Post-transitional Justice in Spain:
Passing the Historical Memory Law
Nadia Hajji
Undergraduate Honors Thesis
Sanford School of Public Policy
Duke University
Durham, NC
Hajji
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................. 3
I. Introduction.................................................................................................................……. 4
II. Background.................................................................................................................…… 5
III. Methods.................................................................................................................…….. 13
IV. Results..............................................................................................................................
A. Section 1: International Context……………………….......................................
B.
Section 2: Generational Turnover.........................................................................
C. Section 3: Political Considerations.………..........................................................
18
18
28
35
V. Conclusion.......................................................................................................................... 45
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................................................... 48
Hajji
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my advisors, Professor Sarah Bermeo, Professor
Judith Kelley and Professor Ken Rogerson, for their continual availability
and support in my research and writing process. Many thanks also to the
generous support of the Sanford School of Public Policy that enabled me
to conduct research and interviews in Madrid and to the Duke University
librarians for their kind assistance. I am indebted to all those who
participated in my interviews for donating their time and offering
invaluable insights into my topic. Finally, special thanks to my mom and
family for accompanying me through the process and being such a strong
support system in this, and all my endeavors.
2
Hajji
ABSTRACT
This honors thesis traces the origin of the post-transitional justice
efforts by the Spanish government to recognize and offer reparations
for the human rights crimes committed during the Spanish Civil War
and subsequent Franco dictatorship. After a delay of at least thirty
years, the Historical Memory Law, passed in 2007, is regarded as one
of Spain’s most ambitious measures to address its past human rights
violations. This thesis argues that three main factors encouraged the
Law’s passage. First, Spanish involvement in foreign social justice
shined a spotlight on Spain’s own unsettled past. Secondly, the
maturation of a younger generation that evaded the worst years of the
dictatorship turned public opinion in favor of reparation. Finally, the
Law was introduced under opportune political circumstances and
encompassed minimal reparations to receive the necessary
congressional vote.
3
Hajji
4
Introduction
Transitional justice, defined as “the array of legal and political mechanisms devised to
hold departing authoritarian regimes accountable for their political transgressions,” has been
particularly relevant in the past few decades.1 This field of study began with the Nuremburg
trials in the 1940s, and was popularized by a worldwide wave of democratization, from
southern Europe to Latin America, that occurred around the 1980s. Most transitioning
countries, such as Portugal and Chile, immediately pursued accountability and reparation
measures for crimes committed by their fallen authoritarian regimes. However, Spain is
distinctive in its decision to ignore the human rights violations of Francisco Franco’s
dictatorship, fearing that it would destabilize the new democracy.2 Nevertheless, the country
was unable to bury its past forever, and eventually Spain was confronted with demands, both
foreign and domestic, to pursue what can be referred to as “post-transitional justice.”3
Pressure climaxed in 2006, and in October 2007 the country achieved a monumental piece of
justice legislation, the Historical Memory Law.4 Scholars have speculated on the motivations
behind this surge of renewed concern for Francoist crimes, yet only limited analysis of
Spain’s recent accountability and reparation measures has been offered, and explanations are
incomplete. This paper strives to contribute to this sparsely researched area of Spanish social
justice. The factors contributing to the passage of the Historical Memory Law, one of the
first, and certainly most important, reparation measures in Spain passed to date, can help
Encarnación, O. G. (2012). Justice in Times of Transition: Lessons from the Iberian Experience.
International Studies Quarterly, 56(1): 179.
2
Aguilar, P. (2008). Transitional or Post-transitional Justice? Recent Developments in the Spanish Case. South
European Society and Politics, 13(4): 418.
3
Urdillo, U. (2011). Impunity for enforced disappearances in contemporary Spain: the Spanish search for truth.
Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law, 6(1): 41
4
Boyd, Carolyn P. (2008). The Politics of History and Memory in Democratic Spain. Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 617(1), 144.
1
Hajji
5
illustrate why accountability for Franco era crimes became an issue on the political agenda so
many years later. This thesis attempts to situate Spain's passage of the Historical Memory
Law in relation to the international, generational and political environments and thus elucidate
the questions "why now?" and "why not before?"
Background
The Crimes of the Franco Regime
Francisco Franco’s dictatorship in Spain from 1939 to 1975 began after a gruesome
three year long Civil War between the Republicans, who were loyal to the established Spanish
Republic, and the Nationalists, a rebel group led by General Franco. Although the Civil War
itself resulted in an estimated 300,000 deaths, an even greater number of Spanish citizens
suffered Francoist repression during the forty years that followed the Republican defeat. The
crimes of the Franco regime can be divided into two phases: the years 1939 to 1947 that
immediately followed the war and those that occurred in a more stable period around 1947 to
1975. The most serious crimes occurred during the former period, yet the political crimes
continued throughout the latter.5
As part of a deliberate system of revenge, Francoist troops targeted civilians in locales
of Republican support in the immediate post-war years.6 Around 440,000 Republicans were
exiled immediately after the war, 10,000 of whom would die in Nazi concentration camps.
As part of Franco’s deliberate system of revenge, numerous individuals were killed, tortured
or imprisoned under the justification of the 1939 Law of Political Responsibilities. Mass
Tamarit Sumalla, Josep María. (2011). Transition, Historical Memory and Criminal Justice in Spain. Journal
of International Criminal Justice, 9(3), 733.
6
Davis, Madeleine. (2005). Is Spain Recovering its Memory? Breaking the Pacto del Olvido. Human Rights
Quarterly, 27(3), 859-863.
5
Hajji
6
trials and executions occurred regularly, and Franco showed little restraint in signing death
warrants. Some 400,000 people were subjected to forced labor, prison time or internment
camps. The number of these “official” victims, who suffered directly from repression
policies, is ambiguous, while the number of those who were terrorized, kidnapped and
murdered in secret is almost impossible to determine. Children were separated from their
Republican parents, who were ruled unfit to raise them, and were often adopted into families
of Franco loyalists with name changes. Although many of these crimes continued well into
the second phase, later violations by the Franco regime consisted more of political sentencing
and a liberal system of torture against government opponents. Special courts, including the
Tribunal de Orden Público (Public Order Court) and War Councils, were major players in this
political repression.7
Forgetting the Past
Despite this horrifying past, or perhaps because of it, after Franco’s death in 1975 and
the subsequent transition to democracy, Spain chose to forego any system of accountability.
There was an attempted coup d’état in 1981, where the Civil Guard tried to reinstate the
military government of the past thirty-five years. Although the coup failed, it demonstrated
the precariousness of the new democracy. In response, victims choose to protect the
country’s democratic achievements at the expense of reparation. There was no attempt to
establish truth, but rather Spain adhered to an unspoken so-called “Pacto del Silencio” or
“Pacto de Olvido” (Pact of Silence).8 The first democratic Parliament after the dictatorship
passed an Amnesty Law in October 1977, pardoning all political crimes, regardless of nature
7
8
Tamarit-Sumalla 733.
Davis 858.
Hajji
7
or outcome. Amnesty extended to murders by terrorist organizations and by the Franco
regime against its enemies.9 This path, many scholars have argued, allowed for a peaceful
governmental transition and helped stabilize the new democracy.10 Still, a general consensus
exists that this law is unconstitutional and incompatible with international human rights law.11
Nevertheless, amnesty may have been appropriate for Spain at the time. In fact,
despite its neglect of justice processes, Spain’s transition is regarded as a model for securing
strong democratic outcomes after a dictatorship. Conversely, Portugal’s proactive
investigations into past crimes during its transition compromised democratic stability. The
pursuits became a witch-hunt, distracting from political reconciliation.12 In accordance with
this example, the UN historically has actually supported laws granting amnesty and
preventing prosecution as a means to restore peace and solidify democratic governments.13
Nevertheless, in choosing this method of transition, Spain did not fully close the tragic
chapter of its past.
Several obstacles perpetuated Spain’s pact of silence and hindered judicial inquiry into
Franco violations. The first obstacle concerns statutes of limitations embedded in most legal
systems, Spain’s included. These statutes insure that prosecution for crimes occur only within
a reasonable period after they are committed. However counter-arguments hold that the
statute does not apply because the disappearances have not been solved, making them
ongoing crimes. Another obstacle pertains to basic due process rights for the accused, which
cannot be upheld since the deceased are unable to defend themselves.14 Some say that
Tamarit Sumalla 734.
Encarnación 183.
11
Tamarit Sumilla 734; Barbeito 258; Encarnación 186
12
Encarnación 79.
13
Guarino, Angela M. (2010). Chasing ghosts: pursuing retroactive justice for Franco-era crimes against
humanity. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 33(1), 68.
14
Guarino 77.
9
10
Hajji
8
fighting to bring justice to crimes whose perpetrators are likely deceased is unproductive, or
that justice towards past regimes is unnecessary and simply unrealistic.15 However, to others
the purpose is not only to bring the guilty to justice, but also to grant reparations to the victims
and redeem their right to truth.16
Law of Historic Memory
While Spain evaded a transitional justice process in the early stages of the new
government, the country could not hide its past transgressions indefinitely. The Franco
regime human rights violations were neglected for decades, until around 2000 when the nongovernmental organization Association for the Recuperation of Historical Memory (ARHM)
was created to assist private initiatives in exhuming mass graves and investigating the fate of
disappeared persons.17 A “fever for remembering” occurred in 2006, when the Spanish public
pressed to acknowledge the truth of Franco regime crimes.18
Shortly after the ARMH was created, Spain for the first time officially acknowledged
the actions of Franco’s dictatorship as “unjust”19 by passing the Historical Memory Law in
October 2007. The Law received international and domestic attention and was regarded as a
milestone in addressing the country’s silenced past. However, in an attempt to achieve broad
appeal, the Law intentionally did not refer to any historical or collective memory; it did not
establish an account of what human rights violations took place or condemn the regime for its
actions. It simply recognized each citizen’s right to “personal and family memory,” or his or
Ibid 85.
Barbeito, M. Z. (2010). Investigating the Crimes of the Franco Regime: Legal Possibilities, Obligations of
the Spanish State and Duties Towards the Victims. International Criminal Law Review, 10(2): 261.
17
Ferrándiz, Francisco. (2013). Exhuming the defeated: Civil War mass graves in 21st‐ century Spain.
American Ethnologist, 40(1), 41.
18
Erice, Francisco. (2006). Combates por el pasado y apologías de la memoria, a propósito de la represión
franquista. Hispania Nova: Revista de historia contemporánea.
19
Urdillo 52.
15
16
Hajji
9
her right to investigate crimes that pertained directly to their families.20 The bill created a
process for victims to seek a “Declaration of Reparations and Personal Recognition,”
enhanced the pensions of Republican survivors and Francoist political prisoners and
instructed local administrative units to help locate and exhume mass graves. Further, it
required removal of partisan commemorative symbols and prohibited political acts at the
Valley of the Fallen, Franco’s burial site.21
While the Socialist Worker’s Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, or PSOE)
introduced the Historical Memory Law expecting quick, unanimous passage, the political
process for the Law proved unexpectedly contentious. The country’s two main political
parties, the center-left PSOE and the center-right Popular Party (Partido Popular, or PP) had
both been active in the debate for retroactive justice in Spain. The PP objected the proposal
for the Law in its entirety, accusing the PSOE of attempting to destroy the democratic
transition.22 Some attribute the PP’s position to the public ties party members and their
families had to Franco’s institutions.23 Whatever the case, the political process became highly
publicized and controversial, yet eventually Congress agreed upon a revised version of the
legislation, which passed with 127 votes for and 119 against (115 of which were from the
PP).24
Breaking the Silence
Boyd 146.
Ibid.
22
Ibid 145.
23
Urdillo 52.
24
Ibid, 56.
20
21
Hajji 10
It is uncertain what caused the new push for Spanish transitional justice that
materialized in the Historic Memory Law. Transitional justice literature suggests that ethical
principles do not drive pursuits for accountability and reparations, but rather a combination of
other elements condition the process.25 Thus to discover why the Law of Historical Memory
passed in 2007 and not a previous year, a one must conduct not an ethical examination, but
rather a situational one.
The conversation for justice is not exclusively domestic, but rather foreign
governments and organizations have interest in the matter. Some research26 claims that active
advocacy, including international advocacy, is key in guaranteeing prosecution of human
rights crimes. Lobbying and political strategy by the international community, in their
opinion, is consequential.27 Additionally, geographic proximity to strong international
forces28 and the desire and perceived need to enter the “European family” may favor
transitional justice.29 Whether and how these international factors played a role in the Spanish
pursuit of justice is discussed in Section 1 of this thesis.
Still, the local community and public opinion likely overshadow the influence of the
international community.30 In transitioning countries, retroactive justice is not intended to
deter further crime, but rather is a way to validate the rights of citizens and legitimize the
young democratic government. The new state authority must address these violations;
otherwise it may be construed as retroactively supporting the perpetrators.31 Eijkman explains
Encarnación 180; Brito 15.
Kim, H. J. (2012). Structural determinants of human rights prosecutions after democratic transition. Journal
of Peace Research, 49(2): 305-320.
27
Aguilar 15.
28
Encarnación 83.
29
Brito 5-27.
30
Eijkman, Q. (2010). Recognising the Local Perspective: Transitional Justice and Post-Conflict Reparations.
Global Jurist U6, 10(3): 1-16.
31
Seibert-Fohr, A. (2009). Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations. Oxford, Oxford UP, UK, 7.
25
26
Hajji 11
that public opinion on the priority of justice determines the appropriateness of these
prosecutions.32 Internal pressure is examined in Section 2 by comparing the Spanish populace
of 2006, when the Historical Memory Law was introduced, to that of previous periods.
Finally, differing ideas on retribution and reparations often become attached to
political parties, making politics a crucial element in transitional justice. The agendas of these
parties can mobilize demands for justice, and other political factors, such as institutions, can
shape the way a country confronts its difficult past.33 For example, Spain’s Populist Party and
the PSOE have been strategic in advocating for and against reparations, even defining justice
attempts as an attack on the foundation of Spanish democracy.34 Political explanations such
as these are explored in Section 3 for the Historical Memory Law.
Although modest compared to the desires of the political left, the Historical Memory
Law attempted to break the country’s silence and amnesia towards the past human rights
violations. In this thesis, political debate, interviews and media reporting surrounding the
passage of the Historical Memory Law are used to give evidence for the proposed motivations
behind the justice concerns in Spain. In the subsequent sections, I argue that the bill came at a
time of renewed interest in Francoism and the Civil War. The interest occurred when the
country was finally stable enough to address the past without jeopardizing its democracy.
International criminal law and victims’ rights developments encouraged initial self-reflection
in the country. Further, an increasing number of Spanish citizens felt a moral obligation to
right past wrongs. These citizens were part of an emerging new generation of social and
political participants that were replacing those who actually lived through the Civil War and
Eijkman 8.
Brito 115.
34
Aguilar 15.
32
33
Hajji 12
early years of the dictatorship. Finally, the politicians found reparation electorally favorable
in 2006, and negotiated to ensure the Law’s passage. Thus, looking at the international,
generational and political contexts gives a comprehensive understanding of the push factors
for the Historical Memory Law.
Hajji 13
METHODS
Parliamentary dialogues retrieved from the Spanish Congress of Deputies online
journal were examined to assess the political debate on the Historical Memory Law. These
journals were obtained from the website of the Congreso de Diputados, www.congreso.es,
which provided the journals by parliament session. The particular journals analyzed were
retrieved by searching speeches in the eighth legislative session (2004-2008) under the
keywords “Guerra civil y la dictadura.” These terms were chosen because the original law
was introduced under the title, “Proyecto de Ley por la que se reconocen y amplían derechos
y se establecen medidas en favor de quienes padecieron persecución o violencia durante la
Guerra Civil y la Dictadura.” The search yielded three journals from the dates October 31,
2007, December 14, 2006, and November 11, 2006. On these dates the debate of the Law
was recorded, with members of each parliamentary party speaking on particulars of the bill,
offering amendments and expressing overall support or concerns. The political parties who
spoke on the bill included: the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE), who were the ruling
party of the time responsible for introducing the law; the Democratic Popular Party (PP); the
Vasco Party; the Parliamentary Coalition of the Canaries and New Canaries; the Catalan
Parliamentary Group; the United Left; the Republican Left of Catalonia; and the Mixed Group
comprised of 9 members belonging to parties not large enough to create their own
parliamentary group.
In each session, members of all parties contributed to the debate of the Historical
Memory Law. An entry was added for each additional member who spoke on the law for
each session. Multiple comments by a single member were recorded within a single entry.
Generally, in each session only one speaker for each party would speak on behalf of the entire
Hajji 14
party, expressing all the positions, concerns and opinions of that group. Therefore, in total
there were 36 entries that represented the stance of all parties in Congress at the time, rather
than the opinions of every individual. The debate was analyzed for several factors. First, to
evaluate the political receptiveness on the law, opinions and complaints on the bill were
monitored. Complaints were tracked in areas where justice was considered to be still
incomplete after the Law was passed, according to findings from the literature review, while
any complaints outside of these categories were documented as “other complaints.” The
tracked areas included:
1.) complaints about the Valley of the Fallen;
2.) proper documentation of the dictatorship and Civil War;
3.) sufficient recognition of victims/apology;
4.) condemnation the Franco regime, establishment of a truth commission;
5.) concrete policy on the exhumation of mass graves;
6.) annulment of summary judgments during the Franco regime; and
7.) prosecution of perpetrators of human rights violations.
A complaint was considered any comment that was disapproving towards, critical of
or opposed to the bill. A “complaint” was not necessarily negative in tone, but also included
any constructive comment that suggested changes, ways to improve or personal desires for the
bill that were not addressed by the bill. Additionally, to assess overall satisfaction with the
bill, a parliamentary member’s overall interpretation of the law was tracked as either
“sufficient,” “insufficient” or “neutral.” Interpretations as “insufficient” were readily
apparent in speeches that referred to the bill as “lacking,” “not enough,” “disappointing,” or
simply “insufficient.” If explicit language was not used, then speeches that contained
Hajji 15
arguments for further reparation were marked as “insufficient” interpretations, while those
that lacked such arguments and expressed optimism or satisfaction with the law were marked
“sufficient.” When an argument did not clearly fall into these categories, or when there were
conflicting interpretations in the same argument, it was marked as neutral.
The congressional debate entries were tagged with the political party each respective
speaker affiliated with. This allowed for analysis by political party to better see how politics
affected the shaping and passage of the law. Furthermore, references to the international
community, such as international human rights law, Spanish involvement with the case of
Pinochet or international interest groups such as Amnesty International, were documented.
These references were important to assess what role the international community played in
passing the law, such as creating pressure, and to gauge how often the international stage was
used in the debate. Finally, the congressional debate was tracked for any evidence of a
generational change that occurred within Spain and the congressional representatives. For
example, if a member stressed a need to do justice for his or her grandparents or alluded to an
inability to pass the law previously because of the unstable democracy, his or comment was
included in generational tracking.
I supplemented congressional debate data with interviews done in person in Madrid,
Spain in the summer of 2013. These interviews were designed to obtain opinions of those
familiar with the Historical Memory Law, such as its benefits and drawbacks. Furthermore,
these interviews were used for insight into why the bill was on the political agenda, public
opinion on the law and overall aspects of the debate that may not have been acquired through
analysis of journal and newspaper documents. Lastly, information gathered from these
interviews was used to enhance the background information of the transitional justice process
Hajji 16
in Spain, where my interviewees were used as experts in this field of study.
My primary interview was with Carlos Castresana-Fernandez, a renowned Spanish
prosecutor, criminal law professor, and head of the International Commission against
Organized Crime in Guatemala (CICIG). He has a particular interest in the Spanish justice
due to his work with Superior Courts of Justice of Madrid and Catalonia, as well as in the
Special Prosecutor’s Offices against Corruption. Castresana-Fernandez is an expert in
international human rights, winning the National Award for Human Rights in Spain in 1997
and the Human Rights Award from the Argentina Association of Human Rights in 1999. The
interview took place on August 29, 2013.
Further interviews were conducted with Patricia Esteban, a local of Madrid and
professor on literature of Spanish history at the Universidad San Pablo; with Juan Pulgar, a
lawyer in Madrid; and with Pilar Pulgar, a Spanish mother and worker who lived through the
Franco dictatorship.
As a final source of data, post-transitional justice arguments for the Historical Memory
Law were analyzed using the two most circulated newspapers in Spain: El País and El
Mundo. El País has a loosely liberal affiliation, and El Mundo is loosely conservative.
Therefore using both of these sources insured inclusion of the most relevant articles and a
representative sample of arguments associated with both ideologies. Furthermore, I was able
to compare the coverage of both of these newspapers for partisan differences. Articles and
opinion pieces were gathered from 1990 to 2013 in the LexisNexis database, using search
terms corresponding to the Historical Memory Law, human rights and the Franco dictatorship.
Duplicate articles and editorials were eliminated, as well as false positives that did not refer
directly to the above search criteria. News coverage was quantified as the number of articles
Hajji 17
within certain time frames that referenced the Law of Historical Memory, Franco,
international human rights and indications of generational changes, such as appeals to justice
for grandparents. Particularly relevant articles were individually cited.
This system yielded support for the argument that the Historical Memory Law passed
due to the peculiar situation of the international community, the generational evolution within
Spain, and the fact that the law was, in many senses, inadequate. The results are outlined in
the discussion below.
Hajji 18
Results
Section 1: International Context
The renewed interest in justice and accountability that occurred in the 2000s in Spain,
after years of observance of the pacto de olvido, was situated in a unique moment on the
international stage and in the evolution of the international law itself. Though there were not
direct international demands, the establishment over time of international human rights law,
Spain’s involvement in foreign transitional justice and the international repose all served as a
confluence of international push factors for Spanish social justice.
Active International Pressure
Spain was not required to address its past human rights violations by the international
communities it joined following the democratic transition. Spain joined the Council of
Europe in 1977, yet the Council did not impose entry requirements pertaining to Franco-era
crimes. Although this Council in 1950 forged the European Convention of Human Rights, an
international treaty to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe, they did not
attempt to apply this doctrine retroactively to Spain (HREA 2011). The country’s subsequent
entry into the European Union in 1986 similarly occurred without any condition relating to
Spain’s pursuit of accountability.
More recently, the European Union has strictly imposed such reparation conditions on
countries before granting membership. For Serbia, important democratic standards were
demanded for entry, including the surrender of all war criminals to the former Yugoslavian
Hajji 19
tribunal.35 Similarly, conditions were imposed on the Czech Republic and all eastern former
members of the Warsaw Pact. Spain and Portugal, however, were both accepted without such
demands.36 Thus, a direct request by the international community never drove the Spanish
pursuit of justice through the Historical Memory Law, nor did the Law have any direct
repercussions for Spain in the international community. 37
Although there were initially no specific demands for Spain to repair Franco victims,
later requests may have resonated with the country. Amnesty International implored Spain to
do justice for the thousands of victims up until38 and even after39 the Historical Memory Law
was passed. These appeals were publicized to the Spanish population through El País in
articles in May and November of 2003. In the May 2003 article, the newspaper offset AI’s
negative commentary on the country’s new Alien Registration Act, with AI’s support of new
initiatives that honor Civil War victims and exhumations of mass graves.40 Likewise the
United Nations human rights office eventually recommended action in Spain in 2002, “to
investigate the disappearance at the hands of Franco regime at least two cases of Republicans
shot after the Civil War.”41 This recommendation was featured in El País on November 16,
2002, and sparked an immediate unprecedented motion in Parliament on November 20
condemning Franco’s uprising in 1936 as an illegal rebellion against a legitimate
35
Barber para. 1.
Dimitropoulou-Hassiotis, M. (2006). A guide to the european union : Institutions, policies, programmes, funds
and entry tests to the EU institutions: Institutions, policies, programmes, funds and entry tests to the EU
institutions. Camberley, Surrey: Porphyrogenitus.
37
C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, Aug. 29, 2013.
38
Spain: Window of opportunity for a fresh start on human rights. (2004, June 11) Amnesty International.
Retrieved Nov. 07, 2013, from http://www.amnesty.org/
39
Spain blocks investigations of Franco-era crimes. (2013, June 17). Amnesty International. Retrieved
November 23, 2013, from http://www.amnesty.org/
40
Espana impulsa una "justicia especial solo para inmigrantes". El País, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
41
UN wants Spain to lift amnesty. (2012). The Nelson Mail, 6.
36
Hajji 20
government.42 This indicates that the Spanish community was aware and responsive to such
requests.
Building International Norms
Through its incorporation in these communities, Spain was contiguous to the
development of international human rights law. Developments began with the Nuremberg
Tribunal in 1945, when the United Nations resolved that atrocities like those of World War II
should never recur. The organization adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
three years later, though this declaration and the similar Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (1992)43 are not legally binding. In contrast, the UN’s
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are legally binding human rights agreements, effective
as of 1976. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted in 1998
and put into effect in 2002, establishing four core international crimes: genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.44 Spain ratified the Rome Statute
in 2000, although the Court did not have retroactive power to look into Spain’s past. Finally
in 2005, drawing on the efforts of previous doctrines, the “Basic Principles and Guidelines on
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” defined and
outlined thirteen necessary parameters of reparation. According to this standard, which is
retroactive in nature, full and effective reparation requires restitution, compensation,
42
La ONU pide que se investigue donde estan enterrados republicanos fusilados tras la guerra. El País,
Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
43
United Nations: General assembly resolution and declaration on the protection of all persons from enforced
disappearance. (1993). International Legal Materials, 32(3), 903-910.
44
The evolution of international criminal law. (1999). Strategic Survey, 100(1), 35-37.
Hajji 21
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.45 Moreover, the parameters
explicitly obligate prosecution of persons allegedly responsible for human rights violations,
provision of proper assistance to victims seeking access to justice, and the inapplicability of
statutes of limitations.46 With the accumulation of all such human rights doctrines, the UN
has a basis for recommendations on handling human rights violations, including the 2002
recommendation to Spain discussed previously. Similarly, as part of the UN community, all
such norms that have retroactive power apply to Spain for Franco violations.
This evolution of criminal law set the stage for Spanish renewed interest in Franco
crimes in the 2000s.47 Almost twenty percent of debate speeches for the Historical Memory
Law cited World War II as the origin of the international criminal law applicable to Spain,
referring to it as the structural basis of European democratic culture,48 the foundation of the
core European value of human rights,49 and acknowledging the 60th anniversary of the
existence of such an international precedent.50 Moreover, thirty six percent of the debate
speeches for the Historical Memory Law speeches explicitly accused Spain of violating
established international human rights doctrines. Figure 2 indicates the distribution of these
accusations over the international human rights doctrines discussed in the previous paragraph.
Moreover, it shows the appearance of these doctrines in the totality of the debate. Because
45
U.N. General Assembly, 64th Session. (2005). Resolution 60/147. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. (A/Res/60/147). AccessUN Readex. (16 Dec. 2005).
46
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation, UN General Assembly, § VII
47
C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, Aug. 29, 2013.
48
Tarda i Coma, J. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Núm. 296. Sesión del 31/10/2007,
p.14621 [http:///www.congreso.es].
49
Xuclà i Costa, J. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Núm. 925. Sesión del 17/10/2007, p.31
[http:///www.congreso.es].
50
Herrera Torres, J. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Núm 222. Sesión del 14/12/2006, p.
11265 [http:///www.congreso.es].
Hajji 22
some speeches mentioned multiple international doctrines, total percentages in the chart are
not out of one hundred.
Figure 1:
International Doctrine
UN International Covenants on
Human Rights
UN Rome Convention
Other UN Doctrine
Council of Europe (European Court
of Human Rights or European
Convention on Human Rights)
General International Human Rights
Norm
% of Debate References
to International Doctrine
(Out of 14)
% of Total Debate
(Out of 36)
35.70%
21.40%
14.30%
13.90%
8.30%
5.60%
28.50%
11.10%
42.90%
16.70%
As the figure shows, 71.4 percent of deputy accusations referred to violation of some
UN human rights doctrine. Most accusations cited non-compliance with UN International
Covenants of Human Rights, followed by neglect of the UN Rome Convention. Other UN
doctrines, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, were mentioned less.
Specifically, Joan Tardà i Coma of the Republican Left on October 31, 2007 argued that,
“[Spain] deliberately ignored UN resolution 95 on the recognition of judgments and the
principles of international law arising from Nuremberg.”51 He referred to the mandatory
subrogation requirement, whereby one person takes over the rights or remedies of another
against a third party, implying that the current Congress was responsible for remedying the
Franco violations against Spanish citizens. Similarly, deputy Begoña Lasagabaster Olazábal
51
Diario Núm 296, 2007, 14620.
Hajji 23
complained that the bill did not adhere to the UN doctrine on war crimes and crimes against
humanity.52
Additionally, 28.5 percent of the accusations, and 11 percent of the entire debate,
referenced human rights developments of the Council of Europe, such as the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR). For example, Aitor Esteban Bravo of the Vasco Group insisted
that the parameters judging the Historical Memory Law should not be limited to the Spanish
constitution, but should include the ECHR.53 Arguments for the existence of a general
international human rights norm appeared in 42.9 percent of the accusations, and a total of
16.7 percent of the debate. Congressional deputies referred to the need to explicitly condemn
the Franco regime and combat historical relativism that paints Franco as a “soft” dictator in
order to abide by this norm.54 Overall, more than fifty percent of the bill debate referenced
some international human rights development.
Moreover El País consistently referred to the UN doctrine on human rights and the
Rome Statute in articles from 2000 to 2008,55 in reporting on such matters as Iraqi,56
Palestinian57 or Euskadi58 terrorism, thus informing the Spanish public of the existence of
such a norm during this time. The Spanish public expressed interest in this international
doctrine on human rights, with 380 opinion pieces on human rights and the UN doctrine in El
País between 2000 and 2007. These findings suggest that international human rights law
Diario Núm. 296, 14611-14633.
Diario Núm. 296, 14619.
54
Joan Herrara Torres. Diario Núm 296, 2007, 14615.
55
380 articles between 2000 and 2008 in El País, retrieved from LexisNexis Academic
56
Fisas, V. (April 26, 2007). Naciones Unidas acusa a Bagdad de ocultar la lista de los civiles muertos. El País,
Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
57
Construir la paz despues de la guerra. El País, Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
58
Ruperez, J. (April 22, 2005). Director ejecutivo del Comite contra el Terrorismo de Naciones Unidas "El 11-M
nos cogio absolutamente desprevenidos." El País, Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
52
53
Hajji 24
informed the political debate and Spanish media, and the Spanish responded to these
international norms around the 2006 introduction of the Historical Memory Law.
The Justice Cascade
Spain was surrounded by a progression in transitional justice in other countries,
beginning with Latin America. Social justice occurred in Chile, Argentina and Guatemala in
the late 1990s;59 ICC cases were brought against Uganda, Congo, Sudan and South Africa in
the early 2000s;60 and truth commissions were created in 25 respective countries during these
two decades.61 These occurrences left people wondering when Spain’s victims would have
their turn for justice. In an opinion piece in El País, Javier Maravall wrote,
“Argentina and Chile, in their democratic transition processes, looked
to the Spanish transition as a model of peaceful and consensual change.
Maybe it's time you España look now to processes that have occurred in
these two brotherly countries to clarify human rights violations that
occurred during the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco (19391975).”62
From 1997 on, El País featured several other opinion pieces contrasting reconciliation
in Spain and in other countries, particularly Argentina and Chile.636465 Spain not only
59
Sikkink 24-47
Situations and Cases. (n.d.). International Criminal Court. Retrieved Oct. 23, 2013, from http://www.icccpi.int/
61
Truth Commissions. (n.d.). Amnesty International. Retrieved November 25, 2013, from
http://www.amnesty.org/en/international-justice/issues/truth-commissions
62
Maravall, Javier. (June 23, 2005). Derechos humanos y guerra civil. El País, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
63
Carrillo, M. (Nov. 28, 1997). Contra la corriente. El País, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic;
64
Tortella, G. (Jan. 29, 2007). Contra la corriente. El País, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic;
60
Hajji 25
witnessed accountability measures in other countries with similar pasts, but also actively
participated in these cases. In 1999, Guatemalan citizen Rigoberta Menchú used the Spanish
High Court to bring a case against the Guatemalan military leadership for human rights
violations against indigenous populations during the civil war. In June 2003, Spanish
judge Baltasar Garzón jailed a former naval officer of the Argentine military dictatorship,
after he was extradited from Mexico to Spain pending trial for genocide and terrorism.
In September 2005, Spain's Constitutional Court ruled that the "principle of universal
jurisdiction prevails over the existence of national interests," allowing the National Court to
reach beyond national borders in cases of torture, terrorism or war crimes, even when no
Spanish victims were involved. Subsequently, the Court on January 11, 2006 initiated an
investigation into seven former Chinese officials, including former President Jiang
Zemin, who allegedly took part in genocide in Tibet. July 7 of that year six Guatemalan
officials were formally charged to appear in the Spanish Court in regard to the Menchú case.
One of Spain’s early probes into foreign human rights crimes, the case of Chilean
dictator Augosto Pinochet, was pivotal in pressure for Spanish vindications on Franco-era
crimes.66 In 1998, Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzón issued an international arrest warrant
for General Pinochet for 94 counts of torture of Spanish citizens and the 1975 assassination of
Spanish politician Carmelo Soria.67 The charges filed by Spain for infractions in, not only
another country, but on another continent, highlighted hypocrisy in the Spanish government.
Martínez Monserrat, R. (Aug. 23, 2011). ¡Qué envidia de Chile!. El País, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
66
C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, Aug. 29, 2013.
67
United States Embassy. Chile. (1991). Rettig report: Synopsis of cases.
65
Hajji 26
Spanish citizens and the international community alike wondered why the country
would provide justice for the victims of another dictatorship, and not for its own victims.68
Such a reflection was seen in sixteen articles in Agence News Press,69 and a range of other
international news sources, such as The New York Times, with one article cleverly entitled, “A
Mother Country's Advice: Do as I Say, Not as I Did.”70 The bulk of such international media
occurred in 1998. Spanish citizens raised the same concerns in El País opinion pieces, with
one professor saying,
“…when we asked that Pinochet be held accountable, we must prove that
there is no contradiction between our peculiar relation with the Franco
dictatorship and the request for Pinochet’s prosecution. Or there must be
very good reasons for holding different criteria.”71
The debate for the Historical Memory Law featured identical sentiments. For
instance, Joan Tardà i Coma noted the “contradiction that Spanish state judges pursue crimes
committed in Chile or Argentina a few years ago instead of in the State itself.”72 In fact, a
third of the debate speeches looked to the legal protection of victims in other countries as
precedents, two-thirds of which directly referred to Spain’s involvement in the Pinochet case.
Although Patricia Esteban conceded a difference in sensitivity when dealing with their own
conflict versus those in other countries, she too felt that Spain’s involvement in foreign justice
issues was “paradoxical.”
C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, Aug. 29, 2013.
Pinochet's death confronts Spain with own painful past. (Dec. 14, 2006). Agence France Presse -- English,
Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
70
Riding, Alan. (Dec. 13, 1998). A Mother Country's Advice: Do as I Say, Not as I Did. The New York Times,
Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
71
Zapatero, Virgilio. (Dec. 18, 1998). Transiciones y Derechos Humanos. El País, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
72
Diario Núm. 925, 2007, 26
68
69
Hajji 27
Deputies mentioned S-21 as another international justice measure they were interested
in replicating within Spain. S-21 was the former Security Prison 21 in Cambodia where as
many as 20,000 prisoners there were killed under the Khmer Rouge regime, and which was
later transformed into the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum. Deputy Herrera Torres wanted a
similar tribute to be made out Spain’s tragic sites.73 El País brought up the happenings with
S-21 in 200474 and 2007,75 familiarizing the Spanish public with how other countries
transformed their sites of past horrors into sites of reconciliation and truth. Additionally,
Esteban saw the Valley of the Fallen, Franco’s mausoleum, as unacceptable in an
international context, citing it as the equivalent of the German population venerating the tomb
of Hitler and having the government protect its architecture. In sum, the international
development of transitional justice was present in the debate for the Historical Memory Law
and used as an appeal for further reparations within Spain.
“Honeymoon” for Justice
In addition to foreign justice precedents, a peacetime situation with Spain’s
international relations made pursuit of reparations plausible in 2006.76
Carlos Castresana-Fernandez, Spanish lawyer, judge and magistrate, refers to periods of
international calm as “honeymoons” for justice.77 The international tranquility after World
War II nurtured the Nuremburg trial process. However, post-World War II justice efforts
were suspended for almost half a century until the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Berlin
73
Diario Núm. 296, 2007, 14615
Reinoso, Jose. (Nov. 21, 2007). Los jemeres rojos se sientan en el banquillo 30 años después. El País,
Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
75
Elorza, Antonio. (April 16, 2004). Religion y violencia. El País, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
76
C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, Aug. 29, 2013.
77
Ibid
74
Hajji 28
Wall in 1989 ushered in an international peace that allowed for retroactive inspection
worldwide. Thus an enormous volume of justice occurred in the next decade, as seen in Latin
America, that had been impossible during the fifty years of the Cold War.78 However, the late
1990s did not prove favorable for Spanish justice politically, as seen in Section 3 of this
thesis.
The honeymoon of the 1990s ended with the collapse of the Twin Towers in 2001.
Although the Iraq War raged until 2011, Spain pulled troops out of Iraq in 2004 under
Zapatero, reinstating a peace period in country. With the onset of the 2008 economic crisis,
such international stability ended, limiting the government’s ability to carry out reparations
requiring heavy state involvement.79 Therefore during the few crucial years between 2004
and the economic crisis of 2008, Spain was sufficiently at ease to warrant reconciliation with
its past. Thus, the development of international human rights standards, the Pinochet case and
the 2004-2008 domestic calm all coincided to serve as a catalyst for Spanish justice. Still,
Spanish public and political cooperation, discussed in the next sections, made reparation most
plausible in 2006, as opposed to earlier years.
78
79
Sikkink 33.
P. Esteban, in-person communication, Aug. 29, 2013.
Hajji 29
Section 2: Generational Turnover
During the Socialist PSOE rule from 1982 to 1996, the government shied away from
significant accountability and reparation measures. In the following terms from 1996 to 2004,
the majority Popular Party showed reluctance to heavy reparations due to conservative ties.
At the start of a renewed Socialist term from 2004 to 2012 under Rodriguez Zapatero, new
opportunity for reparations arose. Yet this new opportunity was more than just the result of a
political changeover. With the passing time and changing governments, a simultaneous
generational transition occurred. The composition of the Spanish general public moved from
those who were directly affected by the Spanish Civil War and Franco dictatorship to a more
removed population: their grandchildren.
Political Continuity
In many respects, the grandchildren of the Civil War and dictatorship represent a
continuity of their predecessors. Castresana-Fernandez noted a “natural heritage” in the
Spanish lineage originating during the Franco dictatorship.80 The end of the Spanish
dictatorship was not achieved through defeat of the regime, as in Greece, Italy or Portugal, but
rather was negotiated. As a result, remnants of the dictatorship remain, even in the form of
indifference towards the past.81 The social group who represented and supported the
dictatorship now comprises the social mass that votes conservative, although they no longer
hold the same authoritarian values. For example, Joan Tardà i Coma chastised the Popular
Party for allowing a participant of the Franco regime, Manuel Fraga Irabarne, who was
80
81
C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, Aug. 29, 2013.
Ibid.
Hajji 30
responsible for the police killing of five workers in Vitoria in 1976, to hold a distinguished
position in the party.82 Similarly, the political opposition during the dictatorship now aligns
with the leftist parties (ERC and IU) or the socialist parties (PSOE). Therefore the same
conservative and progressive divisions from the dictatorship still exist and rotate in and out of
office. Because of their ties to the Franco regime, the conservatives tend to be less interested
in pursuing accountability and giving reparations for this regime, prefering to not “reopen old
wounds,” as university professor Patricia Esteban puts it.83 Likewise, the liberals, who
disproportionately represent the victims of that time, are more inclined to pursue these
reparations. The number of reparation measures these groups have passed while in office
illustrates this difference. Although they passed a similar number of symbolic reparation
measures,84 the PP passed only one material reparation during its 2000-2004 term, while the
PSOE passed fifteen during its 2004-2008 term.85
Reservations of the Elder Generation
Yet in other ways, a large distinction between the old and new generation was visible.
In an opinion poll conducted by El Mundo newspaper in 2006, critical opinion of Franco’s
uprising that started the Civil War was greater among younger individuals than the elderly,
where one in four preferred not to state any opinion.86 Thus in 2006, the elder generation still
manifested the pact of silence and reluctance to confront the Franco dictatorship. The last
generation, according to Joan Tardà i Coma of the Republican Left, were “people who had
82
Diario Núm. 296, 2007, 14620.
P. Esteban, in-person communication, Aug. 29, 2013
84
5 during the PP 2000-2004 term; 6 during the PSOE 2000-2008 term
85
Aguilar 424.
86
El Franquismo a debate 30 años despues/ Encuesta 1. El Mundo. Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
83
Hajji 31
internalized so much pain and terror in the years of transition [that they] only dared to
undertake timidly a tough journey to repair the memory of their parents.”87 Those of the
previous generation who lived through the dictatorship, such as interviewed Pilar Pulgar, a
mother in Madrid who lived through the last two decades of the Franco dictatorship, preferred
to cite the “placidity” of the dictatorship and the normality of life under it.88 Patricia Esteban,
a literature professor in Madrid, noted that some of this generation, even today, do not regard
Franco as a dictator and deny any oppression occurred, despite all investigations and evidence
otherwise. Although Juan Pulgar, a conservative who lived through ten years of the
dictatorship, conceded that atrocities occurred, he argued that 2006 was not a proper time to
deal with such matters. He resented that the government’s efforts were being directed at the
“ghosts of the past,” instead of concentrated on the economy.89
A New Pro-Justice Generation
On the other hand, there was evident in the new Spanish generation of the 2000s a
trend towards favorable opinion for justice. While only 26 opinion pieces relating to General
Francisco Franco were published in El País during 1995 to 1997, there were more than 200
pieces from 2004-2006.90 This suggests a growing willingness of the public to engage in
debate over the dictatorship, which was also reflected in the political sphere. To begin, all the
political parties were democratic in 2006 when the Historical Memory Law was introduced,
whereas this was clearly not the case in the late 1970s when a strong authoritarian influence
still pervaded. Deputy Esteban Bravo of the Vasco group maintains that, as of 2006, no
87
Diario Núm. 296, 2007, 14620.
P. Pulgar, in-person communication, Aug. 29, 2013.
89
J. Pulgar, email communication, Aug. 31, 2013.
90
Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic. Note: some duplicates possible.
88
Hajji 32
longer was any political party fully in favor of the status quo of silence and against the pursuit
of justice, “because it is not good for democracy nor for coexistence and equality for all
citizens.”91 In fact, only 3 of the 36, or about eight percent, of the speeches in the Historical
Memory Law debate regarded it as “unnecessary.” Even these speeches did not express
hostility to reparations in general, but strictly to this specific law. On the contrary, these three
speeches all pushed for different reparation than that of the Historical Memory Law. For
example, one pushed for increased compensation to those who suffered imprisonment under
the dictatorship, another for explicit condemnation of the Franco regime, and the lastly for a
census of all seizures and confiscations of the time. Esteban, a young professor of Spanish
literature, embodies the sentiments of this new generation, saying,
“In my opinion [the Historical Memory Law] was absolutely necessary,
despite its limitations, because it recognized and put in the center of public
and political life an issue- injustice, repression and violence during the
civil war and ‘Franquismo’- which appeared to have been overcome
during the transition to democracy, but were really only silenced. The
transition was a politically sensitive time, and Spain had been under a
dictator for 36 years that prevented any review or claims of violence and
repression of the war and Franco. So we chose a pact of silence. But once
the transition was surpassed, and while direct victims or surviving
relatives are still alive, we have to face reality and face this historical
trauma and evaluate our present relationship to the past that can not be
erased. It affects social, culturally and personally a great part of the
91
Diario Núm 296, 2007, 14618.
Hajji 33
population. Giving legitimacy and focusing this memory, or its recovery,
to implement reparation measures for victims was a must.” 92
There were multiple reasons why the grandchildren of the victims of the Civil War
were more adamant for reparations than their predecessors. First, the younger generation that
dominated during Zapatero’s term was distanced from past horrors. Not only had they evaded
the worst of the Civil War and dictatorship, but they grew up in a world where the topic was
practically taboo. Patricia Esteban discussed how children in Spain did not, and still do not,
learn in full about Spain’s recent history and the extent of the Franco dictatorship and human
rights violations.93 Thus, tired of being shielded and eager to do justice for the grandparents
that were never able to procure it themselves, a new pro-justice generation emerged. Thirtynine percent of the debate speeches on the Historical Memory Law referenced this new
generation of the grandchildren of victims, whether by directly acknowledging an old versus
new generation or by appealing to do justice for their grandparents. Jorge Fernández Díaz, for
example, mentioned, “a new generation…[that] does not share the hatreds and passions of
those who participated in [the Civil War.]”94 Although several deputies, like Jordi Xuclà i
Costa from the Catalán Group recognized that thirty years ago the only possible path was one
of selective amnesia to cater to the peace and harmony necessary for democracy, they, as part
of the new generation, agreed that now another route was possible. Joan Tardà i Coma
effectively summarized this idea during the debate, saying,
P. Esteban, in-person communication, Aug. 29, 2013.
P. Esteban, in-person communication, Aug. 29, 2013.
94
Diario Núm. 925, 2007, 32.
92
93
Hajji 34
“I’m not a person of the transition or who fought against Franco. I am one
of the grandchildren, and my generation… has gone through school
without studying and without knowing what was the struggle against
Franco. We know from our family tradition, or the explanations of friends,
colleagues, but we have not studied it. It would be impossible for this to
happen in France, Germany, Portugal and in so many countries that have
shown that they have done good.”95
A Decline in Surviving Victims
Pressure to act before all the victims were deceased contributed to the new pro-justice
consensus. The years 2005 and 2006 marked the 30th anniversary of Franco’s death and the
70th anniversary of the beginning of the Civil War, respectively. These anniversaries
indicated the time lapse since the violations in question and, frankly, the reality of a declining
number of living victims. Descendents wanted monetary or intangible compensation for their
elder relations during their last years. Even those without personal connections to Franco
victims acknowledged the urgency to address the issue while victims and relatives of victims
were still alive.96 Such urgency was expressed during the debate of the Law, such as when
Begoña Lasagabaster Olazábal of the Mixed Group said he took his 97-year-old grandfather
multiple times to request annulment of his sentence from the Military Division of the
Supreme Court under the Franco regime.97 Moreover, many with deceased relations began to
think, “Well, my grandfather is still buried in a clandestine grave. I want the body, I want the
95
Diario Núm. 222, 2006, 11262.
P. Esteban, in-person communication, Aug. 29, 2013.
97
Diario Núm. 925, 2007, 17.
96
Hajji 35
corpse, and I want a dignified process of re-vindication and a decent burial, not a clandestine
one,” which Castresana-Fernandez confirms is absolutely legitimate.98
Such a desire for dignity and decent burial for familial victims explained the
emergence of the Association for the Recuperation of Historical Memory (ARMH) that led
early attempts to break the pacto de olvido. The ARMH was created in 2000 after the
privately led exhumation of a mass grave of 13 civilians killed by republican gunmen
Phalangist in 1936. Many came to the excavation site in Leon Priaranza del Bierzo for
assistance in finding other missing persons, motivating those working at the site to create
ARMH to provide such help. Since then, the group works to dignify Spanish past, do justice
for those who deserved it and deepen Spanish democracy.99 By July 2006, according to an El
País survey, 64 percent of those questioned wanted bodies from mass graves to be exhumed,
identified and returned to their families. In sum, the newer generation illustrated a growing
willingness to move away from policies of silence and towards reparation. This new populace
in favor of reparations represented a constituency that, if not pressured Congress to pursue
retroactive justice, at least held accountable those representatives who were contrary to
measures of reparation. In fact, the PP in all debate speeches complained that the PSOE was
using the Law of Historical Memory as a political weapon to boost their image and distort that
of parties in opposition. This demonstrates that the general constituency was supportive of
justice for the Spanish people, and disapproving of those against reparations. Therefore, the
Historical Memory Law came about in part due to the maturation of this new generation.
C. Castresana, in-person communication, Aug. 29, 2013.
¿Quienes Somos?. (2013). Association for the Recovery of Historical Memory. Retrieved November 10, 2013,
from http://memoriahistorica.org.es/
98
99
Hajji 36
Section 3: Political Considerations
Although many point to the Historical Memory Law as a heroic measure of
reparations, others insist that the degree of justice achieved with this law is overstated.
Supporters of the bill often referred to it as a “starting point,” acknowledging the bill’s
limitations as well as its potential to serve as a precedent for future, more substantial,
reparations. 100 Others during the debate argued that the Law was trivial and would not satisfy
anyone without remedying all persisting justice concerns.101 Because the Law encompassed
sensitive and controversial topics, Congress struggled to reach a consensus for many areas of
reparation.102 Interviews and the congressional debate suggest that the PSOE strategized to
acquire sufficient votes by compromising aggressive reparation in the Law. If this is the case,
then the accomplishment of this justice law thirty years after the dictatorship seems less of a
feat.
The introduction of the Historical Memory Law itself was a strategic political move.
The Law was not, in fact, included in the Socialist Worker’s Party manifesto for the 2004
general election, yet it eventually became a centerpiece of the PSOE’s legislative agenda once
the Party came to power. It was meant to strengthen the Party’s position, after a fortuitous
election that swung votes in their favor, making the PSOE the majority party by only five
Rodríguez Sánchez, F. & Herrera Torres, J. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Núm. 296.
Sesión del 31/10/2007, p. 14614-14615 [http:///www.congreso.es].
100
Fernández de la Vega Sanz, M. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Núm 222. Sesión del
14/12/2006, p.11256 [http:///www.congreso.es].
Diario Núm. 222, 2006, 11256
Duran i Lleida, J. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Núm. 296. Sesión del 31/10/2007,
p.14623 [http:///www.congreso.es].
102
Blakely 318.
101
Hajji 37
percent.103 Out of a total of 394 members of Congress, respective representations of political
parties are displayed in Figure 2.
Figure 2:
Parties Represented in VII Legislative Session
47
Socialist Party (PSOE)
187
Popular Party (PP)
Other Parties
170
The figure illustrates the narrow margin of victory of the PSOE over the PP, which
created a dually dominated Congress. The PSOE had to look to new opportunities, arguably
in the Historical Memory Law, to garner support and retain their majority position in the next
election. Esteban indeed cited the Law as an opportunistic play of the PSOE, comparing it to
issues on abortion and gay marriage used to strengthen and advertise their leftist politics as
distinct from conservative ideologies. Juan Pulgar, a Madrid inhabitant, complained about the
Law’s absence from the PSOE platform, calling it a “trial balloon,” or a tentative measure to
see how the policy would be received.104 Additionally, in the bill’s congressional debate, PP
deputies consistently accused the PSOE of manipulating reparation for political gain and to
attack the conservative ties of the PP. For instance, Jorge Fernández Díaz claimed the
103
104
Blakely 319.
J. Pulgar, in-person communication, Aug. 31, 2013.
Hajji 38
purpose of the bill was, “from day one, a deliberate attempt, make no mistake, to marginalize
the [Popular] Party, to present this as a policy in which the opponents are a factious, proFranco or fascists and the progressives are those who understand the pain and suffering of the
people.”105 The PSOE ostracized the PP in the debate by refusing to support productive PP
amendments, including one that would grant increased compensation to prisoners of the
dictatorship,106 and by “selling a distorted image of the Popular Party,” by liberally
interpreting their opposition to the Law as an offense to all reparation measures.107 On the
contrary, PP representative Manuel Atencia Roblado explained PP opposition to the Law as
resistance to the imposition of an official historical memory and rejection to a single Law that
simultaneously addressed an array of complex social justice issues.108 Several PP speakers
defended the party’s continuous support of reparations, reminding Congress of the past
reparation measures they had enacted.109
Nevertheless, as the graph indicates, the Socialist Worker’s Party lacked an absolute
majority in Congress, and thus had to appeal to other congressional parties for support of the
strategic bill. During the political debate of the Historical Memory Law, there was a
discussion and an attempt to get the maximum consensus possible. The first draft of the bill,
from September 8, 2006, was debated on December 14, 2006 when three amendments on the
totality of the bill were presented. The United Left and the Republican Left presented the first
two amendments as alternative texts for consideration, and the PP presented the third
amendment that simply requested withdrawal of the bill. All three amendments were rejected.
Following this debate, 377 more amendments to the bill were presented. Thus, agreement was
105
Diario Núm. 925, 2007, 32.
Zaplana Hernández-Soro, E. Diario Núm. 296, 2007, 14627.
107
Ibid 14627-14628.
108
Diario Núm. 222, 2006, 11259-11262.
109
Fernández Díaz, J. Diario Núm. 925, 34.
106
Hajji 39
a strenuous process, and intense negotiations occurred up until its passage (Blakely 2008,
319-323). In this manner, the project sacrificed aggressive reparations to reach an agreement,
and is accordingly unsatisfactory for the formal authorities, international standards and the
victims.110 Patricia Esteban noted that a large part of the Spanish population believe the Law
was useless, and herself feels the Law has not made a significant impact in society. Many
members of Congress demanded address of pending justice issues, outlined below, yet to no
effect.
The most frequent concern in the Historical Memory Law debate regarded annulment
of judgments. Out of the 36 entries, it was mentioned 17 times, or in approximately 47
percent of the debate. The Historical Memory Law declared illegitimate the military tribunals
that condemned individuals based on political standings. These thousands of judgments span
from 1933 to 1978 and include criminal sentences for political, military, religious or
ideological reasons. Congressional deputies insisted these judgments occurred without due
process of law, and have errors of form and substance. Those on trial often lacked proper
defense and the trials themselves lacked impartiality. Death sentences passed by the military
courts were given, hundreds at a time, without even reading the charges.111 Therefore
sufficient guarantees for fair sentencing were not met, and, according to several congressional
deputies, should be null and void.
The main controversy was over the term “illegitimate,” which did not carry sufficient
legal value. By declaring the judgments illegitimate, victims and their families were only
allowed to “solicit individual reparation” before a council of five appointed senior social
scientists who would examine each case independently before granting annulment or
110
111
C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, Aug. 29, 2013.
Stuart para. 11.
Hajji 40
compensation—a process that could take decades. Many congressional deputies viewed the
appeal process as an unfair burden on victims. They proposed amendments to make it the
state’s duty to review these judgments, rather than require 50,000 people all sue for the same
nullity. These amendments were rejected. In each of her three debate speeches, Congress
member Joan Herrera Torres of the United Left cited this issue as the “main stumbling block
in the negotiations with the government.” 112 She noted that the governing PSOE party did
not want the annulment of judgments, and in the original text did not even declare the
judgments illegitimate. Several other congressional representatives113 expressed the same
frustration, and they also cited hundreds of interest organizations, including Amnesty
International, who agreed that Spain should abide by UN doctrine on crimes against humanity
and annul these judgments.114
Moreover, declaring these judgments illegitimate in effect gives validity to the Franco
regime. Although this was not the concern for all who expressed a desire for annulment of
judgments, 28 percent of speeches in the debate desired an explicit condemnation of the
Franco dictatorship. By formally expelling the Franco regime from the legal system,
oppressive legislation and judgments from the period would be deemed crimes against
humanity and repealed. As the Law omitted condemnation, a present controversy remains
today, which literature professor Patricia Esteban regretted, over how Franco is depicted in
the Spanish Biographical Dictionary, edited by the Royal Academy of History. Articles in
both El País and El Mundo115 included comments by professors, filmmakers, writers and
everyday citizens who expressed outrage that the Dictionary distorted the history of the
Diario Núm 222, 2006, 32.
Olzábal Lasagabaster, B., Xucla i Costa, J., Esteban Bravo, A., Tarda i Coma, J. and Llamazares Trigo, Diario
Núm. 925, 2007, 11255-11285.
114
Llamazares Trigo, G. Diario Núm. 215, 10910.
115
21 articles in El País, 17 articles in El Mundo retrieved from LexisNexis Academic
112
113
Hajji 41
Franco dictatorship. Yet without establishing either a “solemn and unequivocal
condemnation” of Franco or a truth commission to set the record straight (recommended by
deputy Begoña Lasagabaster Olazábal and the UN),116 the Law permits the negation and
downplay of Franco oppression in Spanish society. Moreover it violates the UN Right to
Remedy stipulation that the country guarantee, “Inclusion of an accurate account of the
violations that occurred in international human rights law and international humanitarian law
training and in educational material at all levels.”117
The Valley of the Fallen was another prominent point of contention with the Law.
Over thirty percent of the debate speeches expressed discontent with Law’s solution for the
Catholic basilica and memorial in the municipality of San Lorenzo de El Escorial, Spain. The
site was conceived by Franco to bury and honor those who died during the Civil War. The
Valley of the Fallen remains controversial for two reasons. First, it was constructed in part by
a workforce of prisoners of war, and secondly, it is a common burial ground for both Franco
and war victims from both sides.118 While some insist it is disrespectful for the dictator to
remain buried next to his victims, others insist it would be dishonorable to disturb the
monument. In essence, the Historical Memory Law prohibited demonstrations, political
events or exaltation of Franco at this burial place. It provided the grounds would be governed
by the rules for establishments and places of worship and public cemeteries.
In the debate of the Historical Memory Law, Jorge Fernández Díaz of the Popular Party saw
the Valley of the Fallen as, “first and foremost a place where the remains of 60,000 people
who died during or as a result of the civil war are,” and was content with simple deDiario Núm 296, 2007, 14614;
Junquera, N. (June 2, 2013). Dwindling number of Franco-era victims plead for "last hope" truth commission. El
País. Retrieved Nov. 23, 2013 from www.lexisnexis.com
117
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation, UN General Assembly, § IX
118
Ferrandíz 41.
116
Hajji 42
politicization of the area. On the other hand, Esteban Bravo of the Vasco Group saw it
“inadmissible” to have the tombs of both Franco and Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, a notable
politician and lawyer executed by the regime during the war, occupy the same resting place.
Similarly, Francisco Rodríguez Sánchez scoffed at the argument that Congress “dare not
desecrate the Valley of the Fallen or remove the tombs” of these two individuals, and accused
the Law of being paternalistic at the expense of having legal or administrative value.
Judge Castresana-Fernandez pointed to this as a political and ideological problem. He
noted that the place should be transformed into “a museum of historic memory,” establishing
what happened in the war and dictatorship, as is done with German concentration camps.
Uxue Barkos Berruezo of the Mixed Party fought to convert the Valley into such a memorial
during the debate.119 Yet while María Teresa Fernández de la Vega Sanz, the PSOE
government spokesperson, assured that the objective of the bill was to make the Valley of the
Fallen a place to exalt peace and democratic values,120 Patricia Esteban asserted that the
current government as of 2013 shows no intention to follow through on the conversion and
reinterpretation of the monument.121 In a manifestation in Madrid in July, 2013, the group
Contra La Impunidad del Franquismo handed out flyers to protest the government’s
manipulation of the monument as a tourist attraction, against the stipulation in the Historic
Memory Law that restricts it to ecclesiastical functions.122 Thus the Valley of the Fallen still
falls short of being a real symbol of reconciliation.
Finally, the Law is limited in regard to the administration of mass grave exhumations.
The Law provided state financial support and assistance for families in tracking, identifying
119
Diario Núm. 296, 2007, 14613.
Diario Núm. 296, 2007, 14611.
121
P. Esteban, in-person communication, Aug. 20, 2013.
122
Barcala, Diego. (2013, August). Rajoy promueve el turismo franquista en el Valle de los Caídos. Plataforma
¡Contra La Impunidad! del Franquismo!, p.58.
120
Hajji 43
and eventually exhuming Franco victims who were subject to extrajudicial executions and
placed in mass graves unbeknownst to their families. Representatives from the Catalan,
Vasco, United Left, Republican Left and Mixed Group parties all attempted to secure active
governmental responsibility for these identifications and exhumations during the political
debate in Congress, yet in the end the Law simply allowed families to request authorization
for such actions, without dictating any duty of the state. Castresana-Fernandez explained the
difficulty of privatizing the exhumation process through the example of the famous poet
Federico Garcia Lorca who was executed by Nationalist forces. Evidence suggested Garcia
Lorca was buried along with three or four other victims in a mass grave. While the families of
the other victims all desired to exhume the bodies, Garcia Lorca’s family objected and thus
hindered the rights of the other families to proper burial of their relatives. Moreover, he
argued that with, “more than 100,000 forced disappearances, it is obviously a process that
cannot be dealt with privately by the families.”123 This process is not only inefficient, but also
noncompliant with international human rights standards that mandate the State to establish
truth and coordinate the legal consequences of reparation. In accordance with the UN “Right
to a Remedy,” it is the duty of the State “to investigate violations effectively, promptly,
thoroughly and impartially,” and conduct, “the search for the whereabouts of the
disappeared.”124 Therefore, the Law was insufficient for failing to require public
administration of this dimension of reparation.
In sum, while disagreements still remained among conservatives and progressives over
the extent to which reparation should be given, a digression from the political sentiments of
the dictatorship presented a new political atmosphere where all parties held democratic values
123
124
C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, Aug. 20, 2013.
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation, UN General Assembly, § VII
Hajji 44
and agreed that at least some recognition and reparation was necessary. Furthermore, the
political circumstances of the 2004 election provided the stimulus for the government to
present the Historical Memory Law. Thus politics in one sense advanced the cause of
Spanish social justice, yet, in another, hindered it. The range of pending issues of reparation
and accountability that needed to be addressed made for complicated legislation that
inevitably made it politically controversial. As there was not a consensus on several sensitive
matters, such as truth commissions, exhumations and nullification of judgments, politics
caused the Law to fall far short of compliance with international standards on remedy of
human rights violations.
Hajji 45
Conclusion
The hundreds of thousands of Franco regime victims decided to forfeit justice during
the transition, understanding the volatility of the time. However instead of addressing the
violations when the democracy stabilized, Spain continued to shun its painful history for
decades. Spain’s involvement with the United Nations, the development of international
human rights law and the justice cascade in the 1990s set the stage for Spanish justice in the
early 2000s. With each passing year, the Spanish population was further removed from its
painful history, thus by the 30th anniversary of Franco’s death and the 70th anniversary of the
Civil War in 2005 and 2006, respectively, the community was ready to face the Franco
violations. Finally, the opportune moment for justice came after the 2004 congressional
election, when the Socialist Party employed the past to secure an electoral advantage.
Therefore, the pact of forgetting was finally broken with the Historical Memory Law in 2006,
when favorable international, social and political conditions aligned.
The three factors contributing to Spanish justice all interplayed to foster an
environment conducive to reparation and accountability. International social justice cases
from Latin America to Eastern Europe informed public opinion of international justice norms.
Grandchildren in Spain, sheltered from the reality of Franco violations, saw the country arrest
Pinochet in London and ultimately requested the same legal protection Spain provided for
victims in foreign countries. With time ticking and a diminishing number of surviving
victims, Spain faced a “now or never” moment to do justice for those affected. The domestic
push penetrated the political sphere by encouraging politicians to pass reparation measures
and providing a threat of constituent backlash to those who outright opposed such measures.
Taking advantage of this public opinion, the PSOE introduced the Historical Memory Law, in
Hajji 46
part to marginalize the conservative PP. Still because of the complexity of the issue, the Law
went through a process of negotiations and compromises that ultimately reduced the degree of
justice incorporated. This confluence of simultaneous factors accounts for the passage of the
Historic Memory Law in 2007, as opposed to in the ‘70s, ‘80s or ‘90s. However, conditions
did not prove favorable enough to fully rectify the social justice concerns, as the standards of
“full and efficient reparation” defined by the UN were not all addressed.
All three factors (international human rights development, generational changeover
and political circumstances) were necessary for the Law of Historical Memory to pass, yet
none were singularly sufficient. Without international social justice developments, the
Spanish public may not have been as adamant for reparations; and without public desire to
grant reparations, Spanish politicians would have been less likely to support reparation
measures; and without political cooperation, reparation measures could not have been
officially enacted. Still, these factors do not exclusively explain the passage. Certainly other
considerations played a role in the Law’s passage, such as domestic organizations, the media
or institutional frameworks, and further research into the existence and roles of such
contributors would be beneficial. Moreover, which of the three factors discussed contributed
most to Spain passing the Law, can be researched further. Finally, a study comparing the
amount of reparation countries that pursue justice immediately are able to achieve, as opposed
to countries that pursue reparation retroactively, would be useful.
The delay in Spanish justice pursuits has made subsequent attempts difficult.125
Because Spain failed to implement reparation and accountability measures during the
transition, pessimism for the future of reparations is apparent in Spain. Patricia Esteban
commented that if full reparation did not occur in 2008 while some of the direct victims and
125
C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, Aug. 20, 2013.
Hajji 47
relatives of the victims were still alive, then restoration of memory and justice will likely
never be achieved. As time passes, it will no longer be a priority, and “a legacy of neglect
and manipulation of the memory of the Franco dictatorship will remain for future
generations.”126 Indeed, in November 2013 Spain maintained that it would not review the
amnesty law for crimes committed during the war and dictatorship to a critical U.N.
Committee on Enforced Disappearances.127 Though the Law of Historical Memory has often
been referred to as a “starting-point” of Spanish justice for Franco-era crimes, with failed
attempts even in the most opportune circumstances, one must wonder if there will ever be an
end-point.
126
P. Esteban, in-person communication, Aug. 20, 2013.
Evans, Robert. (2013, Nov. 06) Spain Tells U.N. No Rethink on Post-Franco Amnesty. Reuters. Retrieved
Nov. 07, 2013, from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/06/us-un-rights-spain-idUSBRE9A513C20131106
127
Hajji 48
REFERENCES
Aguilar, P. (2008). Transitional or Post-transitional Justice? Recent Developments in the
Spanish Case. South European Society and Politics, 13(4): 417-433.
Barbeito, M. Z. (2010). Investigating the Crimes of the Franco Regime: Legal Possibilities,
Obligations of the Spanish State and Duties Towards the Victims. International Criminal Law
Review, 10(2): 243-274.
Barcala, Diego. (2013, August). Rajoy promueve el turismo franquista en el Valle de los
Caídos. Plataforma ¡Contra La Impunidad! del Franquismo!, p.58.
Barber, T. & MacDonald, N. (2007). Serbia glimpses 'european dawn'. FT.Com, 1.
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation, UN General
Assembly, § VII
Blakeley, G. (2008). Politics as usual?: The trials and tribulations of the law of historical
memory in spain. Entelequia: Revista Interdisciplinar.
Boyd, Carolyn P. (2008). The Politics of History and Memory in Democratic Spain. Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 617(1), 133-148.
Brito, A. B. d., et al. (2003). The politics of memory transitional justice in democratizing
societies: transitional justice in democratizing societies. Oxford, Oxford University Press,
UK.
Carrillo, M. (Nov. 28, 1997). Contra la corriente. El País, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic;
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. (2013). Opinión Pública y Política, 2004-2013
[Spain]--Summary file 1--Final national [Data File]. Retrieved from
http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/1_encuestas/estudios/listaTematico.jsp?tema=1&todos=si
Summary_File_1/ 0Final_National/
Construir la paz despues de la guerra. El País, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
Costa Pinto, A. (2006). Authoritarian legacies, transitional justice and state crisis in
Portugal's democratization. Democratization, 13(2): 173-204.
Davis, Madeleine. (2005). Is Spain Recovering its Memory? Breaking the Pacto del Olvido.
Human Rights Quarterly, 27(3), 858-880.
Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Núm. 296. Sesión del 31/10/2007,
p.14611-14633 [http:///www.congreso.es].
Hajji 49
Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Núm. 925. Sesión del 17/10/2007, p.2-45
[http:///www.congreso.es].
Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Núm 222. Sesión del 14/12/2006,
p.11255-11285 [http:///www.congreso.es].
Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Núm 215. Sesión del 22/11/2007,
p.10909-10910 [http:///www.congreso.es].
Dimitropoulou-Hassiotis, M. (2006). A guide to the european union : Institutions, policies,
programmes, funds and entry tests to the EU institutions: Institutions, policies, programmes,
funds and entry tests to the EU institutions. Camberley, Surrey: Porphyrogenitus.
Eijkman, Q. (2010). Recognising the Local Perspective: Transitional Justice and PostConflict Reparations. Global Jurist U6, 10(3): 1-16.
Elorza, Antonio. (April 16, 2004). Religion y violencia. El País, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
Encarnación, O. G. (2012). Justice in Times of Transition: Lessons from the Iberian
Experience. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1): 179-192.
Erice, Francisco. (2006). Combates por el pasado y apologías de la memoria, a propósito de la
represión franquista. Hispania Nova: Revista de historia contemporánea.
Espana impulsa una "justicia especial solo para inmigrantes". El País, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
Evans, Robert. (2013, Nov. 06) Spain Tells U.N. No Rethink on Post-Franco
Amnesty. Reuters. Retrieved Nov. 07, 2013, from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/
The evolution of international criminal law. (1999). Strategic Survey, 100(1), 29-38.
doi:10.1080/04597239908461107
Ferrándiz, Francisco. (2013). Exhuming the defeated: Civil War mass graves in
21st‐ century Spain. American Ethnologist, 40(1), 38-54.
Fisas, V. (April 26, 2007). Naciones Unidas acusa a Bagdad de ocultar la lista de los civiles
muertos. El País, Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
El Franquismo a debate 30 años despues/ Encuesta 1. El Mundo. Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
Hajji 50
Guarino, Angela M. (2010). Chasing ghosts: pursuing retroactive justice for Franco-era
crimes against humanity. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 33(1),
61.
Hourtoule, G. O. (1953). The case of Franco Spain before the United Nations, 19461950. ProQuest, UMI Dissertations Publishing.
Junquera, N. (June 2, 2013). Dwindling number of Franco-era victims plead for "last hope"
truth commission. El País. Retrieved Nov. 23, 2013 from www.lexisnexis.com
Kamminga, M. (2007). Towards a permanent international claims commission for victims of
violations of international humanitarian law. Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice, 25, 23373.
Kennedy, D. (2002). The international human rights movement: part of the problem?
Harvard Human Rights Journal, 15: 101.
Kim, H. J. (2012). Structural determinants of human rights prosecutions after democratic
transition. Journal of Peace Research, 49(2): 305-320.
Locard, Henri. (2005). State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979) and
Retribution (1979-2004). European Review of History, 49(1): 121–143.
Maravall, Javier. (June 23, 2005). Derechos humanos y guerra civil. El País, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
Martínez Monserrat, R. (Aug. 23, 2011). ¡Qué envidia de Chile!. El País, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
La ONU pide que se investigue donde estan enterrados republicanos fusilados tras la guerra.
El País, Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
Pinochet's death confronts Spain with own painful past. (Dec. 14, 2006). Agence France
Presse -- English, Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
¿Quienes Somos?. (2013). Association for the Recovery of Historical Memory. Retrieved
November 10, 2013, from http://memoriahistorica.org.es/
Reinoso, Jose. (Nov. 21, 2007). Los jemeres rojos se sientan en el banquillo 30 años después.
El País, Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
Riding, Alan. (Dec. 13, 1998). A Mother Country's Advice: Do as I Say, Not as I Did. The
New York Times, Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
Hajji 51
Ruperez, J. (April 22, 2005). Director ejecutivo del Comite contra el Terrorismo de Naciones
Unidas "El 11-M nos cogio absolutamente desprevenidos." El País, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic
Seibert-Fohr, A. (2009). Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations. Oxford, Oxford UP,
UK.
Sikkink, K. (2011). The justice cascade : How human rights prosecutions are changing world
politics: How human rights prosecutions are changing world politics. New York: W. W.
Norton & Co.
Situations and Cases. (n.d.). International Criminal Court. Retrieved Oct. 23, 2013, from
http://www.icc-cpi.int/
Spain blocks investigations of Franco-era crimes. (2013, June 17). Amnesty International.
Retrieved November 23, 2013, from http://www.amnesty.org/
Spain: Window of opportunity for a fresh start on human rights. (2004, June 11) Amnesty
International. Retrieved Nov. 07, 2013, from http://www.amnesty.org/
Stuart, P. (2007, November 21). New law condemning Franco’s crimes further polarises
Spain. International Committee of the Fourth International. Retrieved from
http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2007/11/memo-n21.html.
Tamarit Sumalla, Josep María. (2011). Transition, Historical Memory and Criminal Justice
in Spain. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 9(3), 729-752.
Tortella, G. (Jan. 29, 2007). Contra la corriente. El País, Retrieved from
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic;
Truth Commissions. (n.d.). Amnesty International. Retrieved November 25, 2013, from
http://www.amnesty.org/en/international-justice/issues/truth-commissions
U.N. General Assembly, 64th Session. (2005). Resolution 60/147. Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.
(A/Res/60/147). AccessUN Readex. (16 Dec. 2005).
United Nations: General assembly resolution and declaration on the protection of all persons
from enforced disappearance. (1993). International Legal Materials, 32(3), 903-910.
United States Embassy. Chile. (1991). Rettig report: Synopsis of cases.
Urdillo, U. (2011). Impunity for enforced disappearances in contemporary Spain: the
Spanish search for truth. Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights
Hajji 52
Zapatero, Virgilio. (Dec. 18, 1998). Transiciones y Derechos Humanos. El País, Retrieved
from www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic