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Mutuality NC .......................................................................................................................................................... 2
CX Explanation ....................................................................................................................................................... 5
Extensions ............................................................................................................................................................... 6
***Framework*** .................................................................................................................................................. 7
AT-Act/Omission .................................................................................................................................................... 8
AT-Util/Aggregation............................................................................................................................................... 9
AT—Foreseen But Not Intended Harm Links to NC Standard ............................................................................ 10
AT—Infinite Regress ............................................................................................................................................ 11
***Substance*** .................................................................................................................................................. 12
AT—Non Mutual Defense .................................................................................................................................... 13
Util Explosion/Solvency Indict ............................................................................................................................. 14
Patriarchy Link Turn ............................................................................................................................................. 15
2NR Overview to Turns ........................................................................................................................................ 16
AT Self-Defense ................................................................................................................................................... 17
AT “in response to repeated domestic violence” implies self-defense motive ..................................................... 18
AT Punishment ..................................................................................................................................................... 19
AT spontaneous violence not willed ..................................................................................................................... 20
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I value morality. Normativity arises only within a conception of formal principles a la the categorical imperative because those are the principles that guide every agent who intentionally acts. Reath
1
:
To see what this approach to the formula of humanity involves, let me explain what I think formal principles are for Kant. Kant tends to regard the fundamental principles in some domain of cognition or rational activity as formal principles. This is quite clear in his moral philosophy, where he is explicit that the fundamental principle of
morality must be a formal principle and that
only a formal principle – a principle that determines the will through its form rather than its matter and that prescribes the formal condition of universal law –
has the necessity of a practical law.
The connection between form and normative necessity is explained if we understand
a formal principle [is] as
the internal constitutive principle of a domain of cognition or rational activity.
It is the principle that defines or describes
and makes it possible to engage in that activity, thus the principle that any subject engaged in that activity must follow.
So understood, the formal principle of a domain of
cognitive activity
is uniquely suited to govern[s] it with normative necessity because it is not coherently rejected by anyone engaged in that activity.
The formal principle of making any judgments, including moral judgments, is that our judgments seek to be one with other judgments—hence, not contradictory. Reath 2:
A formal principle of a domain of cognition grows out of and expresses the self-understanding of that activity. It would appear that
any kind of rational activity understands itself as having
[has] certain features that make it what it is
– indeed that it is a formal feature of rational activities that they understand themselves to have a certain form – and that all genuine instances of the activity are normatively guided by this self-understanding. (Rational activity is self-conscious and is guided by its awareness of what it is.) The spontaneity of cognition or rational activity, in part, is that it is normatively guided by this self-understanding (of its own form). In order to make this idea a bit less abstract, let me illustrate with an example taken from Stephen Engstrom (much simplified). Engstrom suggests that it is the mark of judgment that it is ‘self-consciously self-sustaining’. The selfsustaining component is that
a judgment understands itself to make an objectively valid claim that excludes incompatible claims and that agrees with all other judgments and is confirmed by this agreement. Judgment is self-consciously self-sustaining because it sustains itself through its understanding that it is making an objectively valid claim. Among other things, it means that judgment self-consciously
seeks agreement with all other judgments as its formal aim, both
what Engstrom calls
‘subjective agreement’ and ‘objective agreement’. ‘Subjective agreement’ is that all judging subjects are to agree with or
hold a valid judgment, and ‘objective agreement’ is that judgments with different content are to agree with and support each other. Thus the formal feature of judgment is that it understands itself, and so constitutively aims, to fit together with all other judgments in a single
(mutually supporting) body of knowledge that holds for all judging subjects
, and moreover that it sustains itself through its consciousness that it does fit together with all other judgments in this way. In the case of theoretical judgments of the understanding,
since the categories and
principles of the understanding are conditions of agreement or
unity in a single objective
self-consciousness, they serve as the internal norms of judgment. The structure here is that a judgment – in this case a theoretical judgment – understands itself to be making an objectively [a] valid claim that stands with all other judgments in one body of knowledge. This is a necessary feature of judgment, in that a mental state that does not understand itself in this way is not a judgment. Further, this self-understanding leads to a set of internal principles that govern exercises of judgment in two respects. First, these internal principles describe and constitutively guide the operation of theoretical judgment and, because they are part of its self-understanding, tacitly guide all instances, even false judgments. One judges about items given in intuition (brings them to the objective unity of self-consciousness by bringing them under the categories and principles of the understanding. Second, these internal principles function as regulative
norms that
, again because they are based in the self-understanding of judgment, set authoritative standards of success and failure.
A judgment that does not meet the condition of agreement with all other judgments must be withdrawn
Moral judgments must be capable of being universalized without contradiction, so the standard is rejecting non-universalizable maxims. Prioritize perfect duties over imperfect ones under my framework.
Johnson 2 clarifies the standard:
Kant's first formulation of the CI states
[requires] that you are to “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” (G 4:421) O'Neill (1975, 1989) and Rawls (1989, 1999), among others, take this formulation in effect to summarize a decision procedure for moral reasoning, and I will follow them :
First, formulate a maxim that enshrines your reason for acting as you propose
.
Second, recast that maxim as a universal law of nature governing all rational agents, and so as holding that all must, by natural law, act as you yourself propose to act in these circumstance s.
Third, consider whether your maxim is even conceivable in a world governed by this law of nature.
If it is,
then, fourth, ask yourself whether you would, or
could, rationally will to act on your maxim in such a world.
If you could, then your action is morally permissible
.
If your maxim fails the third step, you have a ‘perfect’ duty admitting “of no exception in favor of inclination” to refrain from acting on it. (G 4:421 )
If your maxim fails the fourth step, you have an ‘imperfect’ duty requiring you to pursue a policy that can admit of such exceptions.
If your maxim passes all four steps, only then is acting on it morally permissible.
Following Hill (1992), we can understand the difference in duties as formal: Perfect duties come in the form ‘One must never (or always) φ to the fullest extent possible in
C
’, while imperfect duties, since they enjoin the pursuit of an end, come in the form ‘One must sometimes and to some extent φ in
C
’.
So, for instance,
Kant held that
the maxim of committing suicide to avoid future unhappiness did [does] not pass the third step, the contradiction in conception test. Hence, one is forbidden to act on the maxim of committing suicide to avoid unhappiness . By contrast, the maxim of
1 Andrews Reath, “Formal Approaches to Kant’s Formula of Humanity,” 2009 (To appear in Sorin Baiasu and Mark Timmons, eds,
Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays (Oxford University Press)
2 Johnson, Robert. “Kant’s Moral Philosophy.” SEP. 2008. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#DutResForMorLaw>.
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3 refusing to assist others in pursuit of their projects passes the contradiction in conception test, but fails the contradiction in the will test. Hence, we have a duty to sometimes and to some extent aid and assist others.
I contend that deadly force cannot be universalized. Domestic violence involves mutual violence perpetrated with the intention of domination. Strauss 1:
The study investigated the widely held belief that violence against partners in marital, cohabiting, and dating relationships is almost entirely perpetrated by men, and that when women assault their partners, it has a different etiology than assaults by men.
The empirical data on these issues were provided by 13,601 university students
who participated in the International Dating Violence Study in 32 nations. The results in the first part of this paper show that almost a third of the female as well as male students physically assaulted a dating partner in the 12 month study period, and
that the most frequent pattern was mutuality in violence, i.e. both were violent
, followed by “female-only” violence. Violence by only the male partner was the least frequent pattern according to both male and female participants. Thesecond part of the paper focuses on whether there is gender symmetry in a crucial aspect of the etiology of partner violence -- dominance by one partner, The results show that
dominance by either the male or the female partner is associated with an increased probability of violence.
These results, in combination with results from many other studies, call into question the assumption that partner violence is primarily a male crime and that, when women are violent, it is self-defense. Because these assumption are crucial elements in almost all partner violence prevention and treatment programs, a fundamental revision is needed to bring these programs into alignment with the empirical data. Prevention and treatment of partner violence could become more effective if the programs recognize that most partner violence is mutual and act on the high rate of perpetration by women and the similar etiology of partner violence by men and women.
There is almost no empirical evidence that the motive for female violence is self-defense. Strauss 2:
However, examination of
[World Health Organization] references 32 [and 37]
, 37, and 38 found that although all three assert ed that women’s violence was primarily
[is] in self defense ,
#32 Saunders (1986)
[However,] 32 reported no data on self-defense
,
#37 DeKesseredy et al (1997) does report data but their data shows that
[and in 37] only 6.9% of the women acted in self-defense
, and reference #38
Johnson & Ferraro (2000) is a review paper that cites references 32 and 37 and other references which also present no empirical data. At least five other studies that report data on self-defense. Like the
DeKesseredy et al. study, four out of the five found that only a small percentages of female violence was in self- defense [Carrado, 1996 #2909; Cascardi, 1995 #230; Felson, 1998 #6675; [Follingstad, 1991
#446; Sarantakos, 1998, 1999 ??; [Sommer, 1996 #3011]. For the one study which found high rates of self-defense, the percentage in self-defense was slightly greater for men (56%) than for women (42%)
Harned (2001??).
Rather than self-defense,
the
most
usual motivations for violence by women are coercion, anger, and punishing misbehavior by their partner.
These motives are parallel to the motivations of male perpetrators.
Research on homicides by women show s
similar results.
For example, Jurik and Gregware (1989) studied 24 female perpetrated homicides and found that 60% had a pervious criminal record, 60% had initiated use of physical force, and only 21% of the homicides were in response to “prior abuse” or “threat of abuse/death.”
Universalizing the use of deadly force for the intent of domination involves a contradiction in conception because willing universal extension of outer freedom, or domination on others, involves an incoherency in the very idea of freedom. Engstrom
3
explains:
Given the preceding considerations, it’s a straightforward matter to see how
a maxim of action
that assaults the freedom of others with a view
to further ing
one’s own
ends results in a
contradiction when we attempt to will it as a universal law in accordance with the foregoing account of the formula of universal law. Such a maxim would lie in a practical judgment that deems it good on the whole to act to limit others’ outer freedom, and hence their self-sufficiency, their capacity to realize their ends, where doing so augments, or extends, one’s own outer freedom and so also one’s own self-sufficiency. Now on the interpretation we’ve been entertaining, applying the formula of universal law involves considering whether it’s possible for every person—every subject capable of practical judgment—to share the practical judgment asserting the goodness of every person’s acting according to the maxim in question. Thus in the present case the application of the formula involves considering whether it’s possible for every person to deem good every person’s acting to limit others’ freedom, where practicable, with a view to augmenting their own freedom.
Since here
all persons are on the one hand
deeming good both the limitation of others’ freedom and the extension of their own freedom, while on the other hand, insofar as they agree with the similar judgments of others, also deeming good the limitation of their own freedom and the extension of others’ freedom, they are all deeming good both the extension and the limitation of both their own and others’
freedom.
These judgments are inconsistent insofar as the extension of a person’s outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom
Thus, deadly force cannot be universalized because domestic violence usually involves cases of mutual violence in which each partner wills domination over the other. In cases of mutual violence, neither
“victim” can claim the moral high ground. In such cases, deadly force is a limiting case of domination— the coercive use of force—and is thus impermissible.
3 Stephen Engstrom, “Universal Legislation as Practical Law,”
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Frontlines
A2 “in response to repeated domestic violence” implies self-defense motive
1.
“In response to” just implies that a specific action—repeated domestic violence—set off a response— deadly force, but says nothing about the motive behind that response. The question of what intent motivated the use of deadly force is an empirical question, and we need evidence to resolve that debate.
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CX explanation of Reath 1 and Reath 2: Morality must be a formal principle because only a principle that determines the will through its form has the necessity of a practical law. The formal, constitutive principle of a domain of an activity must govern it with normative necessity because that principle cannot be coherently rejected by anyone engaged in that activity. For instance, if I’m playing chess, I can’t reject the principle that I must checkmate the king, or else I wouldn’t be playing chess at all—so the principle “checkmate the king” governs chess with normative necessity, so to speak. Morality is the same way. If I engage in moral judgment, the categorical imperative is THE governing normative principle. The constitutive principle of passing moral judgments is universality. Judgment seeks agreement with all other judgments as its formal aim; it seeks objective agreement and subjective agreement—objective in the sense that a valid judgment excludes other incompatible judgments, and subjective in the sense that all judging subjects would hold that valid judgment.
Thus the formal feature of judgment is that it fit together with all other judgments in a single body of knowledge that holds for all judging subjects. Moral judgments must be capable of being universalized without contradiction.
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Extend Reath 1
Morality must be a formal principle because only a principle that determines the will through its form has the necessity of a practical law. The formal, constitutive principle of a domain of an activity must govern it with normative necessity because that principle cannot be coherently rejected by anyone engaged in that activity.
For instance, if I’m playing chess, I can’t reject the principle that I must checkmate the king, or else I wouldn’t be playing chess at all—so the principle “checkmate the king” governs chess with normative necessity, so to speak.
Extend Reath 2
If I engage in moral judgment, the categorical imperative is THE governing normative principle. The constitutive principle of passing moral judgments is universality. Judgment seeks agreement with all other judgments as its formal aim;. Thus the formal feature of judgment is that it fit together with all other judgments in a single body of knowledge that holds for all judging subjects, which creates the to avoid contradiction.
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The act/omission distinction is irrelevant when it comes to moral responsibility because intentions and identification with intentions are what matters. If you intend the end and take the means to that end, regardless of what physical set of motions that you cause, you are responsible for that action. What makes a movement become an action is intention.
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Next, aggregation of happiness is impossible because of the inter-subjective conception of the good.
Everything that is good or bad is good or bad for someone; my good is good for me and yours for you, but the sum of these two values is not good for anyone. The sum of our goods is not a value—the addition of goods or happiness wouldn’t be good for an external 3 rd party.
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And, the counterfactual test for intention solves for the violation coming from 3 rd party harms because we would still intend an end and take the means to that end without causing the collateral damage or harm. There’s a conceptual difference between intending and foreseeing; when we merely foresee, we aren’t committed to bringing about an end. When we intend, we try to take the means to a certain end.
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Practical reason solves infinite regress--If all value is conferred and not produced externally then we can't question morality because we establish it ourselves.
Only a risk of practical reason--The terminal conclusion of their project is that no framework has any grounding which means an equal risk between frameworks at best for them. Any risk practical reason solves infinite regress is then sufficient to win the framework debate.
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Reject their answers—evidence that shows non-mutual evidence only proves that men are more predominate in crimes caught by the law enforcement
Straus and Scott 07 (Murray A, Straus, Katreena Scott, Family Research Laboratory University of New Hampshire, GENDER
SYMMETRY IN PARTNER VIOLENCE: THE EVIDENCE, THE DENIAL, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIMARY
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT, 2007)
For almost every other type of crime, and especially violent crime , men predominate, for some types of crime at a ratio of about ten to one. There is naturally a tendency to think that this also applies to PV (Ellis & Walsh,
2000). Among cases of PV recorded by the police, 80-99% male predominance also prevails. This is not because of more physical attacks by men, but because of the greater probability of probability of injury from attacks by men and greater fear for safety by women, and the greater reluctance of men to call the police
(Straus, 1999). The predominance of female victims in police-call cases is usually taken as representative of all cases of PV. This gives the impression that few women physically assault their partner, even though police are involved in much less than 10% of PV
Reject their defense—the studies are statistically designed to avoid obtaining data regarding mutual violence
Straus and Scott 07 (Murray A, Straus, Katreena Scott, Family Research Laboratory University of New Hampshire, GENDER
SYMMETRY IN PARTNER VIOLENCE: THE EVIDENCE, THE DENIAL, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIMARY
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT, 2007)
Due to prevailing ideology that women are almost never perpetrators of PV and men are almost never victims, researchers designing surveys have typically asked female participants only about attacks by their male partners, and male respondents only about perpetration . To achieve this, the Canadian national
Violence Against Women survey (Johnson & Sacco, 1995), modified the Conflict Tactics Scales by omitting the questions on perpetration by the female participants in the study. The American National Violence Against Women Survey (Tjaden &
Thoennes, 2000) sponsored by the Department of Justice originally planned the same strategy. Fortunately, the US Centers
For Disease Control added a sample of men to the project. But when Johnson and Leone (Johnson & Leone, 2005) investigated the prevalence of “intimate terrorists” among the participants in that study, they guaranteed there would be no female intimate terrorists by using only the data on male perpetration. Many other studies of PV have also omitted questions about female perpetration and male victimization.
Many, agencies do not permit collection of data on PV unless questions on female perpetration are omitted . This may have been the reason that a comprehensive four site study of batterer treatment programs asked the women only about violence by the partner (Gondolf, 2002). This was a tremendous lost opportunity because it may be the only comprehensive study of male offenders which had access to their female partners.
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Turn—ignoring mutual violence makes treatment/solutions for DV worse and ineffective
Straus and Scott 07 (Murray A, Straus, Katreena Scott, Family Research Laboratory University of New Hampshire, GENDER
SYMMETRY IN PARTNER VIOLENCE: THE EVIDENCE, THE DENIAL, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIMARY
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT, 2007)
As a combined result of the factors listed above, t he past 25 years has seen a systematic denial of evidence about perpetration of PV by women. This denial is troublesome for social scientists because it threatens the integrity of science, and for practitioners because it threatens the effectiveness of prevention and treatment efforts . However, our criticisms are not directed at advocates for women, including the thousands of dedicated women who developed and maintain services for battered women. These women are part of a social movement that has benefited the entire society, not just women. The job of social movements and advocacy groups is to change society. To achieve this, social movements often deny contrary evidence, distort evidence, and exaggerate. It can be argued this is necessary to achieve even modest social changes. But it is the job of the scientist to explain the way the world works, and for this to be achieved, scientists cannot let their social and moral commitments lead them to deny contrary evidence, distort evidence, and exaggerate. In denying and distorting the evidence, social scientists are also doing a disservice to the development of prevention and treatment resources to successfully end PV . First, in addition to being morally wrong, the use of violence in a relationship by either men or women is associated with lower levels of relationship health (see section below on healthy relationships). Second, there may be specific risks for women associated with their use of aggression. Girls (and boys) who bully in childhood are more likely to report being verbally and physically aggressive in their dating relationships (Connolly, Furman, & Konarski, 2000; Pepler et al., 2006). Moreover, female use of aggression is an important precipitant of male aggression (O'Leary & Slep, 2006). Third, the negative consequences for children of witnessing aggressive marital conflict and domestic violence have been well documented (Jaffe, Wolfe, & Wilson, 1990; Margolin & Gordis, 2000; Wolfe, Wekerle, Scott, Straatman, &
Grasley, 2004) and these effects also apply when the perpetrator is the mother (Straus, 1992).
This turns the aff because it means they can’t solve for domestic violence in a world where they deny it’s validity. It’s importment for society to understand the true nature of the violence in order to tailor treatment programs to meet the needs of victims. This controls the internal link into their impacts.
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Turn—ignoring mutuality weakenings the feminist counter-patriarchal cause
Straus and Scott 07 (Murray A, Straus, Katreena Scott, Family Research Laboratory University of New Hampshire, GENDER
SYMMETRY IN PARTNER VIOLENCE: THE EVIDENCE, THE DENIAL, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIMARY
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT, 2007)
Finally, there are political reasons to recognize female perpetration of PV.
As previously mentioned, one concern about acknowledging female aggression is that it might weaken feminists continuing advocacy for fair treatment of women, particularly in the legal arena. However, denial by social groups may be even more harmful to the group than is denial of painful phenomena by individuals (Zerubavel, 2006). The feminist denial of the evidence on female PV may be weakening the feminist cause. We believe it will ultimately have a more negative impact on advocacy than will acknowledging PV by women. Maintaining the position that men are almost exclusively perpetrators and women are almost exclusively victims is already alienating young women and is likely to weaken the public base of feminist suppor t. A the same time, these assertions anger men who feel that they are being unjustly accused and provide fuel for the fire of the growing body of men's groups who claim that women cause more harm to men than visa versa. Finally, such claims may reduce the credibility among academics of feminist scholarship.
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As per Herman 1, any reason presented to rebut the presumption against killing must specifically show that the content of that presumption—that a generic maxim of killing involves undermining the necessary conditions of rational agency—does not apply to the case of the victim’s use of deadly force.
Reject generic aff arguments about “treating people as ends” because those arguments beg the question—the way we determine whether an action treats one as an end is by consistency with the categorical imperative universality procedure, the contradiction in conception and contradiction in will tests. NC offense comes first. Herman:
Herman, Barbara [Professor of Philosophy at UCLA]. “Murder and Mayhem” in The Practice of Moral Judgment. Harvard
University Press, 1993. p.125.
The appearance of a conception of value at the heart of Kantian theory does not imply that we can drop the
CI procedure and make moral judgments directly according to some scale of values
. Knowing that the autonomous will has value beyond price does not tell us when our actions discount that value. The procedures of judgment for the CI explicate the conception of value that is at the foundation of Kantian moral theory.
The role of the CI procedure , through its two tests, is to tell us when our willing is good —when we succeed in acknowledging the true worth of rational agents (ourselves and others) in our maxims. The arguments of the
CI procedure at once describe[s] the form of good willing and bring[s] it to bear on the conditions of human agency.
Good willing is a matter of deliberative commitment, in which formal procedures of deliberation express the basic value conception. It is not the concept of duty but the ultimate reliance on the CI procedure for judgments of value that makes Kantian ethics “non-teleological.”
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1.
If self-defense is justified, it is justified only as a last resort. First, regulative maxims of proportionality and necessity constrain the use of self-defense because the aggressor is still owed respect as a rational agent. Herman writes:
The justification of self-defense does not devalue the aggressor because he is guilty of aggression. He forfeits no moral title ; I have no claim of moral superiority . If I may act with violence against aggression, I must do so without ignoring the fact that the object of my action is an aggressing agent. Moreover, the fact of his undiminished agency and value grounds a proportionality of response, not because it is better that there be more agents around but because, in limiting my action where possible, I demonstrate the moral regard he is still owed. It may be possible to defeat or defuse the threat, or even remove myself from the other’s sphere of action. The justification of a maxim of resistance does not justify every action that would stop the aggressing agent.
The action of resistance needs to
[It must] be guided by what is necessary to defuse the actual or perceived threat , constrained by other regulative maxims and concerns . If violence in self-defense is justified as an act of resistance to aggression , it would seem to be justified as an act of last resort .
Second, if the defensive measure is not proportional to the threat posed, “self-defense” would merely devolve into unnecessary violence. For example, if you punch me, and I kill you in response, we would deem this as an act of murder rather than a justified act of self-defense.
The victim, in using deadly force, violates this constraint in three ways. a.
Death is inherently disproportionate to non-deadly violence. The topic says that the victim is responding to violence that has occurred in the past, so responses to the threat of possible future deadly violence fall outside the scope of the topic. b.
Force is not necessary because other options are not exhausted. Deadly force is an irreversible harm and does not allow for the possibility of the abuser changing his ways.
Dressler: 4
The more we permit early use of force, the greater the risk that the force used was not necessary.
But, because deadly force is used
-- and the putative aggressor is now dead -- we will never know for sure if the feared attack was going to occur and whether some other
, less extreme, remedy would have been sufficient.
After all, there is the slight possibility that the batterer will change his behavior if permitted to live. Maybe he will "see the light"; more plausibly, since so many batterers have drinking problems, he will get help to combat his alcoholism; or maybe he will go through counseling or anger management training...
We should not entirely give up on the ability of people to change
-- that is one reason why some reasonable temporal requirement is in order.
c.
Most victims are empirically able to leave the relationship. Schwarz: 5
Husbands, ex-husbands, boyfriends and ex-boyfriends are believed to be responsible for about half of all murders of women in the United States. However, Jacobson and Gottman found that a surprisingly large number of women actually escape from their abusive husbands. "Battered women do get out, and they get out at a high rate," explains Jacobson, noting that [The] divorce rate over two years ranges from 2 to 5 percent in the general population. In the study, 38 percent of the women married to [abusers without criminal records] Pit Bulls had left and divorced their husbands, while none of the women married to Cobras had left their husbands after two years. But at the end of five years,
75 percent of the women married to [abusers]
[with criminal without records] and 25 percent married to [abusers with criminal records] Cobras had divorced.
4 Dressler, Joshua, professor of law at the Michael E. Moritz College of Law at the Ohio State University. “BATTERED WOMEN
AND SLEEPING ABUSERS: SOME REFLECTIONS.” The Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, Spring 2006.
5 Joel Schwarz. “It’s emotional abuse, not vicious beatings, that often spurs women to leave battering husbands.” February 26, 1998.
Social Science. Health and Medicine.
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1.
“In response to” just implies that a specific action—repeated domestic violence—set off a response—deadly force, but says nothing about the motive behind that response. The question of what intent motivated the use of deadly force is an empirical question, and we need evidence to resolve that debate.
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1.
Punishment is prima facie wrong—additional moral considerations must be warranted to make punishment morally justified. Murphy writes:
[Jeffrie G. Murphy. “Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?” Columbia Law Review . Vol. 87, No. 3 (Apr., 1987), pp.
509-532.]
Punishment may not be morally justified at all. Since punishment is by definition coercive or invasive, it must (by anyone who takes liberty to be an important moral value) be considered prima facie wrong and in need of moral justification. A theory of punishment must bring a systematic moral theory to bear on the questions of criminalization and punishment in order to show how conduct that is clearly wrong when considered in isolation (e.g., locking someone up in a cage for several years) can be morally justified all things considered.
His arguments just beg the question because he doesn’t isolate why acting on a punishment maxim makes it such that killing for the sake of punishment would not discount the value of rational agency and thus would not involve a contradiction in willing. Just claiming that it is “punishment” does not get him anywhere.
2.
No link to your offense—there’s no empirical evidence that indicates that the motive for victims using deadly force is to punish abusers for their abusive behavior.
3.
Punishment cannot be arbitrary, but must be distributed based on desert. Deadly force violates in two ways: a.
The abuser is not granted the right to a trial when deadly force is legitimated but instead is subject to vigilante justice that would vary case-to-case, so the punishment is inconsistent and based on arbitrary factors other than due. b.
No court of law would give a repeat domestic abuser the death penalty. Death is only reserved for the most heinous of crimes.
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1.
The resolution, in using the phrase “deliberate response,” excludes instances of spontaneous violence. Victims must intentionally use deadly force, i.e. will the maxim on which they act.
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