ABSTRACTS
AGARWAL, Nishkam Sandesh (Author and Freelance Researcher)
“Finding a Place for Atman in Advaita Vedanta: Variations on a theme from
the Principal Upanishads”
Traditional interpretations of Atman in Advaita Vedanta firmly position it as Conditioned
Brahman which is “associated” with a human being. For example, Swami
Adiswarananda(The Vedanta Way to Peace and Happiness) says this succinctly when
referring to the jivatman, and the Mundaka Upanishad refers to Atman as one of the
“indwelling” souls by reference to the metaphor of the two birds sitting on a tree.
One of the mahavakyas from the Chhandogya Upanishad, Tat tvam asi, then
reconnects the Atman with Brahman. In this mahavakya, the Atman is the subject
and Brahman (Object) is part of the predicate. The Isha Upanishad, via Soham asmi, is
technically identical with this subject-predicate delineation: aham (Atman) is subject,
and saha (Brahman) is part of the predicate. Similarly, the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad
says: Ayam atma Brahma, another mahavakya which also is generally interpreted (e.g.,
by Shankara) as having the same order of subject (atma) and predicate
(namely, Brahman, the object).
In this paper, I propose an alternative syntactic re-write of the mahavakya (tat tvam
asi and its equivalents), by reversing the subject and object (which is part of the
predicate). If the Atman is transposed into the predicate, andBrahman is classified as
Subject, then the mahavakya, and its variants are radically changed in meaning and
implication. In particular, in this new scheme, the place for Atman in the
hierarchy Brahman-Atman-mind/body becomes questionable since it obviates the need
to “reconnect” the Conditioned Brahman (or Atman) with Brahman. One of the profound
implications of this re-write is that the concept of reincarnation of Atman becomes more
difficult to interpret.
AI, Yuan (Queen’s College, Oxford, UK)
“The Collective Memory of the Place Lv Liang 吕梁 and its Identity Function”
Inspired by the idea of “collective memory” which was firstly raised by Halbwachs, and
developed by works of Pierre Nora, Chaim Yerushalmi and Jan Assman, this paper
examines how the place of Lv Liang 吕梁 in ancient China functions as a cultural
memory. Moreover, it discusses what identities are associated with this place. Through
analysing different sources from early China up to Qing dynasty, this paper will answer
the questions that (1) why this place became memorable in the first place? (2)What
identities were associated with this place originally? (3)How and why does the memory
of this place transformed? (4) Why the memory of this place can span through
generations? Using the place Lv Liang 吕梁 as a case study, this paper demonstrate the
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importance of “memory of places” in ancient China and how a place of memory
transformed from a mythological place to a political area.
AKINA, Keli’I (Hawai’i Pacific University)
“The Hawaiian Sense of Place as Focus and Field”
The Hawaiian sense of place is pervasive in ancient Hawaiian oral literature and in all
cultural expressions. For traditional Hawaiians, the sense of place determines
individual identity and self-esteem. The most ancient of chants, the Kumulipo, locates
individuals within the context of infinite cosmology and limited geography through the
expanse of time recorded as genealogy. Hawaiian notions of place are rich and range
from the broad concept of the universe to the narrow concept of personal geography
and proxemics.
Oral literature about the Hawaiian sense of place is replete with dualisms for location
such as Earth (ʻĀina) and Heaven (Lani), Moon and Sun, near and far, and intimate and
distant, as it describes human "being." Yet, the same oral literature also references
processes and continuities between seemingly discrete entities and events as it
describes human "becoming." Is the Hawaiian sense of place substance-oriented and
dualistic or is it process-oriented and non-dualistic?
This paper will demonstrate the usefulness of the notions of focus (de) and field (dao),
developed from Confucian thought, for a philosophical description of the Hawaiian
sense of place as it applies to human identity, self-esteem, and relationship both to
places and persons.
ALBERTINI, Tamara (University of Hawai’i)
“Places of Exile and the Diasporic Self: Forced Exile, Self-imposed Exile, and
Exile in One’s Mind”
Rather than living in a place, diasporic selves discover that “places” live in them. These
could be ancestral lands, native landscapes, sacred sites, a family home, or merely the
memory of a door, porch, or well. “Places” of diasporic selves do not even have to relate
to a physical location. A poet like Dante thus described the Paradise and Hell he
“visited” in his mind. In the Islamic world, Sufis “traveled” in their minds and made the
outermost cosmic spheres their true abodes.
This paper explores the “life” places take on in diasporic persons and how they are used
to recreate a space lost, inaccessible, or otherwise irretrievable. Another focus is an
exploration of how places - physical, remembered, poetical, mystical, or longed for inform one’s imagination, thoughts, and language, especially one’s metaphors.
ALFONSO, Russell (Hawai’i Pacific University)
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“Intimacy, Place and Music”
This paper explores the intersection between intimacy, place and music. In the first
section I distill some of the main features of place as it is distinguished from space in
the writings of Yi-Fu Tuan. Then I turn to the concept of intimacy drawing from two
primary sources: Peter Hershock’s ‘Liberating Intimacy’ and Thomas Kasulis’ ‘Intimacy
and Integrity’. The examples I wish to focus on are musical; I wish to illuminate the idea
that sounds can be used to create a musical place that is especially charged with
intimacy, intimacy understood as a felt sense of connection, a sense of meaning and
belonging.
Generally speaking there is a difference between scored-rehearsed musical
performance and improvised musical performance. I would argue here, that there is
something distinctive about an improvised musical place. Improvised musical places
are at once intimate in Hershock’s sense, liberating in Tuan’s sense that “spaciousness
is closely associated with the sense of being free, and epistemically articulated in
Kasulis’ sense of knowing how and when to act with the qualities of a virtuoso.
ALLIK, Alari (Tallinn University, Estonia)
“Same Place, New Locations: Mobile Home and Nomadic Lifestyle of Kamo no
Chōmei”
In East Asian cultures travelling to various places, which serve as sites for geognostic
insight into the true nature of reality, has always been a very important cultural practice.
The temporary lodgings used by travellers were often put together from grass and tree
branches and were valued over luxurious homes in the capital as true dwelling places
for sensitive people. The Chinese poet Bai Juyi (772-846) has said in his famous fourline poem dedicated to the local landowner Mu: ever the most splendid sites / lack a
permanent owner. During the subsequent centuries many writers subscribed to this
idea: the wandering poet or a monk has privileged access to “splendid sites”, since
these are only truly available for those who have renounced ordinary sense of
ownership.
In this presentation I will take a look at the mobile home constructed by Buddhist writer
Kamo no Chōmei (1153-1216) and argue, that the ambition of a poet-recluse such as
him was not so much to move around, but to stay in the same place despite of the
constantly changing circumstances. During an age defined by impermanence (mujō) the
mobile home becomes in his description the only site of permanence since it adapts to
the unpredictable ebbs and flows of the environment. In order to stay in the place where
the environment supports meditating, playing music and writing poetry one had to
sometimes change location. This kind of adjustment of location typical of nomadic
lifestyle is very different from the migration of those on religious pilgrimages. Gilles
Deleuze and Felix Guattari have said in “A Thousand Plateus”: “The migrant goes
principally from one point to another, even if the second point is uncertain, unforeseen,
or not well localized. But the nomad goes from point to point only as a consequence and
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as a factual necessity.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1990:380). I will argue that Kamo no
Chōmei does not live in a hut of a travelling monk, but rather in mobile home of a poetrecluse who does not want move, but often finds that he has to. Comparing Kamo no
Chōmei’s ideas with Western theories on nomadism and mobility I will attempt to outline
the philosophy of place inherent in his writings.
AL-RAWASHDEH, Elham Y. and Oumeima BOUCHLAKA (University of Jordon)
“Postcolonial Spaces and Identity in Nathalie Handal‘s Poet in Andalucia”
This paper investigates the representation of space in Poet in Andalucia (2012) through
which the Arab American poet Nathalie Handal ’’recreates Federico García Lorca‘s
journey, Poet in New York, but in reverse.‘‘ Specifically, this paper demonstrates how
Handal, through writing, reconstructs what she conceives as lost lands and identities.
To the poet, both Palestine and Andalucia are two realms from which her people were
expelled. Such memories motivate her to write literary texts that she looks upon as
symbolic or imaginative spaces which stand for her own cultural spaces. Such a
process renders literary texts as spaces where conflicting ideologies are contested.
Throughout Poet in Andalucia, Handal makes reference to colonized spaces showing,
therefore, how imperial discourses assume a powerful position of dominance and
knowledge legitimization, and how anti-imperial discourses resist and produce an
opposing spatial knowledge. Thirding-as-othering strategy brought to us by Edward
Soja is best exemplified in Handal‘s poetry; as she endeavours to reconstruct real and
imagined spaces in an attempt to bring to readers a clearer vision of their hyphenated
identities and the world they live in. Hence, employing postcolonial theory as well as
Soja‘s conception of Thirdspace, this paper proposes an analytical reading of Handal‘s
Poet in Andalucia.
ANDREWS, Wayne (Hawai’i Pacific University)
“Understanding Place: A Dialectic within Regional American Landscape Poetry
(observing the poetry of Richard Hugo, James Wright, and William Stafford)”
Within Eastern Philosophy, Daoism for example, there is often no sharp divide between
being a philosopher and being a poet; Laozi and Zhuangzi were clearly philosopher
poets, poet philosophers. In contrast 20th century Anglo-American analytic philosophy
created little conceptual space for poetry as a mode of philosophical thought.
Unfortunately, many American poets internalized this narrower academic view and
failed to see they were actually engaged in important philosophical thinking beyond the
scope of the analytic tradition. The purpose of this essay is to illustrate and appreciate
the contribution and philosophical insight of three latter 20th century Regional
Landscape Poets who, while thinking philosophically, did not see themselves as doing
philosophy: Richard Hugo, William Stafford, and James Wright. These three poets
ultimately viewed blessings and hardships befalling them, their social place in the world,
even their existential self- understanding and self-identity as a product of landscapes
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which shaped them. All three present themselves through a dialectic in which they are
both authors of and products of the sorts of landscape they depict.
ANGLE, Stephen C. (Wesleyan University)
“Where and What is tian in Neo-Confucianism?”
Traditionally translated as “Heaven,” tian 天, which I will translate as “cosmos” and
“cosmic," plays multiple roles within Neo-Confucian thinking, helping to signal both the
all-inclusive ambition of Neo-Confucian theory and also the pervasively value-laden
nature of space and place in the Neo-Confucian vision. This paper explores the
tensions created by tian's simultaneous invocation of horizontal inclusiveness and
vertical hierarchy, as well as examining some of the ways in which tian frames the NeoConfucians’ religious, political, and ecological perspectives.
ASHTON, Geoff (University of Colorado at Colorado Springs)
“Sāṁkhya and the Architecture of Devotion in the Bhagavad Gītā: Liberation
through Re-Imagining Place as the Body of Krishna”
Place is a problem for the non-theistic philosophers of classical Sāṁkhya—for insofar
as place manifests, we are em-placed and hence endure suffering (duḥkha).
Accordingly, the Sāṁkhya Kārikā employs metaphysical analysis (as directed toward
various tattvas or ontological principles) in order to realize the total dis-placement or
isolation (kaivalya) of the true self from place as such (prakṛti). However, various texts
exhibiting “proto-sāṁkhya” motifs, ideas, and methods of analysis orient the individual to
place differently. Among these is the Bhagavad Gītā, a text that situates sāṁkhya
analysis within the yoga of devotion (bhakti) to Krishna.
Focusing upon the chapters surrounding the theophany, this paper argues that the Gītā
employs characteristically sāṁkhya metaphysical analysis in order to map out the
architecture of place (prakṛti). Further, it does so at times in order to dissociate Arjuna
from the horrors of the place that he occupies—namely, the duty to initiate a civil war.
Unlike the historically later Sāṁkhya Kārikā, however, the Gītā situates sāṁkhya
doctrine within a theistic metaphysics and a concern to both re-posses his place in the
dharmic order and affirm the battlefield as a manifestation of the cosmic body of
Krishna. By re-imagining place as the body of Krishna, Arjuna learns to not simply bear
his dharma, but find liberation through embracing his place in the dharmic order in full
awareness that his “yes-saying pathos” will not modify his fate.
AXTELL, Guy (Radford University)
“Moral Learning, Imagination, and the Space of Humor”
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The functions of humor and laughter in the Taoist and Confucian classics has been a
topic of some discussion (Froese; Glavany; Harbsmeier; Olberding). Froese (2013,
2014) for example treats the space of humor as opening a plethora of
perspectives/possibilities and, especially in the Zhuangzi, revealing the possibilities but
also the limitations of language. These studies of the function of humor are briefly
surveyed in this paper, but then pushed in a number of directions, both theoretical and
practical.
Firstly, on a theoretical level, the space of humor is developed together with the
importance of the imagination for moral development in James and Dewey’s thought,
and with the manner in which emotions are “ripe for narrativity” in the thought of
contemporary enactivists like Daniel Hutto. Secondly, theoretical resources derived
from this discussion are used to address concerns that Olberding examines in Moral
Exemplars in the Analects: The Good Person is That (2011).
Our approach supports certain aspects of Olberding’s exemplarist virtue ethics, while
adding correctives and insights on the persistent worries that exemplarism favors
imagination over reasoning, and guidance over moral theory (Tan Sor-hoon). Finally,
the pedagogical value of humor in transmitting ancient traditions of moral wisdom to
today’s young audiences is highlighted through the work of Taiwanese cartoon artist
Tsai Chih Chung, a vital figure in moral education in many Chinese-speaking schools,
but whose work remains little-known in the West.
AYYAGARI, Shalini (University of Pittsburgh)
“Dancing in the Desert: Women’s Bodies and Gender Representations in
Contemporary Hindi Cinema”
In this paper, I aim to tease out the complicated representations of place and the female
body in contemporary Hindi cinema by examining intersections of a Rajasthani
landscape and the portrayal of Rajasthani women in song sequences from two
Bollywood films, Paheli (2005) and Dor (2006). Images and sounds of a distinctly
regional Rajasthan in northwestern India are often mobilized in contemporary Hindi
cinema to create a timeless, traditional, and heritage-laden backdrop for filmgoers to
imagine an inclusive Indian national identity.
At the same time, Hindi cinema often reinforces gender and cultural norms, creating
comfortable and universal categories of comprehensibility through which contemporary
Indian women have come to be understood. In this paper, I zero in on the films’
promises to be voices of social change in India, bringing such important women’s issues
to light. I suggest that the use of Rajasthan as regional landscape creates a liminal
frontier. As gender violence continues to plague contemporary India, it is only in
fantastical song sequences, not in the real world of everyday life, in which such
transgressions of gender and societal norms could possibly take place.
BABA, Eiho (Furman University)
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“In Search of Appropriateness through Experience: Gewu and the Place to
Conduct Gongfu as Transactional Events”
This paper examines the relationship between gewu 格物 and the “place to conduct
gongfu” (zuo gongfu chu 做工夫處) in Zhu Xi’s philosophy. I contend that gewu is a
method of gongfu that is conducted on the “place” (chu 處) of transactional thing-events
(shiwu 事物). I begin with wu 物 and show that they are not discrete “things,” but
situated affairs of ordinary events (shi 事) that implicate our involvement or transactions
(yingjie 應接) with them. I situate my discussion in the context of process metaphysics
adopted from the Appended Remarks of the Book of Changes and the Han cosmology
of Huntianshuo 渾天 說 appropriated by Zhu Xi to highlight the importance of cocreativity in his construal of these transactional events. He states that “people often
assume that daoli is an abstract (xuankong 懸空) thing. The Great Learning does not
say ‘qiongli 窮理,’ but only says ‘gewu,’ because it wants us to comprehend through
thing-events (shiwu); only in this way, can we see what is concrete (shiti 實體).”
Zhu Xi further defines “格” (ge) of gewu as “to reach” (zhi 至) and explains that “it is to
actually go to the place (di 地)” where events unfold (Zhuzi quanshu 14: 469). I maintain
that realization (zhi 知) through gewu is not an “abstract,” but a “concrete”
understanding embodied or incorporated (ti 體) through cumulative practice (jixi 積習)
and repeated applications (shixi 時習) of Confucian learning on or through transactional
events as the “place” of gongfu. Zhu Xi also writes that “the heart-mind of the sages...
can respond broadly with thorough appropriateness where each and every application is
not the same (butong 不同)” (Zhuzi quanshu 6: 96).
I shall argue that gewu is a method of gongfu that works to realize appropriateness of
our transactions with thing-events through concrete experience (tiyan 體驗) at the “place
to conduct gongfu.” It aims to cultivate oneself (xiuesheng 修身) to become virtuosic in
making ritual proprieties appropriate and acting with appropriated ritual proprieties in
response to ever- changing circumstances as co-creators who “assist (zan 贊) in the
transforming and nourishing activities of heaven and earth” (Zhongyong 22).
BAGGINI, Julian (Writer, UK)
“Dreams of Utopia – On The Absence of Place”
Philosophy is caught in a perennial tension. Although it rightly aspires to universal truth,
to transcend the particularities of the individual thinker and her time and place, it can
only be done by specific individuals in specific times and places. Indeed, philosophy is
more defined by these localities than many other disciplines: we study particular works
by particular thinkers and group them according to historical era and geographical
location.
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Modern Western philosophy has largely dealt with this tension by ignoring it. Courses in
seventeenth century rationalism, for example, tend to pay scant attention to the
historical or biographical background. The implicit assumption is that to do timeless,
universal philosophy you must think as little as possible about the time and place in
which it is done.
The irony is that this mode of philosophising results in work that is even more parochial
than it would otherwise be, with schools of thought identified with and largely confined to
specific institutions, such as Oxford or Cambridge. The result is a mode of
philosophising that fails to join-up with the “great conversation” of humanity. This is also
reflected in the sociology of Anglophone philosophy, which shows that its practitioners
are relatively uninterested in other global traditions and do not participate fully in
gatherings such as the World Congress of Philosophy.
This paper will argue that to achieve greater universality requires giving due attention to
the localities of thought. The theoretical part of the argument focuses on the argument
that objectivity requires exploring a plurality of perspectives and that this does not
inevitably lead to a kind of relativism or pluralism. A comparison is made with feminist
philosophy. Sceptics believed that feminist philosophy challenged the universal
aspiration of philosophy and so should be ignored, since there could be no such thing
as male or female truths. In fact, we have found that the best feminist philosophy
reveals the blind spots of philosophy as a whole, and hence helps it free itself from its
patriarchal and parochial assumptions. In the same way, it is only by attending to the
locationality of thought that we can see just how far our own locatedness limits our
intellectual horizons.
I then take as a specific example the debate about free will. I will argue that in
Anglophone philosophy, this debate is a demonstrably local one, and that the central
concept in dispute is not shared either historically nor globally today. For instance, the
contemporary concept of free will is not found in either Buddhist or Ancient Greek
philosophy. Furthermore, the assumption that we are only responsible for actions over
which we have control is not found to hold in many cultures around the world.
It is only by understanding why the notion of free will they debate is not universal that
Anglophone philosophers can take the insights they have gained so as to contribute to a
more universal understanding of human freedom and its limits. Only by appreciating the
contingencies of place can philosophy hope to reach truths that transcend it.
BAILEY, Terrance (The University of West Indies, Jamaica)
“Bewaji’s Critique of Mills’ Racial Contract Theory: A Challenge of its Structure,
Content, and Conclusions”
In this paper, I examine John Ayotunde (Tunde) Isola Bewaji’s discussion of Charles W.
Mills’, racial contract theory. Bewaji critiques the theory’s structure, content, and
conclusions. He argues against its structure by advocating for an epistemological
understanding, instead of a historical racial contractarian perception of it. Bewaji
contends with the theory’s content by emphasizing how racial distinctions naturally
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occur, against Mills’ claim that they politically take place in Western society from
antiquity to modernity. Finally, he challenges Mills’ idealist racial contract theory
conclusions, by asserting his realist position on them.
BAINDUR, Meera (Manipal University, India)
“Accommodation, Location, and Context: Conceptualization of Place in Indian
Traditions of Thought”
A human being incorporates within her/his lived experiences ideas of place and location
creating what Casey (2001) refers to as a “geographical self.” How does a concept of
place feature in Indian traditions of thought? A number of equivalent terms that refer to
place or location are to be found in premodern texts. The terms for places are not only
used geographically but in a general locative sense, they define the self or identity.
References to a soul ‘within a body’ or an embodied experience of the subtle matter
within the gross, are prevalent in many early texts like the Upaniṣads. Some of those
terms are sthala, sthāna, deśa, loka (in Sanskrit) and Nilam (in Tamil).
The term sthala refers to an accommodative place or a surface, closer in meaning to the
simple concept of ‘place’ in English. In contrast the term sthāna refers to designated or
appropriate place. Displacement in this sense of place extends beyond the notion of a
physical dislocation to that can be differently imagined through notions of sthāna. One
could be excluded from certain places because one may not be eligible to occupy that
place. Deśa, which is loosely a political-geographical term, is somewhat closer in
meaning to the Tamil world Nilam. In contrast with location based descriptions these
worlds are used in conjunction with time kāla (in Sanskrit) or neram/ kālam (in Tamil).
The deśa-kāla, is also used to signify context, background, causal explanations and
many other conceptualizations. The deep connection between time and place is well
documented in place studies. For instance Tuan (1977, p. 187) claims that “Objects
anchor time.” Do then placements of certain object serve to mark time in various ways?
Traditional architectures in India and elsewhere seem to pay attention to landscape and
placement as well as seasons and other time cycles.
We already see that there are many layers of words for place in these texts. In this
paper, firstly I intend to unpack the various conceptualizations of place in Indian
traditions of thought. The finer distinctions of these terms and the way they are used to
refer to different ideas of place would provide one with a richer layered semantic world
of ideas within these traditions. Following this, I would then argue how the “where”
given by these place-signifying terms not only constructs locations and situatedeness of
beings but also influences relations and identities of these “whats” and “whos.” These
locations and identities corresponding to them create a deeper understanding of intrarelations between beings and their life world. This understanding is of significance as,
the traditional practices of communities continue to foster location-based identities that
influence social relations and ethical norms in the subcontinent. A few concrete
illustrations of these relations such as those of caste and gender hierarchies in India,
human non-human relations would derive from the understanding of sthala, sthāna, and
loka.
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On the other hand the placement of rooms in a traditional home and in notions of
directional/ geographical identities of people will substantiate the understandings of
deśa-kala and its conceptual role in inclusions and exclusions. The paper will hope to
introduce and clarify these concepts around place in Indian thought while providing a
connection between these premodern ideas and practices and norms in contemporary
times in India.
BAKER, Timothy D. (National Dong Hwa University, Taiwan)
“The Emplacement of Chinese Tradition into a Christian Context: Ancestral
Shrines in Taiwanese Christian Homes and Churches”
This paper considers how reverence and offerings to the family ancestors, one of the
signal aspects of Chinese culture in both philosophy and popular thought, have been
absorbed into and transmuted in different ways by Christian practices - and how these
new practices act to personalize places in ways different from traditional Chinese
offerings. Taiwan has a well-established and diverse Christian population that has
grown steadily since the end of World War II, comprising Catholics, most of the
Protestant branches and a number of independent churches. Although the issue of
offerings to ancestors was a critical point in the Rites Controversy during the early Qing,
at which time these offerings were forbidden by the Catholic Church, with the
resurgence and indigenization of Christianity in Taiwan, shrines to the ancestors are
part of many Catholic churches and homes. In addition, since the 1990’s Protestants
have developed an interest in and body of literature on this issue, and are exploring
ways to instantiate it.
There are several issues to be considered here. On one hand, the Christian Chinese
understandings or theology about the persistence of ancestors differ distinctly from the
traditional Chinese understandings; although at the same time they have been, and are
being, influenced by those traditional views. On the other hand, there is the issue of how
these practices sacralize domestic places and domesticate sacred places. Thus, the
home place is connected to a larger matrix of belief, while the place of the church is
linked to the family, which is rooted in the home. Traditional ancestral offerings at home
can, of course, be related to Buddhist or Daoist practices and they can also be made at
temples. But the point of difference is in the way in which the places of Christian
offerings are more effectively tied into a community of belief. As a result, these offerings
link family genealogy to the physical place of the home or church and at the same time
to a non-corporeal “place” of belief. Within this expanded concept of place, attitudes and
practices related to the physical place of the ancestors – their graves – have also been
altered by Christian beliefs, revising the place-triad of private/home, public/church and
public-private/tomb.
Note: This paper is part of a series, beginning with a paper in March for the National Zhengzhi University
conference「移動的空間──生活世界與人文科學」. That paper will focus on the differing roles of family
members - husbands, wives and children - in Christian and traditional ancestral offerings, on which
ancestors are included in the offerings, and on the contrast between ritualized actions and spontaneous
actions. The third part will be a paper in August for a panel at the St. Peterburg Biannual Conference of
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the European Association of Chinese Studies on the ways in which Chinese traditional views have
affected Chinese Christian concepts of ghosts or spirits.
BANG, Hyun Joo (Konkuk University, Korea)
“Zhu-Xi’s Metaphysics of Taiji (太極) and It’s Transition”
I will suggest that the meaning of Li (理)’s Dong-Jing (動靜) would be properly
understood within the scope of the Zhu-Xi (朱熹)’s metaphysics of Taiji (太極), after
accepting all Zhu-Xi’s conflicting opinions about Li’s Dong-Jing and about Taiji as the
origin(根源) and the first principle(本體) of universe but not scrapping or reducing any of
the opinions, and to figure out philosophical relationships with noted Korean NeoConfucians, Yi-Hwang (李滉) and Yi-Yi (李珥)’s metaphysics of Taiji. By noting that Li is
the ultimate origin in his metaphysics of Taiji, Zhu-Xi affirms Li’s activity and that it’s
self-manifesting activity (自己展開). I will also argue that the core of Zhu-Xi philosophy is
the absoluteness of Li and Taiji.
BANKA, Rafal (Jagiellonian University, Poland)
“Confucian Meditations: Localising the Philosophising Mind”
Most philosophers agree in that the ideas they convey possess objective, or at least,
intersubjective status. The strength of the conviction is based on the assumption that a
philosophising subject is located in the most neutral, culturally insensitive place, where
a quasi-God’s-eye perspective can be assumed and universal judgements can be
passed. One of the most famous exemplifications can be found in Meditations on First
Philosophy, where the ‘perfect vacuum’ of suspended reality enables Descartes to
answer most fundamental questions. This metaphilosophical condition can be
challenged by an alternative offered by Confucianism, where the subject is specifically
located in a multiple-level context and presents a holistic (not universal) perspective. In
my paper, I argue for the Confucian localised-concrete subject as a legitimate departure
point of philosophical investigations. My main argument consists in showing that the
subject contextualisation is an indispensable propensity in cognitive processes. I
construct it by referring to enactivism, which concurrently provides a linkage to viewing
the Confucian conception of subject from the perspective of empirical sciences.
BANNON, Bryan E. (Merrimack College)
“Being a Friend to Places”
When considering the human relationship to nature, much has been made of the
attachment that individuals experience toward specific places. For this reason,
environmentalists have discussed the concept of place as a particularly fruitful one for
developing a relationship to the more than human world. However, the relationship
between individuals and those places has been left somewhat undefined. Deep
Ecologists, for example, argue in favor of assimilating the relations of a place into one’s
11
larger “Self,” thereby extending one’s care for one’s “self” to the place itself (e.g., Fox
1990). Bioregionalists, meanwhile, look to places as imposing limits and structure to the
form of human life that takes place within them (e.g., Thayer 2003). In both cases (and
others), there is a certain givenness to place: the relations to place are viewed as
determinative of a particular identity and ethos. The place constitutes the person. On
more humanistic views, the embodied or thinking subject constitutes places around it by
instilling the environing world with meaning (Casey 1993, Tuan 1972). In this paper, I
explore an alternative to this vision of the place to self relation in which the relation is
modeled on friendship rather than on the process of constitution.
The limitations of the constitution model have been explored by Val Plumwood in her
book Environmental Culture (2001), arguing in its place for a self-in-relation model. For
this model to work in the context of place, there has to be a meaningful and (to some
extent) intentional world around us prior to the presence of human beings. Concurrently,
friendship has been criticized as a framework for the human relationship to nature
because nature is presumed to lack these meaningful and intentional structures
(Freiman 2009, Sandler 2007). Taking up and developing Plumwood’s self-in-relation
model, I intend to argue that once a place’s agency is no longer backgrounded and
dependencies upon our places are no longer denied, it will be possible to engage with
places as already meaningful and historical systems of relations in a way that
resembles friendship.
Friendships consist in a number of qualities beyond what I will discuss in the paper, but
here I intend to focus on the reciprocity and self-formation dimensions of friendship. I
do so in order to highlight the mutual formation of place and self that occurs in the
interaction of the living being with its environment, but also to argue in favor of a
particular normative stance toward that process. Friendship is laden with values and
such relationships possess inherent norms that can help us make sense of which
relations to place might be more or less ecologically healthy.
BARDWELL-JONES, Celia (University of Hawai`i—Hilo)
“De-colonial Perspectives of Land and Home: Yearning and a Sense of Place
Within Native Hawaiian and Filipino Identities”
Though there are marked differences between the experiences of Native Hawaiians and
Filipinos in Hawai`i, these identities do overlap one another. First, both Native
Hawaiians and Filipino Americans have a shared history of colonization in their places
of origin, either in Hawai`i or in the Philippines. Second, both groups were denied a
place of belonging within the US national narrative of citizenship. Filipino Americans
were allowed into the country as nationals, but not as citizens. Native Hawaiians were
forcefully included as wards of the state. Third – and what I would like to focus in this
presentation – both held specific strategies for decolonization and the creation of
counter hegemonic narratives. Both I argue utilize a sense of place to reassert their
specific group’s cultural identity and self-determination. Both invoke a sense of place
that on the one hand has been taken away from them because of US colonial practices,
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and on the other hand a sense of place is what recovers their agency and subjectivity. I
aim to examine Trask’s notion of land and Espiritu’s notion of home and how these
narratives of belonging offer a sense of place, which can resist the settler colonial logic
prevalent in Hawai`i.
BEHUNIAK, Jim (Colby College)
“Dewey’s Place with Respect to Comparative Philosophy”
In at least one respect, John Dewey occupies a special place in the history of
comparative philosophy. In 1951, his words were the first to appear in the journal
Philosophy East and West. There, he made a bold statement with regard to the
geographical assumptions of comparative philosophy, claiming that the journal should
“help break down the notion that there is such a thing as a ‘West’ and ‘East’” that stand
to be considered. Dewey’s comments can now be understood in light of his once
misplaced, but now reconstructed manuscript, UnModern Philosophy and Modern
Philosophy. Here, in 1947, Dewey prepared the way for his famous shift from
“experience” to “culture.” Better understanding this shift can help us to appreciate the
meaning behind his 1951 comments. Dewey’s thinking had evolved in such a way as to
consider philosophy itself a “genetic-functional” activity, one that was ineradicably
located in its own social-cultural-geographical situation. From this vantage point,
Dewey challenged the idea that one could or should regard “cultures” objectively from
vantage points that were not already so situated, e.g. setting out to approach the
“Greek” and “Chinese” traditions from some neutral place free from any cultural bias. In
addition to shedding light on his 1951 comments, Dewey’s thesis in this manuscript
presents a contemporary challenge to any form of “comparative philosophy” that would
hope to remain unaffected by its own particular place.
BEIN, Steve (University of Dayton)
“Being-in-the-World, World-in-the-Being: Finding Ethics in Watsuji Tetsurō’s
Socio-environmental Ontology”
WATSUJI Tetsurō provides an elegant foundation for understanding environmental ethics
but offers very little in the way of concrete guidance. His articulation of ningen 人間
embedded in fūdo 風土 is as elegant a model as one could ask for in framing humanity’s
relationship to the natural world, but it is only that: a model, which by itself offers no
moral principles. It tells us how we are but says nothing about what we should do.
By contrast, Watsuji has a good deal more to say about the moral balance to be struck
by the private and public aspects of ningen’s existence. They exist in perpetual
tension—creative at its best, destructive at its worst—and this mutually transformative,
mutually endangered relationship can be scaled up to the level of entire cultures and
their ecosystems. Employing the semiotics of Algirdas Julien Greimas I argue that from
this microcosmic model of ningen sonzai 人間存在 we can extrapolate guiding principles
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of the moral balancing act to be performed on the macrocosmic scale of ningen in fūdo.
Since Watsuji himself has so little to say on the subject, I draw on the work of Aldo
Leopold, Michel Serres, and Augustin Berque in fleshing out how best to think of our
moral relationship with fūdo given its ontological inescapability.
BEN PAZI, Hanoch (Bar Ilan University, Israel)
“Dwelling: Levinas beyond Heidegger”
In his book Totality and Infinity, Emmanuel Levinas discusses the concept of dwelling
directed polemically to Martin Heidegger. In this study I want to suggest that the source
of Levinas's 'domesticity' may found in his Talmudic readings. His phenomenological
research revealed 'dwelling' as an ethical thinking. The Levinasian thought sees Home
that is not derived from the Freudian “angst” or from the Heideggerian
“thrownness“ [geworfen]: "he does not find himself brutally cast forth and forsaken in the
world”.
Levinas explains the ethical meaning of 'domesticity' by understanding the ethical
aspect of the 'feminine': “in a world that offers it no inner refuge, in which it is
disorientated, solitary and wondering… 'The house is woman' the Talmud tells us”. But
the terms 'home' and 'domesticity' goes beyond the descriptive social usage of these
terms, extending to the meaning of 'being in the world'. Levinas’s concept of feminine
and dwelling runs deeper than that and indeed stands in contrast to Heidegger.
Heidegger describes the situation of the Dasein’s being as 'thrown into the world', and
the way of authenticity lies in accepting the facticity of it. And Levinas uses a difficult
metaphor to describe this facticity, that of an actual projectile, as a 'stone one casts
behind oneself'. Opposite the possibility of projectedness is “home-ness/dwelling”.
One possible perception of “home” would describe it as a person’s protected space, a
deliberate turning away from the external and a gathering inward into one’s interior. And
there is another possibility for understanding 'home', and he identifies it with 'the
feminine'. The new meaning of dwelling is not as shelter but as ethical dwelling. Home
that is domesticity intended to welcome, one that remains open in order to accept
guests. Feminine offers an alternative in an alienated world, an alternative called 'home'.
'To feel at home' is not to feel protected but rather to feel that one is moving inward to a
familiar place, a welcoming place. It is a motion of transition – not an outward one,
though, but an inward one.
BERGER, Douglas L. (Southern Illinois University)
“Three Kinds of upādāya prajṅāpti in Early Buddhist Thought”
Early Buddhist philosophy of language has often been seen as strongly reductionist
when it comes to how words describe reality. In the most well-known example of such
reductionism, early canonical texts and Abhidharma commentarial literature made the
case that, just as the word “chariot” was an abstraction based merely on the functional
interaction of the vehicle’s constituent parts, so words like “self” or “person” were
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nothing more than constructed concepts that stood in for the real psycho-physical
aggregates (skandhas) that made up individuals. Such constructed concepts were
called by early Buddhists upādāya prajṅāpti, or mere “designations” (prajṅāpti) that were
“based upon” (upādāya) a collection of parts (āṅga), where the parts were supposed
real entities but the wholes they made up were mere ideational artifacts.
This reductionist understanding of upādāya prajṅāpti was indeed so influential in early
Buddhist circles that the seventh century Madhyamaka commentator Candrakīrti argued
that even central Mahāyāna ideas like “emptiness” and “causally conditioned co-arising”
(pratītya samutpāda) were exactly these sorts of “designations based on parts” rather
than terms referring directly to the ways the world really is and works. However, recent
works by Leonard Priestly and Joseph Walser have shown that two other conceptions of
upādāya prajṅāpti were widespread in the many strands of early Buddhist discourse.
They had to do respectively with how we speak about ideas in a relational complex that
are necessarily mutually entailing (anyonya prajṅāpti), such as “cause and effect” or
“father and son” as well as dependence relationships that do not require reduction of
one thing to another, such as exist between “fire and fuel” or “a tree and its shadow.”
This paper will attempt to flesh out these three conceptions of upādāya prajṅāpti in
order to demonstrate that, even before Buddhism is fully imported into the
cosmologically and personally relational worldviews of East Asia, resources existed
within South Asian schools of Buddhism that enabled words to be placed not only in
reductionist analyses of presumably false concepts, but in a world of inextricable
mutualities and interdependencies between things, persons and ideas.
BHATTACHARYA, Sanusri (Bankura Zilla Saradamani Mahila Mahavidyapith Girls
College, India)
“Place Vs Space: Case of the Amarnath Shrine Controversy”
Kashmir has been known from the very ancient times plausibly for two things –
legendary natural beauty and the Amarnath Cave Temple ascribed to Lord Siva. Recent
addition to its fame/infame has been sectarian subscription to terrorism – Kashmir
Terrorism. The cave temple at Amarnath has been a popular place of pilgrimage
through ages, but has been the centre of controversy with regard to space – the issue of
land transfer (May, 2008) being needlessly politicized and communalized out of
proportion for advancement of separatist cause. The ideology of secularism that India
has officially adopted since independence and is believed to have adhered to, appeared
to fall apart in an instant. It could have been due either to the vacuity of Jammu and
Kashmir people’s belief in democracy and secularism, or to the wrong intentions of the
people in power, or could have been both. It could also have been the separatists’
attempt to diminish the economic growth of the province in order to fulfill their vile aims
by exploiting unsuspecting common people’s religious sentiments. India, despite being
the largest democracy, has been tainted on various occasions by the vested interests of
the ruling class, and the burnt has always been borne by the common citizens. Corrupt
practices here unfortunately follow a top-down model, making it utterly impossible for
15
the masses either to follow the ideologies of or to take the responsibilities of
independence.
Kashmir has been the bone of contention between India and Pakistan since
independence, and not a single opportunity has been spared to further separatist goals
in the name of self-determination – the Amarnath Shrine land transfer issue being
merely a ploy. Such controversies not only mutilate the image of India as a multi-cultural
nation, but also attack the very foundation of people’s belief in democracy. The Indian
Constitution, which upholds plurality as a universal value, seems to lose all relevance in
such situations of disorder, and the age old identity of India as a spiritual country gets
tarnished in every way.
I propose to focus on the history of Amarnath as an important place of pilgrimage in
India, along with how and why the issue of land transfer became an important political
problem of the subcontinent with regard to communal space providing upper-hand to
the separatist groups in and outside India. Much has been written on this issue, but
there still remains considerable scope for reevaluation. I propose to make an effort to
this end in my paper.
BHUSHAN, Nalini, and Jay GARFIELD (Smith College)
“Cambridge in India”
We will talk about the impact of study in Cambridge on Indian philosophy, first in the
construction of Aligarh Muslim University on the model of Cambridge, but then about the
way that Aligarh itself becomes more than just a place, but a movement. We will then
consider how the Aligarh movement reimagines Muslim India as Indian vs Pan-Islamic,
and conclude with a comparison of the similar and yet different way that Cambridge
informs neo-Vedānta in Calcutta, and on how philosophy in these two different places
proceeded in parallel.
BIERRIA, Alisa (Stanford University)
“Paradoxical Space and the Geopolitics of Race and Domestic Violence”
In 2010, Marissa Alexander, a black woman from Florida, fired a single gunshot
upwards into a wall to halt an attack by her abusive husband. The shooting caused no
injuries. Despite the fact that she acted in self-defense, Alexander was denied immunity
from prosecution under Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law. In 2012, she was convicted
sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 20 years in prison. In an interview, Alexander
asked, "If you do everything to get on the right side of the law, and it's a law that does
not apply to you, where do you go from there?"
Recent public debates about the racialized and gendered discrepancies of the
application of “Stand Your Ground” (SYG) laws have created an opportunity for stronger
spatialized analyses of domestic violence, particularly in the context of the
criminalization of battered women who are disproportionately black women and other
women of color. In this paper, I ask can a geopolitical analysis of domestic violence
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create a richer understanding of the criminalization of domestic violence survivors who
act in self-defense?
The spatialized details of Alexander’s experience was the basis on which the court
rejected her SYG defense. The presiding judge argued that Alexander could not have
been “genuinely afraid” (an affective requirement of the law) because she failed to
successfully escape her home after being attacked. State Prosecutor Angela Corey
used Alexander’s movement across her home as evidence that, instead of feeling
“afraid,” Alexander was actually “angry.” Corey writes, “a person who holds a genuine
fear for their life would have escaped through a window in the master bedroom or from
one of the multiple other exits to the home.” In a vivid depiction of the legal burden
placed upon Alexander, she is expected to literally jump out of a window to effectively
perform “fear.” Although the SYG statute states that, if you feel fear, you have the right
to remain where you are and defend yourself, Corey argues the reverse: if you remain
where you are, you must not be afraid. Corey effectively creates a logical contradiction
that is impossible for Alexander to resolve.
In her book, Black Women and the Cartographies of Struggle, Katherine McKittrick
employs the concept of “paradoxical space” to describe the account of enslaved black
woman, Harriet Jacob’s, long process of escape from slavery that involved hiding in a
very small space just beneath the roof of a building for seven years. I argue that the
concept of paradoxical space can also be applied to Alexander’s experience,
particularly as it relates to the state’s rationalization of why she should be prosecuted.
Alexander’s key, open-ended question, "Where do you go from there?" reveals the
despair that lives in the impossibility of overcoming the state’s willful contradictions in its
application of the law for black women. But the question is also provocative in that it
challenges us to consider how the geographic politics of racialized gender violence
defines the borders – the whereness -- of freedom, safety, and the right to exist.
BILIMORIA, Purushottama (Deakin University, Australia)
“Temple Space: The Dwelling Place of the Gods, of the Book, and of
Nothingness”
In this paper I seek to explore the connection between place and the community of
prayer-givers from two Indian traditions: Hindus and Sikhs. I take the tropes of spatiality
and embodiment and apply them to the spaces carved out for presentification
considered to be divine, even transcendent. While the symbolism is of the 'otherworldly', I will argue, drawing on Heidegger's significant insight of 'in-the-world'
situatedness of human beings, that there is no 'external world' . This is so because the
gods or planetary and major deities (in the Hindu temple) and the Book (the Guru
Granth Sahib in the Sikh gurdwara) are, via the archi-tectonics of vāstu inscriptional
edicts, embellished by a series of installational rites and continual rituals, homologized
from their respective cosmo-transcendental presences to the dwelling-place of the
earthly/terrestrial mandapa, sanctums. Here the adherents re-ignite their inner identity in
aesthetic reverence and moral allegiance to the god/s or Guru they behold in darshan or
'sight'. Heidegger's telling proposition sets the tenor for the detailed and in-depth
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analyses, from my own fieldwork, of the anthro-topological, aesthetic, spiritual and
cultural (even political-ethical) role etched by 'place' in the imaginary, architecture, and
'work' of the oikos, or templum:
'Then temple-work , standing there, opens up a world [read 'an other world'] and at the
same time sets this world back again on earth, which itself only thus emerges as native
ground.' (1971:42)
The temple, then, opens up a place for 'the "between" of human dwelling' by holding
together the earth and world in a creative tension or 'oppositional belonging' and
'intimacy of striving' (Malpas 2006: 199).
In the last part of the paper, I relate the thesis enunciated to the Buddhist stupas and
the potentials of representing śūnyatā or emptiness, where images, icons, deities, and
gurus are all subverted in the proper spaces marked with No-thing/No-Self (neither
ātman nor paramātma). What would a temple-work dedicated to the Postcolonial 'NonGod', Karl Jasper's 'Missing God' , Nietzsche's 'Death of God' , and Heidegger's finalé in
'Was ist Metaphysic?' – to Nothingness – be like? What would be their architectonic
aesthetics and political ethics?
BLAKELEY, Don (University of Hawai’i)
“Mapping the Zhuangzi”
Like messages from fortune cookies distributed to make evident a pathway, the
individual stories of the Zhuangzi provide a trail that can function as GPS location
markers of noteworthy sites of achievement. If these markers are processed through a
mapping program with various layers used to highlight particular data sets, the Zhuangzi
presents a vivid display of concrete existential enactments, of modalities of “place.”
‘Place,’ in this context, indicates the identification of phenomenologically circumscribed
concrete existential sites of dao realization. Each is constituted as a limited, holistic,
integrated configuration of a life (animal or human) in its earth, body, social, political,
heavenly and dao contexts. The key and unifying factor throughout the paper is the term
‘know’ (知 zhi). It, like other basic terms, has a changing holographic profile depending
on the particular affordance-conditions that constitute a situation.
The paper has three parts. The first focuses briefly on four layers of Zhuangzi’s map.
The second part provides evidence of a similar arrangement of data sets in recent work
in the area of embodied (embedded, enactive, extended) cognition. This correlation will
exhibit the modern relevance of Zhuangzi’s work. The paper concludes with a brief
summary appraisal.
Part 1.
The first map layer follows the sequence of development from chapter 1 to chapter 7. In
epistemological terms, the reader encounters an assortment of episodes that shift
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interpretive approaches, ranging from realism, perspectivism/relativism, skepticism,
physical performance skills, to challenges of adeptness in more expansive
interpersonal, social, political, and cosmic settings. Each of these locations
(placements, dwelling sites) involve specific encounters, ones that can function as
learning rehearsals involving the existential features, diverse meanings, and the scope
and kinds of dao realizations.
The second layer highlights major ontological levels of realization. The spectrum
ranges from the indeterminate, inchoate primal ever-present source from which all
things emerge, are fueled, and return, to linguistically delineated (this-that, right-wrong)
features of common experience in the world, to more general/abstract ideas, including
fictive imaginative, dream ideas, and general ethical ideals such as ren, li, and yi, logical
perplexities, and the one-many dialectic/dynamic.
The third layer is the realization of the ontological spectrum in the context (from the
point of view) of the development of xin (heart-mind). This includes the transforming
work of “forgetting,” of liberation from the influences of linguistic-conceptual practices,
emotive investments, and beliefs. Xin becomes adept by both loosing itself operationally
and yet being fully in its particular placement matrix. Dwelling in the “turmoil and chaos”
of ongoing transformations also includes a dimension of stillness, emptiness, and not
thinking-feeling-speaking, while learning to abide in what becomes
illuminated/delineated (明 ming).
The fourth layer includes the way to manage a life configured in the multidimensionality of places/placements over time. The challenge is to develop human
capacities to operate properly between the poles of indeterminate dynamics of dao and
the fine delineations that make-up human understanding “on earth, under heaven.” It is
finding the axis (hinge, pivot, center) in the ziran of occurrences. It is learning how,
actively and with full immediacy, to find accommodations in the bounded and
boundless, sometimes characterized as freedom-from (encumbrances, preferences)
and freedom-to (act or engage without interfering).
Part 2
A brief overview of major categories and distinctions common to recent works in
embodied cognition provides evidence of significant parallels with the project of the
Zhuangzi. The correlation shows surprising contemporary relevance of the Zhuangzi in
this respect, providing a means to locate the Zhuangzi in this modern setting. The
playful fantasy, eccentric disciplinary techniques, miraculous and nebulous mysterious
references, paradoxical obscurities, and tricky logical conundrums are absent, the
purpose they serve can nevertheless be shown, without the intriguing literary richness,
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to have significant grounding in the descriptive accounts developed in the work of
contemporary cognitive science.
A map of major distinctions based on these sources will exhibit the noteworthy features
and basis of the comparison. Reference to works by Francisco Varela, Antonio
Damasio, Evan Thompson, Daniel Hutto, and Andy Clark will show important
correlations.
Part 3
Approaching the Zhuangzi from the perspective of the significance of place makes one
aware of the intricate, multi-dimensional conceptual structure and organization of the
text, of its phenomenological-existential concreteness, and of its heuristic
resourcefulness in addressing the question of knowing dao, of dao knowing. The fact
that characteristic features of Zhuangzi’s mapping of place can be correlated with
contemporary work in cognitive science is additional evidence of its astute, profound
contribution and lasting relevance.
BRUYA, Brian (Eastern Michigan University)
“A Place in the Margins: How the Philosophical Gourmet
Report Shapes the Profession of Philosophy”
As human beings, we live in an ambience of contingent hierarchical networks fractured
along a variety of fault lines, including socioeconomic, ethnic, religious, regional, and so
on. Accordingly, academic disciplines have dominant and marginalized populations. In
the field of philosophy, analytic subdisciplines dominate in American Ph.D. programs,
and non-Western subdisciplines subsist in the margins. Setting aside the possibility of
overt coercion in the academy, what factors contribute to one group's dominance, and
what factors allow for marginalized populations to make inroads into the mainstream?
Having examined several of these factors elsewhere, in this talk I focus on an
unexpected impediment to the growth of non-Western philosophy. A small online
publication called the Philosophical Gourmet Report (PSR) has an outsized role in
entrenching and maintaining the status quo in the discipline of philosophy. I offer a
data-driven critique of the PSR, demonstrating its biases toward the dominant
population and its biases against marginalized populations. Due to its biases and its
influence in the academy, it is having a pernicious effect on the field of philosophy
broadly, which should be an urgent concern for all philosophers.
BUBEN, Adam (Leiden University College, The Netherlands)
“Finding a Place for Transhumanist Immortality in Ancient Indian Philosophy”
Transhumanism has much in common with religion as traditionally conceived. James J.
Hughes claims that “a variety of metaphysics appear to be compatible with one form of
transhumanism or the other, from various Abrahamic views of the soul to Buddho-Hindu
ideas of reincarnation to animist ideas.” Most notably, the range of technologically
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optimistic views held by transhumanists shares with many religions a longing for
transcendence of our presently frail and limited situation. In contrast to the doctrines of
many traditional religions, however, transhumanist salvation will not come from divine
intervention, but solely from our own ingenuity. Due to its obvious Enlightenment
humanist bent, the prevailing view has been that transhumanism adopts and
secularizes religious tropes, but is importantly hostile to many traditional religions.
Nonetheless, there is a growing number of voices arguing that shared interests in the
elimination of suffering, the immersion of individual minds in a universal intelligence, or
the remaking of the universe itself, indicate that certain construals of transhumanism
might actually be continuous with certain religious traditions. I will focus on one common
transhumanist goal—personal immortality—that seems inherently opposed to the core
philosophical foundations of at least two major religions. Ancient Hindu and Buddhist
philosophy suggests that any yearning for extension of individual personalities will
ultimately be problematic. On the more superficial understandings of these traditions it
may be possible to accept even this transhumanist goal, but at their most philosophical,
they teach detachment from the ordinary sense of selfhood.
BUDIN, Gerhard (University of Vienna, Austria)
“Place Metaphors in E-learning and E-science – Empirical Transcultural
Explorations and Their Critical Socio-epistemic Reflections”
Space metaphors in general and place metaphors in particular play a crucial role in the
conceptualization, design and the discourses of the Internet and the World Wide Web.
Marshall McLuhan consistently developed his theories and reflections on electronic
media based on the increasing use of spatial metaphors (“galaxy” in 1962, “landscape”
in 1969, and in 1989 the “Global Village”). According to Gow (2001), McLuhan put
spatial metaphors at the center of his conceptualization of new media. Based on and
inspired by his pioneering work and the resulting and widely adopted conceptualmetaphorical framework, the WWW further developed more productive spatial
metaphors, and more precisely place metaphors for various user scenarios. In ELearning and E-Science, for instance, we nowadays use “platforms”, “repositories”,
virtual learning “rooms”, digital “libraries”, work “environments”, collaborative
“laboratories” (or more concisely in the blending “collaboratories”, etc. as “places” where
teachers and students, as well as scientists “meet” and work together.
For the last 10 years we (at the University of Vienna) have been carrying out a number
of research projects co-financed by the European Union in the areas of collaborative ELearning and E-Science. The empirical case study we are currently carrying out focus
on the following research questions: how do students, teachers and researchers from
different cultures (at the Center for Translation Studies we teach in 14 different
languages covering major language communities in all continents world-wide) react to
and behave in such virtual “class rooms” and virtual work “environments” and
collaborative “platforms”? How do the spatial conceptualizations of E-Learning and EScience shape, influence, and change their learning and researching processes? The
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approach in this investigation includes a socio- epistemic perspective looking at the
“communities of practice”, i.e. learning communities and research communities in their
joint and interactive work.
One of these projects we have participated in is called “Open Discovery Space” (ODS)
(see: http://opendiscoveryspace.eu/consortium for the list of project partners). It is
directed towards schools all over Europe and beyond and is thus of a trans-cultural
orientation. Yet the project is multi-lingual and multi-cultural, taking into account different
learning and teaching cultures in schools in different countries. The research
methodology on the metaphors is based on the research tradition in cognitive linguistics
(Halliday2004, Ricoeur 1977, Croft/Cruse 2004, Lakoff/Johnson 1980, White/Le Cornu
2011,and many others). In addition to the philosophical – mainly epistemological –
reflection the current study also aims at developing innovative approaches for a new,
large research project that will be funded by the Austrian Research Fund starting on
January 1, 2016 for 4 years. It includes a digital humanities “platform” for research on
the use of the German language in Austria.
BURIK, Steven (Singapore Management University)
“Between Local and Global: The Place of Comparative Philosophy through
Heidegger and Daoism”
This paper argues for the importance of notions of place for comparative philosophy. I
first provide a comparison of ‘local’ and ‘global’ thinking, using Heidegger and Classical
Daoism. Next, building on this comparison, I look at a set of related notions of place and
argue how they affect how we perceive the goals and ideas of comparative philosophy.
It is often argued that the project of comparative philosophy displays some kind of
inherent contradiction. For in order to be truly comparative, it needs to have some
overarching position with regards to the comparata. In other words, it needs to
transcend the things under comparison somehow. So it needs to be understood as
some form of globalised or cosmopolitan thinking. On the other hand, that form of global
thinking needs to reflect what is often considered its exact opposite, namely a certain
form of local thinking or provincialism. For if the claims of comparative philosophy are to
be taken serious, they need to display an appreciation of the importance of different
ways of thinking as practiced or originated in, and in significant ways bound to, different
parts of the world. Yet provincialism is often seen as a negative thing, understood as an
unwillingness to see the bigger picture because you are stuck in your own way of
thinking. How can we think and use these notions of place in order to alleviate such an
apparent contradiction between these two positions necessary to shape comparative
philosophy?
Here I compare Heidegger and Classical Daoism. I argue that although often
understood at least partly as ‘provincial’ thinkers, Heidegger and the Daoists actually
display exactly that attitude we need in comparative philosophy.
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Cosmopolitanism and globalization are often undestood as involving a loss of
rootedness, and provincialism is seen as a pejorative term, it has had a negative
connotation for some time. Yet more recently, with the revitalisation of non-Western
thought, the notion of provincialism can also be understood as standing for the attack on
the idea of universality in the form of Western philosophy’s dominance over other ways
of thought.
Provincial then means rather a challenge to the dominance of the traditional western
way of doing philosophy. As such, it is clear to see why the dominant tradition would
want to discredit ‘provincial’ thought, since it does not tally with its universalist
tendencies and ideals. Provinciality would be a reinsertion of man into his environment,
into his place and surroundings, into the world, instead of the dominant approach of
situating man outside of his physical and social reality, Thus provincial thought can be
seen as a challenge to perceived distinctions between mind-body, ideas-matter, realityappearance, inside-outside. Such an understanding of provincial thought might be able
to bridge the notions of cosmopolitanism and provincialism, of the homely and
Unheimlichkeit, of localism and globalization, of nostalgia and progress.
Using Heidegger’s ideas of ‘Gathering’ and ‘Ereignis’, understood as preserving in
belonging together through difference, I will compare such thought to the classical
Daoists, and will argue that this way of thinking is also present there. I conclude by
pointing to the importance of understanding the project of comparative philosophy in a
similar way if it is to live up to its intended purposes.
BYRNES, Elyse (University of Hawai’i)
“’Becoming Flowers:’ An Alternative Judeo-Christian Ecological Ethic”
In his widely read essay “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis” Lynn White Jr.
argues that Christians are totally divorced from nature as well as any possibility of
sympathy—“to a Christian a tree can be no more than a physical fact...” he writes, “the
whole concept of the sacred grove is alien to Christianity....”1 However, I will argue that
this is definitively not the case—The Garden of Eden, the original sacred grove of the
Judeo-Christian tradition, serves as an image of humankind united with not only God,
but nature as well. The garden serves as a symbol of unity throughout the Torah and
the later books that compose the Christian Bible—imagery that would be later revived
and reinvigorated by the artists of the Romantic movement.
In order to construct an alternative Judeo-Christian ecological ethic, I will trace the
significance of the garden and nature in Judeo-Christian thought, its development in the
philosophy of those who engage in the relation between humanity, nature, and god,
(namely Whitehead and Nishida); and its application to our ongoing ecological crisis in
the form of a human comportment suited to this particular understanding of nature as
garden: cultivation. Using an Arendtian frame, I will argue that only the comportment of
cultivation, specifically in contrast to the comportment of the fabricator—edification—
allows for human and nonhuman agency, political engagement, and subjective
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revelation. I will show that cultivation serves as a form of action (unlike labor or
fabrication) which both interact with nature purely in terms of use-value. The
“boundlessness” of action characterizes the making of permeable boundaries that
distinguishes cultivation from edification. To more clearly illustrate these points, I will
provide both an example of garden and gardener par excellence; namely, the Garden of
Eden, and the gardener-poet, Keats.
CAI, Liang (University of Notre Dame)
“The Master Kept A Distance from His Own Son: The Place of Family Affection in
Confucian Morality”
Consanguineous affections and filial piety have been heated topics in the study of
Confucianism. Scholars have asked if xiao (filial piety) is the root of Confucian morality
and if it leads to moral corruption. Despite different answers to those questions, xiao is
generally reduced to family affection, and loving one’s parents, in turn, is said to be the
most fundamental human emotion praised by Confucians. During the debate over the
filial piety, one passage— The Analects, 16.13— has drawn little attention from scholars.
Cheng Kang, a disciple of Confucius, asked the master’s son Boyu if he had received
different from what other students received? Cheng was pleased to find out that
Confucius not only taught the same teachings to his own son but also kept a distance
from him.
Attempting to explore the apparent tension between devotion to the master and
devotion to the parents, I point out that the family lives of both Confucius and his
disciples were absolutely overshadowed by their communal life together. Xiao in the
Analects refers to affections beyond parent-child love and is used to prescribe the
relationship between teacher and disciples. Although graded love—prioritizing the love
of one’s family— has been characterized as one of the most prominent ethical doctrines
of Confucianism, it finds no place in Confucius’ learning community. Furthermore,
according to Confucius and Mencius, young children are emotionally attached to their
parents; but adults’ love of their parents, while still spontaneous and natural, is sporadic
and inconsistent. That love needs to be constantly reawakened by appealing to specific
circumstances and by the moral action of xiao. Equating family love with xiao and
regarding consanguineous affections as primary moral resources of Confucian ethics is
a misreading of early Confucianism.
CALLICOTT, J. Baird (University of North Texas)
“The Ecology of Self as a Focus for Comparative Philosophy”
The atomic self is deeply rooted in Western thought. Its advent seems to coincide with
the emergence of alphabetic literacy in Greece, enabling a reader/writer to use
language in the absence of an interlocutor. Oral consciousness is necessarily relational
and communal. Literate consciousness is private and interior. Suddenly death and
even change became problematic. The solution to the problem of death was the
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independent psyche residing in the body, such that the inevitable death of the latter was
not also necessarily the death of the former. The concept of the independent psyche is
traceable to Pythagoras; it was refined and forcefully defended by Plato. From these
Greek origins the atomic self was adopted by the religions of the Book (as they are quite
revealingly called); and it was modernized and resecularized by Descartes.
It remains to be seen what consequences the new communications technologies (twitter
for example) will have for the atomic self. Do they intensify privacy and interiority or
reconstitute virtual communities? If popularized, the consequences of the postmodern
sciences for self reconstruction are more predictable: consciousness is an emergent
property of the central nervous systems of vertebrates, not an entity in its own right;
organisms are exquisitely adapted by evolutionary processes to the physical, chemical,
and biological conditions of the Earth; multicellular organisms are super-ecosystems,
the habitats of thousands of species of microbes outnumbering the organisms’ own cells
ten to one; personal identity (the self) is shaped by one’s environmental and social
relationships. The increasing popularity of voluntary assisted suicide for those whose
quality of life has significantly diminished indicates that death is becoming less
problematic, suggesting that the conscious self is regarded as an organic
epiphenomenon, the extinction of which is inevitable and nothing to fear—the only
question thus being the optimal moment of extinction.
CAPPELLINI, Roberta (Centro Interculurale Dedicato A Raimon Panikkar, Italy)
“Hermeneutics and the Empeiria of the Soul in Panikkar”
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CARELLI, Paul (University of North Florida)
“Beyond the Western Borders”
Travel requires crossing borders and changing places. Travel literature in the European
tradition has been characterized as progressive and teleological and therefore sees the
crossing of some borders as necessary for the establishment of others. The Western
traveler (Dante, for example), focuses on the definition (de-finis) of self, the delimiting of
possibilities, as the primary telos towards which all travel aims. This is in stark contrast
to Daoist notions of travel which stress the freedom of wandering without a specific
goal. It is the multiplication of possibility, with the attendant opening up for the traveler
ever-widening opportunities for response that constitutes travel for Zhuangzi and others.
Travel for the Ancient Greeks does not rest easily on either side of this bifurcation, but,
perhaps surprisingly, has more affinities with Daoist travel. Many-turning (polytropus)
Odysseus, the Greek traveler par excellence, frequently transgresses boundaries—
personal, societal, geographical—becoming a traveler at home in any place though
native to none. Attempting to situate this ancient Greek paradigm of travel with respect
to the positions of the Daoist and later European models will place us in an ideal
location from which to reconsider the borders of our own east/west discourse.
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CARLEO, R. A. III (Fudan University, China)
“This World or That World: Valuing This Place in Contemporary Interpretations of
Chinese Tradition”
Major works of two of the most celebrated living Chinese philosophers, Li Zehou and
Chen Lai, follow Roger Ames in emphasizing a general divergence in worldviews
between Chinese and Western traditions of thought. Traditional Chinese thought, they
argue, predominantly views humans and the reality they inhabit as “one-world,”
celebrating this world and understanding reality (including the divine) as occurring
through and within it. This differs from “two-world” thinking, typically more associated
with Western traditions, which sees the manifest world (including things, humans, and
the divine) as ultimately originating from or grounded in a transcendent realm. Thus, in
“two-world” thought, this world is inferior or secondary to that world. The implications of
such a divergence—a valuing of this place or that which lies beyond this place—are
potentially expansive and fundamental.
Li and Chen see the implications of this divergence as crucial to understanding the
philosophical and cultural histories of China and the West. For them, “one-world”
thinking makes Chinese traditions unique as well as invaluable to global philosophical
discourse. This is because such thought suggests alternative approaches to how we
understand and value our relationships with the other humans and things through which
our world is constituted. It thereby further provides perspectives on ethical issues that
have been generally overlooked in Western philosophy.
After establishing the general distinction Li Zehou and Chen Lai draw between oneworld and two-world thought, this paper outlines the various historical and philosophical
implications that Li claims arise from China’s one-world thinking. Chen Lai generally
affirms and even identifies further potential of Li Zehou’s theory here, including how his
ideas can contribute to our understanding of early Confucian texts. However, Chen puts
forth one major point of dissatisfaction with Li Zehou’s “one-world” claim. I thus
conclude by analyzing Li’s and Chen’s divergent positions regarding metaphysical
aspects within China’s “one-world” tradition, and consider Chen Lai’s assertion that in
such a discussion we must rely on concepts native to Chinese thought, which fall
outside the (inherently “two-world”) vocabulary of Western philosophy.
CASEY, Edward S. (SUNY Stony Brook)
“Implacement and Displacement in the Light of Confucian Thought”
I will explore how place figures in Confucian writings with special attention to the
contrast between rootedness in a single place (home, region, homeland) and being
uprooted from a settled place as in circumstances of forced migration -- a phenomenon
now so conspicuously present on a world-wide scale. To what extent can one carry
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one's placial roots with one in living in new places, and if just how so? What are the
limits of displacement?
CHAKRABARTI, Arindam (University of Hawai’i)
“Going Places: Pilgrimage, Pillage, Penance and Progress”
A pilgrimage must be distinguished from just any travel or tourism. Setting out on an
arduous self-purificatory journey from one’s own place to a distant holy destination
played a crucial role in ancient and medieval religious lives. This paper would briefly
discuss three classic examples of such pilgrimage, from Hindu, Christian and Islamic
literature and theologies. Arjuna’s so-called “tīrtha-yātrā” before the great battle in the
Mahabharata; the Parson’s tale in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales; and Koranic scripture
on the ongoing Islamic practice of Hajj to Mecca.
Drawing general social, political and cultural conclusions from these disparate
examples, I try to unearth some unobvious connections between pilgrims, colonizers,
and refugees—lessons relevant to our own times and for a global philosophy of place.
CHAN, Wing-cheuk (Brock University, Canada)
“Space and Art: From Heidegger to Daoism”
In his later topology of Being Heidegger raises the question: “What is the general
character of space?” While denying the primordial status of the physical-technological
space, Heidegger claims that only art can uncover the authentic character of genuine
space. For Heidegger, clearing-away is the special character of space. As release of
places, clearing-away is a double movement of unoncealment and concealment. Artist
space thereby discloses regions of dwellings for human beings. This paper tries to show
that Daoist philosophy of art can concretely substantiate Heidegger’s theses.
Particularly, it can explain why the emptiness as the special character of space is
neither nothing nor deficiency. In return, it will unfold the ontological character of Daoist
philosophy of art and hence its possible contributions to overcoming the danger of our
technological age.
CHAMPION, Erik (Curtin University, Australia)
“Philosophical Issues of Place and the Past in Virtual Reality”
There are indisputably many good reasons for finding and restoring heritage sites and
artefacts with the most impartial and accurate scientific methods and technological
advances. Yet the ICOMOS Burra Charter defines cultural significance in terms of the
value of a place as it helps people understand the past, as it enriches the present, and
educates future generations, these values can be aesthetic, historic, social or spiritual,
(and thus not just scientific). Therefore it does not necessarily follow that the best userexperience for members of the public is purely based on a rigorous scientific
27
perspective, because such a perspective does not fully explain the cultural significance
of a place as experienced by the originators of the locally situated culture.
On the other hand, evoking cultural significance may be helped by a philosophical
consideration of how specific human experiences can be understood and conveyed.
The Dictionary of Philosophy says (on p.464) phenomenology “is the attempt to
describe our experience directly, as it is, separately from its origins and development,
independently of the causal explanations that historians, sociologists or psychologists
might give”. While hermeneutics, it says (on p.274-5), “explores the kind of existence
had by beings who are able to understand meanings, and to whom the world is primarily
an object of understanding (rather than, say, of sense-perceptions)”.
I wish to investigate whether an approach that would best utilise multimedia and the
differing multimodal ways in which we learn and experience the outside world would be
phenomenological and hermeneutical. In other words it would attempt to understand
how the way individual societies experience the world, how they interpret the world to
themselves and to each other, how their cultural signs are made, modified, and learnt. It
would also attempt to discover how the horizons of current visitors could be nudged out
of balance by being either overwhelmed by encounters with genuine alterity (that is,
sense of otherness), or by gradually learning how to be accepted in this totally different
phenomenological world.
A further pressing issue in the design of virtual places and especially in the design of
virtual heritage environments is to avoid the ‘museumization’ and ‘Western’ viewpoint as
forewarned by Ziauddin Sardar and others. Can this technology help provide an
appropriate sense of alterity and an appropriate situated sense of place?
CHAO, Tien-yi (National Taiwan University, Taiwan)
“The Conceptualisation of a ‘Feminine Universe’ in Lao Zi’s Dao De Jing and
Jane Lead’s Writings about Spiritual Alchemy”
This paper aims to compare the feminisation of the cosmos in ancient Chinese
philosopher Lao Zi’s Dao De Jing with that in the spiritual and esoteric writings by the
seventeenth-century mystic Jane Lead (also Jane Leade, 1624-1704). My study
suggests that both authors celebrated female-centred cosmology, though the cosmos’
femininity is portrayed in different ways. In Dao De Jing, Lao Zi creates the image of
‘Great Mother’ to illustrate the creative energy of the cosmos, while Lead develops
visions of ‘Virgin Sophia’ in Fountain of Gardens (V.2, 1697) and The Wonders of God’s
Creation (1696), referring to the image of Sophia as the ‘virgin body’ of God, who
revealed the secrets of the cosmos to her (Hirst 2005). By comparing and contrasting
the two authors’ narratives about a ‘female universe’, I hope to explore the ways in
which both challenged the established male-centred cosmology in their societies
through a cross-cultural critical approach.
CHAPPLE, Chris (Loyola Marymount University)
28
“Living Within Space and Place: Directionality and Inner Experience in Indian
Texts”
This paper will open with the famous teaching of Satyakama in the Upanisads, wherein
during his time in the forest, a bull teaches him the importance of being oriented to the
four directions, the first "quarter" of his 16 fold learning experience. It will continue with
a comparative analysis of the elemental and bodily aspects of human experience as
articulated in the Sāṁkhya Kārikā, the Abhidharmakosha, and the Tattvarthasutra. The
paper will conclude with passages in the Yogavasistha that connect inner space and
outer space through the practice of concentration on Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Space.
CHATTOPADHYAY, Sanskriti (Manipal University, India)
“When in Mirror: Parallel ‘Place’ in ‘Film-‘Space’’
Tuan’s ‘undifferentiated’ ‘space’ gains value and familiarity to become ‘place’. The
reality of ‘place’ though is geographical and physical for him, in the domain of film
becomes reality of a different kind. The question thus becomes that of a possibility of
the construction of ‘place’ in and from this domain that contains unique creation(s) of
‘space’.
Images that (the analogy of Indian classical music can be drawn, as film practitioner and
thinker Kumar Shahani did) ‘always lead from a kinetic home to a point of rest’ create
the ‘space’ in and of the film. Thus the film becomes a domain that embodies ‘space’ –
open, liberating, and challenging. Perception leads to an object-horizon/figure-ground
dichotomy. From that dichotomy the domain begins to take a turn towards familiarizing
‘space’ in more concrete terms.
Film is in search of tangible inhabitations of senses (or one may argue of these ‘senseplaces’). From Mani Kaul, Kumar Shahani to Deb Kamal Ganguly, in the works of the
thinker-practitioner-makers of Indian film, the ‘place’ has been searched through sound,
images, and through concept-images (conceptualized as a move from Deleuze’s timeimage and movement-image). These concept-images have the possibility to create a
rupture between the ordered relationships of signifier and signified. This rupture leads to
an erosion of meaning making which affects the memory-experience and thus, in the
next step, the intimate recognition and value endowment that converts ‘space’ into
‘place’. This may come across as the antithesis of the turn of ‘space’ to ‘place’ and yet it
is not. Instead of a recognition of a representation (which it ruptures) of familiarity of a
‘place’, through an indulgence of proximate senses as well as the distant senses this
practice create a presentation (which is built) of a new ‘place’. The experience and
reaction to this sense of ‘place’ thus becomes one that is unique to the domain that is
projected singularly by film.
The body of film that arose out of the culture of materiality and the body of video that
developed on malleability of image construction have separate sense of ‘space’
embedded in them. The expression of the move from ‘space’ to ‘place’ hence is different
as well. For the purpose of this research endeavour one shall study into both the body
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of films by Mani Kaul, Kumar Shahani, and video by Deb Kamal Ganguly to perceive
and compare the flexibility of this creation in different formations of visual art.
CHEN, I-Hsin (The University of Manchester, UK)
“A Place to Meditate: James Legge’s Translation of Xin 心”
James Legge’s (1815–1897) translation of xin 心 in his annotated Chinese Classics
(1861; 1893) serves as an excellent example of how translating a key Chinese
philosophical concept for an English-speaking international audience is able to create a
place for metaphysical meditation on the higher purpose of humanity. Legge translates
xin variously into “mind,” “heart,” “soul,” “spirit,” “higher nature,” and “the right way”
based on his dynamic understandings of the meanings and contexts of Ruist/Confucian
teachings. While modern scholarship has established Legge as a pioneering
missionary, sinologist, and translator, my paper suggests that Legge’s translation of xin
reveals his role as a philosopher who attempts to build thoughtful connections between
the Chinese and Western intellectual traditions from antiquity to the contemporary. For
Legge, xin generates universal spaces of thought on the opposition between the animal
human and the mind of reason, the dialectic relation between the quiescent and the
active, and the transcendence from the selfish desires to the principle of Heaven. By
looking at Legge’s nuanced comprehension of xin, the paper demonstrates how Legge
draws inspiration from the ancient sources, the commentaries by Zhu Xi and others, and
Christian discourses in order to enrich the spaces of his interpretations, and how he
transforms these spaces into a place to meditate through cross-cultural hermeneutics.
CHEN, Shudong (Johnson County Community College)
“Dao of Emily Dickinson: Placing of Poetry and Philosophy across Boundaries”
As noun and verb, transitive and intransitive, the word “place” indicates as much of
status, stillness, as of action or motion. The word could also connote the imaginary but
indispensable locales that creative minds, such as Kafka, depend on for thoughtprovoking argument and imagery as his essay on “The Great Wall of China” and his
novel America may so indicate. The word “place” could then also mean the crucial
inborn knowledge not necessarily acquired through actual experiences. This seemingly
unlimited or infinite space and power of the inborn knowledge is exactly what Goethe
once so emphasizes to Eckermann in as much the same way as it is so stressed in
Daodejing, which states how “a wise [person who] may know the world without leaving
his home” (ch. 47), or confirmed, along with Emerson and Zhuangzi, by Dickinson, who
insists likewise how “I never saw a Moor--/I never see the sea--/Yet know I how the
Heather looks.” (J1052). Place could certainly also suggest a never ending process of
search for common ground across cultures for transplanting, transforming, and
translation of ideas. Similarly, it could also suggest a Daoist version of choice,
adaptation, and freedom regarding where and when to fit in -- whether at the center, in
the “marginal spots,” at the “low places,” or around “back positions.” Whether imaginary
or physical, we need a place as Archimedes of Syracuse, who declares: “Give me a
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place to stand, and I shall move the Earth,” or simply as ordinary humans; we need a
place even if just for the necessity to reflect in, upon, through, with, against, and
beyond; we may need a place, just like Whitman’s little “noiseless patient spider,” to be
at once physically and emotionally attached to, attached from, or nourished by. On the
issue of place, the American literature is particularly rich with many of its creatively
philosophical minds so brilliantly sensitive to the influences or power of places, such as
Whitman, Emerson, Thoreau, Henry James, and especially Emily Dickinson.
On the issue of “place,” it is, therefore, not an issue of whether or what we could learn
from Emily Dickinson the poet as philosopher or a philosopher behind a poet, but how,
how much, or how infinitely much from the reputed “Wittgenstein of Amherst” so always
tirelessly searching from place to place, “from blank to blank,” trying to find her ways to
express the “unutterable” (Wittgenstein) “Pain [that] — has an Element of Blank —” (J
659). Unless with the ultimate silence as Wittgenstein also thus indicates, place could
also suggest the maximum efforts and possibility regarding how Dickinson really wants
all “lofty ideas,” such as “Faith,” “Heaven,” and “God,” which often make us float like
Jonathan Swift’s Laputians of the Flying Island, be literally “put down [along with] this
World like a Bundle” (J527) upon the “rough ground” of “actual language” with “frictions”
(Wittgenstein 1968, 107, 46c).
The place therefore could also possibly indicate the risk of such a process that would
abruptly collapse or be paralyzed as our language would as the “unusable locale” at any
moment once involuntarily overloaded with the infinitely growing messages inherent in
the deceptively perspicuous “word pictures,” such as “Four Trees – upon a solitary
Acre” (J742). Ultimately, the illuminated could also instantly illuminates as Goethe would
so suggest here especially in the case with Dickinson as long as there appear any
additional slight tints of light as from Goethe’s little lyric of “Wanderers Nachtlied” and
Ma Zhiyuan’s “Tian Jing Sha” besides the subtle refractions of Daoism. All in all, at once
as noun and as in/transitive verb, the word “place” indicates how often everything in the
world could be so simultaneously of an everlasting spatial tempo and an ever present
temporal space, and how, with Dickinson rightly set in place, the word “place” could also
thus probably indicate Dao itself in ways so reminiscent of a perpetual sense of lyrical
contemporaneity that suggests the forever ungraspable but immeasurably real beauty
and power of Dao in an infinitely intricate and simple mode and mood of its timely
timelessness and motionless motion.
CHENG, Chung-ying (University of Hawai’i)
“Place, Time and Confucian Roots”
The place exists due to time and thus we may speak of past place, present and future
place. The place also exists for yielding its place to things and people. Thus the world is
place full of things and people, but it is also open to continued growth or sudden
destruction or being laid waste. In this panel we explore whether things and people and
cultures have their roots in their places or just flow and being thrown. The speakers will
specifically speak and raise about the rooting of Confucianism in the world. My paper
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will deal with the above issues and take a deep root view of Confucianism and
see Confucianism as a transformative force of humanity which would require
knowledge and moral action.
CHENNOUFI, Ridha A. (University of Tunis, Tunisia)
“Territory, Tribe, and Political Power: A Different View onPolitical Space in the
Maghreb”
The object of my paper is to determine on the basis of Ibn Khaldun’s writings the role
territorial stakes played in the formation of the modern state. Indeed, to this day, the
theory of political power as applied on Islamic lands is essentially centered on the
notions of clan-based ‘solidarity’ (‘asabiyya) and “community” (umma). As a result, the
territorial factor has been occultated under the pretense that Kabyle, Arab, or Muslim
societies, other than Western societies, do not define themselves in relation to the City.
This allegedly explains and justifies that it is border conflicts which prevented and still
prevent the so-called Arabic-Islamic Maghrib (West) and Mashriq (East) to mutually
recognize each other as sovereign states.
My paper will challenge this view by showing that Ibn Khaldun developed a conception
of space, territory, and political power that is diametrically opposed to the Westphalian
one, and, more importantly, of great actuality. Suffice it to say, the political conflicts
igniting the world incessantly since the end of the cold war seem to converge towards
the constitution of large geopolitical spaces defined much more in terms of cultural
identity than the fundamental rights of individuals.
CHENG, Sinkwan (Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Sweden)
“Problematizing the Liberal Notion of ‘Self’ via Aristotle and Confucius”
My paper uses the classical Greek and Chinese traditions’ common incompatibility with
modern liberal notion of “right” to explore the commonalities between them, and
examine how two civilizations apart from each other could nonetheless share a similar
idea of “self” giving rise to similar notions of “right.” This will serve as the starting point in
my search for a new “right” that could better accommodate both Eastern and Western
traditions. Note, however, that while exploring the similarities between the ancient
Greek and Chinese thoughts— represented in my paper respectively by Aristotle and
Confucius--my paper also investigates their critical differences.
Both Aristotle and Confucius prioritize the collective before the individual. Contrary to
modern liberal rights, Aristotle’s to dikaion and Confucius’s ren are both ad alterum (to
another) rather than ad se (to oneself). A major difference, however, exists between the
Hellenic and the Chinese thinker regarding the meaning of the “other.” As evident from
Nicomachean Ethics, the “other” must be “either a ruler or a copartner” (NE V 1). Justice
for Aristotle, in other words, can only occur between “equal members of a civil or
political society, who alone can properly be called 'others'” (Annabel Brett).
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The “other” for Confucius, by contrast, is all embracive—regardless of birth, class origin,
and even species. One of the highest expressions of justice for Confucius is ren (仁).
Being compassionate toward any other human being is ren (仁, humane). However,
being kind to animals also qualifies as ren. My paper explores why Confucius believes
that justice can be best realized in the world (what Confucius describes as “A World for
All (天下爲公)”) in contrast to Aristotle’s idea of justice among “equals in the polis.” I do
so by probing the different cultural assumptions, moral ontology, and cosmologies
underpinning both systems of thinking.
CHEUNG, Leo K. C. (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
“The Place of the Ture Master in the Zhuangzi”
Besides attempting to making all things and discussions equal, in the chapter
“Discussion on making all things equal” of the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi, the author
tries to argue for the existence of the “True Master”, or the “True Lord”, as the one who
controls, or governs, one’s action, sensation, passion, and emotion:
…Let it be! Let it be! [It is enough that] morning and evening we have
them, and they are the means by which we live. Without them we would
not exist; without us they would have nothing to take hold of. This comes
close to the matter. But I do not know what makes them the way they are.
It would seem as though they have some True Master, and yet I find no
trace of him. He can act - that is certain. Yet I cannot see his form. He has
identity but no form.
…The hundred joints, the nine openings, the six organs, all come together
and exist here [as my body]. But which part should I feel closest to? I
should delight in all parts, you say? But there must be one I ought to favor
more. If not, are they all of them mere servants? But if they are all
servants, then how can they keep order among themselves? Or do they
take turns being lord and servant? It would seem as though there must be
some True Lord among them. But whether I succeed in discovering his
identity or not, it neither adds to nor detracts from his Truth. (Watson’s
translation; emphasis mine.)
The True Master, or the True Lord, is therefore the subject, or, the agent. It is formless,
and yet still has its identity.
In the story about Uncle Lack-Limb and Uncle Lame-gait in the chapter “Perfect
Happiness” of the outer chapters of the Zhuangzi, the author seems to try to bring out
the point that the “me”, or “I”, as my body changes (transforms) in the process of
transformation (change):
Uncle Lack-Limb and Uncle Lame-Gait were seeing the sights at Dark
Lord Hill and the wastes of Kunlun, the place where the Yellow Emperor
rested. Suddenly a willow sprouted out of Uncle Lame-Gait’s left elbow.
33
He looked very startled and seemed to be annoyed. “Do you resent it?”
said Uncle Lack-Limb. “No—what is there to resent?” said Uncle LameGait. “To live is to borrow. And if we borrow to live, then life must be a pile
of trash. Life and death are day and night. You and I came to watch the
process of change, and now change has caught up with me. Why would I
have anything to resent?” (Watson’s translation; emphasis mine.)
Moreover, as I argue, with supplementary textual evidence, in this paper in detail, the
author also seems to think that the “me”, who changes in the process of transformation,
is not the True Master, but that the “me” is identifiable with my body. In other words, the
True Master, who governs my action, sensation, passion and emotion, cannot itself
reside in its actions, sensations, passions or emotions, and, in particular, the world—the
process of transformation.
The claim that some authors of the Zhuangzi hold that the True Master, or the subject,
does not change with, nor resides in, the process of transformation at least is supported
by the following passage from the chapter “Tse Yang” of the miscellaneous chapters of
the Zhuangzi:
And because day by day he was with the one who transforms things, he
was one who never transforms—so why should he ever try to stop doing
this? (Watson’s translation with alterations.)
The True Master is then a formless subject, who governs one’s action, sensation,
passion and emotion, and yet has its identity, and is also the one who never transforms
and thus never resides in the world or the process of transformation. One may say, the
True Master is transcendental in the sense that it governs, and influences, one’s
engagement in the process of transformation, that is, in the world.
Besides arguing for the claim that the Zhuangzi adopts the notion of the True Master as
the transcendental formless subject, this paper also aims to investigate the place of the
True Master in Zhuangzi’s philosophy.
CHINN, Meilin (Santa Clara University)
“Space is the Place: Musical Space as Place in Early Chinese Philosophy”
Music has been called the most temporal of the arts and even the art of time itself. The
same is not said of music and space. The assumption that music is not spatial depends
primarily on a definition of space as physically extended and dimensional. Following
this, music occurs in space, but there is no space in music. In contrast, early Chinese
philosophers were disinclined to treat space and time as objective and separate
categories, rather taking them to be particular, idiosyncratic, and best understood in
terms of events, cycles, and movements. Space is as much an event as time.
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Drawing on work by early Chinese philosophers, especially the Confucian view of music
articulated in the Yue Ji or Book of Music, I will make the case that music is not only
spatial, but that musical space is best understood in terms of place, that is, as an
always particular space that emerges through the mutual resonance of performers and
listeners within and across their cultural and historical contexts. Consequently, music
can be used to cultivate virtue as a kind of virtuosity of sense: skilled, keen abilities to
sense right moments, optimal formations, and appropriate, meaningful responses.
Finally, and perhaps more controversially, I hope to use this account of musical space
as place to explain the Confucian belief that the character of people and cultures could
be heard in music from distant places.
CHOI, Dobin (Towson University)
“Environment and Virtue in the Moral Thoughts of Mengzi and Hume”
This paper explores the influences of environment to a person’s virtues in the moral
thoughts of Mengzi and David Hume. Our common sense admits that environmental
factors exert notable influences toward a person’s temper and character. Those who
live near seashore would have acquired different characters from those who dwell in
high mountains, or crowded urban area. While Mengzi acknowledges that the change of
residence would have great influence on one’s nurturing both qi and body (7A36), Hume
admits that ordinary people ascribe “the national characters” to such “physical causes”
as “the air and climate” of their dwelling in his essay “Of National Characters.” However,
Hume dismisses the physical causes due to their having “no discernible operation on
the human mind,” but instead relies on “moral causes” for the characters that are “fitted
to work on the mind as motives and reasons.” Given his emphasis on the faculty of
sympathy and the force of moral sentiment in motivation, the most influential
environmental causes for a person’s virtue are the characters of her surrounding people
rather than physical environment. Not surprisingly, Hume’s human environmental
causes aptly explicate Mengzi’s ideal dwelling. The environmental influence to a
person’s qi does not rule out the change of human environment. Above all, Mengzi’s
conviction that a person’s ultimate residence is ren (7A33) delivers the significance of
human environment. Given that ren is the other-regarding virtue to care “all in the Four
Seas,” a person’s dwelling in ren would partly involve her living surrounded by people,
namely the “moral causes.”
In sum, both Mengzi and Hume would agree that human environment is the central
factor in forming our virtues and character traits. However, Mengzi goes further to claim
that we have the natural capacity to construct the best kind of human environment with
our own effort of introspection. While our introspection of the heart and achievement of
the inherent ren makes the best residence for our life (4B14), our failure to dwell in ren
is identical with “throwing oneself away” (4A10). Mengzi’s suggestion of the
autonomous creation of human environment affords us an inward way of virtue
cultivation. It enables us to avert the negative influence of undesirable human
environment, and further to keep our natural aspiration for benevolence untarnished.
35
CHUNG, Hyun-jung (Yonsei University, Korea)
“Uncleanness of Childbirth and the Purity of Ancestral Rite”
According to one of the Confucian classics, the Book of Rites, one should perform
purification before conducting ancestral rite, and a husband is not supposed to enter the
delivery room of his wife when he is performing purification. Childbirth had been
regarded as an unclean event by the Confucian scholars of the Joseon Dynasty. They
argue that if a wife is in childbirth, the family must not conduct ancestral rite because the
childbirth disturbs the purification and soils the cleanness of ancestral rite. In general,
Confucianism put a high value on human life and being alive. However, Confucian
scholars of the Joseon Dynasty define the moment of birth as a kind of uncleanness in
contrast to purification for ancestor worship ceremony.
CIOFLEC, Eveline (University of Tubingen, Germany)
“Belonging Somewhere: Journeys and Dwelling”
In my paper I will show how “belonging to” defines identity by being a central component
of “dwelling”. “Belonging somewhere” is necessarily included in the first sense of
belonging. Hence, “belonging” cannot be reduced to virtual or abstract entities, but
remains rooted in places exceeding meaning by being grounded on earth. Such,
“belonging to” has a bodily component of “belonging somewhere”. As Edward Casey
has shown, journeys like those of Basho and Odysseus reveal the interlacement
between places and identity.
CLAUS, C. Anne (American University)
“Coral Reef Cultures and Place-Making in Okinawa”
Over the past 40 years in southwestern Okinawa, views of the sea and ino (nearshore
coral reefs) have shifted as this region has become a site of stewardship among coastal
residents. Village life shapes and is shaped by the coral reef in multiple dimensions.
Spiritual interests in the nearshore sea result in engagements with the sea during
annual festivals and in daily prayers, occasions during which the nearshore sea (ino)
becomes a site for purification and protection. At the same time, Shiraho village has
emerged as a cohesive target of mainland scientific and tourist interest because of its
presentation as an eco-village with a strong “coral reef culture.” Past and present
articulations of Shiraho as a cohesive village shaped by its coral reef are conditioned by
demographic changes that have brought increasing numbers of newcomers from
mainland Japan. Two recent conservation projects involve residents in new kinds of
material engagements with the ino, and I examine how the Sunday Market and periodic
walks provide the platform for self-reflective enforcement of a village sense of place as
well as aspirational place-making by mainland Japanese conservationists.
COOK, Benjamin (Almiraj Sufi and Islamic Study Centre, Australia)
“The Place of the Zawiya within Sufism”
36
The Zawiya (Sufi Centre) occupies a significant place within Islam generally and the
Sufi community in particular. For the general population, a zawiya may be seen as a
place wherein people gather and worship. For the adherents of Sufism, the zawiya is a
transformative space wherein teaching is transmitted, baraka (spiritual energy) is
concentrated, and soteriological development is intensified. This paper is divided into
three sections. The first section will provide a historical overview of the development of
the zawiya. The second section will detail what a zawiya ideally contains and how this
informs its functionality. The third section will explore how suhba (companionship) is an
important aspect of the zawiya and how this can contribute to an intensified
soteriological development for the adherents of Sufism.
COYLE, Daniel (Birmingham—Southern College)
“On Global Wandering and Strategic Place: Nietzsche’s Trans-Asiatic
Hyperboreans”
Throughout his professional career, Nietzsche employs a hermeneutic method of
deliberately and experimentally estranging (entfremden) himself from the time, place,
and culture of the present so that he might “look 'into the world' otherwise.” The
practice involves a strategic distancing that seeks to awaken ordinarily dormant
perspectives on emerging futures. This “subtler art and aim of travel” reveals a global
sensibility that we can trace from Nietzsche’s first book to his last. His genealogical and
depth-psychological searching of the ancient past presages a trans-historical philosophy
of a global future, his interest in traveling to North Africa arises from a specific desire to
sharpen his “judgment and eye for all things European,” and finally, his admitted transcultural need employs “the foreign” to “learn to think more orientally,” even “emigrate to
Japan.” This global aspiration matures in the “trans-Asiatic eye” of Zarathustra and the
enigmatic experience of eternal recurrence, which arrives through the spontaneous
cycle of process itself. Since this eye “sees under itself,” it undermines fixed place.
Nietzsche’s places are strategic: calls to wander, signposts for global travelers. His
culminating figure of the “Hyperborean” is curious in many ways. For one, the selfproclaimed “disciple of Dionysus” in a final flash of lucidity again identifies himself as a
pious worshiper of Apollo, thereby establishing a global task.
I argue that within the polar continuum of human experience, when we increase
distance we increase intensity and effect, and that Nietzsche’s mask of Apollo imparts
the insight that reversing perspectives (Perspektiven umzustellen) derives states of
affairs from their correlative opposites, and thus propel us beyond metaphysical
contraries to “life herself.” Nietzsche's method of temporal, spatial, and cultural
distancing provides a valuable hermeneutic resource for understanding East-Asian
ways of thinking, specifically, I show that his deliberate strategy of estranging himself in
quest of an optimal disposition towards the oscillating recurrences of life remarkably
resonates with the proactive Daoist strategic praxeology of “fan 反” (‘returning’).
CRELLER, Aaron B. (University of North Florida)
37
“Place-ing Chinese Epistemology on the Map: The Danger of Ignoring Place in
Accounts of Knowledge”
Analytic epistemology has largely ignored the works of non-English (specifically
Chinese) speaking comparative epistemologists. This paper investigates the problems
of contemporary attempts to integrate Chinese philosophy into Anglo- and Euro-centric
models of knowledge, as well as the role played by geo-political place in dismissing
comparative approaches to theories of knowledge.
Starting off with an analysis of the recent attempts at comparative epistemology
surrounding Ernest Sosa, I argue that much of the original comparative work done by
major analytic Chinese philosophers in the Twentieth Century is ignored because it
does not conform (and perhaps even undermines) contemporary models of knowledge.
One major cause for this confirmation bias amongst English-speaking analytic
epistemologists is the lack of attention to the importance of place, power, and history.
The second half of the paper examines the works of Zhang Dongsun and Jin Yuelin,
identifying the influence Western philosophy has had on Chinese thinkers, as well as
the ways in which they integrated the nuances of both traditional analytic philosophy
and classical Chinese philosophy. Contemporary attempts by Western epistemology to
find “universal epistemic principles” can easily be put into dialogue with the ideas of
philosophers such as Zhang and Jin because they are all discussing the structures of
knowledge, but these figures are mostly ignored in English language sources that are
“discovering” epistemology in Chinese sources, such as Warring-States era texts.
I conclude by arguing that the possibility of such a dialogue demonstrates that the new
interest Western epistemology has in Chinese thought at minimum ignores the history of
Chinese comparative epistemology, and at worst is actively ignoring the important
particulars of its own geo-political place.
CUNEO, Daniele (Leiden University, The Netherlands)
“An Unheeded Locus of the Aesthetic Experience (rasa): The Performer Diderot’s
Paradoxe sur le comédien across Indian Philosophical Sources”
The figure, role and personal experience of the performer have been the object of
practical and theoretical scrutiny across latitudes and cultures since the very beginning
of the various dramaturgical traditions of the globe and the ensuing aesthetic reflections
on the phenomenon of artistic performance in particular as well as art in general.
Famously enough, with regard to the actor’s emotional involvement within the
enactment of the play, the positions at the two extremes are represented by Diderot’s
absolute refusal of any affective relation of the actor to the character he is portraying
and by Stanislavsky’s relentless focus on the complete emotional engrossment within
the fictional, emotional scenery being performed. Similar extreme positions as well as
bold intermediate stances can be found in numerous Sanskrit dramaturgical-cum-
38
philosophical sources. In these works, the various opinions are defended and refuted
according to both more narrowly aesthetic and more largely philosophical arguments
concerning, for instance, the phenomenology of the aesthetic experience, the emotional
make-up of the human mind, and their relation with the underlining configuration of
reality—often viewed as a playful manifestation of an absolute consciousness- principle.
In the most commonly accepted theory, the spectator of the dramatic performance is
understandably considered to be the recognized locus of the aesthetic experience, an
experience of blissful savouring (rasa, ‘taste’), which foreshadows the mystical
experience of oneness with the absolute. However, the existence of a previous,
identical experience in the author of the play and its indispensable transmission through
the medium of the performer —be it an active or a passive recipient of that— are also
recognized as vital aspects of the aesthetic process. In this presentation I’ll try to sketch
some of the arguments put forward by Indian authors with regard to the actor’s aesthetic
role and the implicit rationale behind them, starting with the seminal dramaturgical
treatise by Bharata, the Nāṭyaśāstra, up to the second-millennium theories of Bengali
Vaishnavism, where aesthetics and theology merge in the intentionally paradoxical
figure of the actor-devotee.
The major protagonist in our excursus will be Abhinavagupta (10th-11th century,
Kaśmīr), a tantric master and philosopher who fashioned a masterful synthesis of earlier
aesthetic theories, in which the role of the actor is scrutinized from both a practical and
a theoretical perspective, in order to situate its function within a renovated
understanding of the aesthetic process itself. In such a re-positioning of the actor’s role,
fictional detachment and emotional involvement are integrated in the figure of the
performer and in its liminal nature of both creator and recipient of the blissful elixir of
aesthetic experience.
CURLEY, Melissa Anne-Marie (The Ohio State University)
“Voluntary Captive: HANAYAMA Shinshō’s Prison Pure Land”
In the autumn of 1945, the United States Army took possession of Tokyo’s Sugamo
Prison, outfitting it for use as a detention facility to house those charged with war
crimes. Upon discovering that most of their prisoners professed to be Buddhist, the
army invited Hanayama Shinshō—Shinshū priest and scholar of Buddhist Studies—to
serve as a volunteer chaplain. My presentation examines how Hanayama improvised an
interpretation of the space of the prison as a pure land, both ritually and narratively.
Taking up Keta Masako’s discussion of the two visions of the world offered by Pure
Land Buddhism—the world of death and the world of salvation—I explore how
Hanayama understood his role as chaplain in terms of constructing the prison as a site
of liberation, even for those prisoners who had been sentenced to death. I conclude with
a tentative comparison between the forgotten place of Sugamo and the national
memorial site, Yasukuni Shrine.
DAI, Yuanfang, Dongping ZHENG, Yang LIU (University of Hawai’i)
39
“The “Place” of Identity Construction”
In this paper we to address learning experiences via mobile technology that take place
where social space and school space meet. Using a different dataset sampled from the
same project as in the third paper, Guardian of Mo‘o, we argue that this meeting place
is also a place of identity construction that can accommodate the multiplicity of identity.
We draw on the idea of “genuine pluralist categorization”(Marilyn Frye 1996, 2005) to
interpret language learners’ identity and agency shifts as they move between game
space and built environments such as the Japanese garden and Korean center on UH
campus.
According to Frye, a category is constructed by working differences into structure, rather
than sorting things according to a list of properties and attributes. The structure requires
that the elements that it arranges be in a significant variety of relations with each other
and that they have internal complexity, thus difference of any specific kind is preserved
and organized.
For instance, the category of “women” should be demonstrated by images such as an
individual woman located in “a correlational density in a multidimensional quality space”
(2005). In a similar vein, the category of “language learners” should be constructed
through multilayered correlations, which involve surprise, satisfaction, confusion,
struggles, and conflicts. In a sense, this is a matter of overlapping clusters of similarities
and differences among language learners. An identity of a language learner is
constructed in the multidimensional space where the past self meets the present self,
the Western culture meets the Eastern culture, and the social space meets the school
space.
DALLMAYR Fred (University of Notre Dame)
“Thomas Merton and Asian Thought”
XXXXX
D’AMBROSIO, Paul J. (East China Normal University, China)
“A Wider Space for One’s Place: Contemporary Challenges to Confucianism and
a Communitarian Response”
Chinese conceptions of the self, as discussed by Roger Ames, Henry Rosemont, Li
Zehou, Yang Gourong and others, largely rely on the place a person occupies in social
roles and interpersonal relationships. Moral appropriateness is then achieved through
productively excelling in one’s place. Accordingly, one learns how to properly cultivate
themselves in relationships beginning with immediate role models in the family, which
provide the guidelines for how one should behave in broader social contexts. The self,
in turn, is also broadened. This perspective does, however, contain certain limitations,
which contemporary Chinese society now faces. For instance: 1) What happens if one
40
has bad role models? 2) How can one flourish in stifling roles? 3) How should strangers
be treated? At least in modern times Chinese society seems to have difficulties in these
areas, although there are certainly traditional resources for dealing with these
challenges. For example, the Analects records Confucius as saying "Within the four
oceans [i.e. in the entire world] all men are brothers (四海之内皆兄弟).”
By extending the person's ties beyond established relationships (推己及人), this idea
provides a way to deal with the first and third challenge by expanding one’s field. In
other words, it sets up a sense of community where one's allegiances are not limited
to static (individuated) relationships. The person's concerns and involvement (关) with
others is no longer narrowly fixed (系) in individuated relationships. Unfortunately,
however, these arguments have not been emphasized in recent Chinese philosophy or
society.
Michael Sandel’s communitarian approach offers a way to bolster Confucian philosophy.
In general, communitarianism focuses on the importance of communal ties in
developing one’s sense of self and moral reasoning. Although Sandel himself does not
deal directly with the Chinese Confucian tradition, his ideas can be used to address
challenges outlined above in a way that compliments Confucianism. Sandel’s approach
is more or less in line with the social orientation of Confucian ethics and perspectives on
the self, but emphasizes aspects not stressed in the Confucian tradition. In this way
communitarian philosophy can be used to address some of China’s most pressing
moral crises. This type of dialogue is more promising than others, such as injecting
“human rights” and other notions based on individualism into Chinese society, since
communitarian approaches are much more compatible with traditional Confucianism.
DARWELL, Stephen (Yale University)
“Presence: Place and Second-Personal Space”
What is presence or to be in someone's presence? And how does it relate to the familiar
and our sense of place? I will investigate these issues and how presence as a secondpersonal space of potential interpersonal interaction informs the emotional
apprehension of place.
DAVIDSON, Lake (Colorado State University)
“Yibing: Human Nature’s Impact on the Confucian Model of Righteous War”
Warfare has pervaded humanity across cultures and through time. Because war is
ubiquitous, many philosophers from around the globe have theorized on how best to
deal with it. However, it seems that in order to properly develop an account of military
ethics, philosophers need to establish a substantial view on the nature of humans.
Many moral thinkers on the topic of war have failed to do this; however the early
Confucian philosophers, Mengzi and Xunzi, give very clear accounts of human nature.
While both thinkers hail from the tradition of Confucianism, their debate on human
41
nature remains a major point of inquiry for many scholars, yet the differences between
their ideas of yibing (義兵), “righteous war”, are much more subtle. Several questions
may arise here. What are their views of human nature? How do these views help to
ground their accounts of what constitutes “righteous war”? What impact does the selfcultivation/reformation of the ruler’s nature have on their thoughts of yibing? This paper
serves to answer these questions by highlighting that both Ru stressed the importance
of benevolence, propriety, and righteousness from the peasant to the sage-king. One
key feature of Confucian political philosophy is the consideration of proper governance
through a supreme ruler, who oversaw the conducting of martial affairs. The ruler’s
retention of these virtues was seen as fundamentally important to maintaining an
ordered and noble realm, and to their overall doctrines on righteous warfare.
DAVIS, Gordon F. (Carleton University, Canada)
“The Ethics of Hierophany and Theophany: Buddhist vs. Modern Liberal
Perspectives on the Geography of the Sacred”
One feature of Buddhism that has intrigued many Western philosophers is its apparently
atheist character (at least as ‘atheism’ has been understood in mainstream Western
theology). On a strictly atheist interpretation, Buddhism would seem to hold that
theophanies are illusory. Some religious scholars, such as Mircea Eliade, have tried to
rescue the phenomenology of religious experience, even for those who consider
themselves atheists, by analyzing what they call hierophany. Epistemologists will
remain sceptical of the significance of both ‘theophany’ and ‘hierophany’; and
meanwhile many liberal and cosmopolitan ethicists may express concerns about the
geographical implications of hierophany narratives – in particular, their potential for
divisiveness among various religious communities, some of whom may seek special
protection for, or special access to, the sites where sages or prophets claimed to have
profound religious experiences.
Many ethical perspectives would take a different view, but there is also one normally
thought of as modern and Western that would approach this in a more relaxed spirit,
namely consequentialism. In fact, consequentialists keep an open mind not only about
the significance of the experience of hierophany, but even about reports of theophany –
and the same goes for consequentialists who happen to be atheist. The Mahayana
Buddhist context provides an interesting point of comparison. On the one hand, there
are many tantric traditions in the Mahayana tradition that speak of a kind of theophany;
on the other hand, they are embedded in scriptural traditions that include texts whose
ethical message is more or less consequentialist (either entirely, e.g. according to
Charles Goodman’s interpretation, or partially, as seen in piecemeal appeals to upaya
(‘skillful-means’)).
A case in point is the usage of Santideva’s texts within Tibetan Mahayana Buddhism. I
consider what this kind of consequentialism would imply about the geography of the
sacred, and how the Mahayana’s ‘two-truths’ conception can inform a philosophical
42
account of the interplay between ethics, religious experience and spiritual orientation to
particular places in the extended landscape of a religious tradition.
DAVIS, Jake H. (Brown University)
“The Scope for Wisdom’: Early Buddhism on Reasons and Persons”
The denial that persons exist, in some ultimate sense, is widely understood to be a
central Buddhist doctrine. In Consequences of Compassion, Charles Goodman (2009)
suggests that in a range of classical Buddhist sources some version of this
metaphysical thesis about persons helps to underwrite an ethical thesis, that we ought
to minimize the total amount of suffering there is in the world. There is a compelling
connection between these two ideas: since we all agree that our own suffering is to be
avoided, if there are ultimately no distinctions between persons, then perhaps one ought
to act or live in whatever way will most effectively reduce all of the suffering there is in
the world, regardless of whose it is.
Nonetheless, as a characterization of early Buddhist thought this proposal is doubly
mistaken. The Buddha, as he is portrayed in the early Buddhist discourses, endorses
neither the metaphysical claim, that persons on some ultimate level do not exist, nor the
ethical claim, that we ought to live in whatever way will minimize the total amount of
suffering there is in the world. Instead, early Buddhism has a different, and more novel,
contribution to make to contemporary ethical thought.
DEAN-HAIDET, Kate (Ohio Health Hospice/Ohio University)
“Thanatopoiesis: Zen and the Art of Hospice Care”
Contemporary Western hospice care was conceived as a place for providing respite and
peaceful dying with attention to the whole person, yet cultural trends in American
healthcare delivery are eroding the hospice ideal. This paper describes the moral
distress that emerges for interdisciplinary caregivers when their intimacy-based
assumptions about human beings are overshadowed by integrity-based practices in
end-of-life care. I assert that these affective energies are transforming hospice care
towards a new balance, in the service of a resonant death, where the dying process is
shared in intimate bonds among those in presence.
Thanatopoiesis, a word chosen to connote the creative making of death, refers to a
broad range of holistic transformations that dynamically unfold in spaces of death and
dying. This paper suggests that Zen Buddhist philosophy is reinvigorating the hospice
ideal towards creation of a place where dying resonates within a web of interdependent
relation, beyond the individualized death of Western medicine.
DEFOORT, Carine (University of Leuven, Belgium)
“The Non-Place of ‘Chinese Philosophy’ at European Universities”
43
During the last decades, there has been a lively debate on the legitimacy of Chinese
philosophy and its continuous exclusion from the academic world. This debate has
reached a point where it would benefit from more focus upon different periods and
regions within and beyond China. As for the Western world, the situation in the United
States has been mostly discussed. In this paper, I focus upon the situation in Europe,
using my own university and research funding organizations as a case-study. The
position of “Chinese philosophy” at European universities not only reflects longstanding
views or assumptions concerning philosophy, but is also representative of the
institutional rejection of China (along with other non-Western regions) in other
disciplines of the human sciences. Detailed documentation of the non-place of Chinese
philosophy at European institutions shows how different Europe is from the United
States in this respect.
DIPPMANN, Jeffery W. (Central Washington University)
“Residing in De: Contentment, Home & Finding One’s Place in the Liezi and
Zhuangzi”
Although traditionally recognized as a classic, the Liezi 列子 has remained one of the
most understudied and, in some ways, most misunderstood texts within the Daoist
canon. The present study first elucidates the Liezi’s conception of de 德 as it relates to
contentedness with one’s particular allotment (or fen 分) in life. Special attention is paid
to the exchange between Beigongzi and Ximengzi (found in the Li Ming 力命 [Endeavor
and Destiny] chapter). Here, in spite of his mean status and circumstances, Beigongzi
discovers that contentment arises in the recognition of the virtue/worth/value inherent in
his particular ming (命) from heaven. Whereas Ximengzi’s privileged status, and
apparent happiness, was a result of his heaven-allocated luck, Beigongzi, and by
extension the Liezi’s readers, learns that true happiness resides in making the most of
one’s de, the inborn manifestation of dao 道 within all things. The paper then moves on
to explore similar themes in the Zhuangzi, teasing out the various ways in which the text
both supports and expands the Daoist conception of locating contentment and “home”
within one’s “heavenly mandate” (tian ming 天命). As we read in Zhuangzi 4, “To serve
one’s own mind so that neither sadness or joy sway or move it; to comprehend that
what you can do nothing about and rest content it as your ming 命, this is de 德
perfected” 自事其心者，哀樂不易施乎前，知其不可奈何而安之若命，德之至也.Who
and what we are ultimately resides in our homeground, the perfection of the virtue
provided to each of us by heaven’s allocation.
DIXON, Mark H. (Ohio Northern University)
“Place and Emplacement in the Cinema”
Much has been written about place and its role in being human. The simple truth is that
as embodied beings, as beings in the world, humans are also emplaced beings –
beings that must exist in some place at some particular time. The interactions between
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human beings and place is an intricate one in which places influence human beings and
then human beings in turn influence places. Indeed the details that describe our
emplacement then – the where, the when, the how, the why – have formative roles in
our, social and personal, identities.
In broad terms emplacement emerges through both conscious deliberate process – one
chooses to live in a particular place – and through happenings outside our control – one
receives a promotion and is sent to another office. There are also still other places
where we have been throughout our lives and to which there are greater or lesser
connections. Together all these places and connections influence who we are as
persons. A place then is more than a geographical location it also includes all the
historical associations and personal attitudes that binds us to the place.
The question I shall consider in this paper concerns the role that place has in the
cinema. German director, Wim Wenders writes that it is place that motivates the stories
that films weave. Is this place’s sole role, to motivate stories? There is I believe deeper
role as can be seen in this question: Can films ‘emplace’ us? Our lives and bodies
emplace us somewhere in space and time. Our motivations and desires emplace us in
particular places at particular times. But can films emplace us in the places that the film
describes?
I shall argue that, through image, sound and dialogue the cinema does have to power to
emplace us – emplace us within moving frame in all its richness. As such the places we
inhabit within films have the capabilities to influence or identities and the manner in
which we dwell on the earth has human beings. What is in question here is more than a
mere passing relocation or distraction, what is known as the suspension of disbelief.
The best films do more then than relocate us in some trivial and provisional manner,
rather through their visual, linguistic and aural properties these films emplace us within
the place(s) the film describes. The processes here are analogous to those through
which our choices and other happenings emplace us in ‘real world’ places.
DONAHUE, Amy (Kennesaw State University)
“Places of Knowing in Nyāya and Buddhist Philosophy: What ‘Philosophy’
Cannot Mean if It is Global”
If philosophy is a universal human activity, then conventional representations in the
academy of the concept ‘philosophy’ must change. In Nyāya and Buddhist philosophies
of language, conceptual understandings are always situated in some place. These
conceptual understandings are jn̄ānas – episodic cognitions involving specific knowers,
objects, and mechanisms of cognition. Further, in Buddhist philosophies of language,
conceptual understandings are inferential. They therefore emerge only from specific
pakṣas, or places, and only through spatially, temporally, and causally situated
(deśakālāvasthāniyata) processes of determination. Ultimately, according to these
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philosophies, therefore, understandings of concepts such as ‘philosophy’ cannot be
universal.
However, if one wishes to avoid radical implications of such Buddhist nominalist
arguments for possibilities of communication (as I do), then one might instead seek to
ground global understandings of ‘philosophy’ in other, perhaps less extreme,
philosophical frameworks, such as Madhyamaka philosophies of conventional truth and
Nyāya realism. However, arguments developed by Gaṅgeśa and Jñānaśrīmitra suggest
that one could then no longer legitimately conceive of ‘philosophy’ as a universal human
activity inaugurated by the Greeks dedicated to the examination of a vaguely specific
set of “central” human problems and questions.
DORSEY, Donna (MacEwan University, Canada)
“A Buddhist View of Rebirth: Place or Not-place?”
A Buddhist concept of rebirth might be understood as a way to enable a continuous
presence, a determinate linking place, as it were, enabling karmic continuity. Or rebirth
may be seen as a conduit to a place on the karmic wheel where a relative position is
held within a sequence of possible ethicized places and, here, rebirth may be
conditioned by craving and not by karma. However rebirth is envisioned, imagined or
understood, the relation of rebirth to place is complicated. Rebirth is both place and not
place since rebirth meets some of the conditions of place, but it also rejects such
categorization. If rebirth is a place in the sense of a momentary existent determined by
past acts it is also, in an important sense, no more of a place than any other moment in
existence. The Buddhist doctrines of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) and
impermanence (anitya) reject the belief that rebirth indicates a continuity, and the
Buddhist doctrine of no-self (anātman) is a challenge to any claim that rebirth is an
event in the history of a continuous being. In spite of these foundational Buddhist
principles, rebirth seems to function in the manner of a fixed place for a rebirth-seekingconsciousness bound to the ethicized space of worldly samsara. Since no one account
of the rebirth doctrine crossing all Buddhist schools is agreed upon, this paper instead
will focus on the work of Santideva where, for example in the Bodhicharyavatara, rebirth
is referred to as a snare. An explication of his thinking may provide a way in which the
Buddhist idea of rebirth as place, or as not-place, can be best understood.
DOTTIN, Paul (Fudan University, China)
“ChinAfrican Philosophy: Places of Engagement”
The recent exponential growth in Sino-African relations has captured the world’s
attention. Economically, the value of exports between China and Africa has skyrocketed
from 10 billion dollars to almost 200 billion dollars in the last 15 years alone.
Demographically, both Chinese and African nationals have “followed the money”
resulting today in two million Chinese living abroad in Africa while 500,000 Africans
make lives in China. Now, for the first time in a colossal face-to-face, African and
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Chinese nationals struggle to come to a meeting of the minds vis-à-vis their respective
values and broader systems of thought.
Such trends and issues have spurred investigative and theoretical responses from
philosophers. The collaborative work of Chinese philosophy scholar Daniel A. Bell and
African philosophy scholar Thaddeus Metz on Confucianism and Ubuntuism (a southern
African ethical system) is a major bridge connecting these fields. African philosopher
Jim I. Unah’s study has expanded this search for “common grounds” to include West
Africa’s Yoruba and Igbo traditions. African philosopher Chris Akpan’s pursuit of
causality has drawn Buddhism into discourse with seemingly parallel formulations in
traditional African conceptual schemes.
Yet what these different scattered comparisons of African and Chinese philosophies
have in common is their reliance on a sole orientation: Analytic philosophy. I argue that
this approach, which favors the dissection of concepts and arguments, should be
complemented with the “platial” methodology of African philosophy scholar Bruce Janz
which favors the generation of concepts and arguments phenomenologically and
hermeneutically in situ. I conclude that for “ChinAfrican philosophy” to develop
systematically through both approaches requires theorizing its correct placement within
the broader Chinese “constructive-engagement movement” delineated by Chinese
philosopher Bo Mou.
DUAN, Xiaolin (Elon University)
“Seeking Identity in Place: Hangzhou’s West Lake as Site for Cultural Pilgrimage”
West Lake, a scenic site next to the city of Hangzhou, is one of the most visited places
in today’s China. Its status as a cultural landmark, however, was first established during
the eleventh to the thirteenth century, when the capital was relocated to Hangzhou.
Attracted by its beautiful scenery, increasing number of scholars paid visit to the lake
and left extensive literature works. Examining how this natural landscape has been
conceptualized and represented in these writings, this paper explores how the lake
accumulated its cultural significance as a destination for “cultural pilgrimage” through
scholarly practices of reading, traveling and writing. More importantly, this paper
investigates how the lake was told by different voices as a way to reinforce visitors’
varying social identities.
Traveling to the lake, literati participated into the virtual conversations with historical
figures who were known for touring and living around the lake. By so doing, their senses
of belonging to a cultural community were enhanced. Such identity as literati was also
maintained and confirmed via gatherings on the lake and especially their writings about
such gatherings. During and after the Mongol invasion, state officials regarded the
emerging sightseeing activities around the lake as a symbol of empire-wide revival, in
order to consolidate the ruling of the new regime. On the contrast, however, local gentry
sought to mitigate the feeling of political instability by compiling gazetteers for this
eternal natural landscape. It therefore argues that in the process of travelling and
writing, the lake was transformed into an “anchor for identity” and thus enabled the
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visitors to claim and reinforce their identities with literati culture, state power and local
history. In this process, place is no longer simply a context for historical events or an
aesthetic target, but an acting role in shaping the social-cultural frameworks.
DUFRESNE, Michael (University of Hawai’i)
“Abstraction and Narration: Interpreting Sagacity in the Confucian Tradition”
I seek in this paper to develop an understanding of sagacity (sheng 聖) and of those
who embody it that genuinely engages with the terms and texts of classical Confucian
tradition, from which these notions emerged. Rather than making any explicit claims
about sagacity, I instead attempt to understand it as it has unfolded within its own
context. What I have determined in making these examinations is that, contrary to many
interpretations of the sages (shengren 聖人), one cannot properly define them as
individuals nor can one define sagacity as an achievement of individuality. To do so is to
misconstrue what it means to be a person within this tradition and misinterpret what the
attainment of sagacity entails.
In order to highlight these concerns, I approach sagacity from two different but
complementary perspectives. The first looks at it as a process of abstraction in an
attempt to show that sages are abstractions and that the complexities of sagacity have
frequently gone unrecognized. Sagacity can be understood as a movement from
particularity to generality, but if this process is to be understood to the fullest extent, we
must not let its connection to particularity be lost. The second perspectives looks at
sagacity as a process of narration in order to clarify the place particularity occupies
within it. Through persistent cultivation, each particular person may develop from a
unique personal narrative into a social narrative shared by people, and finally into a
cosmic narrative shared by myriad phenomena (wanwu 萬物). Sagacity is not some
unattainable ideal possessed only by a few venerable figures we call “sages,” but is a
quality shared by all who partake in sagely activity.
DULL, Carl J. (Southern Illinois University)
“Ox Mountain and Not-Even-Anything Village: The Importance of Place in the
Moral and Political Psychologies of Mencius and Zhuangzi”
Mencius and Zhuangzi both utilize models of emotion and cognition that are central
components of their moral and political psychologies. Mencius famously describes the
four principles of virtue (II.A.6) and Zhuangzi discusses the importance of 遊心 youxin or
“wandering heart” (Books 4, 7, 8, and 21). Both models regard emotion and cognition as
emerging from the heart and seeking completion in the social environment. For
Mencius, acting on the four feelings of the 心 xin results in virtuous activity. For
Zhuangzi the pursuit of completion (成 cheng) often results in strife or conflict. Both
propose models of moral psychology that seek to help develop healthy emotional and
cognitive activity: Mengzi through nourishing the four principles in healthy environments
and Zhuangzi by cultivating the wandering heart.
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In the theme of this conference I am especially interested in demonstrating the
relationship of moral psychologies of Mencius and Zhuangzi to the idea of place, and in
examining the kinds of places and environments they believe are necessary for healthy
psychological activity. The first part of this paper discusses the moral psychologies of
Mencius and Zhuangzi, first reviewing Mencius’ theory of emotions and then examining
Zhuangzi’s therapeutic approaches of wandering and emptiness. The second part of
this paper examines these two approaches in relation to the concept of place and what
kinds of places are most important to Mencius for moral development and to Zhuangzi
for wandering at ease. I engage the stories of Ox Mountain (6.A.8) and Not-EvenAnything Village (Books 1 and 7), and demonstrate how both are important parts of
creating first a moral psychology and then for Mencius’ and Zhuangzi’s differing visions
of political psychology and appropriate governing.
For the final part of this paper I suggest these models can be linked to contemporary
discussions regarding emotional and cognitive health. I am particularly interested in
discussions regarding the concept of “natural environments” and the reduction of stress
and anxiety. A body of research growing since the 1990s suggests relationships
between increased exposure to natural environments and decreased indications of
levels of stress and anxiety (through physiological markers and self-reporting). Using
the models of Mencius and Zhuangzi I propose one possible interpretation for these
findings, and offer suggestions for using Classical Chinese models in contemporary
settings.
DUNLAP, Rika (University of Hawai’i)
“A Place for the Minorities: The Issues Surrounding the Ambiguous Subject of
‘We, the Minority’”
The minority group often confronts the majority with the first person plural form of the
subject, “we, the minority.” However, this practice cannot help but perpetuate the
structure that creates the problem, insofar as the ambiguous subject of “we, the minority”
not only leaves behind a group of people who do not quite fit into either the majority or
the specific minority group, but also tends to ignore the intersectional identities within
the same group. The dilemma, however, is that the practice of becoming an ambiguous
plural subject is the only effective way for the minorities to claim their place within
society to become a visible subject at all.
While this practice of becoming a visible subject can refer to the problem of the racial
issues within the United States, I argue that the nationalism of Japan is a twisted form of
the same practice, orientalism as a way to become a visible subject in the international
community where they would otherwise feel invisible. Specifically, I would like to make a
connection between David Haekwon Kim’s analysis of the problem surrounding the
Asian-American assimilation in the United States and Naoki Sakai’s critical cultural
studies on nationalism by focusing on the issues of the ambiguous plural form of the
subject, “we, the minority.”
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EL-KHOLY, Yomna T. (Cairo University, Egypt)
“Ibn Al-Hytham from the Place to the Space: A Comparative Approach”
In Arabic, the word ‘makān ‫ ’مكان‬means both place and space. However, place is more
definite and determined, whereas space is more comprehensive. From a human and
cultural perspective the concept of place is more efficient. But from a physical and
scientific perspective the concept of space is of a higher status; so Newtonian absolute
space – with absolute time – then Einsteinian four dimensional Spatio-temporal
continuum played essential roles in modern science.
This paper explores how the prominent scientist-mathematician al-Hassan ibn alHytham (354-433 A.H / 965-1042 A.D.) contributed to the development of modern
science. Till his time, philosophers and scientists had operated with the concept of
makān as a notion closer to place. Ibn al-Hytham rejected this, criticizing his ancestors
and contemporaries in details. In his elaborated concept of al-Makān, he introduced the
idea of ‘al-aba'ād al-mutakhayyila ‫ ’األبعاد المتخيّلة‬which means "imaginary dimensions".
He thereby moved the concept into space, and contributed to a development which led
to the formulation of "absolute space" in modern physics.
This paper adopts comparative method, not only when examining Ibn al-Hytham and his
ancestors and contemporaries, but also – for the sake of a dialogue between East and
West and between past and present – in comparing Ibn al-Hytham and P. W. Bridgman
(1882-1961) whose Operationalism assigned great role to space, spacialization and
place. Let's see whose approach was more fruitful?
FECH, Andrej (University of Tuebingen, Germany)
“Place in the Philosophy and Biography of Laozi”
In the philosophy of the Laozi, location and directionality play an important role and are
invested with a wide range of meanings. The central notion of the text, the Way 道,
signifying the origin of the world and the ideal mode of action, is associated with several
directions and positions in space, such as the “center” (zhong 中), the “low” (xia 下), the
“behind” (hou 後) etc. The emergence and unfolding of the universe is also often
depicted with the spatial metaphors connoting locations and movements of the Way (or
beings). Likewise, the actions of the exemplary person are often conceptualized in
spatial terms both, static, as in “dwell in the deeds of inaction” (chu wuwei zhi shi 處無為
之事) (ch. 2), and dynamic, as in “walking on the great Way” (xing yu da dao 行於大道)
(ch. 53). The main idea of the text according to which the ruler should act in accordance
with the principles of the Way entails that the former has to emulate the motions/take up
the position of the latter. The ensuing moral teaching commanding the ruler to lower
himself in front of his subordinates challenges the traditional understanding of human
agency in the world.
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Besides showing how the characteristic understanding of the spatial arrangement of the
universe and the state influenced the philosophical teaching of the text, including its
concept of time, I also would like to address the alleged biographical account of Laozi in
this talk. According to it, Laozi left China after having become discouraged with the
political decline of the Zhou dynasty. The depiction as made in the Shiji allows the
inference that he went to the West. While this direction was associated with the sacred
purview during his supposed lifetime, making his choice understandable, I will argue
that it is also possibly his preference for certain spatial directions that could explain his
move.
FINK, Brian (West Chester University of Pennsylvania)
“Synthesizing Qi and Zeitgeist: A Study of Hegelian Dialectic and the Flow of YinYang”
In this paper I argue that the logic of the Hegelian dialectic can be interpreted as giving
a description of the flow of qi in Confucian philosophy. This argument is possible when
we compare similarities between Hegel’s Zeitgeist and the Confucian idea of qi. We can
also see that Hegel’s process of the thesis, antithesis and synthesis have a similar
relationship to yin, yang and the myriad things. In Hegel’s The Science of Logic, Hegel
argues that the starting point of dialectical logic is to take being as a thesis. Once being
exists as a thesis, nothingness is immediately created as antithesis. I argue that the
relationship between thesis and antithesis is a western interpretation of the flow of qi.
Whereas the cyclical nature of yin and yang give rise to the myriad things, the
interaction of thesis and antithesis of Hegelian dialectic give rise to synthesis. Being and
nothingness are synthesized with the idea of becoming which becomes a new thesis
and the cycle is repeated thus producing a multitude of other thesis and antithesis
relationships. Ultimately, Hegel shows that this dialectical process continues until the
idea of being then becomes a synthesis and the entire cycle starts over. The process of
the Hegelian dialectic is then the manifestation of the Zeitgeist which moves and
develops in terms of place.
One major step in showing that Hegelianism is compatible with Asian philosophy is to
argue against the philosophers who take Hegel’s philosophy as not allowing for there to
be philosophy in Asian culture. I will show that we are able to find this compatibility
when we view Hegel’s philosophy in a postcolonial context. This argument is in line with
Hyo-Dong Lee’s argument in “Interreligious Dialogue as a Politics of Recognition: A
Postcolonial Rereading of Hegel for Interreligious Solidarity”. I argue that, with this
postcolonial reading of Hegel, it is possible to make some comparisons between the
movements of Hegel’s Zeitgeist and the flow of qi.
FIRESTONE, Jessica (West Chester University of Pennsylvania)
“Exchanging Places of Yin and Yang: A Feminist Reiteration of Junzi (君子) ”
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Aristotle’s hierarchical method of categorization into genera and species implies an
ultimate homogeneity of the myriad things. In conjunction with his misogynist views on
gender norms, I will show that, for Aristotle, there is a single human genus
predominantly made up of two species: the ideal human specimen -- man -- and the
mutilated, inferior woman. This male chauvinism heavily influenced Western thought
and perpetuated the problematic normalization of patriarchy, sexism, and strict gender
roles. As a method of evaluating and potentially remedying this imbalance, I will
compare Aristotle’s view with the implications of the Eastern concepts of yin-yang,
which views masculinity and femininity as correlative polarities, and junzi, the ideal
human being. In place of the Aristotelian assertion of the naturally superior position of
the male gender, the yin-yang model views the feminine -- yin -- and the masculine -yang -- as interdependent and interpenetrating opposites with equal import and function
in humanity and the cosmos.
Man and woman cease to be static, mutually exclusive species, as Aristotle views them,
and become dynamic combinations of both masculinity and femininity. These qualities
not only interpenetrate, existing in differing proportions in every entity, but serve to
define and create one another. While the yin-yang paradigm ultimately seeks balance
between the polarities of yin and yang, this system is not ignorant to the tradition and
continual tendency to “fu yin bao yang [embody yin and embrace yang],” of which
Aristotle seems to be guilty. To counteract this propensity, yin-yang philosophies
advocate nurturing yin -- passivity, mystery, femininity, emptiness -- to place the
energies on equal ground and establish harmony. The emptiness of yin, I will argue, is
also the source of creativity and therefore resonance, the ultimate directive of Confucian
praxis as articulated by Zhang Zai.
Junzi can then be defined as a master of enhancing human life in the world and
promoting the free flow of the cosmic qi by 1) resisting the human tendency to overvalue
yang and thereby balancing yin and yang energies both internally and externally and 2)
promoting creative interaction and resonance amongst humans and their environment.
Just as Confucius sought to redefine junzi, making it available to every social class, I
propose a second reiteration of this concept that respects and empowers the feminine.
In contrast to Aristotelian ideality, which woman is fundamentally incapable of achieving,
I will argue that the status of junzi is not only available to woman but she is naturally
closer to this human ideal than her masculine counterpart, as she harbors stronger yin
energy.
FOX, Alan (University of Deleware)
“Transcendence versus Immanence: Concrete Mysticism”
I propose to introduce the idea of belonging as an example of what I will call a "concrete
mysticism," using several Daoist and Confucian texts as my primary sources, but
referring to other traditions and texts as well. The goal of a concrete mysticism is to
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merge, not with some abstract and metaphysical absolute, but with the concrete and
immanent world around us. Concrete mystics seek to be at home in the world, rather
than escape from it. The ideal person in such a sense is the one who is perfectly at
ease in any and all situations.
FRENKIEL, Emilie (Université Paris Est Créteil, France)
“The World-Wide-Web and Social Networks as a Political Place: The Impact of
Uncensored Internet Access on the Political Interest and Participation of Chinese
Exchange Students”
Recent statistics from the China Internet Network Information Center have revealed that
China now has about 650 million Internet users with 70% of these so-called netizens
connecting to the web with their mobile phones. When the Chinese Communist Party
displayed a strong resolve to allow for a wide access to the Internet, analysts
announced inevitable political change with optimism. The technological determinism
manifest in early Internet studies as regards old democracies and as regards
authoritarian countries like China promised that the web would help recruit previously
inactive citizens into political participation and enhance robust political debate.
Researches have however repeatedly shown that, with digital technology, political
engagement and participation has mostly been enhanced among already active citizens
and reinforces existing patterns of political participation (Davis, 1999); greater access to
information, enabled by online does not directly lead to increases in political
participation, or greater civic engagement, or trust in political process (Bimber, 2001;
Kaid, 2002) and the internet is susceptible to the profit-making impulses of the market,
which do not traditionally prioritize civic participation or democratization.
However, the Internet’s challenge to traditional media is real and it can “give new voice
to people who’ve felt voiceless” (Gillmor 2004). Collective use of the Internet can lead to
greater political participation when it is characterized by trust and reciprocity
(Kobayashi, Ikeda, & Miyata, 2006). Numerous studies have emphasized that among
the young generations, the use of digital technology can have a strong impact on levels
of political participation and engagement.
This paper will reflect on our place in the world, on the impact of changing places and
on the conception of the Internet as a political place. Based on a general review of the
literature on Chinese Internet studies quantitative and qualitative interviews with a
sample of Chinese exchange students in France, it aims to understand if, how and to
what extent, depending on the location where they stay, especially through uncensored
access to the web, Chinese citizens, especially youngsters, change their internet routine
and come to political interest and active political participation.
FREEMAN, Tim (University of Hawai’i-Hilo)
“Place on Fire: Climate Change and the Summit of Mauna Kea”
53
It has become obvious to all who take science seriously that the problem of climate
change is perhaps the most difficult challenge facing humanity in the 21st century. In his
later writings, Heidegger suggested the problem posed by the development of modern
technology can be traced back to a way of thinking that has framed Western thought
since the ancient Greeks. The danger that Heidegger warned of in this way of thinking is
that everything is reduced to a resource for human use, like a forest of trees considered
only as timber. The most difficult thing about this problem, Heidegger suggested, is that
this way of thinking is so deeply entrenched that it is hard for modern humans to even
comprehend that there could be a different way of thinking.
This paper takes up a reflection on place through a consideration of the dispute
concerning the summit of Mauna Kea. For the scientific community this place is perhaps
the very best place in the world for the placement of telescopes and the new telescope
will thus undoubtedly provide a significant advance in our knowledge of the universe.
For many Hawaiians the obstruction of the landscape by the building of the telescopes
has in some way been a violation of the sacredness of the place. It would be a terrible,
final irony, if we discovered some secret about the origins of it all just as we became
extinct because we never really figured out how to live in this place we call Earth. This
paper will consider what implications this dispute about place might have in confronting
the problem of climate change.
FUJIMOTO, Matthew (University of Hawai’i)
“Nishida’s Language of Place: Understanding Nishida’s Philosophy of Place
through his View of Language”
In this presentation, I will examine Nishida’s view of language as seen in “Expressive
Activity” (Hyōgen sayō, 表現作用) and show that it plays a vital role in his larger
philosophical project of constructing a truly universal philosophy. I will do this by; first,
examining several passages from “Expressive Activity” in order to construct a basic
understanding of Nishida’s view of language, and second, draw out the implications of
such a view of language for his philosophy of place. I will conclude by showing that a
relationship between language and Basho should be expected given our intuitions about
contextualized experiences and persons.
FUNES, Ana (Loyola Marymount University)
“Upaniṣadic Isomorphisms: Mapping the Universe Within the Body”
Isomorphic correspondences between the cosmic and individual spaces is a
characteristic feature of Indian philosophies. In the Upaniṣads we find a model that
maps a particular cosmic Deity with a specific organ of the body and its function in such
a way that the Sun is said to preside over vision; Goddess Earth over smell; the Lord of
Water (Varuna) over taste, and so on. What is the logic behind these
correspondences? What is the significance of those deities with respect to the faculties
of perception and action? Can the understanding of the intimate relation that the natural
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elements have with our own faculties of perception and action help us re-structure our
relation with this world as a place of environmental harmony?
This paper examines the logic used to establish the correspondence between cosmic
deities and bodily functions as described particularly in the Praśna Upaniṣad and then
compares it to the logic used in contemporary cognitive studies to map external stimuli
to neural activity. By doing this it will be shown that the "ancient" idea of mapping things
seen as located in an external space into a space that seems to be internal like our
bodily organs presents a dynamic interrelation between cosmos and individual that
makes one the reflection of the other. If the “external” space expresses the functions of
the “internal” space, then this suggests the important role that self-transformation has in
re-structuring our relationship with the environment.
GANGULY, Deb Kamal (Film and Television Institute of India, India)
“Territorialization by Moving Image Practices: The Transformations of Spatiality
and Placiality in Cinematic Creation and Reception”
'Space' and 'place' are mutually depending experiential categories, as proposed by YiFu Tuan, where 'place' signifies location, stability, safety, pause within the movement,
and 'space' indicates a sense of yearning, a drive to transcend the boundary, an
overarching trajectory towards 'here and now', illuminated with the sense of being and
becoming. Gaston Bacherald on the other hand postulates the reverberation of spatial
imagination within the most commonly encountered architectural elements which are
abound in our living localities, both indoor and outdoor. While 'place' has a mappable
quality, bounded space may have a measurable quality. In Indic tradition the space has
been conceived both as bounded and unbounded, a philosophical move to account for
the 'apeiron' while confined in the affairs mostly related to the 'peiron'. Georg Cantor has
shown that the 'apeiron', the infinite and the finite should not be treated as opposites,
because the constant striving to sense the infinite can go on through the reasoning of
transfinite numbers. While 'space' remains as a primary philosophical category, the
conceptualization of 'place' has seen limited intellectual appeal so far. The further
conceptualization of 'place' can initiate with the abstraction and extention of its
mappable, locational, inhabitable and territorializable qualities.
If we relocate ourselves to the domain of cinema, we find a curious flow of space and
place related characteristics. We always have to situate a camera in a 'place', but what
we record becomes a 'cinematic space', no longer a representational image of a place
or a location. Interestingly the place where the camera is placed does not have a frame;
the camera frames and creates the off-screen space, which remains invisible to the
sensory eye, but immediately lends itself to the contextual imagination of potentially
countless variations. Cantor's transfinites are already operational qualitatively around
the corners of the framed cinematic space. Similarly seeing a film (or for that matter
relating to any artifice) in transient phases of movements between more defined
locations, can provide inhabitable qualities in terms of mnemonic values to those
otherwise spaces of 'non-significance' vis a vis individual memory. The qualities of the
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so called non-significant spaces gathered into the being through the mode of involuntary
attention create an additional frame of mnemonic reference around the experience of
watcing the film. Interestingly Hugo Munsterberg commented on the importance of
involuntary attention even in the primary act of seeing a film almost a century ago. In the
proposed paper attempts will be made to speculate on the possible human practices
regarding cinematic creation and reception with respect to 'spatial' and 'placial'
characteristics and their modes of transformations, while also borrowing from
deterritorialization and reterritorialization from Deleuze and Guattari.
GARFIELD, Jay, and Nalini BHUSHAN (Smith College)
“Cambridge in India”
We will talk about the impact of study in Cambridge on Indian philosophy, first in the
construction of Aligarh Muslim University on the model of Cambridge, but then about the
way that Aligarh itself becomes more than just a place, but a movement. We will then
consider how the Aligarh movement reimagines Muslim India as Indian vs Pan-Islamic,
and conclude with a comparison of the similar and yet different way that Cambridge
informs neo-Vedānta in Calcutta, and on how philosophy in these two different places
proceeded in parallel.
GARRISON, James (University of Vienna, Austria)
“Does Cultural Incommensurability Measure Up? A Consideration of Nearness
and Distance in Intercultural Philosophy”
There is the need for self-defense, not uncommon when presenting intercultural
philosophy to a wider audience, as questions of cultural incommensurability inevitably
arise. Is comparative philosophy legitimate? Is intercultural? Is any type of global
philosophy possible? Are the cultural, terminological, and perspectival differences
simply too great?
Indeed, intercultural philosophers and methods should indeed have to defend
themselves, since critical inquiry demands no less. However, they should not find
themselves initially and forever thereafter in that position of defense and haunted by the
supposedly frightful specter of the culturally incommensurable, when that question is
itself predicated on many less than defensible premises.
The vices of cultural incommensurability questions become apparent as something of a
“sorites paradox” emerges when considering how contemporaneous cultures talk to
each other or how contemporary idioms speak to the past. The sorites paradox, using
the Greek term for “heap,” refers to the slippery slope question of quantification. A heap
might have a certain large number of straws of hay in it, but taking them away one by
one, at some point a threshold is reached whereby the heap ceases to be a heap.
What does this mean here? Well, the idea is that some point exists where things either
become intracultural, occurring within a single proper domain, or intercultural, occurring
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between two separate cultures. This implies a threshold, a spatial, temporal, or spatiotemporal border at which this culture here ends and that culture there begins, and also a
border where each becomes a proper entity, a heap unto itself, and not just subcultural
detritus.
What then is to be done? There has to be a way of recognizing real differences without
giving into the pernicious logic of presuming separation. How would it then make sense
to talk of cultures having conversations if the fallacy of misplaced cultural concreteness
is taken seriously? How can things be intercultural if there are no cultures as such? How
is it possible to rescue basic talk of cultures more generally and avoid somehow
implying that all talk about Chinese philosophy, French culture, or American literature is
in some way essentialist, racist, and/or nationalist?
Answering such questions is no mean task. There needs to be a type of intercultural
philosophy which does not lapse into pernicious abstractions of cultures, and which still
retains the ability to speak of this culture or that as the case may be. There needs to be
a way of talking about world philosophy as a unity while respecting philosophical
worldviews as a dynamic manifold where the constituent elements are fluid, yet insistent
particulars and not simply so much misplaced concreteness.
The approach here takes up Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s rhizomatic method,
Franz Martin Wimmer’s polylog model, and Roger Ames’ observations on interpretation
as negotiation to reconsider place, nearness, and distance in light of the questions that
dog intercultural philosophy. Recognizing the sorites paradox, the response here shifts
away from the incommensurability question’s underlying notions of objective purity that
quantify self-sameness in seemingly monolithic “heaps” of time, place, and culture.
Instead, this approach emphasizes self-consciousness of the necessary impurity of all
perspectives in any multi-point, non-hierarchical conversation that would seek to
appreciate the qualities, not of abstracted and quantified cultures, but of individual
voices within dynamic and constitutively pluralistic philosophical cultures.
GIANETTI, Jason (Eisho-ji-Northwest Zen Center)
“Dialectical Method in Plato and Nagarjuna”
In the interest of brevity, this paper will attempt to concisely present Plato’s formulation
and development of the so-called “Theory of Ideas” and the science of dialectic. I will
attempt to show how the “Theory of Ideas” and the science of dialectic are necessarily
connected; how Plato presents these concepts in various dialogues which, if taken in
the order that I present them, can be understood to roughly correlate to the stages of
developmental complexity presented in the “Divided Line” and “Allegory of the Cave”
sections of the Republic; and how the mysterious and ambiguous things which are said
about ideas and dialectic in the Republic can be deciphered by a careful reading of the
Phaedo, Phaedrus, Parmenides, Sophist, and Philebus. Through an examination of
those dialogues I shall argue that Socratic dialectic operates on two different levels, one
of the eide and dianoia, which consist of discrete and self-consistent units, and one of
the koinonein and episteme which involve a “blending” and “community” which
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necessarily violates the Principle of Non-Contradiction. Finally, I will compare the
methods and conclusions found in the Platonic corpus to some rather evocative
passages in the Hindu and Mahayana tradition of Buddhism.
GILSON, Erinn (University of North Florida)
“Places of Vulnerability”
Vulnerability has recently emerged as a central concept in ethics and politics (e.g.,
Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds 2014). Signifying a fundamental quality of openness, an
openness to being affected and affecting in turn, vulnerability characterizes human
existence as well as that of nonhuman animals and the natural world; in this sense, it is
an ontological concept. Yet, the fundamental capacity to be vulnerable can be exploited,
lives rendered more precarious and the ability of natural places to thrive can be
destabilized. In Judith Butler’s terms (2009), this kind of heightened susceptibility to
harm can be termed “precarity.” Conditions of precarity are produced when vulnerability
is politically framed and differentially distributed: basic vulnerability is exacerbated and
rendered harmful through social, political, and economic conditions and policies to
which some are more susceptible than others. In this way, vulnerability is a core political
concept and ameliorating the inequitable distribution of vulnerability is crucial for social
justice.
This paper explores how places of heightened, harmful vulnerability are constituted
through the modulation of spatial and temporal patterns and arrangements. It develops
the argument that the exploitation of vulnerability can only be understood fully when we
understand how places of greater vulnerability, precarity, are made. I begin my analysis
by articulating the way vulnerability operates as a spatial and temporal phenomenon;
that is, I offer a brief account of the temporal and spatial dynamics of fundamental
ontological vulnerability. Then, I identify the main features of harmful vulnerability,
asking, how are spatial and temporal modes of being modified when lives are rendered
excessively precarious? In particular, I focus on the qualities of places in which people
are deprived of basic forms of control, autonomy, and self-determination. I explicate
how these places are formed via the usurpation of people’s ability to shape their own
relations in and with the places they inhabit.
Such deprivation of the ability to engage in mutually constitutive relationships can take
(at least) two forms, which often coincide: 1) having one’s spatial and temporal modes
of being subject to the ordering and control of others and 2) being subject to a pervasive
spatial and temporal lack of order, which produces not so much a place as an antiutopic non-place. I consider a variety of contemporary examples to illustrate these
claims, including the experiences of incarcerated persons, refugees, undocumented
migrants, and those subject to intensive police surveillance, as in the racial profiling of
Black citizens in the US.
GLUCHMAN, Vasil and Marta GLUCHMANOVÁ (University of Presov, Slovakia)
“Moral Education as the Place of Person and Moral Development”
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Moral education is one of the ways how to place children and people to the world. We
will compare Philosophy for Children (P4C) and ethics of social consequences (ESC) as
the models of moral education, moral and personal development of children. The aim of
P4C is to encourage and develop these skills: to understand the text they read, to
identify what they understand and do not understand, to be interested in what they read
and discuss. Furthermore, it is about their ability to ask relevant questions, to develop
mental abilities, to express ideas and hypotheses, to use imagination in their own
thinking, to examine alternative ideas and explanations. At the same time, the purpose
of P4C is to constitute assessment attitudes, judgements, ability to assess value of
ideas, ability of self-assessment and self-correction. All these abilities are to be
developed through cooperative activities.
Furthermore, we will present ethics of social consequences (ESC) offering a possibility
for moral and personal development through critical moral thinking. The ESC
emphasizes basic values accepted by the moral of the society, i.e. humanity, human
dignity, moral right for life, justice, responsibility, duty and tolerance. On the other hand,
in the process of moral thinking it requires to regard future or past consequences
emerging from our thinking, decision-making and acting. The aim is to create a model of
moral and personal development through critical thinking on the basis of criteria, which
form conditions for free decision-making and acting of person, his/her moral
responsibility determined by the effort to achieve positive social consequences
emerging from our behaviour and acting or at least to achieve predominance of the
positive over negative social consequences.
GOLDBERG, Stephen J. (Hamilton College)
“The Fate of Place and Memory in the Art of Yun-fei Ji and Hai Bo”
The recent work of the Chinese painter Yun-fei Ji (b. 1963, Beijing) and photographer
Hai Bo (b. 1962, Changchun) offer a timely optic through which to examine the fate of a
“sense of place” and corresponding individual and social memory in contemporary
China. Both artists resist the “siren call of amnesia” in order to bare witness, through the
stories they tell, of small village life and the forced migrations of peoples from their
ancestral lands, and the environmental effects of pollution to the waters and air of rural
and urban China.
Drawing on the studies of “place,” “memory” and “forgetting” in the works of the historian
Vera Schwarcz, the philosopher Edward S. Casey, the French anthropologist Marc
Augé, the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, and Norwegian architectural theorist
Christian Norberg-Schulz, this paper will discuss the art of Yun-fei Ji and Hai Bo and the
light it sheds on the issues of “place” and “memory” in contemporary China.
GNERRE, Maria Lucia Abaurre (Federal University of Paraíba, Brazil)
“The Place of Yoga in Brazilian Culture”
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In this paper, we will make a brief analysis of the place of Yoga (an ancient practical
and philosophical system related to the Hindu religion) within the Brazilian cultural
universe, a context wherein it starts to create new identities. Yoga tradition has gained
its own features in Brazil, due to peculiarities of our cultural identity. Our proposal is to
discuss, in an introductory way, the forms and discourses through which Yoga tradition
is presented to our society both as a philosophical and as a practical-physical system by
Brazilian Yoga masters who, since the 1960's, begin to publish their own books and to
create explanations and their own terminology to suit our cultural context. We intend,
therefore, to analyze the ways in which Yoga's place is being built in our culture, and, at
the same time, the ways in which it is being adapted to our own socio-cultural
characteristics.
Although some contemporary Brazilian teachers insist on the importance of valuing
certain practices exactly because of their "purity", "originality" and "fidelity to the Indian
philosophical tradition", we consider the reverse process as the most important from a
historical point of view: the formation of a "Brazilian Yoga", which results from a
particular reading of this Indian tradition in Brazil, due to our historical specificities. Such
specificities – which, since the beginning of colonization, acted in the shaping of our
bodies, our beliefs and the way we relate to the world, – will be analyzed in our speech.
We believe that it is exactly through the lenses of these constitutive elements which
came from the historical and social formation of the Brazilian identity that Yoga finds its
place in Brazilian culture since the mid-twentieth century.
GRIFFITH-DICKSON, Gwen (Lokahi Foundation, UK)
“The Place of ‘Place’ in Communities: Symbol, Substrate, or Actor?”
Humanity moves place; and two of the most urgent and destabilising issues of the
current moment have arisen from humans dramatically moving place: those fleeing from
Islamic State (and allied movements e.g. Boko Haram) to save their lives and modes of
existence, and those fleeing to Islamic State precisely to realise an imagined life and
mode of existence. These mass movements then throw up chronic, unanswered
questions of what it means to belong in/to a place; with sharp political divisions in the
countries receiving refugees and ‘migrants’; but also those same countries alarmed by
the rejection of their citizens who leave to join Da’esh. Meanwhile, those whose territory
is taken feel alienated from the purported new nation-state in their own earthly place
that rejects and indeed endangers their lives and ways of life.
Against this backdrop, I ask what it means to belong to a physical place and what place
can uniquely contribute to human communities. By this point in human history, most of
our human habitats are palimpsests: written on and scraped off to be written on anew
by new occupants, cultures, civilisations. Most of us now live in a diverse human
landscape: whether patchy, with pockets of demographic difference created in layers of
migration and change; or whether hybridised; or both. So what gives a people a
purported ‘right to be here?’ And is the physical (or better, earthly) place – the land, the
waters – ever an entity or indeed an actor in communitarian living, or must it only be the
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passive substrate for human activity that creates a community and a sense belonging
out of everything but this land?
The fantasy of creating a new state – be it Israel, a newly independent nation-state of
Hawai‘i or indeed Da‘esh – where it will at last be possible to right historic injustices and
lead a life in accordance with communitarian values and vision, is a very powerful one.
How much easier and faster to sweep aside a messy or failed historical project and
begin anew, as compared to the slow, ongoing work of scraping and rewriting on a
palimpsest. In some cases (Israel, Hawai‘i) the land itself – this earthly place – is an
ineradicable dimension of that vision. In others, whatever the historical significance or
symbolism ascribed to particular spots, the vision is a universal one; and its current
location or battlefield is merely political expedience, the first, most likely win of an
imagined sequence of conquests to establish a limitless state of righteousness.
But even when the place itself is part of the compelling vision, is the power of a place in
its own right undermined when other tests of belonging are applied – whether it be
ideology, religion, race or ethnicity, or even the rule of a particular vision of law? And if
so, is that not a betrayal of the ‘power of earthly place’?
GROFF, Peter S. (Bucknell University)
“Cultivating Weeds: Ibn Bājja and Nietzsche on the Philosopher’s Regime of
Solitude”
This paper returns to an old question first raised by Socrates: what is the appropriate
place of the philosopher in the polis? In Platonic dialogues, we see again and again the
apparently corrosive effect that the philosopher’s activity has on the laws, myths,
traditions and inherited values of the city-state. Socrates’ solution to this tension in the
Republic is to distinguish between “true” philosophers and their various eccentric or
vicious imitations, and then resituate the former from the periphery of society to the
center of Kallipolis. In this way he seeks to establish the optimal coincidence of
knowledge and political power necessary for justice in the city.
The Platonic ideal of the “philosopher ruler” gets taken up by al-Fārābī (872-950 CE),
who reinterprets it in the Islamicate context as the philosopher-legislator-prince-imām
who rules the virtuous city and makes salvific happiness possible for all. Like Socrates’
Kallipolis, al-Fārābī’s madīnat al-fāḍila is conceptually set over against a host of
ignorant, immoral and erring cities. But it also contains within itself dangerous
oppositional forces: a profusion of citizens who in various ways share in the nature of
the philosopher but who also fall short (i.e., with respect to the ultimate goals they
pursue, their ability to reason properly, their capacity to enact their convictions about the
good, etc). Al-Fārābī calls these diverse types “weeds” (nawābit) and proposes different
means of ameliorating, controlling or eliminating them altogether.
Enter Ibn Bājja (1095-1138), who initiates a crucial shift regarding the place of the
philosopher in the city. He adopts and to a large extent accepts al-Fārābī’s normative
ideal of the perfect city, but rejects the possibility of it ever being brought into being. For
Ibn Bājja, all cities are inescapably sick and ignorant, and thus inimical to the
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philosophical life. The philosopher must therefore cultivate a regime of solitude, dwelling
in the imperfect city and depending upon it to some extent for her bodily survival, but
carefully insulating herself from it spiritually and intellectually. For Ibn Bājja, solitary
philosophers effectively become the “weeds” of imperfect cities and the best possible
regime is reduced to a microcosm of the solitary individual.
Interestingly, we find a similar idea in Nietzsche, despite his rather Platonic insistence
that genuine philosophers are “commanders and legislators.” Particularly in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche emphasizes the necessity of solitude
as a kind of naturalized ascetic practice directed towards the cultivation of higher types.
For both Ibn Bājja and Nietzsche, then, the philosopher must live an isolated, parasitic
life on the margins of the society she rejects, in order to preserve her spiritual autonomy
and care for herself properly. I shall consider the prospects of a “regime of solitude”
(both positive and negative) for the philosophical life, as well as the metaphor of
“weeds” and the ironies involved in the deliberate cultivation of such life-forms.
GUERRERO, Laura P. (Utah Valley University)
“The Place of Reality and the Reality of Place: Ramifications of Buddhist
Conventionalism about Reality”
Coming to realize that reality is ultimately conventional is, according to Mahāyāna
Buddhists, transformative in a positive way of how a person acts and reacts to her lived
world. However, and perhaps ironically, the claims to conventionality threaten to
undermine the epistemic and ethical norms required to support the Buddhist
soteriological project and defend it against rivals. In an effort to address this concern,
this paper explores the role that lived experience pragmatically plays in shaping that
conventional reality and determining its norms in non- arbitrary ways. Focusing on a
comparison between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra articulations of the conventionality of
reality, I will argue that the Yogācāra account of representation that is defended by
Dharmakirti provides a pragmatist account that can support the necessary norms while
retaining the conventionality that is important to the Buddhist account of the reality of
one’s lived world.
GUPTA, Sandeep (Dei University, India)
“Consciousness - Space – Place”
“Place is security, space is freedom: we are attached to the one and long for the other”
and “what begins with undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it better
and endow it with value” observes Yi-Fu Tuan. Tuan’s observations reflect the Eastern
philosophy wherein experience is central to human life and ‘place’ is a subset of ‘space’.
Organic survival, satisfaction and multiplication are the three genetic compulsions of all
living species and it is no different for man. Based on the quality of his experience each
one creates his own ‘place’ (physical, mental, social, economic, political and religious)
and holds on to it, in his bid to feel secure, happy and loved. Unmindful of his basal
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instincts (desire, anger, attachment, greed and ego) he more often than not becomes
the slave of his ‘place’ rather than its master. He identifies himself with his ‘place’ to
such an extent that expansion and protection of his ‘place’ becomes his sole goal of life.
This tendency became all the more pronounced during the scientism and materialism
driven 19th & 20th centuries which perceived reality and life in material terms and
declared the higher realms of reality (spirit & mind) as a figment of imagination.
However, with systems theory and quantum physics gaining acceptance in mainstream
science, there is a growing realization that spirit and mind also have an identity of their
own and are as real as matter. This makes it necessary to look afresh at the concept of
‘place’ in light of the scheme of an integrated universe so that instead of being a limiting
factor to human growth, ‘place’ becomes a contributing factor to human growth.
In the Indian thought the creation is made of spirit, mind and matter and so is man,
which makes him the perfect microcosm of the macrocosm. Further, nature has
bestowed him with a dual dimension consciousness which not only gives him the ability
to change himself but also his external environment. At the spirit level there is no
differentiation between ‘space’ and ‘place’. The differentiation sets in at the mind* level
in a subtle form (*mind is different from brain), which gets highly pronounced at the
material level. In the ordinary course, human consciousness is pre-occupied by the
material world and its dynamics. Once it learns to subsist and operate from the mind
level a marked change takes place in the way one perceives life and reality. ‘My place is
different and I need to protect its uniqueness’, which earlier seemed important, ceases
to be so as it becomes ‘my place is different but similar’. Similarly as consciousness
expands and starts operating from the spirit level, the subtle differentiation which exists
between ‘space’ and ‘place’ at the mind level also ceases and one starts seeing the
entire creation as one big undifferentiated ‘space’ from which the mind spaces and
material places have been born. This transformation in consciousness is a mental
revolution in the way one sees, thinks and acts and in no-way undermines the ‘place’
creating propensity of man or the necessity of ‘place’ in man’s life to enable him to lead
a full life.
Drawing from the ancient Indian philosophy which integrates the secular and the nonsecular needs of man, and has evolved through the ages (Vedanta & Buddhism) and
still continues to evolve in modern times in the form of Sant-Mat and gives out a definite
“science of human possibilities” (philosophy of consciousness), this paper focuses on
how through the process of consciousness expansion, ‘place’ a core human
requirement can be transformed from a growth limiting factor to a growth promoting
factor.
GURU, Gopal (Jawahrlal Nehru University, India)
“The Metaphysics of Pilgrimage: Wari as Dynamic Space”
Arguably, places are empty; they become meaningful after they are filled with different
kinds of meanings. These meanings are generated through social relations and are
communicated through language. Logic of social hierarchy for example, tends to
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fragments place thus nesting people in stigma and un-freedom. Spaces with their
dynamic nature, on the other hand, assigns liberating meaning to places thus erasing
the stigma that is associated with place.
Places provide basic normative condition for the realization of values such as freedom,
equality and dignity. Place, in order to develop this normative capacity has to be
reconfigured along new organizing principles such as democracy. Thus, the realization
of freedom depends on places that are seamless both in terms of time and space. One
could argue and scholars have been arguing that reconfiguration of place occurs in the
modern time.
It is here one can raise the point: do we require modernity as the moment of arrival for
such a reconfiguration of places on egalitarian line? Does one require modernity to
release dynamic spaces that then can effectively attack the constraining logic that tends
to fragment the places? I , in this essay, would like to interrogate the modernity thesis
and argue that even before the arrival of modernity in India, certain humanitarian
tradition did generate spaces which were accommodative of associational aspirations of
different social groups.
For example the heterodox tradition of WARI (the pilgrimage), which has its origin in
13th century Maharashtra continues to exist even today with the same dynamism of
social inclusiveness. I, in this essay, would discuss the emergence of WARI as a
dynamic space particularly in the context of the limits of place which is constitutive of
water tight compartmentalization. Conversely, it would also be imperative to discuss the
limits of WARI in terms of its inability to reproduce dynamic spaces in differentially
structured social places. In short, the focus of the essay would on the tension between
the place whose logic is to fold people in the rigid hole and the spaces whose dynamism
is to free people from this hole and make them flow freely.
GUZOWSKA, Joanna (University of Warsaw, Poland)
“Speech in the Realm of Teeming Life: An Exploration of the Hengxian and the
Qiwulun”
The Hengxian paints an intriguing picture of human speech. Words (言) and names (名)
are like all other phenomena in the realm of teeming life (茲生). They too follow the
threefold logic of spontaneous emergence, reproduction, and gradual entrenchment.
As is implied throughout the text, no particular name (no doctrine, innovation, affair,
action, etc.) enjoys any special cosmic or natural warrant. Cosmically speaking, each
actual name is allowed for with equal indifference. Naming is simply one more process
of life.
A similar insight can be found in the second chapter of the Zhuangzi, the (in)famous
Qiwulun, although there the view of speech (言) as yet another life phenomenon is
entertained as an open question rather than stated with certainty.
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However, speech is not only natural but also normative and both texts recognize it. The
Hengxian notes that human activity is the source of disorder in the world (亂), and the
Qiwulun explores the problem of inter–school conflict that is predicated on the
distinction between right and wrong (是非).
The goal of my presentation is to explore how the Hengxian and the Qiwulun construe
speech as both spontaneous and normative, both natural and human, with an eye to
formulating an account of how speaking both partakes in and transforms the realm of
teeming life.
HALL, Gerard (Australian Catholic University, Australia)
"The Pertinence of Panikkar's Diatopical Hermeneutics for Intercultural Dialogue
with Aboriginal Australians
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HAQ, Sara (University of Maryland)
“’My Place is the Placeless:’ A-Duality and Homeless Sexualities in Mystical
Thought”
What do Rumi’s metaphysics of placelessness/tracelessness and Jennifer Purvis’
notion of a “homeless sexuality” have to say to each other? How are Sufis “queer” in
embodying the vulnerability that comes with owning one’s homelessness? Using
Raimon Panikkar’s notion of advaita (a-duality), and the Sufi concept of zaat
(identity/essence/being), I make the case that our identity politics are always-already
intertwined with our ontological being.
The Sufi is that which is always-already queer; the queer-of-color is that which is alwaysalready fueled by the spiritual. Given that much work has already been done on the
latter by womanists, feminists, and queer activists of color, rooting their theorizing in
religio- spirituality far more than white feminists, this paper will focus on the former
statement: the Sufi is that which is always-already queer. In this paper, I will do the
following.
1) In the first section, I present two poems, one written by Rumi, the other by me,
illustrating an example of how both Sufi thought and queer theory study the underlying
instability of categories. Queer theory primarily works to destabilize gender binaries; Sufi
philosophy destabilizes self/Other, human/Divine binaries by using the destabilization of
gender binaries as one of its many metaphorical lenses. I use Raimon Panikkar’s notion
of aduality, Rumi’s poetry, and Layli Maparyan’s womanist philosophy to make the case
for a love-based feminist/queer method that Orientalism look like today? What does disorienting neo- compartmentalized, otherized sexuality that is defined by
xenophobic/xenophilic orientations? These are a few of the questions that are both
performed and analyzed in this paper.
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2) In the second section, I use Panikkar’s advaitic philosophical notion of a lovingknowledge and a knowing-love to reflect upon the beloved Punjabi folk-tale of HeerRanjha. Drawing on the poem “Chanting Ranjha,” in which the male poet is
masquerading in the female voice of Heer, I make the case for a Sufi linguistic and
poetic style that is always-already queer. I also conduct an in-depth analysis of Persian
and Punjabi terms kardan/kardi (to chant, to do) and zaat (identity, being), to make the
case for the inextricable intertwining of identity politics with the ontological, the doing
with the being.
3) In the third section, I switch focus to the male character of the epic, Ranjha,
discussing the theme of homelessness and connecting this with Jennifer Purvis’ notion
of a homeless sexuality. What feminist/queer scholars have identified as
disidentification in the context of queer hermeneutics – challenging straight/gay binaries
via hybridized positionality, and calling for a post-binary approach to sex, sexuality,
gender, and race – is symbolized in the theme of homelessness found in Ranjha’s story.
I employ Panikkar’s ideas on the contradictory nature of aduality to frame this trope of
owning one’s homelessness as a new home.
4) In my last section, I use AnaLouise Keating’s notion of threshold theorizing to reflect
on how this paper has been an exercise of this methodology, and looking forward, how
we must move past an interrelatedness and call for a radical intra-relatedness. HeerRanjha’s epic is simply one representation of what such a radical intra-relatedness
looks like, a learning to let the Other speak from within the self, rather than simply
speaking on behalf of the Other.
HARRINGTON, Michael (Duquesne University)
“Neo-Confucian Reflections on Being Out of Place”
In a world where human desire and heavenly principle matched up precisely, there
would be no need for anyone to be out of place. The Song dynasty Confucians have a
robust vocabulary to describe the proper placement of things, employing terms like
“principle” (li 理), “pattern” (wen 文), and “position” (wei 位), among others. Effective
action requires that the position of the agent match up with his or her disposition, as well
as with the positions of other people and things involved in the action, and more broadly
with the pattern of heaven and earth. The world we live in is not one where this is
always or often possible. It is important, then, for the student of government to consider
not only how to put everything in its place, but how to be effectively out of place.
The Song dynasty commentaries on the Yijing provide a useful starting point for such a
consideration. The Symbol commentary frequently makes the claim that a line’s
“position is not proper for it” (weibudang 位不當). This claim serves as a starting point
for Confucian reflections on when it is good or bad to be out of place. The initial and top
lines of the hexagrams also occasionally provoke a commentator to give advice on how
to be effectively out of place, since these lines are often understood as referring to
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people who ought to be serving in government, but for one reason or another remain in
seclusion. Finally, the entirety of the March (lü 旅) hexagram is understood by several
Song Confucians as providing advice for those who are out of place.
From these scattered reflections, it is possible to develop an attitude toward being out of
place that is more than mere resignation, and that reflects an appreciation for its
personal and political significance.
HARRIS, Stephen (Leiden University, The Netherlands)
“Samsara is Nirvana: Locating the kleśas in Buddhist Cosmic Psychology”
A startling feature of Buddhist psychology, cosmology and meditational theory is the
correlation of saṃsāric mental states with cosmological realms of rebirth. According to
Abhidharmic categorizations of mental states, this correlation is quite literal: anger is the
state of mind that predominates in a hell realm, and when I lose my temper I share the
mental experience of a hell being. These same claims apply for the other realms of
rebirth, with craving predominating in the realm of hungry ghosts, ignorance in the realm
of animals and so on. There is a sense, then, in which the negative mental states
(kleśas) are physically located, as (predominantly) arising in a given realm.
I argue that this early cosmological picture hints at the rejection of dualisms in later
Mahāyāna metaphysics. I begin by emphasizing the distinction in Buddhist psychology
between pleasure and pain (vedanā) which are karmically and soteriologically neutral,
and the negative mental states (kleśas) like anger and craving. I use The Simile of the
Saw from the Pali Canon as illustrating the limit case in which terrible physical pain is
experienced with complete emotional equilibrium. Theoretically, this same distinction
should apply in the negative realms as well, and this is what we find in Śāntideva’s
description of the bodhisattva’s complete immunity to distress in the hell
realms. Nirvana with remainder, therefore, has no physical location within the realms of
existence, but instead is a skillful (kuśala) mode of interacting with any external
phenomena whatsoever.
All of this hints at the radical rejection of dualisms we find in later Mādhyamika and
Yogācāra metaphysics. Here the dichotomy between virtuous (kuśala) and negative
(kleśa) mental states is itself destabilized, but the basic soteriological movement we find
in the spatialization of the kleśas repeats within the psychological domain. Nirvana with
remainder is no longer merely constituted by a subset of virtuous qualities, but is now a
mode of experiencing all phenomena whatsoever as empty of intrinsic existence
(svabhāva) or of subject object duality.
HARRIS, Thorian R. (University of Maryland Baltimore County)
“Confucius and the Confederacy: What Early China Can Teach us About the
Ethics of Memorials”
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Memorials have many social functions, but perhaps the most definitive is to transcribe,
transmit, and trigger the memory of the subject—whether it is a specific person, group,
event, and action. Memorials that are dedicated to specific persons can express love,
grief, thanksgiving—yet, regardless of the specific intentions of those who establish
them, many such memorials also take on the function of commending the memorialized
person to our attention, encouraging us to regard the person as exemplary, even if only
in a limited capacity. As recent debate in the United States over the memorials
dedicated to figures of the Confederacy demonstrates, the normative force of memorials
and the moral significance of putative exemplars are rightfully subject to critique.
But what are the proper terms and goals of such criticisms? Must those whom we
memorialize be wholly free from moral flaws? If we are critical of monuments dedicated
to militant defenders of the institution of slavery, must we also be critical of monuments
dedicated to slave-owning presidents? Can monuments focus on specific aspects of a
person, and not require approbation of everything about the person? Can memorials
function to open up critical discussions and sustain conflicting moral evaluations, or is a
dominant moral interpretation always implied? Is it possible that we might memorialize
cautionary, and not simply exemplary, figures? Drawing upon the discussions on
exemplars, both terrible and excellent, in the early Confucian literature, as well as the
critical engagement, on the part of Confucians, in the practices of memorialization—
burial mounds, ancestor tablets, historical records—I will define and defend a Confucian
program for critically assessing the normative force and moral significance of exemplars
and the places and objects we use to memorialize them.
HAVLICK, David (University of Colorado at Colorado Springs)
“Re-Placing Memory: Total War, Commemoration, and Reuse of Militarized Sites
in Japan”
The 1931 to 1945 Asia Pacific war created an array of specific militarized places and
more generalized militarized landscapes. These latter, the product of a commitment to
total warfare pursued especially by the US starting in 1944, present a challenge to
subsequent efforts at commemoration. It can be a relatively straightforward task to
commemorate a particular site of military impact, but when warfare has broadly
impacted entire cities or regions it introduces a problem of scale. Total warfare also
creates a distinctive and more diffused post-war politics of memory that raises ethical
concerns for land redevelopment, commemoration, or obliteration. Paradoxically, the
turn to total war may actually make it less likely that we will later memorialize and learn
from the horrors of war. As the survivors of total war in Japan become fewer and fewer,
the task of translating direct experiences into a broader memory of cultural trauma also
becomes both more difficult and more important. This paper examines the irony of total
warfare diminishing the cultural significance of particular places, and asks in turn to
what degree current efforts to revise history and social studies texts, and to remilitarize
Japan, might be a reflection of the Asia-Pacific War fading from view. Are there ways to
better cultivate an ethic of memory that is grounded in physical places, and to elevate
the meaning of the past so it can more clearly inform the present and the future?
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HE, Jinli (Trinity University)
“Spatiality and Location in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi”
Zhuangzi’s interest in spatiality and location constitutes important features of his
philosophy. In this aspect, several questions can be explored: Why it is necessary for
occupying huge space and changing locations (the image of Kun in the Xiaoyaoyou
[Free and Easy Wandering])? Why there has to be a specific location (for example, Kuse Mountain)? What is the significance of spatiality (occupying big space vs. occupying
small space)? How is spatiality expressed in the concept of you 有 and its relationship
with wu 無 ? How to read the dislocation of the body? How and what does it for
losing/forgetting oneself (losing your spatiality and your location), etc..?
In my discussion of those questions, I also intend to explain Zhuangzi’s possible
contribution to our contemporary social space.
HEINE, Steven (Florida International University)
“Utopian Space and Institutional Place in Classical Chan Buddhism”
This paper examines the distinction between two seemingly contradictory yet
complementary views of the sacred habitat for monks evident in classical Chinese Chan
Buddhist writings and forms of practice: one based on a utopian sense of mystical
immersion in an unregulated and unfettered natural setting; and the other based on the
institutional construction of a strictly regulated and highly disciplined monastic training
regimen.
The utopian view is primarily evoked in Tang dynasty legends of monks who lived
exclusively or with preference for a natural state unfettered by the encumbrances of
society. Some of the main examples include the Bird’s Nest Monk who resided at the
top of a tree, from which perch he instructed Bai Juyi among many others; the Boat
Monk who floated on a lake for thirty years until he found a fitting disciple and
deliberately capsized; and Baizhang’s Peak, where the prominent master known for his
monastic rules and devotion to laboring in the fields, escaped for solitary contemplation
which he referred to as the “most extraordinary matter of Chan.”
The institutional view is mainly demonstrated by the Song dynasty’s uniform pattern of
Chan temple construction, which contained seven main buildings, including the Dharma
Hall for preaching and the Monks Hall for meditation. Ideally, based on Baizhang’s
Rules a temple would not need to house a Buddha Hall since the Abbot who resided in
a special quarters was considered a manifestation of the Living Buddha, but that was
aim was rarely practiced. In any case, each and every aspect of the monastic life was
carefully regulated on a 24/7 basis, in contrast to the independent wanderings of Tang
recluses. A famous verse about an all-night vigil while gazing at the mountains and
waters after hearing an inspirational sermon at a temple by the eminent Song lay poet
Su Dongpo provides an intriguing bridge linking the utopian and institutional impulses in
Chan.
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HEITZ, Marty (Oklahoma State University)
“I Am Here Now”—A Finger Pointing at the Moon”
Given that the best we can do, when speaking of ultimate truth, is offer a “finger pointing
to the moon,” I have developed my own “pointer,” and it expresses what I take to be the
fundamental, existential fact: I Am Here Now. That may not sound like much, but as I
understand it each word in this statement is a synonym for every other word, such that
any single word directly implies the other three. Also, while this is a statement of
absolute or “transcendent” truth, it has a relative and “contingent” corollary: i am here
now. That is, we live our lives in the contingent realm of specific places and times, as
this specific person with a specific, relative history, yet wherever I am, whatever the
clock time or whoever I am, “I Am Here Now.” So in the deepest sense, I can never be
“there” or “then,” for I can only ever be Here and Now. I use this, of course, to help
express and explain the non-duality of Advaita Vedanta, Buddhism and Daoism.
HEMMINGSEN, Michael (McMaster University, Canada)
“Place-Based Reasons in Non-Western Thought”
In this paper I describe a place-based kind of validity claim that I refer to as “ecological
truth”, and suggest that it shows up the limitations of Jurgen Habermas’ ontology of
reasons. Habermas suggests that there are three kinds of reasons that are able to be
offered in discourse: claims of fact, claims of normative validity and claims of honest
self-expression. These three kinds of reason constitute, he thinks, the full range of
validity claims available to us, and he identifies the ability to clearly distinguish between
them as a specifically modern accomplishment. He holds that non-modern societies,
many indigenous ones among them, blur the lines between these three categories and
hence fall short of the ideal practices of discourse.
Ecological truth, I suggest, is a kind of reason available in discourse that is rooted in a
close intertwining of practices and communities with particular ecologies and
environments that cannot be subsumed into the categories of fact, norm and selfexpression. As such, I question Habermas’ certainty that he has charted the full extent
of the kinds of reasons available to human beings. As Boaventura de Sousa Santos
argues, “there is no global social justice without global cognitive justice.” I ask,
therefore, why the three kinds of reasons used by “modern” Westerners should
constitute the basic set, deviation from which equates to a failure of understanding.
Using the example of “ecological truth” as an alternative kind of reason, I argue that,
rather than being a confused blurring of the lines of the ideal set of reasons,
expressions on the part of indigenous and “traditional” societies that do not conform to
Habermas’ categories of fact, norm or self-expression are just as likely to be instances
of an expanded ontology of reasons that are equally legitimate.
HENKEL, Jeremy (Wofford College)
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“The Inescapable Contingency of the Dhamma: Applying the Buddhist Critique of
Essences to Buddhism”
If the Buddhist critique of essences is correct, it follows that there is no essence of
Buddhism. But if this is the case, then what if any criterion can we use to determine
whether any particular thinker or school of thought can appropriately be called
Buddhist? If no objective criterion can be identified, then self-attribution risks becoming
immune to error: Dōgen is a Buddhist because he says he is, and Śāṃkara is not a
Buddhist because he says he’s not, and there’s no more to the issue than each
individual’s claims. But, as Wittgenstein teaches us, if there is no way to be incorrect,
then both correctness and incorrectness are rendered senseless. If this analysis is
correct, then the Buddhist critique of essences seems to collapse under its own weight.
But this conclusion need not be understood as a reductio of the Buddhist denial of
essences. My thesis in this presentation is that we can identify an objective criterion for
identifying a school as Buddhist while embracing the Buddhist denial of essences. We
can do this by looking not for some one thing that all forms of Buddhism are, but rather
for something that all forms of Buddhism do. Buddhism is not, fundamentally, any
particular teaching, practice, or doctrine, nor some set thereof. Rather, Buddhism is an
approach, a methodology. Specifically, Buddhism is a methodology for responding to a
dominant ideology. This feature of Buddhism, I contend, explains why Buddhism can
manifest in such varied ways and still be recognizable as Buddhism. Buddhism is
inescapably contingent and hybridized—always existing in dependence on and in
response to a dominant cultural milieu.
HEPACH, Maximilian Gregor (University of Freiburg, Germany)
“Attempting a ‘Philosophy of Climate”
The places we find ourselves in everyday are themselves always in some sort of
climate. We may first think of the climate zone we live in, or of the current season that
has been influencing our mood. But even our indoor spaces are ‘well tempered’: Most of
us spend our days feeling the constant climate of a warm Central European day in May
year-round, literally conditioning the air to our needs.
In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger dedicates most of his book to understanding the
structure of our everyday existence in the world, yet the spatial dimension of our
existence seems to fall short. As Watsuji Tetsuro points out eloquently in “Climate and
Culture”, Heidegger neglects to emphasize that our being-in-the-world is always attuned
to a certain climate. For Watsuji climate does not just describe ‘long-term weather’, but
also the topography we find ourselves in. We may think of fertile soil as a good example
for the complexity of climate: The fertility of soil is dependent not only on a certain
amount of rain and suitable temperatures, but also on the right physical properties and
nutrients of/in the ground. Furthermore, soil is only fertile insofar as it is fertile for
something, for certain plants to grow, or for people to be able to live off of the land.
Yet climate is not only experienced as something seemingly ‘objective’ in the world; our
own emotions may very well be experienced as a form of climate or weather, as
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Hermann Schmitz points out. We may be swept up by a mood that fills the air, or be
aware of the tense atmosphere in the room we are in. In a more general sense we also
speak of intellectual or political climates that determine what can be thought, done and
said.
What all these aspects of climate show, is that climate is not a single observable
phenomena, but rather something of which we are both a part and which determines
who we are in existential ways. Aspects of what I have here called ‘climate’ seem to turn
up in terms such as the between, which Heidegger develops in his later work, or the
Chinese/Japanese term ki,2 which may come closest to describing what I am after here:
something in which everything is, and which is seemingly between everything. The
place in which everything takes place?
To think about climate means to reflect upon all the different ways we influence the
world around us, and how our environment in turn influences us. Difficulties begin to
arise when we begin to ask even the simplest questions, such as what is cold when we
feel cold: is it the air, or us? In the following I hope to illuminate this fabric of climate, of
place, we are woven into.
HEYD, Thomas (University of Victoria, Canada)
“Pilgrimage journeying in Bashō and Alexander von Humboldt”
In this presentation I argue for the place-making power of pilgrimage journeying by
comparing the travel accounts of Matsuo Bashō (1644-1694) in Oku no hosomichi and
Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) in Voyage aux régions equinoxiales du Nouveau
Continent. I propose that both Bashō’s fictionalised account of his travel to remote
regions of Japan, climaxing in his visit to Dewa Sanzan, and von Humboldt’s walk to the
summit of the Teide volcano on the island of Tenerife, in the Canary Isles, constitute
pilgrimages, albeit not religious. I argue that their journeys both reinforce and
reconstitute their destinations as places, carving them out of the surrounding space. As
a result of their respective journeys their destinations stand out as infused with
particular meaning, which later visitors may seek to reconstruct and reaffirm through
their own journeys.
HIGGINS, Kathleen (University of Texas at Austin)
“Putting the Dead in their Place”
Place seems to be a notion that is inapplicable to the dead, for in a straightforward way
they are no longer situated within our time-space continuum. Yet in part for this reason,
their living survivors struggle to find a place for them. Whether or not this struggle plays
out in the appropriation of literal places varies with cultures. Some, such as those that
have a tradition of sky burial, eschew associating terrestrial places with particular dead
individuals. But in many societies, living people create and mark sites for relating to the
deceased in the form of burial and reburial sites, memorials, shrines, altars, dedicated
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spaces, and images that symbolically revive the dead (such as paintings, photographs,
and sculptures).
The practice of dedicating literal places to the dead serves a number of functions that
benefit bereaved people (whether considered individually or as groups). The very
gesture of marking a place for the dead helps to restore a sense of normalcy to our
world after the presumption of continuity in space and time has been disrupted by a
cherished person’s death. Such places also enable the living to act on behalf of the
dead in a context in which one’s efforts seem otherwise ineffectual and one’s sense of
failing the deceased may be acute. As sites of action for sheltering the dead (tending to
their remains and honoring them and their legacies), such places help the living to reassert relationships of caring and close connection with the deceased. By providing a
space in which the person’s absence can be felt as present, they provide the living with
a focus for communicative gestures directed toward the deceased person, satisfying a
desire that may otherwise be frustrated. Such places can also reassure the living that a
beloved individual will not be forgotten, for they are often marked by some
announcement that reminds the world of what it has lost with this person’s death.
However, literal places for the dead have their ironies. Robert Musil argues that
memorials erected to preserve people and events in our memories are especially
ineffective for this purpose, for they become part of the landscape that we typically
ignore as we pass by. Moreover, even though the places deliberately associated with a
deceased person can help to summon up a sense of that person’s presence for the
living, they draw attention to the person’s absence. That absence can be a real
presence, but the memory can be at least as painful as reassuring. Such places are
also potential sites of collision between our memories of the deceased and the
imaginings we have of the person as now having an alien status or lacking existence
entirely.
One might see the effort to find a literal place for the dead as ill-conceived, if
understandable. It might seem a gesture of denial in the face of reality, a fetishizing of
the remains of the person, or a form of concretizing of wishes that cannot be fulfilled.
But the possibility of maintaining a meaningful place for the dead in the sense of having
a degree of a “live” relationship with them is not delusory. A living person can do this by
placing the relationship with a deceased person on a new footing, now in the role of a
guide and perhaps an ancestor. While this involves considerable work of creative
imagination on the part of the living person, such active relating can involve honoring,
deferring to, and even negotiate with someone who is dead. It can result in finding new
meanings in the relationship.
While literal places and spaces can serve facilitative roles, they do not on their own
ensure a place for the dead in our lives. But to the extent that the living person remains
open and responsive, relationships with the dead can continue to develop. We cannot
know what we are to the dead, if such a notion is even coherent. But we can keep
learning and cherishing what they are to us, and in doing so we make and maintain a
place for the dead.
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HOWARD, Veena (California State University, Fresno)
“Queen Gāndhārī’s Mapping the Battlefield: Reversing the Gaze from Detached
Dispassion to Dynamic Interplay of Emotions”
Within the epic poem Mahābhārata, the “Book of the Women,” Queen Gāndhārī laments
the “Great War,” in which all of her heroic sons and allies are killed and their wives
remain widowed. The Queen surveys the battlefield, showing Lord Kṛṣṇa decapitated
bodies and scattered limbs of the warriors while describing their heroic traits and the
glorious lives they once lived. Gāndhārī’s mapping of the post-war battlefield of loss and
lamentation is in stark contrast to Krishna’s pre-war mapping of the battlefield arrayed
with warriors seeking glory of Kṣatriya dharma. Her graphic tale, recounting the loss
experienced by women as the result of this war, invokes strong feelings of grief, disgust,
and compassion on the part of listeners.
Set on the field of Kurukṣetra, the “Book of Women” acts as a cautionary tale
questioning the virtues of impervious machismo and stoic asceticism. The religious
value of the transcendence of emotions — “detached quietism” —is challenged through
display of raw emotions. Making powerful use of bodily metaphor, severed heads show
mind and body are literally at a disconnect. The supposedly heroic male form, now
shattered throughout the battlefield, is juxtaposed with the open vulnerability, empathy
and compassion as articulated in the bodies of the grieving widows— revealing true
strength and resilience. Finally, the lament incites a dispelling of grief, and thus, as a
form of catharsis marks the beginning of a healing process.
This paper examines the power of dynamic interplay of emotions, extolled in the “Book
of the Women,” in opposition with the lauded detachment from emotions championed in
numerous Indian philosophical texts, including the Bhagavad-Gītā. Through this
investigation, it explores the transformative and liberating power of emotions,
specifically of sorrow and compassion (karuṇa), through literary and philosophical
approaches to aesthetic concept of rasa (“aesthetic delight”).
HUANG, Yong (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
“Environmental Virtue Ethics: Contributions from the Confucian Tradition”
Environmental ethics has been dominated by utilitarianism and deontology. However, in
recent years, dissatisfied with these two approaches, a number of scholars, such as
Thomas Hill, Bill Shaw, Ronald Sandler, Philip Cafaro, and Louke van Wensveen, have
developed the virtue ethics approach to the issue of environment. As impressive as their
works are, this approach also has its own problem. In his influential essay,
“Environmental Virtue Ethics: Half Truth but Dangerous as a Whole,” Holmes Rolston III
points out that environmental virtue ethics, based in the Aristotelian tradition, is focused
on the eudaimonia of the virtuous agents, thus rendering our care for the environment
as merely instrumental to our own well-being and unable to recognize the inherent value
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of the environment itself. In this paper, I shall offer a Confucian version of environmental
virtue ethics, which can avoid this problem.
I shall develop this Confucian version of environment virtue ethics primarily along the
lines suggested by neo-Confucian Cheng Hao and Wang Yangming with their central
idea of being on one body with ten thousand things. In their view, a person of ren, the
most important Confucian virtue, is one who can feel the itches and pains of everything
in the world and thus is naturally inclined to help them get rid of these pain and itches.
In this process, the virtuous agents gradually feel that they are in one body with ten
thousand things. This version of environmental virtue ethics, just like any other versions
of environmental virtue ethics, indeed just like any version of virtue ethics, is also
focused on the virtuous person. However, since this virtuous person considers
everything in the universe to be part of his/her own body, his/her care for the
environment is also for the sake of the environment itself. Indeed, the very distinction
between the virtuous agent and the environment no long exists.
HUFF, Benjamin (Randolph-Macon College)
“Servants of Heaven: The Confucian Gentleman’s Place Within the Cosmos”
The nature of the cosmos and humanity’s role within it are fundamental concerns of
early Confucian thought. Confucian standards and aspirations are rooted in both an
understanding of Tian or Heaven as the place in which human life unfolds, and also of
the place of humanity within the cosmic system. Heaven’s mandate or ming both
governs events outside of human control and provides a normative standard for human
behavior. Hence understanding Tian and ming is essential to the Confucian ethos: “One
who does not understand fate (ming) lacks the means to become a gentleman.”
Yet recent scholarship displays deep disagreements on how Heaven and its mandate
are to be understood. In some cases, scholars suggest that early Confucians
themselves lack a consistent conception of what they mean by these words, or that the
operative conception shifts dramatically from one reference to the next. Robert Eno
goes so far as to say that for Mencius, “Tian is not a stable concept but a chameleonlike notion that resembles nothing more than a convenient rhetorical device.” In a similar
spirit, CHEN Ning finds a number of different notions of ming operating in early
Confucian texts, with quite different meanings for the term appearing even within the
same passage. Other scholars describe a reasonably unified conception, but one
whose interpretation of the texts is debatable.
At the same time there is uncertainty over how humans should relate to Tian and ming.
Since they are revered as the source of the moral standard, as most scholars agree,
one might expect that the Confucian gentleman would see other aspects of ming in a
similar light, as good or even normative, and would strive to align his life with them. Yet
in recent years, several scholars have argued that the gentleman does not look for a
harmony between his own goals and ming. Michael Puett, for instance, goes so far as to
say that the gentleman’s relationship with ming is “potentially agonistic.” Edward
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Slingerland takes the somewhat milder view that the gentleman should feel
“indifference” toward ming.
In this paper I argue, however, that the early Confucian conceptions of Tian and ming
are quite consistent and unified, and that the Confucian view of how one should relate
to them is similarly unified. The gentleman consistently regards Tian as a beneficent,
ordering force. Moreover, he strives to harmonize with ming as manifested in outward
events as well as in the moral standard it sets. Far from something distant, he regards
ming as something deeply personal, the basis and content of many of his most
important actions. That is to say, his relationship with Heaven is not passive but active,
not distant but intimate.
Kongzi and Mengzi, I argue, fundamentally understand themselves as servants of
Heaven. Heaven has assigned them a task, which they regard as their ming, both in the
sense of a command they have received and a mandate they bear. This task is
essentially continuous with the task, or mandate, of King Wen and the Duke of Zhou.
Kongzi and Mengzi endeavor to carry it out despite its loftiness and difficulty. They
regard Heaven not merely with respect, but with loyalty and affection. Further, as
bearers of its charge, they trust that Heaven will sustain them and open a path for them
to succeed, even though they are far from certain just how this path will unfold. Finally,
they urge all human beings to join them in serving Heaven by nurturing its gift of human
nature (xing) and living by the virtues that are its fruits.
HUNG, Ruyu (National Chiayi University, Taiwan)
“Critical Trilogy of Place: A Heideggerian Reflection on the Conflict over Land
Development in a Taiwanese Village”
This paper explores the meaning of dwelling in terms of critical trilogy of place. The
critical trilogy is a transformative framework adapted from Gruenewald’s critical
pedagogy of place and Heidegger’s philosophical work on dwelling: a critical trilogy of
place. The critical trilogy of place, which is composed of decentralisation, reinhabitation,
and regermination, reveals the profound meaning of the relationship between human
beings and place when applied to a case of land ab/use in Dapu in Taiwan. Through the
lens of the critical trilogy, the deep sense of interconnectedness and multi-dimensional
relationships between people and place in relation to Heidegger’s notion of dwelling is
to be enfolded. This exploration concludes that to dwell in place is an unbeatable
longing which sustains living and learning on earth.
HUNTINGTON, Patricia (Arizona State University)
“Exploring the Place of Karma in Colonial Displacements:
Basho, The Western Apache, and Yocagara”
The Western Apache hold that place constitutes a greater self of the people because, to
borrow Keith Basso’s phrase, “memory sits in places.” In hope of balancing a
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compassionate attitude toward colonial displacement with the Buddhist path to
renunciation of attachment, I will explore the Apache sense of collective memory as
located in places through a karmic lens. Places arguably hold karma and karmic
streams define our sense of place at both individual and collective levels. I aim to
demonstrate that a concrete and lived sense of place resides at the intersection of
karma and dharma.
Drawing upon Basho’s poetry and Yogacara, I first advance the claim that overcoming
karmic conditioning entails a radical renunciation of the desire to inhabit a particular kind
of place. The felt need for specific conditions – and by extension a sense of
implacement (in Ed Casey’s sense) in a particular geography, land, people, or cultural
setting – impedes awakening from attachment to the self. For the enlightened mind the
quest for place must give way to journey. Nevertheless, the second claim I wish to
advance reflects the paradoxical experience that spiritual renunciation of place,
manifest and symbolized in Basho’s life as wandering, allows each place to grant its
peculiar implacement for the temporal duration it can have and the lessons it can
impart.
I will link karma to longings old and new, and to the alaya-vijnana or store
consciousness. Karma, I suggest, is tied distinctly to past loss or failure and this eonlong sense of loss provides a background horizon for feeling present losses, failings,
atrocities and prospects of loss or tragedy. Dharma, by contrast, I will link to the
boundless spatiality of mind (and Great Mirror Cognition) that exceeds time and space
and thus avails people of healing and transformation but without obliterating the realities
of unrecoverable loss. To the contrary, dharmic living, I hope to show, supports, rather
than impedes, rejuvenated engagement with place both by enabling us to grasp the
depth of loss and by accounting for how displaced peoples, as American tribes have
stated in their own words, survive.
Complexities arise when comparing cases of colonial displacement. In the case of
Drochu-la pass in Bhutan, where a yearly festival commemorates the death of the
Assan, a stolid sense of place can threaten to effectuate a second, post-conflict
displacement by covering over the atrocity of massacre and reifying memory. In the
case of Western Apache we witness the longstanding effects of displacement in simple
erosion of memory. Yet when practices of memorialization and efforts to recover lost
heritage reify memory (or objectify the alaya-vijnana), they can displace victims and
perpetrators alike from their living karmic inheritance as peoples historically intertwined.
Enacted instead as explorations of karmic streams and lamentable acts, festivals of
memoralization can recover a genuine sense of implacement as a lived reality with
collective acceptance of moral debt. Longing for a complacent, sedentary sense of
peace cannot capture Buddhist dharma.
Basho's mature poetics provide a lens through which to reveal the interconnected
nature of karma and dharma as what grants a lived and changing sense of place. His
wandering poetry avails people of a restored sense of karmic inheritance that, precisely
because it resists reification, upsets an easy and comfortable home placement. By this
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jolt, his poetics send people to wander within their histories and traditions to recover
painful memories and spark change. Rest and healing arrive, arguably, through journey
and by bringing karmic lines forth toward possible ripening and exhaustion.
Implacement or being at home in place cannot be lived, I suggest, outside dharmic
transformation. Realizing place involves loss and labored renewal, recovery of unhappy
memories equally as acceptance of unnameable losses, and accountability for crimes
that cannot be undone but which, when released from appropriation, can be let to work
their ripening power of effect.
HWANG, Eun Young (University of Chicago)
“The Paradoxical Place of Self: Augustine and Zhi Yi on the Innermost Place of
Nowhere in the Self”
In this paper, I will engage with a comparative-philosophical inquiry on the paradoxical
place of self in Augustine and Zhi Yi. There has been some history of reading Augustine
and the Tendai tradition (Dogen) respectively in light of the paradoxical place of the self,
as can been seen from Jean Luc Marion (Marion, the Place of Self, 2008) and Nishida
Kitaro (Nishida, The logic of Place and Religious Worldview, 1947). In a similar vein to
these interpretations with a comparative philosophical concern, this paper addresses
how Augustine and Zhi Yi argues that the self’s experience of valuation and desire in
the world is shaped and transformed by the innermost source of the self which is alien
to the self but traceable to the nowhere of the religious ultimate.
For Augustine, the paradoxical place of eternity, which orients one’s desire and
valuation in the soul’s innermost but also above it, is recovered to be the image of God,
when the self turns away from one’s disordered self-centricity toward the well-ordered
love of eternity. One’s initial reorientation of faith deepens the value of what she seeks
and intensifies her desire through this deepening of valuation.
For Zhi Yi, the paradoxical place of Buddha-nature, which generates all mental images
in its untraceable nowhere, is discovered and actualized when the self discovers the
truth of the middle in the inseparability of emptiness and conditioned life, thus having
her ordinary valuation, active desire, and existence to be identified with the ultimate
wisdom, the ultimate liberation, and the absolute reality. One’s sudden reconfiguration
of reality in light of emptiness makes any instance of valuation and desire to be
saturated with this radical acceptance of all infinite viewpoints and values as well as
some underlying un-defilement, leading to some paradoxical attitude of committed
engagement and non-attachment.
ILIEVA, Evgenia (Ithaca College)
“The Place of Exile: Edward Said and Erich Auerbach in Counterpoint”
For some of the most prominent thinkers of the modern period, the characteristic
figure of the 20th century was the refugee and exile. Both represented the
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underside of modernity and the failure of a discourse of human rights. For
example, Hannah Arendt wrote evocatively about the experience of rootlessness
and metaphysical homelessness – the loss of a sense of place or meaning in the
world – and saw these as core elements in the rise of totalitarianism. Others, like
Theodor Adorno, sought to transform our thinking on the question of
statelessness and exile by insisting that exile was a new and better condition of
being, an existence outside the reified world of modern life.
Against more recent narratives of the enriching and ultimately redemptive motifs
of exile, this paper returns to Edward Said’s reflections on exile as a way of
rethinking the notion of place, “the notion by which during a period of
displacement someone like Auerbach in Istanbul could feel himself to be out of
place, exiled, alienated” (Said 1983, 8). While Said recognized the creativity of
exile and brought to light the oppositional politics and secular criticism that an
exilic consciousness articulates, he was keen to remind us that the aura of exile
could not mask the horrors that enabled it: “that exile is irremediably secular and
unbearably historical; that it is produced by human beings for other human
beings; and that, like death but without death’s ultimate mercy, it has torn
millions of people from the nourishment of tradition, family, and geography”
(Said 2000, 174).
Since Erich Auerbach is a central figure in Said’s ruminations on exile, this paper
endeavors to read together these two thinkers with a view towards using their
writings to rethink notions of place. More broadly, the paper seeks to situate their
respective work within a broader context that saw the proliferation of discourses
of world-history, world-philosophy, and world-literature in the middle decades of
the 20th century.
INDRACCOLO, Lisa (University of Zurich, Switzerland)
“Living the Past: The Confucian Classics as ‘Place’ of Moral Cultivation in Early
Imperial China”
The early imperial Chinese scholarly tradition has witnessed a lively engagement with
its own cultural roots, represented at best in a set of foundational texts, the five
“Confucian Classics”. The teachings of the ancients as preserved in this Canon are
elected as the personal inner meta-space in which cultural refinement and selfcultivation come together, and complement each other harmoniously. Such goal is
proactively achieved through the assiduous, reverential frequentation of these texts,
with which an intimate connection is established (Nylan 2001; Lewis 1999).
Ideally, through the study of the Classics and the progressive interiorization of their
teachings, the heart’s innermost intentions, pulsions, and desires are progressively
tamed, and spontaneously modulated in accordance with the values embodied in the
words and deeds of the sage kings of antiquity (Kern 2005; Murray 2007). Thus,
unravelling the deep, subtle meaning of these texts, and disclosing the ethical teachings
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that might have been deliberately hidden throughout them through careful exegetical
and hermeneutical work are a fundamental task of a true scholar (Schaab-Hanke 2010;
Zufferey 2003).
However, erudition is not merely a self-referential exercise devoted to the moral and
intellectual improvement of the individual. Quite the contrary, it is imbued with a deeper
meaning and invested with a broader ethical scope (Knechtges 1976, 2002; Nylan
2014). As the present paper shows, such apparent detachment from the word and
bookish immersion into texts is only a temporary necessity, and should be envisioned
as a fundamental step in a broader humanistic enterprise involving society at large, and
aiming at the establishment of a harmonious society as ultimate goal. A scholar is
invested with a duty of crucial importance, since his conduct, molded by the study of the
most revered texts, embodies and exudes the values promoted in them. Accordingly,
his behavior sets an example for others to follow, igniting a virtuous process that
reverberates through all layers of society.
The present paper explores the literati’s relationship and interaction with transmitted
knowledge, the classical literary tradition and the Confucian Canon in early imperial
China, with a specific focus on the role and the value of the corpus of the Classics as
ethical and poietico-philosophical “place”.
ING, Michael D.K. (Indiana University)
“Rethinking the Place of Value Conflicts in Early Confucian Thought”
In this presentation I will argue that early Confucians recognized the possibility of
irresolvable value conflicts. I will begin the presentation with an overview of the ways in
which several contemporary scholars have described Confucianism as a worldview
without irresolvable value conflicts. Value conflicts, according to these scholars, are
understood as epistemic, not ontological. In other words, many contemporary scholars
assert that early Confucians understood the world as a place where tensions between
values can be resolved if the skills or other capacities of the moral agent are sufficient to
resolve them. Failure to tend to some value signifies a shortcoming of the moral agent,
not a problem with the possibilities afforded by the world. I will challenge these
narratives by looking at several vignettes that depict irresolvable value conflicts.
In constructing my argument I will distinguish between a strong claim and a more
moderate claim; the latter of which I wish to emphasize. I will not make the strong claim
that Confucians believed that values inherently conflict. Early Confucians did not believe
that we live in a fractured world where values are necessarily at odds with each other.
Yet they did believe in the reality of value conflicts such that tragic circumstances are
possible. In other words, early Confucians recognized the complexities of life such that
even the highly skilled moral agent (i.e., a sage) could encounter a situation were the
values at stake were fundamentally incapable of being harmonized. As such, early
Confucians could see the world as conflictual, although they did not see the world as
necessitating conflict.
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The Confucian conflictual world is one of possible incongruity, where minor value
conflicts may even be inevitable given the complexities of life, but values in the abstract
sense are not thought to be in conflict in and of themselves. In this light, deep value
conflicts such as those I will discuss in this presentation may rarely occur, but the fact
that they can occur, and that they can occur for even the most profound people is
significant in forecasting the sentiments people have about the world they live in.
JAIN, Pankaj (University of North Texas)
“Dharma and Science are Complementary: Himalayan Environmental Studies and
Conservation Organization’s Experiments with Himalayan Communities”
This is a paper about the dharmic-social-scientific work done by Himalayan
Environmental Studies and Conservation Organization (hereafter HESCO) in Himalayan
villages in Uttarakhand, India. In 2012, supported by the Fulbright Fellowship for
Environmental Leadership, I surveyed about a dozen districts in Uttarakhand to learn
about HESCO’s projects related to sustainable development and environment. HESCO
arose in the 1970s as a new organization led by its founder Dr. Anil Prakash Joshi and
some of his doctoral students. As botanists, as he and his students became aware of
Himalayan forestry and other ecological issues, their research increasingly became
sociocentric and eventually they all gave up their academic careers and became fulltime
social workers.
In my research, I discovered that HESCO carries out more than social work. Following
Weightman and Pandey (1978), I argue that the concept of dharma can be successfully
applied as an overarching term for their socio-economic work. Dharma synthesizes their
way of life with social work based on dharma’s multidimensional interpretations as I
show in their work with the Himalayan communities.
JAKUBCZAK, Marzenna (Pedagogical University of Cracow, Poland)
“Locating the Self: Between Memory, Attention and Discrimination”
The issue of the psychophysical integrity of human beings finds several interesting
articulations in the classical Indian philosophical texts, including those of SāṃkhyaYoga tradition. A highly debatable question remains, however: where the self, the
subject of perception and volition is located, since the principle of consciousness is said
to be embedded neither in body nor in mind. To define the epistemic status of the
rudimentary self-representation I will discuss in detail how the memory traces of the
past deeds (saṃskāra), focused attention (ekāgratā), and the ability to distinguish
between ‘I’ and non-‘I’ (vivekakhyāti) mutually condition one another according to
Sāṃkhya and Yoga thinkers. While doing so, I will also refer to some contemporary
studies of the cognitive, emotional and volitional functions developed thanks to attention
regulation and monitoring meditation.
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JAMES, George Alfred (University of North Texas)
"India in Comparative Environmental Philosophy"
From the famous essay of 1967 entitled “The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis,
Lynn White Jr. is often credited with initiating the comparative study of environmental
philosophy. His claim was that the dominant religious tradition of the West bears an
enormous burden of guilt for the present environmental crisis for removing the sacred
from nature, and thereby one of the principal constraints to its mindless exploitation.
While White was dubious about the appropriation of non-Western perspectives to
address environmental problems his thought did much to stimulate research and
reflection upon views of nature both in Western and in non-Western traditions. In this
essay I argue that J. Baird Callicott’s Earth’s Insights, represents one of the first
scholarly efforts to examine nature in philosophical and religious traditions on a global
scale. In terms of his treatment of the traditions of India it represents the first of three
distinct phases of scholarship concerning India in this new sub-discipline. I argue that
two subsequent phases of scholarship about Indian philosophical and religious attitudes
to nature are indebted to his pioneering work. Such scholarship has developed and
refined new insights and opened new vistas that have enriched both comparative
philosophy and the comparative study of religion.
JANZ, Bruce B. (University of Central Florida)
“Creating and Activating Concepts in Place: The Example of African Philosophy”
There are no simple concepts. Every concept has components and is defined by
them. It therefore has a combination [chiffre*]. It is a multiplicity, although not
every multiplicity is conceptual. There is no concept with only one component.
Even the first concept, the one with which a philosophy "begins," has several
components, because it is not obvious that philosophy must have a beginning,
and if it does determine one, it must combine it with a point of view or a ground
[une raison]. Not only do Descartes, Hegel, and Feuerbach not begin with the
same concept, they do not have the same concept of beginning. Every concept is
at least double or triple, etc. Neither is there a concept possessing every
component, since this would be chaos pure and simple. Even so-called
universals as ultimate concepts must escape the chaos by circumscribing a
universe that explains them (contemplation, reflection, communication). Every
concept has an irregular contour defined by the sum of its components, which is
why, from Plato to Bergson, we find the idea of the concept being a matter of
articulation, of cutting and cross-cutting. The concept is a whole because it
totalizes its components, but it is a fragmentary whole. Only on this condition can
it escape the mental chaos constantly threatening it, stalking it, trying to reabsorb
it. (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 2004: 15-16)
We tend as philosophers to first ask what something is. Definition is in our DNA, and
that often takes a specific form, tending to abstraction from particular instances,
formative conditions, reception conditions for those concepts by different people, and so
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forth. We have sometimes tended to leave those other questions to other disciplines.
So, psychology, we might think, is concerned with the acquisition and application of
concepts rather than their intention, while anthropology might be concerned with the
cultural history of concepts and literature is concerned with the rhetorical force of the
concepts, and so forth.
Cultural philosophy, I want to argue, makes these seemingly easy distinctions much
less clear. Historically, at least in the case of Western philosophical attitudes to Africa,
the default position has been that the concepts that exist there are either borrowed,
unclear or immature, and the very concept of “concept” is undeveloped. This is a view I
wish to reject, but not by simply arguing that there is, in fact, a robust theory of concepts
in the sense that we might recognize it. I would rather like to see African (and by
extension, other non-Western) theories of cognition as bound up with practice and with
the creation of concepts, rather than simply the recognition of their existence as
fundamental components of thinking. This may seem to simply fall into a pragmatist
theory of concepts, one in which their significant lies in what they do rather than what
they are, but I think things are more complex than this. And, furthermore, if this
argument is successful, I think we will find links to other traditions of concepts in the
west, including the phenomenological cognitive sciences and, in a different way,
Deleuze and Guattari.
African philosophy becomes a useful space in which to think about the creation and
activation of concepts. As V. Y. Mudimbe has pointed out, Africa itself is a conceptual
geography that has been created by external forces. I have argued elsewhere, though
(Janz, Philosophy in an African Place) that the place of thought in Africa has a particular
phenomenological character, and tracing the ways in which concepts are both created
and activated can tell us much about how they become adequate to African lived reality.
This paper will outlines several examples of this kind of conceptual creation in Africa,
and argue that the approach that I call “philosophy-in-place” has application elsewhere
as well.
JEONG, Boram (Duquesne University/ Université de Paris VIII, France)
“Place of the Future in the Economy of Melancholia”
In antiquity, the concept of time was built around the natural motion of heavenly bodies.
Then we began using time as a unit to measure movements, with the introduction of
modern technologies. Today, time seems to have become something we ‘spend,’ ‘save,’
‘waste,’ and ‘manage,’ as we do with money. In this paper I show how time under
financial capitalism is largely subordinated to the movement of capital. Drawing upon
Deleuze’s remarks on the condition of the contemporary subjects – “[m]an is no longer
man enclosed, but man in debt,”– I focus specifically on the temporal structure under
which the indebted live. What characterizes the temporality of the indebted, similarly to
that of the melancholic, is the feeling of guilt that traps the subject into the circle of an
irreversible past and a predetermined future. This paper also reflects on the “temporality
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of no longer,” exemplified in the terms by which the young generation in Japan and
Korea call themselves, such as ‘Three-Give-Up generation’ (or ‘Sam-Po generation’: a
generation that gives up courtship, marriage and childbirth) and ‘Satori generation’ (a
generation without ambition, or hope).
JEONG, Sang-bong (Konkuk University, Korea)
“Zhu-Xi’s Metaphysics of Tai-ji”
In this paper I will show that tai-ji has several metaphysical meanings. First, tai-ji is the
origin of the myriad things in the cosmological sense. Its dong jing 動靜 is not the
mechanical movement and quiescence at the empirical level but the cosmological selfunfolding of tai-ji. This is one of metaphysical activities of tai-ji. Second, tai-ji is the
universal principle of the myriad things in the world. All the things in the world have the
same principle in themselves. It is similar to the one moon becoming the ten thousand
moons when reflected in the ten thousand rivers. Finally, human innate nature (ren 仁•yi
義•li 禮•zhi 智) is the manifestation of tai-ji. This constitutes human mind and heart, and
thus we can also find a moral dimension in tai-ji.
JIANG, Tao (Rutgers University)
"Historicist Challenges to Chinese Philosophy in the American Academy"
This presentation looks into a particular aspect of Sinological challenge to the modern
project of Chinese philosophy within the American academy through the lens of
authorship. It explores philosophical implications for texts whose authorship is in doubt
and develops a new heuristic model of authorship and textuality so that a more robust
intellectual space for the philosophical discourse on Chinese classics can be carved out
from the dominant historicist Sinological discourse.
JOHNSON, David W. (Boston College)
“Watsuji’s Topology of the Self”
In this presentation I maintain that the philosophy of WATSUJI Tetsurō is an instance of
a certain form of topological thinking. Thinking can be characterized as topological to
the extent that it reverses the usual and taken for granted ontological primacy of
discrete objects or entities over the places, contexts, structures, fields, and relations in
which these are located and by which they are engulfed. Topos and entity, moreover,
belong to one another in such a way that one could not exist without the other. The aims
of this presentation are first, to show that the two most important philosophical concepts
used in Watsuji’s analysis of the self, namely, aidagara, or being-in- relation, and fūdo,
or climate, are topological notions in this sense, and second, to indicate some of the
wider philosophical implications of approaching Watsuji’s work through this interpretive
lens.
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The first of the concepts in this pair is aidagara , or being-in-relation. This word captures
the way in which the self finds itself related to others as a co-worker, as a student, as a
member of a family, as a member of a congregation, and so forth. For Watsuji, to be
completely outside of any relation to others is not to be human. We live out our lives
with and among others, unavoidably and always already related to them; other people,
in effect, are the primary setting of human life.
The second concept is fūdo, or what we will translate here as ‘climate.’ Fūdo is a term
intended to express the way in which the natural and the cultural are interwoven in a
setting which is partly constitutive of and partly constituted and opened up by, a group
of people inhabiting a particular place. Such metaphysical commitments will mean that
we will need to somehow think nature together with culture and the self as what belongs
to, emerges from, and shapes this matrix.
Taken together, aidagara and fūdo provide the framework for a topological account of
the self, one which moves beyond the problematic modern understanding of human
beings as individual subjectivities ontologically decoupled both from the other people
among whom they live and the natural environment which surrounds them. Instead,
Watsuji maintains that the relational network of aidagara is itself situated in a specific
fūdo, or spatio-temporal locale characterized by a particular geography, culture, and
history. Hence the self also finds itself always already related to an array of meanings in
a surrounding environment in which culture and nature are encountered as a unitary
phenomenon.
The self, in effect, is emplaced in and encompassed by a place and a space which is
both geo-cultural and social. But this is not a merely passive relation; the self acts upon
and so partly constitutes both other selves and a specific fūdo, on the one side, while
both of these, in turn, act upon and help make the self what it is, on the other. The self,
then, comes to be what it is through relational contact with others and with a particular
climate, while both of these also depend on the self to be what they are. Self, others,
and climate belong to one another in and through this relational exchange, with each
functioning as a component of the larger experiential whole.
Aidagara and fūdo are hence the place and space of the self, but not of a self which
would be “in” or “on” these topoi as a cat on a mat or shoe in a box, as if each one were
an absolutely distinct entity which would then come into relation with the other. Rather,
aidagara and fūdo are dimensions of the basic space and place in and through which
the self is able to be continuous with the wider whole to which it is related. Yet this
continuity does not mean that the self is simply reducible to that which surrounds it;
instead, this is a form of unity constituted by the very difference and distance between
self, other, and climate. One difficulty that arises here, and one which we will need to
face, is the question of how transcendence, the distance and difference that makes
possible freedom and individuation, can be convincingly and rigorously accounted for if
the self is so completely identified with its insertion into the topoi of aidagara and fūdo.
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With this topological understanding of the self not only does Watsuji break convincingly
with dualistic accounts of a self detached from, and facing, the world and its places,
people, and objects; in the concepts of aidagara and fūdo he explores concrete and
quotidian structures of experience which, while neither originating nor culminating in an
obviously religious standpoint, nevertheless exemplify the profoundly nondual nature of
the self.
Furthermore, this close and concrete description of ordinary yet essential features of our
nondual way of being in the world also allows Watsuji’s views to be related quite readily
to the work of thinkers in the tradition of existential phenomenology such as Heidegger
and Merleau-Ponty; moreover, there is little doubt that he has something singular and
significant to contribute to the project of overcoming of dualism in this tradition. Here we
find another ontology in which consciousness and thing, self and world, intertwine and
mutually determine one another. Yet what thinkers in this tradition have overlooked, to
varying degrees, is the manner in which both other people and the specific locale we
find ourselves in are constitutive of the self even as they are also determined or shaped
by it. In looking beyond Japanese philosophy to the wider philosophical world in these
ways, Watsuji’s work expands and opens up our sense of what being-in-the-world,
which has been a phenomenon of the greatest significance for contemporary
phenomenology, and nondualism, which has been a concept of the first importance in
East Asian philosophy, are and can be.
Watsuji’s topological understanding of the human person thus offers a novel, wideranging, and complex view of how the self comes to be what it is—one far removed
from the naiveté and abstractions required to view the human person in purely
individualistic terms. In this vision, we find instead that the self and its consciousness
are rooted in a source far greater and more profound than the awareness of a single
individual: we are immersed in, and emerge from, the depths of the historical and social
world and our lives both shape, and flow from, the vast life of nature.
JOHNSON, Joe (XXXXX)
“Nakamoto Tominaga and the De-exoticizing of Cultural Comparisons”
The general thesis of this paper is that when philosophers and cultural theorists
characterize foreign societies, they tend to focus on that which is ‘other’ than their own
tradition, and in doing so they often leave out significant commonalities with the foreign
tradition. That is to say, there is a bias to highlight elements that are esoteric or
different relative to their own tradition, and to ignore and downplay elements that
resonate well. This tendency may serve to generate more interesting theses,
discussions, and books, but it is something regarding which everyone involved in crosscultural philosophy or cultural theory must at least be aware, and possibly take
corrective steps.
This thesis also has a counterpart—namely, that foreign traditions and cultures tend to
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characterize themselves in this same way. That is to say that in their own selfawareness and critique, they tend to stress elements which are ‘other than the other.’
The present paper is a very modest step toward the above-stated general thesis, and
proceeds by 1) reviewing the rational secularism of Tominaga NAKAMOTO (1715–
1746; Japan) in which he greatly precedes the varieties of Critical Buddhism that have
arisen in both western and eastern scholarship since the 19th and 20th centuries (—not
to mention NAKAMOTO’S critiques of Confucianism and Shinto), 2) contrasting that
with esoteric fascination with eastern ideas by prominent western philosophers of the
same period, and 3) examining the relatively slight treatment NAKAMOTO still receives
in characterizations of the Japanese philosophical tradition
KABELEK, Kobi (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel)
“The Experience of Movement in Holocaust Testimonies”
Kobi Kabalek (History, Hebrew University of Jerusalem) will discuss “The Experience of
Movement in Holocaust Testimonies.” Scholars of the Holocaust assign only limited
importance to phenomena that exceed clearly drawn boundaries of ghettos, camps,
towns, and shtetls, thus testifying to the lingering focus on bounded locations in this field
of study. However, the Holocaust did not only take place only within fixed containers of
violence, but also beyond them and in the movement between them. The journeys to
and from ghettos and camps introduced the Jews to new landscapes and populations,
stirred different feelings among the deportees, and changed their understanding of what
was taking place. These assessments and expectations, in turn, played a role in the
ways in which subsequent occurrences were perceived and influenced the decision
making process upon arrival to the sites of persecution. The paper will examine
depictions of movement as constituting temporary, yet significant, spaces of meaning
and point to the functions of these movements in structuring survivors’ postwar
narrations of the Holocaust.
KALMANSON, Leah (Drake University)
"'Be the Change You Want to See in the World?' Qi-Cosmology and Structural
Change"
Discourses on social justice rightly tend to focus on structural causes of oppression.
Indeed, teaching social justice at the undergraduate level usually involves coaxing
students away from the naive belief that personal self-development can effectively
change society for the better. Although I do not mean to suggest a return to a naive
focus on personal change, I do wish to reconsider the meaning of "structural change"
with resources from qi-cosmology, and from that perspective consider the relation
between people and the places they inhabit.
In neo-Confucian writings on the relation between li and qi, li is the principle that
structures and expresses order in qi. Achieving optional order in the cosmos is often
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seen as an outgrowth of personal qi-cultivation practices. What is the relation between a
well-structured heart-mind, a well-structured society, a well-structured world, and a wellstructured cosmos? How might this qi-cosmology help us rethink how best to envision
and enact a "better world"? This presentation is a preliminary exploration of these
questions.
KANG, Kyung Hyun (Yonsei University, Korea)
“Diagram of the Ethical Ideal: Centering on T'oegye Yi Hwang (退溪李滉,
1501~1570)'s Modification of the Existing the Diagram of Heavenly Mandate”
Many Confucian scholars of the Joseon Dynasty(1392-1910) draw various diagrams
that represent their ethical ideals. T'oegye Yi Hwang (退溪李滉, 1501-1570), the leading
Confucian of the Joseon Dynasty in the 16th century, also creates several diagrams: the
Diagram of Heavenly Mandate and The Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning. Actually, The
Diagram of Heavenly Mandate is originally created by Chuman Jung Ji Un (秋巒鄭之雲,
1509-1561) and revised by T'oegye. I attempt to analyze T'oegye's ethical ideal through
the examination of his modification of the existing the Diagram of Heavenly Mandate.
T'oegye made a few core modifications to the Diagram of Heavenly Mandate.
Specifically, he expresses his view on the Heavenly Mandate through repositioning the
circle of Heavenly Mandate (天命圈). The circle of Heavenly Mandate obtains the
meaning of the Lord on High (上天·上帝)'s mandate by taking a higher position in the
Diagram of Heavenly Mandate. T'oegye thinks that the circle of Heavenly Mandate on
the top of the diagram represents the Lord on High's mandate which is a foundation of
ethical practices and a ground for ethical duties. Therefore, T'oegye lays emphasis on
Oe-gyeong (畏敬, awe and reverence) towards Heavenly Mandate. And Hak-mun (學問,
learning) for T'oegye’s ethical pursuit is to clearly understand the life's duties given by
Heavenly Mandate.
KARNA, Bishal (The Ohio State University)
“A Place for Mindfulness and Awakening: Sōtō Zen Monasteries in the Rural U.S.
Midwest”
Dainin Katagiri roshi (1928-90) was a Japanese Sōtō Zen master who came to the U.S.
in 1963 to establish monastic communities on the model of Dōgen’s Eihei-ji. In planning
his monastery he spoke of “molding an environment” so that “when you are right in the
middle of a monastery, even though your life is like a snake, that snake is in a bamboo
stick and very naturally you straighten out.” My presentation will explore how Japanese
philosophical assumptions and cultural values were adapted to the American context in
establishing the monastic centers in Etizen, Minnesota, and Dorchester, Iowa. In doing
do, I will reference the ideas of Zen Master Dōgen (1200-53) and the cultural philosophy
of place developed by Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960)
KAWASAKI, Soichi (Miyagi University of Education, Japan)
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“’Being-here’, ‘Being-with:’ On What Makes Students Form a Community”
In p4c activities, teachers, as facilitators, try to encourage children to form a “community
of inquiry.” When teachers start p4c in classrooms, they have to explain the importance
of “safety” to children many times. Does this mean that “safety” in a classroom is a kind
of “minimum rule” of p4c which teachers must train students repeatedly to keep?
However, in reality, teachers soon realize that children do not resist this “safety” and
that, on the contrary, they even need it. So we can say that “children already know what
they really need, even when they do not realize it”. In this sense, p4c activity can be
regarded as a practice of Socratic maieutics.
KEATING, Malcolm (Yale-NUS College, Singapore)
“Putting Words in their Place: Elliptical Completion through Postulation”
Classical Indian philosophers, although committed to the compositionality thesis, gave
varying accounts of how interpretive practices allowed for ellipsis completion. The
philosophers known as the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā argued that an interpretive process, which
they called arthāpatti or “postulation,” could yield certain knowledge of how to complete
ellipses. For instance, since the Sanskrit language is highly inflected, someone who
hears a speaker say “Door, door!” can rely on syntactically-encoded information to
recover a complete sen- tence, “Close the door, close the door!” In the 16th century,
Narayaṇabhaṭṭa discusses this process in the Mānameyodaya, arguing that postulation
requires the positing of words in order for there to be anvaya or “connection” within the
expression.
This argument is posed in response to opponents who argue that only the word
meanings, and not the words themselves, must be posited. The term for “connection” in
Sanskrit could be understood as syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic connection. I show
that all three kinds of connection may be the subject of postulation, although the
distinctions between them are only implicit in the Mānameyodaya. I then discuss
connections between Narayaṇabhaṭṭa and contempo- rary Anglophone literature on the
topic. In particular, I argue that due to the ambiguity in the notion of connection, Indian
proposals may be consistent with multiple contemporary formal analyses. Ultimately, I
conclude that the crucial implication to draw from their dialectic is the claim that ellipsis
completion rises to the level of knowledge, and that it does so through a rational
process grounded in the principle of compositionality.
KEENAN, Barry C. (Denison University)
“Locality and Reverence”
Environmental ethics has challenged the anthropocentrism embedded in traditional
western moral philosophy. Neo-Confucian philosophers in the Song period would have
understood this argument. Cheng Yi and Chen Chun elaborated the vocabulary of
classical Confucianism that assumed productive continuities between oneself and one’s
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world tianren heyi (天人合一). The prerequisite in the Cheng-Zhu school for
understanding this continuity was cultivating a reverent attitude jing (敬). Philosophers
and poets of that same reverence who are alive today define the attitude as a felt
recognition of human limitations (Paul Woodruff), and define living according to
reverence as adopting one’s own locality as a place to live while fully accepting the
conjoined interdependence of oneself and one’s world (Wendell Berry).
KELBESSA, Workineh (Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia)
“The Place of Africa in the Current World Order”
This paper examines the place of Africa in the current world order, and shows the
importance of developing more inclusive ethical and epistemological foundations that
are required to reconceptualise and remap our current situation and contribute to the
emergence of a more prosperous, just and peaceful world in the 21st century. Africa and
other ‘developing’ countries have very little influence and voice in today’s global policymaking forums. This paper stresses that the voices of ‘developing’ countries have
important contributions to local, national and international development and
environmental agendas, and can help us to remap the world in a way that makes sense
to ‘us’. Thus, what are needed are fundamental changes in the structures of global
power such that the 'weaker' countries that represent the vast majority of humanity are
no longer weak and the 'powerful' countries that represent a tiny minority of humanity
are no longer powerful. The paper suggests that humanity as a whole must develop
alternative attitudes towards the current world order. Thus, instead of searching for
short-term profits or looking only for immediate gratification, TNCs and other powerful
players in the current world order should respect the knowledge, need, aspiration and
voice of ‘developing’ countries.
KENNEY, Rick (Georgia Regents University) and Kimiko AKITA (Aichi Prefectural
University)
“Yasukuni: A Place for Pacification or a Problem, Still?”
“Yasukuni” was established as a Shinto shrine in 1869 as Tokyo Shokonsha, shortly
after the restoration of the Meiji Empire, to honor the spirits of people who had died
fighting for the emperor. In prewar Japan, jurisdiction over Yasukuni belonged to the
Ministry of the Military, whereas other shrines were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of Home Affairs. After the war, Yasukuni was given the status of a private corporation.
Although Allied rulers during the Occupation insisted that the Japanese separate the
sacred (Shinto) from the secular (government), effectively dismantling the bastard
religion and many of its manifestations, Yasukuni Shrine has remained under the aegis
of an individual religious corporation, independent of an association formed by more
than 80,000 other shrines.
Recent visits to Yasukuni, which honors 2.5 million war dead, including 14 top war
criminals from the War in the Pacific, by Japan’s prime ministers are viewed by Asian
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neighbors as a symbol of the country’s past militarism and as encouragement for its
growing nationalism. Media coverage last month of lawmakers’ pilgrimmage to the
autumn festival at the shrine noted that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stayed away—
though members of his cabinet visited Yasukuni—in advance of a meeting among
leaders from Japan, China, and South Korea planned for this month in Seoul. Abe has
stayed away since his 2013 visit drew rebukes from China and Korea and, for the first
time publicly, the United States.
The name Yasukuni itself means, ironically, “Pacifying the Nation.” This paper would
use the lens of Japanese religious belief systems to examine the competing tensions
represented by the Yasukuni Shrine and those leaders whose very publicly massmediated political attitudes and activities threaten not only peace in the nation, but
throughout East Asia and all the way to Washington.
KOČNOVAITÉ, Liuda (University of Iceland)
“Where Are You (From)?: Locating Persons in Moral Theories”
Person’s position entails significant ethical dimensions, thus inquiries ‘Where are you
from?’ and ‘What do you do?’ are common means for assigning a certain status to the
new acquaintances in the moral framework. For example, Confucian role ethics asserts
that we have to contextualize a person as a bearer of the unique set of roles, in order to
interact with her in the most appropriate way. However, the acclaimed (Western)
principles of individualism, universalism, and equality would seem to contradict such
practices. So where is an autonomous individual situated and where do the equal
individuals meet?
This paper presents a brief overview of the presumed location of human beings,
according to the moral theories of Confucius, Aristotle, Kant, and Mill. The process of
creation of moral places between interactors is also outlined, following the
aforementioned thinkers.
KOCZMAN, Joshua J. (Hillsdale College)
“Where I Am Not: Heidegger’s Gelassenhiet, Dōgen’s Genjōkōan and the
Discovery of Place”
Martin Heidegger’s Gelassenheit and Dōgen’s 現成公按 [genjōkōan] do not name or
categorize but rather describe, as though narratively, the discovery—the dis-covery—of
place. They do not detail a discovering of place, but rather the presencing of place
unconcealed. Gelassenheit, borrowed as it is from Meister Eckhart, and 現成公按
[genjōkōan]—in its originary spelling, 現成公案 [genjōkōan]—arrives from the Buddhist
tradition of China.
What Heidegger offers to the tradition of Eckhart—the Christian tradition—and what
Dōgen offers to the Buddhist tradition is a re-location of the starting point of
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understanding: I must begin where I am and progress from there to where I am not.
What is most near to me of where I am not is what stands in my vicinity, what stands
most near. For Heidegger, what stands most near are things. Things are what is most
readily present. For Dōgen, what is most present, what is most near, is the interplay of
delusion and enlightenment. For Heidegger, things, and for Dōgen, this interplay, are so
readily near that they are often overlooked. Gelassenheit and 現成公按 [genjōkōan]
describe a turning away from over-looking towards under-standing.
Where I am not is where my own place becomes present to me, becomes even a
possibility. My own place is always my own, because where I am not is only ever my
own. Arriving at place is thus always personal, always my arrival at my place. On the
other hand, however, that there is a my own is universal. What is my own place is part
of where an other is not, and so there is something universal at play in the discovery of
place.
The “releasement” of Gelassenheit and the “presencing” of 現成公按 [genjōkōan] are
not affirmations of “a self” apart from what it is not. Rather, they affirm “a self” as a part
of what it is not by first approaching there issue of “where.” I am always first amid
where I am not, and from this, place becomes present, first in dichotomies of self and
other—what Dōgen would call “delusion” and Heidegger would call
“distancelessness”—and then as differences—the very possibility of enlightenment and
identity. Such movement always happens first and most primarily as personal, as my
own and my own where I am not are mine until place arrives and I and they are
released and become present at where I am and not what I am. The discovery of place
happens only where “a self” is no longer a “what” which covers it, but rather a “where”
standing in relation to where it is not.
KIM, David (University of San Francisco)
“What is the Place of Radical Occidentalism in Contemporary Asian Philosophy?
The Case of He-Yin Zhen and Feminist Confucianism.”
In the history of modern Asia (especially the 20th century), there are many examples of
Asian thinkers who explicitly hybridized their native traditions with Western
perspectives, and their work has been addressed as Asian or comparative philosophy.
There are also many examples of Asian thinkers who explicitly displaced their native
traditions and endorsed Western perspectives. Many of these latter thinkers, motivated
by liberatory aims, opted for radical Western thought (like Marxism, anarchism,
feminism, etc.), e.g. He-Yin Zhen, Lu Xun, M.N. Roy, etc. Arguably, many contemporary
theorists in postcolonial studies, Asian American studies, and Asian Studies, especially
Critical Asian Studies, can be positioned within this fairly long trajectory. Radical
occidentalism raises questions about the place of such theories in contemporary Asian
and comparative philosophy. It also raises questions about the role of place for a
philosopher’s theorizing: Should Asian philosophers retain ties to the philosophies of
their homeland? The former question will be addressed through consideration of the
latter. To focus the discussion, the paper discusses the work of He-Yin Zhen, an early
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20th century Chinese anarcho-feminist, and the normative issue of whether she should
have pursued a more hybridist strategy to retain links to place and to avoid
Eurocentrism. Specifically, the paper considers her concept of nannu in the context of
recent efforts at formulating feminist Confucianism, and its ramifications for the role of
place in philosophizing.
KIM, Hyeongseok (Gyeongsang National University, Korea)
“‘Sewer’ of World History: Ham Seok-heon’s Place in his Background of Eastern
Thought and Christianity”
Ham Seok-heon (13 March 1901 – 4 February 1989) was a civil rights activist
committed to human rights and non-violence during the period of Japanese colonial rule,
Soviet military government, and Korean military dictatorship. His commitment to human
rights, democracy, non-violence, and pacifism earned him the name, ‘the Gandhi of
Korea,’ and the Religious Society of Friends (Quaker) nominated him for the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1979 and 1985.
Ham was also a Korean liberal thinker who tried to combine Christianity with various
Eastern philosophical perspectives in order to find Korea’s spiritual identity and produce
new values. He considered Japanese imperialism and Korean dictatorship as a product
of modern totalitarianism, and he found and developed important ideas to overcome
totalitarianism and keep pacifism among East Asian thoughts, especially in Daoism,
although his ideological foundation was Christianity.
This paper mainly analyzes this point with its influence on later activists in Korea. For
example, Ham produced a concept of Ssial (seed grains), which means ‘the people’ as
the historical subject, who keep fundamental life in themselves like seed grains. At the
same time, he matched it with some concepts of ‘weakness’ ‘humbleness’
‘benevolence’ in Laozi. Ham believed only suffering people can sympathize with other
people’s suffering, and that is why God gave the Korean people lots of adversities in
their history. Therefore, ‘weak’ and ‘humble’ Korean people, groaned under despotism
and totalitarianism, could carry their cross, ‘love’ other people, and so achieve world
peace in the truest sense. Ham was also an inspiration to many various antiauthoritarianism or pro-democracy movements in Korea, in terms of suggesting various
approaches including ecology, syncretism, liberation theology, and so on.
KIM, Jongmyung Kim (The Academy of Korean Studies, Korea)
“Place and Culture: Royal Palaces and Buddhist Rituals in Medieval Korea”
The purpose of this paper is to examine how Buddhist rituals in medieval Korea (9181392) were shaped by relationship with their ritual places, royal palaces, which has
been heretofore largely and unduly ignored. Buddhist rituals flourished in medieval
Korea. More Buddhist rituals were held at that time than at any other time in Korean
history, a frequency also unsurpassed in China or Japan. In this paper special emphasis
will be given to the Assembly of Eight Prohibitions (P’algwan hoe) and the Lantern
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Festival (Yŏndŭng hoe), the two most important Buddhist rituals, which were the
Buddhist expression of medieval Korean beliefs such as ancestor worship and were
performed in royal palaces. In particular, in his To Take Place, Jonathan Z. Smith
stresses the importance of place to a proper understanding of the ways in which
"empty" actions become rituals.
This paper will focus on identifying the nature of royal palaces as ritual places in relation
to the major Buddhist rituals in medieval Korea, examining how the royal palaces
contributed to shaping the Buddhist rituals as state rituals in relation to the idea of
ancestor worship, an important part of the Confucian tradition, and understanding the
ways in which the royal palaces are perceived, marked, and utilized religiously.
KIM, Jung-Yeup (Kent State University)
“The Daxue 大學 and the Zhongyong 中庸: Texts about Transforming Ordinary
Places into Extraordinary Ones”
In this paper, I show that there is a common theme of transforming ordinary places into
extraordinary ones in the Daxue 大學 (Great Learning) and the Zhongyong 中庸
(Focusing the Familiar). First, based upon the commentaries on these classical
Confucian texts from Chinese and Korean neo-Confucian philosophers of vital energy
氣 (qi), I argue that this theme can be understood in terms of vital synergy. That is, the
ordinary place is where vital synergy amongst ourselves exists minimally, the
extraordinary place is where vital synergy amongst ourselves is maximally realized, and
a central motif underlying both texts is the emphasis on transforming the former into the
latter.
Second, drawing upon insights from Confucian Role Ethics articulated by Roger T.
Ames and Deweyian aesthetics, I show how this project of transforming place can be
understood as an aesthetic one. Finally, I demonstrate how the Confucian insights
investigated thus far can theoretically and practically contribute to how place is
understood in contemporary discourse on everyday aesthetics.
KIM, Youngmin (Seoul National University, Korea)
“Space and Political Imaginaries: Philosophical Reflections on the eight steps in
the Great Learning”
Philosophical reflection is dependent upon certain formal conditions of discourse. The
eight-steps in the Great Learning represent such conditions for political philosophers in
late imperial China. For example, Ming (Chinese dynasty, 1368 ~ 1644) thinkers took
seriously the chain of causality linking the individual, the family, the state, and the world.
It was the eight steps that set the spatial parameters of their philosophical discourse of
politics. Yet we should find expect to find tensions and instabilities in the interpretations
of the eight steps, since it spanned roughly a few centuries and was used in a great
variety of intellectual contexts. While philosophical discourses surrounding the eight
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steps are too amorphous to allow for unitary conception, they instead provide
framework of comparative analysis.
The primary goal of this paper is to demonstrate that there were sufficiently
philosophical discourses going on in late imperial China to merit comparative studies of
the Ming theories of the Chinese state. To round out the picture, I propose to take midMing philosophy seriously and consider political philosophies of Qiu Jun (1421-1495),
Wang Yangming (1472~1528) and Zhan Ruoshui (1466~1560) as examples. With any
luck, we will be able to philosophically repudiate the existing views of Ming Chinese
state as the despotic nature of rule, which can be traced back to as early as the 18th
century European scholars who often contrasted Europe and China.
KOHL, Christian (University of Education, Freiburg, Germany)
“Are Ideas Bound by Places?”
There is a central idea in Eastern and Western philosophies that is not properly Eastern
and not properly Western. It is the idea of dependence or connection or mean or
bondage. We have not a single word for this idea. In the first place dependence or
pratityasamutpada is an indication of dependence. Dependent bodies are in an
intermediate state, they are not properly separated and they are not one entity.
Secondly, they rely on each other and are influenced or determined by something else.
Thirdly, their behaviour is influenced by something in-between, for example a mover is
attracted by gravitational force, a viewer is dependent on rays of light between his eyes
and the object, a piano player’s action is determined by the fine motor skills of his
fingers, an agent is dependent on his act. Pratityasamutpada is an indication of
dependence and of something that happens between the objects. One object is bound
to the other without being identical to it. The implicit interpretations of
pratityasamutpada, are in terms of time, structure and space.
The following citations and references illustrate the term pratityasamutpada.
Pratityasamutpada is used:
1. as Dependence in Nagarjuna’s Hymn to the Buddha: “ Dialecticians maintain that
suffering is created by itself, created by (someone) else, created by both (or) without a
cause, but You have stated that it is dependently born”.
2. as an intermediate state by Nagarjuna: Objects are neither together nor separated.
3. as bondage in the Hevajra Tantra: “Men are bound by the bondage of existence and
are liberated by understanding the nature of existence”.
4. as an intermediate state by Roger Penrose: “Quantum entanglement is a very
strange type of thing. It is somewhere between objects being separate and being in
communication with each other”.
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5. as something between bodies by Albert Einstein: “A courageous scientific
imagination was needed to realize fully that not the behaviour of bodies, but the
behaviour of something between them, that is, the field, may be essential for
ordering and understanding events”.
6. as the mean between things in modern history of mathematics: to quote Gioberti
again: “The mean between two or more things, their juncture, union, transit, passage,
crossing, interval, distance, bond and contact – all these are mysterious, for they are
rooted in the continuum, in the infinite. The interval that runs between one idea and
another, one thing and another, is infinite, and can only be surpassed by the creative
act. This is why the dynamic moment and dialectic concept of the mean are no less
mysterious than those of the beginning and the end. The mean is a union of two diverse
and opposite things in a unity. It is an essentially dialectic concept, and involves an
apparent contradiction, namely, the identity of the one and the many, of the same and
the diverse. This unity is simple and composite; it is unity and synthesis and harmony. It
shares in two extremes without being one or the other. It is the continuum, and
therefore the infinite. Now, the infinite identically uniting contraries, clarifies the nature of
the interval. In motion, in time, in space, in concepts, the discrete is easy to grasp,
because it is finite. The continuum and the interval are mysterious, because they are
infinite”.
7. as a central point in Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy.
KRUMMEL, John W.M. (Hobart and William Smith Colleges)
“Place and Horizon”
The paper presents a phenomenological ontology of place that synthesizes the results
of my investigations over the past ten or so years on related themes in Heidegger,
Nishida, Ueda, Merleau-Ponty, Nancy, Bollnow, and others, involving the notions of
world, horizon, and the abyssal nature of place that unfolds in myriad determinations.
Wherever we are we are implaced, delimited in our being-in-the-world constituted by a
horizon that implaces us, not only literally but semantically and ontologically. Whether
we take place in its semantic sense or as ontological, I underscore its duplicity—taking
off from Ueda Shizuteru’s concept of two-fold being-in-the-world—as on the one hand
demarcating a realm of determinacy, our ontological finitude or our social imaginary
world, and on the other hand through its horizonal nature as pointing to an
indeterminacy or exteriority that demarcates or delimits that realm, finitizing us. That
latter may be characterized as an excess irreducible to semantic or ontological
determination or as a nothing or a-meaning. Hence place with its horizon implies the
interface of meaning and a-meaning, nomos and anomy, principles and anarché, in
Nishidian terms being and the nothing (mu), in Heideggerian terms unconcealment and
concealment or world and earth. Thus the horizon that constitutes place entails both
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finitude and openness, allowing for alterity and alteration, whereby the determinations
within place are never fixed, secure, or guaranteed. In demarcating a place, the horizon
always points to a yonder beyond the place, its other. In its very contact with the
unassmilable or irreducible, the line of demarcation is itself thus unpredictable in its
fluctuations. The place determined within the nothing or the clearing of unconcealment
amidst the concealed will thus always be provisional despite any appearance or claims
to the contrary. Its determination is indeterminate.
Towards the end of this presentation I would like to discuss the ethical implications of
this understanding of place, both in terms of globalism and in terms of ecology. The
presentation would be relevant to the East-West Conference, not only for dealing with
the theme of place but also, in terms of “East-West,” for incorporating ideas and
concepts found in thinkers of both East and West and also for discussing the current
globalization of our world where previously demarcated regional cultural spheres are
forced to confront and deal with one another and intermingle. The alterity and
alterations belonging to place are made explicit in our contemporary situation with
certain existential-ethical implications that must be addressed.
KUČINSKAS, Justas and Naglis KARDELIS (Vilnius University, Lithuania)
“The Wisdom of Place: Lithuanian Philosophical Philotopy of Arvydas Šliogeris”
In this article is presented the phenomenon of Lithuanian philosophical philotopy.
Philotopy, literally meaning a love of place, is a term first defined by Simone Weil, is
also found in Arvydas Šliogeris philosophy, where philotopy acquires a specifically
Lithuanian dimension. Philotopy in Arvydas Šliogeris thinking refers to a type of
philosophy, which is deeply rooted in individual‘s unique and finite experience of
particular things found in a specially defined and very particular place, usually one‘s
closest environment, where one is born or permanently settled. Philotopy is also a
meta-reflection of the way of thinking about and being in the world which is defined by
that particular place. Philotopy as a way of noticing the importance which the nearness
and particularity of place has to one‘s thinking and being is itself, as we might say,
connected and rooted in a particular place – the landscape and history of Lithuania.
Arvydas Šliogeris, the founder and leader of modern Lithuanian philosophy, points to
philotopical inclinations of Lithuanian culture and forsees philotopy as the probable
direction of Lithuanian philosophical thought. Therefore, the phillosophical philotopy in
Arvydas Šliogeris‘s sense can be summarized as “the metaphysics of the homeland.”
The authors of this article suggest that Lithuanian philotopy calls for reassesment of
meaning and purpose of philosophy as such in the context of the 21st century realities.
The question of the very essence and purpose of philosophy is itself asked from
specifically defined place. In the authors opinion, the project of Lithuanian philosophical
philotopy might be viewed as a contribution of Lithuanian experience to the global
debate on what philosophy is and in what ways is it relevant to the pressing issues of
the world today. A way of pursuing a global issue from a deeply rooted local perspective
becomes crucially important in the context of globalized science, where the demandl for
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internationalization and diversity paradoxically dilutes the ground of diversity itself – the
truly local perspective. Lithuanian philotopy invites philosophers to pursue the mission
to draw people‘s attention to their specific experiences of particular things found in
particular places.
Philotopy is not determined to find The Truth, but only to reflect the singular truth of a
very specific and defined experience of nearness of non human reality of things and
place. The ability to attach to what is dear, the determination to care and nurture the
particular place is also a basis of engaged and courageous thinking, which makes
possible a trully authentic agency, authorship and a real meaningful dialogue. The truth
of unique experience of particular things and its reflection paradoxically becomes the
only way of true inter-human communication. Firstly, it is because every human
existence, however different it may be, is always attached to an experience happening
in particular places. Secondly, it is the experience of non human things (however
different they may be), rather than the language, that gifts people with the experience of
reality. The reality of things is the common ground that any further communication and
being together can be built on. The authors of the article suggest that in this sense
philotopy allows a possibility of authentic, locally rooted existence and thinking
compatible with global awareness. In fact it is even argued that the rootedness in
particular place is the necessary condition of true ecology, where the responsibility for a
particular place is the only basis of consciousness of the bigger whole.
The authors also note that philotopical approach is not new in the history of philosophy.
The birth of philosophy is related to the very particular place and time, which is ancient
Greece, and it is also related to a then more general approach that the wisdom of a
finite human being in defined circumstances and places, although not equal to the
wisdom of gods, has value and is worth pursuing. In terms of the evolution of
philotopical thinking Arvydas Šliogeris takes a second step of philotopy by actually
allowing us to see that the limits of a human being, especially the experience of the
finitude and sacredness of a particular place, are actually the basis of our possibility to
face the two biggest challenges of the world today: our inability to live together and the
profound disconnectedness from our particular living place, manifesting itself, inter alia,
in the global environmental crisis.
KUPERUS, Gerald (University of San Francisco)
“The Flow of the Land: Place in Dōgen and the Koyukon”
In a world in which we have largely lost a sense of place and in which knowledge of the
land is all but destroyed, our identities have become superficial reflections of what used
to be systems deeply grounded in place. In order to understand the depth of this loss I
will discuss the relationship between land and mind as we find it in the indigenous
culture of the Koyukon and the place-based practice of Zen, in particular through Dōgen
Zenji. The latter uses in his famous “Mountains and Waters Sutra” a human category,
walking, to describe the activity of mountains. He however uses one of the most
anthropomorphic categories precisely to question our anthropocentrism. By pulling our
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category away from ourselves and giving it to the mountain instead, he, in fact, seems
to set anthropomorphism up against itself. Although it, thus, might seem that Dōgen
ascribes human qualities to the mountains, the opposite is true. As he writes: “If you
doubt mountains’ walking, you do not know your own walking.” In other words, we
should not understand the mountain as walking in a human sense, but we should
understand our walking in relationship to mountains, as walking along with the
mountains, i.e. as rooted in the place in which we are.
To understand this rootedness in place in a more concrete way I will discus Richard
Nelson’s ethnographic study and personal reflection on the Koyukon in his book Make
Prayers to the Raven. In the closing chapter Nelson describes the Koyukon experience
of “a different reality in the natural world” (238). This reality is a reflection of the
landscape that is constantly undergoing change: “The Koyukon people live in a land
where change is the norm and where stability is almost unheard of” (212). They cannot
afford to try to master the land, they are mastered by the land; they do not confront but
yield to nature (240). Similar to Dōgen’s understanding of walking mountains the
Koyukon, in Nelson’s words, live in a reality in which “the flow of the land becomes also
the flow of the mind.” (243).
I argue that these insights should not be taken lightly and that a retrieval of a sense of
place would first of all have to recognize that we do not simply have “an environment”
as a place that we simply find ourselves in. Rather, what and moreover how we think,
has to be rooted in our place. We are our places, which means that we no longer see
ourselves as a stranger, but find ourselves in the mountain and rivers and we find the
rivers and mountains in ourselves. In a world in which everything constantly changes
and stability is rare, we need to learn how to walk, and think again.
LaFLEUR, Robert André (Beloit College)
“Contested Space, Conceded Place: Negotiating Political and Historical Discord
on China’s Southern Sacred Mountain”
It has often been said that “the winners write the history.” This is only partly true.
Winners, more often than many realize, concede part of the narrative to those they
defeat. From the American Civil War to World War II and beyond, field sites
commemorate times and places of struggle that expand—and even challenge—the
rhetoric of the victors.
On China’s southern sacred peak (南嶽衡山) in Hunan Province stands a square
kilometer of landscaping and elaborate buildings that is celebrated by a wide variety of
Chinese travelers— the focus of outsize attention in terms of historical memory and
political commemoration in today’s People’s Republic of China. The Martyr’s Shrine (忠
烈祠), about a third of the way up the slope, is the site of serious homage to the
Nationalist forces who fought the Japanese in the late-1930s and 1940s, enduring
withering bombing assaults even as they hid in mountain caverns and planned their own
military strategy.
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The shrine has been maintained by the People’s Republic of China, and occupies by far
the largest single “politico-religious-space” on the entire mountain—larger than either
the base temple or peak temple, and dwarfing the size of all others. It focuses on the
very Nationalist (Guomindang; Kuomintang) forces that the Communists defeated in
1949 to take possession of the “mainland.”
So why is a major commemorative space dedicated as a shrine to these very “enemy”
soldiers? The southern mountain contains the seeds of communion even between
viciously opposed armies that reluctantly allied to fight a common enemy. Both
Communist and Nationalist forces endured dreadful attacks in different locations. In the
end, the victorious Communist government has sought a kind of political and religious
statement in a shrine to the Nationalist forces that is seemingly unafraid even to
acknowledge its paramount leader, Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi). Indeed, perhaps the
strangest place of commemoration is a memorial pine grove dedicated to the late,
defeated general.
Space and place are often contested in key historical moments. But it is also (and never
more clearly than here) conceded—sometimes for uncertain political and cultural
capital. This paper will examine the idea of contested space and, explore the similarities
and differences between “contestation” and “concession” in modern Chinese history.
Matters are further complicated by what the social theorist Pierre Bourdieu terms
“strategies of condescension.” Such strategies—clearly at work in and on the Martyrs
Shrine—bring added complexity to the idea of contested space and place. The
theoretical implications are significant for work in many fields beyond philosophy—from
history and anthropology to economics, religious studies, and education.
LAMBERT, Andrew (College of Staten Island CUNY)
“The Place of the Personal in Classical Confucian Ethics”
There has been recent interest in Confucian ethics as a form of role ethics. In this
paper, I argue that while role ethics is correct in taking the personal bonds as a basis for
normative demands, the personal attachment that is strongly emphasized in texts like
the Analects and Mencius can be fruitfully understood in other ways. I consider how the
Confucian ethical sensibility built around personal attachment implies novel ways to
substantiate the basic categories of moral life – ethical obligation, motivation and
justification. That is, the Confucian emphasis on personal attachment can be developed
into an ethics that is richer than the concept of role can capture. Furthermore, this way
of ordering the basic elements of ethical life offers a distinctive account of the highest
ethical ideal, which these elements function to realise – the creation of joyful events in
the course of everyday personal encounters. This paper explores the advantages and
challenges of conceiving of ethics in these terms.
LAUER, Chris (University of Hawai’i—Hilo)
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“Place as Debt and Credit”
Places carry debts, and indeed places are often defined by the debts they carry and
commemorate. The Temple Mount, the Tenochtitlan Templo Mayor, and the Shaolin
Temples are sacred because they all, in one way or another, remind their visitors of
their debts. Traditional Hawaiian mana`o regards Mauna Kea as perhaps its most
sacred place, and here, too, a reckoning of debts is crucial to our understanding of it as
a place. Yet unlike sites such as the Temple Mount, it was not sanctified by any
particular event or set of events, but stands in for the way that places in general mark us
as debtors. In her translation of the Kumulipo, Queen Lili`uokolani returns again and
again to the refrain, “So the gods may enter, but not man.” Though the Kumulipo tells
Hawaiians of their origin, the taboo expressed in this sentence is not a prohibition
against returning to the site of one’s origin, but a reminder of the respect due to place as
such.
This paper will contrast this traditional sense of place as debt with the impulse that
arises in Locke and Fichte to transmute our debts to places into credits. Enlightenment
philosophy is often criticized for effacing all determinacy of place in favor of a
generalized Newtonian spatiality, but in these two thinkers we see something quite
different. The conception of place as unique and determinative of human identity is
retained, but places now appear as assets rather than liabilities on the ledger of selfrecognition. This paper will explore the logic of this transition and what is lost when our
debts to places are expunged.
LAUMAKIS, Stephen J. (University of St. Thomas)
“Pope Francis’ Place”
This paper has two purpose: first, to consider the place of Pope Francis’ encyclical
Laudato si’ in relation to the work of his immediate predecessors, Pope Benedict and
Pope John Paul II, as well as its place within the encyclical tradition of the Catholic
Church more generally considered; second, to consider in some detail Pope Francis’
conception of place and our relation to the environment as he explains these in Laudato
si’. With respect to the first task, I will be exploring the various ways he situates the
document and its teachings within the social justice tradition of the Church. I will do this
by focusing on the texts and authors cited within the encyclical, as well as by examining
its footnotes. With respect to the second task, I will be investigating his notion of
interdependence and how his conceptions of interconnectedness and relatedness help
him make the case for an “integral ecology.” I will close with a philosophical
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Pope’s conception of place.
LEAL OLIVARES, David (University of Santiago, Chile)
“Building Democracy in Cyberspace: An Approach to the Limit of Cyberspace as
Communicative/Symbolic Space Configuration from a Democratic Point of View
to Philosophy of Information”
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The Philosophy of Information is a field of study to work, in especially link the work of
Luciano Floridi, of revitalize of old questions, pose new problems and contributes to
conceptualize our vision of world framework of the Information Society.
In this process, this proposal seeks to analyze the new concept of democracy, unveiling
his new nature and difference with the classical view through the new boundaries of
participation, especially through the concept of transparency of information. Discover
the limit of cyberspace as a place of political constitution and the values found in the
virtual world.
The classical concept of democracy appears to be in crisis, because the configuration of
symbolic space and the limits of cyberspace create a new configuration of political
space (territory) participation, national identity and participation of civil society.
This proposal seek answer to questions about the nature of cyberspace from point of
view of Philosophy of Information and reflexion of media after work of Marshall Mcluhan
and Derrick de Kerckhove.
LEBEDEVA, Kristina (DePaul University)
“Places of Trauma”
The aim of this project is to examine the conjunction of the ‘here’ and trauma in what I
hope to be an innovative way. The predominant trauma theory is about the
consequences of a traumatic event. Indeed, “despite substantial theoretical and
empirical advances in the field of traumatic stress .... existing conceptualizations of
traumatic stress retain the assumption that traumatic experiences have occurred in the
past. This is to say, the event itself is over. More precisely, it is now transformed into a
hauntingly persistent anguish. In Jean Amery’s words, “whoever was tortured, stays
tortured.” The paradigm of this vision of trauma is a soldier returning from war.
However, what I want to do here is to examine the conception of ongoing
traumatization. This is the event that is still happening and whose nature cannot be
understood with a reference to the past. The examples of such continuous
traumatization would be life in warzones, domestic abuse, ongoing persecution, etc. in
other words, they involve “threat to life and bodily integrity.”
What is at stake here is then not a single-trauma event, but rather traumatic experience
indissolubly tied to what might be called ‘hereness’ or specific situation. I will submit that
the response to ongoing traumatization must be articulated on its own terms.
Having elucidated the differences between two conceptualizations of trauma, I will
conclude by suggesting that the therapeutic response demanded by continuous
traumatization is the practice of interruption. It is forcefully fragmenting and fracturing
temporality itself so as to interrupt someone’s suffering. Barring the complete removal of
traumatic situation, the suffering is always there. Interrupting it as often as possible
makes it a little closer to bearable. Thus, the new moral imperative, stemming from the
conjunction of radical hereness and trauma, assumes the form of interruption.
LEE, Cheongho (Southern Illinois University)
102
“Semiotic Place and Personality in Charles Peirce’s Theory of Determination”
My main attempt in this paper is to scrutinize “semiotic place” and “personality” with
special regard to Charles Peirce’s “theory of determination.” In his theory of
determination, Peirce considered two processes of determination, one from object to
interpretant, and the other from idea to mind. A successful occasion of semiotics
proceeds from object to interpretant. Semiotics is a place of an extensional process that
consists of an infinite chain of references. While semiotic determination is reversible in
terms of references, the epistemological process of determination is temporal and
irreversible. In this intensional process, the idea grows into the individual mind, as the
universe is unfolded by the agency of mind.
Based on these two processes of determination, personality, which Peirce calls mind,
on one hand, is “objectified” as “sign” or “interpretant” in the place of semiotics through
communicational inference that enables us to realize the particular in the realm of
becoming. Mind, on the other hand, “subjectifies” the most primitive real, which Peirce
calls idea, into this temporal world. This process of “subjectification” enables the
continuity of ideas, through which idiosyncratic person as idea produces the generalized
mind as idea in the particularized place of “here-and-now.”
LEE, Hyun-sun (Seoul National University, Korea)
“What is the Particular ‘Place’ of Zhu Xi’s Philosophy in the Tradition of Korean
Confucianism?”
Toegye Yi Hwang (1501-70) and Yulgok Yi Yi (1536-1584), the two great thinkers of
Korean Confucianism, both assert that their ideas are derived from Zhu Xi’s philosophy,
in spite of their conflicting philosophical positions. Two scholars’ divergent philosophical
ideas are closely related to their dissimilar regional and social ‘place’ as well as different
circumstances of their time. Nevertheless, they equally attach legitimacy to Zhu Xi’s
philosophy while rejecting Yangmingism which emerged as a major philosophical school
of Confucianism of the time.
These two thinkers demonstrate that Confucian thinkers of the Chosun Dynasty, on the
one hand, struggled to solve social and political problems of the time in terms of Zhu
Xi’s philosophy; on the other hand, they offered new interpretations of Zhu Xi’s
philosophy reflecting their own particular ‘place’. This is where we can indicate the
particular place of Zhu Xi’s philosophy in Korean Confucianism. The investigation into
this particular ‘place’ will elucidate why Confucianism chose a different path in Korea,
drawing a stark contrast to Confucianism in China.
LEE, Janghee (Gyeongin National University of Education, Korea)
“The Place of De”
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Recent studies in characterizing Confucian ethics as virtue ethics seem to miss a very
important aspect in Confucian ethics, namely its ethio-political dimension in early
Confucianism and its ethico-politico-metaphysical dimension in neo-Confucianism. De,
not like virtue, does not just reside in one’s personal boundary; it reaches out toward
public sphere. In neo-Confucianism the expansion of de encompasses the whole
universe. Thus, justice is also a cosmic virtue not confined just to the social, political
one.
I will explore this aspect of de through the contrast between private vs. public and
humankind vs. nature. The pair of early Confucians, Mencius and Xunzi, and of Korean
neo-Confucians, Yi Yi and Chong Dasan, will provide ample resources for us to
investigate this aspect of Confucian de in contrast to virtue in Western ethical tradition.
LENG, Lu (Guangzhou University, China)
“The Multicultural Synergy in Dunhuang”
The discussion will focus on the multicultural synergy and practice in Dunhuang, and its
implications for the education today, in China, Asia, the world, and beyond. Dunhuang
as an important stop in the Silk Road became a transition zone of Central Asia, West
Asia, India, Persia and more distant Byzantine Empire (Fan & Wu, 2004; Rong, 2001).
The collision and fusion of multiculturalism promoted the formation of Dunhuang
civilization and its unique culture and products. The discussion will examine the
successful interaction and convergence of multiculturalism (Banks, 2010) in Dunhuang
and its manifestations in Dunhuang Grottos.
LI, Puqun (Kwantlen Polytechnic University, Canada)
“The Length of Mourning versus the Nature of Mourning—A Critical Analysis of
the Analects 17:21”
On the surface the debate between Confucius and Zaiwo at Analects 17:21 is about
what would be the proper length of a mourning ritual for departed parents. But I think
the core of the debate is actually about the nature of mourning for parents. In particular,
it is about the connection and tension between feelings (spontaneous and reflective)
that are associated with mourning for parents and the seemingly complete arbitrariness
in the length of such mourning. With this understanding of the debate, I argue:
(1) that although Zaiwo seems to have appealing, practical reasons to challenge the
practice of three-year mourning, his reasons, seen from Confucius’ perspective,
severely deviate from the true root of mourning—one’s genuine appreciative feelings
toward parents, and thus Zaiwo’s reasoning is morally misleading.
(2) that, contrary to prevalent readings of 17:21, Confucius’ connecting the rite of threeyear mourning with one’s early childhood experience of being taken care of by one’s
parents for three years should be better (or more charitably) read as an illustration of
the importance of reflecting on moral feelings for the purpose of moral cultivation than
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as a justification (or proof) for the idea that the number of years of being taken care of
by one’s parents in early childhood must match the number of years of mourning for
one’s parents.
(3) that in Confucius’ vision the three-year mourning rite, exemplified by junzi (君子) and
established by the sage kings can serve as a regulative and uplifting moral ideal for
common people. However, this is not to deny that three-year mourning, if taken as a
heterogeneous (‘moral’) demand, can be too high for many people and its actual
implementation may lead to ritual formalism and hypocrisy.
LIPMAN, Jonathan (Maharishi University of Management), and Anne MELFI
(Georgia State University)
“Vedic Vastu Vidya—the Science of Place to Design Buildings that Create Holistic
Health and Enlightenment”
The Vedic philosophy and technology of Vastu Vidya (science of place) holds that the
physicality of a work of architecture can make or break the quality of life within and
around it. Temples, homes, civic forums, and places of business were, and in many
instances still are, designed to optimize the life and purposes that the buildings are
meant to house. The design of place must take into account the laws of nature, both
objective and subjective—orientation of the building in relation to the sun as well as
lunar and planetary influences on earth, with respect to the North Pole, South Pole, and
equator. These must be customized for the particular persons who are to occupy the
place so as to align individual intelligence comfortably with cosmic intelligence. This
science of place is a physical practice with a holistic objective to create not only
pleasant, successful, and fulfilling life in health and prosperity, but also the superlative
degree of that, moksha, enlightenment. It provides the fundamentals of temple
architecture in India, including the performance stage for sacred dance, but also is the
traditional method for building homes.
This presentation will discuss the philosophy and principles behind this traditional Vedic
practice of creating place and also its application worldwide. Architect Jonathan Lipman
will present a show sampling how the principles have been applied to create hundreds
of fortune-creating homes and office buildings in the US, which he has been doing for
the past seventeen years. Anne Melfi will discuss how Kenneth Burke’s theory of
terministic screens offers a practical tool for appreciating the holistic Vedic approach to
place, which leverages physicality and the impalpable Vedic principle of bandhu to
produce happy, enlightened existence in the places we inhabit.
LITTLEJOHN, Ronnie (Belmont University)
“Visiting the Dark Places of Wisdom”
The real origins of Western philosophy, of so many ideas that shaped the world we live
in are associated with activities and philosophers that we know comparatively very little
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about: Epimenides, Parmenides, Empedocles. Likewise, the beginnings of Chinese
Daoism can be traced to the masters of dao who were the sources of the edited
anthologies of their teachings and the accounts of their deeds collected in the Daodejing
and Zhuangzi. In this paper, I consider the importance of the place and space of the
cave, literally and metaphorically, to the consciousness, teaching, and philosophical
projects embraced by those iatroi (healer-seer) known as “lords of the lair” (pholarchos)
in the pre-Socratic period and as “perfected persons” (zhenren) or immortals (xian) in
early Daoism.
LIU, JeeLoo (California State University, Fullerton)
“The Loss of Personal Place: Late-Ming Neo-Confucians’ Sense of Self and
Politics”
According to Yi-Fu Tuan, “Place exists at different scales,” and among which,
“homeland is an important type of place at the medium scale. It is a region large
enough to support a person’s livelihood. Attachment to the homeland can be intense.”
He further asks, “What is the character of this sentiment? What experiences and
conditions promote it?” (Space and Place, 149) This paper will attempt to address
these questions from the experiential perspectives of three late-Ming Neo-Confucians:
Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692), Gu Yanwu (1613-1882) and Huang Zongxi (1610-1695). The
Manchus invaded their homeland in 1644, and their political allegiance, the Ming
dynasty, officially collapsed in 1662. For the rest of their lives, all three philosophers
had to deal with the loss of their personal place.
Wang Fuzhi felt that there was no place in the world for him after the Manchus took over
China. He wrote about his choice for the final isolated abode of seventeen years:
“Crouching under the collapsed heaven and being confined on the earth that has split
open, I simply could not believe that even the tiniest piece of land could be mine.” After
the fall of Ming, Gu Yanwu changed his name to ‘Yanwu’ (meaning a valiant descendent
of the genuine Chinese heritage). For the last twenty-some years of his life, Gu lived as
a nomad, finding no place to be his own. After realizing the futility of the effort to
reinstate the Ming dynasty, Huang Zongxi devoted his remaining years to scholarly and
educational activities. Even though he often had hundreds of students gathering to
listen to his lectures, he always saw himself as an “abandoned,” “lone statesman.”
Before his death, he instructed his children not to use a casket for burial, but to put his
body on a stone slab, so that “his body will decay faster.”
All three philosophers spent their early days dedicated to the Ming loyalists’ attempt to
restore the homeland to Ming’s dominance, and all three spent their later lives in
eremitic seclusion, self-imposed exile and self-depreciation. In Chinese history, these
three Neo-Confucians are revered as the “three leading Confucians in early Qing
dynasty,” but they never felt that they were entitled to any place under the reign of Qing.
This paper will analyze their sense of self-identity and national identity revealed in their
loss of personal place from the usurpation of their homeland.
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LIU, Jing (University of Hawai’i)
“The Ziran of Dao: Persistence and Transience”
The entanglement of permanence and transience is a recurring theme that has
fascinated lots of important philosophers throughout history. Heng 恒 (persistence), the
Chinese character that is usually translated as “permanence”, is also a prominent topic
in early Daoist texts. In this essay I’ll explore how the persistence (heng 恒) of the dao is
articulated through the transience of life in early Daoism.
As a character that implies both space and temporality, heng designates the consistent
unfolding of dao. Unlike the metaphysical “permanence” that is deprived of any place in
reality, the persistence of dao (heng) abides in ordinary life. This is perfectly captured by
chang 常 (consistency, persistence, originally means “skirts and clothes”), a character
that is interchangeable and interexplainable with heng.
All of this offers us a different view of place wherein space and temporality cannot be
separately comprehended. A place is not merely an abstract spatial concept as
conceived in Newtonian physics. – We should not forget, it is exactly with this modern
view of place that nature has been captured as a machine, a dead material at disposal
of humans. Place in Daoism marks out completely contextual situations. A place is
always a world. A world is always worlding. Such is the ziran of dao.
I will begin my paper by distinguishing heng from “permanence” in Plato’s works, then
moving onto a close look at heng in Laozi to elaborate how it is pondered through
transience. The thinking on heng was well developed later in the article of hengxian that
is collected in Shanghai Museum bamboo slips. It is here that heng was considered
together with place, i.e., yu 或/域. I will have a close reading of this precious and
profound text.
Place in this sense should be considered as nature, which still awaits to be realized as a
home, the only home that we dwell in.
LIU, Yunhua (Shanghai Normal University, China)
“A Comparative Study of Sino-Western Original Differences: Under the
Perspective of Division of Horizons”
The Sino-western original differences formed in the original period of their cultures are
deeply explored from the perspective of “division of horizons” in this paper. The author
thinks that the basic differences are firstly represented in the cognition and
representational system of “tian” (天 or cosmos). As the main origin of western culture,
mainstream thinkers in ancient Greek perceive “tian” as an isolated (beyond specific
time and space or form and quality) substance (atom, element, the One, “form”,
“essence” and so on) with invariability, motionlessness, and intangibility. They believe
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this “intangible world” which can be understood by reasoning but cannot be felt, is the
“noumenal” or “real” world with transcendence.
It is quite different in Chinese culture. From Qin dynasty, in any period the highest
principles such as dao 道, qi 气, xin 心, li 理 or even kong 空 in Buddhism are quite
different. On the contrary, the foundation is harmonious “unity”: the unity of dao and qi, li
and xin, tong 通 and bian 变, ben 本 and mo 末. Tai xu ji qi 太虚即气 proposed by
Zhangzai (1020-1077), ren ren yi tai ji 人人一太极，and wu wu yi tai ji 物物一太极
proposed by Zhu Xi (1130-1200) are the typical examples to express Chinese traditional
theory of Being and beings, i.e.，the highest principle of “invariability”is contained in
“variability”without isolated existence.
Secondly, there isn’t a counterpart in Chinese culture for “atomistic individual” which is
constructed on the basis of reflecting on the nature of universe in western culture. As is
pointed out by some scholars，based on family and blood relations, Chinese culture
constructs“relational individuals”which compose a“hierarchical structure”差序结构
between closeness and distance, highness and lowness. Each “small individual”
occupies a single but dependent position in “big individual”.
Thirdly, basically speaking, there is binary opposition between “tian” and human in
western culture. The task for human is to master the real knowledge by grasping the
essence of “tian”through“wisdom”. Because of the diversity in cognitive ability, there
is diversity for “souls” to master the “ knowledge ” by contacting “ tian ” (object world) as
well. Therefore, for quite a long time, western culture has built a system of epistemology
with complex hierarchy and clear distinction via basic methodology such as geometry,
syllogism, and dialectics.
Overall, causal link (sequent relation in diachronic dimension) is emphasized in this big
system. In Chinese culture, there isn’t binary relation between views of truth on the
basis of entity theory, and views of individuals on the basis of atomism. Instead, the
unity of “ tian” and human is emphasized, which implies that every being is qi so it is in
perpetual variation and interaction. Moreover, qi is of vigorousness, hence the theory of
interaction between tian and human is deeply rooted in Chinese culture. The relations
(parallel relation in synchronic dimension) among those factors of tian and human are
usually constructed via analogies.
LOCKE, Patricia M. (St. John’s College)
“Constitution of Place through the Body: Throat-singing the World”
Central Asian throat singers are very attuned to the natural sounds of the animal life
around them, but also the sounds of the terrain, winds, and weather. They imitate and
evoke the living world in song. Yet I would argue that throat singers go farther: they
actually generate physical places through their vocal agency. Drawing on Maurice
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, especially The Visible and the Invisible and “Eye and
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Mind,” this paper will investigate the contours of sonic places. Merleau-Ponty makes
much of Cézanne’s painterly observation that a mountain thinks through him, though his
brush inscribes the mountain’s meaning with his own expressive style. Throat-singing
offers a test of this way of thinking about aesthetic relations with the natural world.
To create a soundscape, Tuvan throat singers of central Asia establish a fundamental
tone, akin to the base of a mountain range that rings the horizon, and simultaneously
sing prominent overtones above that base. The higher tones with clear, bell-like clarity
rise and fall in a melodic line, which is a silhouette like those that mountains display
against the setting sun. Several voices may support one another in the making, giving a
three-dimensional aspect to the pitch and register height variations. Yet the language of
analogy or metaphor is insufficient to fully articulate the discovery or creation of new
sonically-contoured places. My paper will apply Merleau-Ponty’s descriptive
phenomenology to Tuvan throat singing as it exists today, framing human expression as
singing the melody of the world. How does the human voice make place? How do we
come to dwell there? These are my fundamental questions.
LONG, William J. (Georgia State University)
“Tantric State: Dharma, Democracy and Development”
Today, the majority of sovereign states can fairly be described as “democracies”
characterized by elected political leadership and some measure of individual rights and
liberties. Likewise, most states have economies where the marketplace is the chief
arbiter of economic exchange. Virtually all these polities and economies have as their
underlying “operating system” Western liberal principles and values.
There is one place that stands as an exception to this model, the small remote country
of Bhutan. Because of its Himalayan location, its centuries of closure, and the good
fortune of having avoided conquest and colonization, when Bhutan emerged as a
democratic state with a relatively free internal market in the 21st century, it did so with its
1300-year-old belief and value system intact. Its philosophical beliefs and mores are
overwhelming Buddhist, not Western and liberal in character. Contemporary Bhutan, the
country that seeks Gross National Happiness as its fundamental goal, is the only
democratic, market-based state in the world constitutionally and culturally rooted in
Buddhist principles and ethics.
This exceptionality matters because it provides and authentic basis for theoretical
comparison between two distinct models of democracy and development. Here, the
comparison is between two autonomous, identifiable traditions of thought (liberalism
and Buddhism) that differ on important first-order philosophical principles. Such
comparisons can bring to light new questions, frames of inquiry and alternative
approaches to our understanding of democracy and development.
This paper will compare the differences and similarities between Buddhist and liberal
philosophy that lie at the core of two different approaches to democracy and
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development. To illustrate, Bhutanese Buddhist and Western liberal conceptualizations
of the nature of the individual “self,” “human nature,” and “the pursuit of happiness”—the
building blocks of social theory—are profoundly different. Because of their distinctive
ontological and ethical stances, what constitutes “good government” and “appropriate
economic development” differs in critical ways, even though both Bhutan and Western
nations can be described as “democratic” and “market-based.”
By understanding better a Buddhist approach to democracy and development, those of
us in the West can develop a realistic and relativistic view of our own political principles
and values and, perhaps, discover novel ideas useful in addressing contemporary
political and economic challenges such as ideological polarization, income inequality,
and sustainable economic development.
LoPRESTI, Matt (Hawai’i Pacific University)
“Speculative Metaphysics from Trans-cultural perspectives: Traversing
Boundaries and Self-Transformation without moving or changing”
As a professor who introduces Western students to non-Western worldviews, at times I
find myself essentially describing to them an entirely new world, not just different views
of it. As a realist, however, I say it is the same world, but our placement in it and what I
call “stance” towards it is often quite different. A tradition’s perspectival “stance” towards
the world cannot be encountered or understood unless one re-orients oneself to the
world as the sort of place that the Other feels that they inhabit. The very beginnings of
intercultural dialogue, interreligious understanding, and cross-cultural or comparative
philosophical discourse involves this disorienting action of establishing a previously
unexperienced vantage point from which to view the world anew – as a “Hindu”, as a
“Confucian, or as a “Hawaiian.”
Successful reorientation into the world qua Hawaiian for example, is not just
intellectually abstract exercise; the successful reorientation of the self into the world
anew qua Hawaiian (or any other tradition for that matter) must be an experience of the
lived-body. As we encounter and engage this world as embodied persons, we cannot
but begin to understand the world from different perspectives other than as embodied
perspectives in new places. Interestingly, this can mean not just viewing ourselves as
inhabiting a new place (a new way of viewing the cosmos itself) but it can also mean
viewing our self, i.e., viewing our very embodied existence, as radically different too
(i.e., as with or without a soul or Atman, as a primarily relational being, or as a discrete
individual). The competent comparative philosopher (and student) must therefore not
only be able to imagine, inhabit, or impart to his students a view of the cosmos as
various places, but must also be able to be chamilion-like in seeing the self as
fundamentally different in various scenarios as well.
This paper expands on previous work that I have done on the philosophy of place by
Edward Casey and the psychology of perception by J.J. Gibson by applying my
developed concept of “stance” to doing and teaching comparative philosophy.
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LOTT, Greige (University of North Florida)
“Good Odds and Odd Goods: Ugliness and Authenticity in Daoist Zhuangzi and
American Hip Hop”
“If you look at them from the viewpoint of their differences, from liver to gall is as far as
from Ch 'u to Yüeh; if you look at them from the viewpoint of their sameness, the myriad
things are all one.” This excerpt is often used to demonstrate the breadth of Zhuangzi’s
relativistic worldview. Even so, it may still seem a stretch to take seriously connections
drawn between Chinese philosophy and American Hip Hop. But, in the work of
celebrated contemporary Hip Hop artist Brother Ali,—who is both blind and albino, and
who describes his physique as “depending on the day and depending on what I
ate…anywhere from twenty to thirty-five pounds overweight,”— a curious resemblance
to characters in Zhuangzi’s 德充符 (“Signs of the Fullness of Power”) emerges.
Both Ali and Zhuangzi use expressive discourse on the body to dismiss negative
appraisals of unconventional appearance. In Ali’s case, this occurs as recourse to a
type of charisma he repeatedly refers to as “the fire in the eye,” and a state of
authenticity labeled “real as can be.” Similarly, Zhuangzi employs characters who are
either “ugly” or “crippled” to show that one’s virtue (de 德) is, if not independent of
outward appearance, not negatively impacted by it. While differences in temporal,
linguistic, and spatial contexts are obvious, the shared perspective opens Ali’s work to
further philosophical analysis. In turn, mapping the extension of Ali’s self-image into his
core message of social justice and inequality allows a fresh sociological perspective
when applied to Zhuangzi. In keeping with the conference’s theme of place, this study
examines the overlap in two places that, in their respective native contexts, fall outside
of mainstream normative borders. The project also challenges academic philosophy as
a place, asking if Zhuangzi’s relativism is taken seriously enough to allow a comparative
study with something as far afield as American Hip Hop.
LOWMAN, Samantha (Boise State University)
“Wandering towards Dwelling: Opening the Xin for a Renewed Receptivity
towards Places”
Previous scholarship has uncovered certain resonances in ancient Daoist and Zen
Buddhist texts and the works of Martin Heidegger, suggesting that he was influenced by
their thought. With this possible influence in mind, I will explore a connection concerning
human orientation (ways of thinking and acting) towards places in Heidegger’s works A
Question Concerning Technology and Building, Thinking, Dwelling, and the early Daoist
text Zhuangzi. Heidegger’s concepts of poeisis - “bringing-forth” existing potential into
presence - and dwelling -“the fundamental human activity” - are both associated with
an orientation of active care towards the world.
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In contrast, the “deficient mode of care” of modern society adheres to a certain set of
distinctions which tie the value of nature and humanity itself to being-at-disposal seeing the world as a “standing reserve” (Heidegger), with an eye only towards
“usefulness” (Zhuangzi). In Zhuangzi’s stories, wandering is presented as a freeing of
the xin (mind/heart) from these distinctions, an escape from the enslaving “static
conformity of language” which blinds humanity to the wealth of possibility which is
constantly unfolding in Nature.
I contrast Heidegger’s enframing orientation (in which we enclose the living world in
static categories of language) with one that allows nature and humanity to be and
become as good-in-themselves, linking Zhuangzi’s idea of wandering with Heidegger’s
concept of dwelling through their mutual foundation in concern for the essences of all
beings. These two human activities may then be understood as antidotes to the
deficient mode of care which allows desacralization of human places through tourism
and thoughtless residing, healing practices that will aid us in re-establishing an
orientation of creative receptivity towards nature and ourselves.
LUKEY, Benjamin (University of Hawai’i)
“Helping Philosophy Flourish: The Need for Intellectually Safe Places to
Encourage the Pluralism of Philosophy”
This presentation examines modes of philosophical inquiry and suggests philosophy for
children (p4c) as an exemplar of inquiry, roughly understood as the search for greater
understanding, rather than debate, roughly understood as a formal exercise of winning
arguments. While critical thinking and argumentation are necessary skills in seeking
clarity, I suggest that as skills in themselves, they can be counterproductive for inquiry.
Too often critical thinking and argumentation reduce inquiry to debate wherein each
side must attack and defend positions rather than search for greater understanding.
Even more pernicious is the stifling of inquiry due to either perceived relativism or
perceived incommensurability, when participants don’t feel that they can communicate
across modes of argumentation.
Drawing upon the facilitation of inquiries with a range of participants, including
kindergarteners, undergrads, and professionals, I address the importance of creating an
“intellectually safe” community of inquiry and discuss the fine balance of an intellectually
safe critical community. I share examples of how critical thinking and argumentation
can genuinely contribute to a deeper understanding for all participants. Finally, I share
examples of how intellectually safety enables a pluralism of views and beliefs in a
productive inquiry, even when the inquiry challenges deeply held beliefs important to
participants’ identities.
MACBETH, Danielle (Haverford College)
“The Place of Philosophy”
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My focus is the practice of philosophy, in particular, how it is (or should be) done and
what it does (or can) achieve.
Like mathematics, philosophy is an a priori discipline: it does not involve testimony,
either the testimony of one’s senses or the testimony of others, but is instead selfstanding; in principle one can see everything for oneself. But unlike mathematics, the
practice of philosophy seems essentially, constitutively dialectical. The first task is to try
to resolve this tension at the heart of philosophy, and also to clarify the sense in which
the dialogue of philosophy is a human conversation, a conversation among all rational
beings with our sort of body as contrasted both with a conversation amongst all rational
beings, whatever their biological form of life, and with a conversation amongst humans
with, say, one’s own history and culture.
But philosophy is not only a priori and dialectical. It is also intrinsically temporal and
historicist insofar as the nature of the practice changes over the course of history,
sometimes radically. We see this most obviously in the West with Kant and Hegel.
Following in the wake of Descartes’ profound advances in mathematics and
metaphysics, Kant showed that traditional metaphysics was no longer possible, that the
a priori science of metaphysics must give way to critique, an a priori investigation into
the conditions of possibility of knowing. What Hegel then saw is that this showing on
Kant’s part was not, as Kant thought, a discovery of philosophy but instead an
enactment, the creation of a radically new mode of intentional directedness on reality.
But if that is so then, Hegel argues, the form of philosophy cannot in fact be, as Kant
thought, the practice of critique, but must instead be narrative, the telling of a
phenomenology of Geist: if we are to understand ourselves in the world, our being as
human, we need a story of our becoming. Defending this claim is my second task.
The third task is to explore two consequences of such a narrative understanding.
The first is the idea that space in fact has the status of a place insofar as for something
to be a space is for it to have a very distinctive significance for us, one that came fully
into view only with the rise of modern science in the West in the seventeenth century.
The second is the idea that the notion of place has after all a deep commonality with the
notion of space insofar as even our understandings of the places within which we dwell
can and in certain cases should be subjected to the sort of critically reflective scrutiny
that has traditionally been associated exclusively with the concept of space.
By examining these various theses and their interrelations I hope at once to shed
light on the character of philosophy as a discipline and a practice, and to develop and
defend the idea that philosophy is and must be a conversation of all human beings, that
is, of all rational beings with our kind of body, whatever their historical and cultural
circumstances.
MAHOOTIAN, Farzad (New York University)
“Alam al-Mithal: Geographies of Speculative Experience”
The 12th and 13th century Sufi masters, Suhrawardi and ibn Arabi, conceived alam almithal, the imaginal world, as the world of real possibilities. They considered this to be
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an intermediate world less material than the actual world, but more material than the
world of ideas: the real interface between the actual and the ideal. Otherworldly realities
that shape spiritual striving (prophecy, grace, miracles, etc.) were thought to be located
in the magnificent cities of alam al-mithal, accessible by active imagination and nonliteral thinking.
The actual world has changed radically since the 13th century, thus changing alam almithal with it. My thesis is that the imaginal world is metaphysically congruent with the
world of models and theoretical entities, including prana, qi, entropy, subprime
mortgage derivatives, ideal gases and other entities that shape our intentions and
actions upon the actual world. Furthermore, I suppose that the denizens of alam almithal are metaphysical cognates of Whitehead’s “propositions,” what he called “lures
for feeling,” and, specifically, “intellectual feelings” arising from the integration of
physical and conceptual feelings. While propositions are typically judged as true or
false, Whitehead maintained that the mode of “suspended” intuitive judgment is best
suited to intellectual discovery and invention.
Modern thought has populated the imaginal world with many entities whose purposes
are sometimes questionable. These run the gamut from the more empirical to the more
ideal, the wondrous to the quotidian, and all of them capable of materializing and
feeding our noblest and basest aspirations. For millennia, religion supplied map,
compass and guidance to the imaginal world, but that world is now populated by
previously unimagined entities. Furthermore, the tough-minded realism of modern
thought has largely driven imagination into the shadow world of entertainment and
intensely subjective diversions. Rehabilitation of the status of the imaginal could have
fruitful impact on a more informed and intentional grasp of the power of imagination to
shape individual and collective futures.
MAJOR, Philippe (National University of Singapore)
“Rethinking the Temporalization of Space in Early Republican China: Liang
Shuming’s Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies”
One of the most fundamental aspects of the conception of space within the intellectual
scheme of Western modernity, especially from the Enlightenment on, has been a
gradual temporalization of space, in the sense that different locales have been
accommodated within a unilinear meta-narrative of a human evolution perceived as
emancipatory. Within this conceptual scheme, the spatial other becomes a temporal
other as well, so that a European traveller to China could observe the indigenous
population not only from a cultural (spatial) distance, but also from the vanguard of
history. To observe the other from the future, as it were, meant that various dichotomies
could secure a distance between self and other: agent vs subject of history, rational vs
superstitious, autonomous vs heteronomous, etc. This temporalization of space, in
Fabien’s terminology, meant a “denial of coevalness;” that is, an impossibility to
dialogue with the other as a contemporary.
Interestingly, this denial of coevalness could also be related to a desire to uproot
Europe and its others from their geographical and historical settings, and transplant
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them within a universal, abstract, imagined, and hierarchical meta-narrative. The
modern narrative told of primitive people determined by their geographical locations
(warm climate = laziness, etc.), but also of a path which could enable them to gradually
free themselves from this determinism through a process of modernization,
conceptualized as a disembodiment, an uprooting from local cultures equated with an
entering into the universal culture of modernity. In practical terms, this temporal
narrative made possible a discursive universalization of a spatially limited culture: that of
modern Europe.
While the European philosophical critique of both the denial of coevalness and the
meta-narrative of uprootedness (notably in Heidegger) has attracted quite a lot of
attention, it remains little known that before the publication of Being and Time (Sein und
Zeit; 1927), Liang Shuming (梁漱溟; 1893-1988) was already providing a critique of at
least some aspects of the modern narrative touched upon above, a narrative which
became pervasive in China during the New Culture Movement (新文化運動; 19151927). In his classic work Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies (東西文
化及其哲學; 1921), Liang provided both a critique and a reworking of the European
meta-narrative of modernity. While opposing the idea that China could be temporally
behind the West, notably by re-establishing coevalness through a cultural relativism
which would allow different locales and cultures to be on a historical path autonomous
from that of Europe, Liang nevertheless adopted the framework of the European metanarrative of modernity. However, this framework was emptied of its Eurocentric content
in Liang, and modern European culture, as the universal future of humankind, was
replaced by Eastern cultures (that of China and India).
In this essay, I will first outline Liang’s critique and reshaping of the modern metanarrative, before discussing the many tensions within his discourse, between space and
time, localism and universalism, and tradition and modernity. Particularly, I will draw
attention to the tension between his goal, which is to highlight the value of the local
cultures of China and India, and the tool provided by modernity in order to achieve this
goal: a meta-narrative which abstracts cultures from their locale in order to universalize
them. This tension, I will argue, meant that the Eastern cultures Liang wished to revalue
could not but be de-historicized, abstracted, and fetishized. The traditions upheld by
Liang were thus uprooted from their spatio-temporal locales in a manner that cannot but
remind us of the status of European culture within the Eurocentric meta-narrative of
modernity Liang wished to criticize.
MAKAIAU, Amber (University of Hawai’i)
“The Intellectually Safe Ethnic Studies Classroom: A Space for Cultivating and
Nurturing Civic Relationships”
The purpose of this presentation is to illustrate how the philosophy for children Hawai‘i
(p4cHI) approach to deliberative pedagogy can assist educators in creating intellectually
safe democratic schooling spaces for students and teachers in diverse cultural contexts.
It is organized into three main parts.
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(1) At the opening of the presentation I describe how p4cHI, as both an educational
theory and a set of classroom practices, is a deliberative pedagogy that carries out
Dewey’s (1916) assertion that in order for democracy to function as it should, students
and teachers must have opportunities to experience democracy in schools. (2) Second,
I share about the opportunity I was given to experiment with using the p4cHI approach
to deliberative pedagogy to teach Ethnic Studies at a small public high school on the
Hawaiian island of Oahu. This includes an explanation of how I used one of the defining
features of the p4cHI approach to deliberative pedagogy, “intellectually safety”
(Jackson, 2001, p. 460), to cultivate and nurture a collaborative civic space in our
classroom community of inquiry. (3) Third, I describe the large-scale qualitative study
that I designed to investigate the impact of the p4cHI approach to deliberative pedagogy
on student learning. Eighty-nine of my Ethnic Studies students participated in the
research project. Data came from transcripts of our videotaped class sessions and my
students’ coursework (e.g. written reflections, formal essays, out of class assignments,
and inquiry projects). To analyze the data I used the method of constant comparison.
From this research, three important findings emerged. The p4cHI approach to
deliberative pedagogy: (a) creates norms for respectful and ethical civic relationships,
(b) fundamentally shifts the distribution of power in the classroom and opens up access
to multiple perspectives, and (c) facilitates the development of dialogue, deliberation,
and civic action. At the presentation’s conclusion I call on educators to use deliberative
pedagogies like p4cHI to form intellectually safe philosophical communities of action
(Popp 1981) in which students gain the experiences they need for turning our
democratic ideals into reality.
MAKEHAM, John (Australian National University)
"Siting Chinese Philosophy in the Chinese Academy"
Against the historical background of Chinese philosophy's formation as an academic
discipline in modern China, this paper seeks to highlight some of 'internal' challenges
confronting the identity of Chinese philosophy today, including the question of just what
it is that makes Chinese philosophy "Chinese".
MALHOTRA, Ashok Kumar (SUNY at Oneonta)
“Space as Sacred Place in Major Religions and Inner Sanctum in Yoga and
Meditation”
The topic of "Space and Place" in terms of how they are connected and yet different
from each other is an intriguing one.
An insightful philosophical discussion of this experience of how these concepts are
treated in the various philosophies and religions of the world requires a comprehensive
approach involving the philosophical, contemplative, literary, mythological and scientific
perspectives. How spaces become places of sacred worship? How cities such as
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Varanasi, Gaya, Jerusalem, Mecca etc., mountains such as Mt. Kailash, Mt. Meru; Mt.
Sinai and Mt. Hira as well as an entire country of India or Israel or Thailand etc. move
from spaces to sacred places of worship on this earth? How inhabitants of these
countries and cities find their identity by populating it? What is it that is added morally,
ethically, economically, educationally, geographically, aesthetically and spiritually to
transform spaces into places which become so sacred that people are ready to fight to
sacrifice their lives to secure them their status. I will discuss how these external spaces
are converted into sacred places of worship through the injecting of ethical, moral,
religious, spiritual and mythical values.
On the other hand, a similar kind of imposition or assigning of values, meaning and
significance happens in the diverse systems of Yoga and Meditation where the
emphasis is on the inner space and how this is converted into a place where the real
self or divine spark resides.
Similar to the church, mosque or temple situated in the physical place that is
constructed in the outer space, this inner space is converted into the sacred place or
temple within. The Tantric Yoga system is an excellent example where this space is
understood in terms of seven places called chakras where the universal consciousness
resides or reveals itself. These chakras, which are located in the special space of the
body, become seven distinct places to deliver the universal consciousness within the
person.
Yoga and meditation provide methodically the art and technology of getting in touch with
these chakras, which are called the energy centers or sacred places thus leading to the
experience of the real self of the person.
My paper will delve into the discussion of external space and how it is converted into a
sacred place in various religions and their everlasting impact on the people who believe
in them as places of worship. Moreover, I would discuss and delve into the space within
a person that becomes a place of sacred worship to be explored and experienced
through a dedicated meditative effort on the part of the initiate. Furthermore, I will
discuss how the external space that becomes the place of worship in the outside world
might be similar to the internal space in the body that becomes the inner place or the
temple within the body to be experienced through the technology provided by the
diverse systems of yoga and meditation.
MAN, Eva Kit Wah (Hong Kong Baptist University)
“Notes on a Chinese Garden: Comparative Response to Arnold Berleant’s
Environmental Aesthetics”
This presentation is a philosophical reflection on and a comparative study of Arnold
Berleant’s recent work, “Nature and Habitation in a Chinese Garden”, included in his
book Aesthetics beyond the Arts. It reviews Berleant’s notes on the subject and the
object relation, the bodily reaction, and the aesthetic experience evolved when situated
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in the environment of a Chinese garden. His reading of the nature and habitation in a
Chinese garden is examined, and compared with the related comprehension of
contemporary Confucian scholar Tang Junyi.
Tang proposes a metaphysical manifestation in the design of traditional Chinese
architectures and gardens and the interactive relation between man and Nature in his
influential work, The Spiritual Values of Chinese Culture. The comparative notes expand
the reading of Berleant on the subject, which is suggested by Tang 's discussion of
"hiding" (藏), "cultivating" (修), "resting" (息)and "wandering" (游) in a Chinese garden.
Parallel correspondence is reviewed between the two writings, which invites
comparative aesthetics and critical responses.
MANDELSTAM, Joshua (University Hawai'i)
“Where Do We 'Belong'? The Relation between Personal Identity and Location”
When discussing notion of 'belonging', two interpretations come to mind: one of the
individual or culture belonging to a place, and another of the 'place' belonging to a
particular person or group. This paper will then examine the difference between these
two very different ideas of belonging, and how each may effect one's idea of personal
identity - the interplay of how the relationship to the environment effects the sense of
self, and of culture. Many tribal communities, including those of he Hawaiians, Native
Americans, etc., defined themselves by the land they lived on. The traditional Western
conception of 'owning' land led to many wars over territory, and some attempts to
continually acquire more. Other peoples have illustrated nomadic tendencies, carrying
their culture with them wherever they go, as evidenced by the Bedouin Tribes, and the
Judaic culture after the diaspora.
In looking at the these concepts, thinkers on the notions of land and belonging will be
brought up – the Existentialists feeling of 'Throwness' (Heidegger), or 'Alienation'
(Camus), Thoreau's idea of how the right place can change the person on it, Locke's
idea of mixing one's toil with the land to make it one's own. In addition, other
perspectives will be considered such as the Iroquois idea of the land belonging to the
next of 7 generations, or that we are part of the land, as according to Gaia Theory. In
conclusion, the paper will examine how each interpretation of belonging may effect
ethical actions, having ramifications on how people treat the land and each other.
MARTIN, Andre (McGill University, Canada)
“Methodological and Ontological Individualism”
Loosely put, methodological individualism (MI) is the view that explanations in the social
sciences essentially involve explanations in terms of individual-level phenomena
(people, their thoughts, acts, etc.). MI is a view that has historically been subject to
much criticism, e.g. early on by Emile Durkheim (1895) and later by Steven Lukes
(1968), and yet it is taken to be a rather modest view by its proponents, e.g. J.W.N.
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Watkins (1957). In this paper I attempt to clear the debate about MI, defend MI’s
plausibility, and point to where further discussion would be needed to conclusively deny
or prove MI; in general, what I argue is central for all of these tasks is to see MI’s
essential connection to ontological concerns about the individual/social. In the first part
of my paper I set-up what the debate over ontological individualism (OI) should look like
by drawing from more cemented debates in philosophy over metaphysical emergence
and physicalism. In short, I define what possible views one can have over the ontology
of the individual and put them, in part, in terms of whether the social does or doesn’t
bring any radically new causal force into the world.
In the second part of my paper I connect the methodological and ontological concerns
by pointing out how methodological individualists (like Watkins) have based the former
on the latter. This move shows where objections (e.g.by Lukes) that MI is either trivial or
simply implausible have misconstrued MI, missing MI’s motivation from the non-trivial
and prima facie plausible OI (loosely put, the view that the social doesn’t bring any
radically new causal force into the world). Finally, in the third part of my paper I respond
to some more focused objections to MI and point to other areas of philosophy that can
help decide matters. For example, I present what is arguably Durkheim’s argument
against OI and MI alike that social phenomena like fashion trends and social contagion
are examples of new, “sui-generis”, causal forces in the world and so one can’t simply
appeal to the individual level for an explanation, I respond with how OI and MI can
account for these examples in a reasonable way, and finally I point to concerns in the
philosophy of language that might prove to give stronger objections or more evidence in
favour of OI and MI.
MASON, Joshua (West Chester University of Pennsylvania)
“The Right Road and the Proper Path: Metaphors of Navigating the Moral
Landscape”
The commonplace physical experience of walking on a narrow path provides a crosscultural metaphor of morality. In English we say that to be “walking the line,” “on the
straight and narrow” while “taking the high road” is to be moral. Failing morally is
“deviant” behavior that “strays” “out of bounds.” Likewise in Chinese, “dao 道” has the
mundane meaning of traveling a path or road, and is also the foundational moral
concept.
As walking on a path is as near to a universal human experience as we are likely to find,
it seems that this embodied source of moral metaphors is available across cultures.
However, there is more than one way to conceive of the path and how to stay centered
and maintain one’s place upon it. One is to see the path as a fixed and universal route
that all people must discover and conform to. Another is to see paths as steadily
extending, spontaneously emerging, and meandering across a dynamic landscape.
The first conception gives rise to an idea of a moral journey that is clearly defined, rigid,
and eternal. Theories of teleology, divine command, and universal reason seem to
accord with this kind of path. The second gives rise to an idea of a moral journey that is
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underdetermined, flexible, and contextual. Theories rooted in the Chinese tradition of
the Yijing (Book of Changes), in which the landscape is always transforming, accord
with this second conception.
Hence, while it may seem at first as if a universal feature of human embodiment gives
us a universal vocabulary of morality, the cultural assumptions built into these
metaphors force us to remain attentive to the particular connotations that these
concepts carry. This paper describes two ways of understanding the moral journey – the
right road and the proper path – and the different strategies required for staying on
each.
MATTICE, Sarah (University of North Florida)
“The Place of China in Translating the Heart Sutra”
In this presentation I explore a re-translation of the classic Mahayana text, the Heart
Sutra (Prajñāpāramitā hṛdaya). The Heart Sutra is part of the larger Perfection of
Wisdom category of Mahayana Buddhist texts, and is one of the most popular sutras in
daily practice around the world. It is also one of the shortest sutras, and is understood to
fulfill roles as both a text and a dharani. There are more than twenty translations and
commentaries on the text in English; it does not suffer from a lack of translation or
scholarly attention. However, in some sense its popularity also covers over certain
philosophical issues, especially when translated in order to be most accessible to a
large audience. I argue that there are several respects in which current translations do a
disservice to some of the more subtle philosophical points made by this text.
I begin with a brief overview of the controversial position put forward by Jan Nattier that
the Heart Sutra is in fact originally a Chinese text that was only later translated back into
Sanskrit to secure its authenticity. In her 1992 article, “The Heart Sutra: An Apocryphal
Text?”, she argues for the hypothesis that the Sanskrit Heart Sutra is a back-translation
from the Chinese, basing this in part on the explanatory power of the hypothesis for
accounting for differences in the core passages between the versions of the text. While
others, notably John McRae, have argued for the “Chinese-ness” of the text based on
its importance in Chinese Buddhism, Nattier makes the more literal argument for the
text having its origins in China and Chinese language. She concludes her piece by
stating, “The Heart Sutra is indeed—in every sense of the word—a Chinese text” (199).
Although the purpose of this presentation is not to argue for or against the literal
“Chinese-ness” of the sutra, I start from the imaginative question, “What if the sutra
were Chinese?” What impact would that have on how we, as scholars, approach the
translation of the text? Because Sanskrit and Chinese are very different languages, I
argue that taking the imaginative position of the text as Chinese does have important
consequences for its translation into English—translating from Sanskrit or Tibetan into
English is a very different process than starting with Chinese. I draw on the work of two
figures, philosopher, sinologist, and translator Roger T. Ames, and translation theorist
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Lawrence Venuti, in order to argue for a particular re-translation of the text that is
sensitive to concerns arising from the Chinese language.
MAYMIND, Ilana (Visiting Scholar UC/Irvine and Adjunct Faculty, Chapman
University)
“Exile as a Place of Empathy: Maimonides and Shinran Compared”
Historically, exile has been a political act with various philosophical and psychological
ramifications. My presentation briefly focuses on the medieval Jewish philosopher
Maimonides and his Japanese contemporary Shinran. In both cases their exile
experience—an act of enforced displacement and change in community status—led
them to rethink their personal identities and relations to tradition. By using exile as a
heuristic device, I will point out some psychological, emotive, and ethical similarities
between the two thinkers without overlooking their fundamental differences in religious
worldview. Specifically, I will argue that their capacity for empathy was heightened by
recognizing that, placed in unfavorable conditions, people may adopt a philosophical
perspective and lifestyle they might have rejected in less contentious circumstances.
McCRAW, David (University of Hawai’i)
“Metaphors of Place in Pre-Han Chinese Thinking”
Ancient Chinese texts, like the Lunyu, Mengzi, the Laozi and Zhuangzi, inscribed quite
distinctive notions about place. Their notions about place involve metaphors that would
prove central to their explorations of philosophy, social structure, and political
organization. A careful (textual) archaeology can uncover some salient metaphorical
foundations for much that still seems distinctive about old Chinese thought. A full
account of these must await completion of our "excavation"; however, we can sketch a
few preliminary observations:
*These texts do not support a hard-fast distinction between time and space; instead,
you find a continuum.
*They do not support a hard-fast distinction between dwelling-in and movementbetween; action and rest got conceived off as mutually entailing.
*As a result, the metaphorical uses of place get bound up with those of moving along a
way, so that place becomes an essential part of the central Chinese preoccupation with
ways and waymaking.
In a seminal phrase like the beginning of the crucial text "Way of Higher Learning," we
read: 大學之道在...止於至善. The process of learning, then, "comes to lie in alighting
upon highest good." While the ways of cultivation have no endpoint, they will
necessarily involve resting-places, and ancient texts quite often depend on visualizing
progress as developing gradually through a series of stages, which they conceived of as
places, or, roughly, "sites of instruction." Unearthing these sites will help us retrace and
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better understand the intellectual journeys they undertook, despite the vast gulfs of
time-and-space that seemingly separate them from us.
McKERRACHER, David (Boise State University)
“Virtual Enframing: Social Media’s Subsumption of the Other into Theyness”
Human places are undergoing rapid and never before imagined transformations. Not
only does this change the landscape of our environments, but it also has ramifications
on how we relate to the Other, oneself, and the Earth as a whole. As habitats go virtual,
so our habits develop new tendencies. Just as we have ordered the world as standing
reserve to bend to our will (enframing), so we ourselves are continuously challenged
forth. What are the effects of this enframing on human relationships, considering the
rise of social media in the 21st century? This question will be explored primarily using
Heidegger’s Question Concerning Technology, Levinas’ founding of ethics on the faceto-face encounter, and H. Dreyfus’ critique of the internet (using Kierkegaard). Not only
has the shared vulnerability and call of conscience instigated by the transcendence of
the face-to-face encounter been enframed by social media, but the defining
characteristics of individuals and human relationships are being misconstrued and
leveled by over saturation, ease of access, ambiguity and anonymity. My thesis is that
social media is not a neutral presence in our lives, but is rather a powerful force with
insidious tendencies if not compensated for deliberately. For support I draw on
conclusions from studies in sociology, psychology, and experimental philosophy.
McKINNEY, Jonathan (University of Hawai’i)
“Zen, Beauty, and Living with the Planet”
The environment (Earth) is as dynamic and complex as any system that can be
conceptualized. Nature has a long history of fluctuation and balance, both serving to
promote the conditions of growth of new species and collapsing such conditions,
annihilating whole species. Harmony and balance with nature comes at the cost of
being vulnerable to its fluctuations and temperament. Humanity, having learned through
many years of struggle, has made it a priority to master its local surroundings,
controlling or consolidating the effects of storms, droughts, and cycles of predation. We
self-identify as intellectual champions and pioneers of a conquered planet. The two
primary foci of this paper will be to challenge these projections and to establish the
place of humanity within nature rather than above it. To do so, I will introduce the works
of Fritjof Capra, James Lovelock, and Lynn Margulis which establish the existence of a
dynamic world of life.
A key feature of such a world is autopoiesis, or the capacity to create and shape the
world and oneself, or the world as oneself in this case. Once established, I will argue
that humanity’s capacity to shape the world and itself comes from the Earth, rather than
being uniquely human. In so doing, the human will fall from the throne of the
Enlightenment, and finally find its place as a part of the living world. Such a shift
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necessitates a monumental change in how environmental ethics are conceived and
practiced.
To address such a challenge, I will introduce the polarizing voices of Zen Master Dōgen
and Alfred North Whitehead. Each will provide a framework that relies upon similar
notions of interdependence while promoting theories of action that support the opposing
values of conservative meditation (zazen) and projective expression. My subsequent
analysis will explore the intricacies of both, highlighting the important roles each play
within a responsible environmental ethic. Ultimately, when living as parts in a vast
interconnected system of life, humanity role changes from that of a monarch to that of a
single cell within the body of the planet. Combining our efforts, as the human cells of the
world, have the capacity to organ-ize, shaping the world and ourselves. It is through the
delicate balance of our capacity for creative beauty and our diligent practice of humility
that empowers us to live with the Earth responsibly. Our environment, and where
humanity stands within it, are changing as a result of our current conceptions of global
ethics; we should be mindful of our role within the world to reduce the malignance of our
cancerous tendencies.
McRAE, James (Westminster College)
“The Earth Ethic and Comparative Environmental Philosophy”
J. Baird Callicott is renowned as the leading interpreter of Aldo Leopold’s land ethic.
Callicott’s early work provided a normative foundation for Leopold’s environmental ethic,
while his subsequent work has drawn from comparative philosophy, ecology, and
contemporary moral psychology to generate a new earth ethic that can offer viable
solutions to our contemporary environmental crisis. This paper explores the core tenets
of Callicott’s work from the perspective of comparative philosophy, particularly with
regard to environmental conceptions of the self. With the earth ethic, “self” becomes
radically contextualized and “place” becomes a normatively charged space that defines
both who we are and how we ought to act.
MEISTER, Chad (Bethel College)
“Vishishtadvaita Vedanta”
In the writings of the twelfth-century Vedantin philosopher Ramanuja (c.1017-c.1137
C.E.), an influential interpretation of the Vendatin writings was generated that later came
to be called Vishishtadvaita (qualified non-dualism) Vedanta. An important aspect of this
interpretation is that Brahman, the Ultimate Reality [God] has two essential aspects,
conscious (cit) and non-conscious (acit), such that the entire aggregate of things—the
world in totality—has, as its true inner Self, Brahman insofar as it constitutes the body of
Brahman. In the Sanskrit writings of his Sri Bhasya (commentary on the BrahmaSutras) and Vedartha-Sangraha, Ramanuja carefully develops what he means by the
terms “world,” “body,” and “Brahman.”
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In examining the Sanskrit texts of Ramanuja, I will unpack these terms as utilized by
him. As it turns out, the analogy of the world as the body of Brahman (God) as proffered
by Ramanuja furnishes a deep integrative connection between, and unified space of,
the world and the divine reality. This connection provides rich and relevant insights for
both eastern and western approaches to the nature of the divine, to the God-World
relation, and to the role of the human being—insights that are especially relevant to
certain contemporary ecological and social concerns.
MENDELSON-MOAZ, Aida (Open University of Israel)
“Land, Territory and Border: Space and Ethics in Contemporary Israeli Literature”
Borders and identity are fundamental elements of the modern nation-state. In the Israeli
context, land is both a motherland and an historical home. After the 1948 war, Israel
applied the principle of territorial sovereignty on its land and employed rhetorical and
institutional mechanisms that generated commitment to guarding the border and
tightening bonds with the land.
The Six Day War in 1967 introduced a new concept – the Green Line – which is the
border line between the State of Israel and the Occupied Territories. A border
presumably signifies the separation between the “here” and the “there,” between “my
country” and a foreign country. And yet, in the context of the Occupied Territories, the
borders become blurred, creating a twilight zone, a liminal region, which is
simultaneously internal and external, apparently temporary but in fact permanent.
Whereas previously, territory justified the national struggle, which elicited solidarity, the
liminal region of the Occupied Territories violated the clear connection between the
nation-state and the territory, implicating and complicating the national identity.
Following the wake of the first Intifada in the late 1980's, which brought this twilight zone
into the attention of wider Israeli society, in a traumatic and tangible way, Hebrew
literature became engaged with the question of borders and identity. In Hebrew literary
works from the 1990'a to the 2000's whether focusing principally on Israeli soldiers’
experiences across the Green Line, or exploring Israeli society itself, the theme of
space is tied to the concept of borders. In many of these works, the border implies a
transition from one moral and psychological existence to another, creating a physical,
psychological and moral rift. In this liminal zone, the civil identity is frozen, and another
identity is resuscitated – one that obeys other laws, that accord with male stereotypes
projecting roughness and aggression, often on the verge of emotional dissonance and
madness. Most interestingly, the question of border and national space is illustrated
aesthetically. The literary works offer poetic alternatives of presenting and dismantling
the borders, often creating deterritorialization – not just of the liminal space of the
Occupied Territories, but also of the entire national space and sovereignty.
In my paper, I aim to analyze the concept of borders, space and ethics in the Hebrew
literature of the Intifada era, revealing powerful thematic and poetic strategies of
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confronting these issues. I will elaborate on the works of Itzhak Ben-Ner, Orly CastelBloom and Michal Govrin.
MICEL, THOMAS (Auckland University of Technology, New Zealand)
“Textures of Spatial Alterity”
This lo-fi architectural and urban design research contests the claims of the
universal quantifiable spatial continuum of homogenous modernity, by proposing
speculative urban scans and analysis to identify conditions of otherness, of
micro-alterity, including the unusual and unexpected, as sources of spatial and
individual meaning and value. The condition of urban alterity (interiority and
exteriority in exchanges) is offered as the source of innovation in the
hypermodern condition.
Witness the spatial turn in the humanities of the 1990s, which resulted in a
grounding of theoretical propositions and historical analysis mapped onto
territories or locations, both physical and social, as a means of embedding and
fine tuning research though spatial locations and spatial movements. The
discourse of space is the discourse of the performativity of space – beyond
functionalism into personal aberrant customization – habitus, misrecognition,
formality, honestly, decisiveness, imagination, sense, and suspense are all
necessary conditions produced though space and bodily discourse, and are
inextricably bound to both. It is an advantage to architectural thought that the
spatial turn tended to locate invisible or abstract processes in physical space. We
can now see processes in space, on location as it were, and modulate them to
some greater degree by attention to what is often overlooked, minimally present,
or disappearing.
Today now space is now increasingly in play – space is in play is an activation of
codes of space in discourse – and this is aggravated by border conflicts,
homelands, identity formation and insurgencies – all of which are produced in the
rhetorical space of stabilized identities. From human geography to landscape
practices to politics of dwelling, the mutability of identity is in play in the porosity
of spatial condition. This paper seeks to activate aspects of alterity theory to
open up an unexpected line through urbanism, one privileging creativity and
innovation – and asking what can be done to make the increasingly diminishing
spaces at the architectural-urban interface exceptional in their otherness?
MILLS, Ethan (University of Tennessee Chattanooga)
“The Place of Logic in Classical Indian Philosophy”
I use the word ‘place’ in two senses: in the sense of the pakṣa (place, subject) within a
formal Nyāya inference (anumāna), but also in the sense of the importance of logic and
argumentation more generally within the classical Indian tradition. After looking at the
inclusion of place in the first sense in the discussion of inference as a means of
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knowledge, I argue that this first sense reveals an important feature about place in the
second sense, which touches on what one might call the architecture and ethics of
debate. Logic arose in the classical Indian tradition as rules for formal debate in
particular and norms for rational discourse more generally. The pakṣa is an essential
part of these rules and norms insofar as it grounds discussion in a mutually agreed
upon subject/place, which allows for a more fruitful and virtuous debate. My discussion
draws on classical sources such as the Nyāya Sūtra (1.1.32-39 and 1.2.1-9) and
Dignāga’s Hetucakraḍamaru as well as contemporary sources such as Matilal’s The
Character of Logic in India.
I then discuss two places in the Indian tradition where the pakṣa exemplifies its function:
debates about the status of the external world and about the existence of a creator
deity. I end with a contemporary reflection: given the tendency of discussants in many
contemporary political and philosophical disputes to talk past one other (e.g., US
Presidential Debates, analytic- continental disputes, etc.), the place of logic in classical
India encourages reflection on ways in which we might keep our debates grounded,
rational, and respectful.
MITCHELL, Ryan (Yale University)
“The ‘Heart of Things’ in a Heartless World? Representation and Spatial
Imagination in Han Fei’s Disenchantment of the Sovereign’s Charisma”
While Han Fei has often been characterized, in both China and the West, as a protototalitarian thinker, competing interpretations of his oeuvre are gaining increasing
prominence. Notable in such efforts is the attempt to discern the extent to which the
Han Feizi operates as a descriptive theoretical critique of its contemporary politics
rather than only as a normative or practical intervention therein. Indeed, the ultimate
recommendation that Han Fei develops for the all-powerful sovereign developed in his
writing is, paradoxically, to assume a position of quiescent passivity, refraining from any
unnecessary use of his authority and choosing instead to “suffuse” the political system
as a legitimating figure who operates only through objective, neutral standards—the
law, or fa (法).
Han Fei thus problematizes the figure of the sovereign in a way that has proved
theoretically productive (albeit polemical) for the Chinese tradition much as Thomas
Hobbes or Carl Schmitt have in Western political philosophy. Accordingly, this paper
argues that a fuller understanding of the critical dimension of Han Fei’s account of
sovereignty can be obtained by comparative reference to the latter figures. While all
three theorists take the subject of sovereign power as their main area of focus, they
adopt three very different argumentative strategies for portraying (in an “immanent”
fashion) the actual operation of that power. Adapting Clifford Geertz’s notion of the
“thick description” of social practices and definition of political charisma as the “sense of
being near the heart of things,” I argue that the Han Feizi deploys a spatial idiom of
critique, centered on access to the sovereign, that at times surpasses in verisimilitude
the approaches of later Western realist political philosophers.
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MITIAS, Lara (Antioch College)
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MOELLER, Hans-Georg (University of Macau)
“Exiles Since Childhood: On the Contingency of Place in Daoist Philosophy”
This paper reflects on a rarely discussed “character” in the philosophically central
second chapter of the Zhuangzi (Qiwulun): the “exile since childhood” (ruo sang 弱喪).
As Guo Xiang (d. 312 CE), the editor of the standard version of the text, explains, a ruo
sang is someone who lost their home at an early age. Such exiles will not even know if
they return to their hometown; they have no sense of home and can consequently be
content wherever they are. The figure of the ruo sang playfully challenges the
demarcation of places according to a home/away-from-home distinction which figures
prominently not only in the Confucian tradition. It suggests a conception of place as
radically transient and contingent and thereby desists the idea of an ownership of space
with all its potential emotional and socio-political hazards.
MOHANTA, Dilipkumar (University of Calcutta, India)
“Reflections on the Cognitivist-Skeptic Debate in Indian Philosophy and
Pyrrhonism”
In this presentation I will endeavor to demonstrate the unique 'space' in which the
Pyrrhonian Skeptics and the Indian Skeptics can meet for dialogue. The skeptic who
uses an attitude of doubt is a seeker of truth. S/he is a wise person who goes on
questioning or raising doubt about cognitive claims on the basis of beliefs. In Indian
philosophy, the attitude of doubt is accepted as an indispensable precondition for
initiating any fruitful philosophical investigation. In the Nyaya school of Indian
philosophy, we see that philosophical investigation begins with an ipso-facto doubt.
Through the application of causal instruments of knowing (pramana) for eradicating
doubt, they argue, we can arrive at right cognition / knowledge (which is free from doubt
and error) about an object.
However, the primary concern of philosophical skepticism is cognitive. It is critical about
any kind of cognitive guarantee or certitude. It questions the veracity of the necessary
tie that is claimed to exist between the truth of any cognitive position and how we arrive
at it. No knowledge-claim can be accepted as absolutely indubitable or certain. Our
judgments are never free from obscurity and uncertainty. Had it been so, questions like
‘Is the judgment true?’ could not be raised. This indicates that there always remains an
epistemic gap between our available evidence and the asserted content. The no
certainty position is followed from the no criterion argument. For the Skeptic, in this strict
sense, certainty here means absolute certainty and this is next to impossible. S/he
questions the assumption that the Law of Excluded Middle cannot be doubted. The
claimer of the possibility of knowledge relies on the assumption that the judgment about
the world of fact is either true or false. You are to accept either ‘p or not-p’; there is no
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other alternative. But the Skeptic finds no sufficient rational ground to accept either of
the two. To the skeptic, to any pro-argument for a thesis there is an equally strong
counter-argument and, therefore, s/he cannot have any thesis (pratijna in Sanskrit) to
put forward or a thesis of her/his own. This is known as no thesis argument.
The Cognitivist-Skeptic debate is an important aspect of India's Argumentative Culture
and this fact is very often ignored by scholars. But a close re-reading of the
development of philosophical thought in India will show that this debate tradition
enriches India's cultural heritage by giving space and respect to the views of others as
an alternative to one's own. I propose to examine two important charges usually brought
against the skeptic’s position in Indian Philosophy. The first section contains a brief
presentation of the position of philosophical Skeptic. The second section has two subsections -- the first explicates two objections raised against the Skeptic by the
Cognitivist and the second contains a possible rejoinder to these objections. The third
section is an attempt to show some common sharable arguments between Indian
Skeptics and Pyrrhonian Skeptics. Any discussion regarding how the Cognitivist
position can be defended in the face of skeptical challenges is left outside the scope of
this paper. Here the Nyāya position from classical Indian Philosophy and its Greek
counterpart regarding the possibility of knowledge are represented by the term
Cognitivism. The positions of Pyrrho (4th Century B. C. E.) in the Greek philosophical
tradition and the Sanjaya-Nagarjuna-Jayarasi line of philosophizing in ancient India are
conjoined by the term Cognitive Skepticism. The paper concludes with a note that the
Skeptic does not leave the arena of knowledge empty-handed.
However, Pyrrho refers to his philosophical opponents as a dogmatist whereas
Nagarjuna calls them dristivādins (in Sanskrit). Pyrrho's senior contemporary SanjayaBelattiputra (5th century B.C.E.) and his disciple Supriya (4th C.B.E.) used to teach the
method of philosophizing with four-cornered negation. In Sanskrit it is known as Amaravikshepavada, the method of escaping like the movement of an eel fish. There is much
similarity between the arguments developed by Sanjya-Nagarjuna-Jayarasi type
skeptical arguments and Pyrrhonian arguments against the absolute claims to the
possibility of knowledge. So it is wise to doubt everything and to abstain from advancing
any thesis with absolute knowledge-claims. This abstention is called epoche in Greek.
Nagarjuna calls it prasanga in Sanskrit. As all attempts to attain truth with certitude are
doomed to failure, this abstention acts as the root of cultivating
imperturbability, ataraxia.
However, there are differences too between Indian Skeptics and Pyrrhonian Skeptics. In
our elaboration of the arguments we will take care of this 'space'. It will be shown how
the Skeptics can escape the charge of self-contradiction with their special use of
'negation'. This is called prasajya pratisedhah in Sanskrit, which is pure negation, to
distinguish it from relational / propositional negation, which is prajudasa pratisedhah in
Sanskrit.
The Indian Skeptics would find the charge of contradiction as non-sensical. The charge
rests upon the assumption that nothing is equal to something. Nobody does not mean
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somebody in any communicable sense. Again, the Skeptics would say that the
Cognitivists have failed to understand the object-level and the meta-level difference of
language and this leads them to accuse the Skeptics of self-reference. There are
indistinct fuzzy areas in our actual state of knowability and we cannot make exclusive
truth-claim about anything. The claim of the Cognitivists suffers not only significant flaws
but the very assumption upon which it is founded is dogmatically accepted and
therefore questionable. Being the worshippers of free enquiry the Skeptics are against
any kind of rigid and dogmatic belief.
The paper is an attempt to develop the arguments step by step.
MORGAN Julia (Kaua'i Community College), and Kuan-Hung CHEN (University of
Hawai’i)
“Knowing and Places in Hawaiian and Chinese Traditions: A Possible
Construction of ‘Āina (or River Hao) Epistemology”
While the notion of a decontextualized disembodied knower is the ideal knower in an
Enlightenment context, such an ideal is neither not the only way to know but, potentially,
not the most useful in a contemporary world that may very well demand that we
consider place as both the locus of knowledge and the locus of ethical obligations. The
following will explore this dilemma first, by discussing the difference between placebased (or rooted) knowing and the disembodied knowers by exploring Chinese and
Kanaka Maoli epistemologies, on the one hand, and Cartesian and Kantian
epistemologies, on the other hand.
Two examples demonstrate the notion of an embodied knower. The first example is
from the Chinese text of the Zhuangzi, which contains a famous debate between
Zhuangzi and Hui Shi on the knowability of the happiness of the fish. Zhuangzi’s
argument was based on the quality of relationality of the particular place (River Hao).
Zhuangzi even invites Hui Shi to reveal his standpoint instead of hiding it. This passage
demonstrates that certain kinds of knowing are not reducible to abstract
conceptualization.
The second example is from the Kanaka Maoli tradition, where knowing is both contextbased and relational. To that end, Kanaka Maoli gave carefully chosen personal names
to places. These names, and their attendant stories, carried with them valuable
accumulated knowledge about the place and its inhabitants, including soil, seasonal
conditions, and other such Western-type propositional knowledge.
Key to understanding the differences between these ideas of epistemology and
knowledge is the recognition of a conceptual difference between place and space.
While the Cartesian-Kantian-space-based knowledge has been prioritized and
exceptiaonlised, this view of knowledge has some serious limitations and ignores basic
facts about our world. Second, this discussion will explore how in acknowledging both
the importance of and the viability of place-based knowing, we can address the
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problems of the Cartesian-Kantian-space-based traditions and acquire improved tools to
navigate a plural and diverse world, opening up the realm of potential solutions for many
of our current contemporary environmental issues.
MORIOTO, Bruce (Athabasca University, Canada)
“Place Internality and Mind/Body Incommensurability”
I want this paper to set out a way to address the subjective/objective distinction of the
mind/body problem by winding my way through an analysis of place and music. Place,
as it pertains to musical experience, can be described in ways that can serve to help
formulate the relation between objective, physical conditions and subjective, mental
conditions. Internal places where we go to find refuge or to reflect are also places where
we have musical experiences. Analysis of this sense inner place indicates that the
mind/body incommensurability problem is not a problem for musical experience and
especially for creative performance and composition. Indeed, it is a vital tool for
developing potential musical experience. I hope to disclose certain properties of musical
experience that bridge the internal/subjective and external/objective conceptual gap, by
show that this bridge presupposes an underlying or implicate axiological order. If
successful, it may not so much solve the mind/brain incommensurability problem, but
could very well advance a non-reductive approach to explaining the incommensurability
as a condition for musical creativity, and in the longer run, for creativity in moral life.
MOSER, Keith A. (Mississippi State University)
“Biological and Semiotic Marking of Human Space in Michel Serres’s
Interdisciplinary Philosophy”
Throughout his extensive philosophical body of work from 1968 to the present, the
French philosopher of science Michel Serres adamantly maintains that all sentient and
non-sentient beings were arbitrarily tossed into the chaos of existence by indiscriminate,
ecological forces that predate humankind by billions of years. From a scientific and
objective standpoint, Serres explains that every living organism has the same intrinsic
right to exist in a deterministic, chaotic universe. In numerous texts, Serres
incorporates the principles of modern science to deconstruct unfounded notions of
human ontological sovereignty that are grounded in chimerical wishful thinking rather
than rigorous philosophical inquiry.
This maverick thinker shares more in common with indigenous and eastern
philosophers than his Western counterparts given his predilection to frame every issue
from an ecocentric perspective. For Serres, understanding our connection to the myriad
of threads that inextricably link us to the larger web of life is the key to comprehending
our minute place in the biotic community of life. Although Serres often scoffs at
pervasive anthropocentric logic that runs contrary to contemporary scientific erudition,
he does recognize that homo sapiens are a different kind of animal on multiple levels.
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Specifically, the philosopher asserts that humans delineate the boundaries of our space
in both similar and in extremely divergent ways in comparison to other species.
First, Serres reveals that traces of archaic, primal behavior related to the marking of
one’s territory through the excretion of bodily fluids are still clearly visible in the modern
world. Similar to how many other organisms such as dogs, tigers, and lions urinate or
defecate in a certain spot as a form of biological marking which serves to define the
parameters of their personal space or property, Serres contends that humans still
engage in this kind of primordial behavior without realizing it. In his provocative essay
Le Mal Propre, Serres hypothesizes that the cult of virginity in Western civilization is a
vestige of this evolutionary trait. After a woman’s body has been appropriated by a
given male with his semen, the phenomenon of biological marking reveals why she can
never “belong” to another man. In a patriarchal society in which male aggression
remains unchecked, traces of archaic behavior which links us to other animals are still
present lurking beneath the surface of social conventions.
According to Serres, biological marking in the human population is proof that homo
sapiens are part and parcel of the biosphere that conceived them starting with the
cataclysmic events commonly referred to as a big bang. Serres illustrates that the
biological predisposition to leave a little of our secretions behind to indicate possession
and to stake our claim to a certain space is common throughout the animal kingdom.
Nonetheless, Serres also theorizes that we have an innate inclination to soil the space
around us by means of “semiotic contamination” (Filippi 52). The philosopher notes that
other organisms including larks and nightingales engage in this sort of soft pollution as
well. Yet, he implies that humans have a heightened predisposition to appropriate
everything around us through signs.
In Le Mal Propre, Serres suggests that our species possesses a pathological desire to
incorporate every single space within our reach into our pervasive realms of symbolic
representation. Whereas many other life forms tend to remain in the confines of their
ecological niches for the most part, homo sapiens never seem to be satisfied until there
is nothing left outside of the operational logic of our semiotic waste. As Massimo Filippi
explains, “Other animals delimit their territory by marking it with whatever their body is
able to emit-urine, howls, cheerful warbles. Humans are not different […] However,
unlike other animals, human beings seem to have no limits in this process of marking
the existence” (51). As Filippi underscores, Serres affirms that human beings are the
most extreme animals on this planet in terms of polluting the environment around us
through the incessant reproduction of simulacra.
MOWER, Deedee (Weber State University)
“Discourses that Fragment Suburban Educational Spaces”
In the spatial terms of urban, suburban, east, and west, the construction of educational
boundaries has been historically used to separate and segregate particular groups of
people. To understand the analysis of education through a theoretical mapping of
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space, one needs to acknowledge that space has characteristics or manners of
enhancing our understanding. The way we use language or utterances to understand
spaces is not solely created or individually derived. We need to realize that the
utterances themselves are historically and socially situated for that space.
The interactions that take place about spaces have sociolinguistic meaning because
they were socially formed to identify individual selves with communities (Bazerman,
2004). In other words, created spaces become a signifier of particular peoples and
practices, or educational spaces and pedagogies and the discourse surrounding those
signifiers becomes visualized, repeated, and perceived as truth (Lefebvre, 1991: Soja,
1996, Buendia & Ares, 2006) by both those within the community and those on the
periphery.
Historically, race and social class have been used as indictors to ascribe characteristics
to people and places. Educational spaces inherit the discourses of past social
interactions and either perpetuate those attributes or work to form new interactions.
Community members often unconsciously contribute to the discourses about their
educational spaces they are assigned to using both race and social class distinctions.
There are educational inequities when race and social class are continually used as
determinants for school boundaries. Research in urban areas demonstrates these
educational distinctions in segregated spaces. For example, Pauline Lipman’s (2002)
work in Chicago, amongst others (Noguera, P. 2003) demonstrates how segregated
neighborhoods receive unequal educational practices. In Lipman’s work, she explains
how schools relegate certain populations, characterized by race and class, to particular
parts of the city by drawing school boundaries that reflect the segregated communities.
She also demonstrates how existing race inequalities are not only maintained by
geographical boundaries, but inequitable educational opportunities and experiences
increase.
I argue that what has not been researched is how spaces perpetuate normalized
discourses or the regularity of statements that provide “verbal performances that are
identical from the point of view of grammar, that are also identical from the point of view
of logic,” (Foucault, 1972, p 145) for dividing particular suburban educational spaces.
Educational suburban spaces are juxtaposed to urban spaces but not to similar spaces
within the suburbs. Cultural relationship gaps within suburban educational spaces may
be between real and imagined spaces of difference. This paper reviews the local
statements that form a regularity of thought or limitedness of ideas for separation
among certain suburban educational spaces south of Salt Lake City, Utah to determine
how points of logic through discourse historically maintain divided educational spaces
based upon perceived and sometimes imagined differences in race and socioeconomic
status.
MOWER, Gordy (Brigham Young University)
“Property as Place, East and West”
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One way among many by which the raw materials of earthly space can be transformed
into place infused with human significance is through the enclosure of that space under
a regime of private real property. This essay will explore two versions of property
practices, one Western and one Eastern.
In some ways the Western model has become a dominant approach to ownership in the
modern world, but it is also controversial and carries with it intimations of humanity’s
worst characteristics. The justifications for it coming out of the early modern period,
however, sought to base property ownership on noble features of human beings. To
begin with, then, property’s justification is deeply personal and formative, but the
introduction of money and its commodification ultimately undercut the personal nature of
place. As money itself becomes commodified, so does human labor, and so in turn do
the spaces designated as property.
The Eastern model is different in that it grants property title to families rather than
individuals. There is an enlightened recognition here that it is not just the individual qua
individual that needs place. There must also be place that is reflective of our social
natures and most fundamentally of our personal identities as formulated through our
family relations. This arrangement makes clear the place of and for an individual in the
family, the community, and the state. The individual finds a place by working together
with family and members of the community.
I will argue that both models have their defects, but they can perhaps usefully learn from
each other. The Western model has a myriad of faults foremost of which perhaps is the
cult of the individual that cannot help but promote a destructive selfishness. As labor
becomes a commodity, isolated individuals leave their families to go to their “places” of
work. The attachments there must overwhelmingly be to the firm in isolation, not to the
community, not to the state. The individual truly recognizes that her time is not really
even her own while she is at work. Mencius’ well-field system belongs to a bygone era
and it is unlikely to find much place in the modern world. It is inefficient in comparison
with modern farming methods. Nor is it feasible in its land distribution requirement given
the constraints of modern populations.
Nevertheless, the Eastern view of place might be made to complement the Western
view. Every individual needs a place for productive effort. The Western model has
successfully transferred this place from the farm plot to the workplace. The workplace,
however, might not be very satisfying. If our identities are constituted in part by our
relations, we will want a place for them where we work. We will want our workplaces to
become broader communities, where, as in the well-field system, families interact, and
they are connected to the larger community and even to the political community.
MURATA-SORACI, Kimiyo (Belmont University)
“On the Matter of Hospitality”
Being in place, not as subjects stationed in an objective world-space but as mortals
inhabiting with others in a proper abode, matters to everyone’s heart and mind. Our
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poignant desire for a proper implacement in the world hence the need of orientation
calls us to heed the present ēthos and calls us to engage in the issue of how we are to
rightly belong to the tradition by receiving, witnessing, and transferring the common
memory of the past ways to be. The question of place, that is the general topic of the
Conference, turns our gaze to a matter of reception and of the ethos.
This paper will take up the current Japanese phenomena of (a) the World Heritage
tourisms, (b) localization through a community’s consorted effort to economize for
revenue and care for local landscapes of uncanny beauty, ancient architectures of
temples and shrines, and historic sites of great importance for politics and narratives,
and (c) identifying Japan as a culture of hospitality so as to reformulate a narrative of
“we.” We will compare the current ways of recollection and appropriation of the past
with those of Saigyō (1118-1190), Ippen (1239-1289) and Bashō (1644-1694) who
traveled extensively Japan and mapped out, to use a Bachelardian term, the new
“poetics of space” by virtue of their alertness to the essential emptiness (śūnya 空 ) of
self-existence (muga 無我 ) in all phenomena.
In reading appropriate passages from their texts, we shall highlight that the concurrence
of being and language, which the three poets share in common, sets “place” free from
an ordinary understanding of place as a sector of the universal space and enables all
things, including the poets themselves, to show what they are truly in a “no-form” of
reciprocal intertwining. By stepping into a foreign terrain of the past poets and by recollecting the uncanny happening of the gift of the place, we will think anew the current
mode of consecrating Japanese community as well as the familiar pattern of reception
of life within an economy of negotiation and reconciliation for the sake of a common
good.
MURRAY, Judson (Wright State University)
“Chinese and Japanese Views on an Ethics of Place Situated at the Homestead”
My presentation will examine the use of place in efforts to criticize sociopolitically both
intellectual elitism and moral degeneration. The specific places that serve as the
inspirations for such criticisms are the farm and the hearth of the homestead, because
they exemplify values and activities that are antithetical to hypocritical and parasitical
intellectualizing and to the intrigues and moral compromises that often accompany
social relations and affairs of state. My methodological approach is both cross-cultural
and comparative, as the places and periods of interest are early China—both in its preand early imperial contexts--and Tokugawa Japan.
What emerges from these populist ancient Chinese and medieval Japanese critical
discourses is an ethics of place predicated on the assumption that where people locate
themselves and what they do therein formatively influences who they are and how they
conduct themselves morally. Together the farm and the hearth offer a particular kind of
moral education. Proponents of it argue that it is the average and the lowborn who are
best suited to moral cultivation, and the simpler and natural conditions and activities
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associated with these places cultivate a brand of virtuosity that is adaptive and practical,
and that accords properly with, and thereby reinforces, nature’s generative and lifesustaining processes.
MYERS, Michael (Washington State University)
“Place and Space in Israel/Palestine”
Palestinians maintain that Israeli Jews have mythologized the places mentioned in the
Bible and have assumed those places as their own, to the exclusion of Palestinian
aspirations and legal right to the land. Jews argue that Palestinians do not recognize
that Israel constitutes the only space in the world that can provide a safe haven
specifically for Jews, a haven necessary to protect the Jewish people in the wake of the
Holocaust.
Proposed solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict tend to involve concepts of space
alone. Two-state solutions, for example, draw and redraw boundaries in an attempt to
provide space for both peoples. Meanwhile, the places where Palestinians live become
more dangerous, isolated, and squeezed smaller and smaller, while the places in which
Israeli Jews live become increasingly militarized, unsafe, and threatened by attack from
hostile neighboring countries.
This paper seeks a way out of the conflict through an examination of the concepts of
place and space in the unique context of Israel/Palestine. While Israeli/Palestinian
space is confined, contested and finite, it might be possible to construct a place that is
plural, peaceful and conceptually without limit. The beginning of such a project would
bring together Palestinian memory and conceptions of the land such as found in Raja
Shehadeh’s Palestinian Walks: Forays into A Vanishing Landscape with Israeli
aspirations for a post-Holocaust world as found in Emil Fackenheim’s To Mend the
World: Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought.
NABOR, Maria (Aklan State University, Philipines)
“Kalibo Sto. Nino Atiatihan Festival and The Cultural Heritage of the Atis of
Boracay”
The province of Aklan in the Philippines, (is packed with interesting places, from scenic
beaches, captivating waterfalls, and vast caves), one of the top tourist destination of the
Philipines. Boracay island is voted as the best beaches in the world. Aklan comprises
17 municipalities, one of which is known as “Kalibo”.
The month of January is devoted to the various festivals honoring the image of Santo
Nino. The most popular celebration is the Kalibo Santo Nino Ati-atihan Festival that is
replicated throughout the country since 13th century.
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This cultural festival has become a social movement – an expressive behavior pattern
where people collectively adapt to change and individuals find emotional release and an
expression of their beliefs. It is a movement where people from all walks of life join and
unite in traditional ways of celebrating. It is the blending of religious festivities of
yesteryears with the present generation’s lifestyle and the manifestation of this in the
individual as his way of life, his attitudes and his practices (such as the way he dresses
entertains guests or shows friendship and hospitality) developed from childhood to
adulthood.
The Ati-atihan is a gladsome confluence of hope and faith, philosophy, religion,
enjoyment, prayer and merry-making, charity and generosity, thanksgiving and ritual,
atonement and adventure, history and legend, hope and well-wishing, concord and
creativity-all happily blended, in the merry sound of beating drums.
The festival will continue to stay among the Aklanons as a most valued tradition, a
unique legacy that will be handed on and treasured from generation to generation.
During the 12th to 13th century, the Ati’s trusted the Malays for governance. The Malays,
in return, valued their spirit of paternalism, friendship, camaraderie and brotherhood.
This is the very reason why their cultural heritage survived for many centuries and has
been reknowned worldwide.
NAGATOMO, Shigenori (Temple University)
“Holistic Non-Dualism: A Sketch for a Philosophy of Place”
This paper is an attempt to construct a philosophy of place so as to demand a
perspectival shift from “either-or egological dualism” to “holistic non-dualism.” The latter
phrase designates an epistemological conceptual framework that is contrasted with an
epistemological paradigm that is based on “either-or egological dualism”—the stance
which has been used as the predominant paradigm since the age of enlightenment in
the Western philosophical tradition. “Either-or egological dualism” can be explained by
breaking down into the following segments: “either-or” “egological” and dualism.
Dualism is a conceptual stance that divides the whole in two opposing pairs such as
mind and body, I and others, and the host of other pairs. It promotes an oppositional
thinking and ontology. Either-or logic justifies this division, a consequence of which is a
prioritization of one segment or part over the other segment or part. This promotes onesidedness as standard and normal. An agent which performs this prioritization is an ego
that is divorced from the body, i.e., ego as a thinking being wherein rationality is singled
out as the essential defining feature of what it means to be human. This creates a split
and conflict within the human psychē, and a distance between humans and the place
e.g., nature. When the ego engages in thinking, it objectifies the things of its thinking.
This objectification is made possible by accepting the human being as a “being-outsideof-nature.” This definition gives us an image that the human being stands outside of
nature, i.e., a human being as a thinking being is situated outside of [and possibly
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above] nature as an observer. This creates a contradiction namely that while he/she
stands outside of nature, his/her body is anchored in nature as a material being.
Unlike “either-or egological dualism,” “holistic non-dualism” does not promote an
epistemological paradigm in which the whole is broken down into two opposites. Rather,
the whole is understood as the whole, more specifically, a thinker doesn’t stand outside
of the whole, because it understands the human being as “being-in-nature.” Instead of
mind-body dualism, holistic non-dualism accepts the idea of mind-body correlativity, and
to expand it to a larger dimension, it recognizes a micromacrocosmic correlativity
between the human being and nature. Nor does it engage in oppositional thinking that
creates distance between the human being and the whole (or nature). Moreover, it
doesn’t create a split or conflict within the human being.
To advance the above idea, it explicates Nishida’s logic of “absolutely contradictory selfidentity.” Nishida’s logic of “absolutely contradictory self-identity” states that the logical
structure of the world is both “contradictory” and “self-identical” at the same time, where
the adjective “absolutely” indicates that this structure cannot be resolved into a higher
synthesis. This structure is used to account for how change occurs in the world, i.e., his
“place dialectic” in terms of a dialectical change from “that which creates” to “that which
is created” and from “that which is created” to “that which creates.” In this dialectical
change, the paper also examines the human role in terms of Nishida’s theory of “actingintuition.”
NAKAJIMA Takahiro (University of Tokyo, Japan)
“Seeking for Place of Earthly Universality in Modern Japan: Suzuki Daisetz,
Chikazumi Jōkan, and Miyazawa Kenji”
When confronting European modernity, the universality represented in Chinese
philosophy got lost its overwhelming power in East Asia. In contrast with the universality
shown through modern science and philosophy in Europe, the traditional universality in
China turned to be “Chinese universality.” In this turnover of values, how could
Japanese intellectuals imagine the universality? It was not a simple prolongation of
modern universality into East Asia, but a transformed one. We might call it “Earthly
Universality.”
In my presentation, I will first talk about “Earthly Universality” in modern Japan, focusing
on Buddhist Thinkers such as Suzuki Daisetz (1870-1966), Chikazumi Jōkan (18701941), and Miyazawa Kenji (1896-1933).
Suzuki defended Pure Land Buddhism to find a possibility of “Earthly Spirituality.” By
referring to local saints called as “Myōkōnin,” he elaborated the dimension of the
mysterious in the midst of modernized Japan and regarded it as a place of resistance to
the extreme nationalism. He said that “regardless of the East or the West, Political
system should be mainly based on liberty which derives from spiritual liberty.” (1947) As
for religion, he preferred religion existing in the earth. He said, “Though religion is said
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to come from heaven, its essence exists in the earth.” (1944) As a modern intellectual,
Suzuki knew the power of Christianity that had a notion of heavenly “transcendence,”
but he tried to find an earthly universality in Buddhism.
Pure Land Buddhism was drastically transformed in modern Japan. Chikazumi Jōkan, a
contemporary with Suzuki, tried to reform it along with Kiyozawa Manshi (1863-1903).
By paying attention to Christianity, he constituted modern Pure Land Buddhism based
upon new belief “kyūdō.” Miyazawa Masajirō (1874-1957) and his family devoted in the
direction Chikazumi proposed. However, Miyazawa Kenji, son of Masajirō, was
dissatisfied with it.
Kenji left Pure Land Buddhism of Chikazumi, and converted into Kokuchūkai (国柱会
National Pillar Society) based upon Nichiren sect. He hoped to realize social welfare as
Buddhist utopia in this world. However, he became suspicious of Kokuchūkai and tried
to establish a new community for “Earthly Men.” It was called as “Rasu Earthly Men
Association” (1926.8-1927.3) in which Miyazawa challenged to combine natural science
and religion redefined in Genius Loci. By thinking that “religion gets tired and is
substituted by science, and science is cold and dark” (1926), Miyazawa needed to build
a bridge between the universality of natural science and the locality of religion.
Here we come to understand an encounter between Daisetz and Kenji over a detour.
Both of them seriously thought of alternative social imaginary based upon “Earthly
Universality” in modern Japan.
NEVILLE, Robert C. (Boston University)
“On the Confucian Virtue of Shallow Roots”
The conventional belief is that Confucianism fosters the cultivation of deep roots in a
place with family orientations and deep history. But Confucius himself, by legend,
wandered all over China looking for a tenured position. His philosophy expanded to the
very foreign soil, in a cultural sense, of Korea, Japan and Southeast Asia. The most
creative Confucian thinkers of the last century or so lived in self-conscious diaspora
away from China. Nowadays, people with no ethnic roots in China are advancing the
participation of the Confucian traditions in global philosophical conversation outside
even the diaspora of East Asian intellectuals. So there must be something in
Confucianism that allows it to disengage from its roots in one place and set down
sufficient roots in another. The Confucian virtues of humaneness and individuated ritual
virtuosity, or role ethics, must be able to adapt themselves to multiple places, allowing
Confucianism to be in dialectical critical relation to the culture at hand so as to push
back against the instincts of ingroup self-defense that are so hurtful in a global
situation. The paper presents a theory of Confucian transportability.
NGUYEN, Ngoc Tho (University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam
National University – Ho Chi Minh City)
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“Traditional Vietnamese Village Space and its Reaction to Confucianism”
Traditional Vietnam, an inland Southeast Asian nation getting engaged with East Asian
Confucianism, has shown the conrete space culture that are naturally shaped and
promoted by the villagers as means to survive in the local environmental and social
contexts. Being threathened by annual flood and the external expansions, villages in
North Vietnam has been tightly enclosed and internalized to construct the autonomous
style of living units. Such a kind of rural village organizing has built up Vietnamese
cosmology and concepts of human beings and society, regulated the foundation of
Vietnamese identities, personality and communication. Under Vietnamese’s eyes,
village is also considered as “house”, “home” and “state”, village unwritten rules as
“family principles”, “community conventions” and “state law”. Village’s enclosure has
also enclosed villagers’ destiny, eyesight and capacity.
One’s life is complicatedly interfered by and engaged with many village’s components
and relations; therefore, dealing with village also means dealing with each individual. On
the other hand, the enclosed village space has defined the way of dealing with external
sources (cultural exchanges, cultural influences). Confucianism in the early periods as
well as Western philosophies and concepts in the recent centuries all have been looked,
absorbed and reconstructed through different village prisms. This paper is to discuss on
the concept, the construction and the nature of traditional Vietnamese “village” as well
as its impacts on villagers’ social life, cosmology and viewpoints from which the reaction
over the arrival and absorption of Confucianism has been shaped.
NUSSEIBEH, Sari (Alquds University Jerusalem, Palestine)
HENDLER, Micah (Director, YMCA Jerusalem Youth Chorus)
“Noise and Sound: A Space to Call ‘Home’”
I will be developing this presentation with a colleague, Micah Hendel, who leads a
'mixed' youth chorus here at the YMCA, the main idea being that mental space -where
or what one feels at home (occupying)- is significantly a space of sounds, the one often
being exclusive of the other (turning what sounds like a harmonious melody for one into
a jarring noise for the other). Sounds are of different sorts, and these include thoughts
and prejudices. Music as instrument and practice can help expand one's 'home space',
allowing it to become inclusive. It offers a paradigm for how space/home can be
shared.
OH, Jea Sophia (West Chester University of Pennsylvania)
"In the Beginning was the Place…": An East-West Dialogue of Creatio ex
Profundis"
This study will compare Neo-Confucian Zhang Zai (張載)'s taixu (太虛, the vast vacuity)
and process ecotheologian Catherine Keller's tehom (the chaotic depth in Hebrew) as
the ultimate spatio-temporal place of creation, using the Korean term teum (in-
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betweenness) to connect these two resonant ideas. Both Keller and Zhang developed a
nondualistic cosmology as opposed to the Augustinian doctrine of creation ex nihilo (the
creation out of nothingness). As Keller rejects the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo which was
inherited by Augustine where God is the unilateral agent of creation while the multitudes
(萬物, wanwu) are subalternized, for Zhang, taixu is the ultimate place where cosmos
and the multitude are born from the same fluid vital force (氣, qi) resonant with Keller's
creatio ex profundis (creation out of the deep). The great vacuity is not nothingness but
the fullness of vital force (氣, qi). The creation is the manifestation of the endless
becoming(s) of taixu that becomes myriad things by convergence of qi while myriad
things become taixu by diffusion of qi. Both Keller and Zhang Zai's harmonious
cosmology is a new paradigm of creation that this planet is one organic body of the
myriad thing events in which we are all interconnected of which nothing is left out.
OLBERDING, Amy (University of Oklahoma)
“Philosophical Exclusion and Conversational Practices”
In this essay, I seek to assess and analyze the ways in which informal modes of talk
regarding “inclusivity” in philosophy can, even where well-disposed and –intentioned,
act like philosophical gatekeeping, frustrating efforts to devise genuinely hybrid
philosophical efforts that would fully enfold and incorporate philosophical traditions
beyond the west. “Boundary policing” within philosophy is often most apparent where
the discipline’s intellectual territories are explicitly mapped in ways that exclude
traditions beyond the west. However, focusing on intellectually ambitious and explicit
attempts to conceptually define philosophy obscures the ways philosophy is already
functionally defined by our practices. For many philosophers, philosophy just is what
they read in professional journals, what they teach and write, and what they discuss
with colleagues – that is, philosophy is an object of experience, a phenomenon and
lived activity. In this regard, boundaries are more often felt than explicitly announced or
plainly posted, as informal modes of talk signal barriers and thereby functionally patrol
the discipline’s outer edges. Such is to say that even where philosophers are generally
well disposed toward inclusivity, they may nonetheless participate in intellectual and
conversational practices that act like gatekeeping. Indeed, as I argue in this essay, the
way the profession talks about whether or not to find greater place for Asian philosophy
often already contains the negative answer. The dialogue, even where ostensibly open
and interested, is itself shaped as a no.
Olberding, Garret (University of Oklahoma)
“Shadows in the Mirror: Reflective Representation of Physical Space in Early
China”
The compositional norms with which early Chinese geographic maps were designed
remain little understood. Similar to other ancient maps, all are rough diagrams of
uncertain geographic area and indefinite purpose. In my paper, using comparisons with
pre- and post-Renaissance European maps, as well as statements relating to the visual
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organization of space found in early texts, such as the later Mohist canons,
the Huainanzi, and the Guanzi, I will analyze what early Chinese maps reveal about the
standards of reflective signification and epistemic positioning involved in their creation;
for instance, their employment of perspective and contrast.
Juxtaposed against what one might call the Renaissance’s “geometry of sight,” I also
wish to highlight the employment of certain related aesthetic sensibilities, such as the
regular use of linear definition and empty space. Through such analysis, I aim to
demonstrate certain definitive aspects of their logic and organization, and offer some
additional insight into early Chinese representations of cartographic space, and thus
how visual perception shaped the understanding of em/placement.
OLSON, Carl (Allegheny College)
“Place and Play: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Rāmānuja and Zhuangzi”
The notion of play assumes an important place in the philosophical works of the Indian
thinker Rāmānuja and the Chinese Daoist thinker Zhuangzi. After comparing their
positions on play and looking at its features (e.g., its risky nature, its freedom, becoming
lost in play, its effortlessness, and its self-representative nature), this essay examines
the relationship between play and place in these two philosophers. Play necessarily
occurs within some type of context or place that can assume God’s body or the Dao,
according to the respective positions of Rāmānuja and Zhuangzi. Finally, this essay
turns to consider the chosen thinkers conceptions of the relationship between play and
place and the way that it compares to the thought of Yi-fu Tuan in order to suggest any
changes that he might make to satisfy the Indian and Daoist thinkers.
OPPEGAARD, Brett (University of Hawai’i)
“How Media Lost its Place and Found It Again: Proximity Issues from the Penny
Press to the Smartphone”
Our places can be conceptualized as our information interfaces, increasingly integrated
with overlapping digital worlds through mobile technologies. These juxtapositions of
digital media and physical environments can generate deep, complex, and personal
meanings to us, and consumers suddenly can’t get enough of mobile news and
geolocated content that enrich our places. Media organizations, though, generally have
been befuddled and unable to align the potential of locative and contextual information
much with their current business models.
Academics meanwhile have been struggling to find ways to empirically study the related
emerging media forms, with their complex dynamics. Through medium theory and
historical perspectives, this presentation will describe how journalistic media lost its
connections to place during the time of the telegraph and railroad – when Marx and
Heidegger warned of ramifications caused by the annihilation of time and space – and
recently has been reconnecting to place again through experimental prototypes using
geolocation technologies, such as smartphones and tablet computers. To illustrate the
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increasingly important intersection of technology and place, several field studies and
case studies will be shown, focused upon the growing importance in media today of
tailoring information by proximity and the emerging genres.
OZBEY, Sonya (University of Michigan)
“The Outside Generated from the Inside: Xunzi on the ‘Petty Person’”
Integral to the classical Ru imagery of the “civilized world” was the trope of the
“barbarian,” which defined both the territorial and conceptual limits of it. Although the socalled barbarians were often referred to with territorial or directional word compounds,
their perceived inferiority was due to their ritual deficiency—which means although the
lands from where they come shaped the way they are, they were not destined to be that
way. Being born human, they were considered to share similar dispositions with other
humans, although their ritual deficiency took away from the obviousness of their
humanity. The cultivated, exemplary people, by contrast, typically belonged to central
plains, although no matter what kind of conditions in which they found themselves, they
succeeded in following the tradition that is passed down from Xia to Zhou—which, in a
way, amounts to living in the same “cultural universe” regardless of where they actually
end up. As for the other dwellers of the central states, the masses, they too were
thought to be at the mercy of the conditions in which they found themselves, which
were, during the Zhanguo period, far from ideal. Thus, they, naturally, too fell short of
the human ideal, which makes it harder to employ a neat inside/outside dichotomy to
delineate the limits of the civilized human world (the borders of which were already
unclear to begin with, due to the shifting political climate). This paper focuses on the
descriptions of “petty people” in the Xunzi and examines them in relation to bestiality
metaphors, descriptions of the commoners, as well as descriptions of the barbarian
people. My goal is not to locate the exact place of them in the symbolic ladder of
propriety and humanity, but to use various descriptions of petty people as vantage
points to examine the unstable nature of the symbolic field within which different
imageries of the ‘inhuman’ finds expression.
PAOLILLO, Maurizio Paolillo (Università del Salento, Italy)
“The Quality of Space in Traditional Chinese Aesthetics: ‘Real Place’ and
Affinities with the Western Tradition”
With the help of Chinese sources, most of which belonging to painting theory, and
ranging from 5th to 11th century, this contribution aims to show the affinities between
ancient China aesthetic principles and an important part of Western aesthetics, which
from Plato arrives to Middle Age and beyond. During this long historical phase, a vision
of “real place” (Chinese zhenjing 真景), based on the assumption that every landscape
representation must not be limited to a quantitative reduction, takes place among the
élite of the literati. The writer hopes to contribute to the dismantling of some visions, like
the popular vulgata about the “peculiarity” and the relativism of traditional Chinese
thought.
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PARK, Bradley (St. Mary’s College of Maryland)
“Opening the Space Place of Disclosure: Subjectivity, Reflexivity, and the Poise
of Presence”
This paper builds upon traditional phenomenological accounts of embodied space in
relation to neurophysiological accounts of movement; mindfulness and attention
research; contemporary debates about reflexivity; and classical Sino-Japanese
approaches to embodiment organized by the three “dynamic fields” of the dantian (J.
tandens). The aim of the paper is to clarify core aspects of the first-person perspectival
dimension of world disclosure and to shed light on the East-Asian cultivational practices
that are attentive to the dantian.
PARK, Jin Y. (American University)
“Place and Violence, or the Venerability of Philosophy”
Is “place” a source of violence or space for living together? A “place” is a tamed space,
through which humans create meaning. A place is related to identity, and violence, as
Jacques Derrida stated, is the condition of identity, since identity requires a placing of
the self in concrete reality. The place is also related to con-textuality of our existence in
the sense that one cannot think of concrete reality without placing the subject in the
context of the life-world. Philosophy’s relation to place—individual identity, identity of the
ethnic group, geographical identity, and nationalism—is double-edged. The changing
imagination about place changes the nature of philosophy and philosophers sometimes
contradict the fundamental tenets of their philosophy when place-as-identity is
introduced in the philosophizing as opposed to place-as-context.
This paper explores the contradicting functions of the imagination about “place” and
examines how the place-as-identity and the place-as-context can explain gaps and
conflicts in a philosophy. I will focus my discussion on Jacques Derrida’s works on
politics including Specters of Marx (Spectres de Marx, 1993) and The Beast and the
Sovereign I & II (Séminaire La bête et le souverain 2008-2010) and Nishida Kitarō ’s
essays including “The Standpoint of Active Intuition (行爲的直観の立場 1935), Human
Existence (人間的存在 1938), and “The National Polity (国体 1944).
Through a comparative philosophy of Derrida and Nishida, the paper examines the
interaction between these two concepts of place: place as a locus of violence and place
as space to live together. In doing so, the paper also aims to consider the fallibility of
human thinking and thus of our philosophizing. The pitfall of philosophizing might be
more real than we have admitted, and the venerability of philosophy might demand us
to consider different ways to approach the nature of philosophizing.
PARKER, Kirsty (University of Hawai’i—Hilo)
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“The TMT debate and Mauna Kea: A look at Sacred Places and Indigenous
Epistemologies”
Recently, the TMT debate has revealed the conflict between modern scientific efforts
and alternative indigenous epistemologies. The Thirty Meter Telescope project (TMT) is
a multinational scientific effort to build the world’s largest telescope on the summit of
Mauna Kea, Hawai’i. Underlying this effort is a particular set of philosophical
assumptions about nature as ascribed by the Western scientific tradition. Where
Westernized scientists see easily accessible terrain and superb atmospheric conditions,
the Hawaiian people see a spirited and potent ancestor. For Hawaiians, Mauna Kea is
sacred; the mountain is considered mother of the people and that active force upon
which all Hawaiian life is forged. The Hawaiian protest is not against science, but
rather, against the pending annihilation of a once potent sense of place upon which the
Hawaiian identity had been critically formed. For the Hawaiian people, Mauna Kea is
deserving of unconditional respect, preservation, and kapu (limits) in its own right. As
the community has protested against the TMT development, a serious fault between the
epistemological assumptions of modern science and indigenous peoples has been
illuminated.
This paper will address the need for a re-evaluation of sense of place and indigenous
perspectives within the aims of modern science. Through the TMT debate, we can
understand how development of the mountain serves to evince a Hawaiian sense of
place and spirit from the landscape and that this has political, social and cultural
consequences stretching beyond the mountain. The development serves to confirm that
alternate philosophies of being in the world do not have legitimate claims within the
process of modern advancement. Through the implantation of Western scientific
developments upon indigenous places, indigenous cultures have become polarized
against progress and wrongly associated with irrationality. The global scientific
community should use the TMT debate as a platform for developing a more holistic and
inclusive modern science.
PARKES, Graham, and Helen PARKES (Vienna)
“Being in Place — There’s no App for That!”
A distinctive feature of the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche is his emphasis on the
human body, and a corresponding concern with its relations to the various places it
inhabits. Whether the place he was in was urban or rural, Nietzsche insisted that the
immediate environment has a profound effect on one’s physical and mental health.
Although such ideas may not be so popular these days, they are borne out by recent
discoveries in ‘context-based medicine’ in the West and a 2500- year tradition of
philosophy and medical practice in China. Another way of putting this is to say that if
we’re interested in flourishing, we had better pay attention to our being here.
But aren’t we always here in any case, in the particular place where our bodies are? No,
because when we’re distracted—as in day- dreaming, for example—we aren’t here in
any robust sense, but are rather absent. And indeed one of the major differences
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between Nietzsche’s time and ours, some 150 years later, is that the prevalence of
modern information and communications technology has enormous power to distract us
from being here.
Nowadays television, computers, videogame consoles, tablets, i- gadgets, mobile
phones—all these devices, while purporting to connect us with other people and things
(not to mention with more information than anyone could assimilate in several lifetimes),
serve to distract us from being here by exporting our attention elsewhere.
Most of us accept this situation without question, assuming that all these gadgets are
enhancing rather than diminishing our lives. A consideration of Nietzsche’s ideas about
the importance of place and the nature of our being here allows us to question the value
of our communications technologies and their role in the good human life.
Taking the form of a dialogue between representatives of two generations (one from the
old guard ignorant with respect to social media etc., and one from the tech-savvy avantgarde), this multi-media presentation affords a broader perspective on the question of
how much the advantages of these technologies may be outweighed by the way so
many of them diminish our ability to actually be here.
PAVAN, Milena Carrara (Vivarium, Spain)
“A Pilgrimage to the Sacred Place of Kailash”
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PERKINS, Franklin (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore)
“Affect, Responsiveness, and Place in the Xing Zi Ming Chu”
The idea of stimulation and response (ganying 感應) is well known as a key element of
so-called correlative cosmology and as the dominant model for thinking the dynamic
situatedness of things in the late Warring States Period and the Han Dynasty. One of
the earliest expressions of this model appears in the Guodian text known as the Xing Zi
Ming Chu 性自命出 (Dispositions Come from What Is Allotted) (XZMC). The XZMC
does not present this responsiveness to place as an element of cosmology but rather as
an account of basic human dispositions and affects.
On this model, affects arise as spontaneous responses to the things around us. This
responsiveness is unavoidable and is inherently grounded in place. The project of selfcultivation is not to eliminate this responsiveness but to make our responses more
stable and appropriate. This is done through the creation of a humanized place
structured according to rituals and music. Music in particular creates a space in which
affective responses are evoked and thereby trained and shaped. This paper will
examine the interdependence of XZMC's theory of motivation as responsiveness to our
concrete place and the role of music (and ritual) in self-cultivation. It will also include
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some discussion of how this model does and does not fit the Mengzi.
PETERMAN, James, and Margo SHEA (Sewanee: The University of the South)
“Merging the Private and Public in a Thirdspace: Examining the Civic
Dimensions of Private Place-Making”
We propose a two-person panel in which the first of us (Peterman) examines Wilfred
McClay’s recent introduction to his edited volume, Why Place Matters:
Geography, Identity, and Civic Life in Modern America. (New Atlantis: 2014).
Addressing the question of why place matters from two academic perspectives,
comparative philosophy and public history, the panel addresses the tension between
public and private senses of place and whether the tension between them can be
resolved both conceptually and practically.
Why Place Matters assembles scholarly contributions to two conferences on place at
Pepperdine University in 2011 and 2012 by a range of important scholars and thinkers
about place, including Roger Scruton, Yi-fu Tuan, and Ari Schulman.
In this first discussant, Peterman, a philosopher, examines McClay’s enviably clear
account of why place matters in the introduction to this set of essays. He argues that
place matters because a sense of places, an achievement, grounds the develop of civic
virtues by giving individuals something outside of themselves to care about. Despite the
clarity of this account, which focuses on various ways in which place matters, Peterman
argues, the account runs together different senses of place, including a role in social
institutions that one can identify with and care about, a place as the bearer of personal
significance due to one’s experiences their, and a place as a foundational bearer of
significance within a moral or religious tradition. McClay treats the achievement of a
novel personal sense of place, common in modern societies, as serving these other two
roles. Peterman argues that this is a conceptual mistake, and that we need to
acknowledge both why place matters in traditions because of their role in a tradition,
such as the birthplace of Confucius, in families, connected to traditions or not, as well as
why place matters because of a Daoist-style rambling that takes us to places where
unexpected meanings arise. Peterman argues that this tension between traditionbound senses of place and emergent fluid senses of place is inescapable. This raises
the question of whether and how emergent sense of place could serve the function that
McClay gives them: to ground the civic virtues by offering public spaces we care about
and wish to nurture.
In the second discussion, Shea, a pubic historian, builds from Peterman’s efforts to
draw from Wilfred McClay’s arguments for why place matters in order to situate senses
of place both between and beyond traditions and personal meanings. Specifically, she
picks up with Peterman’s assertion that McClay’s phenomenology of place privileges
social, cultural and political underpinnings without making space for the importance
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of “cultivating private sense(s) of place, unburdened by the goals of grafting our senses
of place and places to a tradition.”
This second discussion introduces an ongoing project in public history, which offers a
model of how to cultivate a sense places(s) that is both fluid and can support civic
virtue. That project, called, “Around Here: The Places that Shape Us” is a crowdsourced, searchable, accessible catalogue of places – large and small, private and
public, personal and shared that matter to people who live, work and recreate on and
around the South Cumberland Plateau, locally referred to simply as “the mountain,” in
south-central Tennessee.
This discussion will show how this pubic history project does three significant things in
order to render place attachment, place-making and sense of place meaningful from a
civic perspective. Through participation of any local residents with an interest, it invites
a greater understanding of the role of place as touchstones of moral traditional
processes on the mountain and explores how place matters in relation to local people’s
efforts to maintain tradition, community and social order. Second, it invites individuals
to share their own encounters with place and to expand place-making practice on the
mountain to allow for enigmatic, unique and deeply personal experiences of
place. Finally, the project itself practices pubic history, in Professor of Urban Planning
Edward Soja’s term, in a thirdspace -- a conceptual space that not only mediates
between individual and community, private and public, but also functions to expand the
notion of public space to include the private and private space to include the public.
PETERS, Jill (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
“The Place of Buddhist Ethics in Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR)”
Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction is based upon the idea that our way of relating to
the world leads us to generate stress within ourselves and this relation can be
transformed through Buddhist mindfulness and insight meditation. This paper enquires
how Buddhist ethics can be applied in the conceptualization of MBSR.
The applied Buddhist practices have emerged from a health-paradigm that defines
health as an experience of wellbeing that can be reached when one is no longer
attached to the manifestation of pleasure or pain. MBSR aims to change our
relationship to the experience of suffering. According to the Buddhist idea of the web of
interdependence, all natural historical and cultural factors are perceived as relational. In
Buddhism, perceiving strain from the outside is interpreted as a lack of insight. Such a
shortage in understanding can be replenished by cultivating its counterpart, virtue.
This paper proposes pragmatically employing the idea of skillful means,
kusala upaya, as an overarching principle to apply the elusive abstractions of ethical
theories to the practice of MBSR. Kusala means right or wholesome or skillful, referring
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to states generated by wisdom. Kusala upaya is used to indicate a perception of
competent appliance to help others and oneself.
Based upon the idea of kusala upaya, this paper proposes the term stress mastery. It is
this ethic that gives MBSR the potential to change the clinical practice of stress
treatment. The practice of MBSR offers a hermeneutics of interdependence to
understand the experience of stress. Employing kusala upaya in MBSR means one can
become proficient in handling stress, and in acting with great skill, one can master
stress.
PFISTER, Lauren F. (Hong Kong Baptist University)
“Ubication: A Phenomenological Study about Making Spaces Sacred”
One aspect in the general realm of the philosophy of religion that continues to spark my
interest has been the delineation of particular locations as “sacred places”. While noting
the seminal work on sacred spaces by Mircea Eliade and its “magnificent failure” (Roger
Corless, 2001), there have been efforts to revive, revise, and extrapolate his
phenomenology in general (Allan W. Larson, 2001) and his theory related to sacred
spaces in particular (David Cave, 1993 and 2001). I have continued to sense that there
is a theoretical gap within Eliade’s and others’ related accounts that lacks a dynamism
allowing for changes or even transformations within different kinds and/or varying levels
of special configuration. Eliade’s account offered an ontological claim about the
sacredness of places built upon historical cases and mythical accounts that sought to
underscore the perennial character of religious sites, but it remained vulnerable to
criticisms that point toward the secularization or re-claiming of sacred spaces for secular
purposes as counterexamples to his general position.
Rather than follow Eliade’s and his co-laborers’ theoretical approach, I intend to present
a phenomenological account of sacredness that could support a more dynamic account
of “making places sacred”. Building upon a Tillichean account of religious experience as
an expression of an ultimate concern for an ultimate subject (Lai Pan-chiu, 2015), I will
present an account of multi-leveled cultural spaces that may be “made sacred” by
various means as expressed in contemporary Buddhist, Christian, Daoist, Muslim and
Ruist contexts experienced in Hong Kong and other parts of the PRC. I intend to
describe how different levels of cultural embodiment and identification – starting from
one’s own body (Cave and Sachs, 2012), and then extending into personal and familial
spaces, spaces created for religious communities, cultural spaces involving both the
living and the dead, as well as universally extended accounts of limited and/or unlimited
“space” – can bring about temporal or more enduring expressions of “ubication”, my
neologism for “making spaces sacred” (Pfister, 2007).
Having adopted a phenomenological approach to the set of problems that arise in
accounting for ubication within the broader post-secular philosophical contexts in the
PRC (Pfister, 2012), I will conclude with some critical reflections about this whole
approach. First, there is a need to offer similar accounts of “making times sacred”
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(“quandication”) to augment a phenomenological account of ubication, because the
cultural time-spaces in which religious life is expressed are only analytically served by
separating cultural times from cultural spaces, but actually “take place” within well-timed
cultural settings. Consequently, a more precise phenomenological account of ubication
should include quandication in order to stretch toward a comprehensive account of how
“making spaces sacred” are also linked to sacred times and timing. Secondly, I would
want to argue that the limits inherent in phenomenological methods may hinder an
adequate philosophical account of cultural contexts where conflictual settings produce
what appear to be anomalous situations: when religious attitudes are nevertheless
expressed in secular/profane/mundane places, and also when secular or profane
attitudes are expressed in what others consider to be sacred places. Thirdly, due to my
reliance on a Tillich-ian account of sacredness, there will always be an elusive element
in the subjective states of participants in “making spaced sacred” that can only be
resolved in part by reliable first person accounts of these experiences.
I will argue that these first person testimonies can still become phenomenologically
constructive and theorized reflectively on the basis of a Tillich-ian understanding of
religious orientation, but will make sense only within the culturally-informed contexts of
the particular religious traditions being described.
POLLIN-GALAY, Hannah (University of Pennsylvania)
“When the Index is Wrong: Mapping Black Holes in Victim Memory”
Notions of place lie at the heart of Holocaust discourse and constitute one of the central
forums for debating what the event was about, how it happened and how it should be
studied and remembered. On the one hand, scholars often refer to spatial dimensions
when defining the event as Holocaust as trauma or transvaluation. They have enlisted
images such as “an abyss,” “a black hole,” “eine andere Lokalität” (another locality),” “a
primal scene,” “a blank page” and “a lost spatial center.” While not identical, these
metaphors all evoke a cluster of similar qualities—emptiness, absence, foreignness—all
of which create a geographic register for the Holocaust that is separate from that of
normal life. To claim that the Holocaust somehow created “non-places” is to define the
event as somehow unknowable, un-navigable morally, in excess of human memory and
a sharp rift in its victims horizon of expectations.
However, the idea of the Holocaust as a ‘non-place’—an event that stripped away
cultural and aesthetic tools of spatial understanding—has frustrated other scholars, who
claim that such motifs obscure the specificity of events as they happened and possibly
fetishize aporia. In recent years, scholars and educational organizations have engaged
in focused empirical efforts to counteract the foggy image of Holocaust geography. For
example, the Shoah Foundation launched a map function in 2012, which allows the
viewer to follow the precise longitude and latitude of the witness at every moment of the
testimony. The Foundation has, quite literally, attempted to emplace Holocaust
narratives, to convey that it happened on a real topography. What does big data
mapping do to our understanding of mass violence? What are other kinds of
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cartography that we kind draw from the sources, and what are the larger philosophical
assertions undergirding them?
This panel seeks to open up this tension from a variety of disciplinary and theoretical
perspectives. Hannah Pollin-Galay (Judaic Studies, University of Pennsylvania) will
present a paper entitled, “When the Index is Wrong: Mapping Black Holes in Victim
Memory.” She explores how Holocaust victims verbally reconstruct their spatial
experiences as concentration camp prisoners in first-person testimony, pointing out the
cross-cultural abundance of moments in which they recall a sense of radical physical
disorientation. While far from uniform, the memory of having been in a ‘non-place’
appears over and over again. She reads these moments through the semiotic terms of
Charles Sanders Peirce. If a scientific map makes an assertion of indexicality—a
material, physical measurement from one object to another—then these witnesses
experience their oppression as a suspension of such knowledge. Pollin-Galay compares
how survivor-witnesses present this physical estrangement (or indexical downfall) in
various contemporary discursive settings.
POWELL, John W. (Humboldt State University)
“Justification of War Is Not the Issue”
Why have philosophers not made more progress regarding war? In particular, in the
debate between those who develop and advocate just war theory and those who
advocate pacifism, why has just war theory mainly served as an enabler of war and why
has pacifism’s voice been growing weaker?
I blame both sides. Just war theory, though presently motivated in large part by a
desire to reduce war crimes and atrocities, has suffered from an inflated notion of theory
and moral authority which have proven to be largely impotent. Pacifism, even when
taken narrowly as a position against war, has portrayed war as though it is an issue with
clean boundaries, separable from the world’s largest and most grim issues. Both, then,
have misled their audiences. Both underestimate how much war is entangled in a grim
fabric of contemporary global issues regarding the relations of human beings to each
other and to the natural world. Addressing war as a problem requires more than
centers for study of war, or war colleges run by military authorities, or U.N. resolutions
or peacekeepers. As Freud remarks about love, war is not on a separate page.
Coming to terms with war will involve coming to terms with greed and bigotry and
nationalism. But coming to terms with war also will require coming to terms with
philosophical mistakes, including assumptions about what persons are which make
empathy more remote a possibility because theoretically inexplicable. And it will have
to dig more deeply than contemporary efforts to decide whether war is justifiable or not.
In 1915 Bertrand Russell at 42 published a short essay entitled “The Ethics of War”
which can be read now in large part as making a case that war is intolerable whether
justified or not. Further, it is easy to show that the main terrible accompaniments and
consequences of war are still made manifest whether just war theory guides our actions
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or not. This calls for a cross-examination. We philosophers have concentrated on the
issue of whether war is justifiable or not, with the idea that if it is then pacifism is
untenable. This turns out to have been dust in our eyes. We are better off to think
harder about main contributing factors to war, and to point those out to philosophers
and to others who may through teaching reduce their power or influence. Justifications
will show up on that list. But such things as bigotry and greed and unthinking
nationalisms, racism, impaired empathy, the seductive ideologies of true believers,
exaggerated individualism, utter ignorance of moral issues, ignorance indeed of the
surrounding world, are also clearly and powerfully on the list. Knowledge of these
factors and parents and schools and colleges who deliberately draw attention to them
may have more of an effect in reducing the appeal of war that James Hillman (in The
Terrible Love of War) attributes to, among other things, our lack of other resources for
feeling intimately our connections with life and being.
PRABHU, Joseph (California State University, Los Angeles)
“The Dialectic of Topos and Universality in Panikkar’s Hermeneutics”
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PRIEST, Graham (CUNY Graduate Center/University of Melbourne, Australia)
“Marxism and Buddhism: Not so Strange Bedfellows”
Marxism and Buddhism might seem unlikely bedfellows. However, they have at least
this much in common. Both say that contemporary life is unsatisfactory. Both have a
diagnosis of why this is. Both offer hope of making it better. Buddhism has always been
strong on ethics, its ground and its rationale; generally speaking, it is weak on political
theory. By contrast Marxism has always been strong on political theory, but weak on an
articulation of ethics. In this talk, I will show how aspects of Buddhist ethics and aspects
of Marx’ critique of capitalism are mutually complementary, and can be combined to
produce a much more rounded picture.
PURI, Bindu (Jawahrlal Nehru University, India)
“Transforming Sacred Space into Shared Place: Gandhi and Ambedkar on
Temple Entry”
This paper looks at confrontations about sacred spaces that were open to a select,
rather chosen, few. In this context it examines an issue which was one of the points of
contention in the debate between Gandhi and Ambedkar-temple entry. The discussion
moves from these confrontations to re-constructions of the confrontations in the
memories of the excluded and oppressed. In this context the paper examines the
memory and re-interpretation of arguments made by Gandhi and Ambedkar around
temple entry in the work of two contemporary dalit scholars Gopal Guru and the late D.
R Nagraj.
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The paper attempts to use the debate about temple entry between Gandhi and
Ambedkar and indeed, between the caste Hindu reformer, the oppressive upper caste
Hindu self and the oppressed classes, to bring out the significance of transforming
sacred space into shared place. This significance is philosophically unpacked in terms
of the role played by such transformations in helping divided communities break out of
the hermeutics of suspicion. It also brings out the importance of the significance
retrospectively attached to the role played by those who attempted to recover and
transform sacred space in terms of locating a moment of trust. This moment of trust is
important because the hermeneutics of suspicion paralyses not only the practise of
communication in politics but also the possibilities of understanding in social science
theory.
It is hoped that the philosophical foray into this aspect of the debate between Gandhi
and Ambedkar would bring out the significance of the relationship between space,
experience justice and trust.
RAGHUNATH, Thill (College of Southern Nevada)
“After Snowden: The US Surveillance State and the ‘Place of the Personal’”
This paper draws from the work of courageous and dissident American journalists
Glenn Greenwald, Robert Scheer, and Chris Hedges, who were all inspired by the
heroism of Edward Snowden and his revelations on the draconian NSA methods of
gathering personal data on individuals en masse , on the US surveillance state and its
corporate colluders. It explores the implications of this expanding surveillance state for
our constitutionally guaranteed, but severely threatened “place of the personal”, or
privacy, on the internet and elsewhere. The interrelations among the triadic values of
privacy, freedom, and human dignity, will be explored and the case for the view that the
US surveillance state undermines these foundations of “the place of the personal” will
be examined.
RAJU, C. K. (Centre for Studies in Civilisations, Delhi, India)
“The Place called India”
For the Greeks, Inde or Hind was the land on the other side of the Indus or Sindhu river.
For William Jones it was land spread up to Cambodia (Kambhoj), where the ruined
temples of Angkor Wat still attract hordes of tourists. For K. M. Munshi and others it was
and is Akhand Bharat, and includes all the places from Kandahar to Sri Lanka,
mentioned in the epics. Which is it?
The answer is important since the notion of the place called India is a potential cause of
tension today. The parting blow of colonialism was to partition the former India, and two
of the resulting nations are today nuclear armed and hostile to each other.
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The concept of India is also needed to understand Indian history. We cannot just
proceed with present-day political boundaries, for political boundaries are ephemeral on
a historical time scale, expanding or contracting with each war. Bangladesh did not exist
50 years ago, and a 100 years ago, both Dhaka and Lahore were very much part of
India. Surely, Mohenjodaro is part of Indian history?
Can India then be understood in religious terms a la Toynbee? That is problematic,
because a multiplicity of religions have always flourished in India. Should India, then, be
understood in racial terms, as in the Aryan race thesis which sought to divide India into
Aryans and Dravidians?
This paper will address these questions and provide a new answer.
RAUD, Rein (University of Helsinki, Finland/Tallinn University, Estonia)
“Spatiality and the Praxis of Being in Dōgen’s Sansuikyō”
A strong consciousness of place has been a characteristic feature of Japanese
cultural practices from ancient times to the present day. Notions of
embeddedness and betweenness, derived from the attitudes toward nature and
the sacred of the Japanese indigenous worldview have interacted with Buddhist
concepts of reality and subjectivity to form a cultural framework that has shaped
both Japanese social practice and philosophical thought, in which, in modern
times, “place” has even been elevated by Nishida Kitarō into one of the central
categories of his system. But this move has a long history behind it.
My paper will look at how the relations between spatiality/nature and the praxis of being
are viewed in the thought of Dōgen (1200-1253), in particular the Sansuikyō fascicle of
the Shōbōgenzō. Elsewhere in his work, Dōgen has developed a theory of Buddhanature as the fundamental characteristic of all being and in this text he conjoins this
theory with a non-dualist view of nature. Sansuikyō, or “Mountains and waters sutra”
also deals with the textualising of landscape — with the construction of culturally
domesticated nature out of nature “out there”, resulting in the loss of an authentic view
of things as they are.
Antedating landscape theorists such as Dennis Cosgrove and Anne Cauquelin, Dōgen
strongly articulates the view that “nature” becomes “landscape” through the assertion of
a particular, personal perspective, which limits the experience of it. One way to read the
text is precisely as an attempt to approximate praxis/enlightenment to a direct approach
to nature and reality bypassing their conceptualisations, achieved from within, not from
without the environment with which the subject interacts. The paper will present several
close readings of key passages and analyse them in the broader context of Dōgen’s
work.
RAVEH, Daniel (Tel Aviv University, Israel)
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“Body as Place: A Short Philosophical Improvisation”
The nearest and most essential place in which we live, or dwell, or simply are, is the
body, the human body, my body. The short improvisation proposed here attempts to
look into selfhood, subjectivity and the body. I work with the famous hagiographic
episode of Śaṅkara in the king's body (in Mādhava's 17th or even 18th century
Śaṅkara-digvijaya). This captivating story (consisting of suspense, humor, and even
implicit erotica) raises questions about identity and identification, embodiment and
disembodiment, borders and border-crossing, knowledge of body and body of
knowledge.
I intend to read and think of the story through three contemporary Indian philosophical
essays - Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's chapters on the subjectivity of the body (in his
acclaimed treatise "The Subject as Freedom", 1930), Badrinath Shukla's "Dehātmavāda
or the Body as Soul: Exploration of a Possibility within Nyāya Thought" (1988), and
Daya Krishna's "The Realms of Between" (1995). Each of these thinkers, in his own
way and context, provides us with a lucid insight into what it means to be (in) a body.
Finally, I will make a brief visit to Patañjali of the Yogasūtra and his commentators, to
look at two sūtras which speak of the capacity of "entering" someone else's body (YS
3.39) and mind (YS 3.19). Technical as Patañjali is, speaking of these extra-ordinary
capacities in the same matter-of-factness as one would currently talk about changing
the bulb in the kitchen, he nevertheless provides yet another vantage point from which
to reflect upon the (dis)connection of self and body.
RO, Young-chan (George Mason University)
“Experience of Space: Dialogical Dialogue of Cosmologies in Panikkar”
Raimon Panikkar, one of the pioneers of intercultural dialogue, developed the idea of
“dia-topical hermeneutics” to explore the significance of “place” (topos) in understanding
and interpreting religious and cultural traditions. For Panikkar, “place” or “space” plays a
critical role in “understanding” and “interpretation” by crossing different geographical
boundaries, cultural contexts, and religious traditions of the world. According to
Panikkar, “dia-chronical hermeneutics,” interpretation across different periods of time
through history within a socio-religious and cultural tradition, is commonly practiced,
however, we are now facing a new challenge to cross the cultural regions, and
geographical territories and relate different cultural “places” in order to engage in
intercultural dialogue.
In light of Raimon Panikkar’s “dia-topical” approach, the panel will discuss the following
topics: 1. The significance of “place” in “understanding” and “interpretation” of religious
and cultural traditions. 2. Finding the importance of “dia-topical” approach in engaging in
the interpretation of different religions, cultures, and civilizations. 3. Discovering different
cosmologies found in different cultures and religions, and engaging in a cross-cultural
dialogue and a “dia-topical” interpretation. One’s way of relating to “space” shapes one’s
way of understanding the universe or the cosmos, beyond a mere scientific cosmology,
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what Panikkar calls “kosmology.” 4. The panel will also explore a broader and larger
implication of Panikkar’s thoughts in relating to how the idea of “space” shapes the
concept of “time.”
ROBBIANO, Chiara (Utrecht University, The Netherlands)
“The Foregrounded Background: The Undivided Place in Parmenides, Śańkara
and Contemporary Phenomenologists”
A fundamental reality prior to any division, description, or opinion.
Both Parmenides (5th cent. BCE) and Śaṅkara (8th cent. CE) and contemporary
phenomenologists refer to a fundamental reality that is prior to and contrasted with
divisions, descriptions, opinions, stories we tell. I will look at similarities in the ways
ancient and contemporary philosophers refer to the presumed fundamental reality,
focussing especially on the spatial metaphors they use.
Words: deceptive and transformative.
A problem faced by ancient and contemporary philosophers alike is that words seem
unsuited to refer to the supposed fundamental reality, which is undivided. Parmenides
and Śaṅkara tell us that words, even their own, can be “deceptive”, since they make us
believe in the reality of the boundaries they trace around the items they describe by
distinguishing each item from all the rest (Parmenides, DK B8,52, Śaṅkara, BSB II,1,27).
Luckily, words can also be transformative (Robbiano 2006). They may trigger a
realization that reveals how all divisions pointed to by words are fundamentally unreal
(Ganeri 2007).
Distinctions that do not point to ontological separations.
Whereas words are always carriers of distinctions, distinctions do not always point to
ontological separations. For instance, Parmenides distinguishes being from ‘knowing’,
‘being aware’ (noeîn), but does not regard them as separate: being is the same as
noeîn (DK B3), which does not mean ‘having mental states with cognitive contents’:
cognitive contents are secondary; they are fruit of human words and opinions (DK B8,
38-41). Śaṅkara explicitly states that the self is the only fundamental certainty one can
have and nobody can deny (BSB I.1.1), whereas every further elaboration on it is
superimposition. Superimpositions are clearly distinguished from the self, but not
separated from it: there is not separate, second reality next to the self (ātman) that is
Brahman.
Same words for Śaṅkara’s self, Parmenides’ being and pre-reflective selfconsciousness.
Especially intriguing is that Parmenides (cf. especially DK B8, 1-49) and Śaṅkara use
words and phrases that are very similar to the ones used by 20th and 21st century
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phenomenologists to refer to pre-reflective self-consciousness: an ubiquitous selfawareness that accompanies all mental states and makes them possible (Zahavi 2006,
125). Such self-consciousness is more fundamental than any experiential content
(Gallagher 2000, 15 in Krueger 2010, 38), unchangeable and constant (Zahavi 2005,
132, in Krueger 2010, 47), invariant (Tagini & Raffone 2010), unitary and continuous
(Zahavi 2010, 76). It might possibly be quite invulnerable (Damasio 1999, 118, in
Krueger, 2010, 40) and with no boundaries (Albahari 2010, 81-82). It might also be nonindividualized: Ganeri among others has pointed out that pre-reflexive selfconsciousness fails to individuate thinkers (Siderits, Thompson & Zahavi 2010, 21) and
“is somewhat akin to the impersonal Advaitic ātman, present equally in all” (Ganeri
2010, 182).
The foregrounded background: spatial metaphors.
One of the things that distinctions can do when used by philosophers that want to point
to an undivided reality is foregrounding what is usually in the background (Sokolowski
1998, 516-518). Foregrounding the fundamental background can be attempted by
means of spatial metaphors that suggest lack of divisions and continuity of reality
across what seem to be boundaries. E.g. Śaṅkara suggests that our self is like ether or
space (ākāṡa), which is the same notwithstanding its apparent enclosure in jars and
pots: we are fundamentally self (ātman) that is Brahman, but we mistakenly identify with
our different bodies and minds (BSB. I.1,5; BSB I,2,6). E.g. Parmenides visualises being
as undivided and safely protected as if by an ultimate boundary (peîras pumatón, DK
B8,42), i.e. a limit which does not separate two domains but whose function is to signal
the invulnerability of what is inside, since there is nothing outside, which could endanger
it. Pre-reflexive self-consciousness is also prone to spatial metaphors: it can be
visualized in terms of “background”, “one coherent space”, which is not separated from
the single experiences, like space is not separated —only distinguished— from objects
in space (Fasching 2010, 204-206). Pre-reflexive self-consciousness, just as
Parmenides’ being, which is noeîn, and Śaṅkara’s self, which is Brahman, can be
foregrounded and pointed to as an undivided space, which is prior to —and on neither
side of— the distinction between subject and object, since it is the condition of this and
any other distinction.
ROBINSON, David P. (Curry College)
“A Place within Uechi-Ryu”
The notion of place is one that affects the worlds of the individual and the interpersonal.
Place is a sense of belonging and connection and can be experienced through physical
location, community, and within the self. Traditional martial arts engage these very
concepts. This paper will explore the topic of place as it relates to the philosophic and
spiritual traditions inherent in the study of Uechi Ryu karate-do. The cultural and
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spiritual perspectives of Okinawa are incorporated in to the training precepts of karatedo such as the concept of “no first attack” and “respect” being intrinsic to the process.
The goal of this work is to effectively articulate the value of such a study and to
demonstrate its applicability and value beyond the practical methods of self-defense
and towards the aim of creating a positive and useful personal place. The development
of this system, and its philosophy, has taken root across the world, allowing for many
students to find their own place within this style. Particular attention will be paid to the
way this notion of place has been challenged and developed as Uechi Ryu has spread
globally. This work will use the author’s experiences as a practitioner of Uechi Ryu as a
framework for engaging this topic.
ROMANO, Carlin (Ursinus College)
“Long-Distance Love as Philosophical Place: What Hu Shi Learned from Edith
Clifford Williams”
In 2009, Susan Chan Egan and Chih-p’ing Chou published A Pragmatist and His Free
Spirit: The Half-Century Romance of Hu Shi and Edith Clifford Williams (Chinese
University of Hong King), a biographical account that opened up the little-known love
affair of Hu Shi and Williams to the world. Between 1914 and 1962, they exchanged
some 300 letters in which they both challenged and dissected each other’s ideas.
Hu Shi (1891-1962) needs little introduction. Sometimes called "the father of the
Chinese Renaissance," he was Dewey's most prominent Chinese disciple, as well as an
enormously important and influential force in the turmoil of the early 20th century. As
President of Peking University, he became one of the founders of China's modern
educational system and a champion of everyday speech as a legitimate form of
intellectual communication. In the Mao years, he was denounced for his promotion of
independent, experimental thinking.
Edith Clifford Williams (1885-1971) is much less well known. An avant-garde painter,
Ithaca native, and long-term veterinary librarian at Cornell University, she met Hu Shi
when he was a student at Cornell. Their love affair began in the early 1930s.
In my presentation, which will include a serious analytic interpretation of the material
provided in A Pragmatist and His Free Spirit, I’ll examine how this at times tortured
relationship, born in romantic idealism but tempered by the reality of their times, helped
form Hu Shi’s idiosyncratic worldview and peculiar version of pragmatism.
ROSENLEE, Li-Hsiang Lisa (University of Hawaii – West Oahu)
“The Place of Friendship in Spousal Relationship: You 友 and Philia”
This paper intends to propose a hybrid conceptual paradigm incorporating both
Confucian you 友 and Greek philia to replace the spousal relationship. So in response
to the question of “What is a spouse for?” the answer is friendship. And in rethinking
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spousal relationship as a hybridized Confucian you 友 with a blend of Greek philia, the
functionary and oppressive aspects of marriage are thus made incompatible with this
friendship based marital union. At the same time, by incorporating marital relationship
into friendship, the concept of friendship is made ever more perfect. Just as in a good
marriage both spouses are lifted up by their marital union, the union between marriage
and friendship uplifts both conceptually as well.
Spouses, in short, should be best friends who lead one another to moral goodness
through mutual cutting and polishing one’s critical moral sense with penetrating
understanding and enduring faith, and the spousal relationship, in turn, is also the best
friendship that is perpetual and complete in its form and content by building a truly
shared life with all aspects of human capacities, eros and all. In short, a feminist
marriage should be a marriage of moral friendship and passionate love. It is a new
conceptual paradigm of marriage that is made in a Confucian image for feminists; it is
also a practical feminist paradigm that we mortals can strive for and realize in our
human all-too-human life.
SAAL, Britta (University of Vienna, Austria)
“About the Taking Place of Intercultural Philosophy”
With the emergence of comparative and especially intercultural philosophy in the late
1980s it has been claimed that philosophy can no longer be equated with European
philosophy, but that there are rather multiple philosophies in different cultural places in
the world. The Indian-German philosopher Ram Adhar Mall speaks here about the
simultaneous “situated unsituatedness” (orthafte Ortlosigkeit) of philosophy, since the
philosophia perennis – the everlasting and therefore placeless philosophy – only
appears embedded in different cultural places. Very similarly, the Canadian philosopher
Bruce Janz developed the concept of “philosophy-in-place”, by which he points out that
philosophy always happens in places and how this matters especially in the African
context. Considering now that the notion ‘intercultural’ indicates a space: the ‘inter’, and
considering the above mentioned emphases on place concerning philosophy, my
question here is: Where, in which place in this inter-space, does intercultural philosophy
take place? And how does it take place?
To answer this question I first like to distinguish between the dimension of the
intercultural – that means the cultural places –, and the dimension of the intercultural –
that means the places of encounter, engagement, and negotiation in the inter-space. It
is here, where philosophy as an activity takes place(s) in form of (a) polylogue(s). That
is to say, the place of intercultural philosophizing is a place in the inter-space which
arises in the very moment of taking it. To further elaborate this, I will refer to Peter
Sloterdijk’s “coming-to-the-world” (Zur-Welt-kommen) as well as to Stuart Halls
“positioning”. Thus, in relation to Mall’s “situated unsituatedness” of philosophy and
Janz’ “philosophy-in-place” I suggest the “taking place” of polylogical philosophizing to
denote intercultural philosophy first and foremost as an activity marked by a processual
and common practice.
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SALLIS, John (Boston College)
“The Protoplaces of Philosophy”
This discourse takes as its point of departure the double sense of the phrase "the
place of philosophy," namely that it designates both the place or abode in which
philosophical thought is enacted and the concept of place that comes to be
formulated through such thought. The place of philosophy in these senses is
considered in such philosophers as Plato, Emerson, and Rousseau. Attention is
given finally to enchorial space and to its attestation in Chinese thought and art.
SALTZMAN, Judy D. (California Polytechnic State University)
“Desire Nothing: Nirvana is Nowhere”
The Diamond Sutra (Vajrachchedika) like many Mahayana Sutras, is filled with
paradoxes. The thesis of this essay is to discuss it’s teaching that the Srotapati (Stream
Winner) who takes the Dharma (Path) is taught to desire nothing, not even the Nirvana,
the spiritual liberation of all beings. For even this desire is a focus on the illusory self
(anatman)-- leading someone to some place is Sunyata (Empty). Even to desire not to
desire is Empty, because it is still a desire. This presentation will demonstrate that,
although it is impossible not to desire, it is possible to give up desires for personal
aggrandizement, and clinging to a doctrinal idea that following the Dharma perfectly will
help you to lead others to Nirvana. This state is in reality nowhere and no place. The
Buddha is already here within each being who is no permanent being at all, but the
result of Skandas. The Diamond Sutra gives us hope, if we can comprehend its
teachings.
At the beginning of the Sutra, the Venerable Subhubti asks the Buddha, How should
men and women who set out on the Bodhisttva Path progress, and how should they
control their thoughts?” The essence of the Buddha’s answer is that that although
countless beings have been led to Nirvana, no being at all has been led to Nirvana. The
Bodhisattva who is enlightened does not know it, for to think that he/she has attained a
physical place; a spiritual plane of mind, or having no mind at all is a delusion. Even the
Buddha fields of the Pure Land Sutra are not serene Buddha fields. Also, the Buddha
teaches that even The Prajnaparamita, The Perfection of Wisdom, is not perfection.
One who thinks he has attained Perfection of Wisdom, or The Buddha fields is not
there, and has attained nothing.
However, in speaking of the Dharma, the Buddha says, “Wherever this discourse is
taught, Subhuti, that place on earth is worthy of veneration by the whole world with its
gods, men and Asuras. That place is like a shrine in which flowers and incense are
offered. That place is the Diamond Heart; it cannot be attained simply by intellectual
means. Furthermore, even if a Bodhisattva offers all treasures, which are made of
dharmas (elemental constituents), he/she would gain immeasurable merit, yet no merit.
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Dana (Charity) must be offered, without knowing it is Dana. No being has been led to
Nirvana. The Dharma is Adharma, because on the Path, one is always at the place
where he/she is going. Each person is the Path itself.
SATO, Maki (University of Tokyo, Japan)
“In Between Time and Space (the Infinite and the Finite): ‘Histo-topo-philia’”
A common understanding shared among global society, based on scientific discoveries
and research investigations, that humans are the cause of global environmental
problems urges and calls for action to actively respond to the changing environment
(climate change per se). However recent developments in studies of the global history,
provides us with a longer and wider perspective of the relationship of humans and
nature, identifying humans have faced drastic climate changes in our Anthropocene
history. Though we have to humbly admit that there still remains uncertainties in the
scientific findings due to our short-sightedness and blindness in how humans
scientifically conceive nature, we cannot ignore the latest scientific findings. In this
regard, the question arises: How can we build an optimal relationship between humans
and nature under the given constraints of infinite time and finite space?
The author has been working on the concept of “Histo-topo-philia” by proposing and
highlighting the importance of identifying and caring a meaningful place (or placefulplace vis-a-vis placeless-place) in our everyday life environment, rather than protecting
particular places such as national parks. However, it is seemingly impossible to build an
optimal mutual relationship with the nature only by addressing the importance and the
idea of “care” (sorge) to everyday place we live. How can we build an optimal mutual
relationship with our surrounding everyday environment to live our everyday lives in
resonance and mutuality with the surrounding others in nature, and to realize us
humans as a member of (a part of) the natural world? Is the idea of “care” sufficient
enough as the bases to build such mutual relationships with living and non-living things
in the world? By touching upon the notion of morphism in Zhuangzi and the idea of care
by Heidegger, the paper is going to elaborate on the idea of “Histo-topo-philia” by
considering the present world as a place where the spatial and temporal is unified.
SELLMANN, James (University of Guam)
“Place, Position and Perspective: A Classical Daoist World View and Physiology”
In this paper I argue that Classical Daoist philosophy, especially Zhuangzi’s worldview,
offers a unique understanding of place. For classical Daoists, existing in a place puts a
creature in a position that results in a certain limited perspective. Daoist physiology, by
means of meditation, teaches people to “walk both ways” (Zhuangzi 4/2/40, Watson p.
41). Walking both ways provides a new position in their placement thereby expanding
peoples’ perspectives. As Laozi says, “we can know the world without going out the
door; we can see the way-making of nature without looking out the window …” (Laozi,
47). With the right training that activates their neurophysiology, Daoists develop the
ability to take different positions to discover new perspectives regarding their place in
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the world. These new perspectives also allow them to gain insights into the position and
perspective of other creatures and people.
SHAINDLIN, Peter Shaindlin (Author and COO, Halekulani Hotel)
“From Ancient Wisdoms to Modern Mediated Spaces: Relationship between
Meaning and Action”
This panel collects works from four disciplines: literature, journalism, and philosophy
and language education. Yet when place is “superimposed” on these projects, we are
immediately transcended into a common space where time and place, ancient and
modern, flow in a continuum between past, present and future that breaks the boundary
of disciplines. The four papers seem to be in agreement on the notions of: 1) time/space
coupling; 2) soft boundaries of meaning-making constrained and afforded by modern
developments and technology advancement; 3) seeming correspondence between
ancient Chinese philosophers and Marx and Heidegger’s concepts of time and being,
even though Chinese philosophers’ yin-yang balance on place implies both being and
moving.
Another underlying notion implicit in the emergent theme is the notion of care: 1) Tuan’s
notion of “fields of care”, 2) Hodges’s theory of language as “caring system”, and 3)
Heidegger’s Dasein as “Being is carried out and guided by the care of to be”. To relate
care to Chinese philosopher’s “highest good”, Dao/the way implies the incessant being
and becoming with the world. The four papers explore being and becoming with the
world and relationally tie place within and with other things through Chinese classics,
geolocation media, identity construction, and values realization.
The discussant Peter Shaindlin embodies the philosophy of the panel in that his identity
speaks to what the four paper tries to reveal: A Dasein being/philosopher in action in
place. Peter Shaindlin: though not an academic is an autodidactic philosopher, cultural
critic, novelist, photographer, musician, poet and COO.
SHANER, David (Furman University)
“Hei-Sei-Ji: The Place of Peace (A Case Study in the Mind of a Temple’s Sense of
‘Place’)”
This multi-media presentation would use photos and videos that document the “spatial”
movement of Hei-Sei-Ji from Nagoya, Japan to Furman University located in the
southeastern United States (Greenville, SC). This five year project occasioned a
magnificent cultural transformation characterized by a new sense of identity and “place”
for what was once a conservative Southern Baptist University. Today Hei-SeiJi (trans. "The Place of Peace") is the University’s iconic centerpiece for international
education.
The identity and sense of place at Furman University was almost immediately
transformed by shear difference, as it were, as people witnessed the re-construction
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process and tools used by the Japanese master temple artisans who specialized (and
socialized) in three distinct groups (wood, tile, and plaster). On September 8, 2008 The
Place of Peace was formally celebrated by the local southern (and international)
communities. At this time Hei-Sei-Ji was formally dedicated as The Place of Peace in a
ceremony facilitated by the presenter. Since 2008, The Place of Peace has been
utilized as the university center for bodymind education where a faculty approved
course (PHL 202: "Realizing Bodymind" Jp. Shinshin Toitsudo) is offered that also
satisfies the university general education “Wellness” requirement.
SHAPIRO, Gary (University of Richmond)
“Atmospheres and Diagrams: A Preface to Geoaesthetics”
In this time of accelerating global environmental change, the arts have
opportunities both to clarify the problematic situation of dwelling on the earth
and to create heterotopias, or other places, that exemplify fruitful, aesthetically
satisfying modes of inhabitation. I will explore some possibilities offered by land
art – broadly including parks, gardens, earthworks, environmental surrounds and
the like – in staging such heterotopias. I draw on the work of both older and
contemporary artists and thinkers (e.g. 18th century British gardens and
picturesque theory, Olafur Eliasson and Peter Sloterdijk). The talk articulates the
strong interrelations of the concepts of atmosphere and diagram for a
constructive aesthetics of place. I take atmosphere as involving both affective
and physical poles; taking clues from Foucault and Deleuze, I understand the
effective diagram of a constructed place to involve not only architectural design
but the effective disposition and enabling of energies and perspectives.
SHEN, Vincent (University of Toronto, Canada)
“The Manifestation of Dao in Urban Places”
In this paper, I will make explicit my understanding of the meaning of the urban life as
manifesting dao, combining phenomenological concept of the life-world, Daoist
concept of dao, and Confucian concept of tui, to the understanding of various urban
places. This could be seen as an essay in a concrete ontology of the urban lifeworld.
Thus, the space in a city is where human beings realize their desire/existence with
intensive communication and complicated infrastructure. In the city, various urban
places are where we meet with many strangers. For me, the infrastructure and
places in the city—such as streets, transportation, schools, markets, administrative
centres, parks and gardens, churches and temples—are there to structuralize
people’s lifeworld and to cultivate themselves so as to form a meaningful life. I tend
to see the city as a complex human gathering where human desires are to be
realized. The city is a gathering of desires, and dao is the way or, better, the waying
of so many things including human desire.
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Combining both phenomenology and Chinese philosophy, this paper will speak about
different layers of manifestation of dao in the city. In fact, Dao has several meanings: as
the way, as saying and discourse, as laws of nature, and as the ultimate reality. To start
with its basic meaning of the way, this paper will begin with the streets in the city, and
talk about those trees along the streets. Then, it will go to dao as discourse, and discuss
a city’s many places for discourse, like schools, market places and town hall etc. Then,
in its meaning as laws or patterns of nature, I will discuss the cosmic patterns as
revealed through parks and gardens in and nearby the city. At the end, I will discuss
dao as the ultimate reality and its relation to urban places like churches, synagogues,
temples and shrines etc.
So, dao is manifesting itself in many places of the city, yet still unfathomable. The city is
visible and we live in it, yet it is still invisible and bringing us beyond. Human desire is
always craving and longing to determine itself in the desired desire. Still, the desiring
desire is moving on, insatiably, infinitely, and unfathomably, to a destiny that is beyond
all borders.
SHIELDS, James Mark (Bucknell University)
"Radical Enlightenment: Critical Buddhist Reflections on Spinoza and Marx."
“Critical Buddhism” (Hihan Bukkyō) was a provocative if short-lived movement within
normally placid world of Japanese Buddhist Studies, lasting from the mid-1980s through
the 1990s. Seeking to inject Buddhist Studies—and Buddhist practice—with a selfconscious sense of history and a progressive commitment to social justice, scholars
Matsumoto Shirō and Hakamaya Noriaki published a number of works dedicated to
these aims. In my 2011 work, Critical Buddhism: Engaging with Modern Japanese
Buddhist Thought, I argued that Critical Buddhism, for all its promise, was ultimately
limited less by the stridency of its advocates than by its adoption of rationalist, “liberal”
paradigms of philosophy, ethics and politics. While the Critical Buddhists’ arguments
concerning the relevance of Rene Descartes’s ideas to Buddhist practice in the
contemporary age are fascinating, I suggest that a more judicious dialogue partner for
Critical Buddhism are figures associated with the so-called Radical Enlightenment, in
particular Spinoza and Marx. This paper is an initial attempt to augment Critical
Buddhist arguments via a critical appropriation of particular themes, arguments and
ideas developed by the leading figures of the Radical Enlightenment, particularly with
regard to topos or “place.” The point, as with any attempt at critical, constructive, crosscultural philosophy, is not to suggest a perfect equivalence, nor to hold one side up over
the other, but to explore the possibilities inherent in bringing together wires that have
rarely been crossed (with, of course, residual risks).
SHRESTHA, Amjol (University of Hawai’i)
“Where are Universals? An Essay Explaining the Placement of Immanent
Universals in Their Particulars”
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For Nyāya-Vaiśeṣ ika thinkers, universals (sāmānya or jāti) are real, mind-independent
entities that inhere in their concrete particulars. If we accept this view, then how shall
we explain the way a universal occupies the space of a concrete particular? In this
essay, I argue that immanent universals do not occupy the space or the location of a
concrete particular, rather a universal occupies the place of a concrete particular. Place
unlike space is a set of relations. The intuition that prompts this argument originates
from a simple example that distinguishes location from place. Imagine moving a fish
bowl, without disrupting the fish bowl furniture, from point A to point B. Although I have
changed its location, I have not changed its place, because I have not rearranged or
removed the fish bowl furniture. In short, the place is the same. Indeed, the sameness
that arises from the change in location is the sameness that reveals the immanent
universal.
SHUN, Kwong-loi (UC Berkeley)
“Ethics without Forgiveness”
The paper begins by arguing against ethical views that idealize forgiveness in the sense
of regarding the readiness to forgive, in general or only under certain conditions, as a
virtue. It then presents an ethical view that does not idealize forgiveness and that is
grounded in certain ideas central to Confucian thought. While the main body of the
discussion will be based primarily on philosophical considerations, the paper will
conclude with a discussion of the Confucian root of such an ethical view.
SIDERAS, Christos (Royal Society of Medicine & Birkbeck, University of London,
UK)
“A Place without Space: The Contributions of Matte-Blanco towards
Understanding the Unconscious”
Matte-Blanco, a psychoanalyst and a theorist of the unconscious, saw, following the
lead of Freud, regularities in the expression of the unconscious and described these as
due to a logic of another type, countermanding the logic of usual consciousness. He
termed this logic symmetric, as opposed to the asymmetric logic of the conscious. He
suggested that a person can shift from these poles of symmetry-asymmetry, through the
different gradations of symmetrization. He described that with increasing levels of
symmetry, there is a blurring of binary structures in relationships, leading to the collapse
of difference to a class equivalence, with the inner- outer distinction becoming
abolished, a lack of temporality and the prototypical absence of contradiction. At the
extremely symmetric state, the sense of self and other is gone, space- time collapses,
distinctions are negated and true indivisibility is achieved. That said, he felt that human
functioning relied on an ability to shift seamlessly between these gradations and,
somehow, compartmentalize them.
These thoughts were explored further by his followers and the idea of the unconscious
as being one and the same as emotions was suggested, with the greater depths of this
unconscious state being much more highly charged in affective terms, that is, the more
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intense emotional states being more symmetrized. The key idea of the unrepressed
unconscious, Freud's third unconscious, was brought to the center of further theorizing,
as an unconscious that does not know consciousness, unlike the one usually discussed,
the one repressed, consisting of conscious memories submerged in the ocean of nonconscious. The question of the drives, so central to Freud's later theorizing, the drives of
life and death, were also considered in the light of these ideas.
I consider the atemporality described to be not a true atemporality but an aspatial
temporality, one without division and without ordering, as per Bergson's suggestion of
duration. This duration, a process, is very much present in emotions and is a different
sort of time than the one conceptualized in a fracturing mind. This would fit with the
descriptions given by the clinician-theorist Riccardo Lombardi, of a divisibility of thought
in the conscious mind and an indivisibility of emotional being in the unconscious. I relate
this idea of divisibility with the Pythagorean prime duality of peras~apeiron and the
ontogenic mythos of Anaximander. John Sallis' explanation of the unintelligible and
invisible also comports here to the idea of the unrepressed unconscious, but the key is
that there is, despite contrasting descriptions, a oneness of the states of form and
formlessness, as articulated in part by the Desert Fathers of early Christianity, but also
the adepts of Mahayana Buddhism. Drawing from the Japanese Zen tradition, some
descriptions of these ideas are given as examples, including also the ideas of traversing
and aptly navigating such self boundaries as this is borne out in the exchange between
Shin'ichi Hisamatsu and Masao Abe, suggesting the way of the free is in reaching "that
place where there is nowhere to stand." This place with no space.
SKOOG, Kim (University of Guam)
“Is Morality tied to Place or Self? Revisiting an Old Problem with a Comparative
Approach”
From earliest times in recorded reflection on morality and “the good life,” writers have
pondered just how significant is “place” in the overall development of morality in a
society. Does the collective experiences, thoughts, and shared culture/belief system
determine moral standards and social expectations amongst a people occupying a
particular place? Or, should morality as practiced in a certain place amongst the
resident community be judged by transcultural moral ideals—from the perspective of
self? This line of inquiry is the basis for the showdown between cultural relativists and
moral absolutist, a debate that has waged for millennia with both extremist viewpoints
taking some serious damage and discredit.
Keeping close to the theme of this conference, “place,” this paper will try to reassess
some of the issues that have arisen in the past in this debate, and look historically and
philosophically at how belief systems have changed or remained the same when either
moving to a different “place” occupied by a different community or when a different
belief system held by a different people “invades” their place.
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Why does significant change happen in some instances and not in other cases? What
role does the specific ethical process within a moral community lead to the preservation,
disillusion, or replacement of their ethical structure? In what ways does varying and
evolving notions of “place” shared throughout a community modify (or resist modification
of) ethical values and perceptions of virtue? Is it possible to concluded at the end of
this study, that ethics is better to reside in place or self ?
SMID, Robert (Curry College)
“Ecologies of Place: A Comparative Inquiry”
All human beings have a sense of “place,” which identifies particular spaces and imbues
them with particular meaning and significance. Different traditions, however, have
constructed this sense of place in different ways, privileging certain kinds of spaces over
others and, similarly, emphasizing certain features of those spaces over others. These
differences have become especially apparent of late in light of the rising ecological
crisis, as human beings have become able to transform their surroundings in
unprecedented ways—and often to ill effect. This has not diminished our ability to
create a sense of place; to the contrary, we continue to find our place within our
continually transformed world (including, most recently, places in the digital world). Yet
not every sense of place serves our interests as a species equally well.
This paper is concerned with the extent to which contemporary senses of place work
against those interests, insofar as they become detached from the broader ecological
context within which they are rooted. Accordingly, it seeks to identify traditions that
have been more successful in maintaining that connection, including but not limited to
certain elements of the Shinto, Daoist, Jain, Native American, and Neopagan traditions.
The primary purpose of the paper is to consider the extent to which, as well as possible
strategies by which, any advantages that exist within these traditions for an ecologically
mindful construction of “place” can be carried over into other traditions as well.
SPECKER SULLIVAN, Laura (University of Hawai’i)
“Particularist Bioethics”
Principlist ethical justification pervades American bioethics, from the Belmont Report to
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Yet how useful
are these principles in resolving difficult cases that arise in research and clinical settings
in diverse places and within different cultures? There are strong indications that the
answer to this question is “no.” As Renee Fox quoted William LaFleur in her acceptance
of the Henry Knowles Beecher award at the 2015 American Society of Bioethics and
Humanities meeting, “bioethics has become more international without becoming
internationalized.” Fox herself had already observed in 1984 that principlist methodology
in bioethics “contribute(s) to its inadvertent propensity to reflect and systematically
support conventional, relatively conservative American concepts, values, and beliefs.”
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In this presentation, I describe an alternative method of assessing and evaluating
ethical arguments in bioethics. This method, which I term “particularist bioethics,”
approaches bioethical issues from the ground-up, rather than from the top-down.
Drawing from metaethical defenses of moral particularism, I show how evaluating the
ethical justification of a given biomedical practice entails providing a critical picture of
the practice on multiple dimensions: institutional standards, relevant concepts, social
expectations, empirical data, and so on. The practice is not measured against an ideal
or principle, but is judged in terms of its specific purposes, meanings, and expectations.
I suggest how particularist bioethics can be used to analyze two different practices:
stem cell research in Japan and stem cell research in the U.S. I propose that different
ethical issues arise in these two practices because each is located in a particular place,
within particular institutions, and based on particular assumptions. These examples give
a clear picture of what a particularist analysis might look like and how it can contribute
to ethical justification in bioethics.
SPONSEL, Les (University of Hawai’i) and Poranee NATADECHA-SPONSEL
(Chaminade University)
“Sacred Places: What Can a Philosopher Say?”
Sacred places are particular sites, areas, and/or landscapes possessing one or more
attributes that distinguish them as somehow quite extraordinary, usually in a religious or
spiritual sense. Individuals may experience a sacred place in different ways as a site of
awe, mystery, power, fascination, attraction, connectedness, oneness, danger, ordeal,
healing, ritual, meaning, identity, revelation, and/or transformation.
Sacred places are an integral part of the human condition and experience as an ancient
cross-cultural universal. Billions of people throughout the world variously recognize and
appreciate the special meanings and significances of certain sacred places in their own
habitats and elsewhere. Many of these sites attract pilgrims and tourists, some sites
with thousands or even millions of visitors annually, as for example Lourdes in France
or Mecca in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, it is more than simply curious that individuals from
many different ecological, cultural, religious, and national backgrounds may quite
independently view the same site as sacred. For example, Mount Kailas in Tibet is
sacred to adherents of the indigenous Bon religion, Buddhists, Hindus, and Jains as
well as some Westerners.
How might a philosopher explain the existence, meaning, and significance of sacred
places in general? Moreover, might there be something inherent in the place that
attracts attention as sacred from people of diverse backgrounds? These and other
questions will be explored from a philosophical perspective with an emphasis on the
theories of environmental ethics.
In looking at sacred places from some philosophical perspectives we need to discuss
the relationships between sacred places as objects and human beings as subjects. How
do humans view sacred places in terms of their own virtues either as intrinsic values or
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as the instrumental values these places render to the benefit of the wellbeing of
humankind. Will John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian approach be the best explanation? William
James’s the will to belief can help to understand why sacredness is attached to such
places. Arthur Schopenhauer’s attempt to explain our experiences as the objectification
of the will should lead us to see the distinction between reality and appearance, and
also how we might see the universalistic and individualistic views in these sacred
places. Being-in-itself and being-for-itself as Jean Paul Sartre explains how we know
our world can further differentiate the perceptions of sacred places.
Buddhist teachings represent an Eastern world view of sacred places from the basic
Four Noble Truths and the practical ethics of the Noble Eightfold Path. Right thoughts
and right livelihood are the focal points of do no harm to others which in turn reduce
suffering and increase happiness. For Buddhists sacred places can represent a
sanctuary from greed and anger where loving kindness and compassion dwell. The
Buddhist concept of interconnectedness helps to explain how sacred places are
relevant to Buddhists.
The environmental ethical theories will be discussed within the scope of the existence
and function of sacred places. The anthropocentric and ecocentric approaches will
explore the moral consideration of sacred places.
STALNAKER, Aaron (Indiana University)
“An Early Confucian Theory of Shared Practice”
Several analysts have argued that the dào or “way” of the early Rú or “Confucians” is
practical in the sense that it concerns human life and its proper organization. I think the
early Confucians should be seen as practical because they are very concerned with the
actual practices people engage in, and view the dào as consisting of repeated activities
that shape human relationships, character, and embodied skills. This approach builds
on long-standing scholarly fascination with Confucian “self-cultivation,” but extends it to
focus on the formative and expressive practices the early Rú advocated, as well as their
richly elaborated views of human relationships, roles, and how individual development
relies on and fits into the web of human relationships.
According to early Rú sources, following the Way requires teachers and students to
engage in long-term relationships of practical training in crucial arts such as ritual and
music, together with textual study and a communal life in the study group. Mastery of
these arts and practices, when properly integrated together, constitute mastery of the
dào as a whole. And Confucian analysis of the transmission of traditions of practice
suggests that while some practices, such as ritual, are crucial to the cultivation of
virtuous skill mastery (dé 德), a greater variety of practices, such as archery, have the
potential to be practiced so that they contribute to real mastery, even if they are more
vulnerable to failure and deformation. Thus the early Rú see a spectrum of practices
from the most humanly essential and generally valuable, on the one hand, to the most
narrow and inessential, on the other, with important consequences for thinking about
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how best to approach and understand a variety of human activities that many already
perform. My approach to these issues is to interpret the early Rú as “practice theorists”
in their own right, rather than as exemplifying some contemporary theory such as that of
Pierre Bourdieu.
STERNER, Gregory (West Chester University of Pennsylvania)
“Placing One’s Self in the World: A Moral Duty to Resonate”
In this study, I will argue the position that resonation with the myriad things (every
aspect of society from one’s self, to nature, to one’s fellow human beings) is a moral
duty, following from the Confucian notion of social propriety and fulfilling one’s role in
the larger world. One of the five social relationships Confucius highlighted in the
Analects, which must be honored as a matter of duty, was Master and Servant. He
spoke of the Master and Servant relationship (as well as Parents/Children,
Husband/Wife, Elder Sibling/Younger Sibling, and Friend/Friend) in the context of filial
piety (honoring one’s parents and ancestors in deference and their name in action), but
also within a larger vision of social propriety. Confucius regarded the family as a
microcosm of the overarching structure of society over the individual.
I will examine how the Master/Servant relationship can be extended to encompass the
master (society) and the servant (one’s self) and what honoring one’s duty in this
context looks like. I will also compare and contrast the Eastern Confucian idea of social
propriety with the Western Platonic concept of Justice as well as the Eastern Confucian
notion of following yi (right moral action) in the context of li (propriety) with the Western
Aristotelian idea of “right reason.”
I will examine the function of resonation itself in the process of connecting societal
relationships to the end of moral correctness and social justice. Furthermore, I will
explore the idea of resonation as practice, relating specifically to looking inward,
honestly appraising one’s abilities and strengths, recognizing one’s weaknesses (and in
addition, what position or polarity one occupies in location among the other myriad
things) and pursuing a vocation (role) appropriate to both and in conjunction with the
needs of the larger world.
STOLL, Joshua (University of Hawai’i)
“Where is My Mind? On the Implacement of Self”
As we go about our lives we are, of necessity, tied to others in some manner. But those
others are still very much other no matter how close to oneself they are. Though you are
here with me at some place, you can never be here, in my place. As suggested in
Abhinavagupta’s Parātrīśikāvivaraṇa, the world itself, the place where we meet, comes
about through the space that grows out of and through what occurs between us. As
social creatures perpetually in each other’s presence, perhaps even in solitude, we are
intimately, albeit subtly, involved in the development of everybody else, indeed of the
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world itself. But despite this multiplicitous occurrence of people in the world, things
seem to only ever be present to me – whoever that is. In light of this of this paradoxical
juxtaposition of myself and others which opens up a world, this talk will investigate the
question of not just who I am – i.e. who is the one to whom things are present – but
where the events that constitute my mind, my experience, occur. It will ask and analyze
the question “Where is my mind?”
To this end, I will look at Jonardon Ganeri’s recent ‘ownership view’ of selfhood, the
idea that a self is the necessarily embodied endorsement of and claim to clusters of
intentions and preferences, conscious or not, regulated by normative emotional
responses to the environment. Although Ganeri, following Peter Strawson, takes it that
such a self is necessarily social, he doesn’t delve much into sociality itself. To make
more explicit the social ‘location’ of human persons, I will explore Abhinavagupta’s
discussion of the world coming about through the questioning of Śiva by Śakti. Next I
will emphasize Emmanuel Levinas’ claim in Alterity and Transcendence that ethics is a
matter of an immediate fear, in the face of the other, of literally taking their place, that is,
of eliminating them from the world.
Finally I will discuss the sort of multiplicitous and relational conceptions being
emphasized by feminist thinkers. These points will culminate in the idea that the self is
in an embodied mind’s being prompted by another. Thus, if for Ganeri the self is the
place (ādhāra) – irreducible to the body though necessarily grounded in it – where the
mind occurs and is thus owned, then this can only be because of the way we are
perpetually already implaced (to use a term of Edwin Casey’s) in the yawning gap that
opens up between us in social engagement. In order for there to be a ‘first person
stance,’ to use Ganeri’s phrase, one must always already be seconded by the other,
that is to say placed, by others, among the array of social possibilities.
STOREY, David (Boston College)
“Wisdom at Work: Philosophy in the Agora”
We take for granted that the proper place of philosophy is in the academy, yet the
academy is not where philosophy was born. When students leave the university, they
are told they are entering the “real world.” This signals that philosophy has no place or
use in their professional and personal lives. It seems odd that people are generally only
exposed to what are arguably the richest resources humanity has developed to help
them live wisely and well for four years in their youth. This is even stranger when we
consider that Western philosophy’s birthplace was the marketplace, and was only later
institutionalized in an academy.
In this presentation, I argue that we are in the midst of a renaissance of what Pierre
Hadot called “philosophy as a way of life” and explore its implications for the future of
philosophy within and beyond the academy. This renaissance is unsurprising given that
we now live in an informational economy based more on the exchange of information
and ideas than an industrial economy in which philosophy was confined to the
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academy. The signs of philosophy’s return to the marketplace are ubiquitous: a bevy of
popular books and blogs by philosophers and about philosophy in everyday work and
life; the explosion of interest in mindfulness meditation; the emergence of “in-house
philosophers” at companies like Google; the growth of ethics consulting companies and
corporate social responsibility; the rise of philosophical counseling and consulting,
Philosophy For Children, and the growth of Stoic-inspired cognitive-behavioral-therapy
in psychotherapy. I see these as anomalies pointing to a tectonic shift already in
motion, a change in the role and place of philosophy in contemporary life. These trends
are emerging at a time when the academic job market is hemorrhaging, the future and
purpose of higher education as we know it seem unclear, and accelerating automation
makes the future of work itself look frighteningly uncertain.
My argument is not against academic philosophy, but against the idea, embraced
explicitly or tacitly by many academics and many lay people, that the academy is the
proper—that is, exclusive and best--place for philosophy. I argue that our mission has
changed. We do not need “research,” but “outreach”: the use of skillful means to
midwife wisdom in sundry sectors. The operative symbol should be not the philosopher
escaping the cave/marketplace to seize wisdom, but returning to the cave to awaken
others; not the stone Buddha sitting on the mountaintop, but the merry monk entering
the marketplace with bliss-bestowing hands. As Plato warns in the Republic, we must
not allow the people who escape the cave to dwell in the “Isles of the Blessed.” And to
adapt his adage, the world will know no end to suffering until businessmen become
Bodhisattvas or Bodhisattvas become businessmen.
To this end, I offer several proposals for the future of graduate education in philosophy.
First, graduate programs should aim to change their culture, so that successful
placement is not defined as obtaining a tenure-track job. Second, the role of the
placement officer should be given pride of place within departments, expanded to
include non-academic careers, and integrated with the universities career services.
Third, departments should keep meticulous data on alumni so that students can connect
with those who charted a path out of the academy. Fourth, given that we live in the age
of the internship, departments should broker graduate student internships at think tanks,
non-profits, and businesses, along the lines of service-learning programs. Fifth, as a
profession we should be taking seriously the philosophy of work and leisure, especially
as it pertains to the mission of a university in the 21st century. Our schools today are
hardly places of true schole—leisure—and the future of automation is likely to
dramatically change the meaning and relationship of work and leisure.
The animating goal of these initiatives is to better adapt academic training in philosophy
to the needs of a warping world in a way that does not water down the reservoirs of its
ancient traditions.
STRUHL, Karsten J. (John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY)
“Buddhism and Marxism: Points of Intersection”
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In this essay, I will focus first on the general concern which informs both perspectives –
their respective analyses of the causes of suffering. For Buddhism, suffering (dukkha)
has a fundamental ontological cause – the illusion of self and its attendant desires,
cravings, and attachments. For Marxism, suffering is caused by the division of labor,
class exploitation, alienation, and the illusion that these are necessary. Second, I will
discuss their respective understanding of the overcoming of suffering. For Buddhism,
this requires extinguishing the illusion of self and its attendant desires, cravings, and
attachments. For Marxism, this requires the construction of a classless society which
would ultimately overcome all divisions of labor and forms of domination and their
attendant ideological illusions. Third, I will focus on their respective practices to achieve
the overcoming of suffering. This will include attention to engaged Buddhism as a
revolutionary social practice.
Finally, I will consider what each perspective can contribute to our confronting the
fundamental existential crisis of the 21st century – climate change and the ecological
crisis. I hope to demonstrate that Marxism and Buddhism can, in each of these areas,
mutually enrich and support each other, offer constructive criticisms of each other, and
intersect in ways that can help to change human consciousness and the world. As
regards this last, I will argue that the historical creation of a society in which “the free
development of each is the condition for the free development of all” (Marx) will require
a human agency liberated from the illusion of self (Buddhism).
SUHRUD, Tridip (Gandhi Ashram, India)
“Walking to Truth”
The Bhagvad Gita asks a question: How does a sthitpragna (one whose intellect is
secure) move, sit, speak and Walk? M K Gandhi pursued a life-long quest to attain the
ideal state as described in the Gita. We know of his direct speech and his practice of
silence, his economy of prose which saw use of extra words as a practice akin to
accumulation, his posture developed for hours of incessant spinning. And his walk? The
images of a reed thin man, walking with long, impatient, rapid strides are etched in our
minds. The staff (or stick) he carried grew longer with each passing year, till it grew
longer than him. He walked daily, ritually to prison gates and back from his Ashram in
Ahmedabad. He walked in South Africa with miners, and in Noakhali to wipe tears from
every eye. He walked for Swaraj to Dandi from his Ashram in Ahmedabad.
The essay seeks to understand Gandhi's practice of walking, trace its path from
London, South Africa, Dandi, Noakhali, to his final walk to meet the assassin's bullets
and find his Truth."
SULLIVAN, Ian M. (University of Hawai’i)
“The Sage in Silicon Valley: A Confucian Sense of Place in the Age of the
Internet”
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In Confucian role ethics, a priority is given to one’s vital familial relations. Tied up in
these emotionally and socially close relations is an element of spatial proximity as well,
a physical closeness. Presumably, the historical need for such spatial proximity was
part economic and part communicative. Economically, the establishment and
maintenance of the family and home required labor that itself required physical
presence. Communicatively, these narrative Confucian relations required
communication and a constant co-creation of the relations, a reinvestment of them with
meaning through shared and sharing experiences. When looking for ways in which
classical Confucian values can be adapted to contemporary society, it is tempting to see
the demand for spatial proximity as anachronistic.
The economic well-being of the family no longer requires spatial proximity in terms of
either labor or cash currency. Not only can I work far from my family—and sometimes
must work far from my family thanks to corporate culture—but with the swipe of a finger
across my smartphone I can transfer money back to parents or dependents and thereby
contribute to the “home account.” Communicatively, the need for spatial proximity
seems to have diminished as well. Social media allows me to share photos, videos,
voice, and text messages from the opposite side of the world with little expense or
effort. Experiences can be shared more readily and more effectively over great
distances then ever before.
Despite all of this, I will argue that spatial proximity, when fleshed out as a thick sense
of place, remains a compelling reason to follow some version of the classical Confucian
teachings on remaining spatially proximate and physically present. A shared physical
environment imbued with personalized and shared meaning, namely a place, in which
one shares a bodily proximity and thus the ability for bodily communication through
touch, remains a paramount requirement for the growth, if not the very maintenance, of
our vital relations.
SUNDSTROM, Ronald R. (University of San Francisco)
“Yi Fu-Tuan, The Lived Experience of Place and the Disruptions of Gentrification”
There is a rich literature on the lived experience of place driven by research in
phenomenology and cultural geography. The connections of these phenomenological
approaches to issues of justice in cities and communities (e.g., concerns about housing
inequality, gentrification, and displacement) have been largely evocative rather than
robustly connected through the mechanics of theories of justice. In this paper, drawing
on the work of Yi Fu-Tuan, I map out a series of connections between these two camps.
I discuss how important but hidden normative features appear in competing definitions
of gentrification provided by social scientists, developers, local government agencies,
and community groups. Their competing conceptions of gentrification are value laden
and partial, and incompletely deal with the normative concerns at the heart of anxieties
over gentrification.
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I argue that analyzes of gentrification should learn from the anxious perspectives of
poor communities, and not succumb to the temptation of allowing market-based
reasoning to displace moral and political concerns about the rights of individuals and
communities. Accounts of the lived experience of place are a valuable tool for
considering those perspectives, and such analyses could be paired with the technical
mechanisms of democratic egalitarian arguments about the needs of individuals and
communities for capacity and community building. The result of this pairing is a critique
of housing inequality based not just in distributive justice, but also in the appreciation of
community capability, and the recognition of urban residents as equal democratic
citizens.
TABATA, Taketo (Miyagi University of Education, Japan)
“The Phenomenology of the Group Dialogue: The Description of the Intellectually
Safe Place of p4c Sendai in Japan”
The purpose of this presentation is to give a phenomenological description of the group
dialogue of philosophy for children Sendai (p4cS). P4cS comes from p4c Hawai‘i
(p4cHI) and shares its ideas, tools and methods. In p4cS, a unique freedom emerges in
the classroom.
(1) At first, I distinguish p4cS group dialogue from standardized Japanese class
teaching. Some features of the p4cSI/HI are shown; (a) the arrangement of desks in a
circle without desks and not in rows behind desks, (b) the new lighthearted tool to
communicate called the “Community Ball”, (c) the full articulation of the new rules of the
dialogue, e.g., intellectual safety and only one who holds the community ball can speak
and others should listen to him/her, (d) the new orientation not to answer but to listen to
the questions from children, and (e) the change of the teacher’s leadership from the
tyrannical to the democratic. These elements make a drastic change of the classroom,
the teacher and children. This change is so radical that any unexpected good or bad
events occurring in the class provide opportunities for the teacher to more deeply
understand the children and for the children to develop themselves.
(2) Second, I focus on the change of the teacher in the p4cS and describe his/her lived
experience in terms of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. In p4cS the teacher should
change his/her attitude as a “teacher” to a “facilitator”. The essential attitude of a
teacher is teaching and leading, suggesting and guiding. In contrast, the teacher as a
facilitator of p4cS stops to teach. The teacher “suspends” reflectively to teach and lead
children. In addition he/she should “bracket” the rightness and various beliefs in his/her
opinion, ideas and life-view, and open him/herself to the children’s rightness and beliefs.
It’s like “ἐποχή (epokhe)”. However the “reduction” of the teacher isn’t as radical as that
of a phenomenologist and remains partial. The teacher’s interest turns to serve the
intellectually safe place and to let children speak and listen. The teacher doesn’t
withdraw into the inner subjectivity but appears as a servant leader, a spectator and a
participant in the outer intersubjectve world of the dialogue.
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(3) Third, the intellectually safe place of the p4cS dialogue is described as the place of
the “appearance”―something that is being seen and heard by participants in terms of
Hannah Arendt. Nevertheless, the speech and action in public that Arendt points out are
not the same as those in the p4cS; speaking and listening after throwing and receiving
the community ball in p4cS are kinds of “action” Arendt says. Speech and action reveal
human unique distinctness. And to act means to take an initiative, to begin, to set
something into motion. In this phenomenological point of view we can understand the
reason why so many unexpected amazing events happen in p4cS/HI.
TANKE, Joseph (University of Hawai’i)
“Painting From The Outside: Reconstructing the Early Foucault’s Account of Art”
This presentation develops an answer to the question with which aesthetics has
sought to displace the priority of metaphysics throughout the course of modern
Western philosophy, namely, how is there something rather than nothing? It
does this by examining Michel Foucault’s account of the constitutive role played
by madness [folie] in the arts of modernity. By isolating Foucault’s remarks on
van Gogh, Nietzsche, and Artaud, we develop Foucault’s early and largely
abandoned notions of art and creativity, with the aim of explaining how nothing
can produce something. This project entails a close reading of the significance
that Foucault builds into terms such as “reason,” “unreason,” “art,” and
“madness” throughout the course of his major work the History of Madness, and
the account it offers of the various stages in the development of Western reason.
By isolating Foucault’s remarks on van Gogh, we seek to place his understanding
of painting in dialogue with thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Meyer Schapiro,
and Jacques Derrida; however, unlike the famed debate regarding the “truth in
paining,” it will be argued that one virtue of the Fouaultian approach to van Gogh
(and painting) resides in the fact that it offers us a historical-ontological account
of how a non-place, such as madness, can be configured so as to produce novel
forms of experience.
TIAN, Lin and Peter ZHANG (Grand Valley State University)
“Interality and the City: The Case of Xi’an”
This article scrutinizes what makes the city urbane by foregrounding interality (间性),
which is a newly coined philosophical concept that wills nothing short of a paradigm shift
in philosophical inquiry. As a polysemous term, interality can mean empty space,
interplay, relationality, betweenness, and beyondness, etc. To illustrate the point, the
article uses Xi’an, the highly cultured tourist city in Northwest China, as an “object of
study” and compares it with other cities such as Hangzhou, Suzhou, Kyoto, and
London, where appropriate. The article makes the following main points: 1) Interality is
what gives a city its spirit (i.e., breath). Without interality, the city is suffocating and
soulless. 2) Overdevelopment makes a city unlivable precisely because it squeezes out
the city’s interalities. 3) The good urbanist values interality as much as elegant physical
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structures. 4) Interality, urban rhythmanalysis, flow, and affordance. 5) The recovery
and reinvention of interalities. 6) A thick description of interalities in Xi’an over the past
thirty years. 7) Implications of the study.
THÉOFILAKIS, Fabien (University of Montreal, Canada)
“The Development of a Geographic Vision in the National Socialist Worldview”
Fabien Théofilakis (History and German Studies, University of Montreal) will talk on
“The Development of a Geographic Vision in the National Socialist Worldview.” Looking
at written and visual sources created by the leaders of Third Reich, among them the
notes written by Adolf Eichmann during his 1961 trial, he traces the conceptual
development of the so-called German “Lebensraum” (vital space) as a spatial ideal for
the new Europe. This vision, contrary to current scholarly assumptions, was not
uniformly understood to begin with, but developed out of a dynamic and contingent
negotiation of maps, proposed by different Nazi agencies. Looking at primary maps, he
extracts debates about deporting “Reichsfeinde” (enemies of the Reich) on the one
hand and re-Germanizing newly conquered territories on the other. Tracing this dynamic
as a spatial discussion, he argues, sheds new light on the Nazi project. Finally, he
compares these historically produced maps to the spatial scales and aesthetic that
scholars have recently employed when studying the Holocaust.
THOMPSON, Kirill O. (National Taiwan University, Taiwan)
“Fallingwater”: Daoist Inklings about Place for Design and Sustainability
The Laozi offers poetic reflections on the formation of opposites and interplay of being
and non-being, which arise and return to dao. This formation and interplay of opposites
and being and non-being against the backdrop of imperceptible, inchoate dao yield an
aesthetic view of not just the formations of things but of the couching formation of
reality, which together yield place. (Arguably, the human sense of place refers to
“place” in this sense rather than to coordinates on a map.) This aesthetic view of place
registers the dynamic mutual dependence of the opposites, e.g., being and non-being,
that form this floating world in the perspective of dao. The present paper will note
implications this aesthetic view has for ontology and fundamental philosophy but will
concentrate on its implications for grasping and working with place, design, and
functionality, particularly as illustrated in the thought and designs of Frank Lloyd Wright.
As intimated by Laozi, ch. 11, working with place, design, and functionality in this
perspective tends to foster efficiency and sustainability. I conclude by attributing these
assets to the rich ontology and fundamental philosophy of Laozi’s position, and
suggesting how this aesthetic view could facilitate the design of more efficient and
sustainable as well as elegant structures, implements, and artifacts.
Reference text. Laozi 11:
Thirty spokes join at one hub,
But it is the non-being (the hole) that gives the use of the cart.
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Lumps of clay are molded to form a vessel,
But it is the non-being (space within) that gives the use of the
vessel.
Doors and windows are constructed to form a chamber,
But it is the non-being (space within) that gives the use of the room.
While the materials are the asset,
But it is the non-being (within) that gives the function.
THOMPSON, Paul B. (Michigan State University)
“The Allure of the Local in Food Ethics”
Philosophical inquiry into food security, the environmental impact of agriculture and fair
treatment for small farmers and other food system workers has recently congealed into
the field of “food ethics”. Taking up an alternative food movement’s interest in mounting
resistance to large corporate actors and the global food system, advocacy for “locavore”
eating practice is a topic in food ethics that links to the Conference theme of “place”.
Emphasis on local food systems links several disparate normative rationales, however,
and not always in ways that cohere. First, local food systems are said to place a lower
burden on the environment than the global food system, providing an environmental
ethics rationale. Second, local food systems allow money to circulate in local
economies, providing a rationale based on local job creation within communities of
place. Third, local food systems are said to promote sociality and convivial social
relations, serving a political value of place-based solidarity. Finally, aesthetic qualities
such as terroir are said to enrich the experience of eating foods from specific places. Do
these notions of place converge or diverge? The answer is that while there are tensions,
there is a surprising sense in which quotidian practices of local food culture have the
capacity to invest place with distinct but mutually supporting conceptions of value. Food
practice is thus a cornerstone for sense of place.
TIMM, Jeffrey (Wheaton College)
“A Place Beyond Place: The Divine Madman and the New Materialism”
The New Materialism rejects “transcendence” and “objectivity” within the study of
embodied, emplaced and “embraided” cultural experience. Recently scholars like
Vasquez (2011) and Harvey (2013) have argued for an approach to the study of religion
as everyday life, celebrating difference and employing “otherness” as a methodology.
From the otherness of the Vajrayana the gaze turns to the new materialism, wondering
exactly what is new about it. Contrasting the natural embeddedness of traditional
indigenous cultures with the alienation from place and self in the modern west sets the
stage for a third possibility: Vajrayana.
Kyimed Lhakhang is a sacred temple in western Bhutan identified with the divine
madman and, despite its emplacement or embraidedness in a particular and meaningful
landscape, it forever points to a transcendence of place and “going beyond, beyond.”
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This Vajrayana cultural understanding of place is directly linked to an appreciation and
cultivation of alternate states of consciousness. It is here that the divine madman and
his ancient wisdom tradition, attuned through insights of biogenetic structuralism,
quantum physics and fractal geometry, may have some helpful suggestions for the New
Materialists.
TIWALD, Justin (San Francisco State University)
“The Importance (or Lack Thereof) of Local Ties in Neo-Confucian Charactercentered Theories of Governance”
This paper revisits the great Confucian debate about two systems of regional
governance: the ancient “enfeoffment” or “feudal” (fengjian 封建) system and the more
centralized “commandery” or “province-county” (junxian 郡縣) system. One important
dimension of this debate concerned the advantages of having regional governors with
ties to the localities that they govern. Proponents of the enfoeffment system thought that
local ties make an official more invested in and knowledgeable about the communities
he governs, whereas defenders of commanderies thought that local ties make it more
difficult to centralize and unify authority.
I offer a novel approach to this debate, one which takes account of another major
current in Confucian thought that I describe as a preference for “character-centered
theories of governance.” According to character-centered theories, successful
governance depends more fundamentally on the virtue of those who govern than on the
institutional rules and regulations to which they adhere. I look at two of the most
sophisticated character-centered theorists, HU Hong 胡宏 (1106-1161) and ZHU Xi 朱熹
(1130-1200) and explain how they are able to use character-centered foundations and
frameworks to justify their particular views about the value and function of local ties.
Both Hu and Zhu prefer the enfeoffment system because it fosters and builds on local
ties, but whereas Hu thinks the enfeoffment system is necessary for good governance,
Zhu thinks it an implication of his character-centered theory that both the enfeoffment
and the commandery systems can bring about successful governance. Hu and Zhu thus
illustrate different ways of conceiving the relationship between virtuous governance and
historical and personal connections to one’s place. Other issues that overlap with the
theme of space are the use of fixed boundaries to reduce conflict, the centralization vs.
decentralization of power, and the value of what HU Hong calls “being rooted” in the
place in which one lives.
TOYODA, Mitsuyo (Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan)
“Towards the Growth of Agrarian Literacy”
One of the concerns that J. Baird Callicott shares through his works is the
impoverishment of the value of agriculture. With the trend of increasing mechanization,
farmers are enforced to pursue efficiency and profits by introducing whatever
technological measures available. Agriculture is a business based on the relationship
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between farmers and consumers. Farmers’ choices are thus significantly influenced by
the choices of consumers. Thus, Callicott writes, “Farmers are asked to make costly
changes in their method of production for the sake of everyone else’s quality of life.”
In order to consider the value of agriculture that has been dismissed in recent
agricultural business, Callicott cites Aldo Leopold’s land aesthetic. Aesthetics goes
beyond instrumental evaluation. It is the appreciation of the existence of certain things
per se. Leopold’s land aesthetic, according to Callicott, “recognizes the beauty of
neglected natural environments.” It is not about the appreciation of scenic beauty of
agricultural landscapes but the understanding of their history of evolutionary and
ecological biology. Biological literacy is thus the foundation of Leopold’s aesthetics.
The connection between agriculture and biodiversity began to be emphasized in
Japanese agricultural policies. Farmlands are now valued from various perspectives
such as ecological habitat, scenic beauty, therapeutic function, disaster prevention, etc.
Several agrarian villages have been selected as GIAHS sites by FAO and have been
recognized as important bio-cultural heritages. In spite of these progresses, the future
prospect is not bright. In this paper, I examine unique agrarian aesthetics in Japanese
tradition and consider the difficulties and hopes concerning current agricultural
conservation movement. One of the possible solutions is the cultivation of agrarian
literacy.
TRIGG, Dylan (University of Memphis)
“Place, Culture, and Nostalgia: a Phenomenological Perspective”
The reception of nostalgia in the 19th and 20th century is striking. At once an emblem of
political conservatism, nostalgia is also an invariant aspect not only of individual
existence but also of different cultures. From the Japanese concept “mono no aware” to
the Portuguese term “Saudade,” nostalgia is a nuanced and culturally mediated
concept. In this paper, I assume a phenomenological perspective on nostalgia,
exploring the points of converge and divergence between Eastern and Western
attitudes toward pastness, longing, and transience. My claim is that spatiality plays a
central role in the formation of nostalgia, such that our experience of the past is tied up
with the materiality of places, both in the presence and in their absence. I explore this
claim through situating Freud’s short essay “On Transience” in dialogue with Kazuo
Ishiguro’s The Remains of the Day.
TSAI, George (University of Hawai’i)
“Blame and the Blamed's Place in (or beyond) the Moral Community”
How does blame achieve its desired-effect of modifying the behavior of the blamed?
More specifically, how does the blamed's place or position with respect to the moral
community (whether the blamed is situated within or beyond the moral community)
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make a difference to how, and whether, blame is able to achieve its desired-effect? In
exploring these questions, I argue that it is a rather complex matter how blame operates
to change the blamed, and that this complexity matches the fact that the blamed (as a
group) are a morally and psychologically diverse lot.
TURNER, Paul M. Turner (DePaul University)
“The Estrangement of Presence in the Zhuangzi”
It is well-known that the Zhuangzi 莊子 portrays apparently irreconcilable opposites as,
in fact, mutually dependent on one another. This is most clearly the case with two sets
of terms in the text's second chapter, shi-fei 是非 ('that's it' and 'that's not') and shi-bi 是
彼 ('this' and 'that'). Each term plays a role in distinguishing between what is correct or
incorrect, and especially with regard to determining just what is properly virtuous, good,
beautiful, and so on. Much of the English language commentary to date portrays these
pairs of contraries as being primarily linguistic. Their contrariety seems merely
semantic, then, while the contraries in fact form a unity either insofar as their meanings
require one another, or there is an underlying unity beyond language which the use of
names somehow distorts.
In this paper, I will take up and radicalize Brook Ziporyn's suggestion about the status of
perspective in the Zhuangzi, which is that a thing does not merely have but rather is
such a perspective. This is to say that a thing's affirmation and negation structures its
presence. What this means is that affirming and negating are not activities which beings
undertake in an everyday sense, or 'within language', but are rather better understood
as ontologically constitutive of a being which can act or speak. I will argue that a thing in
the Zhuangzi is a clearing and lighting-up (ming 明) which essentially emerges from the
dark and confused chaos of nonbeing (hundun 渾沌), where illumination has the sense
of 'forming a meaningful world'.
What is remarkable, then, is that the presence of any thing involves the chaos of
nonbeing, or what it is not, such that its presence depends on what is not there. This
means, I contend, that all presence is simultaneously there and beyond itself, so that
there is essential uncertainty as to 'where' it is. To make this case, I will provide close
readings of several key passages from the inner chapters, focusing on moments where
things are shown to emerge out of, or exist within, formlessness and ambiguity, such as
the Qiwulun's 齊物論 'music from empty holes' and the final chapter's account of
Emperor Chaos' hospitality toward guests. What will be key for the analysis is the way
such 'ex nihilo' emergence—understood in a nontraditional sense—means that beings
are inextricably rooted in what is unformed and nowhere, and still further how this noplace is a common ancestral 'home' for each of the myriad things.
VAIDYA, Anand Jayprakash (San Jose State University) and Victor PINEDA
(University of California, Berkeley)
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“How Can Disability Studies Help Global Philosophy Think about Place and
Space: Lessons from the work of Dr. Victor Pineda”
Recent work at the intersection of justice studies, disability studies, phenomenology,
and the metaphysics of space and place suggests that paying attention to how persons
of disabilities experience and understand “space” and “place” is central to the very
construction of space and place from the standpoint of equality and justice. In this talk
we present the pioneering work of Dr. Victor Pineda, who is the key architect of the
AWE movement (A World Enabled Movement).
We present his work against the background of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum
who have also drawn attention to the experiences of persons with disabilities in their
articulation of the capabilities approach to justice. However, we argue that Dr. Pineda’s
work is pioneering and goes beyond those of Sen and Nussbaum in so far as he argues
for the thesis that our current understanding of disability is confused, since we take a
medical or biological approach to disability rather than a social and environmental
approach to disability. We show how his careful argumentation suggests that everyone
is disabled relative to some environment or place because disability is a functional
notion tied to an individual in a space that is a constructed place through affordances it
allows a person to optimize in freedom and being. We rehearse his empirical research
on the United Arab Emirates in which he shows how laws concerning disability have
shaped the production of the city life.
We conclude by suggesting that cross-cultural research on disability provides a pathway
forward for researchers in a variety of fields. The grand unification we point is research
space and place that combines disability studies and future studies with comparative
philosophy and theories of justice in political theory and philosophy.
VALMISA, Mercedes (Princeton University)
“The World is a Cage” or The Place of Freedom in Early Chinese Philosophy
Zhuangzi 莊子 23, “Geng Sang Chu” 更桑楚, speaks of a bow master who would make
a cage of the world so that no bird finds escape. What is the place of human freedom in
a cage-like world? Much as birds flying in an immense cage, we seem to freely move
around without realizing our boundaries. Are we in control? Can we actually choose
how to act? Do we even have an influence over the course of events?
Inspired by the long-standing Western philosophical debate on the (in)compatibility of
determinism and free will, I analyze the way in which Early Chinese authors argued that
behaving adaptively could lead to a kind of non-dualist, compatibilist freedom that I call
“Adaptive Freedom.” I begin with a Song-times debate on the historical and
philosophical reasons for feudalism (Su Shi 蘇軾�vs Zhu Xi 朱熹), which helps
illuminate similar positions with regard to fate and free action in Early China.
In a complex web of interactions between actors and environment, the place of freedom
emerges between an inherently deterministic and limit-imposing universe, and the
awareness of a strategic, purposeful and adaptive agent. This analysis provides an
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alternative reading of compatibilist freedom for contemporary philosophical debates,
and turns away all arguments in favor of dominant determinism, fatalism and passive
resignation in Early China.
van der BRAAK, A.F.M. (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
“The Secular and the Sacred as Contested Spaces? A Cross-cultural
Hermeneutical Investigation into Western and Chinese Perspectives”
In the Abrahamic religious traditions, the notion of the sacred is often conceived in
terms of nearness to God and God’s grace. The sacred is thus differentiated from the
secular, and is set apart as mysterious and inconceivable. Emile Durkheim has even
singled out such a ‘setting apart’ of the sacred as the defining element of religion: “A
religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to
say, things set apart and forbidden” (Durkheim, The elementary forms of religious life:
47). Charles Taylor has argued in A secular age that one aspect of secularization in the
West (the emptying of public spaces of all reference to the sacred) has resulted from
the growing opposition and separation between ‘secular’ spheres of activity (economic,
political, cultural, educational, professional, recreational) and ‘sacred’ spheres of activity
(religious, spiritual). In the West, the secular and the sacred have become contested
spaces over the past centuries.
This paper wants to contrast this Western perspective on the secular and the sacred
with a Chinese one. In classical Chinese, there was no exact term to describe ‘religion’.
In the nineteenth century, the phrase zongjiao was coined, with a combined meaning of
‘ancestral teaching’ and ‘pious doctrine’. Absent in this phrase is the connotation that is
present in religare: re-establishing the bond between the superhuman and the human,
and bridging the gap between the divine and the secular (Yao and Zhao, Chinese
religion: 27). Instead, the concept of zongjiao draws the divine nearer to the human
world. In this way, religion is demystified and rooted in human experience and
expectations. Rather than emphasizing the tension between the human and the divine
(e.g., a separation from the divine needs to be reconciled through grace as a way to
salvation), zongjiao emphasizes communication, correspondence and mutuality, which
enables confidence in the human capacity for transformation and perfection.
Each individual is believed to possess the source and resource to reach perfection or
enlightenment. As a result of this, the sacred (shensheng) is conceived of as a
permanent presence. The Chinese term is a combination of shen (the mysterious or
spiritual) and sheng (sagacity), referring to the realm where the supernatural and the
human are integrated into a perfect unity by which humans have reached
enlightenment. Since the transition from the secular to the sacred is a continual
process, the sacred can therefore be practiced, sought after and learned about: the
Way exists everywhere.
This paper uses a cross-cultural hermeneutical approach to investigate the
philosophical and theological presuppositions behind the Western approach to the
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secular and the sacred as contested spaces, and investigate an alternative hermeneutic
of the secular and the sacred that is closer to the Chinese perspective.
VENDE, Yves (Sun Yat Sen University, China)
“Mencius and Plato about Land Repartition: Humane Space is Well-divided Space”
One of the recurrent questions asked to Mencius by rulers who come to visit him, is how
to gain the authority over all under Heaven (天下) and to unify the entire China under
one sovereign power. Many rulers worry about the size of their territory which seems
too small to achieve this goal. How to pretend to take command over all under Heaven
with only a small kingdom? According to Mencius, to gain command over all under
Heaven is not a question of the size of a territory but rather of the behavior of the ruler.
If the ruler behaves like an authentic King and conducts a benevolent government which includes giving the appropriate amount of space to each one in accordance with
his rank - then all under Heaven will be willing to follow his leadership. To make a
repartition of the available land, and to settle rules for the use of it, is also to give each
one an opportunity to fulfill his needs and to make the world humane (otherwise wild
beasts might come and enter into competition with men).
In Plato's Laws, the protagonists discuss a similar question, which is how to deal with
issues relating to good governance. The goal was not to unify all of Greece but to create
a colony in Crete, so as to make it an exemplary city. For that purpose, the city must not
be too close to the sea (because ports bring business and business attracts all kinds of
morally depraved people). The dialogue also addresses the issue of territorial repartition
which should be done according to the size of the population. This division of the land is
in fact closely tied up with the concern of avoiding conflicts among citizens. Therefore,
an important aspect of this organization of space is agriculture, which should be the
base of the economic life of the city. According to the Laws, a good King should act like
a cloth-maker or a pastor.
Reading the Mencius and the Laws, we can observe that in both ancient texts, to divide
land properly and to be strict on boundary issues is part of “good” government, whether
the final objective is to unify China or to establish an exemplary city. For both Mencius
and Plato: space is humane when it is politically organized, which first requires a welldivided space.
VOJTÍŠKOVÁ, Kristýna (Charles University, Czeh Republic)
“Watsuji Tetsurô’s Fûdo in the Context of Globalized World”
Watsuji Tetsurô's (和辻哲郎, 1889-1960) theory of fûdo (風土) as a “cultural climate”
conceptualizes a “betweenness” (間柄) of humanity and milieu as inseparable and
mutually determining. Watsuji tends to view fûdo as stable within a particular culture.
However, globalization as a homogenizing element undermines human attachment to
physical space, as well as cultural and national differences, which seems to be a
prerequisite of Watsuji's concept of fûdo. Thus it may seem that it tells us little about the
ethics of inter-relationality between human being and his milieu in the world of
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globalization and multiculturality. In my paper, I will argue that in the notion of
“betweenness” as a fundamental structure of human being within fûdo, there is an
ethical insight that enables Watsuji's view to shift from a theory of climatic (or national)
characters, as it is often perceived to be, to an approach to cohabitation within a shared
milieu that blurs the frontiers of cultures and nations.
WANG, Robin R. (Loyola Marymount University)
“Equality and Hieracrchy in A Swirling Space”
Based on a careful reading of some pre-qin Chinese texts this paper will focus on the
space where equality and hieracrchy can be made compatible. It shows that equality
and hieracrchy cannot be fixed in a frozen polarity and argue for a constructive and
complicate relationship between equality and hieracrchy.
WEBER, Ralph (University of Basel, Switzerland)
“The Place of Europe in Philosophical Eurocentrism”
This paper revisits the global debates about Eurocentrism since the 1980s and offers a
critical discussion of the variety of Eurocentrism charges. I distinguish between
philosophical and political charges and argue that political Eurocentrism is something
contemporary philosophy would do well to guard against. Ironically, more often than not
lurking behind attempts at charging others with philosophical Eurocentrism is nothing
more than a political anti-Eurocentrism. What needs to be examined, therefore, is what
a philosophical Eurocentrism would amount to, how it could be philosophically defended
if it can be so defended at all, and how best to attack it philosophically. Europe, whether
understood as a concept or a place, is best understood relationally, which implies other
concepts or other places.
In philosophical discussion and its underlying institutional support systems across the
globe, Europe still has an impressing presence, while the relational quality it is given
covers the entire range from appreciation to abhorrence. A better understanding of what
philosophical Eurocentrism might and might not be and how it is tainted with political
Eurocentrism is required precisely if one wants Europe to banished from philosophy and
to be simply a place again. Europe should acquire a presence among other presences,
or perhaps with regard to philosophy better a non-presence among non-presences. The
philosophical importance of place is a double-edged sword, and the lessons that can be
drawn from the debates about Eurocentrism should make us aware of the dangers
involved in hypostatizing it.
WELTER, Albert (University of Arizona)
“Public Places and Privileged Spaces: Perspectives on the Public Sphere and the
Sphere of Privilege in China and the West”
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Public places (i.e., Habermas’ “public sphere”) have privileged status in modern
democracies as arenas for the free exchange of ideas and commodities. Likewise,
private interests enjoy a privileged status beyond state control, authorized as free
expressions of the autonomous individual. In this paper, I compare the notions of public
place and private space against common assumptions in the Chinese tradition, where
public and private realms were never thought of as distinct, but as part of a continuum
of harmonious, if sometimes contested terrain. In place of a public sphere where the
principles of an engaged democracy are manifest, Confucian models in China provided
for a “sphere of privilege” that allows access to the mechanisms of power and arenas of
cultural privilege through control mandated by central authority. This authority
designated and privileged an inside sphere, a “sphere of privilege,” where sanctioned
activities deemed to foster government aims operated as legitimate organs of
government policy.
WEN Haiming (Renmin University of China)
“Roger Ames’s Reconstruction of Chinese Metaphysical Idea of Place”
This article aims to clarify the metaphysical dimension of Roger Ames’s reinterpretation
of Chinese philosophical idea of place. I argue that his metaphysical reinterpretation of
Chinese philosophical idea of place can assist research on Chinese philosophy in
transcending the background of Greek-German philosophies in particular, and Western
philosophical narratives in general. What he has done is to reconstruct a new model of
philosophical interpretation on the idea of place for Chinese metaphysics, one that
connects ancient Confucian and Daoist metaphysics with the processual nature of
reality in American Pragmatism. He has translated many ancient Confucian and Daoist
classics into English, and by doing so, provided a new perspective of interpretation of
the idea of place with which to reconstruct Chinese metaphysics, introducing a new
vocabulary with distinctive metaphysical implications. Furthermore, through his
reconstruction of Chinese metaphysics, his interpretation has also shed light on the
continuing dialogue between Chinese and American philosophy.
WILLIAMS, John R. (National University of Singapore, Singapore)
"Our Journey Home is our Home: Zhuangzi and the Impossibility of a Coherent
Philosophy of Place"
If the following claim from Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall's "four presuppositions of
Daoist cosmology," (P1) "we too are inescapably people of a time and place," is taken
to mean (at least by implication) our claims are all historically conditioned, then we must
be prepared to accept the consequences of P1: namely, (P2) if P1 is true, then P1 is
likewise, being itself a claim, historically conditioned; (P3) P2 must also be historically
conditioned, given P1; (P4) P3 must also be historically conditioned, given P1; (P5) P4
must also be historically conditioned, given P1; and so on, ad infinitum. Subsequently,
one can either (1) argue that at least claim P1 is exempt from the relativism it
advocates; (2) argue that P1 results in the paradox of relativity, and is thereby refuted;
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or (3), argue that the implications of P1 corroborate rather than refute P1. Given one
takes this regression to corroborate rather than refute the initial proposition, one cannot
establish givens, such as Platonic ideas, or determiners, such as Kantian categories, as
a point of departure for philosophical inquiry: that is, the regression precludes a
perspective sub specie aeternitatis from which to establish such a point of departure in
a non-question-begging-manner. I call this implication of P1 (qua "3") "homelessness."
Ames has recently aligned himself with Gadamerian hermeneutic phenomenology to
confront this homelessness. In this paper, I hope to proffer the Zhuangzian notion of
"the radiance of drift and doubt" (滑 疑 之 耀 guyizhiyao) and related notions to
complement Gadamerian hermeneutic phenomenology in this connection. As a result, I
hope to give the reader a critical glimpse into a philosophy without foundations.
WONG, David (Duke University) and Marion HOURDEQUIN (Colorado College)
“Hiding the World in the World: A Case for Cosmopolitanism Based on the
Zhuangzi”
Human relations to place cannot be easily or simply characterized. As a species, we
have long been both settled and mobile, with some rooted in place and others more
migratory. Mobility is not a new feature of human life; however, economic globalization
and technologies that facilitate rapid movement from place to place have increased the
pressures and opportunities to move. Some argue that greater mobility, in combination
with the homogenization of places through the spread of chain stores and multinational
corporations, has created a problematic placelessness for many persons and societies.
This paper draws on classical Confucianism and the early Daoist thought of Zhuangzi to
explore questions of place and mobility in the contemporary world.
From one point of view, contemporary mobility can be seen as liberating. Particularly
among global elites, people have greater freedom than ever to cross cultural
boundaries, to make homes in new places, and to pursue opportunities – economic,
intellectual, artistic, or otherwise – that would otherwise be unavailable to them.
Experiences of mobility for the less advantaged are often fraught with danger and
insecurity, but often hold out the promise of a different or better life. Even if moving
were easy and safe for all persons, however, we might still ask whether it would be an
unmitigated good. In the Analects, Confucius criticizes those who withdraw from society
to free themselves from its various problems and shackles. Although the text does not
put it this way, one might read Confucius as criticizing moral placelessness, a form of
human life where one is cut off from the social connections and cultural rootedness that
make moral personhood possible (see, e.g., Analects 18.6). The Analects thus offers
an important cautionary note regarding mobility and detachment from one’s roots.
Zhuangzi, however, might be more optimistic about the possibilities for a cosmopolitan
moral self, and in the remainder of the paper we explore the theme of roaming in the
Zhuangzi, and what lessons the text might offer for contemporary life. Zhuangzi
suggests that excessive attachment – to place, to one’s bodily form, and even to other
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persons – is problematic, and from this perspective, one might critique certain parochial
forms of rootedness, given the interdependence and moral entanglements of the
contemporary world. For example, Zhuangzi tells a story about trying to hide what you
value by secreting in a hiding place, only to have it exposed and your treasure stolen –
but, the text says, if you hide the world in the world, you cannot lose it. This offers
grounds for a positive conception of contemporary mobility, one that draws on a
Zhuangist acknowledgement of interconnection and interdependencies to support an
attitude of identification with the whole and not just one’s own corner of the world. At
the same time, Zhuangzi does not shun attachment altogether, as attachments – to the
human form, to one another, and to the places we inhabit – are important to our
particular form of life, transient though it may be.
WONG, Peter Yih Jiun (University of Melbourne, Australia)
“On Realising One's Fate and Finding Contentment in One's Environs”
In the “Appended Statements” (Xici 繫 辭) collected in the Book of Changes, the notion
of knowing and realising one's fate (zhiming 知命) is paired with finding contentment
within one's environs (antu 安土). It involves a sense of place that is always dynamic—
there is no one place that is the ideal place: no Heaven, no paradise, no pure land.
Instead, the person is required to sensitively and creatively adapt to the places and
situations in which one finds oneself—both in finding an appropriate posture and in
enhancement of the place. This paper seeks to articulate the foregoing understanding
through a reading of the Confucian commentaries contained in the Book of Changes,
which represent an interpretation of the core passages of the Book of Changes by
means of categories that are ritual in origin—among which, the notion of place (wei 位)
plays a key role. We then pose the question: Is successful and creative adaptation to a
particular place a completely satisfying goal in its own right? Are there some situations
that are preferred by the Confucians over others?
XU Di (University of Hawai’i)
“The Dunhuang Grottos and Education”
Dunhuang is a famous and fascinating World Heritage site on the Silk Road in the
desolated Gobi Dessert northwest of China (Fan & Wu, 2004; Treasures of Dunhuang
Grotto, 2002). Since 366 AD, a traveling Buddhist monk built a modest and simply
meditation grotto on the east side of Mt. Mingsha, over a thousand grottos, fancy or
basic, have followed the suite over a thousand years of civilization. They first flourished
over 13 dynasties (366 – 1368 AD), and then survived approximately another thousand
years through wars and turmoil in the nation. Today Dunhuang Grottos is well-known
and well studied in terms of its contributions to Buddhist religion, history, archeology,
art, geography, sociology, and multiple fields.
However, interestingly there is a missing link in Dunhuang study regarding Dunhuang
and philosophy in general and educational philosophy in particular. This panel will
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explore and examine the relation between Dunhuang and educational philosophy as it is
manifested through Northern Liang (421–439 AD) to Yuan Dynasty (1227 –1368AD).
The primary questions are: What is the connection between Dunhuang and Chinese
educational philosophy or if there is any? How has the place influenced the Chinese
educational philosophy in theory and practice? Where is the place of Dunhuang in
education then in China’s ancient past and now for global education for both China and
the rest of the world?
The discussion will focus on the direct connection between Dunhuang Grottos and
education. The paper will examine the formation of Chinese educational philosophy
through cultural, social, historical, and geographical, and political diversity. It will
highlight the synergy and transformation of educational philosophy and practices in
Dunhuang and China over the course of history. Most importantly, the paper will draw
from the insights of Dunhuang and its education for education today.
Together the panelists hope to start a new field in Dunhuang study that has been
seriously neglected and overlooked. Dunhuang is not only a place in the past or merely
an ancient museum of the lost civilizations. It actually offers insightful and rich
educational philosophy that has been developed, synergized, and transformed over
thousands of years. It still holds the philosophical essence for education, relevant for us
today.
XUE, Fuxing (Nankai University, China)
“Callicott’s Interpretation of Daoism”
J. Baird Callicott considers Chinese Daoism significant for reflecting upon the limitations
of traditional Western thinking, particularly the mechanical worldview. Drawing from
leading scholarship in Daoist philosophy, Callicott addresses core concepts such as chi,
Dao, de, yin and yang, and the wuwei/youwei distinction. He finds a deep and intrinsic
connection between Daoism and contemporary environmental philosophy, and states
that Daoism provides a classical paradigm that is applicable to today’s society. The
cyclical nature of the Way closely parallels contemporary ecology, which describes
cyclical and reciprocal processes in nature. The dynamic worldview embodied by “Dao”
is crucial for today’s world and offers a rationale for “appropriate technology.” However,
Callicott’s discussion of Daoism has some critical limitations: he neglects the importance
of the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi and he fails to address the problematic nature of the
concept of wuwei.
YANG, Liuxin (Peking University, China)
“A Home under tian 天 for the People of ren 仁: On the Cultural Symbolism of the
“Xiangdang Chapter 乡党篇 of the Analects of Kongzi”
The “Xiangdang” chapter of the Analects of Kongzi is an extremely valuable document in
describing the details of daily life of Kongzi in the classics of ru 儒 school. The parent’s country
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is exactly the home where exemplary persons junzi 君子 can “dwell poetically ”, and the folk
society composed by parents and children, brothers and sisters, and friends is just the
community where exemplary persons can practice ren 仁 and li 礼. As a model, Xiangdang
reflects Kongzi’s cultivation and teaching, with extremely rich and profound cultural symbolic
meaning. We can find through the window of Xiangdang, traditions and customs of the Chinese
moral civilization that Kongzi admired and inherited. Xiangdang symbolizes a moral civilization
and a home of people under tian 天 , and has eternal significance.
YAO, Fuchuan (Chinese Culture University, Taiwan)
“The Place of Justice in Buddhism”
In the West, justice has been a conventional and vague concept. It means different
things for different people in different contexts. Although it may be significant to
investigate why the concept of justice is vague, we are not interested in it. Instead, we
are interested in an ignored question of what justice means for Buddhism in the East.
In other words, we are interested in what the place of justice is in Buddhism. This issue
has been neglected and might not be legitimate for Buddhism. For “justice” is surely a
western vocabulary and the Buddha had never said anything about it.
However, given the significance of justice and the emphasis on pluralistic views in
today’s world and without clarifying this neglected question, it would be difficult for
Buddhists to offer any plausible arguments in terms of Buddhist justice.
So this paper is to do three things. First, I review this ignored question with very few
literature in the East and West. Second, I argue that karma is the main concept of
justice in Buddhism and explain how the law of karma can construe three western
concepts of justice. Third, I raise and defend three cardinal concerns with the law of
karma.
YAO, Zhihua (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
“Does Space Exist? Buddhist Disputes on Ākāśa”
In the Buddhist Abhidharma system, space (ākāśa) is classified as one of the
unconditioned factors and enjoys a higher status than time (kāla), which marks the
conditioned existence. All the conditioned existents, being bound in temporality, are
inevitably impermanent. Owing to its unconditioned nature, space, however, is as
permanent as nirvāṇa—the final goal of Buddhist practice. The privileged status of
space is challenged by a group of Buddhists, who see it as violating the Buddhist
teaching of impermanence. They try to reduce space to a conceptual construction and
hence deny its existence. The current paper will examine the disputes on the reality of
space between the two parties and try to articulate the Buddhist theories of space, a
topic neglected by most contemporary Buddhist scholars.
YE, Lin (Dunhuang Research Academy, China)
“School Education in Dunhuang”
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The discussion will examine the school education in Dunhuang. Dunhuang grottos have
once been the public place that offered education to the ordinary people, as well as the
women’s club and study center for scholars. The chair monks delivered Buddhism
lectures and lay folks often gathered in the grottoes for special meetings. The murals
and paintings documented the Buddhist stories and teachings which guided people’s
behaviors based on moral principles. This discussion will focus on the educational
function of Dunhuang grottoes and the implication of Dunhuang education to the
contemporary education in China and beyond.
YUAN, Jinmei (Creighton University)
“On Zheng 正, Associative Properness and Logical Validity: A Case Study of
Shared Practices of Matteo Ricci, S. J, and Chinese Mathematicians in the 17th
Century
Thinking through the discourse between Jesuits and Chinese scholars in 17th century
China, one can discover some significant progresses in building a mutual understanding
between the West and the East at a level of logical practices. One of successful
example is the co-work of translating Euclid’s Elements Books 1-VI, Jihe yuanben 几何
原本, done by Matteo Ricci, S. J. (1552-1610) and Chinese mathematician, Xu Guangqi
徐光启(1562-1633) in 1607. (The rest of nine books (Books 7-15) of Elements was
translated by the Protestant missionary Alexander Wylie and Chinese mathematician Li
Shannan 李善兰 (1811-1882) in 1857). Their efforts and contributions provide a good
case for us to study how a mutual understanding between two very different language
games could be possible.
The contemporary philosopher Richard Rorty suggests that it would be extremely hard
to introduce a notion, even one as simple as the concept of “pain,” to another group of
people who lack it in their language game. The concepts in a language are related, and
one cannot grasp one concept without understanding a whole set of other concepts in
the language game.
Although it is a fact that the discourse between Chinese and Westerners often
encounters problems and misunderstandings, Matteo Ricci’s and Xu Guangqi’s effort in
bridging the East and the West could be a meaningful case study in clarifying how
accurate one can understand the rules in another language game, and further to
understand another unfamiliar culture. To study thinking patterns, which normally
backup human thought and reasoning, brings in an inquiring of the differences between
Chinese and western ways of thinking at the logical level. In this paper, I shall explore
how Matteo Ricci, as a traditional Aristotelian thinker, tried hard to adopt Confucian
terms and ways of teaching. In doing so, Ricci turns to be one of earliest western
thinkers who can think within and outside the box.
First of all, I shall discuss the gap caused by different thinking rules between Chinese
and Western logics. I argue that while Aristotelian thinkers separate the logical world
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from the real one, Chinese thinkers show no such attempt. The former, based on a
presumption that there is an order in the universe, studies logical patterns for reaching
logical certainty in deductive logic and seeks for the high probability in inductive logic.
On the contrast, the latter, based on a presumption that everything is changing, seeks
for associative properness, zheng 正, in doing reasoning, which can be examined from
different perspectives. Secondly, I shall exam how an analogical argument, as an
important associative logical tool, functions in Chinese ways of reasoning. Analogical
arguments are also recognized and carefully used in Aristotelian induction, in which it is
concluded that two entities are alike in one or more respects. After Ricci arrived in
China, he soon learned how to use analogical arguments to discuss with Neo-Confucian
scholars, including Xu Guangqi. Starting from there, he introduced Aristotelian
understanding of Truth and Validity to Chinese mathematicians. Thirdly, I shall further
focus on a particular rule, ostensive definitions, or pointing out, which is a rule used by
both Ricci and Chinese mathematicians in learning from one and another. According to
Aristotelian logic, an ostensive definition is a demonstrative definition in which the
objects denoted by the term being defined are referred to by means of pointing, or with
some other gesture. For Chinese mathematicians, using pointing out to demonstrate
associations, one can reach zheng 正, associative properness. Pointing out turns to be
a rule which can open possible paths to understand logical validity. Xu Guangqi’s
strong curiosity in accurate proofs echoes Ricci’s effort. With some compromises,
Aristotelian deductive logic is finally introduced to Chinese via Elements, a Geometry
text.
The conclusion of this paper is that Chinese logic and Aristotelian logic are very
different. The effort of seeking for zheng, associative properness has no comparison to
seeking for logical validity. However, the attempts to understand the unfamiliar and the
novelty are commonalities of human beings. To understand different ways of thinking,
efforts must be made from both sides. The discourse between Jesuits and Chinese
mathematicians in 17th century is an excellent example of having an open mind for a
sense of wonderings. This is the hope for human knowledge and mutual
understanding.
YUSA, Michiko (Western Washington University)
"Topological Existence: Panikkar & Nishida"
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ZHANG, Peter (Grand Valley State University)
“Beijing Hot, Beijing Cool”
This article uses McLuhan’s notions of hot and cool as heuristics to advance a critique
of the city of Beijing as a living and lived material-symbolic complex. It both extends the
applicability of these notions and draws attention to their paradoxical coexistence when
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the analysis becomes specific. The article ends by calling for a cooler Beijing, a society
to come.
The main function of the city as a node is the production of subjectivity.
– Félix Guattari (1985, p. 460)
ZHANG, Xi-Wen Verena (Tunghai University, Taiwan)
“Space, Architecture, and Meanings in the Italian Renaissance and the Chinese
Song Dynasty”
Immanuel Kant in his Critique of the Power of Judgment addresses that “taste can be
called sensus communis with greater justice than can the healthy understanding, an
that the aesthetic power of judgment rather than the intellectual can bear the name of
communal sense.” In the sense, when we gaze the ceremonial space, the Saladei
Baroni of the “Castello Aragonese”, why its beautiful star vault astonish us so much?
The vault was constructed “about the 85-foot (26-meter)-square space to a height of
nearly 92 feet (28 meters).” Its Spanish architect Guillermo Sagrera “transformed the
square space into an octagon by constructing squinches in its corners.” He set eight
primary ribs springing out of the wall and converging toward a central oculus. In this
way, the vault was divided into several harmonious parts in which present a
combination of Gothic and ancient styles. It reminds us one of the masterpieces of
Renaissance architecture, the Dome of the Cathedral in Florence (1418-1436) which
was constructed about 100-foot high (30.5 m), 459-foot diameter (140 m), and
“the diameter of the octagonal crossing meausres nearly 140 feet (43 m), almost as
great as the Pantheon in Rome.” The octagonal form of the Dome deviated from the
classical hemispherical; Brunelleschi used eight visible ribs and sixteen concealed
one—“in a manner similar to the construction of Gothic vaults.” Another kind of
transformation of Chinese pagoda from square to octagon is from the Period of
Simplicity (ca. 500-900) to the Period of Elaboration (ca. 1000-1300); in the former
period, there the square form of one-storied, multi-storied, multi-eaved pagodas
prevailed in China. After the end of Tang dynasty, one-storied pagoda disappeared; “the
octagonal form became the norm and the square plan the exception.” “The octagonal
pagoda which first appeared in the Tomb Pagoda of Ching-tsang in 746...” The term of
pagoda may be a kind of southern pronunciation of Chinese “pa-chiao-t’a”—“pa-kot’a” meaning “eight-cornered pagoda”. Chinese architect, Liang Ssu-ch’eng in his A
Pictorial History of Chinese Architecture mentions: The word “pagoda” instead of “t’a” is
deliberately used in this book because it is accepted in all the European languages as
the name for such a monument. The very fact that the word finds its way into almost
every European dictionary as the name for the Chinese t’a may reflect the popularity
of the octagonal plan at the opening of Western contact. It’s hard to say that the
Italian Gothic, eight-corner form have any genetic relation to Chinese pagoda. However,
we may ask why this form had been prevailing in Europe (France, Spain, Italy...) and in
Asia (e.g. India and China). What communal sense this form aroused in human
beings? What is the meaning transmitted by this form? What functions of architecture
with this form serve for? What’s the relation between space and architecture with this
form in the Italian Renaissance Renaissance and in Chinese Song dynasty?
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Firstly, this paper aims to answer the above questions and besides, it relates to some
theoretical questions proposed by Robert David Sack in his Conceptions of Space in
Social Thought: A Geographical Perspective and explores them when connecting with
the above questions. Secondly, The meaning of relation between space and
architecture may refer to the problem of subjective and objective meaning raised by
Immaneul Kant in his Critique of the Power of Judgment on philosophical, aesthetic
level. Thirdly, it also relates Talcott Parsons’s theory of social system, especially the
relation between political subsystem and society as a whole. In conclusion, this paper
tries to compare space, architecture, and meanings in the Italian Renaissance to that in
the Chinese Song dynasty through philosophical, geographical, historical and
sociological dimensions.
ZHANG, Yue (University of Exeter, UK)
“The Scholars’ Garden: A Place of Confucian Rituals and Freedom”
[Subthemes: The Place of the Personal; Place and Culture; Place and the
Political]
This paper argues that the Chinese scholars’ garden is a place for developing
Confucian personhood and achieving Confucian freedom through ritualistic practices of
the arts. Building upon the arguments of Hahm (2001), Li (2010) and Zhuang (2013),
the paper challenges conventional understanding of scholars’ gardens as places
embodying the Daoist concept of individual, escapist freedom.
The Confucian emphasis on ritual propriety and self-discipline is often considered as the
antithesis of the Daoist individual freedom. Hahm (2001) using a Foucaultian
perspective, argues that the Confucian practices of self-discipline do not inhibit
individual freedom—but rather such practices are indispensable for the proper practice
of freedom, which Hahm identifies not with individual freedom, but rather with the
creation of a free or better society.
Hahm’s view may be complemented by Li Zehou’s (2010) discussion of the Confucian
ideology of ‘rites-music mutuality’ (li yue fu he). Li demonstrates that the Confucian view
of self-discipline or ritual propriety is not merely about using external forces (e.g. rites,
laws, moral codes) to restrict the body (behaviours), but more importantly, using the
means of music (yue) or art – inner forces—to cultivate the body, i.e. to affect one’s
inner psyche (emotions, understanding, imagination and ideas) which one’s actions
reveal. Music or art, therefore, are not excluded from Confucian rituals, but complement
to rites, a quintessential form of Confucian ritual practice. Rites, together with music or
art both mould or temper the individual’s psyche and similarly shaped the social order,
thus allowing Confucian freedom.
A Chinese scholar’s garden, as I suggest elsewhere (2012, 2015), is a place for
practising the arts (e.g. poetry, calligraphy, music) through which Confucian personhood
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is developed. Reading both Confucian classical texts and scholars’ garden essays, I
argue, in light of the above, that a scholars’ garden emerged through the sustained
Confucian ritual practices of the arts. Instead of being a place to pursue Daoist
individual freedom, the scholars’ garden is a place where the scholar harmonizes both
his (rarely her) self and socio-political relations, thus practising freedom in a Confucian
or Foucaultian sense—to create a better society.
ZHENG, Dongping, Yang LIU, Daniel HOLDEN, Jared TOMEI (University of
Hawai’i)
“A Relational Space for Language Learners’ Mobility between Built and Natural
Environments”
Language learning in classrooms can imply the reinforcement of abstract rule-learning
first and language use in its aftermath. “Place” is a secondary phenomenon, rather than
a lived and functional space that is relationally and temporally meaningful.
This paper aims to rethink the function of classrooms, a conventional learning space, to
expand the ecology of language learning to natural and sociocultural places where
learning while doing on the fly is of a normative practice. In place-based learning,
learning materials are used as resources. Learners are brought out of the safe haven as
protected by well-defined textbook boundaries, teacher expectations and classroom
norms. Learners are forced to encounter strangers, odd things, and texts not written for
language learners. The same place offers different features to natives vs. non-native
speakers. Perception of place results from cultural experiences, which gives rise to
different action potentiality (Chemero, 2009). Being in places extends language to
things, signs, actions, and a sense of normativity (dialogical third parties in Linell’s
sense (2009). Taking action in places cultivates and attunes learners’ affectivity to care
for the world and themselves.
We use examples of language learners’ play of a mobile game, Guardian of Mo‘o
locating Hawaiian culture within UH campus diversity and cultural artifacts along the
East-West Road. The game was designed using concepts of place, and never-ending
perception and action cycles with the affordances of virtual and real world spaces for
action taking; and therefore to demonstrate the technologically enabled meshed spaces
for language learners’ wayfinding.
ZHENG, Yujian (Lingnan University, Hong Kong)
“The Place of the Second Nature in the Diachronic First Nature”
This paper aims at revealing a paramountly important feature of the place of rational
beings in the universe, a feature inextricably embedded in natural evolution or
cosmological contingent processes that, with no supernatural design, ultimately have
produced creatures who can legitimately and inevitably assume the ‘design stance’ to
understand almost everything in their environments as well as cosmological history.
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To facilitate this aim, I argue for a special notion of modality, i.e., retrospective
necessity, that distinguishes itself both from causal/nomological necessity and from
conceptual/apriori necessity. It is, in one sense, akin to Kripkean style aposteriori
necessity but, in at least two important aspects, irreducibly unique: firstly, it is
associated with the ex post facto perspective of an end-product of some multistep
lottery-like (natural) games, regardless of the epistemic status of the product; secondly,
the objectively attributable retrospective necessity (in a weak sense) to the product’s
upstream causal chain would only gain its full logical status when the endogenous
product, or surviving species, become epistemic rational beings, beings capable not
only of self-legislation in the space of reasons but simultaneously also of normative
retrospective endowment/ascription of content to their evolutionary predecessors.
I will conclude the argument with an illuminating comparison of this generic notion of
retrospective necessity with the (weak version of) Anthropic Principle in cosmology, with
an eye to showing the latter’s special significance in re-enchanting nature as well as our
unique place in it.
ZHU, Fengqing (Harbin Institute of Technology, China)
“Five Trends in Confucian Studies”
For over a decade, Confucian studies has gone through several evolutions and
developments. From 2010 to today,this area has delivered a number of the fine
scholars.In this paper, I will analyze and compare five current trends in Confucian
studies:
1. Global-Contextualism. Generally ,contextualism means that any system of claims,
value, and activities cannot be understood outside of the real cultural context in which
they occur. For many scholars, to understand the philosophical background of
contextualism is very helpful in exploring the real meanings of these crucial concepts in
Confucianism. A modern practice of classical Confucianism requires a contextualist
interpretation of the world. As virtue, consequential or normative ethics, Confucianism
should be contextualized, globalized, and developed as the moderm way of thinking
emphasizing rationality and practice over traditional considerations. For this reason,
there has been a dramatic shift toward a more contextualist methodology. Some of
these methodologies attempt to reinterpret Confucian thought through the contextualism
of globalized sinology.
2. Asian-Modernism. Some scholars disclose in meticulous detail the relevance of
Confucianism to the contemporary world. It is popular to divide Confucianism into
traditionalist and modernist forms. “New Confucianism” (different from NeoConfucianism) can be regarded as modernist Confucianism that incorporates modern
interpretations and practices for nowadays needs.There have been significant
discussion of the intercourse and interaction between Confucian developmentalism and
Western models.
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3. Asian-Americanism. Asian American have quite recently emerged as an increasingly
important force in American politics. Asian American voices have been prominent in
policy debates over such matters as education, race relations, and immigration reform.
4. Multi-Comparativism. More and more scholars have tried to construct an effective
paradigm for a critical comparativism and multi-comparativism in the field of Confucian
studies through Western philosophical hermeneutics. Some of them have provided
applicable approaches to study Confucian through new or contemporary comparativism.
We may reveal the development and main tendencies of new type of comparativism.
5. Classical-Textualism. Some scholars lean to “classical textualism.” “Classical
textualism” demands rigid adherence to the Confucian text, and stresses that
Confucianism can be understood only by interpreting the original words of the
Confucian classics. Conservative scholars advocate an historical understanding of
words, and the liberal ones prefer a more modern understanding of words. More and
more scholars attempt to adopt the “classical textualism” or integral, complete and
comprehensive textualism to overcome the fragmented textualism they believe is
distoring original Confucian teachings.
I will offer an overview of these five trends revealing how each of them comprise a
significant movement in Confucian studies. In addressing each, I will provide certain
theoretical critiques and the responses to those critiques. The main thrust of this issue
is to examine the simlarities and differences among those scholarly inquiries as well as
to justify those research programs that are debatable, controversial, and even confusing.
In each movement I have in effect discussed certain types of challenges against
“orthodox prejudice,” and also compared and contrasted them through a philosophical
perspective. The significance of those trends is two-fold: it argues for a new stage in the
development of contemporary Confucian studies, and it extends the Confucius thought
to Western scholars and people.
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