cold war hysteria provided motivation for illegal
and unethical human radiation experiments, weapons testing, and environmental degradation. Other times, the crimes may be
state crimes persist over time with
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politically and geographically contextualized (i.e., Cuba’s proximity to the U.S.). The state, therefore, may be
instrumental in creating and sustaining the conditions that account for the persistence of institutional harms caused by its agencies.
Sanctions take entire civilian populations hostage--The sacrifice of whole people for
strategic interests is ethically indefensible
Kochler, Professor of Philosophy, 94
[Dr. Hans, International Press Organization, “Ethical Aspects of Sanctions in International Law The
Practice of the Sanctions Policy and Human Rights”, http://i-p-o.org/sanctp.htm#I, accessed 7/8/13, VJ
*Paraphrased for Ableist language within brackets]
Comprehensive economic sanctions, then – continuing with the comparison above – have the ethical
quality of terror bombings: the civilian population is explicitly taken hostage in the framework of a
security strategy of power politics. It is self-evident that this kind of political instrumentalization of the
human being – as the citizen of a community that is a subject in international law – is not compatible
with his status as an autonomous subject, i.e. with human dignity.23 People have a natural right not to
be sacrificed for a strategic purpose over whose formulation and realization they exercise no
influence. As Quinn says, "They have a right not to be pressed, in apparent violation of their prior
rights, into the service of other people's purposes."24 In the area of ethics, the so-called "Doctrine of
Double Effect" secures every person's right to veto "a certain kind of attempt to make the world a better
place at his expense."25 It attacks the purely utilitarian approach (the maximization of usefulness)
which, in the case of sanctions, could sacrifice the health and prosperity of a whole people for the
sake of the external political purposes of member states in the Security Council or of another state
coalition. (This could be clarified case by case in such measures as the sanctions placed against Iraq,
Former Yugoslavia, Haiti, etc.) The sacrifice of a whole people for the sake of the strategic interests of a
superpower or of a coalition of states (as may be formed within the Security Council) would appear to
be in no way ethically justifiable.26 Assertions to this effect have already been made in connection with
the sanctions against South Africa: if there are no general criteria for morally evaluating a particular
political strategy, then those who have to bear the primary costs of measures such as sanctions should
be able to decide whether they are to be imposed.27 The general ethical principle guiding the use of
sanctions should thus be that consideration be taken of the affected population in the formulation of
such measures. Precisely this principle, however, is excluded by the nature of the coercive measures in
accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As American authors have illustrated in an evaluation of
the sanctions policy in the wake of the Gulf War, economic sanctions cause the civilian population to be
held hostage in its own country.28 Measures such as those which explicitly intend to harm the
population are to be judged as amoral,29 for "one cannot intentionally [weaken] cripple an economy
without intentionally affecting the people whose working and consuming lives are partially
constitutive of that economy."30
This is a form of American sponsored genocide on Cuban citizens
Simons, freelance author, 1999
[Geoff, “Imposing Economic Sanctions”, Pluto Press, 12-13, chip]
The years-long US attempt to deny Cuba access to food, medicine and drinkable water represents a
clear case of genocide. The UN Genocide Convention 29 defines as genocide any of various acts intend
to destroy ‘in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’. These acts include: killing
members of the group, causing them serious bodily or mental harm, and deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. Genocide
itself is punishable, as are the conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in
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genocide. Persons who may be punished include ‘constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or
private individuals’. The American blockade has had incalculable consequences for the health and
general well-being of the Cuban people. With a de facto and de jure embargo on Cuban access to food
and medicine, the incidence of disease and malnutrition has soared; with no sign of relief for a civilian
population posing no conceivable strategic threat to the United States. As a few examples (apart from
the broad trading prohibition): the US Treasury refused to license Medix (Argentina) to sell Cuba spare
parts for medical equipment; the Ayerst Laboratories (Canada) has been blocked from supplying
colyrum (for the treatment of gas and chemical damage to the eyes) to the Cuban health service; CGR
Thompson (France) has been denied a US license to sell Cuba spare parts for medical X-ray equipment;
Siemens (Germany) has been blocked from selling Gamma Cameras, an ultra-sound system and a
Magnetic Nuclear Resonance system – all intended for use in the Cuban health service; Toshiba (Japan)
has been denied licenses to sell medical equipment to Cuba; and Alfa-Laval (Sweden) has been blocked
from supplying filtration cartridges to the Cuban health service.30Maria del Carmen, aged 27 (in July
1996), had been suffering seriously worsening sight for months and was unable to obtain glasses
because of the blockade. Francisco Rodriquez, a journalist, commented: ‘Most people are affected by
this blockade in terms of medicine, food, transport, water, electricity, all those basic needs. Living
under this continual lack has made Cuban people very stressed, very nervous.’ Silvana Mayoral, a
teacher, directed her anger at Washington: ‘They are crazy sometimes, the Americans. What gives them
the right?’ A press release (30 November 1996) for the prestigious British medical journal the Lancet
indicated the scale of the US embargo against the supply of medical supplies to Cuba. Dr Anthony F.
Kirkpatrick (Tampa, Florida) was cataloguing firms (Johnson & Johnson, Merck, International Murex and
others) that had been prevented from exporting medical equipment to Cuba. He has noted that the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States has denounced the
Cuban embargo on food and medicines as a violation of international law. In early 1997 journalists were
continuing to report the affects of the US embargo on the civilian population: ‘The shortages of food
and medicine meant that the kids became a bit more asthmatic and the adults got skinnier than ever
... Today, Fidel’s market reforms are gradually solving the food problem. But the kids are still sick.’31 In
March 1997 the American Association for World Health – the US Committee for the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) – issued a report on the
consequences of the embargo on Cuban health: ‘The outright ban on the sale of American foodstuffs
has contributed to serious nutritional deficits, particularly among pregnant women, leading to an
increase in low birth-weight babies ... food shortages were linked to a devastating outbreak of
neuropathy numbering in the tens of thousands ... The embargo ... has led to serious cutbacks in
supplies of safe drinking water ... a factor in the rising incidence of morbidity The US Role 139 and
mortality rates ... Due to the direct or indirect effects of the embargo, the most routine medical
supplies are in short supply or entirely absent from some Cuban clinics.’32 Media coverage of the
report in the West was minimal. The Guardian(7 March 1997), under the heading ‘Children die in agony
as US trade ban stifles Cuba’, gave various details: Child cancer sufferers are some of the most
distressing victims of the embargo, which bans Cuba from buying nearly half of the world-class drugs
in a market dominated by US manufacturers. This team visited a paediatric ward which had been
without the nausea preventing drug, metclopramide HCl, for 22 days. It found that 22 children
undergoing chemotherapy were vomiting on average 28 to 30 times a day. Another girl, aged five, in a
cancer ward lacking Implantofix for chemotherapy, was being treated through her jugular vein because
all her other veins had collapsed. She was in excruciating pain. The American Association for World
Health (AAWH) noted that few other embargoes had banned food and denied life-saving medicines to
ordinary citizens: ‘Such an embargo appears to violate the most basic international charters and
conventions governing human rights, including the United Nations charter, the charter of the
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Organization of American States, and the Articles of the Geneva Convention governing the treatment
of civilians in wartime.
Sanctions are economic bullying—only the superpowers have the ability to hurt
growing nations to make the rich richer and the poor poorer
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99
[Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The
Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 136-137 ,Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]
Large and diversified economies are virtually immune to sanctions, since they have the economic
flexibility to pay higher costs in the short run, and to make structural changes in the long run.sq
Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott note that nations with weak or unstable economies therefore make the
best targets for economic sanctions. In a section entitled “The Weakest Go to the Wall,” they argue that
“there seems to be a direct correlation between the political and economic health of the target
country and its susceptibility to economic pressure,” and suggest that their data “demonstrate that
countries in distress or experiencing significant problems are far more likely to succumb to coercion by
the sender country. “3s They conclude with a list of “dos and don’ts” for those imposing sanctions,
including “Do pick on the weak and helpless. “3s Their analysis of the cases indicates that sanctions are
most effective when the target is much smaller than the country imposing sanctions, and
economically weak and politically unstable. In successful cases, the average sender’s economy was
187 times larger than that of the average target.37 Thus, sanctions offer themselves solely as
mechanisms that strong nations with large economies, or international alliances including strong nations
with large economies, can effectively use against countries with weak or import-dependent economies,
or countries with unstable governments. The reverse is not true— sanctions are not a device
realistically available to small or poor nations that can be used with any significant impact against
large or economically dominant nations, even if the latter were to, say, engage in aggression or
human rights violations, or otherwise offend the international community. This has been obvious since
the reformulation of sanctions as a tool of international law.38 Therefore, there is a danger that
sanctions will be used “opportunistically” by powerful nations39 —for example, as a response by a
superpower to its declining economic hegemony. Here we can understand the particular enthusiasm
the United States holds for sanctions; the sheer size of the U.S. economy means that sanctions can be
imposed at little cost to itself, and with no likelihood that any other nation could retaliate in kind. It
would seem that we have lost altogether the rationale for sanctions that was articulated in the
formation of the League of Nations, It may be that sanctions, and the attendant harm to innocents, can
be justified as an alternative to actual warfare; but in order to justify this choice on utilitarian
grounds, we would have to have reason to believe that sanctions in fact obtain compliance by the
target state. If not, then they simply constitute the gratuitous imposition of suffering on a helpless
population, for no ethically defensible reason.
We control the scale of violence – structural violence is necessary to psychologically
prime people for macro-level conflict
Scheper-Hughes, Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely, and Bourgois Prof of
Anthropology @ UPenn, ‘4
(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)
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This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses
everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger
and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans
dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg,
Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the
“smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and
social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal
bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized
(Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political
self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e.
preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to
our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence.
Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of
everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More
important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the
powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because
suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a
violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also ScheperHughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics,
emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention
centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are
capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide
continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute
uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term
genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and
alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in
purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our
volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the
concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to
find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing
protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” goodenough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to
impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal
industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States
(Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This
applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore,
Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted
away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are
hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this
regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his
concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence
hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in
communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader
meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit
political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the
possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied
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systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape
during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US
immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered
genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday
forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased
with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangleholds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace”
possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the
government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally,
the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex
has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience.
The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger,
the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient
prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it
possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority
youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end
it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough
humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and
even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies
possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to
recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social
exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize
atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of
constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history
as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic
anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among
other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations,
i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing
homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of
violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the
practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of
rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is
ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally
vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm,
the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment.
Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or
social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during
the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass
violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so
are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence
in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic
doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests
who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby
coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and
routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close
to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nusrecognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig
(1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links
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between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.”
Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in
the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of
culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very
everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the
prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence,
and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped
is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989).
Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu
treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less
efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic
domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be
understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the
expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to
understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault
basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of
violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on
genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement,
and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible?
In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially
incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims
themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in
social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They
harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the
“genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of
human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social
parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the
militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of
heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of
victimization).
Utilitarianism is a faulty lens for sanctions—an ethical standpoint is necessary
Kochler, Professor of Philosophy, 94
[Dr. Hans, International Press Organization, “Ethical Aspects of Sanctions in International Law The
Practice of the Sanctions Policy and Human Rights”, http://i-p-o.org/sanctp.htm#I, accessed 7/8/13, VJ]
Comprehensive economic sanctions which heavily impact the life and health of the civilian population
need to be analyzed from an ethical standpoint before a normative evaluation of the current practice in
international law can be undertaken. Indeed, comprehensive economic sanctions seem to be the
"classical" instruments for inducing submission in the power politics of the so-called "New World
Order"14 – and instruments whose permissibility must be critically examined from the standpoint of
ethics as well as of international law. It does not of necessity follow that a measure praised as the
panacea of power politics fulfills the requirements placed on a legitimate international order. In the
first place, coercive measures like economic sanctions represent a form of collective punishment15
and thus do not comply with the ethical principle of individual responsibility, i. e. with the ability to
attribute behaviour to an individual. The punishment of people not responsible for political decisions is
most akin to a terrorist measure; the aim of such a measure is to influence the government's course of
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action by deliberately assaulting the civilian population.16 Purposefully injuring the innocent is,
however, an immoral act per se, one which cannot be justified by any construction of utilitarian ethics.
In accordance with the conception of Thomas Aquinas, inquiring into the intention behind a particular
decision is of decisive value for an ethical evaluation.17 In the present context, several conditions
govern the moral permissibility of acts in which a morally questionable bad upshot is foreseen: (a) the
intended final end must be good, (b) the intended means to it must be morally acceptable; (c) the
foreseen bad upshot must not itself be willed (that is, must not be, in some sense, intended); and (d) the
good end must be proportionate to the bad upshot18, (that is, must be important enough to justify the
bad upshot).19 The problematic nature of this utilitarian context of evaluation is plain to view. Are
those who suffer under a certain measure to be viewed sympathetically as the victims of the pursuit
of a good intention, or is their suffering to be regarded as the deliberate component of a strategy?
This debate seems merely to invite hypocritical casuistry. The outcome for the affected population is
one and the same. A "superficial" difference may only be discerned by an ethics of attitude from the
viewpoint of the perpetrator. The latter appeases his conscience with reference to the unintentional
but "inevitable" side effects. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the so-called "Doctrine of Double Effect"
was developed, following a distinction made by Thomas Aquinas.20 It was designed to help clarify
ethical questions that arise when a morally good end can only be reached through inflicting harm
upon other people.21 In the concrete instance of comprehensive economic sanctions in accordance
with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the moral good that is aspired is the maintenance or restoration of
international peace; the wrong that is thereby effected is the suffering of the civilian population
(including sickness and death as results of the mass suffering that accompanies the breakdown in the
distribution of essential commodities). According to Quinn's ethical analysis, it is necessary to take into
account the relation which the aspired goal has to the foreseen wrong that results from it.22 In this
context, Quinn refers to the difference between "terror bombing" and "strategic" bombing in war: in
the first instance, the suffering of the civilian population is deliberately intended; in the second, the
possibility that the population will suffer is merely tolerated. In the first instance, harm is directly
inflicted, in the second case indirectly. (In accordance with the currently valid rules of international
humanitarian law, which we will later examine more closely, terror bombings are strictly prohibited, for
the civilian population is never allowed to be the direct target in a military conflict.) Economic sanctions,
however, are in line with the first case mentioned above: harm is directly and deliberately inflicted so
as to force the government to alter its course of action.
Backlash of other parties shouldn’t implicate your decision calculus as an ethical policy
maker
Alan Gewirth, Professor of Philosophy @ The University of Chicago, 1982
(“Human Rights: Essay on Justification and Application.” Pg. 230)
The required supplement is provided by the principle of intervening action. According to this principle,
when there is a casual connection between some person A’s performing some action (or inaction) X
and some other person C’s incurring a certain harm Z, A’s moral responsibility for Z is removed if,
between X and Z, there intervenes some other action Y of some person B who knows the relevant
circumstances of his action and who intends to produce Z or who produces Z through recklessness.
The reason for this removal is that B’s intervening action Y is more direct of proximate cause of Z and,
unlike A’s action (or inaction), Y is the sufficient condition of Z as it actually occurs. An example of this
principle may help to show its connection with the absolutist thesis. Martin Luther King Jr. was
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repeatedly told that because he led demonstrations in support of civil rights, he was morally
responsible for the disorders, riots, and deaths that ensued and that were shaking the American
Republic to its foundations. By the principle of intervening action, however, it was King’s opponents
who were responsible because their intervention operated as the sufficient conditions of the riots and
injuries. King might also have replied that the Republic would not be worth saving if the price that had
to be paid was the violation of the civil rights of black Americans. As for the rights of the other
Americans to peace and order, the reply would be that these rights cannot justifiably be secured at
the price of the rights of blacks.
Placing blame on the Cuban regime is a psychological defense mechanism used to
evade responsibility for an ongoing genocide.
Simons, former chief editor at the National Computing Centre, 97 (Geoff Leslie, The
Scourging of Iraq : Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice, p. 210)
Any attempt to confront someone (official or other) with the fact of a prevailing genocide in which
they may be implicated, albeit indirectly, immediately generates¶ various defensive reactions. Ideology and
propaganda have already prepared the ground. An initial response may be silence, while the water is tested. Why am I being¶
challenged in such a way? Then the exculpations are presented. In the case of Iraq¶ the demonisation of Saddam
Hussein has accomplished everything. If the Iraqi people are suffering, it is Saddam's fault. If Iraqi infants are going blind through want
of¶ insulin, he should have thought of that. If Iraqi women are being forced to endure caesarian sections without anaesthetic, what a
monster Saddam Hussein must be.¶ Guilt transference — if I, my country, our allies, my ideology are full of
rectitude, then who can be blamed for the manifest fact that Iraqi babies lie dying in their¶ thousands in
dirty hospital wards? The propaganda has done its filthy work. If I or my government are withholding
medicine and food from sick and malnourished¶ children then there must be a very good reason.
What can it be? It is obviously the fault of the demon.¶ Attempts have been made to identify the
psychological elements that combine to shape the mentalities of those involved in genocide. Thus
Robert Jay Lifton, a¶ professor of psychiatry and psychology at the City University of New York, and Eric Markusen, an associate
professor of sociology at Carthage College (Kenosha,¶ Wisconsin), have highlighted the 'psychological mechanisms
that protect individual people from inwardly experiencing the harmful effects, immediate or
potential, of¶ their own actions on others'. 50 Such devices, 'all of which blunt feelings', include such
elements as 'dissociation or splitting' (where a part of the mind separates from¶ the whole), 'psychic
numbing' (a reduced capacity or inclination to feel), 'brutalization' (allowing sustained behaviour that
causes harm to others), and¶ 'doubling' (akin to splitting, but where a second self emerges to allow the
person some sanctuary from otherwise unsettling experiences).¶ All such mechanisms, along with guilt
transference, are evident in public and private people that today support the continuation of the
antiIraq¶ sanctions regime. It must¶ be right or we would not be doing it. If the Iraqis are dying and diseased, it isn't
my fault, my government's fault, President Clinton's fault, the UN's fault. It's all¶ Saddam's fault. If he won't say what
happened to some biological material eight years ago then of course we should starve another one million Iraqis to death. I n any¶
case, I've enough to think about, you're too argumentative, and politicians are all the same. I don't
really care, I've enough to think about. Yes, it's all very sad, but¶ that's how things are.
Sole focus on survival destroys value to life and is always used to justify the worst
atrocities.
Callahan, Fellow at the Institute of Society and Ethics, 1973
(Daniel, The Tyranny of Survival, Pages 91-93)
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The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it
has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against
the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domination has
for over two decades, fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what
the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese Americans were herded, without
due process of law, into detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in
Korematsu v. United States (1944) in a general consensus that a threat to national security can justify
acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official
legitimizations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposed a
ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has been one
of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival, the destruction of villages in
order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evokes as a final and
unarguable value. The main rationale B.F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the
controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jaques Monod, in Chance and Necessity,
survival requires that we overthrow almost all known religious, ethical, and political system. In genetics,
the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of
offensive genetic traits from marrying and beating children. Some have suggested we do the cause of
survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means to find means by which those suffering
from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life and thus procreate
more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul
Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness to
contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to starving populations of
nations which have not enacted population-control policies For all these reasons, it is possible to
counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no
imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for the sake of survival, no rights,
liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger
when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but
only about the need to defend the fatherland, to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies.
But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at legitimate concern for survival, when that
concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental
human rights and values. The potential tyranny of survival as a value is that it is capable, if not treated
sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a
destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral
dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is
the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without
the premise of a right to life - then how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival
without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival.
To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason
why an effort should be make to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic
victories.
Utilitarianism destroys human value – it treats people as means to an end
Grisez, professor of Christian ethics @ Mount Saint Mary’s College and Shaw, 94
(Germain Gabriel and Russell, Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom p 28)
One arrives at a different judgment of how one ought to proceed in such circumstances if human life is
regarded, not as one of the things of relative value which a person has, but as an intrinsic component of
the person, and so as a value which shares in the dignity of the person. In denying that we can choose
to kill one person for the sake of two, we really are denying that two persons are "worth" twice as
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much as some other real person. On this view it is simply not possible to make the sort of calculation
which weighs persons against each other (my life is more valuable than John's life, John's life is more
valuable than Mary's and Tom's combined, or vice versa) and thus to determine whose life shall be
respected and whose sacrificed. The value of each human person is incalculable, not in any merely
poetic sense, but simply because it is not susceptible to calculation, measurement, weighing, and
balancing. Traditionally this point has been expressed by the statement that the end does not justify
the means. This is a way of saying that the direct violation of any good intrinsic to the person cannot
be justified by the good result which such a violation may bring about. What is extrinsic to human
persons may be used for the good of persons, but what is intrinsic to persons has a kind of sacredness
and may not be violated.
Smart sanctions only mask civilian suffering—sanctions are inherently unethical
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99
[Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The
Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 141-142, Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]
Many of those who defend sanctions do not argue that damage to innocents is morally acceptable,
but rather that this damage is not inherent in sanctions and could in principle be mitigated or avoided
altogether. Where measures are taken to minimize civilian harm, the argument goes, sanctions are
ethically defensible. But this optimism is inconsistent with the nature of economic sanctions, as well
as with the history of sanctions and the logic of the vested interests created by sanctions. If economic
sanctions are motivated by an intent to do economic damage, then partial sanctions and humanitarian
exemptions will allow the target nation to adjust its economy to minimize the overall damage,
undermining the intentions of the political actors imposing the sanctions. The more complete the
sanctions, the more effective they will be, in terms of economic damage; but that in turn means that
the economy as a whole will be undermined. The greater the degree to which the economy is
generally undermined, the greater the damage to the civilian population, outside the military and
political leadership. The greater the damage to the civilian population, the more serious the harm will
be to the most vulnerable sectors—infants, the elderly, the sick, the handicapped, pregnant women,
widows with children. Sanctions that are economically effective necessarily entail the greatest harm to
those who are the most vulnerable and the most disenfranchised from power. The ethical dilemma is
not resolved by placing blame on the target state for its initial wrongdoing or for its response to
economic crisis. We know from the history of sanctions, and of sieges and blockades in wartime, that
the state will generally increase the proportion of the economy that goes to the support of the
political leadership and to the military, for any of a number of reasons: because national security is
legitimately seen as the highest priority, or because the nature of the “siege mentality” is that the
leadership will first protect itself, or because desperate need for basic goods creates opportunities for
black marketeering. This may shift part of the moral responsibility to the target state, but it does not
vitiate the moral agency that resides in the state that initiated the crisis by imposing sanctions in the
first place, particularly in light of the predictability of the outcome. The use of sanctions is even more
troubling if we acknowledge that the odds are not good that any political ends will be achieved by
sanctions. Even if the end is one that could justify the human cost of sanctions—such as stopping
military aggression— the one thing we know about sanctions is that they are generally unlikely to
achieve their goal. Alternatively, we could frame the “goals” of sanctions not in terms of political ends,
but in terms of punishment or symbolic expression. However, these cannot claim the ethical
justification that was invoked when sanctions were seen as the means of stopping war—that harm to
innocents may be justified when it is for the purpose of preventing a far greater harm. Establishing
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criteria for the ethical use of sanctions does not resolve these contradictions, but instead masks them.
To say that sanctions are ethical as long as we make sure to minimize civilian harm is to mask the fact
that sanctions by their nature cause harm to civilians directly and primarily. It is like using a pickaxe for
brain surgery the nature of the instrument suggests that targeting certain areas with precision and
effectiveness, without killing the patient in the process, is not going to happen. It is disingenuous to be
surprised or apologetic when sanctions turn out to do no harm to a ruling elite, to achieve none of the
ostensible goals of the sanctions regarding “unacceptable behavior” or “punishment of international
outlaws, ” and to be generally ineffectual for much of anything besides rhetorical posturing and the
psychological gratification of having done something.
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Sanctions Unethical
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Target Innocent Civilians/Use People as Means
Sanctions take civilian populations hostage—the sacrifice of whole people for strategic
interests is ethically indefensible
Kochler, Professor of Philosophy, 94
[Dr. Hans, International Press Organization, “Ethical Aspects of Sanctions in International Law The
Practice of the Sanctions Policy and Human Rights”, http://i-p-o.org/sanctp.htm#I, accessed 7/8/13, VJ
Paraphrased within brackets for ableist language]
Comprehensive economic sanctions, then – continuing with the comparison above – have the ethical
quality of terror bombings: the civilian population is explicitly taken hostage in the framework of a
security strategy of power politics. It is self-evident that this kind of political instrumentalization of the
human being – as the citizen of a community that is a subject in international law – is not compatible
with his status as an autonomous subject, i.e. with human dignity.23 People have a natural right not to
be sacrificed for a strategic purpose over whose formulation and realization they exercise no
influence. As Quinn says, "They have a right not to be pressed, in apparent violation of their prior
rights, into the service of other people's purposes."24 In the area of ethics, the so-called "Doctrine of
Double Effect" secures every person's right to veto "a certain kind of attempt to make the world a better
place at his expense."25 It attacks the purely utilitarian approach (the maximization of usefulness)
which, in the case of sanctions, could sacrifice the health and prosperity of a whole people for the
sake of the external political purposes of member states in the Security Council or of another state
coalition. (This could be clarified case by case in such measures as the sanctions placed against Iraq,
Former Yugoslavia, Haiti, etc.) The sacrifice of a whole people for the sake of the strategic interests of a
superpower or of a coalition of states (as may be formed within the Security Council) would appear to
be in no way ethically justifiable.26 Assertions to this effect have already been made in connection with
the sanctions against South Africa: if there are no general criteria for morally evaluating a particular
political strategy, then those who have to bear the primary costs of measures such as sanctions should
be able to decide whether they are to be imposed.27 The general ethical principle guiding the use of
sanctions should thus be that consideration be taken of the affected population in the formulation of
such measures. Precisely this principle, however, is excluded by the nature of the coercive measures in
accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As American authors have illustrated in an evaluation of
the sanctions policy in the wake of the Gulf War, economic sanctions cause the civilian population to be
held hostage in its own country.28 Measures such as those which explicitly intend to harm the
population are to be judged as amoral,29 for "one cannot intentionally [weaken] cripple an economy
without intentionally affecting the people whose working and consuming lives are partially
constitutive of that economy."30
The Embargo harms the Cuban people in an attempt to use them as “ammunition”
against the Cuban regime
Font, M.D, 98
Guillermo Font, M.D., 4-13-98, “Embargo Is Cruel And Un-american”, Chicago Tribune,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-04-13/news/9804130176_1_embargo-cuban-viral-hepatitis,
accessed 7-12-13, JF
RIVER FOREST — For the first time since the U.S. embargo was imposed 38 years ago, a group of
Americans and Cuban-Americans are joining forces to support legislation pending in Congress that
would lift the ban on the sale of food and medicines to Cuba.¶ As we all know, the embargo is imposing
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extraordinary burdens on the Cuban people, a goal that was never intended. Americans have always
had a tradition of meeting the needs of hungry and sick people. Following in this tradition, the
embargo on food and medicine to Cuba--which causes suffering among children, women, the old and
the sick on the island--should no longer be tolerated.¶ The United States is the leader of
pharmaceutical research and production, and the embargo is in effect depriving Cuban patients of
drugs manufactured by U.S. companies. The embargo also prevents the Cuban people from receiving
U.S. medical equipment, parts and accessories.¶ Foreign companies have refused the sale of X-ray
equipment, operating tables, respirators, dialysis units and other medical supplies since this equipment
contains U.S.-made components and such sales are prohibited under the embargo.¶ The U.S. sanctions
crimp the island's imports of foodstuffs and supplies for the agricultural industry, causing a food
shortage which is linked to a drop in the weight of the general population, and an increase in the
incidence of low-birth weight babies.¶ The embargo also prevents the purchase of water treatment
chemicals, and other equipment to keep Cuba's clean water supply. The deterioration of the water
has led to a rise of water-born disease such as typhoid fever, dysentery and viral hepatitis.¶ Diseases
such as scabies and pediculosis are running to epidemic proportions. Dirty water is also related to
hospital infections and outbreaks of disease.¶ Cuban patients with HIV have limited access to lifeprolonging drugs and the general population is also limited in their access to AIDS testing and measures
to protect the blood supply from HIV infection.¶ Screening for breast cancer with mammograms has
been suspended several times because of the lack of X-ray films.¶ These are some of the examples
currently faced by the Cuban people. While I completely oppose the Castro regime, it does not seem
reasonable to use the Cuban people as ammunition in the fight against it.
Sanctions are unethical instruments of mass destruction
Rarick, Professor at Purdue, and Duchatelet, Dean at Purdue, 08
[Charles A, Martine, June 1st, Economic Affairs, Volume 28, Issue 2, “AN ETHICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY”, page 50, EBSCO, accessed 7/9/13, VJ]
The main deontologist. eighteenth-century German
philosopher Immanuel Kant, discounted the consequences of behaviour in assessing ethics, and instead
focused on human reasoning and logic. Kant developed the categorical imperative as his framework for
ethical behaviour. The categorical imperative has two formulations; the first being universalism. In order
to act in an ethical manner a person has to want the behaviour they are engaging in to be universally
applied. For example, if you want the act of murder to be ethical, you would have to accept that
everyone is entitled to murder others. The second formulation of the categorical imperative - 'So act
that you use humanity, whether in your person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as
an ends, never as a means' (Kant. can be used to argue against the use of sanctions. Sanctions are a
means to an end. The theory operating behind sanctions is to cause as much pain as possible to the
people of the receiving country in order for pressure to be brought on the government. The citizens of
the sanctioned country are used as a means to achieve the foreign policy objectives of the sanctioning
country. Using people as a means represents an inhumane form of public policy. Dennis Halliday.
former co-ordinator of United Nations Resolution 986 (Food-for-Oil in Iraq), describes economic
sanctions as a 'totally bankrupt concept'. Sanctions in Iraq caused the price of basic food products to
greatly increase, resulted in inadequate nutrition, caused a decline of healthcare, and led to the
collapse of the national currency (BBC, 1998). According to UN1CEF, economic sanctions against Iraq
resulted in a doubling of the death rate for children less than five years of age. The organisation
reports that the sanctions made it wry difficult for parents to provide needed medicine, food and safe
drinking water for their children, and estimates that they resulted in the deaths of 500,000 children
under the age of five between 1991 and 199s (Pigler, 2004)- Economic sanctions themselves can be
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called instruments of mass destruction (Mueller and Mueller, 1999) when one considers the human
toll inflicted on the innocent people of sanctioned countries.
Sanctions fail and disproportionally and intentionally target the most vulnerable and
least politically powerful
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99
[Joy, Fall, Cross Currents, Volume 49, Issue 3, “ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, JUST WAR DOCTRINE, AND THE
"FEARFUL SPECTACLE OF THE CIVILIAN DEAD"”, http://www.crosscurrents.org/gordon.htm, accessed
7/9/13, VJ]
To some extent, their reasons reiterate the same arguments made by others -- that sanctions are less
harsh than warfare; that the population consented to, or for other reasons can properly be held
responsible for, the acts of the leadership; that structuring in humanitarian exceptions will prevent
sanctions from causing death or great suffering. I have addressed these issues elsewhere.(24) Here I
want to look at Christiansen and Powers to draw a distinction between sanctions-as-war and sanctionswithout-war. The distinction does not resolve the underlying question: Are sanctions a device that
keeps the peace and enforces international law, or are they intrinsically a form of violence, which in
fact violates the laws of warfare? Woodrow Wilson, in urging the adoption of sanctions as a method by
which the League of Nations would keep the world free of war, described them as a "peaceful, silent,
deadly remedy." And indeed, before the Iraq situation showed us how extensive and extreme the
human damage from sanctions can be, economic sanctions were most commonly portrayed in the
U.S. as a kind of stern but peaceful act -- a punishment which inconveniences or embarrasses, but does
no damage of the sort that raises moral issues. In fact, it was the peace activists who, in 1990, were in
the forefront arguing that sanctions be used in the case of Iraq rather than military undertakings. Like
many other commentators, Christiansen and Powers are partly basing their claim on two sets of
empirical assumptions regarding the speed and degree of damage done by sanctions: "Whereas war's
impact is speedy and frequently lethal, the impact of sanctions grows over time and allows more easily
for mitigation of these harmful effects and for a negotiated solution than acts of war."(25) Christiansen
and Powers suggest that the way to conceptualize sanctions is that warfare is akin to the death penalty,
whereas sanctions are more like attaching someone's assets in a civil proceeding.(26) In this analogy, the
economic domain is seen as fully separate, and of a different nature altogether, than the domain of
power and of violence. But economic harm, while it is not directly physical, can also be a form of
violence. The sanctions-as-mere-seizure-of-assets theory, whether on the level of the individual or an
entire economy, implicitly assumes a starting point of relative abundance. Whether the seizure of
someone's assets is inconvenient or devastating depends entirely on what their assets are, and how
much is left after the seizure. For an upper-middle-class person with, say, $50,000 in stocks and an
annual income of $80,000, seizing $1000 from a checking account would at most cause inconvenience,
annoyance, perhaps some slight reduction in luxuries or indulgences. For someone living at poverty
level, seizing $1000 may mean that a family has lost irreplaceably the ability to pay for fuel oil for a
winter's heating season, or lost their car in a rural area with no other transportation, or lost the
security deposit and first month's rent on an apartment that would have given them a way out of a
homeless shelter. Living in a home with a temperature of 40 degrees in the winter does not kill
quickly, in the way that a bullet does, and may not kill at all. It may only make someone sick, or over
some time, worsen an illness until death occurs. Living in a shelter or on the street for a night or for a
week or for a month doesn't kill in the way that a bullet does, but it exposes someone to a risk of
considerable random violence, including killings. To conceptualize economic deprivation in terms of
mild punishment whose effects are reversible with no permanent damage -- inconvenience,
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embarrassment, living on a budget -- is to misunderstand the nature of the economic. "Economic
deprivation" is not a uniform phenomenon; the loss of conveniences constitutes a different experience
than the loss of the means to meet basic needs. There is a reason that infant mortality rates and life
expectancy rates are used as measures of economic development: poverty manifests itself in
malnutrition, sickness, exposure to the elements, exhaustion, dirty drinking water, the lack of means to
leave a violent country or neighborhood -- the shortening of one's life. It is for this reason that liberation
theologians and others have argued that poverty is indeed a form of violence, although it doesn't kill in
the way that a bullet does. Christiansen and Powers argue that sanctions differ from siege partly on the
grounds that the intent of sanctions is to prevent violence rather than exacerbate it. Under the doctrine
of double effect, however, this does not seem to hold. The doctrine of double effect provides that the
foreseen evil effect of a man's action is not morally imputable to him, provided that (1) the action in
itself is directed immediately to some other result, (2) the evil effect is not willed either in itself or as a
means to the other result, (3) the permitting of the evil effect is justified by reasons of proportionate
weight.(27) Although the doctrine of double effect would seem to justify "collateral damage," it does
not offer a justification of sanctions. "Collateral damage" entails the unintended secondary harm to
civilians. If a bombing raid is conducted against a military base, the collateral damage would be that
the schoolhouse half a mile away was destroyed by a bomb that missed its intended target, which was
the military base. In that case, the bombing raid would be equally successful if the base were hit, and
the schoolhouse were undamaged. But the damage done by indirect sanctions is not in fact "collateral,"
in that the damage to the civilian population is necessary and instrumental. The direct damage to the
economy is intended to indirectly influence the leadership, by triggering political pressure or uprisings
of the civilians, or by generating moral guilt from the "fearful spectacle of the civilian dead." Sanctions
directed against an economy would in fact be considered unsuccessful if no disruption of the economy
took place. We often hear commentators objecting that "sanctions didn't work" in one situation or
another because they weren't "tight" enough -- they did not succeed in disrupting the economy. Thus,
sanctions are not defensible under the doctrine of double effect. Although the end may indeed be
legitimate, the intended intermediate means consists of the generalized damage to the economy, which
violates both the first and second requirements of the doctrine. But there is a second reason why good
intent can not available as a justification for sanctions: the intent cannot in good faith be reconciled with
the history and the logic of sanctions, and with the likely outcome. We know from the history of siege
warfare that, legitimately or not, in the face of economic strangulation, the military and political
leadership will insulate themselves from its consequences, and place a disproportionate burden on
the civilian population. We also know from history that economic strangulation will consolidate the
state's power rather than undermine it; we know that sanctions are, for the most part, unlikely to
prevent military aggression, or stop human rights violations, or achieve compliance with any political
or military demand, even when sanctions drag on for decades. It is hard to reconcile the claimed "good
intent" of sanctions with a history that makes it easy to foresee that those intentions are not likely to be
realized. Thus, I would suggest that while sanctions may have very different goals than siege warfare -including goals such as international governance -- they are nevertheless subject to many of the same
moral objections: that they intentionally, or at least predictably, harm the most vulnerable and the
least political; and that this is something which the party imposing sanctions either knows, or should
know. To the extent that economic sanctions seek to undermine the economy of a society, and thereby
prevent the production or importation of necessities, they are functioning as the modern equivalent of
siege. To the extent that sanctions deprive the most vulnerable and least political sectors of society of
the food, potable water, medical care, and fuel necessary for survival and basic human needs,
sanctions should be subject to the same moral objections as siege warfare.
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Sanctions are modern siege warfare—they systematically deprive the innocents of
basic life
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99
[Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The
Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 126-127 ,Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]
Thus, the argument can be made that siege is a form of warfare that itself constitutes a war crime. In
just war doctrine we could demand a justification for a military strategy in terms of the obligation to
minimize harm to civilians: the ammunition factory was a legitimate target, and there was no way to
bomb it without collateral damage to nearby residential areas. But siege is peculiar in that it resists such
an analysis: the immediate goal is precisely to cause suffering to civilians. In the case of the
ammunitions factory, we can answer the question, how is this act consistent with the moral
requirement to discriminate? In the case of siege, we cannot. Sanctions are subject to many of the
same moral objections as siege. They intentionally, or at least predictably, harm the most vulnerable
and the least political, and this is something the party imposing sanctions either knows or should know.
To the extent that economic sanctions seek to undermine the economy of a society and thereby
prevent the production or importation of necessities, they are functioning as the modern equivalent
of siege. To the extent that sanctions deprive the most vulnerable and least political sectors of society
of the food, potable water, medical care, and fuel necessary for survival and basic human needs,
sanctions should be subject to the same moral objections as siege warfare. Drew Christiansen and
Gerard Powers argue that the just war doctrine does not apply to peacetime sanctions in the same way
that this doctrine applies to sieges and blockades imposed as part of a war effort. The fundamental
difference, they hold, is that the use of economic sanctions is rooted in the intention to avoid the use of
armed force, as opposed to the intent to multiply the effects of wars The distinction between sanctionsas-war and sanctions-as-nonviolent-alternative-to war goes back to the fundamental question, what
kind of “things” are economic sanctions? Are sanctions “a stern but peaceful act”-a punishment that
inconveniences or embarrasses, but does no damage of the sort that raises moral issues? Or are they a
form of slow-acting but lethal warfare, which targets the innocent and helpless in a way that would
constitute a war crime in a military context? The implications of this ontological issue are enormous: in
one view, economic sanctions are attractive and can be ethically justified easily and often; in the other
view, sanctions do gratuitous, direct human damage that is ethically indefensible. Christiansen and
Powers suggest that warfare is akin to the death penalty, whereas sanctions are more like attaching
someone’s assets in a civil proceeding. In this analogy, the economic domain is seen as fully separate,
and of a different nature altogether, from the domain of power and violence. But economic harm, while
it is not directly physical, can also be a form of violence. The sanctions-asmere- seizure-of-assets
theory, whether on the level of the individual or an entire economy, implicitly assumes a starting point
of relative abundance. Whether the seizure of someone’s assets is inconvenient or devastating depends
entirely on what those assets are and how much is left after the seizure. “Economic deprivation” is not
a uniform phenomenon; the loss of conveniences constitutes a different experience from the loss of
the means to meet basic needs. I do not deny that the contexts in which sanctions and sieges occur
maybe different. The intent of each may differ the nature of the demands maybe different, and the
options of the besieged or sanctioned states may be different. But the moral objection to sanctions does
not rest on the analogy; sanctions do not have to be identical to siege warfare in order to be subject to
condemnation under just war principles. Indeed, if the intent of sanctions is peaceful rather than
belligerent, then the usual justifications in warfare are unavailable. I am morally permitted to kill
where my survival is at stake, and in war, I am morally permitted to kill even innocents, in some
circumstances. But if one’s goal is to see that international law is enforced or that human rights are
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respected, then the stakes and the justificatory context are quite different. Lori Fisler Damrosch has
argued that sanctions warrant a particularly high degree of tolerance because of the importance of the
international norms they are intended to protect: Especially in the case of norms such as the
prohibitions against aggression and genocide, which are themselves devoted to the preservation of
human life, it may be necessary to tolerate a high level of civilian hardship in order to prevent or at least
discourage future violations.7 Yet it is hard to make sense of the claim that “collateral damage” can be
justified in the name of protecting human rights; or that international law might be enforced by
means that stand in violation of international laws, including the just war principle of discrimination.
Thus, if sanctions are analogous to siege warfare, then they are problematic for the same reasons—both
effectively violate the principle of discrimination. But if sanctions are not analogous to siege, then they
are even more difficult to justify. If the goals of sanctions are the enforcement of humanitarian
standards or compliance with legal and ethical norms, then extensive and predictable harm to
civilians cannot be justified even by reference to survival or military advantage. Insofar as this is the
case, sanctions are simply a
device of cruelty garbed in self-righteousness.
Sanctions are ethically unacceptable- treat people as a means
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99
[Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The
Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 128-129 ,Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]
In addition to viewing sanctions within the ethical framework offered by the just war doctrine, we
should also examine them from a deontological perspective. I refer here to Kant’s ethical theory, which
holds that all rational beings are characterized by “dignity,” the inherent worth of a person that makes
him or her irreplaceable and that stands in contrast to those material things with a price, which can be
exchanged for other things of equal or greater price without loss. This is the basis for Kant’s claim that
all rational beings have autonomy, the right and the capacity to rule themselves. In Grounding for the
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says that it is a categorical imperative, an unconditional moral mandate
binding on all rational beings, to “act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of another, always as an end and never simply as a means.”8 This ethical
framework would arguably have had little to offer in the debate over sanctions at the time that Article
16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations was being set forth as a mechanism of enforcement. The
articulated purpose of sanctions was quite narrow: it was to stop military aggression. In that context,
there were two innocent populations involved—the nonpolitical/nonmilitary population of the
aggressor nation and the entire population of the nation under attack. Because deontological ethics
enjoins us to treat all human beings as ends in themselves and not solely as means, it would not offer
much guidance in the situation where some innocent population (or at least a sector of the population)
will be harmed, and where the issue is whether the innocents who are harmed will be the civilian
population of the aggressor nation upon whom sanctions are imposed, or the civilian population of the
attacked nations who are the objects of military aggression. In this case, either one population is the
means to the military victory of the aggressor, or the other population is the means to interdict the
aggressor. But deontological arguments do offer guidance in situations where military aggression is
not at issue, and where the choice therefore is not which innocent population suffers harm, but
whether an innocent population may be harmed in the service of the political interests of a foreign
state, or for the interest of the international community in enforcing norms. Where sanctions impose
suffering on innocent sectors of the target country population for an objective other than preventing
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the deaths of other innocent persons, this is clearly incompatible with deontological ethics, since in
these situations, to use Kantian language, human beings are reduced to nothing more than a means to
an end, where that end is something less than the lives of other human beings.
Sanctions are economic bullying—only the superpowers have the ability to hurt
growing nations to maintain their lead
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99
[Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The
Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 136-137 ,Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]
Large and diversified economies are virtually immune to sanctions, since they have the economic
flexibility to pay higher costs in the short run, and to make structural changes in the long run.sq
Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott note that nations with weak or unstable economies therefore make the
best targets for economic sanctions. In a section entitled “The Weakest Go to the Wall,” they argue that
“there seems to be a direct correlation between the political and economic health of the target
country and its susceptibility to economic pressure,” and suggest that their data “demonstrate that
countries in distress or experiencing significant problems are far more likely to succumb to coercion by
the sender country. “3s They conclude with a list of “dos and don’ts” for those imposing sanctions,
including “Do pick on the weak and helpless. “3s Their analysis of the cases indicates that sanctions are
most effective when the target is much smaller than the country imposing sanctions, and
economically weak and politically unstable. In successful cases, the average sender’s economy was
187 times larger than that of the average target.37 Thus, sanctions offer themselves solely as
mechanisms that strong nations with large economies, or international alliances including strong nations
with large economies, can effectively use against countries with weak or import-dependent economies,
or countries with unstable governments. The reverse is not true— sanctions are not a device
realistically available to small or poor nations that can be used with any significant impact against
large or economically dominant nations, even if the latter were to, say, engage in aggression or
human rights violations, or otherwise offend the international community. This has been obvious since
the reformulation of sanctions as a tool of international law.38 Therefore, there is a danger that
sanctions will be used “opportunistically” by powerful nations39 —for example, as a response by a
superpower to its declining economic hegemony. Here we can understand the particular enthusiasm
the United States holds for sanctions; the sheer size of the U.S. economy means that sanctions can be
imposed at little cost to itself, and with no likelihood that any other nation could retaliate in kind. It
would seem that we have lost altogether the rationale for sanctions that was articulated in the
formation of the League of Nations, It may be that sanctions, and the attendant harm to innocents, can
be justified as an alternative to actual warfare; but in order to justify this choice on utilitarian
grounds, we would have to have reason to believe that sanctions in fact obtain compliance by the
target state. If not, then they simply constitute the gratuitous imposition of suffering on a helpless
population, for no ethically defensible reason.
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Sanctions = Genocide
Economic sanctions against Cuba are an ongoing genocide.
Simons, former chief editor at the National Computing Centre, 97 (Geoff Leslie, The
Scourging of Iraq : Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice, p. 248-250)
In March 1997 the American Association for World Health published documents (an Executive
Summary and Report) on the impact of US sanctions on health and¶ nutrition in Cuba. 63 The
Summary of Findings begins with the words:¶ After a yearlong¶ investigation, the American Association
for World Health has determined that the US embargo of Cuba has dramatically harmed the health and
nutrition of large¶ numbers of ordinary Cuban citizens, it is our expert medical opinion that the US
embargo has caused a significant rise in suffering — and even deaths —¶ in Cuba.¶ The US embargo has
contributed to 'serious nutritional deficits, particularly among pregnant women, an increase in low
birthweight¶ babies, food shortages linked to a devastating outbreak of neuropathy numbering in the
tens of thousands, serious¶ cutbacks in supplies of safe drinking water, rising incidence of morbidity
and mortality rates from waterborne¶ diseases'. The embargo has¶ brought 'untold hardship' to sick
patients; with, for example, 35 children being treated with chemotherapy in a cancer ward denied
nausea-relieving¶ drugs, and so¶ vomiting an average of 28to30¶ times a day; and a heart-attack¶
patient denied access to an implantable defibrillator (the firm CPI was willing to make the sale but the¶
US government denied a licence) — the man died two months later.¶ A report, on release of the AAWH
documents, was carried under the heading: 'Children die in agony as US trade ban stifles Cuba'.64 This is
what the United¶ States stands for in the modern world. This is the policy that is being so
comprehensively and so mercilessly imposed on the Iraqi people; and which — were the¶ Washington
strategists allowed — would be applied to many other identifiable countries around¶ the world. The
United States is orchestrating a new Holocaust in Iraq; and is working to accomplish a similar genocide
in Cuba ('Such a stringent embargo, if applied¶ to most other countries in the developing world, would
have had catastrophic effects on the public health system. Cuba's healthcare system, however, is
uniformly¶ considered the preeminent model in the Third World' — AAWH 65 ). The American policy of
bringing catastrophe to national populations through starvation and¶ disease — that is, through
biological warfare — is nicely portable from one country to another.¶ The policy of the United States in
this regard is a manifest genocide under the terms of the convention (see Appendix 11 and also 1990s
Genocide, above). The policy¶ deliberately targets 'national' groups, 'killing' their members, 'causing
serious bodily or mental harm', 'deliberately inflicting conditions of life¶ calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part' and 'imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group' (Genocide Convention, Article¶ II). The Convention indicates also (Article III) the acts that shall be
punishable and the persons (Article IV) that shall be punished. Genocide, as defined, is punishable;¶ but
so also are 'conspiracy', 'incitement', 'attempt' and 'complicity'. Therefore Washington stands
condemned not only for its accomplished genocide in Iraq but also¶ for its attempted genocide in Cuba.¶
It is easy to identify the culpable individuals — the 'constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials
or private individuals'. The principal names have already been¶ published by Ramsey Clark, former US
Attorney General (see Appendix 10). It remains to be seen whether the successors to Boutros
BoutrosGhali,¶ John Major¶ inter alia (namely, Kofi Annan, Tony Blair inter alia) will earn exemption from
Clark's 'Criminal Complaint' (Annan at least has called for an end to the US embargo¶ on Cuba66 ).¶ I
remember private discussions and public debates about the perpetration and nature of past
genocides; in particular, about the Holocaust. How could such things have¶ been allowed to happen?
How could responsible states have fallen under such leaderships? Did literate and educated publics
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really know nothing of what was¶ happening? How are we to avoid such human catastrophes, such
moral and legal derelictions in high places, in the future?¶ Today, in contemplation of such matters, we
do not need to make imaginative leaps into the past. We do not need to consider only past¶
genocides. With the example of what is being perpetrated in 1990s Iraq we are all contemporaries of genocide. In particular, with the
current players on the scene, we¶ need contemplate only the psychologies, ethics and politics of President Bill
Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright inter alia and the unfeeling indifference of¶ comfortable populations
in Western states.
The denial of basic rights to Cuban citizens through the embargo is categorical
genocide
Simons, freelance author, 1999
[Geoff, “Imposing Economic Sanctions”, Pluto Press, 12-13, chip]
The years-long US attempt to deny Cuba access to food, medicine and drinkable water represents a
clear case of genocide. The UN Genocide Convention 29 defines as genocide any of various acts intend
to destroy ‘in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’. These acts include: killing
members of the group, causing them serious bodily or mental harm, and deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. Genocide
itself is punishable, as are the conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in
genocide. Persons who may be punished include ‘constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or
private individuals’. The American blockade has had incalculable consequences for the health and
general well-being of the Cuban people. With a de facto and de jure embargo on Cuban access to food
and medicine, the incidence of disease and malnutrition has soared; with no sign of relief for a civilian
population posing no conceivable strategic threat to the United States. As a few examples (apart from
the broad trading prohibition): the US Treasury refused to license Medix (Argentina) to sell Cuba spare
parts for medical equipment; the Ayerst Laboratories (Canada) has been blocked from supplying
colyrum (for the treatment of gas and chemical damage to the eyes) to the Cuban health service; CGR
Thompson (France) has been denied a US license to sell Cuba spare parts for medical X-ray equipment;
Siemens (Germany) has been blocked from selling Gamma Cameras, an ultra-sound system and a
Magnetic Nuclear Resonance system – all intended for use in the Cuban health service; Toshiba (Japan)
has been denied licenses to sell medical equipment to Cuba; and Alfa-Laval (Sweden) has been blocked
from supplying filtration cartridges to the Cuban health service.30Maria del Carmen, aged 27 (in July
1996), had been suffering seriously worsening sight for months and was unable to obtain glasses
because of the blockade. Francisco Rodriquez, a journalist, commented: ‘Most people are affected by
this blockade in terms of medicine, food, transport, water, electricity, all those basic needs. Living
under this continual lack has made Cuban people very stressed, very nervous.’ Silvana Mayoral, a
teacher, directed her anger at Washington: ‘They are crazy sometimes, the Americans. What gives them
the right?’ A press release (30 November 1996) for the prestigious British medical journal the Lancet
indicated the scale of the US embargo against the supply of medical supplies to Cuba. Dr Anthony F.
Kirkpatrick (Tampa, Florida) was cataloguing firms (Johnson & Johnson, Merck, International Murex and
others) that had been prevented from exporting medical equipment to Cuba. He has noted that the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States has denounced the
Cuban embargo on food and medicines as a violation of international law. In early 1997 journalists were
continuing to report the affects of the US embargo on the civilian population: ‘The shortages of food
and medicine meant that the kids became a bit more asthmatic and the adults got skinnier than ever
... Today, Fidel’s market reforms are gradually solving the food problem. But the kids are still sick.’31 In
March 1997 the American Association for World Health – the US Committee for the World Health
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Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) – issued a report on the
consequences of the embargo on Cuban health: ‘The outright ban on the sale of American foodstuffs
has contributed to serious nutritional deficits, particularly among pregnant women, leading to an
increase in low birth-weight babies ... food shortages were linked to a devastating outbreak of
neuropathy numbering in the tens of thousands ... The embargo ... has led to serious cutbacks in
supplies of safe drinking water ... a factor in the rising incidence of morbidity The US Role 139 and
mortality rates ... Due to the direct or indirect effects of the embargo, the most routine medical
supplies are in short supply or entirely absent from some Cuban clinics.’32 Media coverage of the
report in the West was minimal. The Guardian(7 March 1997), under the heading ‘Children die in agony
as US trade ban stifles Cuba’, gave various details: Child cancer sufferers are some of the most
distressing victims of the embargo, which bans Cuba from buying nearly half of the world-class drugs
in a market dominated by US manufacturers. This team visited a paediatric ward which had been
without the nausea preventing drug, metclopramide HCl, for 22 days. It found that 22 children
undergoing chemotherapy were vomiting on average 28 to 30 times a day. Another girl, aged five, in a
cancer ward lacking Implantofix for chemotherapy, was being treated through her jugular vein because
all her other veins had collapsed. She was in excruciating pain. The American Association for World
Health (AAWH) noted that few other embargoes had banned food and denied life-saving medicines to
ordinary citizens: ‘Such an embargo appears to violate the most basic international charters and
conventions governing human rights, including the United Nations charter, the charter of the
Organization of American States, and the Articles of the Geneva Convention governing the treatment
of civilians in wartime.’33
Sanctions are genocidal
Anderson, senior editor, 10
[David E., September 13, Religion & Ethics Weekly, “The Ethics of Sanctions”,
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/2010/09/13/the-ethics-of-sanctions/7016/, accessed
7/6/13, VJ]
Sanctions are attractive to policy makers—and the public—for a number of reasons. They seem more
substantial than diplomatic finger-wagging, less costly to impose than military action, and morally
preferable to war. “They are often discussed as though they were a mild sort of punishment, not an
act of aggression of the kind that has actual human costs,’’ Gordon wrote in a 1999 issue of
CrossCurrents, the journal of Association for Religion and Intellectual Life. Over the years, as the
humanitarian consequences and punitive social impact of comprehensive economic sanctions
imposed on Iraq and other countries such as Haiti, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Yugoslavia became apparent,
ethicists began debating more urgently how this tool should be understood. Albert C. Pierce, professor
of ethics and national security at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, writing in a 1996
issue of Ethics & International Affairs, the journal of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International
Affairs, argued that economic sanctions “are intended to inflict great human suffering, pain, harm, and
even death and thus should be subject to the same kind of careful moral and ethical scrutiny given to
the use of military force before it is chosen as a means to achieve national political objectives.’’
According to Gordon, “because sanctions are themselves a form of violence, they cannot legitimately
be seen merely as a peacekeeping device, or as a tool for enforcing international law.…They require
the same level of justification as other acts of warfare.’’ Pierce, Gordon, and others say sanctions
should be evaluated in much the same way and with similar principles as force is evaluated, that is,
with the just war doctrine. Gordon, for example, argues the sanctions imposed on Iraq violated both
the criteria that must be met before going to war, such as just cause and the probability of success, and
the criteria for how the war is conducted, employing such norms as proportionality and discrimination,’
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which bars directly intended attacks on noncombatants and noncombatant targets. Comprehensive
economic sanctions as employed against nations such as Iraq in 1990, Haiti in 1991, and Cuba since the
1960s, have failed to achieve their goals while at the same imposing devastating hardships on the
civilian population. Gordon cites studies that found the economic sanctions leveled against Iraq were
responsible for the death of some 237,000 Iraqi children under age five. At best, sanctions have been
successful in just a third of the cases where they have been employed. US sanctions in Iraq
“systemically overrode many of the basic principles of international humanitarian law,” she writes,
adding that “many have maintained that the magnitude of the suffering was such that the sanctions
regime could properly be termed genocidal.”
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“Genocidal Mentality”
Negative arguments like “it’s Castro’s fault” and “policymakers can’t consider
morality” are psychological defense mechanisms used to evade responsibility for an
ongoing genocide.
Simons, former chief editor at the National Computing Centre, 97 (Geoff Leslie, The
Scourging of Iraq : Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice, p. 210)
Any attempt to confront someone (official or other) with the fact of a prevailing genocide in which
they may be implicated, albeit indirectly, immediately generates¶ various defensive reactions. Ideology and
propaganda have already prepared the ground. An initial response may be silence, while the water is tested. Why am I being¶
challenged in such a way? Then the exculpations are presented. In the case of Iraq¶ the demonisation of Saddam
Hussein has accomplished everything. If the Iraqi people are suffering, it is Saddam's fault. If Iraqi infants are going blind through want
of¶ insulin, he should have thought of that. If Iraqi women are being forced to endure caesarian sections without anaesthetic, what a
monster Saddam Hussein must be.¶ Guilt transference — if I, my country, our allies, my ideology are full of rectitude,
then who can be blamed for the manifest fact that Iraqi babies lie dying in their¶ thousands in dirty hospital
wards? The propaganda has done its filthy work. If I or my government are withholding medicine and
food from sick and malnourished¶ children then there must be a very good reason. What can it be? It
is obviously the fault of the demon.¶ Attempts have been made to identify the psychological elements
that combine to shape the mentalities of those involved in genocide. Thus Robert Jay Lifton, a¶ professor of
psychiatry and psychology at the City University of New York, and Eric Markusen, an associate professor of sociology at Carthage
College (Kenosha,¶ Wisconsin), have highlighted the 'psychological mechanisms that protect individual
people from inwardly experiencing the harmful effects, immediate or potential, of¶ their own actions
on others'. 50 Such devices, 'all of which blunt feelings', include such elements as 'dissociation or
splitting' (where a part of the mind separates from¶ the whole), 'psychic numbing' (a reduced capacity
or inclination to feel), 'brutalization' (allowing sustained behaviour that causes harm to others), and¶
'doubling' (akin to splitting, but where a second self emerges to allow the person some sanctuary from
otherwise unsettling experiences).¶ All such mechanisms, along with guilt transference, are evident in
public and private people that today support the continuation of the antiIraq¶ sanctions regime. It must¶ be
right or we would not be doing it. If the Iraqis are dying and diseased, it isn't my fault, my government's fault,
President Clinton's fault, the UN's fault. It's all¶ Saddam's fault. If he won't say what happened to some biological material eight years
ago then of course we should starve another one million Iraqis to death. In any¶ case, I've enough to think about, you're
too argumentative, and politicians are all the same. I don't really care, I've enough to think about. Yes,
it's all very sad, but¶ that's how things are.
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Sanctions Only Ethical if they Cause Change
Sanctions fail and are only ethical if they result in change
Rarick, Professor at Purdue, and Duchatelet, Dean at Purdue, 08
[Charles A, Martine, June 1st, Economic Affairs, Volume 28, Issue 2, “AN ETHICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY”, page 49, EBSCO, accessed 7/9/13, VJ]
When we look at the consequences of sanctions, in most cases the outcome has been to lower the
economic, educational and healthcare systems of the sanctioned countries. While one could argue
that higher pleasures such as virtue and moral principle could override the negative consequences of
sanctions, it is questionable that most people in sanctioned countries would agree with that
argument. In some cases the citizens of sanctioned countries may. through state propaganda, take a
different view. However, factual data concerning quality-of-life issues is a better indicator of negative
consequences. The longest-running case of economic sanctions, the embargo against Cuba, has
harmed the healthcare industry of that country. A study by the American Association for World Health
concluded that economic sanctions haw had a devastating impact on the quality of healthcare in
Cuba. The trade embargo is responsible, at least in part, for increases in certain diseases such as
waterbome illness, the lack of surgical supplies and equipment, and the unavailability of medicine
(Williams, 191")- While the socialist policies of Fidel Castro have made medical services available to all
citizens of Cuba, the lack of medicine, medical supplies and equipment have decreased the effectiveness
of healthcare providers. The dire economic conditions in Cuba, of course, cannot entirely be blamed on
US economic sanctions. Castro has been a less than effective economic planner. He has, however, been
able to blame his failed policies on US-imposed sanctions (Katz, 2005) and has gained some sympathy
with other political leaders in the region. There are both short- and long-term consequences of US
sanctions against Cuba, and the results of this policy may be felt for some time past the eventual lifting
of the sanctions. If sanctions were effective most of the time, it could be argued that the positive
results gained by the people of the sanctioned country justify* the necessary pain they experience in
the application of the sanctions. This is not, however, the case because economic sanctions seldom
achieve their desired aims. In most cases, they therefore result in a net loss in happiness for
sanctioned-country citizens, both in terms of lower and higher forms of pleasure.
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Travel Sanctions Unethical
Travel sanctions have a negative humanitarian impact
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 11
[Joy, Fall, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 25, Issue 3, “Smart Sanctions Revisited” page PQ,
ProQuest, accessed 7/6/13, VJ]
There are two common types of travel sanctions: those limiting travel by individuals, such as visa bans,
and those involving broader restrictions, such as flight bans or restrictions on an entire airline. Visa bans
seem to be an ideal targeted measure in that they can designate individual political leaders or
wrongdoers by name, and the restrictions would affect them alone. But there are problems with
implementation, and doubts whether those targeted are seriously affected. Often there are no clear
procedures providing guidance for states that encounter banned individuals in their territory or
attempting to enter it. It is not difficult for individuals to hold passports in multiple nationalities or to
use fraudulent passports. But even when the travel of individuals can effectively be restricted, there is
little evidence that it is so costly to a political or military leader as to cause him to reconsider a policy
or state practice, or that restricting travel affects such individuals in any way that goes beyond
inconvenience.48 Aviation bans target an airline or a nation's airline industry. In some cases, such as the
sanctions imposed on Libya in response to the Lockerbie bombing, the aviation ban was widely viewed
as contributing to a successful outcome. However, there continue to be difficulties with implementation
and enforcement of aviation bans; and, as with any measure that compromises something as
fundamental as transportation, there are significant consequences for the civilian population, for
neighboring countries, and for others who are not the intended subject of the sanction. Even when
there are extensive efforts to strengthen them, there are many ways that flight bans can be
circumvented. Planes can be registered under different names, and the pilots can file false flight plans.
Restrictions on passenger flights are implemented relatively well, since commercial passenger airlines
are generally well regulated; however, the air cargo industry is not, and thus aviation bans on cargo
flights are quite porous.49 These illegal flights, in turn, often contribute to the black market in the
sanctioned country. The flight ban imposed on the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) was violated continuously, with tons of goods being flown in daily on illegal but highly profitable
flights, benefiting those who could afford to buy black market goods.50 There are also humanitarian
impacts that are not widely acknowledged. The lack of regular commercial flights can significantly
affect the population as a whole. The flight ban imposed on commercial flights to and from Haiti in
1994 was seen as a way of denying the wealthy the opportunity to shop for luxuries abroad, but another
consequence was that hundreds of Haitians hoping to receive asylum in the United States or
elsewhere had no way to leave the country.51 In the case of the Security Council sanctions on Libya in
response to Lockerbie, the aviation ban meant that travel presented a much greater hardship for the
population as a whole; for example, a flight from Tripoli to Alexandria, Egypt, is only ninety minutes,
whereas driving takes fifteen hours.52 Restrictions on aviation do more than block flights carrying elites
on shopping trips or cargo flights bringing in luxuries. Aviation is critical to other sectors, such as
agriculture and health care. UN agencies reported that the aviation ban in Libya compromised the
import of agricultural inputs and veterinary supplies, and also undermined crop dusting, which in turn
reduced the availability of food from both animal sources and agriculture.53 When the Security
Council assessed the expected humanitarian impact of sanctions on Sudan, UN agencies anticipated that
an aviation ban would affect medical evacuations and the import of vaccines that require refrigeration,
as well as food availability, since aviation bans were likely to undermine the import of perishable
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goods.54 In addition to prohibiting flights, aviation bans often also prohibit the sale of parts or services
related to aircraft maintenance. Consequently, even where there are exemptions - for local travel, crop
dusting, or medical evacuations - the secondary prohibitions can undercut those exemptions. In Libya,
domestic air travel was compromised by safety issues, since the air travel ban prohibited the sale of
parts for repair and maintenance, and prohibited services, such as engineering or the certification of
airworthiness.55 In Afghanistan, the Security Council sanctions froze the assets of the state-owned
airline, depriving it of the funds to purchase spare parts for repair and maintenance.56 This measure
ignored the fact that air travel is critical in Afghanistan, since fighting and the consequent damage to
roads and bridges makes overland travel dangerous.
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Sanctions = Ethnocentric
Sanctions are a form of ethnocentrism- prioritizes democratic governance over
economic development and only increase suffering.
Rarick, Professor at Purdue, and Duchatelet, Dean at Purdue, 08
[Charles A, Martine, June 1st, Economic Affairs, Volume 28, Issue 2, “AN ETHICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY”, page 49, EBSCO, accessed 7/9/13, VJ]
A number of economic sanctions have been imposed based upon a lack of democracy in a country.
While democracy is generally viewed as the preferred form of government, even democracies can be
ineffective in advancing the interests of all citizens, and democracy will not solve every country's
problems. Reich (2007) has argued that even in democratic countries such as the USA. citizen interest
has been overtaken by special-interest groups lobbying law-makers for policies favourable to their
interests. Brittan (2007) warns against viewing democracy as everything that is politically desirable.
While this paper does not argue against the desirability of a democratic form of government, it does
propose that economic sanctions cannot be relied upon to produce democratic forms of government,
or to ease the suffering of people under totalitarian regimes. It is an ethnocentric viewpoint to
assume that people strongly desire democracy over economic freedom and development. Economic
sanctions aimed at producing political change can have the opposite effect and harden dictatorial
rule, increasing the suffering of people in the sanctioned countries. In the case of Myanma r. recent
civil unrest over the military regime's policies and worsening economic situation has produced an even
harsher response from the government (Kazmin, 2007) including a crackdown even on the monastic
community of the country. Government leaders have a fiduciary duty to represent all people, not just
those with special interests. Young (2007) has proposed that leaders should use this fiduciary duty,
which has evolved from the Judaeo-Chrtstian tradition and Roman law, to represent all stakeholders.
Often sanctions are imposed because of pressure brought by special-interest groups, such as Burmese
or Cuban refugees living in the USA. who are successful in getting sanctions imposed in order to
advance their own agendas. Economic sanctions imposed for a special interest, even with good
intentions, can be questioned on the basis of their ethical legitimacy. Using the three major
frameworks of ethics the morality of economic sanctions can be explored, and conclusions drawn
concerning the ethical nature of this type of public policy.
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Outweighs War
Violent sanctions outweigh war
Dalecki, writer, 12
[Maggie, October 1st, The Ethics Blog, “Are Economic Sanctions Ethical?”,
http://ethicsblog.ca/archives/44, accessed 7/6/13, VJ]
Economic sanctions are often seen as a way to change the way a government behaves that is easier
and more humane than war. However, Professor Emily Muller (University of Manitoba) argues that our
faith in them is based on a misperception. When we look more closely at their effects on civilian
populations, and at their effectiveness in actually bringing change, we can see that they are often a
bad idea. Those in favour of sanctions argue that because they avoid military action, they are an
important tool to promote change internationally without bringing on the horrors of war. But
economic sanctions can be brutal. They often create levels of civilian suffering and hardship as great
as or even greater than those resulting from war. If their imposition is to be ethically defensible, the
harm done to civilians should be offset or outweighed by a reasonable chance of securing victory.
Another problem with economic sanctions, however, is that they are imprecise and their effects are
unpredictable. Generally it is extremely difficult to know whom they will hurt most, or whether they
will affect those in power at all. Further, if sanctions are to work, there must be a reliable connection
between subjecting civilian populations to economic hardship and those populations pressuring their
governments to change. And if the people do bring such pressure, it must be effective. Professor Muller
thinks that in many cases, the sanctions will either rally support for the enemy regime, or rob the
population of its ability to bring about change. There is a strong connection between a thriving middle
class and accountable governments, says Professor Muller. She argues that when societies are placed
under economic sanctions, it often disempowers the middle class by reducing them to poverty. This in
turn robs them of their capacity to deal with political oppression. It is also important to consider, when
contemplating sanctions, who takes responsibility. Because sanctions seem like an easy and bloodless
alternative to war, and because the harms are indirect and hard to calculate, governments are often
quick to impose them, without thinking seriously about the true costs or about the prospects for
success. And the governments responsible for sanctions often fail to accept any blame for the
suffering they cause. Whoever imposes economic sanctions must take their decision seriously, and
must be prepared to bear responsibility for the effects – especially harmful ones – of this decision.
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AT: Utilitarianism
Sanctions unethical and utilitarianism can’t be applied
Kochler, Professor of Philosophy, 94
[Dr. Hans, International Press Organization, “Ethical Aspects of Sanctions in International Law The
Practice of the Sanctions Policy and Human Rights”, http://i-p-o.org/sanctp.htm#I, accessed 7/8/13, VJ]
Comprehensive economic sanctions which heavily impact the life and health of the civilian population
need to be analyzed from an ethical standpoint before a normative evaluation of the current practice in
international law can be undertaken. Indeed, comprehensive economic sanctions seem to be the
"classical" instruments for inducing submission in the power politics of the so-called "New World
Order"14 – and instruments whose permissibility must be critically examined from the standpoint of
ethics as well as of international law. It does not of necessity follow that a measure praised as the
panacea of power politics fulfills the requirements placed on a legitimate international order. In the
first place, coercive measures like economic sanctions represent a form of collective punishment15
and thus do not comply with the ethical principle of individual responsibility, i. e. with the ability to
attribute behaviour to an individual. The punishment of people not responsible for political decisions is
most akin to a terrorist measure; the aim of such a measure is to influence the government's course of
action by deliberately assaulting the civilian population.16 Purposefully injuring the innocent is,
however, an immoral act per se, one which cannot be justified by any construction of utilitarian ethics.
In accordance with the conception of Thomas Aquinas, inquiring into the intention behind a particular
decision is of decisive value for an ethical evaluation.17 In the present context, several conditions
govern the moral permissibility of acts in which a morally questionable bad upshot is foreseen: (a) the
intended final end must be good, (b) the intended means to it must be morally acceptable; (c) the
foreseen bad upshot must not itself be willed (that is, must not be, in some sense, intended); and (d) the
good end must be proportionate to the bad upshot18, (that is, must be important enough to justify the
bad upshot).19 The problematic nature of this utilitarian context of evaluation is plain to view. Are
those who suffer under a certain measure to be viewed sympathetically as the victims of the pursuit
of a good intention, or is their suffering to be regarded as the deliberate component of a strategy?
This debate seems merely to invite hypocritical casuistry. The outcome for the affected population is
one and the same. A "superficial" difference may only be discerned by an ethics of attitude from the
viewpoint of the perpetrator. The latter appeases his conscience with reference to the unintentional
but "inevitable" side effects. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the so-called "Doctrine of Double Effect"
was developed, following a distinction made by Thomas Aquinas.20 It was designed to help clarify
ethical questions that arise when a morally good end can only be reached through inflicting harm
upon other people.21 In the concrete instance of comprehensive economic sanctions in accordance
with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the moral good that is aspired is the maintenance or restoration of
international peace; the wrong that is thereby effected is the suffering of the civilian population
(including sickness and death as results of the mass suffering that accompanies the breakdown in the
distribution of essential commodities). According to Quinn's ethical analysis, it is necessary to take into
account the relation which the aspired goal has to the foreseen wrong that results from it.22 In this
context, Quinn refers to the difference between "terror bombing" and "strategic" bombing in war: in
the first instance, the suffering of the civilian population is deliberately intended; in the second, the
possibility that the population will suffer is merely tolerated. In the first instance, harm is directly
inflicted, in the second case indirectly. (In accordance with the currently valid rules of international
humanitarian law, which we will later examine more closely, terror bombings are strictly prohibited, for
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the civilian population is never allowed to be the direct target in a military conflict.) Economic sanctions,
however, are in line with the first case mentioned above: harm is directly and deliberately inflicted so
as to force the government to alter its course of action.
Sanctions fail and it’s impossible to apply util to sanctions
McGee, president of the Dumont Institute for Public Policy Research, 03
[Robert W., December 1, Economic Affairs, pg 42, “THE ETHICS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS”, EBSCO,
accessed 7/6/13, VJ]
If the sanctions are successful, the nations imposing the sanctions gain psychic income, since their
efforts have paid off and have resulted in the target country buckling under pressure to change
behaviour. If the sanctions were imposed because the target country engages in human rights abuses,
the people who are being abused benefit when the abuses cease. If the abusive country has been
abusing the rights of 10 million of its own people, there are 10 million beneficiaries. But that is only
one side of the coin. Who are the losers? If the oil embargo is effective, the price of oil must
necessarily go up, since the supply is effectively reduced. That being the case, the 6 billion people on
the planet who use oil, either directly or indirectly, are losers because they must pay more for oil and
oil products. The obvious retort to this line of reasoning is that the 10 million people who cease to have
their human rights abused more than offsets the few extra pennies that 6 billion losers must pay for
their oil. That may or may not be the case. One of the major problems with utilitarian ethics is that
there is no precise way to measure gains and losses. Is it worth it to pressure some country to ease up
on their human rights abuses if doing so causes the price of oil to increase just a little bit? Such a
decision involves value judgements and estimates as to gains and losses. Another major problem with
this line of reasoning is that the assumption is that the sanctions are effective. Studies have almost
uniformly shown that sanctions are more likely to fail than succeed. That being the case, it appears
even less likely that a sanction intended to prevent or reduce human rights abuses will result in a
positive-sum game. What is a more likely scenario is that the 10 million people in the target country
will not experience a lessening in the extent of the human rights abuses perpetrated against them,
while the 6 billion other people in the world will have to pay higher prices for oil and oil products.
Thus, everyone is a loser. Indeed, the sanctions may result in additional suffering on the part of the
very people the sanctions are intended to help. That is definitely the case with the sanctions against
Iraq, as we shall discuss below.
Utilitarianism a bad way to weigh unethical sanctions
McGee, president of the Dumont Institute for Public Policy Research, 03
[Robert W., December 1, Economic Affairs, pg 43, “THE ETHICS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS”, EBSCO,
accessed 7/6/13, VJ]
Sanctions generally cannot be justified on utilitarian grounds because the losers exceed the winners.
However, utilitarian ethics is not a precise tool because it is not possible to precisely measure gains
and losses, especially when some of the gains and losses cannot be reduced to monetary units. Psychic
gains are only one example. Many other gains and losses are of a non-monetary nature. If sanctions
kill, which they sometimes do, how can total gains and losses be measured and compared? Another
major problem with applying utilitarian ethics is that utilitarians ignore rights violations. All that
matters to a utilitarian is whether the gains exceed the losses. The ends justify the means. For a
utilitarian, killing a few (or a few million) innocent people might be justified as long as the result is a
good one. That is one of the major problems with utilitarian ethics and it is one of the major strengths
of rights-based ethics. A rights-based ethic takes the position that an action is bad if someone’s rights
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are violated, regardless of whether the good outweighs the bad. What is wrong prima facie does not
become right just because some majority ultimately benefits. A major advantage of a rights-based ethic
is that there is no need to calculate total gains and compare them with total losses. It is impossible to
precisely measure gains and losses anyway. A rights-based ethic removes this problem. The only thing
that needs to be determined is whether someone’s rights would be violated. The matter is further
complicated, however, because there are two different kinds of rights, negative rights and positive
rights. Negative rights include the right not to have your property taken from you without your
consent and the right not to be killed. One attribute of negative rights is that they do not conflict. My
right to property does not conflict with your right to property. My right to life does not conflict with your
right to life. Positive rights have different attributes from negative rights. Examples of positive rights
include the right to free or low-cost medical care and the right to subsidised housing. One attribute of
positive rights is that they always involve the violation of someone’s negative rights. My right to free or
low-cost medical care comes at the expense of the taxpayers who must pay something to make up the
difference between the market price of the service and the price I have to pay. My right to lowcost
housing comes at the expense of the landlord, who is prohibited from charging the market rate for the
rental of his property. In a sense, positive rights are not rights at all. They are a licence to expropriate
the property of others with legal sanction. The kind of rights we need to look at when we are trying to
determine whether a particular sanction is justified is negative rights. We must ask ourselves the
question: ‘Are anyone’s negative rights to life, property, contract, etc. violated by this sanction?’ If the
answer is ‘yes,’ then the sanction cannot be justified. That being the case, one can easily conclude that
the vast majority of sanctions cannot be justified on ethical grounds because someone’s rights are
almost certainly violated. If even one willing buyer is prevented from buying what he wants from
whomever he wants, rights are violated. But what is more likely is that the rights of thousands, or
even millions, are violated by economic sanctions. The two case studies examined in this article are the
sanctions that have been imposed against Iraq and Cuba. Although they are both good examples,
because they illustrate the point, they are by no means the only examples that could be given. They
have been chosen because they are cases the average reader is most likely to be familiar with because
they have been reported frequently in the popular press.
Even utilitarian calculus rejects Cuban sanctions
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99
[Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The
Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 133-135 ,Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]
Since the formation of the League of Nations, those defending sanctions have justified
them in part on the basis of utilitarian reasons: the argument is that the economic hardship of the
civilian population of the target country entails less human harm overall, and less harm to the
sanctioned population, than the military aggression or human rights violations the sanctions seek to
prevent. Yet if this is so, then—as an ethical matter—we must look at the effectiveness of sanctions. If
they do not in fact stop military aggression or human rights violations, then a procedure that harms
innocent sectors of the population loses its utilitarian justification. We might begin by distinguishing
between economic effectiveness and political effectiveness. A common view is that the “generally
accepted goal” of sanctions is “to influence the conduct of political actors in another country who refuse
to conform to the accepted norms of international conduct. “2° Economic effectiveness concerns “the
volume of pecuniary damage or disruption inflicted, while political effectiveness refers to the degree
that desired changes, if any, are undertaken by the target state. “21 Johan Galtung points out that the
economic damage done by sanctions in fact tends to have little likelihood of actually achieving the
stated goal of forcing the target nation to change its conduct or policies. Instead, he argues, what
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emerges is an ethos of “conspicuous sacrifice. “22 Far from undermining the political legitimacy of the
target state, sanctions often trigger the opposite response: Galtung used the term “rally-around-theflag effect” to argue that leaders in target nations could use the economic pain caused by foreign
nations to rally their populations around their cause. Rather than creating disintegration in the target
state, sanctions would invoke nationalism and political integration.2j The relation between economic
effectiveness and political effectiveness is not at all clear; indeed, it may be an inverse relation. Many
economists and historians hold that, generally, sanctions are politically ineffectual. In the twentieth
century, this assessment dates back at least to the first time the League of Nations sought to impose
sanctions on a major military power—Italy under Mussolini— and failed quite spectacularly.24 Rather
than impeding Mussolini, the sanctions were reported to increase patriotic fervor and support for his
military project. Sanctions were denounced as ineffectual in stopping aggression,zd and the League of
Nations did not survive. Losman’s study of long-term boycotts against Israel, Cuba, and Rhodesia notes
that even where there was considerable economic damage, the only apparent political effect was
increased political integration.27 The common (though not universal) result is that “the morale-killing
effects of economic sanctions often operate in the opposite fashion, stimulating xenophobia and
strengthening the determination of the target country to maintain its stance. “28 The scholarship on
sanctions has to a large extent documented this phenomenon, though it has also described exceptions.
In the first large empirical study of the success of sanctions in the twentieth century, published in 1985,
Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott held that sanctions had in fact been effective in about one-third of the
situations in which they were imposed.29 Theirs is one of the most optimistic estimates. Others
question whether sanctions have been effective even one-third of the time.JO It is not surprising to see
historians, political scientists, and economists echoing the observation that target nations cannot
generally be expected to change their acts or policies in response to sanctions. Thus, when we work out
the utilitarian calculus of sanctions, we see on one side that there is not a high likelihood that
sanctions will succeed in stopping military aggression or human rights violations. On the other side of
the calculus, we see the high probability, if not inevitability, that sanctions will harm the most
vulnerable population.
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AT: Symbolic Value
Sanctions fail as symbolic messages—overly penal and there are better alternatives
Winkler, PhD in political science, 99
[Adam, Human Rights Quarterly Volume 21 Issue 1, “Just Sanctions”, Page 144,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/human_rights_quarterly/v021/21.1winkler.html#authbio, accessed
7/9/13, VJ]
A second dilemma for right intention is that posed by the pursuit of symbolic goals. David Baldwin
argues that sanctions should be understood to have both primary economic objectives, such as
impacting a foreign economy and achieving a change in a target nation's policies, and symbolic
objectives, such as demonstrating resolve to allies or domestic constituents. 72 According to Baldwin,
even when sanctions have little economic impact, they may still be considered successful if symbolic
messages are relayed. 73 As sanctions are more often successful in relaying messages than in achieving
policy objectives, Baldwin recommends that states use them for their communicative potential. 74 The
principle of right intention, however, renders the pursuit of symbolic goals objectionable. Because of
the harm caused by economic sanctions, they are far too penal to be used as signaling devices
intended for domestic constituents or foreign allies. Symbolic messages can be sent in numerous
other ways without harming anyone, including public statements, resolutions of international
organizations, and diplomatic maneuvers, like recalling ambassadors or negotiators. Symbolic
sanctions are neither the last resort short of war nor do they aim at objectives that absolutely mandate
inflicting harm on others. Finally, symbolic goals are often unarticulated and thus risk the same
dangers of vague sanctioning goals described above.
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AT: Smart Sanctions
Smart sanctions fail—don’t force change and continue humanitarian violations
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 11
[Joy, Fall, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 25, Issue 3, “Smart Sanctions Revisited” page PQ,
ProQuest, accessed 7/6/13, VJ]
Several types of targeted sanctions, such as arms embargoes, have structural problems with
implementation that appear to be irresolvable after almost two decades of efforts by practitioners,
NGOs, and academics. Most types of smart sanctions have not brought about an increase in
effectiveness that is dramatically better than that of "traditional" broad trade sanctions. Some have
argued that effectiveness has to be understood more broadly than just target compliance. As noted
earlier, Baldwin maintains that sanctions should be seen as effective if they increase the costs to the
targeted actor or otherwise affect the calculus of decision-making. Adopting a different approach,
Brzoska suggested that, in the case of arms embargoes, while target compliance was very low, arms
embargoes could be considered much more successful if we look instead at situations where the sender
is satisfied with the outcome, regardless of actual compliance. There may be merit to Baldwin's and
Brzoska's strategies for evaluating the impact of sanctions. However, they do not support the view that,
because they aim at specific individuals or goods, targeted sanctions are significantly more effective
than traditional trade sanctions. These proposals only suggest that if we use different criteria, we will
view sanctions as more successful than they seem by the measurement of target compliance. But that
is equally true of traditional sanctions. And, as Drezner notes, however "smart" the sanctions are,
their effectiveness is compromised when the senders have different goals. One sender can be looking
for containment, another for regime change; or one sender's goals can change as its strategic interests
in the region change, without any goal being accomplished.75 To the extent that targeted sanctions are
imposed to achieve conflicting or ambiguous goals, they will be no more effective than traditional
sanctions. More disappointingly, targeted sanctions did not bring an end to the humanitarian damage
or the ethical conundrums presented by traditional trade sanctions - at least not in the manner
expected. Arms embargoes that are imposed against all parties- both aggressors and victims- can
cripple the self-defense efforts of those under attack. Aviation bans can undermine a major
component of a nation's transportation sector, adversely affecting the civilian population generally.
Financial sanctions targeting the personal assets of individuals - the form of targeted sanctions that is
often seen as the most promising in every regard - has raised issues of due process that have brought
into question the fundamental nature of the Council's authority to impose Chapter VII measures. It may
even be that the rhetoric of targeted sanctions has caused, so to speak, a certain collateral damage: it
seems that the trend toward designing- or at least labeling - economic measures as "targeted" has
done much to silence the discussion of the humanitarian impact. Where the 1990s witnessed growing
demands that humanitarian monitoring be incorporated within the sanctions regime, and for prior
assessment of the humanitarian impact, this has largely ceased. It seems that the common view is that
since sanctions are now "smart," we no longer have to worry about harming the innocent. But that is
clearly not the case. Sanctions targeting a nation's financial system, or critical industries or exports,
disrupt the economy as a whole, much like traditional trade sanctions.
Smart sanctions only mask civilian suffering—sanctions are inherently unethical
Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99
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[Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The
Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 141-142, Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]
Many of those who defend sanctions do not argue that damage to innocents is morally acceptable,
but rather that this damage is not inherent in sanctions and could in principle be mitigated or avoided
altogether. Where measures are taken to minimize civilian harm, the argument goes, sanctions are
ethically defensible. But this optimism is inconsistent with the nature of economic sanctions, as well
as with the history of sanctions and the logic of the vested interests created by sanctions. If economic
sanctions are motivated by an intent to do economic damage, then partial sanctions and humanitarian
exemptions will allow the target nation to adjust its economy to minimize the overall damage,
undermining the intentions of the political actors imposing the sanctions. The more complete the
sanctions, the more effective they will be, in terms of economic damage; but that in turn means that
the economy as a whole will be undermined. The greater the degree to which the economy is
generally undermined, the greater the damage to the civilian population, outside the military and
political leadership. The greater the damage to the civilian population, the more serious the harm will
be to the most vulnerable sectors—infants, the elderly, the sick, the handicapped, pregnant women,
widows with children. Sanctions that are economically effective necessarily entail the greatest harm to
those who are the most vulnerable and the most disenfranchised from power. The ethical dilemma is
not resolved by placing blame on the target state for its initial wrongdoing or for its response to
economic crisis. We know from the history of sanctions, and of sieges and blockades in wartime, that
the state will generally increase the proportion of the economy that goes to the support of the
political leadership and to the military, for any of a number of reasons: because national security is
legitimately seen as the highest priority, or because the nature of the “siege mentality” is that the
leadership will first protect itself, or because desperate need for basic goods creates opportunities for
black marketeering. This may shift part of the moral responsibility to the target state, but it does not
vitiate the moral agency that resides in the state that initiated the crisis by imposing sanctions in the
first place, particularly in light of the predictability of the outcome. The use of sanctions is even more
troubling if we acknowledge that the odds are not good that any political ends will be achieved by
sanctions. Even if the end is one that could justify the human cost of sanctions—such as stopping
military aggression— the one thing we know about sanctions is that they are generally unlikely to
achieve their goal. Alternatively, we could frame the “goals” of sanctions not in terms of political ends,
but in terms of punishment or symbolic expression. However, these cannot claim the ethical
justification that was invoked when sanctions were seen as the means of stopping war—that harm to
innocents may be justified when it is for the purpose of preventing a far greater harm. Establishing
criteria for the ethical use of sanctions does not resolve these contradictions, but instead masks them.
To say that sanctions are ethical as long as we make sure to minimize civilian harm is to mask the fact
that sanctions by their nature cause harm to civilians directly and primarily. It is like using a pickaxe for
brain surgery the nature of the instrument suggests that targeting certain areas with precision and
effectiveness, without killing the patient in the process, is not going to happen. It is disingenuous to be
surprised or apologetic when sanctions turn out to do no harm to a ruling elite, to achieve none of the
ostensible goals of the sanctions regarding “unacceptable behavior” or “punishment of international
outlaws, ” and to be generally ineffectual for much of anything besides rhetorical posturing and the
psychological gratification of having done something.
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Structural Violence Outweighs War
We control the scale of violence – structural violence is necessary to psychologically
prime people for macro-level conflict
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4
(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)
(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)
This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses
everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger
and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans
dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg,
Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the
“smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and
social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal
bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized
(Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political
self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e.
preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to
our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence.
Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of
everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More
important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the
powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because
suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a
violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also ScheperHughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics,
emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention
centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are
capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide
continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute
uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term
genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and
alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in
purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our
volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the
concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to
find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing
protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” goodenough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to
impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal
industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States
(Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This
applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore,
Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted
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away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are
hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this
regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his
concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence
hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in
communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader
meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit
political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the
possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied
systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape
during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US
immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered
genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday
forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased
with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangleholds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace”
possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the
government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally,
the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex
has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience.
The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger,
the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient
prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it
possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority
youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end
it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough
humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and
even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies
possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to
recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social
exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize
atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of
constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history
as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic
anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among
other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations,
i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing
homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of
violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the
practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of
rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is
ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally
vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm,
the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment.
Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or
social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during
the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass
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violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so
are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence
in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic
doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests
who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby
coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and
routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close
to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nusrecognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig
(1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links
between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.”
Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in
the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of
culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very
everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the
prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence,
and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped
is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989).
Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu
treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less
efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic
domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be
understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the
expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to
understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault
basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of
violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on
genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement,
and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible?
In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially
incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims
themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in
social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They
harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the
“genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of
human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social
parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the
militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of
heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of
victimization).
Structural violence outweighs the case: their impacts are finite, wars end, but
oppression doesn’t, and it’s harder to identify, we control the most proximate cause
of conflict.
Gilligan 96 [James, professor of Psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School, Director of the Center for
the Study of Violence, and a member of the Academic Advisory Council of the National Campaign
Against Youth Violence, Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and its Causes, p 191-196]
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The deadliest form of violence is poverty. You cannot work for one day with the violent people who fill our prisons and mental
hospitals for the criminally insane without being forcible and constantly reminded of the extreme poverty and discrimination that characterizes
their lives. Hearing about their lives, and about their families and friends, you are forced to recognize the truth in Gandhi’s observation that the
deadliest form of violence is poverty. Not a day goes by without realizing that trying to understand them and their violent behavior in purely
individual terms is impossible and wrong-headed. Any theory of violence, especially a psychological theory, that evolves from the experience of
men in maximum security prisons and hospitals for the criminally insane must begin with the recognition that these institutions are only
microcosms. They are not where the major violence in our society takes place, and the perpetrators who fill them are far from being the main
causes of most violent deaths. Any approach to a theory of violence needs to begin with a look at the structural violence in this country.
Focusing merely on those relatively few men who commit what we define as murder could distract us from examining and learning from those
structural causes of violent death that are far more significant from a numerical or public health, or human, standpoint. By “structural violence”
I mean the increased rates of death, and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted with the relatively
lower death rates experienced by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a
function of class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society’s collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the
collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting “structural” with “behavioral violence,” by which I mean the nonnatural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to
homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. Structural violence differs from behavioral violence in at least three major
respects. *The lethal effects of structural violence operate continuously, rather than sporadically, whereas murders, suicides, executions, wars,
and other forms of behavioral violence occur one at a time. *Structural violence operates more or less independently of individual acts;
independent of individuals and groups (politicians, political parties, voters) whose decisions may nevertheless have lethal consequences for
others. *Structural
violence is normally invisible, because it may appear to have had other (natural or violent) causes. The finding
that structural violence causes far more deaths than behavioral violence does is not limited to this country. Kohler
and Alcock attempted to arrive at the number of excess deaths caused by socioeconomic inequities on a worldwide basis. Sweden was their
model of the nation that had come closes to eliminating structural violence. It had the least inequity in income and living standards, and the
lowest discrepancies in death rates and life expectancy; and the highest overall life expectancy in the world. When they compared the life
expectancies of those living in the other socioeconomic systems against Sweden, they found that 18 million deaths a year could be attributed to
the “structural violence” to which the citizens of all the other nations were being subjected. During the past decade, the discrepancies between
18 million deaths a year caused by structural
violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from
the rich and poor nations have increased dramatically and alarmingly. The 14 to
structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million
military and civilian deaths, including those by genocide—or about eight million per year, 1939-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66
(perhaps 575,000) deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear
exchange between the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (232 million), it was clear that even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence, which
continues year after year. In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed
by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating,
Structural
violence is also the main cause of behavioral violence on a socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from homicide
thermonuclear war, or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.
and suicide to war and genocide). The question as to which of the two forms of violence—structural or behavioral—is more important,
dangerous, or lethal is moot, for they are inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect.
Structural violence is the biggest impact, causes more deaths than nuclear war –
nuclear extinction evidence is unverified and overblown. Their focus on “extinction
politics” only reinforces the legitimacy of institutions that make nuclear war possible.
Martin 84 [Dr. Brian Martin, physicist, resource associate in Faculty of Science, SANA Update
(Scientists Against Nuclear Arms Newsletter), number 16, May 1984, pp. 5-6: Extinction politics,
http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/84sana1.html // Accessed: July 25th 2012 // BP]
The possibility of massive death and destruction from war has long played a major role in thinking
about war and peace. One theme has been that the increased destructiveness of weapons would provide an effective deterrent to war.
Alfred Nobel thought that his invention of dynamite was a great contribution to the cause of peace, and many scientists have used similar
beliefs to justify their own contributions to weapons technology. Prior to World War II, many observers thought that the capabilities of air
bombardment were so horrific that war was virtually unthinkable. And since the development of nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence has
become a standard plank of Western foreign and military policy. he promotion of beliefs in massive death and destruction from war has been
an important facet of the efforts of many peace movements. In the 1930s, British military planners estimated the effects of aerial
bombardment by extrapolating linearly from the very limited experience of bombardments and casualties in World War I. On the basis of such
assumptions, people such as Philip Noel Baker in the 1930s predicted the obliteration of civilization from war. But the experience of World War
II showed that the 1930s military expectations of casualties per tonne of bombs were sizeable overestimates.[1] By the 1950s, a large number
of people had come to believe that the killing of much or all of the world's population would result from global nuclear war. This idea was
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promoted by the peace movement, among which the idea of 'overkill' - in the sense that nuclear arsenals could kill everyone on earth several
times over - became an article of faith. Yet in
spite of the widespread belief in nuclear extinction, there was almost
no scientific support for such a possibility. The scenario of the book and movie On the Beach,[2] with fallout clouds gradually
enveloping the earth and wiping out all life, was and is fiction. The scientific evidence is that fallout would only kill people
who are immediately downwind of surface nuclear explosions and who are heavily exposed during
the first few days. Global fallout has no potential for causing massive immediate death (though it could
cause up to millions of cancers worldwide over many decades).[3] In spite of the lack of evidence, large sections of the peace movement have
left unaddressed the question of whether nuclear war inevitably means global extinction. The next effect to which beliefs in nuclear extinction
were attached was ozone depletion. Beginning in the mid-1970s, scares about stratospheric ozone developed, culminating in 1982 in the
release of Jonathan Schell's book The Fate of the Earth.[4] Schell painted a picture of human annihilation from nuclear war based almost
entirely on effects from increased ultraviolet light at the earth's surface due to ozone reductions caused by nuclear explosions. Schell's book
was greeted with adulation rarely observed in any field. Yet by the time the book was published, the
scientific basis for ozonebased nuclear extinction had almost entirely evaporated. The ongoing switch by the military forces of
the United States and the Soviet Union from multi-megatonne nuclear weapons to larger numbers of
smaller weapons means that the effect on ozone from even the largest nuclear war is unlikely to lead
to any major effect on human population levels, and extinction from ozone reductions is virtually out
of the question.[3] The latest stimulus for doomsday beliefs is 'nuclear winter': the blocking of sunlight from dust raised by nuclear
explosions and smoke from fires ignited by nuclear attacks. This would result in a few months of darkness and lowered temperatures, mainly in
the northern mid-latitudes.[5] The effects could be quite significant, perhaps causing the deaths of up to several hundred million more people
than would die from the immediate effects of blast, heat and radiation. But the
evidence, so far, seems to provide little
basis for beliefs in nuclear extinction. The impact of nuclear winter on populations nearer the equator,
such as in India, does not seem likely to be significant. The most serious possibilities would result from
major ecological destruction, but this remains speculative at present. As in the previous doomsday scenarios, antiwar
scientists and peace movements have taken up the crusading torch of extinction politics. Few doubts have been voiced about the evidence
about nuclear winter or the politics of promoting beliefs in nuclear extinction. Opponents
of war, including scientists, have
often exaggerated the effects of nuclear war and emphasized worst cases. Schell continually bends
evidence to give the worst impression. For example, he implies that a nuclear attack is inevitably followed by a firestorm or
conflagration. He invariably gives the maximum time for people having to remain in shelters from fallout. And he takes a pessimistic view of the
potential for ecological resilience to radiation exposure and for human resourcefulness in a crisis. Similarly, in
several of the scientific
studies of nuclear winter, I have noticed a strong tendency to focus on worst cases and to avoid
examination of ways to overcome the effects. For example, no one seems to have looked at
possibilities for migration to coastal areas away from the freezing continental temperatures or looked
at people changing their diets away from grain-fed beef to direct consumption of the grain, thereby
greatly extending reserves of food. Nuclear doomsdayism should be of concern because of its effect on the political strategy and
effectiveness of the peace movement. While beliefs in nuclear extinction may stimulate some people into antiwar action, it may discourage
others by fostering resignation. Furthermore, some peace movement activities may be inhibited because they allegedly threaten the delicate
balance of state terror. The irony here is that there should be no need to exaggerate the effects of nuclear war, since, even well short of
extinction, the consequences would be sufficiently devastating to justify the greatest efforts against it. The effect of extinction politics is
apparent in responses to the concept of limited nuclear war. Antiwar activists, quite justifiably, have attacked military planning and apologetics
for limited nuclear war in which the effects are minimized in order to make them more acceptable. But opposition to military planning often
has led antiwar activists to refuse to acknowledge the possibility that nuclear war could be 'limited' in the sense that less than total annihilation
could result. A 'limited' nuclear war with 100 million deaths is certainly possible, but the peace movement has not seriously examined the
political implications of such a war. Yet even the smallest of nuclear wars could have enormous political consequences, for which the peace
movement is totally unprepared.[6]The peace movement also has denigrated the value of civil defence, apparently, in part, because a realistic
examination of civil defence would undermine beliefs about total annihilation. The many ways in which the effects of nuclear war are
exaggerated and worst cases emphasized can be explained as the result of a presupposition by antiwar scientists and activists that their political
aims will be fulfilled when people are convinced that there is a good chance of total disaster from nuclear war.[7]There are
quite a
number of reasons why people may find a belief in extinction from nuclear war to be attractive.[8] Here I
will only briefly comment on a few factors. The first is an implicit Western chauvinism The effects of global nuclear
war would mainly hit the population of the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union. This is quite
unlike the pattern of other major ongoing human disasters of starvation, disease, poverty and political
repression which mainly affect the poor, nonwhite populations of the Third World. The gospel of nuclear
extinction can be seen as a way by which a problem for the rich white Western societies is claimed to be a problem for all the world.
Symptomatic of this orientation is the belief that, without Western aid and trade, the economies and populations of the Third World would face
disaster. But this is only Western self-centredness. Actually, Third World populations would in many ways be better off without the West: the
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pressure to grow cash crops of sugar, tobacco and so on would be reduced, and we would no longer witness fresh fish being airfreighted from
Bangladesh to Europe. A related factor linked with nuclear extinctionism is a belief that nuclear war is the most pressing issue facing humans. I
disagree, both morally
and politically, with the stance that preventing nuclear war has become the most
important social issue for all humans. Surely, in the Third World, concern over the actuality of massive
suffering and millions of deaths resulting from poverty and exploitation can justifiably take
precedence over the possibility of a similar death toll from nuclear war. Nuclear war may be the
greatest threat to the collective lives of those in the rich, white Western societies but, for the poor,
nonwhite Third World peoples, other issues are more pressing. In political terms, to give precedence to
nuclear war as an issue is to assume that nuclear war can be overcome in isolation from changes in
major social institutions, including the state, capitalism, state socialism and patriarchy. If war is deeply
embedded in such structures - as I would argue[9] - then to try to prevent war without making
common cause with other social movements will not be successful politically. This means that the
antiwar movement needs to link its strategy and practice with other movements such as the feminist
movement, the workers' control movement and the environmental movement. A focus on nuclear
extinction also encourages a focus on appealing to elites as the means to stop nuclear war, since there
seems no other means for quickly overcoming the danger. For example, Carl Sagan, at the end of an article about
nuclear winter in a popular magazine, advocates writing letters to the presidents of the United States and of the Soviet Union.[10] But if war
has deep institutional roots, then appealing to elites has no chance of success. This has been amply illustrated by the continual failure of
disarmament negotiations and appeals to elites over the past several decades. Just about everyone, including generals and prime ministers, is
opposed to nuclear war. The question is what to do about it. Many people have incorporated doomsday ideas into their approaches. My
argument here is that antiwar activists
extinction politics.
should become much more critical of the assumptions underlying
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AT: Sanctions Non-Violent/Alternative to War
Sanctions are a violent form of economic warfare- they are deliberately targeted to
deprive a society of basic needs.
Simons, freelance author, 1999
[Geoff, “Imposing Economic Sanctions”, Pluto Press, 1-3, chip]
There is discussion also of the relationship of economic sanctions to warfare: are sanctions in fact a type
of warfare, though conventionally distinct from the ‘military option’? It has been argued (before
genocidal sanctions were imposed on Iraq in 1990) that economic sanctions, typically imposed in
peacetime, are milder than economic warfare, an adjunct to military action. Thus Professor William
Medlicott suggests that economic warfare is ‘a military operation’ designed ‘to deprive the enemy of
the material means of resistance ... It must be distinguished from coercive measures appropriate for
adoption in peace to settle international differences without recourse to war, e.g., sanctions, pacific
blockade, economic reprisals, etc., since unlike such measures, it has as its ultimate sanction the use of
belligerent rights.’5 (The distinction seems unconvincing, not least because ‘pacific blockade’ in the
circumstances of the global economy can effectively deny a population the necessities of life –
scarcely less drastic than a ‘military operation’. It is unfortunate also that Medlicott uses the word
‘sanction’ in two different senses in the same sentence.) It should be obvious that the language is less
important than the practicalities of such matters: an Iraqi child starving to death because of UScontrived United Nations policies will not be overly concerned to enquire whether she is the victim of
‘sanctions’, ‘embargo’, ‘boycott’, blockade’, ‘quarantine’ or ‘economic warfare’. A preoccupation with
terminology, a nice self-indulgence of lawyers and academics, often diverts attention – sometimes
intentionally – from practical realities; here, from the scale of devastation and human suffering
caused by specific economic policies. It should be remembered that economic sanctions, in depriving
(usually) helpless civilians of ‘some value’ (food, clean water, medical supplies), can have an appalling
effect on innocent populations. You cannot do more to a people than denying them food or compelling
them to die from preventable diseases (see Chapter 5). Such a consideration should tell against the
‘aura of righteousness’6 that was part of sanctions policy during the period of the Cold War; and against
the idea that sanctions should be distinguished ‘from violent or non-violent techniques employed
specifically to further the interests of one or more states at the expense of others’.7 In fact, sanctions
are today most likely to be imposed in a brutally cynical way to support the foreign-policy objectives
of powerful states; in particular, the United States, via the calculated manipulation of the United
Nations and other international bodies. Before considering the use of economic sanctions in the modern
world it is helpful to give examples of their historical use. Such instances, far from exhaustive, often
exhibit characteristics that can be found in the modern use of sanctions. The central principle is simple
and applicable in all ages: that a targeted group, society or country be deliberately deprived of the
means to an effective economic life.
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AT: Word PICs
Focusing on the words we us is a distraction from the ongoing material reality of
suffering imposed by sanctions.
Simons, freelance author, 1999
[Geoff, “Imposing Economic Sanctions”, Pluto Press, 1-3, chip]
There is discussion also of the relationship of economic sanctions to warfare: are sanctions in fact a type
of warfare, though conventionally distinct from the ‘military option’? It has been argued (before
genocidal sanctions were imposed on Iraq in 1990) that economic sanctions, typically imposed in
peacetime, are milder than economic warfare, an adjunct to military action. Thus Professor William
Medlicott suggests that economic warfare is ‘a military operation’ designed ‘to deprive the enemy of the
material means of resistance ... It must be distinguished from coercive measures appropriate for
adoption in peace to settle international differences without recourse to war, e.g., sanctions, pacific
blockade, economic reprisals, etc., since unlike such measures, it has as its ultimate sanction the use of
belligerent rights.’5 (The distinction seems unconvincing, not least because ‘pacific blockade’ in the
circumstances of the global economy can effectively deny a population the necessities of life – scarcely
less drastic than a ‘military operation’. It is unfortunate also that Medlicott uses the word ‘sanction’ in
two different senses in the same sentence.) It should be obvious that the language is less important
than the practicalities of such matters: an Iraqi child starving to death because of US-contrived United
Nations policies will not be overly concerned to enquire whether she is the victim of ‘sanctions’,
‘embargo’, ‘boycott’, blockade’, ‘quarantine’ or ‘economic warfare’. A preoccupation with
terminology, a nice self-indulgence of lawyers and academics, often diverts attention – sometimes
intentionally – from practical realities; here, from the scale of devastation and human suffering
caused by specific economic policies. It should be remembered that economic sanctions, in depriving
(usually) helpless civilians of ‘some value’ (food, clean water, medical supplies), can have an appalling
effect on innocent populations. You cannot do more to a people than denying them food or compelling
them to die from preventable diseases (see Chapter 5). Such a consideration should tell against the ‘aura
of righteousness’6 that was part of sanctions policy during the period of the Cold War; and against the
idea that sanctions should be distinguished ‘from violent or non-violent techniques employed
specifically to further the interests of one or more states at the expense of others’.7 In fact, sanctions
are today most likely to be imposed in a brutally cynical way to support the foreign-policy objectives of
powerful states; in particular, the United States, via the calculated manipulation of the United Nations
and other international bodies. Before considering the use of economic sanctions in the modern world it
is helpful to give examples of their historical use. Such instances, far from exhaustive, often exhibit
characteristics that can be found in the modern use of sanctions. The central principle is simple and
applicable in all ages: that a targeted group, society or country be deliberately deprived of the means to
an effective economic life.
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Oil Spills Add-On
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Inherency- Cuban Regs Don’t Solve
Cuba cannot prevent oil spills based solely on regulation of oil companies
Nerurkar, Specialist in Energy Policy, and Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs,
11
(Neelesh, Mark P., November 28, Congressional Research Service, “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development:
Background and U.S. Policy Considerations”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41522.pdf, Accessed 78-13, ABS)
The U.S. agency in charge of enforcing safety and environmental regulations on the U.S. Outer
Continental Shelf, including oil spill response, is the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). In addition, several statutes, including the Clean Water Act and the
Oil Pollution Act, establish a liability regime for oil spills. Offshore exploration and production
operations in non-U.S. waters may not be governed by analogous regulations or fall under a liability
structure that creates an incentive to minimize oil spills. Since the Repsol project is only the second
deepwater well to be drilled in Cuba’s EEZ, Cuban officials are in the process of developing and
implementing up-to-date regulations to prevent offshore drilling accidents and contingency plans to
address accidents if they do occur.31 They have pledged to follow the highest international
environmental and safety standards, and have expressed a strong willingness to cooperate with the
United States and other countries on safety measures.32 However, as the recent U.S. experience in
the Gulf of Mexico illustrates, even the long-time existence of regulations and regulator may not
always prevent an oil spill.
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Sanctions Prevent Oil Spill Coop
Sanctions prevent oil spill coop – equipment and technology trade is necessary to
build relationships
Nerurkar, Specialist in Energy Policy, and Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs,
11
(Neelesh, Mark P., November 28, Congressional Research Service, “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development:
Background and U.S. Policy Considerations”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41522.pdf, Accessed 78-13, ABS)
Currently the United States and Cuba are not parties to a bilateral agreement on oil spills. In the
aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon spill, however, U.S. officials in Havana kept the Cuban
government informed about the oil spill in working-level discussions. With Cuba’s movement toward
developing its offshore oil resources so close to the United States, some analysts have called for more
institutionalized or formal U.S.-Cuban cooperation and planning to minimize potential damage from
an oil spill. Given the comprehensive U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba, some analysts have called for
the Administration to amend or rescind regulations that restrict the transfer of equipment, technology,
and personnel that would be needed to combat an oil spill in Cuba.51 Some energy analysts assert that
foreign oil companies operating in Cuba need to have full access to technology and personnel in order to
prevent or manage a spill.52 Some maintain that the U.S. embargo has forced drillers to use secondhand equipment to avoid buying from U.S. companies.53
Sanctions impede coordinated oil spill response.
Nerurkar, Specialist in Energy Policy, and Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs,
11
(Neelesh, Mark P., November 28, Congressional Research Service, “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development:
Background and U.S. Policy Considerations”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41522.pdf, Accessed 78-13, ABS)
The Obama Administration has been making efforts to prepare for a potential oil spill in Cuban waters
that could affect the United States. This has included: updating oil spill area contingency plans covering
Florida and developing a broader offshore drilling response plan; engaging with Repsol over its oil spill
response plans (including plans to inspect the oil rig that Repsol will use); and licensing U.S. companies
to provide personnel and export equipment needed for oil spill preparedness and response. Some
energy and policy analysts have called for the Administration to ease regulatory restrictions on the
transfer of U.S. equipment and personnel to Cuba for oil spill preparedness and response. Some have
also called for direct U.S.-Cuban government cooperation to minimize potential oil spill damage,
looking at U.S. cooperation with Mexico as a potential model as well as information sharing and
cooperation through multilateral channels under the auspices of the International Maritime
Organization. In contrast, some policy groups call for the United States to focus on preventing Cuba
from engaging in offshore oil exploration altogether.
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Sanctions Prevent US Cuba Environmental Coop
Sanctions on Cuba hinder support for bilateral cooperation to protect biodiversity.
Boom, director of the Caribbean Biodiversity Program and Bassett Maguire Curator of
Botany at the New York Botanical Garden, 12
(Brian M., 8-14-12, Science and Diplomacy, “Biodiversity without Borders: Advancing U.S.-Cuba
Cooperation through Environmental Research”, http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/files/biodiversitywithout-borders_science__diplomacy.pdf, Accessed 7-8-13, ABS)
Nature knows no boundaries, and given the number and scale of environmental problems shared by
Cuba and the United States, combined with the multitude of impediments to finding joint solutions to
these problems, the best way to enhance environmental cooperation between the two countries
would be through the establishment of a bilateral agreement on this theme. The ecological stakes are
too high for Cuba and the United States to rely on anything short of a government-to-government
accord to formalize, catalyze, and facilitate cooperation on environmental problems of mutual
concern. Various models for such an agreement exist: the United States has joint statements on
environmental cooperation with Spain and Italy, an agreement on air quality with Canada, and a
memorandum of understanding on environmental protection with India, among others. Such a bilateral
agreement could logically take advantage of the collective experiences of the U.S.-based environmental
NGO community in conducting collaborative initiatives with Cuban counterparts over many years and, in
some cases, decades. The focus of such a bilateral agreement should be on helping to facilitate the
activities by NGOs that are currently underway and encouraging new initiatives by NGOs in consultation
with and the approval of Cuban authorities. The elements of such an agreement should take into
account the difficulties mentioned above and the following considerations: Project Approvals: Before
cooperative projects can begin, one or more Cuban agencies need to approve. It would be ideal to have
this process more clearly defined and streamlined to minimize delays in getting approvals. Visas:
Research visas for representatives of NGOs conducting approved projects should be expedited and
ideally approved for multiple entries into Cuba, perhaps renewable annually for the duration of the
project. Permits: Permits for all the components of projects (e.g., to collect specimens, to enter and
collect or monitor in protected areas, to import research equipment, to export biological specimens,
etc.) should be expedited for approved projects. Licenses: The processes for obtaining the U.S.
Department of the Treasury’s OFAC specific licenses and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of
Industry and Security licenses should be streamlined and more transparent. Cuba’s Ministerio de
Relaciones Exteriores (MINREX) might logically take the lead on such a bilateral agreement. Any of
several U.S. government entities could logically take the lead, such as the Department of State, NOAA,
the Fish and Wildlife Service, or the Environmental Protection Agency. At the same time, efforts should
continue unabated to promote the revision of U.S. government policies that currently impede greater
bilateral environmental cooperation between the two countries. Cuba and the United States have the
potential to work around their differences to respond to the threats to their shared biodiversity. And
no matter what the trajectory of future official relations between the two countries, initial mutually
beneficial steps concerning the environment can provide an important opportunity to address real
shared problems while also building links and trust between the two societies that can provide some
bedrock for future relations.
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OFAC restrictions prevent private funding for Cuban environmental projects.
Boom, director of the Caribbean Biodiversity Program and Bassett Maguire Curator of
Botany at the New York Botanical Garden, 12
(Brian M., 8-14-12, Science and Diplomacy, “Biodiversity without Borders: Advancing U.S.-Cuba
Cooperation through Environmental Research”, http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/files/biodiversitywithout-borders_science__diplomacy.pdf, Accessed 7-8-13, ABS)
Cuba has an excellent cadre of environmental professionals with a demonstrated capacity for
conducting successful projects.13 Unfortunately, Cuba’s investment to date has been limited, and
there is a chronic shortage of funding for the infrastructure, research, training, monitoring, and
dissemination of research results for Cuban environmental projects that would be of shared interest
for the United States and Cuba. U.S. funds that could support such environmental initiatives are
potentially considerable, but they are severely limited currently due to OFAC restrictions on the
amount of private funds that can be expended in Cuba and the complete prohibition of U.S.
government funds for such environmental projects. U.S.-based private foundations, including the John
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Christopher Reynolds Foundation, the Tinker
Foundation, Inc., and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, have taken the lead in funding OFAC-licensed
environmental projects in Cuba. More funding is needed to provide modern infrastructure and
information technology; vehicles, vessels, and gear for field studies; and travel options for Cuban
scientists and students to participate in workshops and conferences and to pursue formal and
informal studies and internships abroad.
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US Cuba Environmental Coop Modeled
US-Cuban cooperation spills over to sustainable development at the global level.
Conell, Research associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 9
(Christina, June 12 2009, The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “The U.S. and Cuba: Destined to be an
Environmental Duo?” , http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-an-environmental-duo/, 6/25/13, AZ)
Sustainability through Collaboration¶ In many parts of the country communism has inadequately acted as a seal to preserve elements of Cuba’s
past as the centralized government prohibited private development by not giving special permission. A number of tourist resorts already dot
the island, but Cuba has been largely exempt from mass tourist exploitation due to frozen relations with the U.S. Although the island remains
underdeveloped, Fidel Castro has used his unchecked power to back policies, which have been heedless to environmental considerations, thus
damaging some of the island’s pristine ecosystem that once defined the island. Roughly the size of Pennsylvania,
Cuba is the largest
Caribbean island, and if preservation and conservation measures are planned and carried out in a
cognizant manner, it could become a paradigm for sustainable development at the global level.¶ The
Obama administration’s recent easing of travel restrictions on Cuban Americans visiting relatives on
the island could be of immense importance not only to Cuban families, but also to the preservation of
Cuba’s unique and increasingly threatened coastal and marine environments. Such a concession on
Washington’s part would mark a small, but still significant stride in U.S.-Cuba relations, yet the travel restrictions still remain inherently
discriminatory. The preposterous regulations that allow only a certain category of Americans into Cuba signify only a meager shift in U.S. policy
towards Cuba.¶ The 50-year-old U.S. embargo against the island has resoundingly failed to achieve its purpose. Obama’s
modifications fall short of what it will take to reestablish a constructive U.S.-Cuba relationship. Cuba’s
tropical forests, soils, and maritime areas have suffered degradation as a result of harmful policies stemming from a Soviet-style economic
system. Cuba’s economy could be reinvigorated through expanded tourism, development initiatives and an expansion of commodity exports,
including sugarcane for ethanol. U.S.
policy toward Cuba should encourage environmental factors, thereby
strengthening U.S. credibility throughout the hemisphere.¶ An environmental partnership between
the U.S. and Cuba is not only possible, but could result in development models that could serve as an
example for environmental strategies throughout the Americas. The U.S. has the economic resources
necessary to aid Cuba in developing effective policy, while the island provides the space where
sustainable systems can be implemented initially instead of being applied after the fact. Cuba’s
extreme lack of development provides an unspoiled arena for the execution of exemplary sustainable
environmental protection practices.¶
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Cuban Oil Spill Kills Fla Biodiversity
Cuban oil spill uniquely threatens the Florida keys.
Nerurkar, Specialist in Energy Policy, and Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs,
11
(Neelesh, Mark P., November 28, Congressional Research Service, “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development:
Background and U.S. Policy Considerations”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41522.pdf, Accessed 78-13, ABS)
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico heightened concerns over the potential of
an oil spill in Cuban waters and the risk such a spill could affect Florida’s waters and coastal areas.30
As noted above, Repsol’s current plans for drilling in Cuba fall within about 55 to 60 miles south of Key
West, Florida. Were an oil spill to occur in these areas, it could have environmental impacts in the
United States. Oil can be spilled from acute exploration and production accidents, through longerterm discharge from operations, or through transportation accidents, such as a tanker collision or
pipeline rupture.
Cuban oil spills destroys unique and vulnerable Florida ecosystems- kills coral and
endangered species, destroys wetlands, and hurts the economy.
Nerurkar, Specialist in Energy Policy, and Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs,
11
(Neelesh, Mark P., November 28, Congressional Research Service, “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development:
Background and U.S. Policy Considerations”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41522.pdf, Accessed 78-13, ABS)
If significant quantities of oil did reach U.S. waters, risks to the marine and coastal resources of
Southern Florida could be of particular concern. The coastal and ocean resources of the region provide
recreational, commercial, and ecological benefits to both local communities and the nation. One of
the more vulnerable areas that could be at risk is the Florida Keys and adjacent areas. The Florida Keys
National Marine Sanctuary includes state and national parks, wildlife refuges, ecological reserves,
research areas, and sanctuary preservation areas. North of the Florida Keys are the Everglades and
Biscayne National Parks. As one moves up Florida’s east coast, barrier beaches backed by lagoons and
wetlands dominate the geography. And then there are the densely populated areas of Miami-Dade,
Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. The Florida Keys and adjacent areas comprise diverse and
interrelated marine systems. The Florida reef is the most extensive living coral reef in North American
waters, stretching for 325 miles. Reefs, sea grass beds and mangroves in the region provide habitats
for many marine animals, including a number of threatened and endangered species. These coral
reefs and related coastal ecosystems are valuable because they provide protection from erosion and
flooding, especially from severe storms such as hurricanes. Depending on timing, size, and location, an
oil spill can cause significant harm to individual organisms and entire populations in marine and
coastal habitats.41 Spills can cause impacts over a range of time scales, from days to years, or even
decades for certain spills. Acute exposure to an oil spill can kill organisms or have non-lethal but
debilitating affects on organism development, feeding, reproduction, or disease immunity.
Ecosystems in which they exist can also be harmed.42 Certain habitats in the area—such as coral reefs,
mangrove swamps, and salt marshes—are especially vulnerable.43 Long-term, chronic exposure, as
occurs from continuous oil releases such as leaking pipelines, offshore production discharges, and
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non-point sources (e.g., urban runoff) can see impacts spread from sea life to the survival and
reproductive success of marine birds and mammals.44 Southern Florida’s natural resources are closely
integrated with its economic interests. Southern Florida supports significant tourism as well as
commercial and recreational fishing. Florida’s tourism industry directly employs more than a million
people. The 84 million tourists that visited Florida in 2008 spent around $65 billion.45 The Deepwater
Horizon spill illustrated that an oil spill can significantly harm the tourism industry of affected areas. A
well-publicized oil spill can even weaken tourism in a nearby area, regardless of the actual threat to
human health created by the spill.
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Impacts- Environment and Economy
US Cuba cooperation on oil spills is key to the ecological and economic well-being of
both nations.
Boom, director of the Caribbean Biodiversity Program and Bassett Maguire Curator of
Botany at the New York Botanical Garden, 12
(Brian M., 8-14-12, Science and Diplomacy, “Biodiversity without Borders: Advancing U.S.-Cuba
Cooperation through Environmental Research”, http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/files/biodiversitywithout-borders_science__diplomacy.pdf, Accessed 7-8-13, ABS)
The most urgent environmental problems requiring bilateral action are broadly classified as
disasters—both those that occur naturally and those that are man-made. Hurricanes are the clearest
examples of shared natural disasters. During the twentieth century, 167 hurricanes struck the U.S.
mainland. Of these, 62 were major (categories 3, 4, or 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale). During the same
period, 36 hurricanes, half of which were major, made landfall over Cuba. Because many hurricanes—
Katrina and Ike being twenty-first century examples—strike both countries, there exists a shared need
after such disasters to respond to the negative effects, including environmental problems created by
rain, wind, and storm surges. Most major hurricanes occurring in the Caribbean during the past century
have resulted in documented extensive perturbations of shallow-water marine ecosystems,
particularly to coral reefs, seagrass beds, and coastal mangroves.2 Aside from physical damage to such
ecosystems from more turbulent water, hurricanes can also negatively impact water quality. On land,
hurricane damage to ecosystems can be even more severe than in the ocean. For example, damaged
native vegetation will possibly be more prone to colonization by exotic, noxious species such as
Australian pine and Brazilian pepper.3 While Cuban and U.S. scientists have shared motivation to
assess, monitor, and remediate the marine and terrestrial ecosystems that are damaged by
hurricanes, they currently cannot do so. Man-made environmental disasters, such as oil and natural
gas leaks, can likewise be of shared concern to the Cuban and U.S. governments. The Gulf of Mexico is
a rich source of oil and gas and will remain so for decades to come. According to the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), there exist nearly 4,000 active oil and gas platforms in the
Gulf of Mexico off the U.S. coastline. Cuba also has plans for new oil and gas platforms off its northern
coast.4 Given the near- and long-term implications of gas, oil, and chemical dispersants on the Gulf of
Mexico’s biodiversity, it is imperative for the economic and ecological wellbeing of both Cuba and the
United States that exploration is pursued with enhanced safeguards to avoid the mistakes of past
disasters, such as the dramatic explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig.
Joint rapid response to oil spills essential to the environment and the economy.
Boom, director of the Caribbean Biodiversity Program and Bassett Maguire Curator of
Botany at the New York Botanical Garden, 12
(Brian M., 8-14-12, Science and Diplomacy, “Biodiversity without Borders: Advancing U.S.-Cuba
Cooperation through Environmental Research”, http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/files/biodiversitywithout-borders_science__diplomacy.pdf, Accessed 7-8-13, ABS)
While Cuba and the United States are signatories to several international protocols for cooperation on
containment of oil spills, there is scant cooperation between them on this front—although there were
at least some low-level meetings between the countries after the Deepwater Horizon blowout.5 Given
the potential of currents in the Gulf of Mexico to disperse spills from off the coast of one country to
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the waters and shores of the other, there were ongoing concerns about the possible reach of the
disaster. Fortunately, relative to its potential, the Deepwater Horizon spill remained mostly contained.
However, with increased drilling in the area, including deep wells, more than luck will be needed to
avert future disasters. Even if oil and gas leaks or spills are restricted to Cuban or U.S. waters, the
negative environmental impacts can be important regionally. The two nations’ shared marine
ecosystem is the foundation for the mid Atlantic and Gulf Stream fisheries. Many important commercial
and sport fish species breed and feed in Cuban waters. So destruction of Cuban mangroves and coral
reefs will impact stocks of species such as snapper, grouper, and tuna, along with myriad other
animals, plants, and microbes that spend different parts of their life cycles in the territorial waters of
each country.6 Given that urgent environmental problems can arise rapidly and harm the economic
and ecological health of the United States and Cuba, it is imperative that there should be a
mechanism for rapid, joint response to these shared threats.
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Biodiversity Impacts
Biodiversity loss risks extinction.
Young, PhD coastal marine ecology, 10
(Ruth, “Biodiversity: what it is and why it’s important”, February 9th,
http://www.talkingnature.com/2010/02/biodiversity/biodiversity-what-and-why/, 7-9-13, ABS)
Different species within ecosystems fill particular roles, they all have a function, they all have a niche. They interact
with each other and the physical environment to provide ecosystem services that are vital for our
survival. For example plant species convert carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and energy from the sun into
useful things such as food, medicines and timber. Pollination carried out by insects such as bees
enables the production of ⅓ of our food crops. Diverse mangrove and coral reef ecosystems provide a
wide variety of habitats that are essential for many fishery species. To make it simpler for economists to
comprehend the magnitude of services offered by biodiversity, a team of researchers estimated their value – it amounted to $US33 trillion per
year. “By
protecting biodiversity we maintain ecosystem services” Certain species play a “keystone” role
in maintaining ecosystem services. Similar to the removal of a keystone from an arch, the removal of these species can result
in the collapse of an ecosystem and the subsequent removal of ecosystem services. The most well known
example of this occurred during the 19th century when sea otters were almost hunted to extinction by fur traders along the west coast of the
USA. This led to a population explosion in the sea otters’ main source of prey, sea urchins. Because the urchins graze on kelp their booming
population decimated the underwater kelp forests. This loss of habitat led to declines in local fish populations. Sea otters are a keystone species
once hunted for their fur (Image: Mike Baird) Eventually a treaty protecting sea otters allowed the numbers of otters to increase which inturn
controlled the urchin population, leading to the recovery of the kelp forests and fish stocks. In other cases, ecosystem services are maintained
by entire functional groups, such as apex predators (See Jeremy Hance’s post at Mongabay). During the last 35 years, over fishing of large shark
species along the US Atlantic coast has led to a population explosion of skates and rays. These skates and rays eat bay scallops and their out of
control population has led to the closure of a century long scallop fishery. These are just two examples demonstrating how biodiversity can
maintain the services that ecosystems provide for us, such as fisheries. One
could argue that to maintain ecosystem
services we don’t need to protect biodiversity but rather, we only need to protect the species and
functional groups that fill the keystone roles. However, there are a couple of problems with this idea. First
of all, for most ecosystems we don’t know which species are the keystones! Ecosystems are so
complex that we are still discovering which species play vital roles in maintaining them. In some cases
its groups of species not just one species that are vital for the ecosystem. Second, even if we did
complete the enormous task of identifying and protecting all keystone species, what back-up plan
would we have if an unforseen event (e.g. pollution or disease) led to the demise of these ‘keystone’ species?
Would there be another species to save the day and take over this role? Classifying some species as ‘keystone’
implies that the others are not important. This may lead to the non-keystone species being considered ecologically worthless and subsequently
over-exploited. Sometimes we may not even know which species are likely to fill the keystone roles. An
example of this was
discovered on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef. This research examined what would happen to a coral reef if it were over-fished.
The “over-fishing” was simulated by fencing off coral bommies thereby excluding and removing fish from them for three years. By the end of
the experiment, the reefs had changed from a coral to an algae dominated ecosystem – the coral became overgrown with algae. When the time
came to remove the fences the researchers expected herbivorous species of fish like the parrot fish (Scarus spp.) to eat the algae and enable
the reef to switch back to a coral dominated ecosystem. But, surprisingly, the shift back to coral was driven by a supposed ‘unimportant’
species – the bat fish (Platax pinnatus). The bat fish was previously thought to feed on invertebrates – small crabs and shrimp, but when offered
a big patch of algae it turned into a hungry herbivore – a cow of the sea – grazing the algae in no time. So a fish previously thought to be
‘unimportant’ is actually a keystone species in the recovery of coral reefs overgrown by algae! Who
knows how many other
species are out there with unknown ecosystem roles! In some cases it’s easy to see who the keystone species are but in
many ecosystems seemingly unimportant or redundant species are also capable of changing niches and maintaining ecosystems. The more
biodiverse an ecosystem is, the more likely these species will be present and the more resilient an
ecosystem is to future impacts. Presently we’re only scratching the surface of understanding the full
importance of biodiversity and how it helps maintain ecosystem function. The scope of this task is
immense. In the meantime, a wise insurance policy for maintaining ecosystem services would be to
conserve biodiversity. In doing so, we increase the chance of maintaining our ecosystem services in
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the event of future impacts such as disease, invasive species and of course, climate change. This is the international year of
biodiversity – a time to recognize that biodiversity makes our survival on this planet possible and that our
protection of biodiversity maintains this service.
Biodiversity loss risks extinction – there’s an invisible threshold
Diner, Major in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps of the United States Army, 94
(David N., “The Army And The Endangered Species Act: Who's Endangering Whom?,” Military Law
Review (143 Mil. L. Rev. 161), Winter, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA456541, 7-9-13,
ABS)
4. Biological Diversity. – The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity . 77
As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by
reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. 78
Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling
narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems.
"The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which
each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a
simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." 79 By causing
widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity
increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the
dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be
expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly
perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each
new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an
aircraft's wings, 80 mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.
[*173]
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Coral Reef Impacts
Maintaining coral reefs prevents collapse of marine ecosystem, political unrest and
the starvation of 1 billion people worldwide
Red Orbit 10
(March 26 2010, “Coral Reef Extinction Could Have Catastrophic Effect”,
http://www.redorbit.com/news/science/1842159/coral_reef_extinction_could_have_catastrophic_effe
ct/index.html, Accessed 7-9-13, ABS)
Coral reefs are slowly becoming extinct and could disappear entirely within the next century -- which
could have disastrous results all over the world, experts claim. According to National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) statistics published in a March 25 Associated Press (AP) article,
roughly 19-percent of the Earth's coral reefs have already disappeared, and an additional 15-percent
could be gone within the next two decades. Furthermore, Dr. Kent Carpenter, a professor at Old
Dominion University, believes that global climate change could result in the extinction of the species in
no more than 100 years unless more is done to combat global warming. Were that to occur, the results
could be catastrophic. Coral reefs are eaten or inhabited by many of the oceanic fish population, which
in turn provide a food or income source for an estimated one-billion people around the world. In
addition to hunger and poverty, some predict that severe political unrest could also result, should the
coral reef actually become extinct. "You could argue that a complete collapse of the marine ecosystem
would be one of the consequences of losing corals," Carpenter told Brian Skoloff of the AP on Thursday.
"You're going to have a tremendous cascade effect for all life in the oceans." "Whole nations will be
threatened in terms of their existence," added Carl Gustaf Lundin of the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature.
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AT: Resiliency
Loss of keystone species makes resiliency defense irrelevant
Perrings, Professor of Environmental Economics at ASU, 97
(Charles, Jan 28, Prof. at U. of NY, Cambridge University Press, "Biological Loss: Economic and Ecological
Issues", p. 301, 7-9-13, ABS)
The contributors to this volume have argued that the fundamental goal of biodiversity conservation is not species preservation for its own sake,
but the protection of the productive potential of those ecosystems on which human activity depends. This, it has been argued, is a function of
the resilience of such ecosystems. Ecosystem
resilience has been shown to be a measure of the limits of the
local stability of the self- organization of the system. Hence a system may be said to be resilient with
respect to exogenous stress or shocks of a given magnitude if it is able to respond without losing selforganization. Where species or population deletion jeopardizes the resilience of an ecosystem
providing essential services, then protection of ecosystem resilience implies species preservation. This is
not to say that we should dismiss arguments for species preservation for its own sake. The identification of existence or nonuse
value in contingent valuation exercises indicates that people do think in such terms. But it does make it
clear that there is both an economically and ecologically sound rationale for ensuring the conservation
of species that are not currently in use. More particularly, species which are not now keystone species
but may become keystone species under different environmental conditions have insurance value,
and this insurance value depends on their contribution to ecosystem resilience.
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AT: Cartagena CP
CP does not solve - Oil response capability is limited
Sheehy, Senior Lecturer RMIT University, 4
[Benedict, Novemebr 1, 2004, “Does International Marine Environment Law Work? An
Examination of the Cartagena Convention for the Wider Caribbean Region,” Georgetown
International Environmental Law Review, Volume 12: 3, page #27-8, AS]
Article 13 requires sharing of scientific information. CEP’s series of 43 technical reports goes some way
in addressing this concern.74 And a general review of internet search results indicates some cooperation
among scientists and governments on environmental issues.75 Article 14 requires the development of
laws to address liability and compensation in the event of pollution damage. To date, this has not
occurred. In her analysis of Cartagena’s oil spills protocol, seven years ago Miller observed: “Even in a
non-controversial areas such as the oil-spills Protocol, progress on implementation has been slow…
few of them [countries] have implementing legislation.”76 Article 15 requires institutional
development and integration. Such development and integration has not yet occurred to a significant
extent.77 As Miller observed, “oil spills response capability in the region is still very limited, and it is
inhibited by legal and administrative problems.”78 In the overall, as to the actual condition of the
environment, there is little evidence that the situation today is different than it was twenty years ago
when Cartagena was first ratified.
CP does not solve – too many other legalities need to be addressed
Bert, USCG, 2011-2012 Military Fellow, U.S. Coast Guard and Clayton, Fellow for
Energy and National Security, 12
[Melissa and Blake, March 7th, 2012, Council on Foreign Relations, “Addressing the Risk
of a Cuban Oil Spill,” http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oil-spill/p27515, accessed
7/10/13, AS]
Before that step can be taken, U.S. lawmakers may need to amend the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
to allow for limited, spill-related coordination and communication with the Cuban government. Next,
President Barack Obama should issue an export-only industry-wide general license for oil spill
response in Cuban waters, effective immediately. Issuing that license does not require congressional
authorization. The license should allow offshore oil companies to do vital spill response work in Cuban
territory, such as capping a well or drilling a relief well. Oil service companies, such as Halliburton,
should be included in the authorization. Finally, Congress should alter existing oil spill compensation
policy. Lawmakers should amend OPA 90 to ensure there is a responsible party for oil spills from a
foreign offshore unit that pollutes or threatens to pollute U.S. waters, like there is for 3 vessels.
Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Congressman David Rivera (R-FL) have sponsored such legislation.
Lawmakers should eliminate the requirement for the Coast Guard to obtain congressional approval on
expenditures above $150 million for spills of national significance (as defined by the National Response
Plan). And President Obama should appoint a commission to determine the appropriate limit of
liability cap under OPA 90, balancing the need to compensate victims with the desire to retain strict
liability for polluters. There are two other, less essential measures U.S. lawmakers may consider that
would enable the country to respond more adeptly to a spill. Installing an early-response system based
on acoustic, geophysical, or other technologies in the Straits of Florida would immediately alert the
U.S. Coast Guard about a well blowout or other unusual activity. The U.S. Department of Energy
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should find out from Repsol about the characteristics of Cuban crude oil, which would help U.S.
authorities predict how the oil would spread in the case of a well blowout.
Specific protocols need to be created before the Cartagena convention can become
useful.
Pinon, and Muse, advisors to the Brookings institution task Force on U.S.Cuba Relations, 10
(Jorge R., Robert L., Brookings Institution, “Coping with the Next Oil Spill: Why U.S.-Cuba
Environmental Cooperation is Critical,”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/5/18%20oil%20spill%20cuba%20pinon
/0518_oil_spill_cuba_pinon.pdf, accessed 7/10/13, AS)
The 1983 Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine environment in the Wider
Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention) is another comprehensive umbrella agreement that
provides the legal framework for cooperative regional and national actions to protect the marine
environment. So, the commitment to marine environmental cooperation already exists at the often
aspirational level of international accords. What is needed now is for the United states and Cuba to
develop appropriate regulatory and procedural protocols that ensure the free movement of equipment
and expertise between the two countries that will be indispensable to a satisfactory response to a future
oil spill. Establishing specific protocols cannot wait because nothing in U.s.-Cuba relations is ever
simple. for example, disaster response coordination between Cuba and the United states will involve
various government departments such as the environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National
Ocean and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of Commerce
because U.s.-origin equipment requires licenses for even temporary export to Cuba. The allocation of
responsibilities and the development of interagency cooperation will take time. That luxury exists
now, but will end very soon when the first drill bit hits the Cuban seabed. on the subject of the legal
basis for proactive regulatory action to deal with a future oil disaster in Cuba, the obama Administration,
irrespective of the current embargo, has the power to license the sale, lease or loan of emergency relief
and reconstruction equipment to Cuba following an oil spill. it also has the authority to license U.s.
citizens to perform emergency response and subsequent reconstruction services in Cuba in the wake of
such a disaster.3
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US- Latin American Relations Add-On
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I/L: Cuban Relations key to Latin American Relations
Cuba is key – Latin American countries view it as a litmus test for relations with the
US.
Sheridan, diplomatic correspondent for The Washington Post, 9
(Mary Beth, 5/29/09, The Washington Post, “U.S. Urged to Relax Cuba Policy to Boost Regional
Relations,” http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-05-29/politics/36798831_1_cuba-scholar-oasmembers-travel-restrictions, accessed 6/24/13, IC)
The U.S. government is fighting an effort to allow Cuba to return to the Organization of American States
after a 47-year suspension. But the resistance is putting it at odds with much of Latin America as the
Obama administration is trying to improve relations in the hemisphere.¶ Eliminating the Cold War-era
ban would be largely symbolic, because Cuba has shown no sign of wanting to return to the OAS, the
main forum for political cooperation in the hemisphere. But the debate shows how central the topic has
become in U.S. relations with an increasingly assertive Latin America. The wrangling over Cuba
threatens to dominate a meeting of hemispheric foreign ministers, including Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton, scheduled for Tuesday in Honduras.¶ "Fifty years after the U.S. . . . made Cuba its
litmus test for its commercial and diplomatic ties in Latin America, Latin America is turning the
tables," said Julia E. Sweig, a Cuba scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations. Now, she said, Latin countries are "making Cuba
the litmus test for the quality of the Obama administration's approach to Latin America."¶ President
Obama has taken steps toward improving ties with Cuba, lifting restrictions on visits and money transfers by Cuban Americans and offering to
restart immigration talks suspended in 2004. But he has said he will not scrap the longtime economic embargo until Havana makes democratic
reforms and cleans up its human rights record. Ending the embargo would also entail congressional action.¶ Obama is facing pressure to move
faster, both from Latin American allies and from key U.S. lawmakers. Bipartisan bills are pending in Congress that would eliminate all travel
restrictions and ease the embargo.¶ Cuba has sent mixed signals about its willingness to respond to the U.S. gestures.¶ Latin
American
leaders say that isolating Cuba is anachronistic when most countries in the region have established
relations with communist nations such as China. The OAS secretary general, José Miguel Insulza, has called the
organization's 1962 suspension of Cuba "outdated" -- noting it is based on the island's alignment with a "communist bloc" that no longer exists.
However, he has suggested that OAS members could postpone Cuba's full participation until it showed democratic reforms.¶
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Impacts: US- Latin American Relations Good
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Laundry List
Strong relationships ensure economic growth, energy security, democracy, and human
rights.
Goodman, Doctor, Guest Contributor to the Diplomatic Courier, 13
(Allen, 5/24/13, The Diplomatic Courier, “Cooperation is Key to Growth for Latin
America,” http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/opinion/1464-cooperation-is-key-togrowth-for-latin-america, accessed 6/30/13, ARH)
On a recent visit to Latin America, it was increasingly clear to me that policymakers in both the public
and private sector are committed to investing in higher education to develop their workforce and
future leaders. Learning, research, institution-building, and community engagement have become top
priorities for many governments across Latin America in the past ten years, and an emphasis on
international study as a means to advance national economic growth has been one of the keys to
achieving these priorities. The Institute of International Education has been involved in many of these developments over the years,
beginning with establishing a Latin America Division at our New York headquarters in the 1930, and then through our Latin America regional
office in Mexico City since 1974. Chief among the programs managed by IIE beginning in the 1970s was the ITT International Fellowship
Program, which served as an exemplary model of corporate involvement in international educational exchange for 17 years. Over the years, the
Institute’s work in the Western Hemisphere has grown to include a number of dynamic initiatives related to higher education, scholarship, and
fellowship programs, promoting study abroad, workforce and professional development, institutional partnership building, educational
advising, and English language testing. In
the United States, the Obama administration has made it a priority to
expand academic exchanges between Latin America and the United States. The U. S. government is
working with foreign governments, universities and colleges, and the private sector to reach the goal
of “100,000 Strong in the Americas” to increase the flow of students between Latin American and the
Caribbean and the United States to 100,000 in each direction. The most recent data in Open Doors
report, published by IIE in partnership with the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs, shows that 64,021 students from the region studied in the United States and 39,871
students from the U.S. studied abroad in Latin America and the Caribbean. As described in a chapter on
Western Hemisphere Academic Exchanges by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Meghann Curtis and
Policy Adviser Lisa Kraus at the U.S. Department of State, “Strong partnerships in the region are critical
to both U.S. domestic and global strategic interests.” The authors note that science and technology
innovations have accelerated through cooperative partnerships and are key to shared sustainable
growth, and that working collaboratively across borders in the region is necessary to attain energy
security and to combat transnational crime and narcotrafficking, as well as to support the global effort
to promote democracy, rule of law, social inclusion and human rights around the world. “At the center
of these partnerships—and U.S. strategy in the region—are educational exchanges, which help us
establish a strong foundation for empowering the best innovators, entrepreneurs, and leaders of
today to meet all these challenges.”
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Democracy
Expanding Latin American relations promotes democracy throughout the hemisphere.
Barshefsky et. al., senior international partner at WilmerHale in DC, 08,
(Charlene Barshefsky, R. Rand Beers, Alberto Coll, Margaret Crahan, Jose Fernandez, Francis Fukuyama, Peter Hankim, James
Hermon, John Heimann, James Hill, Donna Hrinak, James Kimsey, Jim Kolbe, Kellie Meiman, Shannon O'Neil, Maria Otero,
Arturo Porzecanski, David Rothkopf, Julia Sweig, 5/2008, Council on Foreign Relations, “US- Latin America Relations: A New
Direction for a New Reality”, http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-latin-america-relations/p16279, accessed 6/30/2013, GM)
Latin America has never mattered more for the United States.¶ The region is the largest foreign
supplier of oil to the United States and a strong partner in the development of alternative fuels. It is
the United States' fastest-growing trading partner, as well as its biggest supplier of illegal drugs. Latin
America is also the largest source of U.S. immigrants, both documented and not. All of this reinforces
deep U.S. ties with the region—strategic, economic, and cultural—but also deep concerns.¶ This report
makes clear that the era of the United States as the dominant influence in Latin America is over.
Countries in the region have not only grown stronger but have expanded relations with others, including
China and India. U.S. attention has also focused elsewhere in recent years, particularly on challenges in
the Middle East. The result is a region shaping its future far more than it shaped its past.¶ At the same
time Latin America has made substantial progress, it also faces ongoing challenges. Democracy has
spread, economies have opened, and populations have grown more mobile. But many countries have
struggled to reduce poverty and inequality and to provide for public security.¶ The Council on Foreign
Relations established an Independent Task Force to take stock of these changes and assess their
consequences for U.S. policy toward Latin America. The Task Force finds that the long-standing focus on
trade, democracy, and drugs, while still relevant, is inadequate. The Task Force recommends reframing
policy around four critical areas—poverty and inequality, public security, migration, and energy
security—that are of immediate concern to Latin America's governments and citizens.¶ The Task Force
urges that U.S. efforts to address these challenges be done in coordination with multilateral
institutions, civil society organizations, governments, and local leaders. By focusing on areas of mutual
concern, the United States and Latin American countries can develop a partnership that supports
regional initiatives and the countries' own progress. Such a partnership would also promote U.S.
objectives of fostering stability, prosperity, and democracy throughout the hemisphere.
Democracy promotion is key to conflict de-escalation
Lynn-Jones, Editor of International Security for Belfer Center Studies in International
Security, 98
(Sean M., March 1998, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs “Why the United States Should Spread Democracy,”
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2830/why_the_united_states_should_spread_democracy.html, 6-30-13)
C. America''s Goal: Liberal Democracy Given the variety of definitions of democracy and the distinction between democracy and liberalism,
what type of government should the United States attempt to spread? Should it try to spread democracy, defined procedurally, liberalism, or
both? Ultimately, U.S.
policies should aim to encourage the spread of liberal democracy. Policies to
promote democracy should attempt to increase the number of regimes that respect the individual
liberties that lie at the heart of liberalism and elect their leaders. The United States therefore should attempt
to build support for liberal principles-many of which are enshrined in international human-rights treaties-as well as encouraging
states to hold free and fair elections. Supporting the spread of liberal democracy does not, however, mean that the United States should give
the promotion of liberalism priority over the growth of electoral democracy. In most cases, support for electoral democracy can contribute to
the spread of liberalism and liberal democracy. Free and fair elections often remove leaders who are the biggest impediments to the spread of
democracy. In Burma, for example, the people would almost certainly remove the authoritarian SLORC regime from power if they had a choice
at the ballot box. In South Africa, Haiti, and Chile, for example, elections removed antidemocratic rulers and advanced the process of
democratization. In most cases, the United States should support elections even in countries that are not fully liberal. Elections will generally
initiate a process of change toward democratization. American policy should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good by insisting that
countries embrace liberal principles before holding elections. Such a policy could be exploited by authoritarian rulers to justify their continued
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hold on power and to delay elections that they might lose. In addition, consistent U.S. support for electoral democracy will help to bolster the
emerging international norm that leaders should be accountable to their people. Achieving this goal is worth the risk that some distasteful
leaders will win elections and use these victories at the ballot box to legitimize their illiberal rule. The United States also should attempt to build
support for liberal principles, both before and after other countries hold elections. Policies that advance liberalism are harder to develop and
pursue than those that aim to persuade states to hold free and fair elections, but the United States can promote liberalism as well as electoral
democracy, as I argue below. II. The Benefits of the Spread of Democracy Most Americans assume that democracy is a good thing and that the
spread of democracy will be beneficial. Because the virtues of democracy are taken for granted, they are rarely fully enumerated and
considered. Democracy is not an unalloyed good, so it is important not to overstate or misrepresent the benefits of democratization.
Nevertheless, the spread of democracy has many important benefits. This section enumerates how the spread of
democracy will improve the lives of the citizens of new democracies, contribute to international peace, and directly advance the national
interests of the United States. A. Democracy is Good for the Citizens of New Democracies The United States should attempt to spread
democracy because people generally live better lives under democratic governments. Compared to inhabitants of nondemocracies, citizens of
democracies enjoy greater individual liberty, political stability, freedom from governmental violence, enhanced quality of life, and a much lower
risk of suffering a famine. Skeptics will immediately ask: Why should the United States attempt to improve the lives of non-Americans?
Shouldn''t this country focus on its own problems and interests? There are at least three answers to these questions. First, as human beings,
American should and do feel some obligation to improve the well-being of other human beings. The bonds of common humanity do not stop at
the borders of the United States.19 To be sure, these bonds and obligations are limited by the competitive nature of the international system.
In a world where the use of force remains possible, no government can afford to pursue a foreign policy based on altruism. The human race is
not about to embrace a cosmopolitan moral vision in which borders and national identities become irrelevant. But there are many possibilities
for action motivated by concern for individuals in other countries. In the United States, continued public concern over human rights in other
countries, as well as governmental and nongovernmental efforts to relieve hunger, poverty, and suffering overseas, suggest that Americans
accept some bonds of common humanity and feel some obligations to foreigners. The emergence of the so-called "CNN Effect"-the tendency
for Americans to be aroused to action by television images of suffering people overseas-is further evidence that cosmopolitan ethical
sentiments exist. If Americans care about improving the lives of the citizens of other countries, then the case for promoting democracy grows
stronger to the extent that promoting democracy is an effective means to achieve this end. Second, Americans have a particular interest in
promoting the spread of liberty. The United States was founded on the principle of securing liberty for its citizens. Its founding documents and
institutions all emphasize that liberty is a core value. Among the many observers and political scientists who make this point is Samuel
Huntington, who argues that America''s "identity as a nation is inseparable from its commitment to liberal and democratic values."20 As I argue
below, one of the most important benefits of the spread of democracy-and especially of liberal democracy-is an expansion of human liberty.
Given its founding principles and very identity, the United States has a large stake in advancing its core value of liberty. As Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbott has argued: "The United States is uniquely and self-consciously a country founded on a set of ideas, and ideals, applicable
to people everywhere. The Founding Fathers declared that all were created equal-not just those in Britain''s 13 American colonies-and that to
secure the `unalienable rights'' of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, people had the right to establish governments that derive `their just
powers from the consent of the governed.''"21 Third, improvements
in the lives of individuals in other countries
matter to Americans because the United States cannot insulate itself from the world. It may be a cliché to
say that the world is becoming more interdependent, but it is undeniable that changes in communications technologies,
trade flows, and the environment have opened borders and created a more interconnected world. These trends
give the United States a greater stake in the fate of other societies, because widespread misery
abroad may create political turmoil, economic instability, refugee flows, and environmental damage
that will affect Americans. As I argue below in my discussion of how promoting democracy serves U.S. interests, the spread of
democracy will directly advance the national interests of the United States. The growing interconnectedness of
international relations means that the United States also has an indirect stake in the well-being of those in other countries, because
developments overseas can have unpredictable consequences for the United States. For these three reasons, at least, Americans should care
about how the spread of democracy can improve the lives of people in other countries. 1. Democracy Leads to Liberty and Liberty is Good The
first way in which the
spread of democracy enhances the lives of those who live in democracies is by promoting individual
liberty, including freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, and freedom to own private property.22 Respect for the liberty of
individuals is an inherent feature of democratic politics. As Samuel Huntington has written, liberty is "the peculiar virtue
of democracy."23 A democratic political process based on electoral competition depends on freedom of expression of political views and
freedom to make electoral choices. Moreover, governments that are accountable to the public are less likely to deprive their citizens of human
rights. The global spread of democracy is likely to bring greater individual liberty to more and more people. Even
imperfect and illiberal democracies tend to offer more liberty than autocracies, and liberal democracies are very likely to promote liberty.
Freedom House''s 1997 survey of "Freedom in the World" found that 79 out of 118 democracies could be classified as "free" and 39 were
"partly free" and, of those, 29 qualified as "high partly free." In contrast, only 20 of the world''s 73 nondemocracies were "partly free" and 53
were "not free."24 The case for the maximum possible amount of individual freedom can be made on the basis of utilitarian calculations or in
terms of natural rights. The
utilitarian case for increasing the amount of individual liberty rests on the belief
that increased liberty will enable more people to realize their full human potential, which will benefit
not only themselves but all of humankind. This view holds that greater liberty will allow the human
spirit to flourish, thereby unleashing greater intellectual, artistic, and productive energies that will ultimately
benefit all of humankind. The rights-based case for liberty, on the other hand, does not focus on the consequences of increased
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liberty, but instead argues that all men and women, by virtue of their common humanity, have a right to freedom. This argument is most
memorably expressed in the American Declaration of Independence: "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness ..." The
virtues of greater individual liberty are not self-evident. Various political ideologies argue against making liberty the paramount goal of any
political system. Some do not deny that individual liberty is an important goal, but call for limiting it so that other goals may be achieved. Others
place greater emphasis on obligations to the community. The British Fabian Socialist Sidney Webb, for example, articulated this view clearly:
"The perfect and fitting development of each individual is not necessarily the utmost and highest cultivation of his own personality, but the
filling, in the best possible way, of his humble function in the great social machine."25 To debate these issues thoroughly would require a paper
far longer than this one.26 The short response to most critiques of liberty is that there appears to be a universal demand for liberty among
human beings. Particularly as socioeconomic development elevates societies above subsistence levels, individuals desire more choice and
autonomy in their lives. More important, most political systems that have been founded on principles explicitly opposed to liberty have tended
to devolve into tyrannies or to suffer economic, political, or social collapse. 2. Liberal Democracies are Less Likely to Use Violence Against Their
Own People. Second, America should spread liberal democracy because the citizens of liberal democracies are less likely to suffer violent death
in civil unrest or at the hands of their governments.27 These two findings are supported by many studies, but particularly by the work of R.J.
Rummel. Rummel finds that democracies-by which he means liberal democracies-between 1900 and 1987 saw only 0.14% of their populations
(on average) die annually in internal violence. The corresponding figure for authoritarian regimes was 0.59% and for totalitarian regimes
1.48%.28 Rummel also finds that citizens of liberal democracies are far less likely to die at the hands of their governments. Totalitarian and
authoritarian regimes have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of genocides and mass murders of civilians in the twentieth
century. The states that have killed millions of their citizens all have been authoritarian or totalitarian: the Soviet Union, the People''s Republic
of China, Nazi Germany, Nationalist China, Imperial Japan, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. Democracies have virtually never massacred
their own citizens on a large scale, although they have killed foreign civilians during wartime. The American and British bombing campaigns
against Germany and Japan, U.S. atrocities in Vietnam, massacres of Filipinos during the guerrilla war that followed U.S. colonization of the
Philippines after 1898, and French killings of Algerians during the Algerian War are some prominent examples.29 There are two reasons for the
relative absence of civil violence in democracies: (1) Democratic political systems-especially those of liberal democracies constrain the power of
governments, reducing their ability to commit mass murders of their own populations. As Rummel concludes, "Power
kills, absolute
power kills absolutely ... The more freely a political elite can control the power of the state apparatus,
the more thoroughly it can repress and murder its subjects."30 (2) Democratic polities allow opposition to be expressed
openly and have regular processes for the peaceful transfer of power. If all participants in the political process remain committed to democratic
principles, critics of the government need not stage violent revolutions and governments will not use violence to repress opponents.31 3.
Democracy Enhances Long-Run Economic Performance A third reason for promoting democracy is that democracies tend to enjoy greater
prosperity over long periods of time. As democracy spreads, more individuals are likely to enjoy greater economic benefits. Democracy does
not necessarily usher in prosperity, although some observers claim that "a close correlation with prosperity" is one of the "overwhelming
advantages" of democracy.32 Some democracies, including India and the Philippines, have languished economically, at least until the last few
years. Others are among the most prosperous societies on earth. Nevertheless, over the long haul democracies generally prosper. As Mancur
Olson points out: "It
is no accident that the countries that have reached the highest level of economic
performance across generations are all stable democracies."33 Authoritarian regimes often compile impressive shortrun economic records. For several decades, the Soviet Union''s annual growth in gross national product (GNP) exceeded that of the United
States, leading Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to pronounce "we will bury you." China has posted double-digit annual GNP increases in
recent years. But autocratic countries rarely can sustain these rates of growth for long. As Mancur Olson notes, "experience shows that
relatively poor countries can grow extraordinarily rapidly when they have a strong dictator who happens to have unusually good economic
policies, such growth lasts only for the ruling span of one or two dictators."34 The Soviet Union was unable to sustain its rapid growth; its
economic failings ultimately caused the country to disintegrate in the throes of political and economic turmoil. Most experts doubt that China
will continue its rapid economic expansion. Economist Jagdish Bhagwati argues that "no one can maintain these growth rates in the long term.
Sooner or later China will have to rejoin the human race."35 Some observers predict that the stresses of high rates of economic growth will
cause political fragmentation in China.36 Why do democracies perform better than autocracies over the long run? Two reasons are particularly
persuasive explanations. First, democracies-especially liberal democracies-are more likely to have market economies, and market economies
tend to produce economic growth over the long run. Most of the world''s leading economies thus tend to be market economies, including the
United States, Japan, the "tiger" economies of Southeast Asia, and the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. Two recent studies suggest that there is a direct connection between economic liberalization and economic performance.
Freedom House conducted a World Survey of Economic Freedom for 1995-96, which evaluated 80 countries that account for 90% of the
world''s population and 99% of the world''s wealth on the basis of criteria such as the right to own property, operate a business, or belong to a
trade union. It found that the countries rated "free" generated 81% of the world''s output even though they had only 17% of the world''s
population.37 A second recent study confirms the connection between economic freedom and economic growth. The Heritage Foundation has
constructed an Index of Economic Freedom that looks at 10 key areas: trade policy, taxation, government intervention, monetary policy, capital
flows and foreign investment, banking policy, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market activity. It has found that
countries classified as "free" had annual 1980-1993 real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (expressed in terms of purchasing power
parities) growth rates of 2.88%. In "mostly free" countries the rate was 0.97%, in "mostly not free" ones -0.32%, and in "repressed" countries 1.44%.38 Of course, some democracies do not adopt market economies and some autocracies do, but liberal democracies generally are more
likely to pursue liberal economic policies. Second, democracies
that embrace liberal principles of government are
likely to create a stable foundation for long-term economic growth. Individuals will only make long-term
investments when they are confident that their investments will not be expropriated. These and other economic decisions require assurances
that private property will be respected and that contracts will be enforced. These conditions are likely to be met when an impartial court
system exists and can require individuals to enforce contracts. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has argued that: "The guiding
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mechanism of a free market economy ... is a bill of rights, enforced by an impartial judiciary."39 These conditions also happen to be those that
are necessary to maintain a stable system of free and fair elections and to uphold liberal principles of individual rights. Mancur Olson thus
points out that "the conditions that are needed to have the individual rights needed for maximum economic development are exactly the same
conditions that are needed to have a lasting democracy. ... the same court system, independent judiciary, and respect for law and individual
rights that are needed for a lasting democracy are also required for security of property and contract rights."40 Thus liberal democracy is the
basis for long-term economic growth. A third reason may operate in some circumstances: democratic governments are more likely to have the
political legitimacy necessary to embark on difficult and painful economic reforms.41 This factor is particularly likely to be important in former
communist countries, but it also appears to have played a role in the decisions India and the Philippines have taken in recent years to pursue
difficult economic reforms.42 4. Democracies Never Have Famines Fourth, the United
States should spread democracy
because the citizens of democracies do not suffer from famines. The economist Amartya Sen concludes that "one
of the remarkable facts in the terrible history of famine is that no substantial famine has ever
occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press."43 This striking
empirical regularity has been overshadowed by the apparent existence of a "democratic peace" (see
below), but it provides a powerful argument for promoting democracy. Although this claim has been most closely
identified with Sen, other scholars who have studied famines and hunger reach similar conclusions. Joseph Collins, for example, argues that:
"Wherever political rights for all citizens truly flourish, people will see to it that, in due course, they share in control over economic resources
vital to their survival. Lasting food security thus requires real and sustained democracy."44 Most of the countries that have experienced severe
famines in recent decades have been among the world''s least democratic: the Soviet Union (Ukraine in the early 1930s), China, Ethiopia,
Somalia, Cambodia and Sudan. Throughout history, famines have occurred in many different types of countries, but never in a democracy.
Democracies do not experience famines for two reasons. First, in democracies governments are accountable to their populations and their
leaders have electoral incentives to prevent mass starvation. The need to be reelected impels politicians to ensure that their people do not
starve. As Sen points out, "the plight of famine victims is easy to politicize" and "the effectiveness of democracy in the prevention of famine has
tended to depend on the politicization of the plight of famine victims, through the process of public discussion, which generates political
solidarity."45 On the other hand, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are not accountable to the public; they are less likely to pay a political
price for failing to prevent famines. Moreover, authoritarian and totalitarian rulers often have political incentives to use famine as a means of
exterminating their domestic opponents. Second, the existence of a free press and the free flow of information in democracies prevents famine
by serving as an early warning system on the effects of natural catastrophes such as floods and droughts that may cause food scarcities. A free
press that criticizes government policies also can publicize the true level of food stocks and reveal problems of distribution that might cause
famines even when food is plentiful.46 Inadequate information has contributed to several famines. During the 1958-61 famine in China that
killed 20-30 million people, the Chinese authorities overestimated the country''s grain reserves by 100 million metric tons. This disaster later led
Mao Zedong to concede that "Without democracy, you have no understanding of what is happening down below."47 The 1974 Bangladesh
famine also could have been avoided if the government had had better information. The food supply was high, but floods, unemployment, and
panic made it harder for those in need to obtain food.48 The two factors that prevent famines in democracies-electoral incentives and the free
flow of information-are likely to be present even in democracies that do not have a liberal political culture. These factors exist when leaders
face periodic elections and when the press is free to report information that might embarrass the government. A full-fledged liberal democracy
with guarantees of civil liberties, a relatively free economic market, and an independent judiciary might be even less likely to suffer famines, but
it appears that the rudiments of electoral democracy will suffice to prevent famines. The ability of democracies to avoid famines cannot be
attributed to any tendency of democracies to fare better economically. Poor democracies as well as rich ones have not had famines. India,
Botswana, and Zimbabwe have avoided famines, even when they have suffered large crop shortfalls. In fact, the evidence suggests that
democracies can avoid famines in the face of large crop failures, whereas nondemocracies plunge into famine after smaller shortfalls.
Botswana''s food production fell by 17% and Zimbabwe''s by 38% between 1979-81 and 1983-84, whereas Sudan and Ethiopia saw a decline in
food production of 11-12% during the same period. Sudan and Ethiopia, which were nondemocracies, suffered major famines, whereas the
democracies of Botswana and Zimbabwe did not.49 If, as I have argued, democracies enjoy better long-run economic performance than
nondemocracies, higher levels of economic development may help democracies to avoid famines. But the absence of famines in new, poor
democracies suggests that democratic governance itself is sufficient to prevent famines. The case of India before and after independence
provides further evidence that democratic rule is a key factor in preventing famines. Prior to independence in 1947, India suffered frequent
famines. Shortly before India became independent, the Bengal famine of 1943 killed 2-3 million people. Since India became independent and
democratic, the country has suffered severe crop failures and food shortages in 1968, 1973, 1979, and 1987, but it has never suffered a
famine.50 B. Democracy is Good for the International System In addition to improving the lives of individual citizens in new democracies, the
spread of democracy will benefit the international system by reducing the likelihood of war .
Democracies do not wage war on other democracies. This absence-or near absence, depending on the definitions of "war"
and "democracy" used-has been called "one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological generalizations that can be made about
international relations."51 One scholar argues that "the absence
of war between democracies comes as close as
anything we have to an empirical law in international relations."52 If the number of democracies in
the international system continues to grow, the number of potential conflicts that might escalate to
war will diminish. Although wars between democracies and nondemocracies would persist in the short run, in the long run an
international system composed of democracies would be a peaceful world. At the very least, adding to the
number of democracies would gradually enlarge the democratic "zone of peace." 1. The Evidence for the
Democratic Peace Many studies have found that there are virtually no historical cases of democracies going to war
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with one another. In an important two-part article published in 1983, Michael Doyle compares all international wars between 1816 and
1980 and a list of liberal states.53 Doyle concludes that "constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another."54
Subsequent statistical studies have found that this absence of war between democracies is statistically significant and is not the result of
random chance.55 Other analyses have concluded that the influence of other variables, including geographical proximity and wealth, do not
detract from the significance of the finding that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another.56 Most studies of the democraticpeace proposition have argued that democracies only enjoy a state of peace with other democracies; they are just as likely as other states to go
to war with nondemocracies.57 There are, however, several scholars who argue that democracies are
inherently less likely to
go to war than other types of states.58 The evidence for this claim remains in dispute, however, so it would be premature to
claim that spreading democracy will do more than to enlarge the democratic zone of peace. 2. Why there is a Democratic Peace: The Causal
Logic Two types of explanations have been offered for the absence of wars between democracies. The first argues that shared norms prevent
democracies from fighting one another. The second claims that institutional (or structural) constraints make it difficult or impossible for a
democracy to wage war on another democracy. a. Normative Explanations The normative explanation of the democratic peace argues that
norms that democracies share preclude wars between democracies. One version of this argument contends that liberal states do not fight
other liberal states because to do so would be to violate the principles of liberalism. Liberal states only wage war when it advances the liberal
ends of increased individual freedom. A liberal state cannot advance liberal ends by fighting another liberal state, because that state already
upholds the principles of liberalism. In other words, democracies do not fight because liberal ideology provides no justification for wars
between liberal democracies.59 A second version of the normative explanation claims that democracies share a norm of peaceful conflict
resolution. This norm applies between and within democratic states. Democracies resolve their domestic conflicts without violence, and they
expect that other democracies will resolve inter-democratic international disputes peacefully.60 b. Institutional/Structural Explanations
Institutional/structural explanations for the democratic peace contend that democratic
decision-making procedures and
institutional constraints prevent democracies from waging war on one another. At the most general level,
democratic leaders are constrained by the public, which is sometimes pacific and generally slow to
mobilize for war. In most democracies, the legislative and executive branches check the war-making power
of each other. These constraints may prevent democracies from launching wars. When two
democracies confront one another internationally, they are not likely to rush into war. Their leaders will
have more time to resolve disputes peacefully.61 A different sort of institutional argument suggests that democratic processes and freedom of
speech make democracies better at avoiding myths and misperceptions that cause wars.62 c. Combining Normative and Structural Explanations
Some studies have attempted to test the relative power of the normative and institutional/structural explanations of the democratic peace.63
It might make more sense, however, to specify how the two work in combination or separately under different conditions. For example, in
liberal democracies liberal norms and democratic processes probably work in tandem to synergistically produce the democratic peace.64
Liberal states are unlikely to even contemplate war with one another. They thus will have few crises and wars. In illiberal or semiliberal
democracies, norms play a lesser role and crises are more likely, but democratic institutions and processes may still make wars between illiberal
democracies rare. Finally, state-level factors like norms and domestic structures may interact with international-systemic factors to prevent
wars between democracies. If democracies are better at information-processing, they may be better than nondemocracies at recognizing
international situations where war would be foolish. Thus the logic of the democratic peace may explain why democracies sometimes behave
according to realist (systemic) predictions. C. The Spread of Democracy is Good for the United States The
United States will have an
democracy because further democratization enhances the lives of citizens of other countries and
contributes to a more peaceful international system. To the extent that Americans care about citizens of other countries
and international peace, they will see benefits from the continued spread of democracy. Spreading democracy also will directly
advance the national interests of the United States, because democracies will not launch wars or
terrorist attacks against the United States, will not produce refugees seeking asylum in the United States, and will tend
to ally with the United States. 1. Democracies Will Not Go to War with the United States First, democracies will not go to war
interest in promoting
against the United States, provided, of course, that the United States remains a democracy. The logic of the democratic peace suggests that the
United States will have fewer enemies in a world of more democracies. If democracies virtually never go to war with one another, no
democracy will wage war against the United States. Democracies are unlikely to get into crises or militarized disputes with the United States.
Promoting democracy may usher in a more peaceful world; it also will enhance the national security of the United States by eliminating
potential military threats. The United States would be more secure if Russia, China, and at least some countries in the Arab and Islamic worlds
became stable democracies. 2. Democracies Don''t Support Terrorism Against the United States Second, spreading
democracy is
likely to enhance U.S. national security because democracies will not support terrorist acts against the
United States. The world''s principal sponsors of international terrorism are harsh, authoritarian regimes, including Syria, Iran, Iraq, North
Korea, Libya, and Sudan.65 Some skeptics of the democratic-peace proposition point out that democracies sometimes have sponsored covert
action or "state terrorism" against other democracies. Examples include U.S. actions in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Chile in 1973.66
This argument does not undermine the claim that democracies will not sponsor terrorism against the United States. In each case, the target
state had dubious democratic credentials. U.S. actions amounted to interference in internal affairs, but not terrorism as it is commonly
understood. And the perpetrator of the alleged "state terrorist" acts in each case was the United States itself, which suggests that the United
States has little to fear from other democracies. 3. Democracies Produce Fewer Refugees Third, the spread of democracy will serve American
interests by reducing the number of refugees who flee to the United States. The countries that generate the most refugees are usually the least
democratic. The absence of democracy tends to lead to internal conflicts, ethnic strife, political oppression, and rapid population growth-all of
which encourage the flight of refugees.67 The spread of democracy can reduce refugee flows to the United States by removing the political
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sources of decisions to flee. The results of the 1994 U.S. intervention in Haiti demonstrate how U.S. efforts to promote democratization can
reduce refugee flows. The number of refugees attempting to flee Haiti for the United States dropped dramatically after U.S. forces deposed the
junta led by General Raoul Cedras and restored the democratically elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, even though Haiti''s
economic fortunes did not immediately improve.68 In addition to reducing the number of countries that generate refugees, the spread of
democracy is likely to increase the number of countries that accept refugees, thereby reducing the number of refugees who will attempt to
enter the United States.69 4. Democracies will Ally with the United States Fourth, the global spread of democracy
will advance
American interests by creating more potential allies for the United States. Historically, most of America''s allies
have been democracies. In general, democracies are much more likely to ally with one another than with nondemocracies.70 Even scholars
who doubt the statistical evidence for the democratic-peace proposition, agree that "the nature of regimes ... is an important variable in the
understanding the composition of alliances ... democracies have allied with one another."71 Thus spreading democracy will produce more and
better alliance partners for the United States. 5. American Ideals Flourish When Others Adopt Them Fifth, the spread of democracy
internationally is likely to increase Americans'' psychological sense of well-being about their own democratic institutions. Part of the impetus
behind American attempts to spread democracy has always come from the belief that American democracy will be healthier when other
countries adopt similar political systems. To some extent, this belief reflects the conviction that democracies will be friendly toward the United
States. But it also reflects the fact that democratic principles are an integral part of America''s national identity. The United States thus has a
special interest in seeing its ideals spread.72 6. Democracies Make Better Economic Partners Finally, the United States will benefit from the
spread of democracy because democracies will make better economic partners. Democracies
are more likely to adopt market
economies, so democracies will tend to have more prosperous and open economies. The United States
generally will be able to establish mutually beneficial trading relationships with democracies. And
democracies provide better climates for American overseas investment, by virtue of their political
stability and market economies.
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Economy
Stronger partnerships with Latin America will increase US economic growth in all
sectors.
Arcos et al., Senior Advisor @ The National Defense University’s Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies, ‘12
(Cresencio, The Inter-American Dialogue, April 2012, "Remaking the Relationship: The
United States and Latin America?”,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf,
6/30/2013, PD)
Expanded trade, investment, and energy cooperation offer the greatest promise for robust US-Latin
American relations. Independent of government policies, these areas have seen tremendous growth
and development, driven chiefly by the private sector. The US government needs to better appreciate
the rising importance of Latin America—with its expanding markets for US exports, burgeoning
opportunities for US investments, enormous reserves of energy and minerals, and continuing supply
of needed labor—for the longer term performance of the US economy . With Brazil and many other
Latin American economies thriving and showing promise for sustained rapid growth and rising
incomes, the search for economic opportunities has become the main force shaping relationships in
the hemisphere. Intensive economic engagement by the United States may be the best foundation for
wider partnerships across many issues as well as the best way to energize currently listless US
relations with the region. What Latin America’s largely middle and upper middle income countries—
and their increasingly middle class populations—most want and need from the United States is access to
its $16-trillion-a-year economy, which is more than three times the region’s economies combined . Most
Latin American nations experienced quicker recovery from the financial crisis than did the United
States, and they are growing at a faster pace Nonetheless, they depend on US capital for investment,
US markets for their exports, and US technology and managerial innovation to lift productivity. They also
rely on the steady remittances from their citizens in the United States . The United States currently buys
about 40 percent of Latin America’s exports and an even higher percentage of its manufactured
products. It remains the first or second commercial partner for nearly every country in the region. And it
provides nearly 40 percent of foreign investment and upwards of 90 percent of the $60 billion or so in
remittance income that goes to Latin America. US economic preeminence in Latin America has,
however, waned in recent years. Just a decade ago, 55 percent of the region’s imports originated in the
United States. Today, the United States supplies less than one-third of Latin America’s imports. China
and Europe have made huge inroads. China’s share of trade in Brazil, Chile, and Peru has surpassed that
of the United States; it is a close second in Argentina and Colombia. Furthermore, Latin American
nations now trade much more among themselves. Argentina, for example, may soon replace the United
States as Brazil’s second largest trading partner, just behind China. Still, these changes must be put in
perspective. Even as the US share of the Latin American market has diminished, its exports to the region
have been rising at an impressive pace. They have more than doubled since 2000, growing an average
of nearly 9 percent a year, 2 percent higher than US exports worldwide. US trade should expand even
faster in the coming period as Latin America’s growth continues to be strong. But the United States will
have to work harder and harder to compete for the region’s markets and resources. While Latin
America has been diversifying its international economic ties, the region’s expanding economies have
become more critical to US economic growth and stability. Today the United States exports more to
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Latin America than it does to Europe; twice as much to Mexico than it does to China; and more to
Chile and Colombia than it does to Russia. Even a cursory examination of the numbers points to how
much the United States depends on the region for oil and minerals. Latin America accounts for a third
of US oil imports. Mexico is the second-biggest supplier after Canada. Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia
sit among the top dozen, and imports from Brazil are poised to rise sharply with its recent offshore
discoveries. Within a decade, Brazil and Mexico may be two of the three largest suppliers of oil to the
United States. The potential for heightened energy cooperation in the Americas is huge, with wideranging ramifications for economic well-being and climate change. Latin America is an important
destination for US direct and portfolio investments, absorbing each year about eight percent of all US
overseas investment. At the same time, Latin American investment in the United States is growing fast.
And no economic calculus should omit the vital value to the US economy of immigrant workers; US
agriculture and construction industries are heavily dependent on them. These workers, mostly from
Latin America, will drive the bulk of US labor force growth in the next decade and are important
elements in keeping social security solvent over the longer term.
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US-Cuba Relations Add-On
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Cuban Cooperation Impacts
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Disease (Biotech)
Cuban biotech key to solving disease but trade sanctions inhibit progress.
Eaton, Assistant Professor at Flagler College, 3
(Tracey, November 28th, 2003, The Seattle Times Company, “A shot in the arm?: Cuba's biotech industry raises
hope, suspicion,” http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2001802677_cubagerm19.html, accessed 7/9/13, AS)
The center and others on the island have filed for patents on at least 150 new medicines and
technologies to be used to treat cancer, AIDS and other diseases.¶ Cuban drugs are now sold in 50
countries around the world but aren't available in the United States because of the U.S. ban on trade
with the socialist regime.¶ One example is PPG, or polycosanol, made from sugarcane wax. Cuba
markets the drug worldwide, saying it reduces unhealthful fats and promotes a healthy heart. Cuban
scientists also market Epidermal Growth Factor, or EGF, used to treat burn patients, and melagenina,
used to treat a skin disorder.¶ Another obstacle to expansion, Cubans say, is that the socialist
government doesn't have enough money to fully develop and test all its new drugs.¶ "There are more
ideas and lines of investigation in the country than we can finance," said Manuel Raices of Cuba's
Business Development Group, which seeks foreign funding for medical innovations.¶ Cuban officials
blame the trade ban for their failure to obtain much of the financing they need. But they have pushed
ahead, signing trade or transfer of technology pacts with dozens of countries.¶ The United States has
granted only one license for a Cuban product since the embargo. In 1999, British pharmaceutical
company Smith Kline Beecham, now GlaxoSmithKline, persuaded Washington to exempt a vaccine
discovered by Cuba, which was the world's first vaccine for the child-killing disease meningitis B.¶ Glaxo
now is doing advanced tests on the Cuban vaccine in Belgium, Britain and Spain and hopes eventually to
market it in the U.S.¶ Intrigued by such advances, researchers from Harvard Medical School, Princeton
University and other schools have visited and studied at Cuban biotech centers. But the trade ban has
severely limited scientific exchanges, said Dr. Gustavo Kouri, director of the Pedro Kouri Institute,
founded by his father in 1937.¶ The Kouri center, a 20-building complex outside Havana, evaluates and
does clinical trials on Cuban vaccines and antiretroviral HIV/AIDS treatments.¶ Kouri, an expert on
tropical diseases, has headed the center for 25 years. "For a small country, Cuba has accomplished great
things," he said from his office, decorated with dozens of diplomas and awards. But the trade ban
doesn't make things easy, he said.¶ For starters, Cuba has difficulty obtaining U.S. medical equipment,
he said. "In general we buy from suppliers in Europe and Japan, and that means the transportation costs
are enormous, sometimes more than the product."
Disease leads to extinction
Yu, Dartmouth Undergrad, 9
(Victoria, 22 May 2009, University publication: Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science, “Human Extinction:
The Uncertainty of Our Fate,” 6-31-13)
A pandemic will kill off all humans. In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. Perhaps
the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in
the mid-14th century (7). While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other
infectious diseases, new viral strains are constantly emerging — a process that maintains the
possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction. Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a
potential pandemic-causing virus. It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable
cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the
virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a
proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8).
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Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale
global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS
itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system. However, for
more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more
consequential. The simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift (point mutations that lead to new
strains) and antigenic shift (the inter-species transfer of disease) in the influenza virus could produce a
new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure. Since influenza can
spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic,” according to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when
bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the
Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required
to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).
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Coral Reefs (Oil Spills)
More co-operation solves oil spills in Florida’s coral reefs.
Conell, Research associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 9
(Christina, June 12 2009, The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “The U.S. and Cuba: Destined to be an
Environmental Duo?” , http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-an-environmental-duo/, 6/25/13, ND)
The recent discovery of oil and natural gas reserves in the Florida straits in Cuban waters has attracted foreign oil exploration from China and
India, both eager to begin extraction. Offshore
oil and gas development could threaten Cuba’s and Florida’s
environmental riches. Together, Cuba and the U.S. can develop policies to combat the negative results
coming from the exploitation of these resources. The increased extraction and refining of oil in Cuba could have
detrimental effects on the environment. Offshore drilling is likely to increase with the discovery of petroleum
deposits in the Bay of Cárdenas and related areas. Excavation increases the possibility of oil spills, which would in
turn destroy the surrounding ecosystem, including fisheries and coral reef formations. The amount of
pollutants released into the air from refining crude oil and the amount of wayward oil residuals would also increase
with drilling and extraction. Those conversant with the very sensitive habitat issues are calling for immediate
consultations aimed at anticipating what should be done.¶ However the U.S.’s enormous oil usage and its development
requirements will cultivate economic growth on the island. Washington must work with Cuba to create an
ecological protection plan not only to establish an environmentally friendly public image, but to make it a
reality as well. Degradation of the environment will deprive Cuba, in the long run, of one of its most important sources of present and future
revenue: tourism. Consequently, it
is in the mutual interests of the U.S. and Cuba to develop a cooperative
relationship that will foster tourism and growth in a sustainable manner.
Coral reefs are at the base of the marine food web.
Romm, Ph.D. in physics from MIT, 9
(Joseph, September 2nd 2009, Center for American Progress Action Fund, “Imagine a World without Fish:
Deadly ocean acidification — hard to deny, harder to geo-engineer, but not hard to stop — is subject of
documentary,” http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2009/09/02/204589/a-sea-change-imagine-a-worldwithout-fish-ocean-acidification-film/, 6-30-13)
Other continental shelf regions may also be impacted where anthropogenic CO2-enriched water is being
upwelled onto the shelf. Or listen to the Australia’s ARC Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies,
which warns: The world’s oceans are becoming more acid, with potentially devastating consequences
for corals and the marine organisms that build reefs and provide much of the Earth’s breathable
oxygen. The acidity is caused by the gradual buildup of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere,
dissolving into the oceans. Scientists fear it could be lethal for animals with chalky skeletons which
make up more than a third of the planet’s marine life”¦. Corals and plankton with chalky skeletons are
at the base of the marine food web. They rely on sea water saturated with calcium carbonate to form
their skeletons. However, as acidity intensifies, the saturation declines, making it harder for the animals
to form their skeletal structures (calcify). “Analysis of coral cores shows a steady drop in calcification
over the last 20 years,” says Professor Ove Hoegh-Guldberg of CoECRS and the University of
Queensland. “There’s not much debate about how it happens: put more CO2 into the air above and it
dissolves into the oceans. “When CO2 levels in the atmosphere reach about 500 parts per million, you
put calcification out of business in the oceans.”
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Environment
US –Cuba cooperation is essential on the environment
Newhouse, Center for International Policy Cuba delegate, NatGeo editor and
publisher, and member of the Cuba Advisory Group, 12
(Elizabeth, 2/17/12, Center for International Policy, “The U.S. Must Work with Cuba on the
Environment”, http://cipcubareport.wordpress.com/2012/02/17/the-u-s-must-work-with-cuba-on-theenvironment/, 6/24/13, AZ)
It should be an article of faith that the environment is immune from U.S. politics where U.S. interests
are clearly at stake. That’s mostly the case with other countries, but not with Cuba. In New York last
week a workshop organized by The New York Botanical Garden (NYBG) highlighted this aberration—
and its damaging effects. Participants included a number of key non-governmental groups, such as the
Environmental Defense Fund, the Nature Conservancy, the Wildlife Conservation Society, and the
Mote Marine Laboratory. They strongly agreed that measures must be taken to make it easier to
cooperate on the environment with Cuba.¶ Cuba and the United States, whose territorial waters meet
in the Gulf of Mexico and the Florida Straits, have much in common ecologically, as Brian Boom of the
NYBG pointed out in his paper “Biodiversity without Borders,” (PDF). This shared biodiversity ranges
from threatened ecosystems, such as coral reefs and mangrove forests, to thousands of migratory
species, including the Monarch butterfly, the Atlantic bluefin tuna, and the Hawksbill turtle. Many
species have economic value and others are seriously endangered; still others are invasive and highly
disruptive, while others carry serious disease like dengue fever. All of them require ongoing study and
monitoring.¶ Even more urgent, natural disasters (hurricanes) and man-made threats (oil spills) can
cause enormous damage that call for rapid bilateral solutions. The recent start of oil exploration off
Cuba’s north coast points up the compelling need to prepare for a spill—and for the harm that will be
done to the marine environment even without one.¶ However, between the U.S. and Cuba there exists
no governmental cooperation on the environment as on much else. In 2007, Wayne Smith and CIP
determined to work around this vacuum by organizing a conference in Cancun, Mexico, of key Cuban
scientists and environmentalists and a group of their U.S. NGO counterparts (Conference report is
here). The group, the first of its kind, agreed on priorities for research and conservation in the Gulf of
Mexico and set up an organization to establish the gulf as a model for protection. The organization, now
including Mexico and called the Trinational Initiative, plans to hold its fifth meeting this year.¶ CIP’s
initiative and other subsequent workshops and conferences have helped ease the way for
environmental NGOs to work in Cuba. It is still far from easy, however. While visas for scientists and
others to go and come are much more available under the Obama administration, tough procedural
obstacles exist in both countries. These include obtaining licenses for people and equipment, funding
limitations due to the embargo, and difficulties in securing project approvals, permits, and research
visas from the Cuban government.¶ As Brian Boom’s White Paper concluded—and workshop
participants vehemently agreed—the ecological stakes urgently call for a government-to-government
accord that will allow professionals to work together on the critical environmental issues that extend
beyond boundaries. Nature knows no nations!
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Overfishing (Food Security)
Cooperation between US and Cuba is critical to effective fisheries management.
Waitt Foundation 13
(Waitt Foundation, Institute dedicated to protection and conservation of oceans and marine resources,
6/25/13, Waitt Foundation “CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE”, http://waittfoundation.org/cubanenvironmental-science, 6/24/13, AZ)
EDF’s work to protect important shared marine resources in the U.S. Southeast, the Gulf of Mexico
and Caribbean depends upon close working partnerships with world-class — but under-resourced and
little-known — Cuban environmental scientists. A biodiversity hotspot, Cuba has regionally important
marine and coastal ecosystems. With connectivity to the United States, the window of opportunity is
now to share our resources and to work together towards solutions.¶ Over the past 12 years, and with
a special license from the U.S. Department of Treasury, EDF has built strong relationships with Cuban
environmental institutions and Cuban environmental scientists, who are among the best educated
and most experienced in the region. Cuban scientists’ rigorous research has informed important
environmental policy initiatives, including the Cuban government’s decision to include 25% of the
insular shelf in marine protected areas (MPAs). The current 108 MPAs represent the following:¶ - 15% of
the Cuban insular shelf - 16 fish spawning sites¶ - 35% coral reefs - 31% seagrass beds¶ - 27% mangroves¶
However, because of inadequate funding and other constraints on research, field work in Cuba has
been limited and much remains unknown about critical issues such as overfishing , the benefits of
MPAs, and ecosystem vulnerability to changing ocean conditions. These gaps in knowledge hamper
the development of sound environmental policy and effective fisheries management.¶ Project Goals¶
With support from the Waitt Foundation, EDF is launching a new initiative in 2013, led by Dan Whittle,
to support collaborative field research with scientists from Cuba’s Center for Marine Research. This
initiative will enable teams of Cuban and American scientists to carry out a series of two- to fourweek research cruises aboard the Cuban research vessel Felipe Poey and will support year-round port
sampling of shark landings in at least four Cuban ports.¶ The overarching project goal is to generate
scientific research that can inform sound policy to improve the performance of fisheries and MPA
networks. Specific objectives are to:¶ 1. Facilitate Cuban environmental scientists’ research and promote
international awareness of Cuba’s high-quality marine science.¶ 2. Collect biological and ecological data
essential to the management of sharks and selected reef fish.¶ 3. Assess the biological, ecological and
socioeconomic performance of existing Cuban MPAs.¶ 4. Characterize the socioeconomic contribution of
fisheries and MPAs to the economy.¶ 5. Use research results to inform conservation and management
strategies.¶ Field Expertise¶ Daniel Whittle directs EDF’s work to advance conservation of marine and
coastal ecosystems in Cuba. He works with Cuban scientists, lawyers and resource managers to
identify and implement collaborative strategies for fisheries management, coral reef conservation,
and sustainable coastal development in Cuba and the region.¶ For the last decade, Whittle has been
collaborating with Cuban fishermen, scientists and environmental officials on ways to protect shared
resources like fish and marine mammals. Operating under a special license from the U.S Treasury
Department, he’s also working to ensure that the right safeguards are in place for projected oil
development off Cuba’s northwest coast.¶
Overfishing is key to food security – affects one billion people.
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 12
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(Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 6/8/12, “Overfishing and Food Security,” http://www.dfompo.gc.ca/international/media/bk_food-eng.htm#tphp, accessed 7/8/13, AS)
The impact of global overfishing is typically measured in environmental and economic terms, but
often overlooked is the threat depleted fish stocks pose to the millions of people around the world
who depend on fish for food.¶ According to the World Resources Institute, about 1 billion people –
largely in developing countries – rely on fish as their primary animal protein source. Fish is highly nutritious,
and it serves as a valuable supplement in diets lacking essential vitamins and minerals.¶ During much of the last half-century, the growth in
demand for animal protein was satisfied in part by the rising output of oceanic fisheries. Between 1950 and 1990, the oceanic fish catch
increased roughly fivefold, from 19 million to 85 million tonnes. During this period, seafood consumption per person nearly doubled, climbing
from 8 to 15 kilograms.[1]¶ Unfortunately,
the human appetite for seafood is outgrowing the sustainable yield
of oceanic fisheries. Today, more than 70 per cent of the world’s fisheries are either fully exploited or depleted. Production levels in
many fishing nations have fallen to historically low levels, confirming that some fish stocks are in a fragile state.¶ Global investments in
aquaculture are seen as one way to help bridge the growing demand for fish and seafood. While this may also help contribute to food security,
it is only part of the solution. Action is still needed to create sustainable fish stocks in the high seas.¶ One of the major factors contributing to
the current predicament of global fisheries is illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Illegal fishing undermines efforts to conserve
and manage fish stocks. This situation leads to the loss of both short and long-term social and economic opportunities, and to negative effects
on food security.¶ IUU fishing is especially problematic for developing nations. These States can lose tens of millions of dollars to illegal fishing,
and may not have the governance structures in place to ensure proper fisheries management. [2]¶ The
world's oceans, lakes and
rivers are harvested largely by artisanal fishers. Their catches provide essential nourishment for poor
communities, not only in Africa and Asia, but also in many parts of Latin America and islands in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans. Of the 30 countries most dependent on fish as a protein source, all but four are in the developing world.[3]¶ The rapid growth in
demand for fish and fish products, in combination with shrinking supply, is leading to significant increases in fish prices. As a result, fisheries
investments have become more attractive to both entrepreneurs and governments. This is to the detriment of small-scale fishing and fishing
communities all over the world. Developing countries are also taking a growing share of the international trade in fish and fishery products. This
may have both benefits and drawbacks. While the exports provide valuable foreign exchange, the diversion of fish and fish products from local
communities and developing regions can deprive needy people of a traditionally cheap, but highly nutritious food. [4]¶ The Government of
Canada recognizes the threat that both overfishing and IUU fishing pose to global food security. These issues were specifically addressed in the
Ministerial Declaration of the St. John’s Conference on the Governance of High Seas Fisheries and the United Nations Fish Agreement and the
Bali Plan of Action. In these international commitments, concrete measures were outlined to: strengthen regional fisheries management
organizations to help ensure sustainable fisheries; and assist developing nations in implementing relevant agreements, instruments and tools
for the conservation and management of fish stocks.¶ Sustainable
fish stocks are needed as a significant and
renewable source of healthy food for large parts of the world’s population. Continued sustainable use
provides for increased food security on a global basis.
Food shortages lead to World War III
Calvin, theoretical neurophysiologist at the University of Washington, 98
(William, Atlantic Monthly, January, The Great Climate Flip-Flop, Vol 281, No. 1, 1998, p. 47-64, 6-31-13)
The population-crash scenario is surely the most appalling. Plummeting crop yields would cause some powerful countries
to try to take over their neighbors or distant lands -- if only because their armies, unpaid and lacking food, would
go marauding, both at home and across the borders. The better-organized countries would attempt to use
their armies, before they fell apart entirely, to take over countries with significant remaining resources,
driving out or starving their inhabitants if not using modern weapons to accomplish the same end: eliminating competitors for
the remaining food. This would be a worldwide problem -- and could lead to a Third World War -- but Europe's
vulnerability is particularly easy to analyze. The last abrupt cooling, the Younger Dryas, drastically altered Europe's climate as far east as
Ukraine. Present-day Europe has more than 650 million people. It has excellent soils, and largely grows its own food. It could no longer do
so if it lost the extra warming from the North Atlantic.
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IFI Loans Add-On
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Cuba Needs IFI Assistance
The Cuban economy is hardly surviving–needs investment
Global EDGE, business newswire @ Michigan State University, 7/8/13
[“Cuba: Economy,” http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/cuba/economy, accessed 7/8/13, YGS]
To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment in targeted sectors.
Although majority foreign ownership has been permitted since 1995, it has seldom been allowed. Foreign investment often takes the form of
joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for agricultural
crops. The number of joint ventures has steadily declined since 2002 to 218 in 2009. Moreover, a
hostile investment climate,
characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor, dense regulations, and an impenetrable
bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. In 2010, the government published a new law that extended the leases
foreign investors could sign from 50 years to 99 years, exclusively for tourist properties, and said that it was in talks with international firms to
build up to 16 new golf courses in 2011. None had moved forward by the close of 2011. Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by
the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The
Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does
not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank. Therefore,
Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel, and structured financial
instruments tied to more stable revenue sources (e.g., nickel, tourism, and remittances). Because of its poor credit rating, an $18 billion hard
currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%.
Cuban reforms need IFI assistance—now is key
Feinberg, former Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security
Council, 11
[Richard E., 9/17/11, FT, “Come on – Cuba needs help, not hindrance to progress,”
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/90986330-110e-11e1-ad22-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2YVjE3TMt, accessed
7/8/13, YGS]
Cuba’s recent liberalisation of markets in private homes and automobiles suggests that the
forces of economic reform are
gaining momentum on the Caribbean island. This is good news not only for ordinary Cubans but also
for the international community and the US – all of whom should be placing their weight firmly
behind the reformist factions. Now is the time for the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank to begin to assist the Cuban economic transition.¶ The reforms come not a moment too soon.
The Cuban economy is underperforming. Positive developments in areas such as tourism, mining,
energy and biotechnology are insufficient to offset glaring weaknesses in the economy. Industrial
production has yet to recover its pre-1989 Soviet-era levels. Agricultural output is insufficient to feed
the population. Merchandise exports are a paltry $3bn to $4bn a year, leaving a chronically large
trade deficit. Especially debilitating, national savings and investment rates are very low, relegating
Cuba to a low-growth trap.¶ In April, the Cuban Communist party approved 311 economic reforms,
which, if acted upon, would transform society. The guidelines aim to replace state paternalism with individual responsibility
and substitute universal gratuities with targeted subsidies to the most needy. Workers will be paid according to the quality
of their labour.¶ The new reforms will allow central planners the final word, yet power will be decentralised to municipalities and to nonstate enterprises such as self-employed workers or co-operatives. State-owned groups will enjoy greater autonomy.¶ Governments including
Spain, Brazil and Canada are already working with Cuba to advance these progressive reforms by, for example, supporting farmers and assisting
municipalities. Now
that the Cuban government has publicly declared its alignment with these goals, these
donors are well positioned to step up investment. In contrast, American programmes in Cuba have focused on fostering
political change – but so far have only succeeded in landing a hapless US aid consultant in jail for violating Cuban laws.¶ In other
countries making the transition from a centrally planned economy to a more market-oriented one, the
IMF and World Bank have provided strategic policy advice and significant financial assistance. Yet of their
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187 members, the only absent countries are North Korea and Cuba. Admitting Cuba would not imply approval for its policies: quite the
opposite. The
IMF and World Bank would work with Cuba to modernise its economy.
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Terror List Blocks IFIs
IFI assistance is restricted to state sponsors of terror.
Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 5
[Mark P., 5/13/05, CRS Report for Congress, “Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List,”
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32251.pdf, p. 1, accessed 7/8/13, YGS]
The “state sponsors of terrorism list” is mandated under Section 6(j) of the¶ Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (P.L. 96-72; 50
U.S.C. app. 2405(j)),¶ under which the Secretary of State makes a determination when a country “has¶ repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism.” Cuba has remained¶ on the list since 1982, and at present there are five other countries on the list — Iran,¶ Libya,
Syria, Sudan, and North Korea.¶ Under
various provisions of law, certain trade benefits, most foreign aid,¶
support in the international financial institutions, and other benefits are restricted or¶ denied to
countries named as state sponsors of international terrorism. Under the¶ authority of Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act, validated licenses are¶ required for exports of virtually all items to countries on the terrorism list, except¶ items specially
allowed by public law, such as informational materials, humanitarian¶ assistance, and food and medicine. Being
listed as a sponsor
of international¶ terrorism also restricts bilateral assistance in annual foreign assistance appropriations¶
acts, as required most recently in Section 527 of the Foreign Operations, Export¶ Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2005
(P.L. 108-447, Division¶ D). Section 502 of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2462) makes a¶ country ineligible for the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) if it is on the¶ Section 6(j) terrorism list. Section 620A of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L.¶
87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2371) also prohibits assistance authorized under the act to the¶ government of a country
that “has repeatedly provided support for acts of¶ international terrorism.” Likewise, Section 40 of the Arms
Export Control Act (P.L.¶ 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2780) prohibits the export or other provision of munitions to a¶ country if the government “has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international¶ terrorism.”1
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IFIs Solve Cuban Economic Reforms
IFI’s are key to Cuban economic reforms
Feinberg, former Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security
Council, 11
[Richard E., November 2011, Brookings, “Reaching Out: Cuban’s New Economy and the International
Response,”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cub
a_feinberg, p. 20-21, accessed 7/8/13, YGS]
In their ambitions, confusions, and omissions, the guidelines also ¶ suggest that there could be
important roles for the major international financial institutions (the International Monetary Fund and
¶ World Bank, as well as the regional Inter-American Development Bank and the Andean Development
Corporation) in assisting the Cuban reform process. In an interdependent world, external agents can
legitimately provide ideas and resources that lend weight to the reformers in their ¶ internal battles
to alter the status quo. Furthermore, with their deep financial pockets the international financial
institutions have assisted many countries in reducing the costs and hastening ¶ the rewards of
change. With their accumulated knowledge, the IFIs could also help Cuba to avoid ¶ the errors made by
others and, with modifications attuned to local circumstances, apply the best ¶ practices gleaned from
global success stories, as Sections 4 and 5 will suggest.
IFI’s solve negative Cuban investment climate
Feinberg, former Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security
Council, 11
[Richard E., November 2011, Brookings, “Reaching Out: Cuban’s New Economy and the International
Response,”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cub
a_feinberg, p. 42-43, accessed 7/8/13, YGS]
In the realm of global diplomacy, the EMs are gaining market shares not only in international commerce
but also within international institutions. The recent reallocation of voting rights in the ¶ International
Monetary Fund and World Bank benefited China and Brazil. These emerging giants ¶ have stakes in the
IFIs, even as they may wish to alter their governance structures and some of ¶ their policy prescriptions.
In recent history, both China and Brazil borrowed heavily from the IFIs ¶ and appreciate their valueadded in providing financial and technical assistance, particularly in¶ times of stress. It should not be
assumed that these EMs would counsel Cuba to remain outside of ¶ the IFIs. On the contrary, they may
well prefer to see the IFIs influencing Cuba toward more rational ¶ economic policies that would
improve the investment climate and make Cuban economic policies ¶ more efficient and
predictable—and less prone to suspending contractual commitments. As a matter of principle, Brazil
has repeatedly urged the IFIs to accept Cuba as a member.
[EMs are emerging markets]
IFI admittance solves Cuban structural economic decline
Pujol, former Board of Directors member for The Association for the Study of the
Cuban Economy, 12
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[Joaquin P., 8/2/12, ASCE, Cuba in Transition, “Cuba’s Membership in the IMF and Other International
Financial Institutions and Their Possible Role in Promoting Sustainable Economic Growth in Cuba,”
Volume: 22, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume22/pdfs/pujol2.pdf, p. 60-61,
accessed 7/8/13, YGS]
Let me state at the outset that, in my view, to
bring¶ about rapid and sustainable growth of the Cuban¶ economy,
the flow of direct private capital investment would need to be re-established, and there¶ would need
to be a major modernization of the deteriorated capital stock of the country. Years of lack of¶ maintenance and
of refurbishing of existing plant¶ and equipment, obsolete technologies, and lack of incentives to modernize have taken their toll and major¶
investments will be needed. The
current Cuban administration does not have the necessary financial resources
to carry out such an effort, nor does it have¶ access to external financing to do so. Cuba is heavily¶
indebted and has little access to external credits other¶ than those obtained from Venezuela and a few governments that
are political allies and whose credits¶ are conditioned on political commitments of doubtful duration. This has resulted in a concentration of¶
Cuba’s international trade in just a few countries and¶ a heavy reliance in the export of professional services,¶ mainly to Venezuela, that have a
very low multiplier¶ effect on domestic activities. Moreover, the economy¶ suffers from very low productivity and is hampered¶ by the lack of
appropriate incentives to the economic¶ agents, distortions arising from a multiple currency¶ system and excessive State intervention on
economic¶ decisions. Substantial
structural reforms are needed¶ to bring about a change in this situation.¶
Under these conditions, the reestablishment of Cuba’s membership and participation in the activities
of¶ the main multilateral financial institutions would¶ send an important signal to the rest of the
world. It¶ would indicate that Cuba is ready to adhere to a code¶ of international behavior consistent
with respect for¶ international law, to respect the rights of its trading¶ partners, and to make the
necessary structural adjustments to bring about an increase in productivity of¶ the economy. Such
membership would be an important step to reestablish Cuba’s creditworthiness¶ and its full
participation in the world economic and¶ financial system¶ Membership in the multilateral
international financial institutions (known as IFIs) can play an important role in Cuba gaining access to
financial resources¶ and technical assistance to support economic reconstruction. It would also help
normalize access to¶ credit from international commercial banks, including access to financing for
import transactions that¶ currently have to be paid largely through cash payments. But more
importantly, advice from the IFIs,¶ and their participation in helping Cuba frame economic policies,
can provide credibility to the efforts undertaken by the authorities and facilitate access to¶ other
sources of finance on competitive—and thus¶ much cheaper—terms, making it possible to unlock¶
financing from multilateral and bilateral lenders, as¶ well as to facilitate the rescheduling or reduction
of¶ the outstanding external debt. Data provided by the¶ Cuban authorities about its economy in the past have¶ been questioned
with respect to their transparency¶ and accuracy. Membership and full participation in¶ the activities of the IFIs and
adherence to international standards, including independent evaluation¶ of information, would go a
long way to lend credibility to the data provided and make it possible for economic actors to make
informed decisions.
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Cuban Economic Reforms K/ Environment
Cuban economic reforms are key to protecting coastal regions and preventing
biodiversity loss
Gonzalez, staff writer @ Inter Press Service, 13
[Ivet, 6/17/13, IPS News, “Cuba Wakes Up to Costs of Climate Change Effects,”
http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/cuba-wakes-up-to-costs-of-climate-change-effects/, accessed 7/9/13,
YGS]
HAVANA, Jun 17 2013 (IPS) - “How much is a species worth? What is the price tag on the services provided by a river or a forest?” These are the
questions biologist María Elena Perdomo
is asking to encourage Cubans to take account of environmental costs,
which may apparently be incorporated in the present economic reforms.¶ “Climate change effects
reduce biodiversity, cause a decline in quality of life, change landscapes and have enormous social
consequences. But what does all this mean in economic terms?” asks Perdomo, a researcher at the Centre for Environmental Studies and
Services in Villa Clara, 268 kilometres from Havana.¶ In an interview with IPS, she said that this kind of analysis should be given more attention
when decisions are being made about how to protect the environment, and when planning ecological projects, defining environmental
education messages and programmes and planning construction or other works that could harm vulnerable areas.¶ “One way of determining
the value of a service, resource or ecosystem is to consider the cost of replacing it if it were not available,” she said. “What losses are caused by
a tropical cyclone or a prolonged drought? How much would it cost to take clean water to arable lands left without water sources?Ӧ In
Cuba, as in other Caribbean countries, the effects of global warming will have the greatest impact on coastal
areas, although the whole island will be increasingly affected by extreme weather events, such as
heat waves, prolonged periods of drought and heavy rains. Potable water and fertile land will be
scarcer and biodiversity will be diminished.¶ Some 80 coastal settlements are likely to be affected and
15 could disappear by 2050 if the Cuban government does not implement adaptation measures in response to
the prediction that, by then, 2.32 percent of the national territory will be permanently under water, according to
the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment.¶ Because of this situation, conservation and remediation of
natural areas that can contribute to mitigating temperature rise is another challenge for Cuba’s 11.2
million people and its economy, which is struggling to emerge from a severe crisis that has lasted over 20
years.¶ The strategic programme of economic and social reforms begun in 2008 by the government of
President Raúl Castro includes addressing environmental problems. This year, that approach became
more visible as using renewable sources of energy, which are much less polluting than fossil fuels,
became a higher priority.¶ The authorities are directing investments so that by 2030 about 10 percent of the energy consumed in the
country will come from wind, sun, water and other renewable sources, it was announced this month.¶ The ministry has also created
an environmental research and management macro-project to consider climate change vulnerability
and risk assessment in coastal zones from 2050 to 2100, which includes recommendations for
adaptation measures.
The Cuban coastal regions are a critical hotspot—fishing stock, coral reefs, Florida
Keys
Waitt Foundation 13
[6/25/13, “Cuba’s Unique Marine Resources,” http://waittfoundation.org/cubas-unique-marineresources, accessed 7/9/13, YGS]
Funded by the Waitt Foundation, a two week scientific marine
expedition jointly led by the Environmental Defense
Fund and The Nature Conservancy was launched in April 2012 to explore the health of Cuba’s
ecosystem and the conservation issues facing the country’s unique marine resources. Aboard the Waitt
research vessel, some of the world’s leading experts in ocean conservation from Environmental Defense Fund, The
Nature Conservancy, University of California Santa Barbara Bren School, Mote Marine Laboratory, Atlantic and Gulf Rapid Reef Assessment
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Program along with Cuban Marine Scientists from Cuba’s Ministry of Science, Technology & Environment, University of Havana, the Cuban
Center for Coastal Ecosystems Research, Center for Marine Research, and Cuba’s National Protected Area Center collaborated in a scoping trip
to Cuba’s Jardines de la Reina National Park (Gardens of the Queen) and Havana. Cuba¶ In 1996, the Cuban government set aside Jardines de la
Reina as an 850 square mile marine reserve – the largest in the Caribbean – as part of a planned island-wide network of protected areas. Only
500 catch and release fishermen and 1,000 divers are permitted to enter the Gardens each year. Having been granted permission by the Cuban
Government to explore their diverse marine habitat, the Waitt Foundation’s mission was to support a scientific expedition off of Cuba’s
southern coast to characterize important areas for expanding and strengthening Cuba’s network of marine protected areas and to gather
preliminary baseline information about biodiversity, reef fish and sharks. Exploring
this underwater Eden was a rare
opportunity that allowed researchers to collect valuable data for analyzing possible future
environmental threats to this relatively unspoiled patch of ocean.¶ Cuba’s natural marine environment is world
class, but at a critical juncture. During five decades of isolation from mass tourism and rapid economic development, Cuba’s marine
and coastal resources have thrived. Its coral reefs, seagrass beds and mangroves abound with beauty and biodiversity, providing shelter and
sustenance to more than 200 species of valuable fish, crustaceans, mollusks and sponges. As
both “the gateway” to the Gulf of
Mexico and the “crown jewel” of the Caribbean, Cuba and its natural resources provide important
regional benefits to the United States and Mexico as well as the rest of the insular Caribbean. ¶ The
majority of Cuba’s commercially important fish stocks, however, are in critical condition. About half
may be fully exploited and 40% are overfished, with consistently declining catches. This decline in
productivity represents a major environmental and economic threat for both Cuba and the United
States. With Cuba just 90 miles from the Florida Keys, the health of our marine ecosystems is tightly
interconnected. Cuba’s thousands of islets, keys and reefs provide important spawning grounds for
lobster and reef fish that help populate waters along the southeast U.S. and in the Gulf of Mexico.¶
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AT: Politics
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AT: CIR Disad
The link is not unique, the plan is a huge political win, and the internal link doesn’t
make any sense.
Bilbao, Executive Director at Cuba Study Group, 13
[Tomás, 6-11-13, CSIS Event, “The Case to Remove Cuba from the Terrorist List”,
http://csis.org/event/case-remove-cuba-terrorist-list, audio transcribed by Conor O’Brien from 41:3543:40, accessed 7-10-13]
Carl Meacham:
I’m going to make it more provocative here and pressure Tomás a little bit more, you’re doing very well
and you look very smooth, so I’m going to try to rattle you a little bit. So, so here’s the deal, so If I’m an
official in the US government and you mention the issue the issue of immigration, which I think has…
is very important in the whole political horse trading side of it and I think your point was very clear, but
given that its more trouble, given that there are obvious difficulties and the backlash exists, you know,
why deal with Cuba? Why not if I can focus on, you know the Pacific Alliance or if I can focus on free
trade agreement with Europe including Mexico or TPP why am I going to spend time on Cuba? Why is it
important to me if I can do other things that have to do with Latin America and not face the kind of
backlash, political backlash that I would by doing things on Cuba?
Tomás Bilbao:
Well one because you already made the commitment, you’ve already identified that as a policy goal in
Latin America, the Obama administration perhaps is not in a position where they have an excess of
political victories to parade and maybe bringing a resolution to the Cuba issue which no
administration has been able to do for 50 years, which would radically change the landscape of the
U.S relationship with the rest of Latin America, is something that the administration would be
interested in. They’ve already began to take those steps and I think that what you alluded to is you
know, why pick a fight with certain members of Congress while you’re in the middle of immigration
reform? And I guess what’s implicit, in that, in that assumption is that somehow Marco Rubio is going
to be against his own immigration bill if the administration were to move on Cuba, something that I
find very difficult. Of course I would love to see Cuban American hardliners in Congress go against their
own pieces of legislation and use as justification improvement in the U.S effectiveness of U.S policy
towards Cuba.
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AT: Castro DA
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Regime Stable/Collapse Not coming
The regime is stable-history proves
John Hopkins Comparative National Systems students 9
(Edited by Mitchell Orenstein, Professor of Political Science at JHU, 11/19/2009, “Cuban Political System:
More than Just Castro”, http://www.mitchellorenstein.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Cuba.pdf,
KR)
Confirming the statement that the survival of communist Cuba has demonstrated that it consists of
more than just Fidel Castro, this report has analyzed the characteristics of the most important actors in
Cuban politics. Over the last fifty years, the Cuban regime has been able to overcome major obstacles
to achieving a socialist state. Despite heavy sanctions from the United States since 1961, the collapse of
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, and a global trend towards democratization starting in the mid1970s, the regime has strived to keep alive its vision to construct a socialist state. Over the decades,
the development of solid institutions has permitted Fidel and Raul Castro to remain in power. In
present-day Cuba, the one-party authoritarian state exhibits a high degree of influence on every
aspect of Cuban society. There is no clear distinction between the judiciary, legislative, and executive
branches of government. With the excuse of protecting state security, the government reduces the
opposition through repressive measures. The Cuban security apparatus rapidly wipes out the
emergence of growing demands that the state cannot meet. The Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, a
key entity in the Cuban regime, exerts control of the economy and the Communist Party, the only
political party recognized by the Cuban constitution, has close ties with the major political institutions,
including the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. Under the Cuban political system, the same
person, Raul Castro, occupies the presidency of the recently mentioned bodies. In Cuba, the way
political and military institutions work with one another is essential to the stability of the authoritarian
regime. However, the existence of many dysfunctions in the Cuban system does not necessarily mean
that it will collapse. Solid historical evidence has suggested that unless the leaders of the Communist
Party decide otherwise, Cubans will have to live under a one-party authoritarian state for many years
to come. Neither growing demands for economic needs, nor international influence has persuaded
Cuban leaders to revise their vision of a Cuban socialist state. The lack of strong opposition has not
permitted the expression of dissident views. An effective security apparatus led by the leaders of the
Communist party hinders the appearance of an opposition capable of challenging the government and
the party. That is to say, the future of Cuba may not lie in the hands of the majority of its citizens, but
rather in the will of the leaders of the Communist Party.
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Sanctions Prop up Castro
Sanctions boost Castro’s power-he blames the US for Cuban suffering
Taylor, Senior Fellow at Brookings, 2k
(James, May 13, 2000, National Journal, “LEGAL AFFAIRS - How the Embargo Hurts Cubans And Helps
Castro,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/legal-affairs-how-the-embargo-hurts-cubans-andhelps-castro-20000513, accessed 7/8/13, KR)
By aggravating the dire poverty in which most Cubans live, the embargo enables the 73-year-old
Castro to maintain a siege mentality and blame Yankee imperialists for the disastrous state into which
his Communist regime has plunged the Cuban economy. No other nation now supports the embargo,
which once had the backing of the Organization of American States and others. Virtually every other
nation condemns Helms-Burton. These policies bar U.S. businesses from competing for toeholds in a
Cuban market that will someday become lucrative. They have manifestly failed to drive Castro from
power, to ease his repressive rule, or to lay any groundwork for a peaceful transition to freedom and
democracy. To the contrary, the embargo and Helms-Burton have strengthened Castro in both Cuban
and world opinion. Although Castro clamors for an end to it, "I think he loves the embargo," says one
high-level former National Security Council official. "It keeps him in power."
Even Cuban-American exiles agree that lifting sanctions promotes democratization
Havana Journal writers 13
(2/21/13, “Cuba Study Group calls for end of US Embargo and freer trade and travel to Cuba”,
http://havanajournal.com/politics/entry/cuba-study-group-calls-for-end-of-embargo-and-freer-tradetravel-to-Cuba/, KR)
Today the Cuba Study Group released a whitepaper titled: “Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S.
Policy Toward Cuba,” calling on the U.S. Government to de-codify the Cuban embargo via the repeal of
Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions that deny the United States the flexibility to respond
swiftly and strategically to developments in Cuba as they take place. ¶ The document also outlines a
series of immediate measures the Executive can take under existing licensing authority to secure and
expand the free flow of resources and information to the Cuban people.¶ “De-codifying the embargo
would allow the Executive Branch the flexibility to use the entire range of foreign policy tools at its
disposal –including diplomatic, economic, political, legal and cultural– to incentivize change in Cuba. The
President would be free to adopt more efficient, targeted policies necessary for pressuring the Cuban
leadership to respect human rights and implement political reforms, while simultaneously empowering
all other sectors of society to purse their economic well-being and become the authors of their own
futures,” reads the document.¶ The call is the first of its kind by a leading Cuban exile organization in
that it recognizes that Helms-Burton has failed to secure international sanctions or advance the cause
change in the Island, and is now having the unintended effect of delaying the very economic and
political changes it sought to advance.¶ “This failed policy has only isolated the United States from
Cuba and continues to provide the Cuban leadership with a reliable excuse for its economic blunders
and human rights abuses. Worst of all, it is now stifling an emerging class of private entrepreneurs and
democracy advocates whose rise represents the best hope for a free and open society in Cuba in over
50 years,” stated Carlos Saladrigas, the Group’s chairman.¶ “We must shift the focus of our policy away
from obsessing with hurting the Cuban regime and toward obsessing with helping the Cuban people.
It’s what Cuban civil society leaders have been asking us to do for years and what proved to work in
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Eastern Europe. Let’s empower the Cuban people with the tools, resources and capital necessary to
develop a robust civil society that can foster and sustain long-lasting change,” stated Saladrigas.
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Engagement Supports Democracy
Engagement builds support for democracy-trade and international participation
empirically break down regimes
Weisburg, Chairman of the Slate group, 6
(Jacob, August 2, 2006, Slate, “Thanks for the Sanctions,”
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_big_idea/2006/08/thanks_for_the_sanctions.ht
ml, accessed 7/9/13, KR)
Tyrants seem to understand how to capitalize on the law of unintended consequences. In many cases, as
in Iraq under the oil-for-food program, sanctions themselves afford opportunities for plunder and
corruption that can help clever despots shore up their position. Some dictators also thrive on the
political loneliness we inflict and in some cases appear to seek more of it from us. The pariah treatment
suits Bashar Assad, Kim Jong-il, Robert Mugabe, and SLORC just fine. Fidel Castro is another dictator
who has flourished in isolation. Every time the United States considers lifting its embargo, Castro
unleashes a provocation designed to ensure that we don't normalize relations. It was a
disappointment, but no surprise, to learn that the Cuban dictator was in "stable" condition after surgery
this week. With our help, Castro has been in stable condition for 47 years. ¶ Constructive engagement,
which often sounds like lame cover for business interests, tends to lead to better outcomes than
sanctions. Trade prompts economic growth and human interaction, which raises a society's
expectations, which in turn prompts political dissatisfaction and opposition. Trade, tourism, cultural
exchange, and participation in international institutions all serve to erode the legitimacy of repressive
regimes. Though each is a separate case, these forces contributed greatly to undermining dictatorships
and fostering democracy in the Philippines, South Korea, Argentina, Chile, and Eastern Europe in the
1980s. The same process is arguably under way in China. Contact also makes us less clueless about the
countries we want to change. It is hard to imagine we would have misunderstood the religious and
ethnic conflicts in Iraq the way we have if our embassy had been open and American companies had
been doing business there for the past 15 years ¶ As another illustration, take Iran, which is currently
the focus of a huge how-do-we-get-them-to-change conversation. Despite decades of sanctions, Iran is
full of young people who are culturally attuned to the United States. One day, social discontent there
will lead to the reform or overthrow of the ruling theocracy. But there is little reason to think that more
sanctions will bring that day any closer. The more likely effect of a comprehensive sanctions regime is
that it will push dissatisfied and potentially rebellious Iranians back into the arms of the nuke-building
mullahs.
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Sanctions Target People, Don’t cause Regime Change
The embargo targets the people, not the regime, and doesn’t spark political change
Gordon, Fairfield philosophy professor 12
(Joy, Winter 2012, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, “The U.S. Embargo against Cuba and the
Diplomatic Challenges to Extraterritoriality,” HeinOnline, KR)
Many analysts have criticized the U.S. embargo against Cuba as an anachronistic holdover from the Cold
War. Yet its problems go far beyond that. In many regards, the U.S. embargo against Cuba represents a
caricature of the various American misapplications of economic sanctions: if the goal is to end the
Castro regime this policy has not only failed, but spent half a century doing so. If the intent is to
support Cubans in their aspirations for a different political system the sanctions have failed in this
regard as well, since even the most vocal dissidents in Cuba criticize the embargo. In the face of the
“smart sanctions” movement to develop economic tools that target the leadership rather than the
people, the embargo against Cuba represents the opposite pole: it impacts the Cuban people
indiscriminately, affecting everything from family travel, to the publication of scientific articles by
Cuban scholars, to the cost of buying chicken for Cuban households.
No regime change now-sanctions only hurt the Cuban people
Webber, editorial director of the Harvard Business Review, 9
(Alan, 2009, Center for Democracy in the Americas, 9 Ways for US to Talk to Cuba and for Cuba to Talk
to US, http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/9-Ways-for-US-to-talk-to-Cuba-and-for-Cuba-to-talk-toUS.pdf, accessed 7/9/13, KR)
The U.S. regime change goal toward Cuba persists, but any objective observer would have to conclude
that the strategy has failed. Ten U.S. presidents have come and gone and the revolutionary
government of Cuba is still in command. It is hard to think of an instance in U.S. political history when
economic sanctions alone have precipitated regime change, particularly from within a hostile country.
Sudden, radical political change from within Cuba is, at best, highly unlikely. ¶ U.S. economic sanctions
have, however, exacted a considerable cost on Cubans and on us. A report from Cuba’s government to
the United Nations estimates that the U.S. embargo since its inception has cost Cuba more than $93
billion.¶ As detailed extensively in this report, the embargo takes food off the table in Cuban homes and
makes access to certain medical care significantly more difficult for the Cuban people. For these
reasons and others connected to them, our nation has paid a dear price for the embargo in the form of a
diminished global image and reduced moral standing in the eyes of the world. We have been denounced
by resolutions voted in the United Nations General Assembly for seventeen consecutive years; most
recently, the vote was 185-3 against the U.S. embargo.
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Delisting => Reform
Taking Cuba off the list benefits the Cuban people-they’d be more independent
Metzker, Inter Press writer, 6/13/13
(Jared, 6/13/13, Inter Press service, cites Bilbao, executive director of the Cuba Study Group at CSIS,
“Pressure Building for U.S. to Remove Cuba from 'Terror Sponsor' List”,
http://www.globalissues.org/news/2013/06/13/16803, accessed 7/8/13, KR)
Nonetheless, he asserted that the time is ripe for the United States to take Cuba off the list and
prioritise helping the Cuban people over harming the Cuban regime.¶ President Barack Obama’s
administration has overseen some notable policy shifts, such as a relaxation of laws restricting travel by
U.S. citizens with family in Cuba. Certain realities have also been changing within Cuba, including the
abdication of Fidel Castro from power, which make friendlier policies toward the island nation more
feasible.¶ Sarah Stephens, executive director of the Centre for Democracy in the Americas, a U.S.
organisation that promotes reconciliation with Cuba, told IPS that delisting Cuba now would “enable
the U.S. to support Cuba’s drive to update its economic model, make it easier to facilitate trade and
easier for Cuba to access high technology items”.¶ “Doing so,” she said, “would in turn help Cubans
lead more prosperous and independent lives.”
The plan will allow negotiation to promote change-it’s not a concession
López-Levy, coauthor of Raúl Castro and the New Cuba, 13
(Arturo, doctoral candidate at the University of Denver, 4/10/13, The National Interest, “Getting Ready
for Post-Castro Cuba,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/getting-ready-post-castro-cuba8316?page=1, KR)
The president can begin by taking Cuba off the State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism. It
would be a positive gesture towards Havana and a signal to the world that he meant what he said
when he advertised a new diplomatic approach towards U.S. adversaries. It will not be a concession to
Cuba, since Havana has not been connected to any terrorist actions for at least the last twenty years.
The misuse of the list to serve the agenda of the pro-embargo lobby undermines its credibility against
real terrorist threats.¶ Taking Cuba off the State Department terror-sponsor list also will provide a
framework to negotiate the Alan Gross affair. Gross, a USAID subcontractor, is serving a fifteen-year
prison sentence in Havana. He was arrested by Cuban authorities because of his covert mission
providing satellite access to internet to several Cuban civil-society groups, circumventing government
controls. The Cuban government admits that Gross was not a spy but found that his actions could make
Cuba vulnerable to cyber warfare by the United States. Gross’s activities are provided for under section
109 of the Helms-Burton law, a program designed to promote regime change on the island.¶ Negotiation
on the Gross case is held up because of the false premise that he is a hostage of a terror-sponsoring
nation. But the situation might become manageable if the two countries negotiate an agreement that
could be face-saving for both governments. Such an agreement could be the first step in a course of
engagement and people-to-people contact. If the United States is to have some influence during the
transition to a post-Castro Cuba, it must start this process today.
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Reform Now
Human rights claims against Castro are exaggerated and ignore reforms
Lopez-Levy, University of Denver Lecturer, and Abrahams, Former Professor of
Constitutional Law & Jurisprudence, 8
(Arturo and Harlan, 2008, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Anything But Human Rights:
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, http://www.upf.edu/dcpis/_pdf/alopezlevy.pdf, accessed 7/10/13, KR)
A legitimate concern for Human Rights has transformed into a debate over “unfoundedly exaggerated
allegations against Havana.” 13 Most Latin American nations have refused to participate in this debate
and have abstained from taking a position until recently, when Cuba was withdrawn from the U.N.
Human Rights agenda. 14 As Tom Malinowski says: “[A] policy designed to promote human rights in
another country has to meet two basic tests ... First, is the policy more likely to be effective than the
alternatives? Second, does it advance the interests and speak to the needs of those struggling to
defend human rights in the country concerned? After forty years, it is clear that the all-out embargo
against Cuba fails both tests.” 15 This failure is striking in light of the positive steps that have been
taken on the island in the past decade. Pluralization of the civil society and marketization of the
economy advanced during the 1990s even though they did not play well for the Embargo lobby. And the
liberalizations that have swept the island since Raúl Castro formally took power as president have
prompted almost no response from the U.S.— except for repetition of the same tired rhetoric about
democracy—and authorization to send cell phones to the island.
The regime is pursuing liberal reforms
Ratliff, Hoover Research Fellow, 13
(William, Jan 30, 2013, Hoover Institution, “Cuba's Tortured Transition”,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/139281, KR)
In 2006, sickness forced Fidel, now 86, to informally pass power to his brother Raúl. Raúl, now 81,
became President in 2008 and head of the Cuban Communist Party (CCP) in 2011. A source close to
Cuban intelligence now reports that Fidel has Alzheimer's and will not survive long. Fidel’s passing,
analysts expect, will heighten domestic tensions and perhaps spark another mass migration by sea. Raúl
has always been the more pragmatic brother and, unlike Fidel, is eager to learn from the serious and
systematic economic reforms of recent decades in China and Vietnam. On taking power, he
immediately highlighted some of Cuba’s critical but previously unmentionable economic disasters under
Fidel, and set out to “update the economic model,” a feel-good phrase that masks criticism of Fidel. The
CCP adopted an “updating” blueprint in 2011.¶
The dean of Cuban-American economists, Carmelo Mesa-Lago, considers these reforms “the most
extensive and profound” ever undertaken by the government. And yet the author of Cuba en la era de
Raúl Castro (2012) added that they fall far short of those in China and Vietnam. New York Times
correspondent Damien Cave has characterized Raúl’s reforms as “handcuffed capitalism.”
¶ Specific problems range from inadequate infrastructure and pervasive corruption to disincentives
imposed by officials who don’t understand or really support the “updating.” Thus more than five
decades of stagnation and atrophied ideological dogmatism still impede Cuba’s morphing from a
retrograde family dynasty dictatorship into a more modern nation. In general the opening undermines
CCP control, as would an absence of reforms. Castroite leaders also fear the loss of oil handouts if
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s cancer gets the better of him.
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¶ There have not been equally significant non-economic reforms, though there has been a drift to
somewhat greater freedom of expression than during the Cold War. Most of Fidel's political prisoners
have been released, but government critics under Raúl are still harassed and arrested and prodemocracy advocate Oswaldo Payá died in an automobile “accident” last July. Still, some changes may
improve life, the most recent being the liberalization of laws on foreign travel.
The Castro regime is already opening up to political liberalization
Lopez-Levy, University of Denver Lecturer, 13
(Arturo, April 17, 2013, Foreign Policy in Focus, “A Post-Castro Era Looms for Cuba,”
http://fpif.org/a_post-castro_era_looms_for_cuba/, KR)
This does not imply a transition to multiparty democracy over the next five years. But even without
regime change, economic liberalization will force an expansion of pluralism within the current
People’s Power system. Candidates for local elections could come from the new non-state sectors, or
previously unrepresented religious or social groups, and demand a transparent use of local taxes.
Pressures for systemic political changes could increase as the economy adopts more market-oriented
structures and more Cubans are able to travel abroad. Then the party system could be reformed in
order to remain at the helm of social and economic changes.
Political liberalization will probably start at the lower levels of government, allowing citizens to vent
their frustrations at that scale. However, the pressure is sure to rise. Raul Castro’s decision to limit
political office holders to two five-year terms, at a time when the older generation is leaving power by
attrition, will result in a less personalized and more institutionalized leadership that promotes upward
mobility of new politicians in an orderly fashion. The central challenge facing Cuban leaders is to have
the audacity, creativity, and self-confidence to accelerate economic reforms, without losing control of
the ongoing political liberalization.
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Castro Good
Castro improved the quality of life in Cuba- US atrocities far outweigh. Their ev
exaggerates Castro’s faults
Ramonet, editor of Le Monde diplomatique, 6
[Ignacio, 12/27/06, Foreign Policy, “Was Fidel Good for Cuba?”,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/12/27/was_fidel_good_for_cuba?page=0,1, Accessed
7/8/13, ML]
You must stop looking at Cuba through an ideological prism and twisting the facts to fit in with a
preconceived scheme of things. It is time to reason like adults. Your statistics, which blur the number
of fighters killed in an old war (1956–59) with the number of people anxious to emigrate, the majority
for economic reasons, show nothing. Exaggeration turns to insignificance.¶ No serious organization
has ever accused Cuba -- where, in fact, a moratorium on the death penalty has been in place since
2001 -- of carrying out "disappearances," engaging in extrajudicial executions, or even performing
physical torture on detainees. The same cannot be said of the United States in its five-year-old "war
on terror." Of these three types of crimes, not a single case exists in Cuba. On the contrary, to a certain
extent the Cuban regime stands for life. It has succeeded in increasing life expectancy and lowering
infant mortality. As New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof asserted in a Jan. 12, 2005, article, "If the
U.S. had an infant mortality rate as good as Cuba's, [it] would save an additional 2,212 American babies
a year."¶ These successes constitute a great legacy of Fidel Castro's, one that few Cubans, even those in
the opposition, would want to lose and one that the many Latin Americans who have been swayed
recently by populist leaders covet. Cubans enjoy full employment, and each citizen is entitled to three
meals a day, an achievement that continues to elude Brazil's Lula.¶ But Castro will not only be
remembered as a defender of the weakest and poorest citizens. Historians 100 years from now will
credit Castro with building a cohesive nation with a strong identity, even after a century and a half of
the white, elitist temptation to side with the United States out of fear of the numerous and oppressed
black population. They will remember him correctly, as a preeminent pioneer in the history of his
country.
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AT: Cap K
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AT: Cap K - Perm
Only the perm can solve—without attacking the way we define terrorism the state will
continue to label all forms of opposition as terrorists, killing alt solvency
Joseph, School of Politics and International Relations @ University of Kent, 11
[Jonathan, 4-8-2011, “Terrorism as a social relation within capitalism: theoretical and emancipatory
implications”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, volume: 4:1, p. 35, GSK]
In terms of real world social changes, we might point to such things as the effects of¶ the end of the
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union on the nature of political¶ movements, their organising
ideals or the way in opposition to imperialism gets expressed.¶ We might look at the changing nature of
the state and the rise of new forms of governance¶ that place greater emphasis on responsible action.
The emphasis on individual responsibility¶ is particularly prevalent in forms of risk management and
insurance. The process of¶ underwriting terrorism has been examined by Aradau and van Munster,
who talk of how¶ this ‘fosters the imaginary of the indefinite continuity of the present as capitalist
social and¶ economic processes’, protecting the propertied subject, and defining terrorism in such a¶
way that it ‘instantiates forms of continuity between all actions deemed destabilizing for¶ social and
economic processes’ (2008, p. 207). Meanwhile, the ‘hollowing out of the state’¶ through new forms of
governance might be examined alongside the strengthening of the¶ state in its powers of observation,
classification and calculation, the removal of civil liberties¶ in the name of anti-terrorism and
justification of states of exception. These topics¶ should not be the preserve of those with an interest in
Agamben; it was after all Poulantzas¶ (1980) who had the foresight to note the re-emergence of the
strong state. These issues are¶ not just the result of the way elites use the terrorism narrative to justify
surveillance, social¶ control, the normalisation of security procedures or altered legal practices (Jackson
2009).¶ They are more deep-rooted than this and are part of the reconfiguration of the institutional¶
framework of capitalist societies. This leads to the issue of neo-liberalism. It works as a¶ strategy for
governing from a distance precisely through dividing up populations, classifying¶ them, assessing their
labour and skills and condemning large sections to live ‘bare life’¶ in the ghettos and slums although
state terror helps guarantee that nothing will hinder the¶ extraction of surplus value and accumulation
of capital. This works as a dual process of¶ coercion and legitimation (Blakeley 2009, pp. 7–8), and
where necessary, force and terror¶ will be used to gain access to markets and resources.
Perm solves best—analyzing CTS through a Marxist framing has the most potential for
change
Herring, School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies @ University
of Bristol, and Stokes, School of Politics and International Relations @ University of
Kent, 11
[Eric and Doug, 4-8-2011, “Critical realism and historical materialism as resources for critical terrorism
studies”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, volume: 4:1, p. 18, GSK]
CTS has achieved a great deal in a short space of time. Those achievements could be¶ extended further
with the resources provided by CR and HM. CR helps us at the levels¶ of philosophy and methodology by
relating epistemological relativism (we can know the¶ social only indirectly through our interpretation of
it) to ontological realism (there is a¶ powerfully influential social reality that includes but is much more
our knowledge claims¶ about it) through judgemental rationalism (knowledge claims can be tested
against social¶ reality, although always in an indirect, interpreted and fallible manner). Furthermore, CR¶
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characterises social reality as having three levels: our knowledge claims about its nature,¶ social reality
as it exists now and potential social reality. CR-informed HM provides a substantive¶ theory that can
contribute to the ability of CTS to understand the world and the¶ roles of terrorism and discourses
about terrorism within it. Crucial to any emancipatory¶ project is the idea of change, and this approach
is a major resource in understanding how¶ change happens. CR-informed HM shows that capitalism
constantly remakes the world, in¶ part by means of thinking that goes far beyond status quo-orientated
problem solving. It¶ can also be used to explore how terrorism can be an instrument of capitalist class
rule: this¶ does not mean that it is always or solely a means of such rule, of course. It also helps us¶
understand how the use of terrorism involves the kind of reified thinking that it is inherently¶ antiemancipatory. There are areas of common ground and potentially fruitful mutual¶ learning between
CR-informed HM and all other categories of CTS perspective even where¶ major disagreements
remain.
Perm solves—only a combination can provide both a method and theory
Joseph, School of Politics and International Relations @ University of Kent, 11
[Jonathan, 4-8-2011, “Terrorism as a social relation within capitalism: theoretical and emancipatory
implications”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, volume: 4:1, p. 34-35, GSK]
However, the article by Eric Herring (2008, p. 199), which is mentioned at the end of¶ this quote, is one
of the contributions concerned with exactly the issue that CTS makes very little mention of Marx,
Marxism or historical materialism. Herring (2008, p. 198–¶ 199) rightly calls for a more engaged analysis
of social relations, noting how the use of¶ discourse analysis and constructivism cannot themselves
perform this task given that they¶ are methods of analysis rather than theories of world politics. More
specifically, he says that¶ although CTS rightly focuses on bringing the state back into the study of
terrorism, more¶ is required, in particular, ‘a class analysis of the state and terrorism, one that is
historically¶ specific to the changing dynamics of capitalist globalization’ (Herring 2008, p. 200). Ruth¶
Blakeley’s book certainly does this by linking state terrorism to the control of labour and¶ markets in
the South (2009, p. 19). However, this is one of the few exceptions.
The perm resolves the link—their authors concede the CTS just needs to include more
materialist focus
Joseph, School of Politics and International Relations @ University of Kent, 11
[Jonathan, 4-8-2011, “Terrorism as a social relation within capitalism: theoretical and emancipatory
implications”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, volume: 4:1, p. 36, GSK]
In summary, those wishing to make a case for the CTS project need to provide a much¶ more serious
engagement with critical theory and historical materialism. CTS needs to¶ become more ontological in
its approach and scale down its fixation with the discursive¶ construction of terrorism. However
important this issue is, it is only one side of the story,¶ and makes no sense without the wider social,
historical and material relations. In the case¶ of the engagement with critical theory, this means
recognising that CT is not just a critique¶ of traditional theory but of the capitalist social relations that
this theory expresses¶ in intellectual form. This means moving from a critique of discourse to a critique
of the¶ society that produces it and then, if we intend this to be an emancipatory critique, to a¶
suggestion about how society might be otherwise. As discussed in the section on CSS, the¶ project for
emancipation must also be stated far more clearly and with reference to specific¶ socio-historical
situations and opportunities. The fixation with the study of the way¶ discourse ‘constructs’ terrorism
must be rejected in favour of a more balanced account of¶ the relationship between discourse and
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other social relations. This means accepting that¶ terrorism is not exhausted by the process of
discursive articulation and that there is something¶ real, ‘out there’, in ‘objective’ social relations that
makes the discourse of terrorism¶ meaningful. And it is because of this, if we can complete the circle,
that CTS needs a much¶ more serious engagement with critical theory and historical materialism.
Prefer the permutation—CTS is an ideal framework to bring Marxism into discussions
of state violence
McKeown, School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies @ University of
Bristol, 11
[Anthony, 4-8-2011, “The structural production of state terrorism: capitalism, imperialism and
international class dynamics”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, volume: 4:1, p. 89-90, GSK]
In this article I have argued that CTS needs to engage more thoroughly with the political–¶ economic
causes of state terrorism in the developing world. To do this, I have contended¶ that CTS scholars
should aim to complement descriptive accounts of terrorism with theoryladen¶ analyses that provide
a lens through which to focus on the deeper, structural causes¶ of state terrorism, as these derive from
the dynamics of an unevenly developing global¶ capitalism. Put another way, and to purloin a phrase
from Roy Bhaskar, the detailed ‘social¶ scientific and historical work’ produced within the field of CTS is
‘blind’ without Marxism¶ (Bhaskar 1998, p. 44). Scholars within the field need to address the complex
ways in which¶ the dynamics of capitalism, imperialism and class interests combine to produce the
structures¶ in which terrorism is likely, rather than focusing on particular instances of terrorism¶ and
‘naming and shaming’ the immediate culprits. This implies the need for a stronger¶ emphasis on the
ways in which capitalist expansion is traversed with imperialist class ¶ interests and embedded within
domestic configurations of class power, where these are¶ understood as ‘dialectically intertwined’
(Harvey 2003, p. 176) rather than ‘functional or¶ one-sided’ (Harvey 2003, p. 30).¶ The actions of state
managers in developing countries are always ‘already structured’¶ by imperialist dynamics, with the
implication that any instance of state terrorism should be viewed as a particular manifestation of the
context-specific ways in which imperialist¶ interests fuse with, or contradict, the interests of the
dominant classes in dominated states¶ (Poulantzas 1975, pp. 74–75). Today, with the tendential
globalisation of a one-size-fitsall¶ model of neo-liberalism, imposed through the increasing enmeshment
of the world¶ in a ‘universal capitalism’ (Meiksins Wood 2003, pp. 151–154), these contradictions are¶
intensified (Berberoglu 2003). Laudable attempts at ‘bringing the state back in’ to terrorism¶ studies
should therefore be complemented with studies that ‘bring capitalism and class¶ back in’ (see e.g.
Blakeley 2007, 2009), for without attention to these aspects the concept¶ of ‘state terrorism’ risks the
accusation that it is a ‘chaotic conception’ in which the ‘totality¶ of many determinations and relations’
(Marx 1973, p. 100) that produce state terrorism are¶ elided.
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AT: Sudan CP
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Still sponsors terrorm
Sudan still sponsors terrorism and removing them would prop up human rights
abusers.
Cohen, Act for Sudan co-founder, 11
[Eric, December 16, Act for Sudan, “Act for Sudan – Letter to the President”, http://actforsudan.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/2011-1216-AfS-Letter-to-President.pdf, accessed 7/8, CC]
Full text of letter below:¶ December 16, 2011¶ President Barack Obama¶ The White House¶ 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.¶ Washington, D.C. 20500¶ Dear Mr. President,¶ We, Act for Sudan, wrote to
you on November 3, 2011, expressing deep concern about the ongoing government-sponsored
genocide in Sudan which spans more than two decades and has resulted in the death and
displacement of millions of people. Its targets have included the tribes of Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue
Nile, Nubian North, Beja East, and South Sudan. The situation in Sudan has continued to be dire, not
only in Darfur, but particularly for the Nuba people and throughout the South Kordofan and Blue Nile
regions. Aerial attacks are accompanied by the denial of access to vital humanitarian aid for hundreds of
thousands of people.¶ We continue to believe that strong leadership by the United States government
is essential to ending the violence, protecting civilians and bringing the perpetrators to justice.¶ For
some time, the U.S. has been considering removing Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.
During November, while the Government of Sudan continued its attacks on its own people, the Embassy
of Sudan in the U.S. retained The Law Office of Bart S. Fisher “to counsel and assist the Republic of the
Sudan in satisfying appropriate U.S. conditions to reduce and to eliminate the sanctions currently
imposed on the Sudan; [and] in satisfying appropriate U.S. conditions to have Sudan removed from the
list of State Sponsors of Terror of the U.S. Department of State…” Also during November, Deputy
National Security Advisor Denis McDonough and Special Envoy Princeton Lyman visited Khartoum for
high level meetings on U.S.-Sudan relations.¶ We write to you today to explain why we hope that the
U.S. is not about to reward the Government of Sudan by removing it from the State Sponsors of
Terrorism List. Removing the Government of Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list would
conflict with U.S. interests and policy on international terrorism, present additional dangers for the
already endangered people of Sudan, and be incompatible with a “comprehensive strategy” for
addressing the ongoing crises in Sudan. With the Government of Sudan continuing to oppress its
people and even use food as a weapon in its war against its people, there are millions of Sudanese
under attack, in camps without adequate aid, in prison, and enslaved. Now is hardly the time to reward
and encourage the regime in Khartoum. We ask the Administration to adopt a “whole of Sudan” policy
rather than conflict-specific approaches as all conflicts arise from the same source: Khartoum¶ First, even
if the recent increased U.S. focus on the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) resulted in clear confirmation that
the Government of Sudan (GOS) has ceased support for this international terrorist organization, it is still
clear that the GoS continues to support international terrorism in its relationship with and support for
Hamas and Iran.¶ The leader of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, recently visited Khartoum, Sudan.
Ahmadinejad and Bashir announced their increased partnership and continuing mutual support,
including military cooperation. Bashir announced Sudan’s support for Iran’s right to develop nuclear
technology, and their joint communiqué ominously declared that Iran was “ready to transfer its
experience in the science and manufacturing sectors.” Iran has long been recognized as an arms
supplier to Hamas and to Sudan. Recent news reports confirm that Sudan continues to be a major
delivery route for arms to Hamas. The leader of Hamas, Khalid Mishaal, visited Khartoum and spoke at
the annual Al Quds conference on Hamas continuing jihad against Israel. Mishaal and Bashir announced
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their continuing strong mutual commitment and support. Mishaal visited Khartoum again in November.
These close and growing ties of both Hamas and Iran with Sudan are troubling, not only because of the
implications for terrorism, but also in the larger strategic context of the realignment of radical forces in
the Middle East.¶ In addition, the U.N. confirmed reports of Sudan bombing the refugee camp in Yida,
South Sudan. Sudan’s deliberate attack across a recognized international border, against a civilian camp
of refugees from Sudan’s earlier attacks in South Kordofan, must be recognized as an international
version of the terror tactics Sudan has employed for years within its own borders.¶ Second, keeping the
GoS on the State Sponsor of Terror (SST) list has real impact and importance.¶ The GoS has long sought
to be removed from the SST list. Therefore, removing Sudan from the SST list is real leverage that must
not be given up lightly. Removal, particularly when it appears not to have been earned, deprives the U.S.
of this leverage.¶ Sudan’s economy is grinding to a halt. GoS officials have stated in the Sudanese media
that many investors from the Middle East, Turkey and Asia are leaving Sudan, partially because of the
indirect effects of Sudan being on the SST list.¶ Sudanese believe the National Congress Party (NCP)
needs Sudan removed from the SST list to alleviate its political and financial isolation due to its pariah
status. Removal would send the wrong message to the Arab League, the African Union and the larger
international community. It would signal U.S. tolerance of the NCP’s war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide against its own citizens, for which International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest
warrants are outstanding. Removal would undermine justice and the possibilities for the arrest and
prosecution of the accused.¶ Removal would embolden the NCP in its attacks on and oppression of the
marginalized Sudanese (which constitute a majority of the population). The NCP likely would use the
increased foreign investments that would follow the U.S. lifting of the SST designation to purchase and
build more weapons to annihilate its perceived enemies, not to provide for the people.¶ Removing Sudan
from the SST list would have extremely negative effects on Sudanese civilians, not only in South
Kordofan and Blue Nile which are most affected today by the GoS tactic of using food as a weapon of
war against its people, but also in Darfur, Abyei, Eastern Sudan and any other region the NCP chooses to
attack.¶ Removal would signal that the U.S. tolerates Sudan’s attacks on South Sudan and Sudan’s
imposition of its tax” on South Sudan’s oil, which China has publicly declared could endanger the
region.¶ Removal would signal that the U.S. tolerates Sudan’s continued bombing and denial of
humanitarian aid in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and Sudan’s rejection of negotiations and of
ceasefires with the people in those regions.
Sudan has close ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia- all of which sponsor terror
Large, PhD from University of London Department of Politics and International Studies
‘13
(Daniel Large-, Research Associate, South African Institute of International Affairs, Research Advisory
Group member @ British Institute in Eastern Africa, Member @ ESRC Emerging Powers Network, 22 Mar
2013, “In Delicate Balance, Sudan Courts Both Iran and Saudi Arabia”
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12810/in-delicate-balance-sudan-courts-both-iran-andsaudi-arabia, accessed 7/10, DG)
Sudan has been pursuing some eye-catching regional diplomacy in recent weeks. In late-February,
Sudan’s ICC-indicted defense minister was in Riyadh, while its oil czar was in Tehran. These visits
followed a meeting between Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad on the sidelines of an Organization of Islamic Cooperation meeting in Cairo in January,
and Bashir’s attendance at the Arab Economic Development Summit in Riyadh earlier in February.
Combined, the moves suggest a shift in Sudan’s tactical approach to relations with Saudi Arabia and
Iran, one guided by Khartoum’s pragmatic concerns for regime survival. Sudan has had difficult relations
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with the Middle East since the National Islamic Front (NIF) seized power in 1989, and Khartoum’s
adventurist pan-Islamist foreign policy in the early 1990s subsequently deepened its regional isolation.
Under the National Congress party (NCP), as the NIF renamed itself in the late-1990s, Sudan adopted a
more moderate, reactive style of diplomacy underpinned by successful petro-partnerships with China,
Malaysia and India. Today, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and South Sudan’s secession, the NCP
faces very different circumstances. Sudan’s relations with Iran have long been prominent in regional
politics. The military-strategic alliance between the internationally isolated regimes in Khartoum and
Tehran has been sharpened by Sudan’s long-standing proxy position in Israel-Iran relations, rendered
visible by an apparent Israeli air strike on a military factory in Khartoum in October 2012. Port calls by
the Iranian navy at Port Sudan shortly afterward provoked further concern, including in Washington and
Riyadh. More than military links, however, Sudan has also been actively soliciting economic assistance
from Iran: Sudanese Petroleum Minister Awad al-Jaz was accompanied by the agriculture minister
during his February trip to Tehran, for example. Saudi Arabia has long been concerned about Sudan’s
links with Iran. Riyadh previously protested to Bashir about the transit through Sudan of Iranian
weapons bound for Shiite rebels in Yemen. In December 2012, the Gulf Cooperation Council, in which
Saudi Arabia has preponderant influence, failed to mention Sudan in its final communiqué, as it has in
recent years. This was more than unusual, given Sudan’s alarming security and economic
circumstances. This year has seen more-concerted and more-visible Sudanese outreach to Saudi
Arabia, following up on efforts to repair relations that were already underway late last year, including
meetings between the Sudanese and Saudi Arabian spy chiefs in November 2012. Khartoum’s efforts
have been partly driven by the desire for rapprochement, which requires assuaging Riyadh’s concerns
over Sudan-Iran ties. Sudan’s chronic need for major external investment is another factor. The
economic drivers behind Sudan’s regional relations have been strengthened by its most recent
economic crisis and the continuing fallout of the South’s July 2011 secession, notably Juba’s oil
shutdown in February 2012. Gulf investment has been important to Sudan historically, and has become
even more so in the past two years. To date, however, Saudi Arabia has not been a particularly
significant economic partner for Sudan. Khartoum would clearly welcome more Saudi money and has
been making a concerted bid to secure agricultural investment in particular. In January, during the
development summit in Riyadh attended by Bashir, a parallel Sudanese-Saudi investment forum was
also held, part of Sudan’s continuing, though previously unsuccessful, efforts to sell itself as the
“breadbasket of the Middle East.” In this context, a Sudan-Saudi Arabia food security partnership might
finally be moving beyond ritual, aspirational rhetoric. The failure of earlier efforts did not derail the
NCP’s grand “agricultural renaissance” strategy, which sought to offset the oil dependence of Sudan’s
predominantly agricultural economy, and which now appears to dovetail with Saudi Arabia’s food
security aims. In April 2012, a Saudi businessman announced a 5-million-acre land lease deal in eastern
Sudan reportedly involving extremely investor-friendly conditions that evoke Khartoum’s desperate
courtship of oil companies in the war-torn 1990s. Thus far, however, there is little to suggest that the
new food security vows between Sudan and Saudi Arabia will be kept, much less succeed on their own
highly ambitious terms. Though economic factors remain central to Khartoum’s courtship of Saudi
finance, they now interlock with steps to reboot strategic military links. Coming on the heels of limited
Sudan-Saudi military exercises, the late-February talks between Sudanese Defense Minister Gen. AbdulRahim Mohamed Hussein and his Saudi counterpart, Salman bin Abdul-Aziz al Saud, appear to have
yielded an agreement to reactivate military cooperation. Thus it would seem Sudan is now set on
cooperating militarily with both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Sudan’s efforts to maintain relations with the
two adversaries are far from a zero-sum game. Sudan has generally never been an easy pawn in
regional politics, tending instead to exercise its own agency. But its stance is complicated by NCP
leadership divisions over foreign relations. Iran exposes a divide about where, and how, the NCP wants
to go, with an ongoing rift between those advocating deeper Iranian links as the only counterweight, bar
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China, to Western pressure, and those advocating a more conciliatory approach to Saudi Arabia and
other Gulf states as important for Sudan in their own right, and as a possible means of rapprochement
with the West. Notwithstanding real differences in internal NCP positions, however, projecting strategic
ambiguity through choreographed foreign policy divisions is also useful: Resting on a more coordinated
underlying aim of regime security, it maximizes Khartoum’s options. Much remains to be seen about
how far Khartoum’s outreach to Riyadh goes, how much it delivers for the NCP and how relations with
Tehran progress. How much hard security concerns can be reconciled with softer economic aspirations,
principally food security, is also questionable. However much Saudi Arabia may seek to weaken Sudan’s
relations with Iran, Khartoum is locked into a reactive mode in terms of its foreign relations, one driven
by the existential imperative of regime survival. This default setting means Khartoum is likely to
continue to pursue concurrent partnerships with regional enemies in order to maximize its own returns;
leveraging one against the other can advance as much as jeopardize this goal. For this reason, more eyecatching regional diplomacy from Sudan is assured.
Sudan still sponsors terrorism.
SCHANZER, vice president for research at Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 13
[Jonathan, 4-27-13, the Standard, “U.N. for Combating Terror Finance to Convene in Sudan, a State
Sponsor of Terror”, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/un-combating-terror-finance-convenesudan-state-sponsor-terror_719277.html, accessed 7-7, CC]
Sudan was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993 by the Clinton administration for
providing support to a wide range of terrorist organizations. Sudan remained on the list because it
provided a safe haven to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda in the early 1990s.¶ While Washington
successfully pressured Khartoum to purge al Qaeda from the country after the September 11 attacks,
Sudan remains on the terrorism list today because, among other things, it provides financial, military
and material support to Palestinian terrorist groups such as the Iran-sponsored Popular Resistance
Committees, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas.¶ Sudan maintains a close and continuing
relationship to the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is perhaps the most prolific of the countries on the
state sponsor of terrorism list. Iran uses Sudan as a hub to provide weaponry to local conflicts
throughout Africa. Port Sudan, on the Red Sea coast, is a key node in the smuggling routes that bring
Iranian weapons to the Gaza Strip. Iranian warships have docked recently at Port Sudan for unspecified
reasons. Sudan furnished Hamas with Iranian-made Fajr 5 rockets last year, an arsenal that precipitated
Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defense in November.
Sudan still sponsors terrorism.
Schanzer and Grossman, research analysts for Defense of Democracy, 12
[Jonathan Schanzer - former intelligence analyst at the US Department of the, Laura Grossman, July 5th,
Foundation for Defense of Democracy, “Pariah State: Examining Sudan’s Support for Terrorism”,
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/pariah-state-examining-sudans-support-forterrorism/#sthash.5W7YzqUZ.dpuf, accessed 7/8, CC]
However, to Khartoum's annoyance, the France-based Sudan Tribune reported on 18 August 2011 that
the country would remain on the list, indicating that peace with South Sudan was not the only factor
influencing the US government's decision. Indeed, evidence pointing to Sudan's continued support for
terrorist activities precludes it from being delisted. On 18 August 2011, the US Department of State
released its annual terrorism assessment, Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, which concluded that
terrorist groups, including "Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorists, remain in Sudan as gaps remained in the
Sudanese government's knowledge of and ability to identify and capture these individuals as well as
prevent them from exploiting the territory for smuggling activities".¶ The administration of President
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Bill Clinton first labeled Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism on 12 August 1993. The original listing
cited Khartoum's known harboring of local and international terrorists, as well as the country being a
transit point for terrorists and weapons, as its justification.¶ In the early-1990s, Sudan provided safe
haven to Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network until a change of policy (resulting partially from
US pressure) forced the network to leave the country in 1996. The relationship between Sudan and
Bin Laden was both ideological and financial. The wealthy Saudi invested heavily in Sudanese
infrastructure in return for being able to reside there temporarily.¶ Since the late-1990s, the US
acknowledges that Sudan has co-operated with it on various counter-terrorism initiatives to combat AlQaeda's presence there. While that co-operation continues today, elements of Al-Qaeda and other
international jihadists linger in Sudan, with or without government knowledge.¶ Still, concerns over
Sudan's support for terrorism extend beyond a diminished Al-Qaeda presence. For the past two
decades, Sudan has maintained a multi-pronged relationship with Iran, the most active state sponsor
of terrorism. This relationship is often described as a marriage of convenience; in return for the
economic, military and security support it provides, Iran has gained a presence inside Khartoum
where it can leverage Sudan's proximity to the Gaza Strip as well as its location on the Red Sea to
track US and Israeli maritime activity.¶ Sudan also maintains a direct relationship with Iranian
surrogate groups, primarily Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and more recently, the
Popular Resistance Committee. According to Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, Hamas and PIJ
continue to fundraise in Sudan and maintain a presence there. These groups also established a strong
relationship with Sudanese government officials and use Sudan as a key transit route to facilitate the
movement of Iranian-shipped weapons to Gaza.¶ While Sudan has made considerable efforts to cooperate with the US on combating the Al-Qaeda threat in Sudan, it has not met all the requirements
necessary to be removed from the list. Most obviously, its continued support for Hamas and PIJ is
likely to impact co-operation in the near term. If Sudan were to abandon its co-operative position, US
intelligence capabilities to fight Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in East Africa are likely to diminish.
In addition, Sudan may decide to further strengthen ties with Iran, which has proven to be a dependable
and willing partner, providing the Sudanese government with critical military and security assistance.
Sudan does not respect human rights.
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 13
[April 20, US state department, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012”,
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204171#wrapper,
accessed 7/9, CC]
Sudan is a republic with power concentrated in the hands of authoritarian President Omar Hassan alBashir and his inner circle. The National Congress Party (NCP) continued to control the government,
continuing more than 23 years of near absolute political authority. The country last held national
elections in April 2010, the first multiparty elections in 24 years. The elections, which several opposition
parties boycotted, did not meet international standards. Observers reported restriction of civil liberties,
intimidation, threats of violence, lack of transparency in vote tabulation, and other problems. Voters
reelected the president and gave the NCP 323 of 450 seats in the National Assembly. There were
instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of civilian control, especially in
the Darfur Region.
The most important human rights abuses included: government forces and government-aligned
groups committed extrajudicial and other unlawful killings; security forces committed torture,
beatings, rape, and other cruel and inhumane treatment or punishment; and prison and detention
center conditions were harsh and life threatening.
Other major abuses included arbitrary arrest; incommunicado and prolonged pretrial detention;
executive interference with the judiciary and denial of due process; obstruction of humanitarian
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assistance; restriction on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and movement;
harassment of internally displaced persons; restrictions on privacy; harassment and closure of human
rights organizations; and violence and discrimination against women. Societal abuses including
instances of female genital mutilation; child abuse, including sexual violence and recruitment of child
soldiers; trafficking in persons; violence against ethnic minorities; denial of workers’ rights; and forced
and child labor were also reported.
Except in rare cases, the government took no steps to prosecute or punish officials in the security
services and elsewhere in the government who committed abuses. Security force impunity remained
a serious problem.
Conflict between government and rebel forces in Darfur, Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan states
continued. Rebels also committed abuses in Darfur and Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states (the
Two Areas).
Sudan does not respect human rights.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 13
[April, UK National Archives, “Human Rights ¶ and Democracy:¶ The 2012 Foreign & ¶ Commonwealth
Office Report”, p 229-232, http://www.hrdreport.fco.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/2012Human-Rights-and-Democracy.pdf, accessed 7/9, CC]
Torture¶ Though torture is prohibited by the Interim Constitution, there are widespread reports that
security forces routinely carry out torture, beatings, rape and other cruel and inhumane treatment or
punishments. Prison and detention centre conditions were sometimes harsh and life threatening. We
were particularly concerned by the case of British national, Magdy El-Baghdady, who was held by the Sudanese authorities and reportedly
mistreated during his detention from February to May 2011. At Mr Baghdady’s request, we first raised this issue with the Sudanese authorities
in February 2012, after the conclusion of his appeal. We requested that a prompt, impartial investigation be undertaken, and continue to press
on this matter.¶ Conflict and protection of civilians¶ In July 2011, South Sudan seceded from Sudan and became independent under the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. A number of issues contained within this peace agreement, including border demarcation, citizenship, oil
and the status of disputed areas, remained unresolved at the start of 2012 and have been a source of tension between Sudan and South Sudan
throughout the year, with outright conflict briefly breaking out in April 2012. Although Sudan and South Sudan signed a series of agreements in
September and the two presidents recommitted to them at a summit in Addis in January 2013, they have yet to be implemented.¶ The UK
Government has deep concerns about ongoing conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States. We have regularly expressed those concerns
with the government and the SPLM-N, and pressed them to negotiate to agree a cessation of hostilities. The UN estimates that this conflict has
now severely affected or displaced approximately 900,000 people, and predicts that food insecurity may reach crisis levels in some areas of the
two states. The UK has made clear that the ongoing restrictions on humanitarian access to those in need of assistance are completely
unacceptable. We also strongly condemn the use of indiscriminate tactics during this conflict, in particular the use of aerial bombardment by
the Sudanese Armed Forces, which has put civilian lives at great risk. Such actions, which are likely to be violations of international
humanitarian law, deserve credible and independent investigation, as the Foreign Secretary called for in June when the fighting began in
Southern Kordofan. However, the ongoing fighting and the lack of access by third parties have prevented substantive progress on a credible
investigation. In May, the UK played a leading role at the UN Security Council in the adoption of UNSCR 2046, which was the first time a Security
Council resolution had looked to address the fighting in these two conflict areas. The UK Government provided financial and technical support
to the mediation efforts of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel. The Africa Conflict Pool Programme for Sudan/South Sudan was
also used to support conflict prevention and resolution and to promote good governance.¶ Conflict continued
in Darfur despite
the signature in 2011 of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). There was some progress in implementation
of this agreement – the Darfur Regional Authority was inaugurated in February and all requisite commissions and ministries were established.
The All Darfur Conference for Peace and Development and a Joint Assessment of Development Needs mission were held in 2012, but further
progress needs to be made in 2013 for it to be judged a success. Progress
on the ground in Darfur continues to be
hampered by the lack of governmental funding for implementation of the DDPD. The region has also
witnessed increased insecurity as a result of the outbreak of new hostilities, which led to new
displacements of civilians. Armed groups, militias and government-linked security forces were all reported to have committed
violations and abuses, including the killing of civilians and sexual gender-based violence. There were also a number of kidnaps of humanitarian
workers and United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) staff in Darfur in 2012. There are 3.4 million people receiving
humanitarian assistance in Darfur, of whom 1.2 million are internally displaced according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs.¶ In the East of Sudan, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimate that
thousands of refugees, asylum seekers, migrants and Sudanese nationals rely on smugglers to transport them into, through and out of Sudan
every year. Exit visa requirements from Eritrea into Sudan as well as Sudan’s strict encampment policy leave asylum seekers and refugees with
no feasible alternatives but to rely on smugglers to assist with such irregular movement. UNHCR estimates that approximately 3,000 persons
enter the East of Sudan from Eritrea every month, of which an average of 2,000 seek asylum in the Shagarab camp. The vast majority of these
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seek to move on in a matter of weeks. A sophisticated network set up by smugglers enables movement of people efficiently from Eritrea
through the East of Sudan to Khartoum, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel and beyond. UNHCR and IOM received a significant and increasing
number of reports in 2012 of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers en route who have been subjected to kidnapping, extortion, torture and
severe sexual and physical violence by criminal groups involved in the smuggling of persons. We have also received credible reports that human
organ-trafficking may be taking place linked to this activity.¶ Freedom of religion or belief¶ Although the constitution provides that Sharia Law
should not be applied to non-Muslims, in practice, there continue to be arrests for offences such as the possession of alcohol and inappropriate
dress. In April, rioters attacked a church compound located on disputed land in Khartoum and set it on fire, allegedly following incitement from
a local imam. These actions were officially condemned by the government of Sudan as well as Muslim religious leaders.¶ Women’s rights¶
Female politicians play a role in public life in Sudan, and women are guaranteed a quarter of the seats in the National Assembly. In practice
however,
women face considerable discrimination, in particular in family and property matters, and
gender-based violence is widespread.¶ Police have used provisions of the Criminal Code outlawing
“indecent and immoral acts” to prohibit women from wearing clothes of which they disapprove. In April
and again in June, two women were sentenced to death by stoning because of adultery. Both sentences were overturned on appeal. The
women were sentenced under article 146 of Sudan’s Criminal Act of 1991, which provides that the
penalty for adultery by a married person is execution by stoning, and the penalty for an unmarried
person is 100 lashes. UK Government officials raised concerns with the government of Sudan in these cases prior to the convictions
being overturned.¶ Female genital mutilation (FGM) is widely practised – it is understood that at least 64% of the female population aged 16–
49 have undergone some form of genital mutilation (approximately 12 million women). A new DFID programme to eradicate FGM will begin in
2013.¶ Reports persist of rape being used as a tactic of warfare in Darfur and other conflict-affected areas.¶ Lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender rights¶ Homosexual
relations are criminalised in Sudan with such activity liable to be punished
through floggings, fines, prison sentences and even the death penalty. In 2012, there were credible
reports in the press that some homosexual men were charged with indecent acts and sentenced to
prison terms or floggings.¶ Children’s rights¶ Gaps remain in the implementation of the Child Act (enacted
in 2010), which raises the age of criminal responsibility, criminalises child exploitation and abuse and,
among other things, prohibits recruitment of children to armed groups. We have received credible reports of the
use of child soldiers, particularly by armed militia groups in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile States. A UNICEF mission to South Kordofan in
August reported seeing no boys over the age of 12 in areas where IDPs had gathered.¶ Racism¶ Sudan’s
interim national
constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, but this provision is not effectively enforced.
There is evidence of discrimination according to race or ethnicity in many areas of society in Sudan,
including employment and education. There were also credible reports in 2012 that detainees from certain ethnic groups faced
worse treatment when compared to other ethnic groups, particularly Arab tribes.
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CP Links to Politics
Washington believes Sudan is human rights abusers.
Ramirez, president of Hardwired Inc, 13
[TINA, June 13, CQ Congressional Testimony, Ҧ INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT
IMPLEMENTATION; ¶ COMMITTEE: HOUSE OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM; ¶ SUBCOMMITTEE:
NATIONAL SECURITY”, lexis, accessed 7/8, CC]
As one of the first major initiatives inspired by IRFA, U.S. policy in Sudan serves as an important indicator
of our government's success over the past 15 years implementing this legislation. Recognizing the
inhumanity of the situation, where slavery, forced starvation, mass killings, and terrorism flourished,
Democrats, Republicans, the Human Rights Caucus, the Congressional Black Caucus, and people of all
or no faith throughout the country worked together to pass legislation to end the human destruction
occurring in Sudan. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom recommended that the
White House appoint a Special Envoy to negotiate a peace agreement to end the civil war. President
Bush appointed former Senator John Danforth to serve as the Special Envoy to Sudan and he worked
tirelessly and honorably to draft the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA was signed
between the north and the south in 2005, finally bringing an end to the decades-long conflict.
CP links to politics - unpopular
Sen, reporter covering foreign policy for The Washington Times. 11
[Ashish Kumar, February 8th, Washington Times, “Sudan’s terror-list removal untied from Darfur”,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/8/sudans-terror-list-removal-untied-fromdarfur/?page=all, accessed 7/8, CC]
The Obama administration intends to remove Sudan from a U.S. terrorist blacklistregardless of
progress in the conflict-riddled province of Darfur. The move is likely to anger some members of
Congress and human rights activists.¶ The Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (DPAA) requires the
government of Sudan to resolve the conflict in Sudan’s western province before the nation can be
removed from the terrorism list.¶ “The Obama administration, for the purposes of this designation, will
delink this listing from Darfur,” a senior U.S. official told The Washington Times on the condition of
anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the matter.¶ “We have told the Sudanese that what we
intend to do is to waive the application of the DPAA in this regard should they fulfill all requirements of
the [Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005],” he added.¶ The peace pact ended two decades of civil
war between the Muslim north and the largely Christian and animist south. About 2 million people were
killed in the fighting.¶ However, some members of Congress are still worried about the continuing
violence in Darfur between pro-government Arab militias and rebel groups.¶ “People on the Hill are
still concerned about the situation in Darfur, but the referendum has taken a lot of oxygen out of that
debate,” said a congressional source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he is not
allowed to speak with the media.
Isolation of Sudan is bipartisan – removing sanctions is not.
Bell, executive director of the Darfur Coalition and Genocide Intervention Network, 10
[Sam, 11/17, The Hill, “Bipartisan effort needed again for Sudan”, http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/the-administration/129729-bipartisan-effort-needed-again-for-sudan, accessed 7/9, CC]
In the DPAA, Congress encouraged the president to “to deny the Government of Sudan access to oil
revenues, including by prohibiting entry at United States ports to cargo ships or oil tankers engaged in
business or trade activities in the oil sector of Sudan or involved in the shipment of goods for use by
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the armed forces of Sudan.” Congress should be prepared to quickly consider this and other similar
measures should oil payments to Southern Sudan stop. ¶ Republicans and Democrats in Congress have
been frustrated by presidents from both parties failing to take sufficient action to help address the
gross human rights abuses in Sudan. In the past decade at least three major Sudan laws were passed
with bipartisan support. Moreover, the constituencies concerned about Sudan are liberal and
conservative. The referenda in Sudan, potential flashpoints for violence, will take place just days after
the 112th Congress is sworn in. A divided Congress should continue the bipartisan tradition on Sudan
policy and firm up the administration’s carrots-and-sticks Sudan strategy.
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AT: Reform List CP
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Reform CP
Counterplan isn’t competitive- reforming the list would take cuba off- their author
agrees
Byman, Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the
Brookings Institution, 08
[Daniel L, professor in the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
with a concurrent appointment with the Georgetown Department of Government, previous director of
Georgetown's Security Studies Program, May 2008, Saban Center @ the Brookings Institution, “The
Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism”,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/5/terrorism%20byman/05_terrorism_
byman.pdf, accessed 7-5-13, chip]
Current U.S. lists regarding state sponsorship have four problems. First, they often list countries that
are not major sponsors of terrorism today while ignoring other sponsors. Cuba and North Korea,
while noxious regimes, are not major concerns for U.S. counterterrorism, while Pakistan should be
on the list if it is to truly reflect its government’s actions. Second, the list does not recognize
important gradations in support. Iran and Syria are both “supporters,” but the scale of their
activities is quite different. Third, removal from the list is difficult and there are few
rewards for improving behavior short of a complete turnaround. As a result, regimes
have little incentive to meet the United States part-way. Finally, the lists ignore the
tricky issue of passive sponsorship