From: Antonella Demartini
To: Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans
Re: Natural Disaster Management, Post Hurricane Katrina
Date: March 20, 2013
In response to your request, please find below a discussion of background information, three significant
issues caused by Hurricane Katrina, and recommendations for managing them.
Case Background:
Parts of New Orleans are below sea level and surrounded by bodies of water. Built on a natural levee next
to the Mississippi river, the city has experienced cyclical flooding since its founding in 1718 (Lalwani, Khagram, &
Lindenberg, 2007). Throughout the centuries, human intervention has reconstructed the landscape in a number
of ways which has made New Orleans more vulnerable to storms and flooding: destruction of sand bars;
deforestation along the riverbank; construction of ditches and levees; drainage of swamps; and the construction
that accompanies urbanization and industrialization (Lalwani, Khagram, & Lindenberg, 2007). Such ecological
alterations have contributed to New Orleans’ “rate of subsidence [which] is three feet every one hundred years”
(Lalwani, Khagram, & Lindenberg, 2007, 11).
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina decimated New Orleans. The category four storm caused segments of
the levee system to collapse, allowing water to flood thousands of homes. The storm displaced over 1.5 million
people; the National Hurricane Center estimated the value of infrastructural damage at $75 billion; and more than
3,200 people were still unaccounted for by January 2006 (Lalwani, Khagram, & Lindenberg, 2007, 10).
 Issue #1: The Storm’s Inequitable Impact on Different Communities
Poor and minority communities, which composed most low lying neighborhoods, were inundated. The
low-lying neighborhoods were largely remnants of social inequity (Frederickson, 2010) caused by racial and
economic segregation of the 20th century:
ordinances banned African Americans from residing alongside
Caucasians and from purchasing certain types of property; also, economic developments shifted toward a service
economy, limiting job opportunities for individuals without college degrees.
New Orleans’ public housing
projects, concentrated in low-lying areas where drainage was most difficult, were “highly racially segregated
enclaves of poverty” (Lalwani, Khagram, & Lindenberg, 2007, 7). The residents of the low-lying areas struggled to
evacuate because most did not have access to a car. Many gathered in the Superdome where there was lack of
electricity, food supplies, sanitation, and security until they were evacuated three days later (Lalwani, Khagram, &
Lindenberg, 2007, 13). For residents confined to nursing homes or in need of medical care, evacuation delays
resulted in fatalities.
Recommendation: Re-zone the lowest lying land in New Orleans as unfit for urban development, and
work with environmental scientists and ecologists to restore the wetlands, according to the Coast 2050 Plan.
Also, divert five percent of city property and other local tax revenues to an education fund for high school
students whose families lost their homes in Hurricane Katrina. The funds would pay for student college
applications, and cover relocation expenses associated with attending out-of-state colleges.
 Issue #2: Failure of Management Among Local, State, and Federal Leaders
Local, state, and federal leaders were unable to communicate with one another to coordinate a
centralized response to Hurricane Katrina. The Louisiana state emergency plan stated that the mayor was
responsible for “initiat[ing], execut[ing], and direct[ing] the operations during a disaster or emergency” (Lalwani,
Khagram, & Lindenberg, 2007, 13). However, no one took charge to coordinate an emergency plan. Rather, there
were multiple leaders and organizations working in silos: the Mayor’s office, Governor Blanco, the Office of
Emergency Preparedness, the New Orleans Police Department, the Federal Management Emergency Association
(FEMA) of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the Louisiana Guard, the National
Guard, the Pentagon, the Justice Department, and the President.
Recommendation: Initiate a government network according to the “joined-up model” (Goldsmith &
Eggers, 2004) where multiple government agencies across governmental levels join together to provide crisis
management and public safety services. The Mayor, the public official closest to the local disaster, would
commence and schedule regular communications in times of crises, and periodic communications in times of
stability. Communication would happen in real time among the network leaders via web teleconferencing, or
phone conferencing, depending on the availability of technology. The various government agencies would share
their knowledge and recommendations to coordinate a centralized response to a crisis, and to brainstorm crisis
response scenarios during times of stability.
 Issue #3: Mismanagement of Federal Funding for Emergency Preparedness
Between 2002 and August 2005, New Orleans used millions in federal funding, but had not yet completed
its disaster preparedness plan. Although the city used $18 million dollars of federal funding to “stage exercises,
train for emergencies, and build relay towers to improve emergency [communications]” (Lalwani, Khagram, &
Lindenberg, 2007, 10), the state disaster plan was incomplete. The city had yet to compose plans for evacuee
transportation and public safety to maintain law and order.
Recommendation: Complete the state disaster plan using the information gleaned from three years of
completed exercises and training. Disseminate the disaster plan among the local, state, and federal leaders, and
schedule meetings to identify information gaps along with an action plan and timeline for obtaining missing
information. Engage local parish communities in town hall meetings to request public stakeholder feedback.
Also, implement a five percent sumptuary excise tax (Mikesell, 2011) on alcohol consumed in New Orleans’ bars
and restaurants to fund further emergency training and exercises.
Many residents of New Orleans lost their faith in government to protect their health and safety after
Hurricane Katrina, especially those that were inequitably impacted by the storm. In addition, interactions of local,
state, and federal government stakeholders were uncoordinated. Also, federal funding for emergency
preparedness was mismanaged. Given these empirical observations, we must question Wilson’s notion that
“administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics” and that “administrative questions are not political
questions” (Wilson, 1887, 210). Rather, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that administrative questions are part
and parcel to political questions.
Nevertheless, Wilson also pointed out that improving government service, or making it more businesslike,
was necessary and could be achieved “by establishing the sanctity of public office as a public trust, and making the
service unpartisan” (Wilson, 1887, 210). For Wilson, government could not be effective if it was not accountable
to the public, and if it did not consider matters of equity (Frederickson, 2010). The above described
recommendations include: rezoning low lying land; adopting the Coast 2050 plan; creating an education fund for
New Orleans high school students; initiating a government network; completing the state disaster plan; and
implementing a sumptuary excise tax. Implementing such recommendations would be a step in the right direction
to improve natural disaster management services, and regain the trust of New Orleans residents in government.
References:
Frederickson, H. George. 2010. Social Equity & Public Administrations: Origins, Developments & Applications.
Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe.
Goldsmith, Stephen & Eggers, William D. 2004. Governing By Network: the New Shape of the Public Sector.
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Lalwani, Tanya; Khagram, Sanjeev; & Lindenberg, Marc. 2007. Hurricane Katrina: A Man-Made Crisis? Harvard
Kennedy School of Government.
Mikesell, John L. 2011. Fiscal Administration: Analysis and Applications for the Public Sector. Boston, MA:
Wadsworth.
Wilson, Woodrow. June 1887. The Study of Administration. Political Science Quarterly. 2(2). 197-222.