HD 9045 R572E73 2005 Paul Erdkamp, The Grain Market in the Roman Empire: A Social, Political, and
Economic Study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. 372. ISBN 0-521-83878-9.
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Reviewed by Joseph Lemak, Elmira College (jlemak@elmira.edu) Bryn Mawr Classical
Review 2006.12.09
Erdkamp believes that the Roman world as a pre-industrial society was not
fundamentally different from early modern Europe. He is correct in
most cases since the dominance of agriculture in the economy, the
integration of the market, and the high cost of transportation are all
legitimate parallels between ancient and early modern Europe.
the main processes of food production and food distribution which supplied
urban areas were mostly controlled by the upper levels of society.
In the fifth chapter (pp. 206-258), "Rome and the Corn Provinces," poor market
integration is the driving force behind Erdkamp's description of the
relationship between Rome and the grain producing regions of the
Empire, and how grain was transported and distributed within Rome
itself. Erdkamp does not break any new ground when he states that
Sicily and Egypt were vital for supplying the enormous belly of the city
of Rome.
Once Erdkamp explains where the grain that fed Rome came from, he turns to
the question of who transported, stored, and distributed it. When it
comes to the argument of who managed the grain supply of the city of
Rome, Erdkamp takes the middle-road between Finley and Rickman.8
Finley stated that much of the grain importation and distribution was
under strict governmental control and diminished the important of
private entrepreneurs. On the other side of the coin, Rickman stressed
the central administration's heavy reliance on the corpora of shippers,
grain dealers, and warehouse owners. Erdkamp argues that due to the
low integration of the grain market in most of the Roman Empire, the
most reliable way to secure a consistent, sufficient grain supply was to
collect taxes-in-kind in the grain producing regions of the Empire,
namely, Sicily and Egypt. While the Roman government relied on private
shippers, traders, and bakers for transportation, storage and
distribution, the private entrepreneurs were closely supervised and
directed through governmental contracts and incentives.
HD 9049 C8R667 1980 G. Rickman, The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome (Oxford, 1980);
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DE 86 G37 1988 P. Garnsey, Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World (Cambridge, 1988);
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HC 31 F5 1973 M.I. Finley, Ancient Economy (London: 1973);
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DG 12 A575 v.36 G. Rickman, "The grain trade under the Roman Empire," in J.H. D'Arms and E.C. Kopff,
eds., The seaborne commerce of ancient Rome: studies in archaeology and history (Rome,
1980), 261-275.
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330.9394 S797 State and temple economy in the ancient Near East
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DAVID KESSLER, PETER TEMIN “The organization of the grain trade in the early Roman Empire”
Economic History Review, 60, 2 (2007), pp. 313–332
A generous estimate is that each person consumed on average around 300 kg of
wheat, for a total Roman consumption of approximately 300 million kg a
year. This large amount of wheat could not have been grown locally or
even in Italy as a whole. It was imported from around the
Mediterranean Sea. The average size of Roman ships has been
estimated from ‘thin but nicely random’ data to be around 70,000 kg,
although the extant information suggests that larger ships were used on
the main large-scale routes such as bringing food to Rome. The
combination of these highly imprecise estimates implies that it required
between two and three thousand voyages across the Mediterranean to
feed Rome [each year].
The republican and imperial governments of Rome were very much involved in
the import of grain. They provided a distribution of grain, the annona,
for some of the residents of Rome. The government gave around 400 kg
(60) per year to each male head of a household. The number of
households receiving this largesse is unclear, but it is generally agreed
that it was between 200,000 and 250,000 during the reign of Augustus.
Using the larger figure, the government’s distribution accounted for
about one-third of total consumption; using the lower figure, even less.
A prominent book on the annona put the share at 15 per cent; a recent
description of the grain market put it at one-third. The bulk of wheat
imports to Rome consequently were private, that is, either sold or
consumed by absentee landowners in Rome and not ordered or funded
by the government. In addition, the government obtained the wheat it
distributed by contracting with private merchants and shippers and sold
any surplus to them. Almost all the wheat imports to Rome were
handled through markets as a result.
The government intervened in the wheat market when prices rose too high. The
government was distributing wheat in ordinary years to keep the
residents content; it also tried to moderate price rises when the supply
of wheat was interrupted by harvest failures or shipping disasters. There
are many instances when the Roman emperors tried to keep the price
of wheat in Rome low, but these interventions were the exception
rather than the rule. While we know of many instances, they are spread
among even more years. The forms of these interventions—setting
maximum prices, searching for more supplies, subsidizing purchasing—
show that they were attempts to control a free market. The frequent
mention of grain prices in our sources reveals the existence of a market
where prices were variable and important. Roman merchants were
operating in relatively free markets with occasional government
intervention.
All the actors in the grain trade hailed from the upper three groups in Roman
social hierarchy. The highest group, the senators, included only about
600 politically active members….The most visibly active businessmen
came from the knights and wealthy freedmen. The knights were the
slightly poorer relations of the senators, although some knights were
wealthier than some senators….numbering about 5,000. Senators and
knights formed a single class of educated, wealthy men. Since they had
the leverage of high social standing without the legal and cultural
constraints faced by senators, knights could become central figures in
business. Below the senators and knights were the privileged freedmen,
literally a first generation of educated slaves who either had been
manumitted or had purchased their own freedom…. Freedmen
sometimes could reach the rank of knights, and knights could become
senators if they were successful in farming, marriage, or business, and
interested in politics.
MICHAEL CHARLES AND NEAL RYAN THE ROMAN EMPIRE AND THE GRAIN FLEETS: CONTRACTING OUT
PUBLIC SERVICES IN ANTIQUITY
http://apebhconference.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/charles_ryan1.pdf
The Roman emperor Claudius, damned by Gibbon as ‘feeble’ and painted by the
ancient sources as an uxorious and simple-minded cripple, emerges as a
ruler responsible for doing much to ensure the continued supply of
grain to Rome. As it turns out, he did so by means that are, from a
public sector managerial perspective surprisingly modern. This action
was prompted by grain shortages at the time of his accession, in
addition to a more serious occasion in 51, during which Claudius was
abused by a hungry mob in the middle of the Forum. First of all,
Claudius decided to create the appropriate macro-level infrastructure.
In this case, this meant securing the port of Ostia (grain ships were far
too large to travel up the River Tiber directly to the capital) by means of
constructing a suitable port that could protect ships in adverse weather
conditions. A lighthouse, like the famous Pharos at Alexandria – one of
the seven wonders of the ancient world – was also established. This
meant that larger ships no longer had to offload their cargo at Puteoli
(modern Pozzuoli) and have smaller vessels ferry the grain thence to
Ostia, and then up to Rome via the Tiber in even smaller vessels. As a
necessary concomitant, impressive storage facilities were also
constructed, both at Ostia (for the grain from Africa) and at Puteoli (for
the grain from Egypt). Unfortunately, Claudius’ new harbour was still
unable to provide sufficient protection, and it was not until Trajan’s
reign (AD 98–117) and the establishment of an even more protected
inner harbour (Portus) at Ostia that large ships could ‘sail direct to Ostia
to unload their grain in relative safety’. Of import, too, is that Claudius
transferred the free grain from the Aerarium, the treasury of the state
(overseen by the senate), to the Fiscus, which was the imperial treasury.
As Momigliano first pointed out, ‘Distribution of these doles through the
Fiscus … was an open indication that it had become the Emperor’s
personal largesse’. Furthermore, Momigliano saw this as part of a
Claudian imperial ‘policy of centralization’. Claudius also seems to have
understood that contracting out in the context of a mere ‘arm’s-length
market transaction’ would not provide the appropriate industry
environment for greater collaboration between the state and its service
providers. Thus, in order to engage more readily with his contractors
and promote a suitable Claudius also seems to have understood that
contracting out in the context of a mere ‘arm’s-length market
transaction’ would not provide the appropriate industry environment
for greater collaboration between the state and its service providers.
Thus, in order to engage more readily with his contractors and promote
a suitable contracting environment, Claudius instituted a variety of
additional benefits and incentives.