North Yorkshire Waste Action Group
Objection to Allerton Waste Recovery Park:
FURTHER OBJECTIONS BASED ON JULY
MATERIAL FROM AMEY CESPA
Table of Contents
SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................................4
AWRP Non-Technical Summary....................................................................................................................4
Supplementary Planning Statement.............................................................................................................5
WRATE Model and Misleading Conclusions .................................................................................................6
Ecology and Nature Conservation ................................................................................................................7
Air Pollution ..................................................................................................................................................7
Travel Plan ....................................................................................................................................................7
ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS.................................................................................................................................7
Capacity ........................................................................................................................................................7
Financial harm ..............................................................................................................................................8
Traffic impacts ..............................................................................................................................................9
Abnormal Operation .....................................................................................................................................9
National Policy Planning Framework ............................................................................................................9
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................. 11
PART A: OBJECTIONS BASED ON FURTHER MATERIAL FROM THE APPLICANT................................................. 12
A1: AWRP Non-Technical Summary .................................................................................................................. 12
A2: AmeyCespa’s Supplementary Planning Statement ..................................................................................... 16
A2.1: Planning Policy, Legislation and Regulation Update ............................................................................ 18
A2.2: Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme Regulations .................................................................................. 23
A2.3: Sub-Regional Policy .............................................................................................................................. 23
A2.4: Appendix A1 – Community Involvement ............................................................................................. 27
A2.5: Appendix A3 and Additional Environmental Information Statement – Landscape and Cultural
Heritage ......................................................................................................................................................... 30
A3: AmeyCespa’s Part B – Additional Environmental Information ................................................................... 32
A3.1 Appendix B2: Response Letter .............................................................................................................. 32
A3.1.1: Recovery or Disposal ..................................................................................................................... 32
A3.1.2: Decommissioning and Restoration ............................................................................................... 32
A3.1.3: Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS) ................................................................................... 33
A3.1.4: Sustainability Assessment ............................................................................................................. 34
A4: WRATE Model and Misleading Conclusions ................................................................................................ 34
A4.1: Towards a Meaningful Comparison ..................................................................................................... 36
A4.2: Comments on Appendix B4 .................................................................................................................. 36
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A4.3: Comments on Appendix B5 .................................................................................................................. 39
A5: Ecology and Nature Conservation ............................................................................................................... 41
A6: AIR POLLUTION (Appendix B13) .................................................................................................................. 42
A6.1: Group 3 Metals..................................................................................................................................... 43
A6.2: Short Term WID Limits ......................................................................................................................... 46
A7: Travel Plan ................................................................................................................................................... 46
PART B: ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS .................................................................................................................... 49
B1: NYWAG Views on the Vision Statement ..................................................................................................... 50
B2: Additional Material on Harm that AWRP will cause ................................................................................... 52
B2.1 Over-Capacity Issues ............................................................................................................................. 52
B2.1.1: The European Dimension .............................................................................................................. 52
Figure B2.1.1: Tonnage of Waste Processed in Netherlands .................................................................... 53
Figure B2.1.2: Falling Gate Fees in Germany ............................................................................................. 53
B2.1.2: Regional Capacity .......................................................................................................................... 54
Figure B2.1.3: Residual Waste Arisings and Treatment Capacity - Great Britain ...................................... 55
Figure B2.1.4: Residual Waste Treatment Capacity – Yorkshire and Humber .......................................... 56
B2.1.3: Overcapacity in North Yorkshire ................................................................................................... 57
B2.2: Financial harm ...................................................................................................................................... 58
B2.3: Traffic impacts ...................................................................................................................................... 60
B2.4 Emissions and Abnormal Operations .................................................................................................... 61
B2.5: Implications of the National Policy Planning Framework .................................................................... 63
NPPF and Sustainable Development ......................................................................................................... 64
Local Determination and Democratic Deficit ............................................................................................ 65
Health and Pollution .................................................................................................................................. 66
Other Conclusions from the NPPF Document ........................................................................................... 66
ANNEX A - Letters to Knaresborough Post – April 2012 .................................................................................... 69
References ......................................................................................................................................................... 71
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SUMMARY
1.
This document reviews AmeyCespa’s Supplementary Planning Statement and accompanying material.
Far from alleviating our concerns, much of this additional material reinforces them and therefore
strengthens our objections to AWRP. It reinforces the need to refuse planning permission.
2.
The original purpose of AWRP was to treat municipal waste from NYCC and CYC only. Going beyond this
original purpose and remit for the proposed facility would distort the local market for waste and put the
future of existing local firms at risk, with concomitant adverse impacts on employment. This is a further
reason for refusing planning permission.
3.
This document also presents supplementary material which adds to our earlier objections.
AWRP Non-Technical Summary
4.
There is nothing in the Non-Technical Summery to alter our view that the AWRP is not needed and
would cause harm in many ways including to the climate, to the environment and human health and
well-being, to the economy and to sustainability.
5.
However, there is much deceptive “spin”. Even the artist’s impression on the cover-page is somewhat
sanitized; it omits any sign of waste or stored IBA, vehicles and the large plume. In reality this gross
intrusion would have major adverse landscape and visual impacts and would harm current recreational
facilities, the tourist industry and the enjoyment of public rights of way.
6.
Since the proposed AWRP plant exceeds its original purpose (meet the residual waste management
needs for NYCC and the CYC) and risks damage to already-established local waste management
business, planning permission should be refused.
7.
We question whether the applicant has sufficient UK experience, or sufficient experience of incineration.
The Applicant’ proposed “solution” flies in the face of their claimed values and aims (their para 1.3.4).
Indeed, their failure to meet these values at AWRP leads to many of the objections that we and others
have.
8.
Environmental and health impacts are significantly greater than AmeyCespa describe. They ignore the
fact that many of the emissions from the EfW plant are bio-accumulative and pose unacceptable risks for
human health and the environment. Their additional material repeats many of the errors in their earlier
evidence leading to erroneous conclusions; e.g. too low a stack height (only 70m). They fail to convince
that proper consideration was given to alternatives or to using existing or new facilities elsewhere
(Teesside, Ferrybridge). The transport implications were not given sufficient weight and the logistical
problems of bringing waste in from across the entirety of North Yorkshire ignored. They continue to talk
of AWRP as offering CHP (or CHP ready) despite the lack of a market for the heat. Hence their R1
calculations are based on a fantasy.
9.
Section 5.5 (Ecology and Nature Conservation) claims to follow best practice yet ignores the incinerator
emissions and the various stresses they cause. AmeyCespa only seem to acknowledge adverse impacts
where they apply to items of minor import but ignore or trivialise impacts from AWRP’s main facilities.
Mitigation either only addresses relatively minor impacts or would be largely ineffectual.
10.
Section 5.7 (Hydrology, Hydrogeology and Flood Risk) contains some contradictions and fails to give
adequate consideration of possible future needs for drinking water or issues surrounding local leaching
of pollutants into groundwater and the spread of pollution within aquifers via groundwater flows. The
claim of “Minor Beneficial effect on surface water quality” is entirely wrong; the reverse is true. Adverse
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effects on water quality will also place stress on aquatic ecosystems. Despite AWRP being within an EA
Designated Groundwater Source Protection Zone, AmeyCespa offer no evidence concerning the nature
of the surficial sediments or of hydro-geological modelling of the underground aquifer to check for harm.
11.
Section 5.10 (Traffic and Transport) downplays the impacts and associated risks. The large number of
HGVs associated with AWRP will damage the safety and security of residents and North Yorkshire road
users. There are serious safety issues concerning the A59/A168 and contiguous A1(M)/A59 junctions,
especially during periods of peak traffic flow.
12.
A number of conclusions in Section 5.11 (Air Quality, Odour and Dust) are false. AmeyCespa’s
conclusions concerning the operation of AWRP (Section 5.1) are ill-founded. This leads to their overly
sanguine views of health impacts and they totally ignore the fear they engender. They also ignore or
dismiss the many adverse social impacts that AWRP would lead to.
Supplementary Planning Statement
13.
AmeyCespa emphasise the National Policy Planning Framework’s presumption in favour of sustainable
development. However, AWRP is not a sustainable development; the “golden thread” of AmeyCespa’s
imaginings is actually a vicious circle leading to ongoing harm over decades. There can be no
presumption in favour of development. AWRP is alleged by AmeyCespa to serve the wider community
yet it would fail to do even this, instead causing harm in a number of ways.
14.
AWRP is not the strategic project AmeyCespa claim and it will not deliver the economic, social and
environmental benefits that they claim. Indeed, we discuss the harm it will do in each of these areas.
15.
There have several changes in Planning since AmeyCespa’s original application. These include the
Localism Act which could lead to the abolition of the RSS. However, our evidence is germane irrespective
of the possible abolition of the RSS. We see the Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme Regulations as
irrelevant as there is currently no market for the heat; AmeyCespa pretend otherwise. At best heat use is
only speculative.
16.
We and others who commented on the proposed new Waste Core Strategy (WCS) feel strongly that it
would be wrong to determine planning permission prior to the new WCS being agreed and adopted. This
is because all the documents put out by NYCC regarding the WCS have said "this assumes that the
incinerator already exists". This presumption is without foundation as it appears to pre-empt the
outcome of the AWRP planning application and any subsequent public inquiry. Thus there must be
concern that the current WCS development is merely a public relations exercise intended to act as a
“smoke screen” behind which a highly controversial proposal can proceed. At the very least, planning
permission should be withheld until the LDF and the WCS are firmly in place.
17.
We present evidence showing that consultation and so-called “community involvement” have been a
sham. We utterly refute the derogatory implications of para 1.4.25 et seq that the public have come to
see all new buildings as ugly. This is typical of the attitude shown towards people who disagree with the
Applicant. While they have given presentations, they have not given serious attention to people’s
concerns. Consultation involves listening and acting on other people’s views, not simply hearing them
and dismissing them apparently automatically. Had they take full and proper account of what was said, it
would not have been necessary for the Community Liaison Group (CLG) to distance itself from the whole
process; why carry on when there is no real dialogue? To claim that the engagement process helped
form choices and decisions is hypocritical when there was no real engagement.
18.
AmeyCespa attempt to discredit Harrogate Borough Council, a statutory consultee who objected
strongly to AWRP by seeking to place the views of qualified officers above the democratic decision of the
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Council to object. For AmeyCespa to speak of “inaccuracies and misinformation” in HBC’s formal
response is ironic, given the very many examples of inaccuracies and misinformation in AmeyCespa’s
Application. This provides a strong example AmeyCespa’s contempt for consultation and the views of
others, as does the CLG episode and AmeyCespa’s denigration of NYWAG and others as representing
“the negative interests of a few”. If this is their attitude even before planning permission has been
decided, how can people trust them to act with respect towards the local communities were planning
permission to be granted? Their failures in respect of consultation therefore constitute a further
reason for refusing planning permission.
19.
The Conservation Management Plan and Landscape and Cultural Heritage Fund are discussed. There may
well be adverse reaction to a single landowner receiving a large sum in respect of Allerton Park and
Garden. Given the unrealistically low amount of monies and the seriously restricted aims of the
Landscape and Cultural Heritage Fund, we feel that this is disproportionate. Given that AWRP’s
emissions will harm both the natural environment and the built environment, the restricted timescale
over which these monies are available is totally inadequate. Finally, the procedures for managing this
fund do not inspire confidence, given the lack of trust in the community engendered by the farcical
consultation to date. We feel that the Conservation Management Plan and the Landscape and Cultural
Heritage Fund are of little relevance and the latter is wholly inadequate to offer any realistic mitigation.
20.
AmeyCespa’s arguments on Decommissioning and Restoration are disingenuous. The very fact that they
propose to construct AWRP on land which was supposed to be restored under the original consents
shows that a “suitably-worded planning condition” is no guarantee of decommissioning and certainly
does not ensure that funds will be available. It is therefore essential that financial provision is made in a
way that ensures that the council does not bear the whole of the decommissioning costs if operations
have to cease prematurely or the operator goes out of business. Since AmeyCespa appear unwilling to
make such provision, this is one further example of potential financial harm and therefore adds to our
reasons for opposing planning permission.
21.
In summary, the application runs counter to the UK’s national and international commitments on
climate change; is contrary to EU, National and District Planning Policies; will cause harm to the
environment and human health and well-being, to the economy and to sustainability; that harm
cannot be mitigated; and the applicant fails to prove a need that overrides the harm. Planning
permission should be refused.
WRATE Model and Misleading Conclusions
22.
Our Chapter on Climate Change sets out faults in the WRATE model and in the methodology used in the
original Planning Statement. There are likewise many deficiencies in AmeyCespa’s supplementary
evidence. These deficiencies mean that AmeyCespa’s results cannot be taken at face value and certainly
do not mean that the EfW (incineration) plant is acceptable. There is nothing in AmeyCespa’s later
material to alter this conclusion.
23.
We understand that the EA are now moving away from WRATE and (with ERM, WRAP and nine English
Local Authorities) are developing an alternative modelling tool in accordance with international
standards on life cycle assessment, carbon foot-printing and Defra’s draft guidance on life cycle thinking.
Eunomia have already developed an alternative life cycle modelling tool known as ATROPOS, used to
analyse policy for Defra and the Committee on Climate Change. NYCC should use the ATROPOS model
to validate the applicant’s WRATE report and the claims about carbon savings.
24.
In reality CO2 emissions from the EfW incineration plant are much higher than AmeyCespa claim;
incineration is the worst alternative to landfill in terms of GHG emissions. It is in direct contradiction of
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the sustainability criteria set by the Brundtland Commission. NYWAG object to the proposed AWRP
both for the damage that it would cause to the climate and because it runs counter to national and
international policy on climate change. Nothing in the new material alters this conclusion.
Ecology and Nature Conservation
25.
Our earlier evidence detailed the Environmental Risks arising from AWRP which could extend over a
wide area and include acidification and/or eutrophication in ecosystems, lower crop yields, adverse
impacts of heavy metals and damage to materials and cultural heritage due to soiling and exposure to
acidifying pollutants and ozone. By contrast, AmeyCespa’s assessment of the impacts of AWRP remains
confined to the immediate locale of the proposed AWRP. They fail to acknowledge that emissions from
the EfW (incinerator) would contribute to ecological damage and damage to materials (and therefore
buildings) over a wide area. They also fail to discuss the role of eutrophication and other environmental
insults and the environmental damage that they can bring. Thus they continue to downplay the
environmental consequences of AWRP. There is nothing in their revised chapter 5 to alter our original
conclusion that the evidence they offer is wholly inadequate.
Air Pollution
26.
AmeyCespa’s Appendix B13 updates their air quality assessment. Crucially, it still relies on the air quality
assessment presented in Chapter 10 of their Environmental Statement. Thus the new assessments are
subject to the same deficiencies as those in the original Planning Statements.
27.
Their assessment of Group 3 metals follows essentially the same approach as used previously. This is
discussed and flaws identified. The methodology chosen does not meet the EU’s aim of a high level of
protection. Additionally it flies in the face of the Precautionary Principle whose objective is to take full
and proper account of all the potential risks in a manner that fully acknowledges the higher end of the
scientifically established or credible range of uncertainty. The Applicant’s approach therefore pays scant
respect to the risks imposed on local people and on their environment.
28.
AmeyCespa conclude that their additional assessment of short-term WID limits “does not alter any of the
conclusions from the original air quality assessment”. The flaws in the original assessment remain so the
many of the conclusions of the update are wrong. This makes it impossible to be as sanguine as
AmeyCespa are. The overriding conclusion remains: planning permission should be refused in view of
the environmental and health risks.
Travel Plan
29.
AmeyCespa’s Travel Plan recognises that local availability of public transport is limited and presents a set
of possible measures to make travel more sustainable. The Plan is discussed and deficiencies identified.
While it might have some limited effect, it can only be a minor palliative, especially as HGVs are the main
concern and they are not covered. As with much else at AWRP, the Travel Plan is best seen as a sop
which does little to mitigate the unacceptable risks arising from the traffic AWRP would generate.
ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS
Capacity
30.
Our chapter on Need and Technology Choices showed that the projections of waste arisings on which the
alleged need for AWRP was based are implausible; waste arisings both locally and nationally are falling
while re-use and recycling are increasing. Many Local Authorities may take similar decisions at about the
same time without giving consideration to national or international factors; e.g. the Landfill Directive has
led to a large number of MSW incineration projects at various stages of development.
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31.
Over-capacity in some EU countries (e.g. Germany and Holland) is beginning to have commercial
consequences leading to the closing of incinerators and exporting waste across frontiers to fill excess
capacity. The European Commission’s Environment Directorate has emphasized the importance of
moving waste up the waste hierarchy and that all member states should prioritize waste prevention. The
European Commission have called for the UK to avoid sending recyclable material to incineration and
have expressed some concern that an over-reliance on incineration could lead to some recyclable
material being burned and called on the UK to ensure that recycling and reuse remain the priority for
waste treatment. The European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment has called for “the phasingout, by the end of this decade, of incineration of recyclable and compostable waste”.
32.
Overcapacity in Europe and the drive to move waste up the waste hierarchy has implications for the
financial viability of the proposed AWRP. Much greater use of re-use and recycling are clearly more in
line with the thinking of the European Commission and the European Parliament. To avoid the financial
harm that AWRP would bring with it, planning permission should be refused.
33.
Research by Eunomia suggests the over-capacity problems seen in Germany and Holland and some
localised areas in the UK are likely to be repeated nationally. Both theIr central and high scenario for GB
projects overcapacity commencing in 2015/16 (1.2 and 6.6 million tonnes respectively), even excluding
potential future capacity, which has not yet entered the planning system. Only on their ‘low’ is the onset
of overcapacity delayed until 2017/18.
34.
Even though there will be regional variations in the onset of over-capacity, it is highly likely that AWRP
would be operating in an over-capacity situation for all or much of its operational life. This is a buyers’
market; people who want waste disposal services would have the upper hand. This adds to the financial
risks faced by AWRP and, in particular, NYCC and therefore council tax payers.
35.
Inspection of NYCC’s revised waste forecasts shows that they are lower than the forecasts on which the
December 15th 2010 decision to award the contract to AmeyCespa, the Council was taken. However, do
include a new and unspecified waste stream called “Trade Waste”. This has suspiciously identical and
excessively high1 growth rates for Craven, Harrogate, Ryedale, Scarborough and Selby (but not CYC)
which fall back to 2% thereafter. Without this change, the MSW predictions for NYCC by 2039/40 would
be c. 380,000 tonnes; if we assume an implausibly low 50% recycling rate, only some 190,000 tonnes of
waste would require treatment, far below the 320.000 tonne capacity of the EfW (incinerator) at AWRP.
36.
The spectacularly high growth rates are unjustified, being an NYCC assumption without any evidence
base. In the face of the regional and national over-capacity and the expected highly competitive market
for waste treatment in the coming years, the high gate prices of AWRP pose financial risks for NYCC.
37.
There needs to be a thorough review both of technology choices and local alternatives before planning
permission is even considered. It is essential to refuse planning permission now to avoid further
nugatory expenditure2.
Financial harm
38.
1
Our earlier chapters argued that AWRP will cause financial harm to the people of NYCC and CYC who will
pay for it and bear the risk for the next 25 years. They advanced a number of reasons for this. However,
there are more. These include the lack of a proper examination of value for money and a blind faith that the PFI
process automatically ensures value for money but this is not always the case; PFI is not always the
These rates are 28.5% (2015/16), 40.1% (2016/17), 23.49% (2017/18) and 20.11% (2018/19).
2
Nugatory expenditure is expenditure that does not achieve any result. (Definition of nugatory: Absolutely and without qualification
lacking in meaning, substance, or worth)
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cheapest option for a given scheme. Moreover, using PFI is not always risk free, as the Treasury Select
Committee pointed out. Not all risk is transferred to the private sector. Finally, council tax payers don’t
want the ongoing certainty of paying over the odds for a guaranteed 25 years. The AWRP proposal is
rather like signing for a fixed rate mortgage for 10% APR when the going rate is 5% and probably falling.
It is the economics of the madhouse.
39.
Granting planning permission for AWRP would give the applicant a monopoly position which will be
incapable of challenge for 25 years. This is unacceptable in terms of the damage to competition by local
businesses. However, there are financial risks arising from the disparity between the circa £130/tonne
gate price at AWRP and the more typical £65/tonne. NYCC’s confidence that it could replace the shortfall
in MSW with C&I waste is likely to be misplaced, especially as there is over-capacity in the region. Hence,
it may not be possible to fill AWRP and this could create commercial risks in trying to source C&I waste in
a very competitive market. NYCC seem not to have factored these risks into their simplistic economic
case, nor acknowledged the possibility of penalties being paid if they cannot supply sufficient waste.
40.
That part of the capacity of AWRP that in not used for the NYCC/CYC MSW must compete on the open
market where the going rate is already far lower and will be subject to downward pressure due to the
growing over-capacity regionally and nationally and due to the probable greater effectiveness and lower
costs of new and emerging technologies. This leads to the possibility of cross-subsidy from the Councils;
this looks suspiciously like a form of state aid and is morally repugnant to us and unacceptable financially
as council tax payers.
Traffic impacts
41.
This section reinforces our objections on Traffic grounds, with the focus on the increased traffic at the
already hazardous A59/A168 junction and the closely associated A1(M)/A59 junction which are
contiguous and should be treated as part of the same system. AmeyCespa fail to do this and thereby
seriously understate the risks. AWRP would generate considerable additional traffic, particularly HGVs.
Moreover AmeyCespa do not allow for the fact that suppliers of waste will determine whether waste will
be direct delivered to the site, or be subject to bulking prior to onward transmission. If they decide to
send their waste directly to the site instead of bulking, the AmeyCespa’s Transport Assessment and all its
conclusions would be largely meaningless since traffic volumes may well be considerably in excess of
their estimates. Thus they are downplaying the impacts.
Abnormal Operation
42.
There are a number of possible abnormal operation modes which feature failure of part of the air
pollution control system leading to permitted emission levels being substantially or greatly exceeded.
There appears to be inadequate safety engineering to avoid or minimise these risks. Moreover,
emissions of some harmful substances could be reduced by the inclusion of proven technologies. These
issues mean that planning permission should be refused in view of the possibility of substantial harm
to the environment and human health.
National Policy Planning Framework
43.
We have added our views on the NPPF in relation to the AWRP application. It introduces a presumption
in favour of sustainable development; there can be no presumption in favour of AWRP because it is not
a sustainable development. Our earlier views on the lack of sustainability are extended and reinforced in
relation to the definitions and criteria within the NPPF.
44.
We welcome the introduction of greater emphasises on local determination and we suggest that this has
been conspicuous by its absence in the case of AWRP and the Waste Core Strategy. The NPPF appears to
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challenge NYCC’s presumption that it should determine this application, especially as the process to date
has ignored public opinion, thus introducing a democratic deficit where none need exist. The NPPF
suggestion that planning should be a collective enterprise including rather than excluding people and
communities implies that decisions should be taken by a more local body and that the views of local
people and communities and their representatives should be given greater weight.
45.
Other conclusions from the NPPF Document include the need to “respond to the changes that new
technologies offer us”, which AWRP signally fails to do. It also emphasises that planning should be
genuinely plan-led, empowering local people to shape their surroundings, with succinct local and
neighbourhood plans setting out a positive vision for the future of the area. Plans should be kept up-todate, and be based on joint working and co-operation to address larger than local issues. Sadly, NYCC
have failed to meet these standards. It has been without a Minerals and Waste Strategy for some years
and has consistently gone against the views of the public. NYCC should not be taking the most significant
contractual and planning decision ever until after it has a valid strategy to guide it.
46.
There are further NPPF recommendations that have not been met in the case of AWRP such as the lack
of a planning framework for minerals and waste; a scheme that cannot conserve heritage assets in a
manner appropriate to their significance; a proposed development would cause harm to the landscape
that cannot be adequately screened or mitigated; a Transport Statement or Transport Assessment.
These, and the many other NPPF requirements that the scheme fails, reinforce our view that planning
permission should be refused
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INTRODUCTION
1.
This document reviews information submitted by AmeyCespa in their Supplementary Planning
Statement and accompanying material made available by NYCC in July 2012. This includes a number of
additional Appendices. Far from alleviating our concerns, much of this additional material reinforces
them and therefore strengthens our objections to AWRP.
2.
It has not proven possible to review every aspect of the voluminous material submitted by AmeyCespa
as part of their planning application for AWRP. Instead, we have for the most part focused on the areas
to which we most strongly object. We must therefore emphasise that we do not necessarily agree with
statements by the Applicant on which we have not commented. What is clear is that there are very
many aspects of the AWRP proposal with which we strongly disagree and that there are cheaper and
cleaner alternatives which would gain our support. Neither do we oppose further development at
Allerton Park as part of a sustainable waste management strategy though we believe that bringing all
residual (after recyclates have been collected elsewhere for treatment) waste through any single site is
unjustifiable. We therefore continue to object to the AWRP proposal and emphasise the need to refuse
planning permission.
3.
We have previously emphasised that there is no need for a facility of any description to treat the amount
of residual waste envisaged for AWRP (see our chapter on Need and Technology Choices). Even NYCC
seem to have belated recognised that AWRP is overly large (though failing to recognise the full extent of
the problem) and suggest that this could be made up by treating commercial waste. We would remind
you that the purpose of AWRP and the responsibility of North Yorkshire is to treat municipal waste only.
Going beyond the original purpose and remit for the proposed facility would distort the local market for
waste and put the future of existing local firms at risk, with concomitant adverse impacts on
employment. This is a further reason for refusing planning permission.
4.
That said the primary purpose of this document is to comment on the new material by AmeyCespa that
was made publically available in July 2012. We have approached this task by commenting on a number
of the individual documents in this supplementary material, with appropriate cross referencing to our
comments on the original material. We feel obliged to apologise for the repetition in the material below
but this is inevitable given the repetitive nature of much of what AmeyCespa say and the fact that this
chapter, unlike our earlier chapters, comments on a substantial number of AmeyCespa documents.
5.
We have also taken the opportunity to add supplementary material which appears in Part B of this
document. This material at Parts B1 to B5 adds to and extends the range of our earlier objections. It
includes a discussion of the new National Planning Policy Framework.
6.
Finally, we reiterate our view that planning permission for AWRP should be refused.
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PART A: OBJECTIONS BASED ON FURTHER MATERIAL FROM
THE APPLICANT
A1: AWRP Non-Technical Summary
7.
The cover-page to this document has a somewhat sanitised artist’s impression. For example, there is no
sign of any waste or stored IBA awaiting treatment, no sign of any vehicles and no sign of a plume,
though this would be up to 300m long on AmeyCespa’s own admission. Even so, the picture makes it
clear that the proposed facility is a massive development of uncompromisingly industrial design and
utterly alien in a rural landscape and would have major adverse landscape and visual impacts. Despite
some limited and inadequate attempt at screening; the AWRP facility would clearly intrude into the
openness of the countryside. It would harm current recreational facilities, the tourist industry and the
enjoyment of public rights of way. The so-called mitigation measures discussed in Section 5 of the NonTechnical Summary have very little if any impact on the gross intrusion that is AWRP. Planning
permission should therefore be refused.
8.
In para 1.3.5 AmeyCespa states that “In 2010 AmeyCespa secured a 25-year waste PFI contract to meet
the residual waste management needs for NYCC and the CYC. AWRP is central to this contract”. The key
phrase here is “meet the residual waste management needs for NYCC and the CYC”. As our chapter on
Need and Technology Choices makes abundantly clear, AWRP is grossly oversized to meet this objective.
To use Council Tax payers and PFI money to subsidise and/or underwrite this development so that it can
also treat commercial waste (a possibility that NYCC have openly admitted to) is wholly wrong. This
would, in turn risk damage to already established local waste management business.
9.
Since the proposed AWRP plant exceeds its original purpose (meet the residual waste management
needs for NYCC and the CYC) and risks damage to already-established waste management local
business, planning permission should be refused.
10.
AmeyCespa claim (Section 1,3) to have been “formed out of two sister companies, merging the public
service provision of Amey with the waste management expertise of Cespa” and that AmeyCespa draws
on over 40 years’ experience in waste management; including both construction and service delivery.
This, they say “includes the operation of over 90 waste management facilities and dealing with the
sustainable, safe treatment of 7,000,000 tonnes of waste every year.” It is worth dissecting these claims:


Although AmeyCespa is registered in the UK its origins are Spanish. It is a recently formed company
(2010) created as a joint enterprise by two organizations. Amey, a company operating in the UK,
which was acquired by the Spanish company Ferrovial in May 2003 and Cespa, who operate
internationally and been part of the Ferrovial Group for over 40 years. Both of these operate within
the Ferrovial Services Division and report to the CEO Santiago Olivares and both are wholly owned
by Gruppo Ferrovial SA based in Barcelona. Neither Amey or Cespa or AmeyCespa are quoted on the
UK stock market they are all wholly owned by the Spanish company Ferrovial.
Much of the claimed expertise in waste management is outside the UK and not necessarily relevant
to UK conditions; only the recently acquired Donarbon is a UK-based waste management firm and
they appear not to have any incineration experience, at least on the scale of the proposed AWRP
facility3.
3
Donarbon is currently delivering a 28 year waste management PFI contract in Cambridgeshire with Cambridgeshire County Council,
worth £730 million. The company has waste treatment facilities in Cambridgeshire and a landfill operation. A further two transfer
stations, nine household waste recycling centres and other industrial and commercial services in the region are also operated by
Donarbon.
Page 12 of 72


Technology transfer can be a difficult process and is by no means instantaneous. Clearly the lessons
of the Cambridgeshire waste management project have not been applied to AWRP; if they had a
more environmentally friendly solution might have been offered.
AmeyCespa claim (para 1.3.4) to be “focused on helping local authorities to design and implement
effective waste management strategies, reducing costs whilst improving environmental outcomes for
both its customers and the UK public alike”. These claims would not be net by AWRP – it is not the
most effective waste management strategy available (e.g. on grounds of substantial over-capacity
and unsuitable technology choice to meet NYCC’s and CYC’s needs), far from reducing costs it is
much more expensive than other proven technology choices and it signally fails to improve
“improving environmental outcomes for both its customers and the UK public alike”. Indeed it has
substantial environmental impacts and carries unacceptable health risks for the public.
11.
While not strictly reasons for refusing planning permission, the above does lead us to question whether
the Applicant has sufficient UK experience. More pertinently, perhaps, the Applicant’ proposed
“solution” flies in the face of the claimed values and aims espoused in their para 1.3.4. Indeed, their
failure to meet these values at AWRP leads to many of the objections that we and others have.
12.
As is made clear in our earlier chapters (e.g. on Climate Change, Harmful Emissions and Health), there
are far more, and more severe environmental and health impacts than AmeyCespa describe. Moreover,
as will be seen later (see below), some of the arguments they use are unacceptable, for example on air
pollution. They fail to adopt a holistic approach and they do not recognise or discuss some adverse
effects or health risks. Thus, it is startling to find that the only cumulative Impacts mentioned at para
2.3.1 and therefore included as part of the EIA are:

Leachate Treatment Facility: the development of lagoons and associated infrastructure to treat
leachate arising from the Allerton Park Landfill; and

Flaxby Golf and Country Club: the development of a luxury hotel, leisure facilities and golf course.
This totally ignores the fact that many of the emissions from the EfW plant are bio-accumulative and
pose unacceptable risks for human health and the environment. It is not acceptable simply to ignore
these important effects which lead to strong reasons for refusing planning permission yet place greater
weight on a Golf and Country Club than on human health.
13.
Para 4.6.1 shows that the digestate and a liquid from the AD plant are sent to the EfW plant. Bearing in
mind that it is perfectly possible to produce usable product from AD plant, the technology choice
appears sub-optimal.
14.
Para 4.6.5 describes elements of the EfW plant including the Flue Gas Treatment/Air Pollution Control. It
states that “An integrated air pollution control system will treat all flue gas prior to emission via a 70m
tall chimney, so we keep emission levels within safe and statutory limits. Flue gas residues including fly
ash will be transported off site in sealed tankers for disposal at an appropriately licensed facility”.
15.
Two points immediately arise. Firstly, we have shown that the stack height of 70m is inadequate and
likely to lead to emission levels exceeding safe and statutory limits (these are not the same thing – for
some emissions best practice demands much more stringent limits than in the UK). As we have already
made clear in our previous submissions, this is not acceptable. Secondly, it is unclear whether or not fly
ash and APC residues are loaded in an air-tight environment consistent with health and safety needs.
Moreover, the destination of the sealed tankers is not stated but it seems likely that they will use the
Source: AmeyCespa Acquires Donarbon Limited, Waste Management World, http://www.waste-managementworld.com/index/display/article-display/6539904517/articles/waste-management-world/markets-policyfinance/2010/09/ameycespa-aquires-donarbon-limited.html
Page 13 of 72
dangerous A59/A168 junction; it is crucial that the sealed containers (tanks) are proof against any
theoretically possible road accident since any breach would lead to a major pollution incident.
16.
Construction work will inevitably cause disturbance and we consider the hours envisaged in para 4.13.3
to be excessive. Instead of construction works being undertaken in accordance with the following normal
(the hours quoted are not “normal”) hours of work of Monday to Friday, 07:00 to 19:00 (excluding Bank
Holidays) it should be 0800 to 1800 and Saturday work should be excluded. No variation should be
allowed except for safety agreed by the Local Authority. (Reasons of continuity is not acceptable – it
simply acts as an excuse for ignoring any restraint on working hours).
17.
Despite misleading claims to the contrary, Section 5 shows that in reality proper consideration was not
given to newer, cheaper and more environmentally friendly alternatives and that the transport
implications were not given sufficient weight and the logistical problems of bringing waste in from across
the entirety of North Yorkshire ignored. Moreover a justification based around a fictitious “do nothing”
scenario is no justification at all. We have shown in other chapters that AWRP is over-sized and not
needed, that it is unacceptable in its health and environmental impacts (a range of issues apparently
given scant consideration in arriving at the AWRP technology choice) and that there are more modern,
cheaper and cheaper alternatives. Alternatives such as sending some waste to existing facilities outside
the county or to new facilities such as those at Ferrybridge appear not to have been considered at all or
dismissed far too easily in view of the potential to save money. We find no evidence that a proper
sensitivity analysis of all the assumptions made has been carried out and there is likewise no evidence of
the risk analysis that one would expect for a project of this magnitude.
18.
Far from being the “optimal technology” that AmeyCespa claim (para 5.2.10), AWRP comprises a
mechanical treatment plant that falls far short of the capabilities of MBT in its ability to enhance
recycling, an AD plant that does not produce useful product and an incinerator which produces only
electricity because there is no readily available market for the heat. It is badly located and fails to make
use of existing rail links in North Yorkshire thereby imposing heavy loads on local road networks with
concomitant traffic accident risks. The transport implications of the AWRP site (or any other single site)
are contrary to the proximity principle and the transport strategy in the Vision Statement. Finally, the
AWRP proposal is not compatible with the waste hierarchy as it does not enable re-use and recycling to
be maximised and would result in waste being treated further down the hierarchy than is necessary or
appropriate.
19.
We refuted the claims made in Section 5.4 on visual and landscape impact in our chapter on Other
Impacts. The reality is that the proposed AWRP building would appear as an isolated but prominent alien
feature of uncompromisingly industrial design in the wider rural landscape; it would be seen from a wide
area and the plume could be seen for 10-20 km. Despite some limited and inadequate attempt at
screening, the AWRP facility would clearly intrude into the openness of the countryside. It would harm
current recreational facilities and the enjoyment of public rights of way. Moreover, AWRP could hurt the
tourist industry locally. The 70m (220 ft) high chimney would be a massive industrial development in the
open countryside which will have major adverse landscape and visual impacts at the A1M/A59 junction
which is the major visitor entry to the York and Harrogate district and would be an unwelcome eyesore
to discourage people entering the Yorkshire Dales. To describe such impacts as “slight” as AmeyCespa do
is a travesty of the truth.
20.
Section 5.5 (Ecology and Nature Conservation) claims to follow best practice yet ignores the emissions
from the incinerator and the various stresses that they cause, as identified by the European
Environment Agency (EEA) in their 2011 reporti . This is discussed in Section 2 of our chapter:
Environmental Insults: Environmental Risks, Traffic, Visual Impact which shows that air pollution is likely
to have greater effects than AmeyCespa acknowledge. Also, AmeyCespa only seem to acknowledge
adverse impacts where they apply to items of minor import (why all the fuss over Claro House?) but
Page 14 of 72
ignore or trivialise impacts from AWRP’s main facilities including the incinerator. Mitigation efforts
either only address relatively minor impacts (e.g. those around Claro House) or are likely to be of very
limited value or ineffectual (e.g. those intended to address some part of the visual impact).
21.
The claim (para 5.6.3) that “Effects on the geology and ground stability due to the construction of AWRP
will largely be Neutral to Slight Beneficial, given the design standards and use of best practice methods”
is wholly without foundation. It is axiomatic that no building confers any benefit on geology, by
definition it interferes with nature. It is interesting that the proposed efforts to prevent gas seeping into
the AWRP facility (para 5.6.5) does not include a gas-impermeable membrane (sometimes also called a
radon barrier) in addition to the other measures proposed.
22.
Section 5.7 (Hydrology, Hydrogeology and Flood Risk) contains some contradictions. For example para
5.7.3 says that there are three aquifers (water bearing rocks) within the Site area and that the Site lies
within the outer extent of an EA designated Groundwater Source Protection Zone (GSPZ). They then say
that there are no drinking water abstraction licences within 1km of the Site. AmeyCespa (para 5.7.6) go
on to say that “We consider that the construction and operation of AWRP would have a Neutral impact
on groundwater and on surface water runoff and there will be a Minor Beneficial effect on surface water
quality”. This claim is in error because it ignores several factors:



There is a risk of pollutants leaching into groundwater locally and the deposition of pollutants into
local land and hence groundwater and drainage systems. The latter also leads to a risk of pollutants
entering the groundwater.
Groundwater is not static; in other words there are groundwater flows. This could lead over time to
pollution reaching drinking water abstraction points or precluding extraction at points which might
otherwise have been used had not AWRP existed.
Deposition of pollutants into local land and hence groundwater and drainage systems means that
the claim of “Minor Beneficial effect on surface water quality” is entirely wrong; the reverse is true.
Adverse effects on water quality will also place stress on aquatic ecosystems.
23.
Despite AWRP being within an EA Designated Groundwater Source Protection Zone, AmeyCespa offer no
evidence concerning the nature of the surficial sediments or of hydro-geological modelling of the
underground aquifer to check for harm. Moreover, information on the precise elevation of the
groundwater table itself is lacking, because old records do not survey the ground surface of the
boreholes and may not be reliable because of the ground-works. The surface and the deeper aquifers
are connected, as indicated by high salt levels recorded in one borehole. Under these circumstances it is
wrong to claim a “Neutral impact on groundwater”; it is more likely to be negative.
24.
Section 5.10 discusses Traffic and Transport and downplays the impacts and associated risks. Our
objections on transport grounds are outlined in Section 4 of our chapter: Environmental Insults:
Environmental Risks, Traffic, Visual Impact. Briefly, the choice of a single site to treat all of North
Yorkshire’s waste makes no sense given this is the largest rural county in England. The position of the
AWRP site is wholly inconsistent with the localism policy, being at one corner of the county. There are
sites that could better meet the needs of NYCC/CYC. The proposed AWRP appears to be contrary to the
Councils policy of road accident reduction. The large number of HGVs associated with AWRP will damage
the safety and security of residents and North Yorkshire road users. There are serious safety issues
concerning the A59/A168 and contiguous A1(M)/ A59 junction, especially during periods of peak traffic
flow giving rise to enhanced accident risks.
25.
AmeyCespa’s Section 5.11 discusses air quality, odour and dust and reaches a number of conclusions
totally at variance with our findings. The latter are set out in our chapters on Harmful Emissions and their
Properties (with the concomitant adverse health effects set out in Health Risks: Adverse Effects from
Incinerator Emissions) while the flaws in AmeyCespa’s argument are given in Air Quality and Health: A
Page 15 of 72
Critique of AmeyCespa’s Assessment. Taken together, these show that the claims made by AmeyCespa
concerning the operation of AWRP summarised in Section 5.1 are ill-founded. (We also gave concerns
over the construction and decommissioning phases). Much of this is also summarised in our Objection To
AmeyCespa Proposal At Allerton Park submitted in January 2012.
26.
Health impacts arising from waste incineration (the main technology at AWRP) is a contentious subject
for many reasons (complexity, uncertainty, vested interests, the nature of the ‘scientific method’,
difficulties ‘proving’ causal relationships, ‘confounding factors’ including both social factors and other
sources of pollution, etc.). However, there is a substantial body of scientific opinion showing that there
are reasonable grounds for concern about potentially dangerous effects of incinerator emissions on
human health, with babies and young children being amongst the most vulnerable. Under these
circumstances European law demands that the precautionary principle be applied. As there are less
costly, more environmentally friendly systems, this means that the health and environmental risks must
be taken into account at the upper end of the range of uncertainty. In particular, the risks of
incineration are such that the precautionary principle means that it is wrong to take the risk of
incineration when you do not have to.
27.
There are a range of social factors which AmeyCespa do not appear to properly recognise and certainly
do not adequately discuss in the Non-Technical Summary. As our chapter on Sustainability show, far
from creating job opportunities (para 5.13.3 AWRP would serve to destroy jobs, particularly in existing
waste management firms and in future re-use and recycling industry. Paragraphs such as 5.13.4 show an
unwarranted dismissive arrogance towards the damage that AWRP would inflict on living conditions and
house prices in the vicinity. Fear of the adverse health impacts arising from incinerator emissions,
adverse impacts on living conditions for people living nearby coupled with economic penalties (e.g.
lower house prices) and adverse traffic impacts are all material concerns that have been factors in
refusing planning permission for incinerators.
28.
All this is sufficient reason to refuse planning permission even without the myriad of other reasons
that we have presented elsewhere.
29.
While we recognise the need to seek alternatives to landfill and move towards a “sustainable integrated
waste management system” (c.f. para 5.15.1). AWRP is not a sustainable solution (see our chapter on
Sustainability) and would not meet North Yorkshire’s needs in a sustainable or cost-effective manner.
AmeyCespa’s claim (para 5.15.2) that “the environmental impacts of the proposed development have
been assessed in great detail” fails to impress because their assessment is replete with many flaws and
judgements manifestly biased in favour of their proposal. While accepting that some (not “great”) care
has been taken to minimise these, these efforts are either peripheral or ineffective or both (as with
visual impact) or leave health and environmental risks that remain above acceptable levels. These facts
reinforce the case for refusing planning permission.
A2: AmeyCespa’s Supplementary Planning Statement
30.
Much of the first part of this document is descriptive but we must take exception to the impression that
there has been proper consultation or community engagement (a point discussed in detail in later
sections). Many NYWAG members were present at the so-called consultations which were more like
presentations and PR exercises. The whole point of consultation is to listen and take full and proper
account of what was said. Had this been done then the widespread public opposition to the incinerator
would have been properly understood and a better alternative substituted. AmeyCespa persist in calling
AWRP an integrated system (e.g. in Section 5). This is surprising in that the various parts of AWRP need
not be part of this allegedly integrated system. Thus the Mechanical Treatment and AD components
need not be associated with an incinerator; plant of this same general type could equally well be part of
Page 16 of 72
some other system such as MBT/AD – one of several cheaper and cleaner alternative options. Proper
consultation would have brought this point home.
31.
The quotation from the National Policy Planning Framework is intended to show reasons why AWRP
should go ahead. In fact the NPPF indicates the opposite. It says:
The crucial point here is that AWRP is not a sustainable development, as our chapter Sustainability,
What Sustainability makes abundantly clear. Consequently, there can be no presumption in its favour.
Indeed, we would argue that the very existence of cleaner and more environmentally alternatives
means that more sustainable alternatives exist and the presumption should be in favour of these.
32.
It is also notable that AmeyCespa have not quoted the recent review by the House of Commons
Community and Local Government Committee (15 December 2011) which concluded that the
“presumption in favour of development” has to be considered in the context of Local Development plans:
“The NPPF’s introduction of a presumption in favour of sustainable development must be seen as a
high-level principle rather than a challenge to the predominance of local decision-making. That is why
we have recommended that it be expressed instead as a ‘presumption in favour of sustainable
development consistent with the Local Plan’.”
(para. 160, our underline)
AWRP fails to meet this test on two counts: it is not a sustainable development and it is not consistent
with local plans. Both these shortcomings are amply demonstrated in the chapters we submitted earlier
and are unaltered by subsequent changes to policy, legislation and regulation.
33.
AmeyCespa see AWRP as a necessary strategic project (our chapter on Need and Technology Choices
demonstrates that it is not needed) that will deliver:
34.
While these aims are laudable enough in themselves, AWRP does not meet any of them and it is
misleading to pretend otherwise. Thus:

Economic Role – the technology choice is obsolescent (i.e. incineration) or less efficient than
industry best practice (why does the mechanical separation plant only remove 10% of waste for
recycling?), or inappropriately designed (why is there no useful product from the AD plant when
such is technically feasible using proven technology?). Worse, AWRP is much more costly than other
Page 17 of 72


35.
more modern and proven technologies and its overcapacity will lead to AWRP treating C&I waste
and, according to NYCC’s latest projections “Trade Waste” This will lead to the destruction of jobs in
the local economy as well as the loss of Council jobs as its excessive costs have to be met. Why
should council tax payers subsidise such a technology that damages employment prospects for local
people?
Social Role: The main social factors are the harm it will do to local people in terms of their health,
their environment, the value and desirability of their homes and, for some people, their employment
prospects. Far from creating a high quality built environment, it is of an entirely unsuitable industrial
design for a rural environment and will blight the existing built environment including, but not
limited to local historic buildings. We would favour making the steps needed to move towards
“locally responsible and sustainable waste management” but AWRP would put this process on hold
for 25 years since it does not represent a sustainable solution. It would destroy resources so that
virgin resources have to be exploited when it would not otherwise be necessary. To allow
AmeyCespa to have any role in education via the Visitor Centre or otherwise would merely be to
encourage company propaganda and proselytising an unsustainable and socially irresponsible
“solution” (i.e. AWRP).
The reality of the environmental role is that AWRP places unnecessary risks on human health and
the environment, leading quite unnecessarily to the many types of harm that we have discussed
elsewhere in our Objection. The main chosen technology (incineration) is the worst possible option
for climate change. Far from minimising or utilising waste, AWRP discourages re-use and recycling
and gratuitously destroys resources for very little benefit in terms of energy. Mitigation measures
are wholly inadequate to address the scale of harm AWRP would cause.
To summarize the extent to which AWRP fails to meet its stated objectives, the application runs
counter to the UK’s national and international commitments on climate change; is contrary to EU,
National and District Planning Policies; will cause harm to the environment and human health and
well-being, to the economy and to sustainability; that harm cannot be mitigated; and the applicant
fails to prove a need that overrides the harm. Planning permission should be refused.
A2.1: Planning Policy, Legislation and Regulation Update
36.
There have been a number of changes since the application and AmeyCespa take this up to April 2012
(the policy documents replaced by National Planning are listed in Appendix A2).
37.
The Localism Act is seen by AmeyCespa as having relatively little impact on this application, even with
the possible abolition of the RSS. In part this is because they see the evidence base for AWRP as strong
and see this as germane even in the absence of the RSS. By contrast, we believe that the case for AWRP
and the evidence that they adduce is deeply flawed and we therefore have a wide range of objections,
most particularly to the use of an incinerator. The evidence we have produced is likewise germane
irrespective of the possible abolition of the RSS.
38.
We feel that it is unfortunate that AWRP should remain a County matter; there is a clear tension
between the imposition of harm on residents of the Harrogate district and the needs of the local
community. We recognise that AWRP will cause financial harm to all who live in York and North
Yorkshire and damage job prospects for some but environmental , health and even traffic are largely
local matters where harm will be imposed from outside.
39.
The National Policy Planning Framework emphasises the role of sustainability and AmeyCespa claim that
AWRP offers a sustainable solution. As we have made clear elsewhere in this document and in our
chapter Sustainability, What Sustainability, this is far from the case. AWRP does not meet any
sustainability criterion, even the ridiculously narrow one used by AmeyCespa. All the claims made by
Page 18 of 72
AmeyCespa here are unsupportable and the NPPF therefore offers further policy reasons for refusing
planning permission.
40.
The Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme Regulations are irrelevant as there is currently no market for the
heat. Being CHP-ready is of no use without a market. Developing some (as yet unidentified) facility that
uses heat would imply further industrialisation in a currently rural environment and this would also meet
planning objections. This Scheme cannot be taken into account at this stage as heat use is only
speculative.
41.
We have commented separately on the North Yorkshire Waste Core Strategy (see Annex A) and were
able to agree with much of the Vision Statement, albeit with important reservations. We believe that the
“Minerals and Waste Development Framework: Minerals Options and Waste Vision Consultations –
March 2012” document and the Vision Statement therein cannot be seen in isolation from the AWRP
planning application.
42.
We believe that the consultation on the Vision Statement and the Waste Core Strategy (WCS) is a farce.
This is because all the documents put out by NYCC regarding the WCS have said "this assumes that the
incinerator already exists". That was the baseline for the workshop NYWAG representatives attended at
Northallerton on October 19th. This presumption is without foundation as it appears to pre-empt the
outcome of the AWRP planning application and any subsequent public inquiry. It begs the question of
whether or not the current WCS development is merely a public relations exercise intended to act as a
“smoke screen” behind which a highly controversial proposal can proceed.
43.
All our evidence points to the fact that AWRP is unacceptable and unsuitable in planning terms and is
environmentally damaging. It also poses unacceptable risks to human health. In consequence is
definitely premature given the embryonic state of the LDF. At the very least, planning permission should
be withheld until this and the WCS is firmly in place; better still, refuse planning permission.
44.
The introductory paragraph 1.4.2 is intended to prove that the direction of travel of the present
Government is for the facilitation of infrastructure schemes such as AWRP. However, the presumption
towards development is irrevocably linked to sustainability and AWRP is not a sustainable development.
45.
We can agree with the arguments in para 1.4.3 that the updated and revised policies do not materially
affect the conclusions. The crucial point is that our conclusions are and will remain radically different
from those of AmeyCespa and lead inescapable to one over-riding conclusion: that planning permission
for AWRP should be refused.
46.
The NPPF identifies three pillars to sustainable development; economic, social and environmental (c.f.
AmeyCespa’s para 1.4.21) and the synergies between them. Thus:
47.
To claim as AmeyCespa do at para 1.4.22 that “the ‘golden thread’ of achieving and delivering
sustainable development runs consistently through the AWRP proposals” is simply absurd. The
statements in the remainder of para 1.4.22 presumably derive from their so-called sustainability
assessment which is wrong on almost every count. As our chapter Sustainability, What Sustainability
shows, AWRP fails even to meet AmeyCespa’s narrow definition of sustainability and falls well short of
meeting widely accepted definitions such as that of the Brundtland Commission.
Page 19 of 72
48.
The Brundtland Commission defined Sustainable Development as “development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (the same
definition now used in the NPPF, taken from Resolution 42/187 of the United Nations General
Assembly). The AWRP would not meet this definition. The 25 to 30 year contract will fundamentally
compromise the ability of future generations to meet their needs and lead to the destruction of valuable
resources that could have been reused or recycled, necessitating the exploitation of virgin resources. The
incinerator dominates the facility in cost and treatment volumes and, once built, cannot be reduced in
size and its capital-intensive nature forces the operator to run it at full capacity even where there is no
need within the county to do so. Its’ use would cause harm by emitting substances harmful to man,
wildlife or the environment and damage the Council’s ability to increase recycling to anywhere even near
to best practice. AWRP would cause harm to both the environment and human health, destroy jobs that
would otherwise have developed in, for example, reuse and recycling and in the leisure and tourism
industries for miles around and damage the social fabric by bringing extra traffic (and accidents with
concomitant human misery) and reduce leisure and recreational opportunities locally. The local
community would suffer other economic harm, for example lower house prices which may lead them to
the Valuation Office Agency to reduce their council tax banding4.
49.
We conclude that AWRP is anything but a sustainable development and the “golden thread” of
AmeyCespa’s imaginings is actually a vicious circle leading to ongoing harm over decades. There can be
no presumption in favour of development. AWRP is not in any sense acceptable and planning permission
should therefore be refused.
50.
AWRP is alleged by AmeyCespa to serve the wider community yet it would fail to do even this. It is
markedly more expensive than other technologies and therefore means that council tax payers across
the entirety of York and North Yorkshire would face higher council tax bills than would be necessary with
a more sensible technology choice. They would also suffer damage to other council services (with loss of
council jobs) due to budget constraints in a time of austerity. This spreads economic and social harm
across a wide and geographically dispersed region. These factors are one further reason why AWRP is
not a sustainable development. There is no clash between the collective interests of the many (the
populations of York and North Yorkshire) and the “negative interest of a few”, to use AmeyCespa’s
derogatory term. This is simply because both the local population and the wider population of York and
North Yorkshire would suffer, albeit that the local people suffer more. Indeed, NYWAG has submitted a
petition bearing 10,000 signatures to NYCC opposing AWRP – hardly a negative few.
51.
Finally, para 1.4.24 prates about “the industrial infrastructure that the country needs”, presumably in the
hope that AWRP will be seen as part of that infrastructure. It is not. Our chapter on Need and Technology
Choices show that AWRP is not needed and that there are a number of more favourable options to treat
the much smaller amount of residual municipal waste that would arise once re-use and recycling reaches
optimal levels.
52.
We utterly refute the derogatory implications of para 1.4.25 et seq that the public have come to see all
new buildings as ugly. We well know that not all changes t the built environment are negative but
equally we know (as most of not all people do) that some changes are positive and others negative while
many are neutral. It defies logic to imply, as AmeyCespa appear to, that just because some changes to
the built environment are positive then a particular change (AWRP) is positive. In fact AWRP would not
appear as a change to the built environment; rather it would be seen as an alien intrusion in a rural
4
The Valuation Office Agency has recently reduced council tax bands for homes in the vicinity of wind farms. Source: Council Tax cuts
for homes near wind farms, Sunday Times. 22 July 2012.
Page 20 of 72
environment5. The argument that is negative is not based on some alleged bias against changes to the
built environment which AmeyCespa wrongly attach to people who object to their proposals. It rests
firmly on facts, as set out in this chapter and the earlier chapters of our objection.
53.
Para 1.4.29 is one of the least credible paragraphs this author has ever seen. We disagree with every
statement in it, with the last three sentences being particularly objectionable.
54.
Para 1.4.34 and its various sub-paragraphs presume to give an interpretation of the NPPF’s intentions
and relate them to AWRP. We feel that it contains a number of inaccuracies in relation to the latter:
1.
We have found that the so-called engagement with the community to be a sham. Admittedly
AmeyCespa have given presentations, what they have not done is give serious attention to people’s
concerns. Consultation involves listening and acting on other people’s views, not simply hearing
them and dismissing them apparently automatically. This sort of concern led to the Community
Liaison Group disbanding; why carry on when there is no real dialogue? To claim that the
engagement process helped form choices and decisions is hypocritical when there was no real
engagement.
2.
The claims made in this paragraph are false. WRP is not a sustainable development, would damage
people’s lives and would not meet the real needs of the people of York and North Yorkshire. The
Landscape Management Strategy is a grandiose name for a set of relatively minor measures that do
little or nothing to alleviate the visual impact and landscape harm that AWRP would impose.
3.
AWRP is not a sustainable development so most of this paragraph is irrelevant. The overall impact on
local employment would be negative, as shown in our chapter Sustainability, What Sustainability?
4.
To us and very many others the buildings are visually intrusive and constitute a wholly alien and
unacceptable feature in an otherwise rural landscape. (This harms the “amenity value” of existing
buildings over a wide area). While it is no doubt possible to produce worse designs, it is the fact of
placing such enormous industrial buildings in a rural landscape coupled with the unavoidable huge
chimney stack (but not sufficiently tall to give adequate dispersion) in a rural landscape that is so
very wrong. Given the sheer scale and enormity of the buildings and what they represent in terms of
environmental, health and social harm, a few curves and a little inadequate landscaping is irrelevant
to the total unacceptability of the AWRP construct. We reject utterly the views of CABE and English
Heritage (always assuming they have been quoted correctly). In this context, we would agree with
Prince Charlesii when he said “For far too long, it seems to me, some planners and architects have
consistently ignored the feelings and wishes of the mass of ordinary people in this country”. Of a
certainty, AWRP in its proposed location would fully qualify for Prince Charles famous description
“what is proposed is like a monstrous carbuncle on the face of a much-loved and elegant friend”
5.
To claim, as AmeyCespa do, that “the development has been designed mindful of the landscape
character and unique environment that may exist and developed to integrate with it” is a travesty of
the truth, as should be obvious from the above paragraph and all we have said about visual impact.
While the site lies outside designated nature conservation and AONB areas, it has a substantial visual
impact for miles around and constitutes visual pollution over a wide area.
6.
Since incineration is the worst waste management technology for emitting CO2 and other
greenhouse gases, AWRP would be hugely damaging to efforts to move towards a low-carbon future
(see our chapter on Climate Change). AmeyCespa emphasis that “supporting low-carbon energy is
central to the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development”.
However, incineration, the main component of AWRP, is the most carbon-intensive energy source
5
AmeyCespa continue to claim support from CABE, a body who no longer advise the Government. That perhaps says all that needs
to be said about the value of their views which, in the case of AWRP meet the strong disagreement of large numbers of people.
Page 21 of 72
(especially as it would be electricity-only) with the possible exception of coal-fired power stations.
This alone should be sufficient reason to refuse planning permission, especially when couple with
the fact that AWRP is not a sustainable development in so many other ways.
7.
The idea that AWRP could ”contribute towards conserving and enhancing the natural environment”
is absurd. We have specified the myriad of ways that AWRP will cause harm to the environment in
other chapters and these negate all the claims to acceptability that AmeyCespa make under this
point. Taken together, they negate the claims to acceptability made in AmeyCespa’s Planning
Statement and Environmental Statement. Moreover, with several proven cleaner, more
environmentally friendly and cheaper alternatives to choose from, there is no need to use a highly
polluting and visually intrusive facility such as the proposed AWRP. It would be contrary to the
Precautionary Principle to grant planning permission.
8.
We are not opposed to some form of development for waste treatment at Allerton Park – the
objection is to AWRP. WE do, however, feel that the traffic implications of a single site for the
entirety of North Yorkshire are unacceptable.
9.
AmeyCespa claim that AWRP is mixed us since it contains a mix of waste technologies. This is true
only to a limited extent – one might as well say that a kitchen offers mixed use of land because it
contains both an oven and d a dishwasher or sink. In other words, the purpose of AWRP is waste
management – a single use. The next claim – that it maximises re-use and recycling is patently
untrue. Incineration, the main component of AWRP discourages re-use and recycling (as we have
explained elsewhere) and destroys materials and goods that could be recycled. This necessitates
exploitation of virgin resources, one of the many reasons why AWRP is not a sustainable ”solution”.
The education centre, far from encouraging recycling, would simply proselytize an obsolescent
technology and promulgate the message “what is the point?” when it comes to recycling.
10. While English Heritage has apparently agreed the proposed mitigation, this does not mean that it is
at all adequate. Indeed to speak of the “legibility and significance of the designed landscape” is pure
nonsense, verbiage as imprecise and redolent of jargon as to be virtually without meaning. That
apart, AWRP would be a “monstrous carbuncle” (to borrow a phrase) that detracts from local
heritage assets and the enjoyment thereof. Moreover, it would have a similar malign influence on
the enjoyment of recreational facilities.
11. Having a single site is a guaranteed way of maximising vehicle miles compared with a multi-site
solution. To speak of promoting “greener, cleaner travel choice” is absurd in the face of the massive
and unnecessary intrusion of HGV’s caused by the inappropriate choice of a single site at one edge of
the region. Moreover, its location in a rural setting means that workers and visitors (if any) would
use motorised transport to get there. The siting necessarily maximises the use of the private car. A
wish-list item that employees will be encouraged to use more environmentally friendly means of
getting to work than a private car won’t make it happen.
12. It is amazing that AmeyCespa include point 12 – “to take account of and support local strategies to
improve health, social and wellbeing for all” AWRP and its EfW(incinerator) in particular, emits a
wide range of toxic substances which impose unacceptable health risks over a wide area while we
have also shown that AWRP causes harm to the wellbeing and social fabric of the community
through the various environmental impacts it causes coupled with damage t employment prospects
in some areas of the local economy.
It is somewhat fanciful for AmeyCespa to claim that AWRP would drive waste up the waste hierarchy
when the reality is that it discourages re-use and recycling and holds waste at the bottom or next to
bottom tier of the waste hierarchy. It reduces opportunities to treat waste at the highest level and is
the antithesis of a sustainable solution. It would impose additional costs on the community
compared with other proven alternatives which do offer the opportunity to drive waste up the
waste hierarchy in an environmentally friendly manner.
Page 22 of 72
55.
We agree that the NPPF aims to help deliver development in a way that is sustainable (pare 1.4.35) and
support this aim. This is indeed one of the many reasons why we oppose AWRP with its obsolescent
technology (incineration) since AWRP is not, and can never be a sustainable development. The very
principles behind the NPPF mean that planning permission should be refused.
56.
AmeyCespa go on to review the Technical Guidance to the NPP (para 1.4.37) and a range of new
regulations in paragraphs1.4.38 to 1.4.45. There is nothing in these to alter our objections, though it is
pertinent to comment on the Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme Regulations.
A2.2: Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme Regulations
57.
As we have shown in our chapter on Need and Technology Choices, there is no market for the heat.
Consequently, AmeyCespa’s claims in this area are meaningless and there would not be unless new
developments were permitted. This would be unacceptable as it would imply further industrialisation
of a rural landscape and this threat adds further to the unacceptability of AWRP and hence to our
objections. The fact that the scheme is not able to utilise the heat increases the harm promises by AWRP
and fails to minimise the use of natural resources.
58.
Therefore the Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme is currently of no relevance except inasmuch as it
carries the threat of further industrialisation in a rural landscape. Being CHP compliant is of little
importance if you cannot sell or significantly utilise the heat.
59.
The promise to keep searching for a market for the heat threatens planning blight will continue to exist
on the local area for the entirety of the life of AWRP were it to be built. These devalues homes and
businesses and is wholly unacceptable.
A2.3: Sub-Regional Policy
60.
We are aware that a number of parties commenting on the proposed new Waste Core Strategy (WCS)
feel strongly that it would be wholly wrong to determine planning permission prior to the new WCS
being agreed and adopted (see Part 2A of this document). This is because AWRP would effectively
predetermine the outcome of the WCS and because AWRP is in practice wholly inconsistent with the
draft material on which consultation has so far been based.
61.
AmeyCespa are clearly aware that Harrogate Borough Council, a statutory consultee, have objected
strongly to AWRP and seek to discredit them. It is true that the qualified officers raised no objection;
living proof that on this occasion the Council showed greater wisdom than their officer s. For AmeyCespa
to speak of “inaccuracies and misinformation” in HBC’s formal response is ironic, given the very many
examples of inaccuracies and misinformation in AmeyCespa’s Application and even in statements they
have made to the press. Moreover, it should be obvious that HBC had available to them material from
consultation which had been submitted by a number of parties following the wholly inadequate report
from qualified officers.
62.
We would support the various objections which are summarised in paras 1.4.49 and 50. One of the many
documents containing inaccuracies and misinformation is AmeyCespa’s Planning Policy Statement and
the special pleading in paragraphs 1.4.52 et seq is based on these earlier documents. In the case of the
adverse impacts on local sites like Allerton Park, Visual Amenity, the scale of the development, adverse
impact on the countryside and concerns over highways issue (i.e. mainly traffic and accidents including
fatalities)there is room for judgement and HBC clearly took the wholly justifiable view that these various
impacts were unacceptable. The “tick-box” approach by AmeyCespa and their reliance on procedures is
Page 23 of 72
not adequate, nor is their reliance on flawed analysis such as their Transport Assessment (a case where
independent professional analysis comes to rather different conclusions).
63.
There are many omissions and errors of interpretation in AmeyCespa’s criticisms relating to Harrogate
Borough Council’s views and it is undemocratic to attach more weight to an officer’s report than to the
Council’s views when the two are incompatible. Flaws in AmeyCespa’s arguments include but are not
limited to:
 Para 1.4.53 (re policy): Clearly HBC considered there were reasons to reject AWRP. Whatever the
officials may have written, there are policy objections at a local level and these have been
enumerated throughout our objection. Further policy considerations are given in Part B of this
chapter.
 Para 1.4.56 (scale of the development) simply reiterates that AmeyCespa consider that there are no
policy objections (they would say that, wouldn’t they?) but this does not alter the fact that others do
not share their view. We object to the visual impact of such a massive industrial development in an
otherwise rural setting (see the visual impact section in our chapter on Other Environmental Insults),
as have others.
 Para 1.4.56 (impact on the countryside). Adverse impacts on the countryside take a variety of forms
including such things as visual impact, loss of recreational facilities and effect on leisure and tourism.
Again, we and other have enumerated many policy objections at various levels and AmeyCespa’s
reiteration of their own views does nothing to change this. Objectors to the scheme have likewise
assessed the scale and impact of the proposed AWRP and share HBC’s view that it is not acceptable.
The mitigation proposed is wholly inadequate.
 Para 1.4.57 refers to AmeyCespa’s own transport assessment but independent professional opinion
places the impacts at a more sever level than AmeyCespa suggest and the supplementary Appendix
included in their supplementary material does not properly address this issue.
 Paras 1.4.58 et seq do little more than repeat what AmeyCespa consider they have provided and
even go so far as to imply (para 1.4.60) that HBC should have known about the further developments
of the Landscape Management Plan now presented (though this may be a matter of poor semantics)
To say that it should not have been criticised for its inadequacy on the grounds that it is to be further
developed is inappropriate and unjustified. The simple fact is that this Plan and mitigation measures
are not fully developed and it would be inappropriate to grant planning permission on the basis of
half-formed ideas, especially when the information we have to date demonstrates their total
inadequacy.
 Para 1,4,61 criticises HBC for recognising that no proper option appraisal has been carried out.
Reiterating that Part 5 of the Planning Statement contains details of the site search fails to recognise
that such a search is but one part of an option appraisal and that there is a link between technology
choice and site selection. It also fails to recognise that other people may disagree both with the
methodology (such as it is) and criteria used.
 Para 1.4 62 speaks of a management plan for Allerton Park and Gardens and claims there is a holistic
approach that seeks to deliver targeted landscape character and cultural heritage improvements.
Bearing in mind the great damage that AWRP would inflict, this claim is breathtaking in its audacity
and shows that AmeyCespa fail to grasp the harm their proposals would do.
 Likewise, it is particularly ironic that AmeyCespa are complaining about the suggestion that HBC and
its officers have not considered public responses (para 1.4.64). We make it clear later that public
consultation by AmeyCespa has been a sham.
 Para 1.4.66 to 72 appear to say that AmeyCespa have already submitted the various pieces of
information referred to but the very fact that it had been thought to be missing or insufficient is
surely a pointer to its inadequacy. For example, it is not unreasonable for people to identify views
that they would like to see in a visual impact assessment or to disagree with the assessments as
carried out by AmeyCespa (para 1.4.71).
Page 24 of 72

64.
Paras 1.4.73 and 74 concern the landscape and heritage fund which is a part of the mitigation
strategy which we believe to be inadequate; indeed the fact that even the proposer sees a need for
mitigation confirms the unacceptability of AWRP. Repetition of views already expressed does not
alter the fact that the scope of mitigation is inadequate and does not address the social and
economic costs that AWRP imposes on households in the surrounding area. (We suggest a generous
compensation scheme is needed, extending at least as far as Boroughbridge and Knaresborough and
a similar distance in other directions.)
Paras 1.4.75 et seq refer to five additions concerns that HBC have raised:




Para 1.4.75 seeks to deny that the facility would have wide-ranging implications for traffic. We do
not concur with AmeyCespa’s view that there are no significant effects relating to transportation and
believe that their traffic assessment is adequate when it is actually inadequate. For example they
have failed to carry out a properly comprehensive accident risk assessment and there is already
evidence that traffic impacts would be significant. The concern over the siting of AWRP is not a mere
whim. Particular concerns focus on accidents and congestion the A168/A59 and A59/A1M junctions
which are contiguous and should be treated as a single entity (which AmeyCespa fail to do). Quite
clearly, effects will diminish with distance from the site but the whole of the A59 up to and including
the junction with the York ring road will be significantly affected, especially where peak traffic to and
from AWRP coincides with rush hours. Similar considerations apply to the A59 towards Harrogate
and roads into Harrogate from the South. Finally, the site assessment failed to take due note of
multi-site options or the proximity principle and placed the entire onus on road links along already
heavily congested roads (see Part B); this is not acceptable.
Para 1.4.77 promises continuing ongoing investigation into potential markets to for the heat from
the incinerator. This can be roughly translated as saying ”we got the siting wrong as there is no
market for the heat but we now want to hold the threat of further industrial development over the
local community”. This threat is unacceptable.
Our chapter on Need and Technology Choices shows that AWRP is not needed and will not be
needed at any time during its projected 25 year life The original case for AWRP was made in terms of
meeting the need to divert municipal waste from York and North Yorkshire away from landfill and
this need (much smaller than claimed by AmeyCespa) can be met through cheaper, cleaner and
more environmentally friendly technologies. There is also the possibility of using existing or
committed facilities, for example on Teesside or at Ferrybridge, thereby avoiding a great deal of
capital expenditure. The lack of any need, the existence of viable and cheaper alternatives and the
lack of sustainability of AWRP mean that all the claims made in para 1.4.78 are false.
AmeyCespa suggest at para 1.4.79 that HBC may be concerned that PFI is the most appropriate
means of funding. If so, this concern is well justified. The dangers have been recognised by the
Treasury Select Committee and some of them are highlighted in the extracts below, taken from their
conclusions.
“4. If Departments or public bodies do not have a capital budget large enough to allow for
desired capital investment, there is currently a substantial incentive to use PFIs which are
not included within Departmental budgets (Departmental Expenditure Limits). A PFI deal
will have a smaller (but much longer lasting) impact on the current budget of an
organisation whereas a conventionally procured capital project will result in a significant
one-off hit to the capital budget. In the long term, the PFI arrangement will build up big
commitments against future years’ current budgets that have not even yet been allocated
or agreed. We are concerned that this may have encouraged, and may continue to
encourage, poor investment decisions. PFI continues to allow organisations and
government the possibility of procuring capital assets without due consideration for their
long–term budgetary obligations.
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“8. Government has always been able to obtain cheaper funding than private providers of
project finance but the difference between direct government funding and the cost of this
finance has increased significantly since the financial crisis. The substantial increase in
private finance costs means that the PFI financing method is now extremely inefficient.
Recent data suggests that the Weighted Average Cost of Capital of a PFI is double that of
government gilts. PFI will only provide value for money if this differential in the cost of
finance, which has significantly increased, is outweighed by savings and efficiencies during
the life of a PFI project. (Paragraph 30)
“9. The current higher cost of finance means there may be a significant opportunity cost
from using PFI. (Paragraph 31)
“10. Allocating risk to the private sector is only worthwhile if it is better able to manage
the risk and can pass on any subsequent savings to the client. The main benefit
highlighted to us by PFI providers was the transfer of construction risk. However a PFI
contract which lasts for 30 years is not necessary to transfer this risk. There are also other
methods such as turnkey contracts which can be used for the same ends. We have seen
evidence that PFI has not provided good value from risk transfer—in some cases
inappropriate risks have been given to the private sector to manage. This has resulted in
higher prices and has been inefficient. (Paragraph 38)
“11. Some of the claimed risk transfer may also be illusory—the government is ultimately
accountable for the delivery of public services.”
[Paragraph numbers taken from the Select Committee report}


Para 1.4.80 concerns harmful emission though AmeyCespa have used the emotive term “toxic
fumes” They claim that the concern is unsubstantiated; again this is a misleading and emotive
term which simply means that there is no absolute proof. Indeed, health impacts arising from
waste incineration (the main technology at AWRP) is a contentious subject for many reasons
(complexity, uncertainty, vested interests, the nature of the ‘scientific method’, difficulties
‘proving’ causal relationships, ‘confounding factors’ including both social factors and other
sources of pollution, etc.). However, there is a substantial body of scientific opinion showing
that there are reasonable grounds for concern about potentially dangerous effects of
incinerator emissions on human health, with babies and young children being amongst the
most vulnerable. Under these circumstances, European law demands the Precautionary
Principle be applied. This principle suggests that as there are less costly, more environmentally
friendly systems such as MBT one must ask – “Why take the risk of incineration when you do
not have to?”
In addition, public concern over harmful emissions and their health impacts is itself a factor
that must be taken into account in considering planning permission and there is precedence
for this being a factor in refusing planning permission.
65.
We suspect that AmeyCespa are attempting to discredit the democratic decision of HBC on the grounds
that they had rejected the opinion of their qualified officers. We find this contemptible; in public service
officials are the servants of elected representatives and those elected representatives are free to reject
official advice, especially where it is seen as inadequate. This is a prime tenet of British democracy and it
is wrong to attempt to discredit it.
66.
We believe that consultation has been a sham (see below) and it is wholly out of order to seek to
discredit the views of consultees, whether statutory or other groups such as ourselves. While we all
(including AmeyCespa) have the democratic right to disagree with views expressed by others the manner
of their response to Harrogate Council’s views does not seem to us to be appropriate and provides a
Page 26 of 72
further example of their unpreparedness to listen and take proper account of the views of the public. It
seems on a par with describing those who oppose AWRP as representing the “negative interests of a
few” (para 1.4.24).
67.
AmeyCespa conclude (para 1.5.1 to 1.5.3) their Supplementary Planning Statement by referring to the
updated policy, legislation and regulation documents which have evolved since their initial application in
September 2011. In essence, they believe that these documents do not alter the acceptability of AWRP.
68.
By contrast, we have examined their Supplementary Planning Statement and found it to contain many
inaccuracies and to be replete with a number of false claims. We, too, believe that the latest policy,
legislation and regulation documents do not materially alter our objection to AWRP and the imperative
need to refuse planning permission.
69.
In part this is because our objections are based on factors that are at a higher level than the details of
planning documents. These include the UK’s international obligations on reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants and European law in respect of
the Precautionary Principle and the Provisions of Human Rights legislation, in particular the Right to Life.
More generally, they arise out of real and deep concern for the health and safety of ourselves and fellow
citizens and for the environment in which we live.
70.
In summary, the application runs counter to the UK’s national and international commitments on
climate change; is contrary to EU, National and District Planning Policies; will cause harm to the
environment and human health and well-being, to the economy and to sustainability; that harm
cannot be mitigated; and the applicant fails to prove a need that overrides the harm. Planning
permission should be refused.
A2.4: Appendix A1 – Community Involvement
71.
Appendix A1 comprises a Statement of Community Involvement and covers the year April 2011 to March
2012. They say that this period did not cover the core consultation time – yet communities actually saw
precious little real consultation in earlier periods. Presentations at which a very few questions were
allowed are not consultation in any meaningful sense; Public consultation is a regulatory process by
which the public's input on matters affecting them is sought. It is a two-way flow of information and
opinion exchange as well as participation (e.g. involving interest groups in the drafting of policy or
legislation). In the case of AWRP this has not happened in any meaningful way. Local communities do not
feel that they have been consulted and the dismissive arrogance of referring to groups (NYWAG and York
Residents Against Incineration (YRAIN)) as representing the “negative interest of a few” despite the
10,000 signatures presented to the Council opposing incineration demonstrates a dismissive arrogance
that shows AmeyCespa’s attitude to public consultation in its true light.
72.
AmeyCespa’s para 1.3.9 (in their original application) speaks of “pre-application consultation with local
communities and statutory and non-statutory organizations” taking place throughout the process and
that “where appropriate, these representations have assisted in developing a planning application that
incorporates a package of mitigation measures that seek to offset impacts and deliver benefits and
enhancements to the environment, social well-being and economic stability.”
73.
The second extract from para 1.3.9 combines the get-out clause “where appropriate” with a number of
statements that are simply false. Thus:

The package of “mitigation measures” is totally inadequate and does virtually nothing to address the
environmental harm and absolutely nothing to address the health risks imposed on the community
Page 27 of 72
(here we mean the unacceptably high health risks that remain after the air pollution control).
Impacts are simply not offset in any meaningful way.

There are no “benefits and enhancements to the environment, social well-being and economic
stability”. As we have shown elsewhere, there is damage to the environment, to human health, to
social well-being, to employment and to the local economy, including through the choice of
unnecessarily expensive and damaging waste management options.
74.
Here, however, our main purpose is to look at AmeyCespa claims concerning liaison with the community.
The get-out clause “where appropriate” in the text quoted above can readily be translated as “we will
ignore anything anyone says that does not chime with what we are trying to do by labeling it ‘not
appropriate’”. Such a caveat is not consistent with the AmeyCespa claim that
“A commitment has been made for on-going liaison with the local community, through a
format yet to be determined. Local community involvement will be key to refining operational
and development changes and opportunities.”
75.
The reality of AmeyCespa’s local community liaison can best be illustrated through what happened to
the Community Liaison Group (CLG) which AmeyCespa merely refer to as defunct without admitting to
the reasons.
76.
The CLG was intended to be the vehicle through which community liaison was to have taken place but
this broke down because AmeyCespa had failed to convince residents of their commitment to listening
and learning from local people. A letter to AmeyCespa by most of the CLG stated that they felt “misled,
misrepresented and ignored”. The text of that letter is worth reproducing here because it well illustrates
the nature of so-called consultation:
“We were asked to participate in the group in good faith on the basis that balanced discussions
would take place and that Amey Cespa would respond to those discussions with mutual
understanding and that the outcome would result in some positive actions by The Company
towards alleviating the concerns of local residents.
We were therefore extremely disappointed that, having given of our time freely and having
raised our expectations of some concessions from Amey Cespa that the only outcome appears
to have been a minor reduction in the height of the proposed chimney and the relocation
within the site of the bottom ash processing plant.
The process of completion of the Photomontages appears to have been a sham, with many of
the photographs taken from positions of low visibility behind trees and other features. The
absence of any views from the Temple of Victory in the Registered Parkland of Allerton Park is
a major omission. In addition the traffic analysis has done nothing to help mitigate the road
safety concerns which were raised at the initial meeting in September.
We therefore wish to be disassociated from any favourable comments or submissions relating
to the Community Liaison Group which Amey Cespa may use in support of their impending
Planning Application.”
77.
AmeyCespa’ response was to dismiss this letter out of hand, with their Bill Jarvis saying “It is unfortunate
that those opposed to our proposals make totally untrue statements in support of their cause” (Yorkshire
Post, 13 May 2011). This thinly disguised contempt for local communities makes a mockery of
community liaison. It is wholly consistent with their arrogant dismissal of the views of others including
ourselves the “negative interest of a few” when the reality is that we represent a considerable body of
opinion.
78.
AmeyCespa’s earlier claim that:
Page 28 of 72
“The local community has been afforded opportunity to contribute to the design development
through consultation events held during the pre-application process. The design has been developed
considering comments made and resulting in significant design iterations.”
is untrue. There have been no substantial changes to the design due to views expressed by the local
communities, including Parish Councils and the CLC. While AmeyCespa claim that the stack height has
been reduced to placate local concerns, we have to point out that:
79.

this reduction is modest in scale and does very little to mitigate the adverse visual impact of
AWRP;

the height has yet to be decided by the Environment Agency (EA), as the permitting authority, as
AmeyCespa well know.

AmeyCespa have apparently given greater precedence over a few metres of stack height in an
attempt to appease concerns over visual impact than they have to concerns over air quality and
human health. To afford visual amenity a greater priority than human health represents a
distorted sense of values.
It is notable that AmeyCespa have resorted to misleading statements. For example, in response to a
letter from Mr. Boyle, Bill Jarvis of AmeyCespa stated that AmeyCespa are a British Company. Mr. Boyle’s
response is reproduced below:
LETTERS TO EDITOR
REF. LETTER FROM BILL JARVIS
(30th March)
Dear Sir,
I refer to the letter from Mr. Bill Jarvis, where he accuses me of inaccurate and misleading
comments regarding his company’s plans to build a giant incinerator in the rural idyll of Allerton
Park.
I will leave it for your readers to judge for themselves, who is peddling half truths and white lies
and will limit my response to just one of Mr. Jarvis’s complaints i.e. my assertion that
AmeyCespa is a Spanish company, which he categorically denies.
He emphasizes that as it is registered in the UK it is wrong or misleading to describe it as
Spanish.
He fails to mention that AmeyCespa is a recently formed company (2010) created as a joint
enterprise by two organizations. Amey, a company operating in the UK, which was acquired by
the Spanish company Ferrovial in May 2003 and Cespa, who operate internationally and been
part of the Ferrovial Group for over 40 years.
Both of these operate within the Ferrovial Services Division and report to the CEO Santiago
Olivares and both are wholly owned by Gruppo Ferrovial SA based in Barcelona.
Neither Amey or Cespa or AmeyCespa are quoted on the UK stock market they are all wholly
owned by the Spanish company Ferrovial.
I fully accept that AmeyCespa is registered in the UK and employs UK personnel but it is owned
by a Spanish conglomerate and guess where any profits will go.
Is this accurate enough for you Bill?
Page 29 of 72
Sent by
Laurie Boyle
80.
Mr. Jarvis did not respond to this letter.
81.
This is not the only example of where AmeyCespa’s approach has created adverse public reaction, as the
first example at Annex A shows. The second example in Annex A shows how NYCC’s and AmeyCespa’s
attempts to persuade people of the rightness of their proposed course of action are seen. Neither of
these letters was prompted or written by NYWAG
82.
As the CLG episode, AmeyCespa’s denigration of NYWAG and other opponents as representing “the
negative interests of a few” when they know fine well that we presented a petition bearing 10,000
signatures opposing AWRP, their attitude to the democratic decision of Harrogate Borough Council to
object (discussed above) and other instances show, AmeyCespa have demonstrated their contempt for
consultation and the views of others even before planning permission has been decided. How, then, can
people trust them to act with respect towards the local communities were planning permission to be
granted? Their failures in respect of consultation therefore constitute a further reason for refusing
planning permission.
A2.5: Appendix A3 and Additional Environmental Information Statement –
Landscape and Cultural Heritage
83.
By the very act of proposing measures intended as mitigation, AmeyCespa accepts there will be harm to
the landscape and to important heritage assets (Allerton Castle and Park). They cannot mitigate this
harm but instead propose to set up two funds using Council tax payer’s money. This is through two
conditional promises made in Appendix A3 which amount to


Provision for a Conservation Management Plan (not yet formulated) “to set aims and objectives to
conserve and enhance the legibility of the heritage assets within Allerton Park and Garden”. It is
promised that this Conservation Management Plan will be finalised and agreed prior to construction
of AWRP commencing. In essence this will pay the landowner (just one individual) £1 million to
repair the wall around his part of the Allerton estate, and to restore various listed structures to
which the public only have access on 2 days each year.
A Landscape and Cultural Heritage Fund said to be “designed to provide a resource to allow for
enhancement and strengthening of the local landscape character, biodiversity and/or features of
cultural heritage within 3.5km radius of the Site and/or within the Landscape Mitigation
Enhancement” with applications to the Fund “assessed against the aims and objectives stated within
the Landscape Management Strategy and associated documentation”.
Applications will be encouraged for a variety of projects which include “hedgerow works, habitat
enhancements and works to features of cultural heritage, Conservation and repair of heritage
assets”.
84.
There may well be adverse reaction to a single landowner receiving a large sum in respect of Allerton
Park and Garden, especially as access to the public is so limited and the community at large gets only
tenuous and peripheral benefit (if any). Given the unrealistically low amount of monies and the seriously
restricted aims of the Landscape and Cultural Heritage Fund, we feel that this is disproportionate.
Moreover, given that the emissions from AWRP will harm both the natural environment and the built
environment, the restricted timescale over which these monies are available is totally inadequate.
Page 30 of 72
85.
Somewhat bizarrely, AmeyCespa say (para 1.3.10) that “In essence the Landscape Management Strategy
uses landscape as a unifying theme to highlight measures that strengthen, enhance and restore
landscape character, features of cultural heritage and biodiversity in a single approach. It then looks to
provide a framework structure and approach to deliver these benefits through a Landscape and Cultural
heritage Fund”. They need to understand that that which damages and destroys (AWRP) does not
produce benefits. Part B of their supplementary application even claims to feature “proposals for
enhancement”. Again harm is not enhancement.
86.
This fund may be intended to enable planting large numbers of trees to in an attempt to hide the AWRP
plant. In reality this programme would destroy the current rural landscape by altering its very nature.
Moreover, Moreover, AmeyCespa don’t own the land concerned so cannot enforce any plan and the
proposals are ineffective.
87.
Crucially real harm in terms of adverse social impact and the impact on people’s property values and
their quality of life are not even addressed by the Landscape and Cultural Heritage Fund. Such could be
done by offering realistic compensation to householders, comprising both a one-off payment and a
subsidy to help pay their council tax bills each year. Professional help to find employment should also be
offered to those whose jobs may have been affected by AWRP. Where people within about 10 miles of
AWRP find difficulty in selling their homes, there should be sufficient resources to buy them at full
market value.
88.
We do not, of course, realistically expect the Applicant to offer such a scheme6 but without it people
who are adversely affected are not helped in any realistic manner. The Landscape and Cultural Heritage
Fund is not aimed at this need and is therefore not only inadequate but also largely irrelevant to the
needs of the people.
89.
As we have already stated the application will cause harm to the environment and human health and
well-being, to the economy and to sustainability. That harm cannot be mitigated; the Conservation
Management Plan and the Landscape and Cultural Heritage Fund are of little relevance and the latter is
wholly inadequate to offer any realistic mitigation. The inability to offer realistic mitigation or
compensation means that planning permission should be refused.
90.
The Additional Environmental Information statement sets out how the Landscape and Cultural Heritage
Fund would be set up and managed. In essence this falls well short of good governance, especially in a
situation where the trust of local people has already been lost. Put bluntly, trust could only be gained
through independent management through a charity set up for that purpose and funded by AmeyCespa
to a fully adequate level. For this to happen, the charity would need a large initial sum and subsequent
payments at a level to be agreed between local councils (and most specifically not NYCC), the charity and
AmeyCespa, with a casting vote going to the local councils. This arrangement would need to be legally
binding and make full provision for funding in the event that AWRP were sold to another operator or the
bankruptcy of AmeyCespa.
91.
Para 1.3.25 gives a list of those involved in developing the strategy. Local people and their democratically
elected representatives are notable by their absence from this list.
92.
We can understand and sympathise with those who view this fund simply as a “buy-off”. As it fails the
twin tests of adequate funding and sound governance, we believe that it will remain inadequate. More
6
The outline scheme offered here is based on observing the compensation paid to residents locally when the A1(M) was
constructed, the sort of compensation which now appears likely to people too close to wind farms, the scheme for civil servants who
are obliged to move to a different area and, more loosely, the compensation paid in the past by EdF to people living near to nuclear
reactors. Hence, no element is unreasonable.
Page 31 of 72
importantly, it does not help the local people whose lives and economic well-being will be harmed by
AWRP. While mitigation of the effect of AWRP is not at all possible, the current proposals are hopelessly
inadequate to meet the real needs of the people.
A3: AmeyCespa’s Part B – Additional Environmental
Information
93.
AmeyCespa state that their Part B provides additional information for and clarification of their
Environmental Statement and should therefore be read in conjunction with it. Likewise, this section
should be read in conjunction with our previous objections, in particular those chapters pertaining to
environmental issues., in particular:

Climate Change

Harmful Emissions and their Properties

Health Risks: Adverse Effects from Incinerator Emissions

Risks from Incinerator Ash

Air Quality and Health: A Critique of AmeyCespa’s Assessment

Sustainability, What Sustainability?
A3.1 Appendix B2: Response Letter
A3.1.1: Recovery or Disposal
94.
Paragraphs 1.2.1-3 and 1.3.1 et seq refer to the R1 formula and a figure of 0.68 for the current plant
design. While this figure could change a little as the plant design is refined, the real point is that R1
Values differ significantly depending on whether or not use is made of the heat. Since we see no realistic
prospect of a market for heat produced by AWRP, the R1 value should be calculated on the basis of
electricity-only, not CHP. This leads to a markedly lower R1 value; most electricity-only plant are outside
the definition of recovery.
95.
In any event, the discussion of whether or not the AWRP is Recovery is largely academic since its
operation does not comply with the waste hierarchy. This is because it discourages re-use and recycling
and because the Mechanical Treatment plant does little to enhance recycling.
A3.1.2: Decommissioning and Restoration
96.
A little-mentioned additional cost burden is that of decommissioning. The planning application reveals
that NYCC (and hence future generations of its residents) are to be committed to the costs of
decommissioning the plant and re-instatement of the site which are at present unknown. We find the
arguments promulgated by AmeyCespa to be disingenuous. The very fact that it is proposed to construct
AWRP on land which was supposed to be restored under the original consents shows that a “suitablyworded planning condition” is no guarantee of decommissioning and certainly does not ensure that
funds will be available.
97.
The consequence of this is to add to the financial risks NYCC and hence its residents. This arises because
NYCC would be committed to the currently unknown costs of decommissioning AWRP and re-instating
the site. These costs might be incurred early; if AWRP had to cease operations early for any reason (e.g.
Page 32 of 72
new EU or UK legislation7, overcapacity regionally or nationally (see Section B2.1), the heavily-indebted
parent company Ferrovial8 becoming unable to meet its financial obligations), NYCC and hence council
tax payers would be forced to pay for decommissioning early. This represents a substantial financial risk
that would negate any alleged financial benefit from AWRP and leave the council with a large and unresourced bill to pay.
98.
This is not to say that a planning condition should not be imposed but by itself it does not ensure that
funds are available for decommissioning. It is therefore essential that financial provision is made in a way
that ensures that the council does not bear the whole of the decommissioning costs if operations have
to cease prematurely or the operator goes out of business. A bond held independently would offer a way
forward
99.
Since AmeyCespa appear unwilling to make such provision, this is one further example of potential
financial harm and therefore adds to our reasons for opposing planning permission.
A3.1.3: Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS)
100. We accept that the ending of LATS does not alter the drive to reduce landfill; it merely alters the policy
instruments used. However, LATS9 did place a ceiling on the amount of landfill an authority could utilise
without incurring excessive charges10. In Section 8 of the main report to the Executive on the 30
November 2010 it was estimated that over a 10 year period the costs of these penalty charges would be
around £120M which one can extrapolate to £300million over a 25 year period. In addition section 7 of
the main report offered an estimate for the sale of underused LATS which could have provided an
income stream.
101. The LATs was calculated to raise £49M giving a total of £349M attributable to LATS
alone. However these
benefits and costs no longer apply. Even though the LATS charges are said to be illustrative, the
magnitude of a potential cost that might have applied shows the risks involved in relying on Central
Government to continue to increase landfill tax in real terms, especially as most of the benefits alleged
for AWRP accrue from the latter part of the proposed operational period.
102. The LATS was seen as a significant financial risk to NYCC and CYC and as such it was frequently cited as a
major driver for the waste PFI scheme, including the need to develop an in-county solution. This threat
has been removed and with it the associated financial risk and the need for an in-county solution.
7
The current regulations in the UK are relatively lax compared with international best practice. Over the years, the tendency has
been towards more stringent emission and other environmental standards
8 A string of divestments has helped Spanish infrastructure group Ferrovial slash its net debt, while the company – which is the
largest investor in BAA, the owner of Heathrow airport – continued to diversify away from its domestic market. The BAA sale (5.9% of
Heathrow Airport-operator BAA) cuts Ferrovial’s stake in BAA to 49.99%, meaning it no longer has to include the UK firm's debts on
its balance sheet. Even so, their debt remains substantial at 5.2bn Euros.
Sources: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/555d756a-5e4f-11e1-85f6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz23Pwyj39w
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15237610
9
The Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS) aimed at improving ‘green’ waste management and all waste disposal authorities
were able to trade, bank and borrow allowances. It specifies (to 2020) an annual quantity of biodegradable MSW that each Waste
Disposal Authority (WDA), or group of WDAs where they have pooled their allowances, may dispose of at landfill. The allowances
decreased each year and, in combination, set an allowance across England which ensures the country meets the target year
allowances. For every tonne that exceeds the annual allowance, the WDA was required to pay a financial penalty of £150
10
LATS allowances were tradable - if an authority underutilised its LATS allowances these could be traded with other authorities.
Page 33 of 72
103. The abolition of LATS illustrates how large financial risks are; though these risks are now in terms of
escalating landfill tax. With this tax, commitment is only to a floor of £80/tonne in two years time. There
is no certainty that landfill tax will increase in real terms beyond that point and it is very foolish to base
project finances on assumed Government policy over 30 years or so. There is much scope for financial
harm resulting from wrong assumptions and a full and thorough financial and risk analysis is needed.
Since there is little evidence that such an analysis has been carried out and independently scrutinised,
council tax payers should be extremely concerned about the financial risks that the council propose to
take on their behalf. Planning permission should be refused to save council tax payers from the
consequences of these risks.
A3.1.4: Sustainability Assessment
104. Para 1.6.1 et seq seek to defend the methodology of AmeyCespa’s Sustainability Assessment yet to
defend any deficiencies by referring to considerations of commercial confidentiality. The latter provides
a convenient smokescreen but is actually irrelevant to whether or not AWRP is sustainable. The whole
section merely points to AmeyCespa (and NYCC’s) obsession with procedure rather than necessarily
getting the right answer.
105. The reality is that AWRP is not a sustainable solution to waste management. In consequence, planning
permission should be refused.
A4: WRATE Model and Misleading Conclusions
106. Paragraphs 69 to 86 in our Chapter on Climate Change sets out faults in the WRATE11 model and faults in
the methodology used in the report from Fichtner Consulting Engineers Limited which had been
commissioned by AmeyCespa as part of the original Planning Statement.
107. Our Chapter on Climate Change focussed on the EfW (incineration) plant and it is right to do so because
incineration is so bad for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, before again focussing on
incineration, it is worth remembering that AmeyCespa make play of AWRP as an integrated facility for
waste management and asking three questions:

Why is the Mechanical pretreatment plant recovering so little of the waste before it is burnt?
AWRP will include a large MT facility which will recover a pitifully small amount of municipal solid
waste before it goes into the AD and incinerator. Why is there so much non-combustible material
going into the EfW and why is there so much recoverable waste being burnt?
 Why is the Anaerobic Digester not producing useful product, as so many plant of this type can? The
digestate is simply burnt, effectively driving waste further down the waste hierarchy than is
necessary.
 Why is all of the C&I waste and all of the HWRC waste going straight into the EfW incinerator
without any effort to recycle? The proposer (AmeyCespa) have stated that “The EfW facility will
receive the mixed RDF and Digestate from the Mechanical Pre-treatment and AD facilities, as well as
directly receiving the HWRC [[Household Waste Recycling Centre]] residual and C&I wastes”. This is
contrary to the Waste Hierarchy because the applicant is failing to maximise recycling. Since one of
the objectives of the Waste Hierarchy is to reduce environmental impact, this would appear
unacceptable.
108. Answering these questions honestly means accepting that that neither the design nor the operation of
AWRP properly conforms to the waste hierarchy. Moreover, it is poorly designed and operated from the
11
Waste and Resources Assessment Tool for the Environment
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standpoint of reducing GHG emissions. These conclusions hold irrespective of how bad incineration is for
GHG emissions but the reality is that the incinerator is the worst alternative to landfill.
109. Most studies show that the advantage over landfill is markedly less for incineration than for any other
technology, as illustrated in our chapter on Climate Change. However, the apparently favourable results
from studies carried out for the AWRP proposal using the WRATE model which purport to indicate that
incineration is a good choice from a climate change standpoint are a consequence of known
methodological flaws in the model. Indeed, the deficiencies in the WRATE model mean that it is hardly
surprising that Fichtner’s results are not in line with what would be expected from the various studies
cited in our Chapter on Climate Change. It is simply that a flawed model will inevitably produce flawed
results which cannot be trusted.
110. Those who use mathematical modelling are generally familiar with the acronym GIGO
– Garbage In,
Garbage Out. In other words if the assumptions fed into a model are incorrect then the results are not
reliable. This adds to the systematic flaws inherent in the WRATE model, making the results even less
meaningful.
111. AmeyCespa’s
earlier work in their Planning Statement relied on inherently implausible comparisons their baseline scenario (all the waste arising sent directly to landfill) is unrealistic as it does not represent
a realistically available option while the modelling of AmeyCespa’s proposed ‘solution’ (their second
scenario) is only one of many possible solutions. Moreover, the low re-use/recycling target of 50%
undoubtedly means that some of the potential CO2 benefits from reuse/recycling are missed.
112. Fichtner’s User Defined Processes were intended to enable them to model components of AWRP
including a Mechanical Pre-treatment facility, an AD facility and an EfW (incineration) facility. While
AmeyCespa failed to consider other potential solutions many of which are better from a climate change
standpoint than the proposed AWRP plant (see our Chapter on Climate Change) this can be done but not
with the WRATE model since it is known to seriously underestimate the CO2 emissions from incineration.
113. This flaw alone is sufficient to render meaningless any study of the CO2effects of the various components
of AWRP or comparisons between incineration and other technologies using WRATE. Indeed, WRATE has
a number of weaknesses that mean that it produces results that differ markedly from those of other lifecycle methods. The WRATE-based conclusion that EfW (i.e. incineration with electricity generation) is a
low-carbon technology is contrary to the findings of many other studies.
114. Flaws in the WRATE model are now well-known. For example the respected environmental consultants
Eunomia identify significant deficiencies with the WRATE model12:
“The Environment Agency’s software tool WRATE is often used to assess the environmental
impacts of waste management treatment methods… we believe the model contains
fundamental errors, both in regard to the behavior of landfilled wastes, and with respect to its
treatment of the stabilised output from MBT facilities. In the case of the latter, WRATE assumes
a proportion of the carbon is degraded within the biological part of the MBT process. However,
when this stabilised material is subsequently landfilled, the methane emission is assumed to be
exactly the same as that of the non-stabilised material – the model only accounts for the
reduction in mass which occurs in material which is biologically pre-treated (occurring as a
result of moisture loss). The model, therefore, significantly underestimates the extent to which
the biological component of the MBT process reduces the biological activity of material
subsequently sent to landfill”.
12
See http://www.ineosbio.com/media/files/INEOS%20Bio%20Life-cycle%20Assessment.pdf
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This means WRATE under-estimates the benefits of MBT as alternatives to landfill and to incineration for
reducing GHG emissions and misleadingly suggests incineration is superior to other approaches.
115. AmeyCespa’s results cannot be taken at face value and certainly do not mean that the EfW (incineration)
plant is acceptable. There is nothing in AmeyCespa’s Appendix B4 WRATE Model Report to alter this
conclusion.
116. We have already stated in earlier evidence that the reality is very different. CO2 emissions from AWRP
and especially the EfW incineration plant are markedly higher than indicated by AmeyCespa in their
planning application. Indeed, incineration is the worst alternative to landfill in terms of greenhouse gas
emissions. EfW is in direct contradiction of the sustainability criteria set by the Brundtland Commission,
a fact that is particularly serious when one considers the environmental damage that global warming is
expected to cause and the potential that it brings for human conflict. NYWAG object to the proposed
AWRP both for the damage that it would cause to the climate and because it runs counter to national
and international policy on climate change. Nothing in the new material alters this conclusion.
A4.1: Towards a Meaningful Comparison
117. The applicant claims carbon savings as a result of diverting waste from landfill and offsetting electricity
generation from gas, oil and coal, using the WRATE computer model and a superficial comparison of
AWRP against other technologies (Environmental Statement Chapter 16 and Appendix 16A). But the
WRATE analysis is inadequate because of its baseline conditions, analysis against other technologies and
conclusions and cannot be accepted without independent validation.
118. We understand that the EA’s WRATE team “no longer exists” and the EA will not “validate” the
applicant’s WRATE analysis (Darren Leng, 19 November 2011) and that they are now moving away from
WRATE and (with ERM, WRAP and nine English Local Authorities) are developing an alternative
modelling tool in accordance with international standards on life cycle assessment, carbon foot-printing
and Defra’s draft guidance on life cycle thinking13. Eunomia have already developed an alternative life
cycle modelling tool known as ATROPOS, used to analyse policy for Defra and the Committee on Climate
Change14 and to model the viability and impacts of waste schemes in London and Ireland. NYCC should
use the ATROPOS model to validate the applicant’s WRATE report and the claims about carbon
savings.
119. AmeyCespa’s main WRATE report assesses the AWRP scheme only against landfilling. This is contrary to
the standard approach used in most WRATE reports, which routinely compare one technology with a
range of others. It is, of course, in line with the narrow one-track focus of only looking at the “do
nothing” scenario and AWRP but is not adequate or acceptable.
A4.2: Comments on Appendix B4
120. AmeyCespa’s Appendix B4 adds two scenarios making four in all:


a baseline scenario which sends all of the waste arising directly to landfill;
a second scenario which models AmeyCespa’s proposed solution;
13
For more information on the research consortium, the tool and its application email hannah.beeby@erm.com. The nine local
authorities with which ERM works are Dorset County Council, Bournemouth Borough Council, Borough of Poole Council, Bath and
North East Somerset Council, Surrey County Council, Cambridgeshire County Council on behalf of the Cambridgeshire &
Peterborough Waste Partnership (RECAP), Hertfordshire County Council on behalf of the Hertfordshire Waste Partnership, Cornwall
Council and Leicestershire County Council
14
Eunomia (2008) Development of Marginal Abatement Cost Curves for the Waste Sector, Final Report for the Committee on Climate
Change, Defra and the Environment Agency, December 2008; Eunomia (2010) Landfill Bans: Feasibility Research, Draft Final Report
for WRAP produced for Defra and the Devolved Administrations
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

a third which models all the waste being sent to an EfW; and
a fourth which models the waste being sorted for recycling, with the rejects going to Anaerobic
Digestion (AD) and then landfill.
121. It is immediately obvious from the above discussion that the faults of the WRATE model mean that it will
seriously understate the emissions from the third scenario while the results from the fourth scenario will
suffer in comparison with the all-incineration third scenario. In consequence the conclusions that
AmeyCespa draw from the work in their Appendix B4 are invalid.
122. We also note that AmeyCespa have failed to model cheaper, cleaner more environmentally friendly
options such as those discussed in our chapter on Need and Technology Choices, e.g. Thermal MBT.
123. There are problems with the assumptions in Appendix B4. Firstly, the thermal efficiencies given for the
various types of electricity generating technologies are open to question – for example the overall
efficiency of CCGT plant is well above 50%iii (typically 56-60%) against the 47% assumed in Appendix B4
while that of coal-fired plant is typically 33%iv, not the 35.7% assumed in Appendix B4. Secondly the
electricity mixes assumed are not realistic; in particular an all-hydro mix is unobtainable bearing in mind
England and Wales known paucity of hydro resources and equivalents such as a 60% nuclear / 40%
renewables are unobtainable on a reasonable timescale while the variable nature of renewables would
present security of supply and grid stability problems in such a scenario. Also, the method of
extrapolation to a “decarbonised” 2030 mix is overly simplistic and does not properly take account of the
way that the load-duration curve (Figure 1) operates. Roughly, the order of plant on the grid is
determined by its marginal operating costs which are strongly related to the fuel costs – thus the
marginal costs of nuclear and renewable electricity generation are low while gas turbines and coal are
high with CCGT intermediate. Hence nuclear and CCGT are base load while coal operates on generally
lower load factors (fewer hours per year).
Figure 1: Annual GB Load-Duration Curve for 2005-8
Source: http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/sys_06/chap2/images/fig2-4.gif
124. Plant at the margin at any time is determined by the market15 and this in turn influences the carbon
intensity of the marginal plant. Since both the shape of the load-duration curve and total demand varies
throughout the day and seasonally, different plant will sit at the margin at different times.
15
For a discussion of the electricity market and its history see
http://www.bath.ac.uk/management/cri/pubpdf/Industry_Briefs/Electricity_Gillian_Simmonds.pdf
There are currently proposals for further reform of the market – see for example
http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Electricity/Data/electricitymarketinfo/ and
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/15/reform-electricity-market-unworkable
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125. It is reasonable to assume that electricity from the EfW and AD plant at AWRP would displace the
marginal plant among other electricity generators. For some of the time this will be coal which is broadly
comparable with incineration (as EfW) in terms of CO2 emissions but for much of the time it would
replace generation sources that are less harmful in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Indeed,
for some of the time (e.g. summer nights) it would displace nuclear plant that emits no CO2.
126. The fact that the AWRP EfW (incineration) plant would result in an increase in the overall CO2 emissions
from the electricity sector means that AWRP runs counter to the UK’s obligations and policy on GHG
emissions. This adds to the many reasons why planning permission for the EfW (incinerator) at AWRP
should be refused.
127. The results from WRATE strongly depend on the energy mix used to calculate the carbon savings against
electricity generated by other processes. AmeyCespa have chosen to use a 2015 date for the energy mix
comparison and used the somewhat specious justification that by this date the facility should be up and
running. This presents a misleading impression of the alleged “benefits” of incineration because the
efficiency of other forms of energy generation will significantly improve in the future, alongside national
targets. Other WRATE studies (above) choose more realistic dates, e.g. 2020.
128. When considering climate change it is essential to look forward to an appropriate time period. The
carbon intensity of incineration is more than 300 gCO2/kWh 16 and will increase above this level as
recycling increases and plastic becomes a more significant element of the waste that cannot be recycled
and is burnt. This means that incineration such as that proposed by AWRP will rapidly be out of line with
national targets - Defra estimates a 75% reduction in carbon intensity from over 300 to about 80 g
CO2/kWh by 2030. This suggests WRATE (or a better model) should be re-run with 2030 as a baseline as
this is mid-way through the contract period and would therefore be a more appropriate baseline for
assessing the carbon emissions.
129. AmeyCespa’s claim that using a “carbon-free” electricity mix “as a comparison to the predicted 2020 mix
because the differences in environmental impact between a these two cases should represent the effects
of offsetting” is not justifiable. The reality is that if more plant is built over the next eight or so years (as
it needs to be) it would include some renewable energy technologies and, for 2020, plant with
reasonably short planning and construction lead times (the lead times for new nuclear plant make it
unlikely that such plant could be online by 2020). Broadly, new plant is likely to be more efficient than
the old plant that it replaces, much of which is coal or oil fired. This means that the amount of coal-fired
plant on the system is likely to fall and that the coal-fired plant at the margin is likely to be more
modern, and more efficient (and therefore less CO2 intensive) than at present.
130. AmeyCespa have failed to consider the situation later in the life of AWRP; there is no realistic 2030
scenario (and their use of a carbon-free scenario is not justified). This is necessarily subject to much
uncertainty, depending on the pace of replacement of aging plant on the current electricity generating
system. However, it is reasonable to suppose that the system will move towards a lower CO2 intensity
and that, as a consequence, the mix of plant at the margin (with which AWRP’s EfW should be
compared) will also become less CO2 intensive. Since the CO2 emissions from the EfW incinerator are,
and will remain, comparable with coal-fired plant this means that AWRP will increasingly displace plant
that emit less CO2 (in 2030 and even 2040). Again, this fact reinforces the need to refuse planning
permission for the EfW incinerator plant.
16
Environment Agency, Biomass: Carbon sink or carbon sinner? 2009.
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131. Other conclusions reached in AmeyCespa’s Appendix B4 are similarly unjustified. Taking their main
conclusions in turn:

“The AmeyCespa solution was found to be equally as good as the EfW Only scenario for the 2020
electricity mix”.
Since incineration is the worst technology other than landfill from a climate change standpoint (see
our chapter on Climate Change), this claim merely confirms the fact that the proposed AWRP
represents a very poor choice for waste management. It should be rejected.

“The AmeyCespa solution was found to generally increase in attractiveness compared to other
scenarios with increased decarbonisation of the UK electricity grid. The high level of recycling
achieved by the solution is an important reason for its good performance.”
Actually the picture is complex as the attractiveness of any solution involving electricity generation
depends on the actually plant at the margin. However, all electricity generation technologies except
perhaps coal are better from a GHG emission standpoint than EfW (incineration) so the tendency is
for AWRP’s incinerator to become increasingly unattractive over time (assuming that the country’s
generation mix becomes less CO2 intensive)
The claim that AWRP offers a high level of recycling is utterly misleading – 50% overall recycling is a
very low level compared with the 70% plus that has been achieved elsewhere and is targeted in
Scotland and Wales. Moreover, most of that 50% is achieved long before the waste gets to AWRP
and the incinerator and concomitant financial commitments actually disincentivise recycling.

“The quantitative results presented in this report for global warming potential and abiotic resource
depletion17 support the qualitative results reported in Appendix 16 to the Environmental Statement
with one exception. The MPT/AD/Landfill18 scenario is clearly preferable in abiotic resource depletion
to landfill only but is clearly less preferable than the other options. Hence, the MPT/AD/Landfill
scenario should ranked Medium rather than High for this aspect.”
The claim that Appendix B4 supports Appendix 16 to the Environmental Statement is unsurprising
but means little because both are based in the same flawed methodology.
132. In conclusion, and none-withstanding claims by AmeyCespa to the contrary, the proposed AWRP
solution is very bad from a climate change standpoint and planning permission should be refused.
A4.3: Comments on Appendix B5
133. Appendix B5 presents results from WRATE covering
a. Climate Change
b. Acidification Potential
c. Eutrophication Potential
17
There are various methods of categorizing natural resources; these include source of origin, stage of development, and by their
renewability, these classifications are described below. On the basis of origin, resources may be divided into:
 Biotic – Biotic resources are obtained from the biosphere (living and organic material), such as forests, animals, birds, and
fish and the materials that can be obtained from them. Fossil fuels such as coal and petroleum are also included in this
category because they are formed from decayed organic matter.
 Abiotic – Abiotic resources are those that come from non-living, non-organic material. Examples of abiotic resources
include land, fresh water, air and heavy metals including ores such as gold, iron, copper, silver, etc.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_resource
18
MPT is Mechanical Pre-treatment
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d. Freshwater Aquatic Ecotoxicity
e. Human Toxicity
f. Abiotic Resource Depletion
It also discusses Potential Electricity Mixes in 2030.
134. However, the discussion is aimed only at a comparison with the irrelevant and unrealistic “do nothing”
scenario and fails utterly to carry out a proper comparison between the AWRP “solution” and other
options which are both cleaner and cheaper. In consequence Appendix B5 presents an incomplete but
biased picture.
135. Bearing this and the comments made above concerning Appendix B4 in mind, it is clear that the
conclusions reached in Appendix B5 are either unsupportable or fail to take account of better options.
Choosing between two very bad options – landfill or AWRP with its EfW incinerator – is not sensible
when cleaner cheaper and more environmentally friendly options exist (see our chapter on Need and
Technology Choice).
136. Each of the conclusions reached in Appendix B5 is misleading or wrong. Thus:

The AmeyCespa solution was found to have a climate change saving of approximately 130,100
tonnes of CO2e compared to the baseline when modelled using the 2015 electricity mix.
The flaws in the WRATE model mean that this conclusion is incorrect (see above discussion on
Appendix B4). By contrast, other possible solutions such as greater re-use and recycling coupled with
Thermal MBT are well able to reduce CO2e emissions compared with either the “do nothing” scenario
or the proposed AWRP “solution”.

The AmeyCespa solution was found to have a climate change saving of approximately 118,200
tonnes of CO2e compared to the baseline when modelled using the 2020 electricity mix.
Comments are as for previous conclusion.

While the net saving has reduced in moving the model from 2015 to 2020, the AmeyCespa solution
still shows a significant net saving.
The comments under the first conclusion make it clear that the alleged “net saving” is an artefact of
the WRATE model and would not exist in reality. By contrast, other solutions would offer savings.

In comparison with the baseline scenario the AmeyCespa solution performed better in all six of the
environmental impacts assessed as default by WRATE in both 2015 and 2020.
This may be true, depending on how far the flaws in the WRATE model affect the outcome,
However, all it says is that one bad solution (AWRP) does slightly less badly than another (the “do
nothing” scenario). It fails to address the fact that other technologies would perform better.

The higher level of recycling achieved by the solution leads to large environmental benefits in all six
impact categories in both 2015 and 2020.
We agree that increasing the level of recycling has substantial environmental benefits. However it is
wrong to ascribe these to AWRP. Most of the benefits are gained by recycling efforts before the
waste reaches AWRP and it is imperative that this continues and increases. AWRP itself offers only
very limited recycling through its mechanical separation plant.
There are other types of facility which would enable greater recycling. By contrast, the financial
commitments made in the long-term contract associated with AWRP and the associated penalties
inhibit efforts to increase recycling.
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Abiotic resource depletion would be greatly increased by incineration compared with other available
waste management technologies. Even with landfill it would be theoretically possible to recover
Abiotic resources but this is not the case with incineration. Metals lost to air are clearly unavailable
while those that enter the ash are, for all practical purposes, irrecoverable. Fly ash is hazardous and,
along with the air pollution control residues, must be treated as hazardous waste. Where IBA is used
in aggregates (as AmeyCespa intend) then the abiotic resources that they contain are lost. Thus
incineration means virgin resources must be exploited to replace all that the incinerator renders
unusable and irrecoverable.
One further point is that the air pollution control equipment itself makes use of resources which are
then irrecoverable.

The AmeyCespa solution performs better than the baseline scenario regardless of the level of
decarbonisation of the grid past 2020.
As will be clear from the discussions under Appendix B4, this is simply untrue. The reality is that EfW
(incineration) is highly CO2e intensive and only coal fired power stations are comparable in CO2e
intensity. As coal is less at the margins and as the older and less efficient (and therefore more CO2e
intensive) drop off the generating system, then AWRP would increase CO2e emissions from electricity
generation.
137. We repeat that choosing between two very bad options – landfill or AWRP with its EfW incinerator – is
not sensible when cleaner cheaper and more environmentally friendly options exist. The first step to
ensuring that this cardinal error is not committed is to refuse planning permission for AWRP. Then,
and only then, can NYCC make a more sensible choice from the many cheaper and cleaner alternatives
now on offer.
A5: Ecology and Nature Conservation
138. The Environmental Risks section of our Chapter on Environmental Insults: Environmental Risks; Traffic;
Visual Impact shows that AWRP would impose harm to the environment and ecology and that
AmeyCespa understate the environmental impacts in their Chapter 5: Ecology and Nature Conservation.
Ecosystem damage due to emissions from the AWRP EfW incinerator (which would reinforce the effects
of pollutants from other sources) on the environment and ecology are reviewed, including:



acidification of ecosystems, both terrestrial and aquatic, which leads to loss of flora and fauna
eutrophication in ecosystems on land and in water, which can lead to changes in species diversity;
damage and yield losses affecting agricultural crops, forests and other plants due to exposure to
ground-level ozone;

impacts of heavy metals and persistent organic pollutants on ecosystems, due to their environmental
toxicity and due to bioaccumulation;
damage to materials and cultural heritage due to soiling and exposure to acidifying pollutants and
ozone

139. The resultant harm would affect both wildlife and agriculture.
Moreover, many of the pollutants from
incinerators are bio-accumulative and enter the food chain. This affects the health of birds and animals
as well as humans and damage to animal health impacts on the health of ecosystems. Pollutants in water
courses can enter into aquifers (e.g. the Sherwood Sandstone) and pollute them. This would tend to be a
cumulative process (the pollutants are persistent and residency time in aquifers can be long) and could
render them unsuitable for any future water extraction.
140. AmeyCespa’s assessment of the impacts of AWRP (their Chapter 5) remains confined to the immediate
locale of the proposed AWRP. They fail to acknowledge that emissions from the EfW (incinerator) would
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contribute to ecological damage and damage to materials (and therefore buildings) over a wide area.
They also fail to discuss the role of eutrophication and the environmental damage that it can bring.
There are also a range of other environmental insults that they do not discuss (see section 3).
141. Even within the narrow confines of what they do discuss, AmeyCespa tend to understate the effects of
the various environmental insults of the proposed AWRP on local ecosystems. This includes downplaying
both the ecological value of that which they propose to destroy and the impact on remaining ecosystems
(e.g. through pollution, noise dust and contamination) during construction. They also seriously downplay
the role.
142.
Operational Phase – Emissions: Much more seriously, we strongly dispute the assertions made in
AmeyCespa’s paragraph 5.6.6 (the same para number in the original and updated versions). The
‘atmospheric emissions’ will have markedly more significant and widespread effects than AmeyCespa
care to admit. There is a considerable body of evidence and expert opinion that points to a range of
unacceptable health risks including cancer. This, and evidence from the European Environment Agency
that we cited in our Environmental Insults chapter makes it clear that AmeyCespa’s conclusion that that
“the impact of atmospheric emissions from the facility are not significant” is entirely wrong. There are
significant impacts, at least Moderate Adverse.
143. In conclusion, AmeyCespa continue to downplay the environmental consequences of their proposed
AWRP. There is nothing in their revised chapter 5 to alter our original conclusion that the evidence they
offer is wholly inadequate. The Precautionary Principle implies that it would be wrong to take the risks
that building AWRP would impose on the environment, ecosystems and aquifers, especially when there
are cleaner and cheaper alternatives that use proven technology. Thus, planning permission should be
refused.
A6: AIR POLLUTION (Appendix B13)
144. AmeyCespa’s Appendix B13 Additional Environmental Information: Additional Air Quality Assessment
updates the air quality assessment in the original planning application for AWRP to take account of the
Environment Agency’s (EA) updated assessment methodology for determining the impact of emissions
of Group 3 metals. It also gives an assessment of the impact of emissions when the AWRP operates at
the short term WID
145. Crucially, it still relies on the air quality assessment presented in AmeyCespa’s Chapter 10 of their
Environmental Statement. Thus the new assessments are subject to the same deficiencies as those in the
original Planning Statements and detailed in our chapter Air Quality and Health: A Critique of
AmeyCespa’s Assessment. These include:





Lack of any assessment of likely modelling errors;
Uncertainty on the data on the wind (which is insufficient for reliable estimation) and on the
pollutants to be dispersed;
Modelling errors arising from erroneous assumptions. For example, inadequate spatial resolution
and inadequate spatial coverage both make it is easy to get misleading results. Also, the
representation of buildings appeared inadequate;
No allowance for periods of suboptimal operation.
Local meteorological conditions are complex and not well represented in a grid of only 4.5km by
4.5km. The Vale of York is in the rain shadow of the Pennines so has a lower rainfall total than areas
to the west. It is also subject to more fog and frosts in winter than other areas because of the
tendency of cold air to drain into the Vale from surrounding higher ground. Thermal Inversion is a
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feature of the Vale of York yet was not taken into account19. Also, during periods of lee-wave activity
in westerly flow, the Vale is often subject to high degrees of near-surface horizontal wind shear and
gusty winds whose strength is poorly forecast by numerical weather prediction (NWP) modelsv.
Trapped lee waves commonly occur in westerly flow in this region and experimentally apparent flow
separation indicates the formation of lee-wave rotors. Again no attempt is made to take this into
account.
A6.1: Group 3 Metals
146. The metals assessment follows essentially the same approach as used in AmeyCespa’s Chapter 10,
albeit
updated, for a range of pollutants. However, its relative brevity makes the methodology somewhat
clearer. Comparisons are made against the specific Environmental Assessment Level (EAL for each metal.
It comprises three steps:

Stage 1 - predict the impact of each metal, assuming it is emitted at 100% of the emission level, and
compare against the screening criteria. Here arsenic and chromium (VI) were found to exceed the
long-term EAL criterion (greater than 70% of the EAL) while concentrations of all other metals
considered were less than 70% of the EAL. AmeyCespa therefore considered that they posed no risk
of exceeding the EAL, This is not necessarily true for manganese and nickel since they reached 41%
and 48% of EAL respectively and the probable error in the air dispersion model results (see our
chapter Air Quality and Health: A Critique of AmeyCespa’s Assessment) are significantly above the
factor of two that would take these metals above the 70% limit for long-term EAL. Likewise the
10.2% figure for vanadium could easily exceed the 20% limit for short-term EAL so these metals
(manganese, chrome and vanadium) were ruled out prematurely by AmeyCespa.

Stage 2 comprises consideration of a “worst case” scenario based on currently operating plant,
assuming each metal comprises 11% of the total group (i.e. 5.60 ng/m³ apportioned across the nine
metals). This assumed proportion is unjustified since measurements could and should be used to
give actual proportions while the presumption that AWRP would reflect other incinerators is, at best
approximate and some new plant have been a great deal worse than the average (as detailed
elsewhere in our objection chapters). AmeyCespa admit that “”neither arsenic nor chromium (VI) can
be screened out, using the worst case scenario”.

Stage 3 comprises consideration of site specific assumptions. This includes assumptions on the
performance of the flue gas treatment system to remove heavy metals from the gas stream and
background data for the levels of the two metals (chromium and arsenic) that AmeyCespa consider
at this stage. Table 5 shows that the only local measurement (2007/08) for arsenic was substantially
above the maximum UK figure for each of 2008, 2009 and 2010. This is not given due weight while
the use of data from Redcar (some 59 miles away and in a totally different type of environment) is
wholly unjustified, especially as it is typically only a tenth of the only local measurement. Bearing in
mind the many uncertainties in this chain of reasoning and the very high local values that already
exist, the conclusion in para 2.1.24 that “the predicted environmental concentration is less than 70%
of the EAL and it is therefore considered that there is no risk of exceeding the EAL for these metals”
cannot be justified. Also, the arguments for chromium are based on exceedingly sparse data and
uncertainties in the air dispersion modelling results and the actual plant performance mean that the
process contribution could be much higher than the 3.9% of the EAL claimed. Moreover, the natural
19
In the case of the Vale of York it would be necessary to have adequate modelling of thermal inversions (an
atmospheric condition in which the air temperature rises with increasing altitude, holding surface air down and
preventing dispersion of pollutants19). In any season, rapid ground-level cooling can lead to night-time fogs when air
temperatures are lowered beyond the dew point. Such radiation fogs develop beneath local temperature inversions but
are usually dispersed by the Sun’s heating during the following day but may persist when deep and well-developed.
Any extensive low-lying area such as the Vale of York is notably subject to these conditions.
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variation in chromium background levels which one might expect between rural and urban sites
means that the process contribution could well be the cause of the EAL being exceeded locally.
147. Following the logic of the above three stages, it is readily apparent that the relevant criteria are, or could
be, exceeded at each stage and that the range of metals that breach the relevant criteria is likely to be
greater than AmeyCespa admit once modelling and data uncertainties are taken into account. This adds
to the many reasons why AWRP is unacceptable from an environmental standpoint and planning
permission should be refused.
148. At para 2.1.34 AmeyCespa quote Environment Agency H1 Guidance which states:
“If an EU Environmental Quality Standard is already exceeded, or may be exceeded as a result of
an additional contribution from an IPPC activity, consideration of further control measures needs
to be taken. This should take into account the practicality and reasonableness of going beyond
indicative BAT...Where a new installation would only make a minor contribution to a breach, it
will normally be more desirable for Regulators (and local authorities, where relevant) to consider
controls on other major sources of pollution rather than imposing excessive costs or refusing a
Permit.”
Clearly, AmeyCespa hope that the last sentence should be applied to them but this is unjustifiable for a
number of reasons: it is by no means clear that the process contribution is minor; cleaner and cheaper
alternatives exist that would not cause or exacerbate any breach; and, the sources of the background
pollution levels are not known and may be a multitude of small intrinsically difficult to control sources
(i.e. traffic on the A1M and A168). We reiterate that AWRP is environmentally unacceptable and
planning permission should be refused
149. Before leaving this topic, it is worth examining AmeyCespa’s logic flow at a higher (less detailed) level
since the methodology used in Appendix B5 has been used elsewhere in AmeyCespa’s environmental
statements. Essentially it comprises three stages (1, 2, 3 above), each of which has an associated set of
criteria (1, 2, 3 respectively). The flow from each stage to the next is such that if a pollutant passes the
criteria associated with that stage then no further consideration is given to that pollutant. If it fails that
stage then the criteria at the next stage are applied but the crucial point here is that they may be less
stringent. This leads to a “now you see it, now you don’t” approach to risk. Thus the flow can be:



Apply Stage 1 / Criteria Set 1
o If passes then OK – If fails then pass to set 2
Apply Stage 2 / Criteria Set 2
o If passes then OK – If fails then pass to set 3
Apply Stage 3 / Criteria Set 3
o If passes then OK – If fails then seek to find mitigating arguments favouring development
(e.g. Environment Agency H1 Guidance quoted above).
150. The proper way to look at it is very different. Each of the criteria sets represents one view of the
acceptable emissions based on scientific evidence of the probability of harm to the environment and
human health. Their very existence and the different degrees of stringency that they represent imply
that there is a range of scientific uncertainty over the risks of harm.
151. Recall that under EU law (binding in this country), the application of the Precautionary Principle has been
made a statutory requirementvi,vii and the European Commission has issued a Communication on the
Precautionary Principleviii in which it adopted a procedure for the application of this concept (see our
chapter on Health Risks for more details). Paragraph 2 of article 191 of the Lisbon Treatyix states that
"Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the
diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the Precautionary
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Principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental
damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay."
152. The 2 February 2000 European Commission Communication indicates that the Precautionary Principle
should be considered within a structured approach to the analysis of risk which comprises three
elements: risk assessment, risk management, risk communication and that it is particularly relevant to
the management of risk. It is presupposed that potentially dangerous effects deriving from a
phenomenon, product or process have been identified, and that scientific evaluation does not allow the
risk to be determined with sufficient certainty. We contend that this applies to risks associated with
emissions from the AWRP EfW (incinerator) plant.
153. The EU Treaty Article 174(2) as amended at Nice 2004 recognized that scientific evaluation can be
inconclusive and accorded priority to public health:
“A precautionary approach must be paramount, as opposed to acting only where proof or very
strong suspicion of harm can be demonstrated. The Precautionary Principle should be applied
where the possibility of harmful effects on health or the environment has been identified and
preliminary scientific evaluation proves inconclusive for assessing the level of risk. Account
should be taken of social and environmental costs in examining the level of risk, but the
protection of public health, including the effects of the environment on public health, must be
given priority”.
154. Under these circumstances, the Precautionary Principle should be applied to the emissions considered in
Appendix B5, as it should be to all emissions from AWRP where there is any potential for harm. In
practice this means that acceptability should be firmly based on the most stringent of criteria sets
identified above or such other scientifically justifiable criteria that exist. Likewise this should be applied
to judgments of other pollutants accorded similar treatment to those in Appendix B5.
155. Applying the Precautionary Principle gives proper weight to potential harm to the environment and
human health and means the planning permission for AWRP )and especially the EfW(incinerator)
plant) should be refused.
156. It is noticeable that AmeyCespa do not discuss the environmental risks associated with any of the
emissions from AWRP either in Appendix B5 or in Chapter 10 and treat the health risks in a somewhat
cavalier fashion. They nowhere acknowledge the possibility of synergistic effects between the various
emissions either on human health or on the environment and wildlife. Neither do they acknowledge the
possibility of errors and uncertainty in the model results (all mathematical modeling of environmental
processes is necessarily subject to uncertainty) and the limited data on which their arguments depend.
Indeed, their approach can be characterized as a “tick box” one in which their objective is to show that
every emission is benign.
157. This approach flies in the face of the Precautionary Principle whose objective is to take full and proper
account of all the potential risks in a manner that fully acknowledges the higher end of the scientifically
established or credible range of uncertainty. The Applicant’s approach therefore pays scant respect to
the risks imposed on local people and on their environment. In the face of this apparent indifference to
the reality of the risks being imposed in the Application, one might reasonably ask whether or not the
Applicant would display a similar indifference were the plant to be built and operated. This is a risk that
local people should not be asked to run, especially when cheaper and cleaner alternatives exist. Planning
permission should therefore be refused.
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A6.2: Short Term WID Limits
158. Section 3 of Appendix B5 considers Short Term WID (half-hourly average) limit values for nitrogen
dioxide, sulphur dioxide, hydrogen chloride and hydrogen fluoride. AmeyCespa claim that AWRP would
operate at or near the Short Term WID limits for brief period of time only and state that the Short Term
WID limits allow for brief peak emissions which all facilities are likely to experience during operation,
whether it is due to variations in the waste or other factors. They further claim that the likelihood of a
well run and maintained facility (they see AWRP as such a facility, albeit without proof) operating at the
Short Term WID limits for any significant amount of time as highly unlikely. Bearing in mind the history of
pollution offences at other incinerators (discussed in our chapter on Harmful Emissions), this is not
necessarily true.
159. As elsewhere, AmeyCespa present their results from the air dispersion modelling as being totally
accurate whereas in reality there are considerable uncertainties in the model results. This means that
the numbers presented in Tables 9,10 and 11 should have a range attached and are likely to be too low
(see our chapter Air Quality and Health: A Critique of AmeyCespa’s Assessment).
160. Allowing for such uncertainties, emissions of hydrogen fluoride and hydrogen chloride are probably not
significant. However, the situation for sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide is less clear-cut than
AmeyCespa recognise and there is a reasonable chance that emissions could exceed the AQO/EAL.
161. Although AmeyCespa claim that their assumptions are “worst case” this is not so. Thus:





Modelling uncertainties mean that ground level concentrations are likely to be significantly higher
than their model predicts.
There can be no guarantee that the plant will operate below the maximum emission limits allowed
under the WID at all times, let alone that actual emissions will be less than the limits (too many
examples of problems exist elsewhere to be able to guarantee this).
The issue of compliance is at the highest ground level concentrations found, not at some site
elsewhere, perhaps several miles away
The assumption that AWRP operates for the whole year may be conservative as the plant will be
offline for about 10% of the year for maintenance and there may be unplanned outages. However,
emissions of some pollutants are likely to be much higher during start-up and shut-down when
operating conditions are necessarily sub-optimal. Thus the AmeyCespa assumption could even
understate the emissions in some cases.
The assumption that each metal comprises 11% of the total group (i.e. 5.60 ng/m³ apportioned
across the nine metals) is without foundation and therefore there is an additional uncertainty over
the actual amounts of each metal emitted. This could lead to limits being exceeded in some cases.
162. In a strange sense, we have to agree with the conclusion stated in AmeyCespa’s para 4.1.3 that “this
additional assessment does not alter any of the conclusions from the original air quality assessment”. The
main conclusions that still stand are that the earlier assessment was flawed and many of its conclusions
in error. Thus all the previously identified criticisms concerning the earlier work still apply and that it is
impossible to be as sanguine as AmeyCespa are. The overriding conclusion remains: planning
permission should be refused in view of the environmental and health risks.
A7: Travel Plan
163. AmeyCespa’s Travel Plan document at least recognises that local availability of public
transport travel
modes is limited and that public transport will not offer a realistic option for regular travel to / from the
AWRP site. We agree that “the relatively limited number of staff to be employed at AWRP and the shift
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system to be operated by many technical staff” means a site specific public transport / minibus service
would prove probably be impractical. They therefore key focus on initiatives such as car sharing and
efficient working practices for encouraging sustainable staff / visitor travel.
164. The success of car sharing is at best uncertain and, given the wide area from which workers may come
and the small numbers of individuals involved, the practicality is at best strictly limited. Promotional
brochures are all very well but will they interest anyone? Matching people by post-code is no guarantor
of acceptability for the individuals concerned even if it makes finding potential car-sharing partners
easier. Cycling is only likely to be a serious option for those who are already keen cyclists and live within
a reasonable cycling distance of AWRP (this will vary between individuals). In other words, the
probabilities of success stated by AmeyCespa appear overly optimistic and the Transport Plan may be
little more than wishful thinking and no reliance can be placed on it at this stage.
165. It is highly uncertain what “efficient working practices” can contribute to sustainable transport options
on the public roads off-site. Home-working for office staff offers some amelioration on travel, though
the cost of getting laptops via Amey IT will put some people off. We accept it could have a limited effect
on the amount of commuting done.
166. Ultimately, workers are free individuals who cannot be coerced into travelling to and from work in a
particular manner and visitors (if any) will come how they choose.
167. What is clear from the data given is that there may be insufficient provision made for parking on-site (it
is not an efficient working practice to limit this) and this could enhance accident risks for workers and
visitors alike while they search for parking. Moreover, providing only one parking place for the disabled
seems unduly limited.
168. We are not objecting to the aims of the Travel Plan but feel that the extent to which they are likely to be
achieved is very limited. For this reason, we consider that it has to be assumed that it will have very little
influence on traffic volumes arising from either visitors or workers and that any traffic assessment
should take the worst case scenario (the Travel Plan fails) as its base case.
169. The aims of the routing strategy to minimise “HGV traffic impact on the immediate local settlements of
Grafton, Marton and Arkendale and avoid the potential for HGV traffic to access inappropriate local rural
route corridors” are welcome. However:



While probably enforceable for MSW delivered by local authorities, the strategy may not be
enforceable for commercial operators bringing C&I waste since these have alternatives and will
not take kindly to their drivers being banned;
Community liaison with AmeyCespa has so far proved ineffectual and they have lost the trust of
many local people. This is likely to prove no different.
The number of additional HGVs and concomitant congestion on critical routes, particularly the
A59 will slow traffic and add to queuing at some junctions. This, and perceived safety issues, will
almost certainly force some drivers to consider other routes – the well-known “rat-run”
phenomenon. This will increase traffic through local villages and is beyond the control of
AmeyCespa (or anyone else).
170. Similarly, the promise to limit AM (08:00-09:00) and PM peak (17:00-18:00) peak hour AWRP related
traffic movements at A1(M) J47 to less than 30 two-way movements per hour ignores the contiguous
A59/A168 junction. Indeed, if the claim that “typically 55% of total AWRP hourly development trip
demand could be expected to access the A1(M) J47 junction” is correct then a substantially higher
proportion would use the A168/A59 junction since York-bound traffic does not use J47. We object to the
fact that traffic on this dangerous junction will be allowed to reach higher levels.
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171. In principle, AmeyCespa’s ‘vehicle cap’ approach would be helpful but we must question whether in
practice it could be secured through the proposed mechanism of “appropriate HGV delivery agreements
between the site operator and haulage contractors during these key ‘rush hour’ demand periods and
careful timing of staff shift changes”. Even if this works to a considerable extent, the “vehicle cap” should
take account of the traffic at the A59/A168 junction.
172. Ultimately, the question s whether the Travel Plan will work, at least in part. Indeed, it may have some
effect but not enough. As with much else at AWRP, it is best seen as a sop which does little to mitigate
the unacceptable risks arising from the traffic the plant would generate. Much of the blame for this rests
with the inappropriate single-site strategy and therefore with the technology choice. Refusing planning
permission would remove these traffic risks and the associated accident risk.
Page 48 of 72
PART B: ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS
Page 49 of 72
B1: NYWAG Views on the Vision Statement
Letter from NYWAG dated 3 April 2012
Minerals and Waste Development Framework
Planning Services
North Yorkshire County Council
County Hall
Northallerton
North Yorkshire DL7 8AH
3 April 2012
Dear Sir
Waste Core Strategy Consultation
I am writing to you as Chairman of the North Yorkshire Waste Action Group (NYWAG), a pressure group of
concerned residents that favours a sustainable solution to waste management. You may be aware that we
have submitted a petition of over 10,000 signatories as part of our objection to the Allerton Waste Recovery
Park (AWRP) proposal (Planning Application Y/2011/0328/ENV) and that NYWAG therefore represents a
substantial body of opinion.
The “Minerals and Waste Development Framework: Minerals Options and Waste Vision Consultations –
March 2012” document asks a deceptively simple question – do you agree or disagree with the Vision
Statement presented on page 8? Since the Vision Statement cannot be seen in isolation from the AWRP
planning application, it is not possible to give a simple yes/no answer.
All the documents put out by NYCC regarding the Waste Core Strategy (WCS) have said "this assumes that
the incinerator already exists". That was the baseline for the workshop NYWAG representatives attended at
Northallerton on October 19th. This presumption is without foundation as it appears to pre-empt the
outcome of the AWRP planning application and any subsequent public inquiry. It begs the question of
whether or not the current WCS development is merely a public relations exercise intended to act as a
“smoke screen” behind which a highly controversial proposal can proceed.
Setting aside this important issue for the moment, we feel that the Vision Statement partly reflects the
outcome of the meeting we attended on 19th October 2011. We can agree with some of the Vision
Statement with two important exceptions:

The first two words "by 2030" were not agreed at the Oct 19th meeting. It should read "From today
North Yorkshire will move substantially.....”

National targets in England for recycling and diversion of waste from landfill fall well short of best
practice and targets in the rest of Britain. We feel suggest that the Vision Statement should reflect
best practice by introducing specific targets consistent with those in Scotland and Wales This means
recycling of municipal waste should reach 60% by 2020 (leading English authorities already achieve
this) and 70% by 2025.
This suggest that the first paragraph should read
Page 50 of 72
“From today, North Yorkshire will move substantially closer to a Zero Waste Economy, through producing
less waste per person and using waste as a resource. Waste disposal via landfill will only be taking place as a
last resort once opportunities to re-use, recycle or recover have been exploited. National targets for
recycling and diversion of waste from landfill will, as a minimum, have been met, and will be being exceeded
where practicable. Specifically North Yorkshire will achieve 60% recycling of municipal waste by 2020 and
70% by 2025.”
[New text is in italics]
Even without these suggested changes, the AWRP proposal is wholly incompatible with the Vision
Statement. It relies on old technology (incineration) which carries well-known health and environmental
risks and is the worst waste management technology (other than landfill) for greenhouse gas emissions. The
transport implications of the AWRP site (or any other single site) are contrary to the proximity principle and
the transport strategy in the Vision Statement. Finally, the AWRP proposal is not compatible with the waste
hierarchy as it does not enable re-use and recycling to be maximised and would result in waste being treated
further down the hierarchy than is necessary or appropriate.
This begs a simple question - How can you have a vision statement that is so completely at odds with the
current plan?
Finally, if AWRP is built, it would exist in 2030 and have another 10-15 years of the contract still to run so
most of the Vision Statement is invalid. If the current Waste Core Strategy development exercise is to mean
anything then it is absolutely essential that no decision on the current planning application is taken until
after the new Waste Core Strategy has been developed independently of current proposals and accepted by
the Council and, if necessary, an appropriate inquiry before an inspector.
The importance of this last point cannot be over-emphasised. For that reason, I am copying this letter to Mr
Shaun Robson. In doing so, I am asking him to register this as an objection to a decision on AWRP being
taken before the new WCS is agreed.
Page 51 of 72
B2: Additional Material on Harm that AWRP will cause
47.
This section summarises and extends why the AWRP will cause harm, contrary to the applicant’s claims,
and includes the following sections:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Over-Capacity Issues
Financial harm
Traffic impacts
Emissions and Abnormal Operations
Implications of the NPPF
B2.1 Over-Capacity Issues
48.
There are already issues of over-capacity in parts of the European Community coupled with the
imminent onset of over-capacity both regionally and nationally in the UK. These are explored below.
B2.1.1: The European Dimension
49.
There are already issues of over-capacity in some EU countries such as Germany and Hollandx. This is
beginning to have commercial consequences. This was exemplified at a recent seminar organized by the
European Federation of Waste Management and Environmental Services20 (FEAD). As an example, Frans
Beckers of the Van Gansewinkel Group waste business in Holland has stated that the company closed
down an incinerator due to overcapacity and advised others to do the same:
“We closed one of our incineration plants in the Rotterdam area. There is overcapacity in
Germany and we hope some of our colleagues will follow suit. We hope more [incineration]
capacity will be taken out of the market. In the end we could harm recycling performance”.
50.
Beckers also claimed that these problems also relate to biomass, stating that: “There is a lack of fuels.
Too much is being burnt. We need to ensure we do not invest in too many biomass energy installations as
we won’t have the fuel any more”.
51.
At the same meeting, Michel Sponar, policy officer with the European Commission’s Environment
Directorate emphasized the importance of moving waste up the waste hierarchy and said that all
member states should prioritize waste prevention – and must produce Waste Prevention Plans by the
end of 2013. He also said that “member states such as Germany and Denmark which are heavily reliant
on incineration need to change their focus too, by sending more waste for recycling and composting”.
52.
These comments should be set in the context of the Environment Agency recently granting SITA a permit
to export 600,000 tonnes of UK RDF to Amsterdamxi a quadrupling of RDF export licenses xii, calls from
the European Commission for the UK to avoid sending recyclable material to incineration (see below)
and the European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment calling for “the phasing-out, by the end
of this decade, of incineration of recyclable and compostable waste”.
53.
A European Commission spokesman has admitted to some concern that an over-reliance on incineration
could lead to some recyclable material being burned and called on the UK to ensure that recycling and
reuse remain the priority for waste treatmentxiii. “The big challenge is to reduce the amount of waste
that is sent for incineration, which could be recycled instead" the spokesman remarked. "In the UK there
is a decrease in the proportion of waste that is going to landfill, which is good, but this is still a high
proportion of the total waste. To solve this, the UK should look to reuse and recycling and not to over-
20
The seminar was held alongside the IFAT ENTSORGA trade fair.
Page 52 of 72
capacity of incineration, countries like Denmark and Switzerland are burning much more than they
should and that’s not good. There is an opportunity for the UK to take positively; I hope they will move in
the right direction.”
54.
As might be expected, overcapacity in countries such as Holland and Germany places downward
pressure on the cost. According to a recent reportxiv the tonnage of waste processed in the Netherlands
has fallen significantly as incineration has replaced landfill, with most of the fall in waste tonnage taking
place in the decade from 1993 (Figure B2.1). Today there is an overcapacity of 1.5 MT or 19%.
Figure B2.1.1: Tonnage of Waste Processed in Netherlands
55.
In Germany there is some 20 MT of treatment capacity out of a total of 29MT (the remainder is largely
RDF). There is an overcapacity of 5 MT, some 17%. As Figure B2.1.2 shows, this long-term overcapacity
has driven down gate fees in Germany.
Figure B2.1.2: Falling Gate Fees in Germany
56.
This decline in Gate Fees makes the export of waste from the UK commercially attractive while the
overcapacity suggests there is a significant market. While Local Authorities such as NYCC are unlikely to
benefit (especially where they are determined on an in-county solution), commercial organizations need
have no such inhibitions. This could impact on the availability of C&I and so-called “trade waste”,
especially given the reasonable proximity of major ports (with good rail links) to part of the region.
Page 53 of 72
57.
Overcapacity and its interaction with increased re-use and recycling is not confined to Europe.
Yokohama, the largest city in Japan reduced waste by 38.7% between fiscal years2 2001 and 2007,
despite a growth of 165,875 people in the city’s populationxv. This reduction in waste is attributable to
the city’s success in raising public awareness about environmental issues and the active participation of
citizens and businesses in Yokohama’s 3Rs program (reduce, reuse, and recycle). As a consequence,
Yokohama was able to shut down two incinerators. The incinerator closures saved US$6 million in annual
operating costs and US$1.1 billion that would have been needed to renovate them.
58.
Overcapacity in Europe and the drive to move waste up the waste hierarchy has implications for the
viability of the proposed AWRP. The example of Yokohama (and the many other examples cited in our
chapter on Need and Technology Choices) shows that incineration is the least attractive option. To avoid
the financial harm that AWRP would bring with it, planning permission should be refused.
B2.1.2: Regional Capacity
59.
In our chapter on Need and Technology Choices we showed that the projections of waste arisings on
which the alleged need for AWRP was based are implausible; waste arisings both locally and nationally
are falling while re-use and recycling are increasing. These could manage 70% of waste as is already
targeted in Scotland and Wales for 2025. In consequence AWRP is not needed.
60.
It is instructive to consider the picture nationally. Many Local Authorities may take similar decisions at
about the same time without giving consideration to national or international factors; e.g. the Landfill
Directive has led to a large number of MSW incineration projects at various stages of development. This
could mean overcapacity, something already seen in some European countries. For example Germany
and Holland. There are already examples in the UK where there is local overcapacity, for example in
Hampshire.21
61.
So, is the over-capacity problem seen in Germany and Holland and some localised areas in the UK likely
to be repeated nationally? There is research that suggests this will be the case. Eunomia’s National
Residual Waste Infrastructure Review – Issue 2xvi is the second bi-annual review of residual waste
treatment capacity. It covers a range of waste management technologies at both national (Great Britain)
and regional level. The latter includes Yorkshire and Humberside.
62.
At a Great Britain (GB) level they report (see Figure B2.1.3) that:


GB had over 28.3 million tonnes of residual waste arisings from local authority collected (LAC), C&I
sources in 2011/12;
Currently, GB has around 14.8 million tonnes of residual waste treatment capacity either ‘operating’
or ‘under construction’. It comprises 32 dedicated incineration facilities, 5 gasification facilities, 29
pre-treatment facilities (using either MBT or autoclave technologies), 11 Waste Incineration
21
Hampshire County Council’s Joint Municipal Waste Management Strategy (JMWMS) resulted in the construction of three large
Incineration plants at Marchwood, Portsmouth and Chineham. The original Planning consents were specific to only allow waste from
within the County of Hampshire to be burnt. This has now changed. The Project Integra & Hampshire JMWMS waste volume
projections to keep those incinerators at full capacity have since proved to have been inaccurate. Indeed, by April 2006 Waste
Management News reported that Hampshire's incinerators were being topped up with residual waste material from household
waste recycling centres to help meet any shortfalls in "black bag" household waste. By October 2009 BBC Radio Solent reported that
Veolia (who run Hampshire’s incinerators) was asking Hampshire County Council’s planning committee to set aside a condition under
which planning permission was granted, namely, that the incinerators should only use waste from Hampshire, in order to allow the
importation of waste from surrounding counties. Today, despite local opposition, the Marchwood incinerator is obliged to import
waste from outside Hampshire to keep the plants fully operational.
For details see Fact Sheet 12 which accompanied our initial letter OUTLINE OBJECTIONS TO AMEY CESPA PROPOSAL dated November
2011.
Page 54 of 72



Directive (WID) compliant biomass facilities and 6 cement kilns processing solid recovered fuels
(SRF).
In 2011/12 there was a ‘capacity gap’ of around 13.5 million tonnes (per annum) between the
quantity of residual waste arisings and the amount of treatment infrastructure capacity either
‘operating’ or ‘under construction’;
Without any change in residual waste quantities, there would be overcapacity of 4.7 million tonnes
(per annum) if the 18.2 million tonnes of waste treatment capacity that has planning consent
reaches financial close and begins construction; and
Planning consent is being sought for a further 4.5 million tonnes of waste treatment capacity. If, on
top of the 18.2 million tonnes already with planning consent, this was consented and constructed
and residual waste quantities remained constant, there would be overcapacity in GB of around 9.2
million tonnes (per annum).
Figure B2.1.3: Residual Waste Arisings and Treatment Capacity - Great Britain
Note: This Figure and Figure B2.1.4 are presented without allowing for the fact that outputs from some
facilities may be inputs to others. As such, the capacity in this figure is not simply ‘additive’.
63.
Figure B2.1.4 shows the key regional data for Yorkshire and Humber:



Currently Yorkshire and Humber has over 900,000 tonnes (per annum) of residual waste treatment
capacity either ‘operating’ or ‘under construction’; It comprises 3 incineration facilities, 2 pretreatment (MBT) facilities and 4 WID-compliant biomass facilities;
Planning consent has been granted to over 2.6 million tonnes of new incineration, gasification, pretreatment and WID-compliant biomass capacity;
Applications for planning consent have been submitted for a further 1.1 million tonnes of
incineration and pre-treatment capacity.
Page 55 of 72
Figure B2.1.4: Residual Waste Treatment Capacity – Yorkshire and Humber
64.
Eunomia suggest a range of assumptions to estimate excess capacity and use several scenarios in view of
the many incertainties in projections. Their central scenario for GB projects around 1.2 million tonnes in
2015/16, as shown in Figure 3. The extent of this overcapacity rises to almost 9.2 million tonnes in
2020/21. Note, however, that this does not include potential future capacity, which has not yet entered
the planning system, and which may result in earlier overcapacity,
65.
The Eunomia ‘high’ infrastructure scenario projects the onset of overcapacity is in the same year
(2015/16) as in the central scenario, but at a higher level of around 6.6 million tonnes. Their ‘low’
infrastructure scenario is predicated on a far lower level of capacity becoming operational in which case
the onset of overcapacity would be delayed until 2017/18.
66.
This means that it is highly likely that AWRP would be operating in an over-capacity situation for all or
much of its operational life. This is a buyers’ market; people who want waste disposal services would
have the upper hand. This adds to the financial risks faced by AWRP and, in particular, NYCC.
67.
We appreciate that there are limitations in the ability of waste to be moved significant distances at low
cost, and that capacity is unevenly spread across GB so there will be some variation between regions in
the time overcapacity is reached. Even so, the situation in the Yorkshire and Humber region is one of
projected overcapacity at some fairly near time. This places risks on the council tax payer if AWRP is
built. There needs to be a thorough review both of technology choices and local alternatives before
planning permission is even considered.
68.
Financial harm, and risk of still greater harm (e.g. through over-capacity) is but one if the many reasons
why planning permission should be refused. This being so, it is essential to refuse planning permission
now to avoid further nugatory expenditure.
Page 56 of 72
B2.1.3: Overcapacity in North Yorkshire
69.
Section 2.1 of our chapter on Need and Technology Choice reveals that AWRP is seriously over-sized to
meet the likely demand to treat MSW (the original purpose of AWRP). This fact appears to be to some
extent appreciated by NYCC but their response is inappropriate.
70.
Inspection of the revised waste forecasts available on NYCC’s website shows that, when compared with
the forecasts used by NYCC at the time of the December 15th 2010 decision to award the contract to
AmeyCespa, the Council has revised down its overall predictions of waste. This shows that the previous
predictions were unreliable and that our view that AWRP is far too large for the needs of NYCC and CYC
is the correct one.
71.
We note that the predictions for the NYCC Districts now include a new waste stream called “Trade
Waste”. This new waste stream was not part of the original 2010 projections on which the Councils took
their December 2010 decision. It is therefore essential to examine the credibility of this new assumption
in detail, not forgetting that it takes AWRP beyond its original purpose.
72.
For all Districts the annual growth in Trade Waste is assumed to be 0% for the period 2010/11 to
2015/16 inclusive. However, in 2016/17 growth rates suddenly rise by a suspiciously identical amount
for Craven, Harrogate, Ryedale, Scarborough and Selby. These rates are 28.5% (2015/16), 40.1%
(2016/17), 23.49% (2017/18) and 20.11% (2018/19). In the years that follow, rates of growth for Trade
Waste for these Districts falls to less than 2% until 2039/40. These startling assumptions are
unexplained, as is the fact that there are no equivalent changes to the Trade Waste predictions provided
by City of York.
73.
These unexplained changes would markedly increase the projected MSW volumes. Without this change,
the MSW predictions for NYCC by 2039/40 would be c. 380,000 tonnes. If we assume an implausibly low
50% recycling rate, only some 190,000 tonnes of waste would require treatment, far lower than the
320.000 tonne capacity of the EfW (incinerator) at AWRP. This far exceeds the demand for MSW, even
at the end of the contract period.
74.
While the “Trade Waste” stream is unspecified, it is possible to speculate that it reflects the assumption
in Mr Bowe’s recent letter to Members that: “The repeal of LATS from 2013 means that future estimates
of commercial waste to be collected by the local authorities in York and North Yorkshire have been
revised upwards as the authorities’ services become more attractive to local businesses”. This apparently
unfounded assumption requires full explanation due to its major consequences for the nature of the
AmeyCespa contract. We understand that these Trade Waste estimates were not provided by the
Collection Authorities (CAs). Indeed, the new NYCC waste flow model makes clear that the data listed
against years 2016/17 onwards is not provided by the CAs – they appear to be a product of NYCC
officers’ assumptions concerning what the CAs might do in a post-LATS world. There can be absolutely
no guarantee that their assumed spectacular growth projections will be realised. Indeed, in view of the
regional and national over-capacity discussed above, CAs should be aware that there will be a highly
competitive market for waste treatment in the coming years and that a facility such as AWRP with its
high gate prices would not be attractive to commercial firms.
75.
The next section explores, among other things, how overcapacity of waste management facilities in the
region and nationally could lead to financial harm.
Page 57 of 72
B2.2: Financial harm
76.
We have argued, not least in our chapter on Need and Technology Choices that AmeyCespa’s application
should be refused because it will cause financial harm to the people of NYCC and CYC who will pay for it
and bear the risk for the next 25 years. There are several reasons for this.




Firstly, AWRP is intended to deal with residual waste from NYCC and City of York Council and it is on
this purpose alone that the need for AWRP must be judged. The projections used in the by the
Councils/AmeyCespa in the Joint Municipal Waste Management Strategy (JMWMS) assume a rising
trend in waste arisings despite the fact that waste arisings have actually fallen year on year for a
number of years. Moreover they assume reuse and recycling only reaches 50% despite much higher
figures being achieved elsewhere (for details see our chapter on Need and Technology Choices) and
the plans for 70% in Scotland and Wales22. Thus the rising projections of waste arisings in the
JMWMS used to size the AWRP facility are seriously out of line with both local and national trends
which show the amount of waste produced is on a falling trend both as total waste produced and
waste per capita. As a result, AWRP is grossly oversized and therefore not needed.
Second, AWRP projections are misleading and falsely inflate the claimed savings. NYCC forecasts
against an unrealistic “Do nothing” option and against increasing waste volumes and rising landfill
tax. This is at best guesswork. For example, NYCC assumes landfill tax will increase in real terms to
£100 by 2020 and £170 by the end of the contract – there is no evidence for this. The low (50%)
target for municipal waste recycling falsely exaggerates the savings forecast.
Third, the 25-30 year contract to amortise the capital cost locks NYCC into incineration technology
and prevents flexibility to take advantage of technological developments and the concomitant cost
savings.
Fourth, as described in our chapter on Need and Technology Choices, there are already proven
technologies that are markedly cheaper. The gate fee charged to NYCC and CYC will be c. £130 per
tonne, which is significantly higher than the existing market price. AWRP will therefore cost £65 per
tonne more than alternatives23 - £13 million more per annum and over £300 million more over the
25-year contract. These costs ignore the huge capital costs of the facility and its debt servicing.
77.
For these reasons, there are significant financial risks in making the alleged savings, because they would
mostly occur late in the contract period and only if the forecasts are correct. Moreover, if a proper
financial appraisal using discounted cash flow techniques had been carried out the alleged savings would
have been largely discounted in any Net Present Value24 calculation and greater emphasis placed on the
role of up-front costs.
78.
A NYCC Working Party which reported to the full council did not look properly at value for money but
argued that the PFI process automatically ensures value for money. This is not true as it excludes
22
Wales intends to reach the equivalent of 70% by 2024/25, and Scotland plans to achieve a 70% rate, but measured
using the Scottish carbon metric, by 2025
23
One clear alternative to the technology mix proposed at AWRP would be to use a Thermal Mechanical Biological Treatment (MBT)
plant, as used currently to process Darlington’s municipal waste at a gate fee of £65 per tonne (nearly half the cost for AWRP).
24
The net present value (NPV) of a time series of incoming and outgoing cash flows is the sum of the present values (PV is the value
on a given date of a payment or series of payments made at other times with future payments discounted to reflect the time value of
money and other factors such as investment risk.
NPV is a central tool in discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, and is a standard method for using the time value of money to
appraise long-term projects. Used for capital budgeting and widely used throughout economics, finance, and accounting, it measures
the excess or shortfall of cash flows, in present value terms, once financing charges are met. NPV can be described as the “Difference
Amount” between the sums of discounted; cash inflows and cash outflows. It compares the present value of money today to the
present value of money in future, taking inflation and returns into account. If n is the number of cash flows in the list of values, the
formula for NPV is given by:
Page 58 of 72
comparison with the most recent best practice. Moreover, as the Treasury Select Committee reportxvii
shows, PFI is not always the cheapest option for a given scheme.
79.
Despite NYCC’s claims to the contrary, the scheme is not risk-free. The Treasury Select Committee report
(op cit) states (Paras 38 and 39) that:
“Allocating risk to the private sector is only worthwhile if it is better able to manage the risk
and can pass on any subsequent savings to the client. The main benefit highlighted to us by PFI
providers was the transfer of construction risk. However a PFI contract which lasts for 30 years
is not necessary to transfer this risk. There are also other methods such as turnkey contracts
which can be used for the same ends. We have seen evidence that PFI has not provided good
value from risk transfer—in some cases inappropriate risks have been given to the private
sector to manage. This has resulted in higher prices and has been inefficient.
Some of the claimed risk transfer may also be illusory—the government is ultimately
accountable for the delivery of public services. Therefore it would not be able to allow a
number of services provided under a PFI contract to cease for any length of time”.
80.
NYCC’s Assistant Director of Resources at NYCC stated (3 December 2011) that “With PFI, the whole
transfer of risk goes over to the private sector. It gives us certainty over a long period of time”. This is
wrong. In the event of failure of the applicant or its heavily indebted Spanish parent company the
responsibility for loan repayment devolves on NYCC and therefore the people of the county and
penalties will be substantial.
81.
In addition, council tax payers don’t want the ongoing certainty of paying over the odds for a guaranteed
25 years. The AWRP proposal is rather like signing for a fixed rate mortgage for 10% APR when the going
rate is 5% and probably falling. It is the economics of the madhouse.
82.
By seeking planning permission for a plant to treat all North Yorkshire’s municipal waste, the applicant is
seeking to achieve a monopoly position which will be incapable of challenge for 25 years. This is
unacceptable in terms of the damage to competition by local businesses. Any profit from the PFI will also
leave Yorkshire as AmeyCespa is a Spanish-owned company.
83.
The applicant claims that AWRP will create new jobs. This is incorrect, because the plant would displace
people currently working in the quarry and in landfilling and waste treatment across the county (see our
chapter Sustainability, What Sustainability?). These job losses could exceed the 70 to be employed at
Allerton. In a time of austerity, it would also reduce council services and employment.
1.
The disparity between the circa £130/tonne gate price at AWRP and the typically £65/tonne at other
facilities is so large that it would put people off using AWRP. This means that NYCC’s confidence that
it could replace the shortfall in MSW with C&I waste is likely to be misplaced, especially as there is
over-capacity in the region (see section B3). Put simply, why should a business choose an expensive
option when much cheaper ones are available? These don’t have to be in North Yorkshire or York
because the cost disparity is so large. This means that it may not be possible to fill AWRP and this
could in turn mean that the Councils have difficulty in meeting their contractual obligations.
2.
Thus there are commercial risks in trying to source C&I waste as it will be becoming a very
competitive market. NYCC seem not to have factored these risks into their simplistic economic case,
nor acknowledged the possibility of penalties being paid if the EfW (incinerator) does not get its
regular ‘feed’ as Stoke-on-Trent found to their costxviii. Much depends on the terms of the contract
which are shrouded in mystery under the blanket of commercial confidentiality.
Page 59 of 72
84.
This situation is complicated by the building overcapacity on the Yorkshire and Humber region and
nationally – a classical “bubble” situation. Inevitably, this will lead to a highly competitive market for
providers of waste treatment below the recycling level of the waste hierarchy. Pricing will be an
important part of the ability to compete. The AmeyCespa contract with NYCC/CYC will mean that these
councils are paying well above the going rate, and doing so for 25 years. However, that part of the
capacity of AWRP that in not used for the NYCC/CYC MSW must compete on the open market where the
going rate is already far lower and will be subject to downward pressure due to the growing overcapacity regionally and nationally and due to the probable greater effectiveness and lower costs of new
and emerging technologies.
85.
The consequence of this is that AWRP would have to reduce its costs for C&I waste services – probably
something akin to marginal cost pricing. Since one cannot run away from sunk costs for ever, this carries
risks for the operator and those whom they borrow from – but then so does running at part-load or on a
low load factor. It also means that the high price to which the Councils are committed might be used to
subsidise the price paid under other contracts. This possible cross-subsidy from the Councils looks
suspiciously like a form of state aid and is morally repugnant to us and unacceptable financially as
council tax payers.
86.
In conclusion, the excessive cost of AWRP brings with it financial harm and the various risks that NYCC
appear not to have considered in their economic case could add substantially to that harm. This is not in
the interests of council tax payers. Accordingly, planning permission for AWRP should be refused.
B2.3: Traffic impacts
87.
The application should also be refused due to traffic impacts – see our chapter: Environmental Insults:
Environmental Risks, Traffic and Visual Impact.
88.
AmeyCespa admits that AWRP would increase traffic on the A168 but fails to address the most serious
risk which will arise at the already hazardous A59/A168 junction and the closely associated A1(M)/A59
junction which are contiguous and should be treated as part of the same system.. Treating only the
A168/A59 junction in isolation is inappropriate and ignoring the remainder of this junction system is not
valid and would seriously underestimate the potential for accidents. There will be an increase of 2 very
large HGVs per minute at this junction. This will cause overloads and restrict vision and, in turn, will
increase the risk of accidents.
89.
AWRP therefore fails to comply with the following regional and local policies as set out in our chapter:
Environmental Insults: Environmental Risks, Traffic and Visual Impact. The primary reason for this failure
are that


90.
AWRP would generate considerable additional traffic, particularly HGVs. This would add to CO2
emissions and other pollutants including particulates. HGVs contribute 19.2% of total emissions from
transport nationally, by far the largest proportion per unit of vehicle type.
The large number of extra HGVs associated with the development would harm the safety and
security of residents and North Yorkshire road users across the county.
AWRP fails to apply the Proximity Principle, contrary to Government recommendations, and will also
increase GHG emissions. A single site to treat the county’s waste does not make economic sense.
Transporting waste from all over the county is folly; it creates many miles of unnecessary HGV travel,
incurs additional transport costs and adds unnecessarily to CO2 emissions and other pollutants.
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Manifestly, AWRP is not the nearest possible location for much of North Yorkshire and a site within the
city boundaries would be more appropriate to York’s waste.
91.
The Transport Analysis in Appendix 11A may well depend on erroneous assumptions in that “In reality,
once a site has been chosen for development, the individual collection authorities will determine whether
waste will be direct delivered to the site, or be subject to bulking prior to onward transmission.”
92.
Therefore, if local authorities (or suppliers of C&I waste) decide to send their waste directly to the site
instead of bulking, the AmeyCespa’s Transport Assessment and all its conclusions would be largely
meaningless since traffic volumes may well be considerably in excess of estimates. The Transport Plan
does not obviate this risk yet AmeyCespa fail to take it into account.
93.
We understand that the applicant was asked by NYCC to provide a full Traffic Assessment. It has failed
to do so. There is not one single map showing what routes the waste would travel to get to Allerton
Park.
94.
AmeyCespa claim that ‘the assessment of the proposed development demonstrates that there are no
significant environmental effects from traffic and transport associated with this development’.
Manifestly, this is untrue. The extra 302 HGV movements in and out of the site daily will have major
adverse impacts on local roads, particularly as many of these HGVs will be large (20+ tonnes). Other
traffic will add to this impact.
B2.4: Emissions and Abnormal Operations
95.
The air pollution control equipment in modern incinerators undoubtedly reduces emissions markedly
compared to earlier incinerators. A sufficiently high stack would ensure sufficient dispersion to reduce
the concentration of pollutants to levels adequate to meet current air quality objectives. However, this
begs several important questions:



Given the many flaws in the analysis in AmeyCespa’s Chapters 10 and 12, (as discussed in our
Chapter Air Quality and Health: A Critique of AmeyCespa’s Assessment), are the stacks sufficiently
high, especially for the incinerator?
Given that AmeyCespa’s calculations are based on incinerating MSW, how far will the inclusion of
Trade Waste (an undefined waste stream) and other known waste streams alter the emissions
profile and quantity?
Given the trend towards more stringent regulations since the original Clean Air Act, should the stack
height be set at a height sufficient to meet the likely future regulations? Given that it is easier to
design and build a stack of suitable height ab initio than to add to an existing stack, why is this not
done?
96.
For the people living around AWRP, the systems that control emissions are safety-critical systems. Yet
there appears to be no failsafe mechanisms and no built-in redundancy. It is therefore important to
consider what happens if one or more of these systems fails.
97.
AmeyCespa’s application to the Environment Agency for an Environmental Permit contains a paper by
Fichtner entitled “Air Quality Addendum: Abnormal Emissions” which makes an attempt to do this. They
consider the following examples of abnormal operating conditions:
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98.
Fichtner based their assumed abnormal emission levels primarily on data from modern plants or used
what they call “conservative assumptions”, though these are undefined. Moreover, they also claim that
they assumed “worst case” weather conditions, again without defining them. In reality, the worst case
weather conditions are likely to be during conditions of thermal inversion, something that the air
dispersion models have not taken into account. Even with these caveats, emission levels exceed
permitted levels greatly as shown in Fichtner’s Tables 1 and 2 which are reproduced below.
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99.
It is very clear that under various assumed conditions of abnormal operation, emissions greatly exceed
the permitted maximum. Correcting for the deficiencies in AmeyCespa’s methodology (outlined in our
Chapter Air Quality and Health: A Critique of AmeyCespa’s Assessment) is likely to increase calculated
ground level concentrations even further. During conditions of thermal inversion these concentrations
are likely to build up fairly quickly due to the trapping effect. This largely invalidates the calculations
reported in Fichtner’s Table 3 which already shows that concentrations are above those in the Waste
Incineration Directive. The reality is that they could be substantially higher.
100. As if these results were not bad enough, they ignore the possibility of two or more of the occurrences
happening at the same time. Such eventualities are commonly taken into account in safety engineering.
Doing so in this instance would increase emissions significantly above those calculated. The duration of
such elevated emissions is a significant parameter that is not even discussed. Possible failure of
instrumentation leading to the fault going undetected for some time
101. One might normally think of dual sets of instruments with appropriate control rules automatically closing
the system down as the failsafe option. This may be inappropriate because emissions are generally high
during shut-down. We have already mentioned the possibility of adding electrostatic precipitation to the
system and this would do much to overcome the failure of bag filters (as well as potentially improving
particle capture). Dual instrumentation and electrostatic precipitation are examples of the concept of
built-in redundancy of systems (though the latter could perform a useful function during normal
operation.
102. Electrostatic precipitators have been a reliable technology since the early and are found mainly on large
power plants, cement plants, incinerators, and various boiler applications. Why are they not being
installed together with filters in order to improve the removal of particulates and to protect the
environment and the public in the event of one of the filters failing?
103. Not being specialist engineers, we are not aware of whether or not it would be possible to fit an
alternative route to the stack to give the option of back-up air pollution control systems. If this is
possible then the SNCR system could be matched by an alternative proven technology, namely catalytic
reduction. The activated carbon system would have to be duplicated.
104. Power stations commonly use flue gas desulphurisation equipment which is a proven technology of long
standing. Surely it should be fitted to reduce SO2 emissions.
105. In conclusion, there are a number of possible abnormal operation modes which feature failure of part of
the air pollution control system leading to permitted emission levels being substantially or greatly
exceeded. There appears to be inadequate safety engineering to avoid or minimise these risks.
Moreover, emissions of some harmful substances could be reduced by the inclusion of proven
technologies. These issues mean that planning permission should be refused in view of the possibility
of substantial harm to the environment and human health.
B2.5: Implications of the National Policy Planning Framework
106. The introduction of the National Policy Planning Framework changes much and places greater emphasis
on sustainable development and on the need for decisions to be made locally. This section discusses
these and other issues. In essence, it responds to the invitation to comment on the effects of the new
NPPF on our objections.
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NPPF and Sustainable Development
107. The NPPF is seen by the Government as a key part of their reforms to make the planning system less
complex and more accessible, to protect the environment and to promote sustainable growth. It
introduces a presumption in favour of sustainable development, which we have discussed above. The
key issue here is that there can be no presumption in favour of AWRP because it is not a sustainable
development, as is made clear above and in our chapter Sustainability, What Sustainability?
108. In our chapter Sustainability, What Sustainability? we used the Brundtland Commission25 definition of
sustainable development, one of the best known and widely accepted definitions. The NPPF states that
“Resolution 42/187 of the United Nations General Assembly defined sustainable development as meeting
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs”. The two definitions are identical so our earlier evidence in the still stands.
109. AWRP fails to meet the Resolution42/187 criterion because the contractual commitment on which it is
based commits present and future citizens of the whole of North Yorkshire to a single waste treatment
plant, at a single site at huge and demonstrably excessive cost to the exclusion of all other solutions for
at least 25 to 30 years. It also compromises the ability of future generations to meet their future needs
by denying them resources for which they will then have to exploit virgin resources. It also causes
irreversible environmental damage (e.g. climate change) as well as damaging human health (especially
vulnerable are babies and young children, the future generation whose interests a sustainable
development would protect).
110. Decommissioning represents an additional cost burden, as discussed in Section 3.1.2. Under
AmeyCespa’s proposal NYCC would be committed to the (currently unknown) costs of decommissioning
the plant and re-instatement of the site. This would apply even if AWRP were to be forced close
prematurely for any reason; this substantial financial risk would negate any alleged financial benefit from
AWRP and leave the council with a large and un-resourced bill to pay.
111. The NPPF also states:

“Sustainable development is about change for the better” AWRP is low down the Waste Hierarchy,
being only slightly better than landfill and significantly below the recycling and value for money
performance of more recent systems (e.g. Thermal MBT systems such as used by Darlington).

There are three dimensions to sustainable development: economic, social and Environmental use
natural resources prudently, minimise waste and pollution, and mitigate and adapt to climate change
including moving to a low carbon economy. AWRP burns 80% of the waste entering the site, thereby
wasting valuable resources rather than maximising material recovery and recycling. The heat
generated cannot be fully utilised; CHP is unrealistic due to the lack of a nearby market. Having a
single site means unnecessarily long trucking distances and results in higher levels of GHG and other
emissions. It fails to contribute to a low carbon economy.
112. Granting planning permission would be wrong as it would most certainly compromise “the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs”.
25
The Brundtland Commission, formally the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), was convened by the
United Nations in 1983. It was created to address growing concern "about the accelerating deterioration of the human environment
and natural resources and the consequences of that deterioration for economic and social development." In establishing the
commission, the UN General Assembly recognized that environmental problems were global in nature and determined that it was in
the common interest of all nations to establish policies for sustainable development.
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113. The NPPF also states “Sustainable means ensuring that better lives for ourselves don’t mean worse lives
for future generations.” AWRP does not do this – not even for ‘ourselves’ because of cost, inferior
recycling capability, increased GHG emissions (including from waste transport distances), damage to the
local landscape and increased risk of pollution from the incineration element. All of these unnecessary
outcomes would be worse for future generations. The development of increased recycling would be
seriously undermined meaning that future generations would have to exploit virgin resources thereby
denying them to later generations.
Local Determination and Democratic Deficit
114. The change in the Government’s approach to planning introduced in the NPPF document places greater
emphasises on local determination. As its Forward says:
“This should be a collective enterprise. Yet, in recent years, planning has tended to exclude,
rather than to include, people and communities. In part, this has been a result of targets being
imposed, and decisions taken, by bodies remote from them. Dismantling the unaccountable
regional apparatus and introducing neighbourhood planning addresses this”.
115. This statement challenges the old ways. The emphasis on more local decision making could be argued to
challenge the NYCC presumption that it should determine this application. It is certainly consistent with
the view that the very body that has voted for AWRP should also determine the planning application.
Why should one body act as judge, jury and executioner on this highly controversial proposal? They will
be seen to lack the independence to do so. This is exemplified by the consultation on the WCS and its
presumption that AWRP will be built (discussed above) In this NYCC’s approach has been far from that of
a “Collective enterprise”. By contrast, views expressed by the public in the WCS Review are from the
community and therefore should be given significant weight. This has not happened to date; recall that
the last time there was a questionnaire of the public (BPEO) there was a huge majority in favour of more
than one site and to reduce transport – quite the opposite of the AWRP proposal. The current WCS
consultation is clear in wanting waste to be treated as a resource, close to where it is produced; again
out of line with the AWRP proposal. Ignoring public opinion in this way introduces a democratic deficit
where none need exist.
116. The NPPF suggests that planning should be a collective enterprise including rather than excluding people
and communities. It deplores decisions taken by “remote bodies”. This suggests that:


A body less remote from the people surrounding the Allerton site should judge the planning
application. This implies either that the decision should be taken locally by HBC or at a Public Inquiry
where full representation of local views is possible.
NYCC should heed this and give very considerable weight to the objections of the communities in the
Harrogate Knaresborough Boroughbridge area who have pointed out the obvious shortcomings of
the scheme. NYCC should also give great weight to the objections of Harrogate and Knaresborough
Borough Councils and local parish councils.
117. The NPPF suggests that planning should be a collective enterprise including rather than excluding people
and communities. We agree and welcome its recognition that “people have been put off from getting
involved because planning policy itself has become so elaborate and forbidding – the preserve of
specialists, rather than people in communities” Although some of our arguments, for example on health,
require specialist knowledge, at heart our arguments are about the harm that AWRP will cause and such
arguments should not have to depend on knowledge of copious numbers of planning documents. While
we have had, perforce, to relate them to some of these documents and the things the Applicant has said
concerning them, the basic message is a simple one: AWRP will cause harm in a large number of ways
that are unacceptable.
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Health and Pollution
118. Paragraph 120 of the NPPF states that
“To prevent unacceptable risks from pollution and land instability, planning policies and
decisions should ensure that new development is appropriate for its location. The effects
(including cumulative effects) of pollution on health, the natural environment or general
amenity, and the potential sensitivity of the area or proposed development to adverse effects
from pollution, should be taken into account.”
119. This makes pollution and health risks an important issue in planning decisions, irrespective of whether it
has been in the past.
120. Our chapters on Harmful Emissions and on Health Risks discuss the unacceptable imposition of pollution
and the health risks AWRP would bring. Health impacts arising from waste incineration (the main
technology at AWRP) is a contentious subject for many reasons (complexity, uncertainty, vested
interests, the nature of the ‘scientific method’, difficulties ‘proving’ causal relationships, ‘confounding
factors’ including both social factors and other sources of pollution, etc.). However, there is a substantial
body of scientific opinion showing that there are reasonable grounds for concern about potentially
dangerous effects of incinerator emissions on human health, with babies and young children being
amongst the most vulnerable. The precautionary principle suggests that as there are less costly, more
environmentally friendly systems such as MBT one must ask – “Why take the risk of incineration when
you do not have to?”
121. We therefore object to the unacceptable health risks that AWRP would impose. In line with para 120 of
the NPPF and the Precautionary Principle, the health risks arising from AWRP mean that planning
permission should be refused.
Other Conclusions from the NPPF Document
122. The NPPF also states “We must respond to the changes that new technologies offer us.”
AWRP fails this
test because its proposed technology is obsolescent and does not offer the best solution to maximising
recycling nor the best value for money. The high capital cost and longevity of the contractual
commitment would deprive future generations of responding to and benefitting from emerging new
technologies, locking the people of North Yorkshire out of the cost savings they might otherwise be able
to benefit from.
123. The NPPF emphasises that planning should be genuinely plan-led, empowering local people to shape
their surroundings, with succinct local and neighbourhood plans setting out a positive vision for the
future of the area. Plans should be kept up-to-date, and be based on joint working and co-operation to
address larger than local issues. They should provide a practical framework within which decisions on
planning applications can be made with a high degree of predictability and efficiency.
124. Unfortunately NYCC as failed to meet these standards. It has been without a Minerals and Waste
Strategy for some years and is now belatedly consulting on a Strategy. This has two consequences:

NYCC should not be taking the most significant contractual and planning decision ever until after it
has a valid strategy to guide it.
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
The public views expressed in the consultations about emerging strategy should be given very great
weight. Significantly those views emphasized
o A preference for maximising recycling and the reuse of materials
o A preference for a number of treatment centres rather than one
o A preference for waste treatment facilities to be located close to the major waste producing
conurbations, rather than a single remote site
o A desire to minimise the distance waste is carried to reduce carbon pollution.
o A view that Energy from Waste systems should be used only where the heat output can be
fully utilised
o A recommendation that NYCC should review and take advantage of waste treatment
opportunities outside its county boundaries
125. The NPPF recommends a planning framework within which local people and their accountable councils
can produce their own distinctive local and neighbourhood plans, which reflect the needs and priorities
of their communities. This reinforces the view that this planning application should not be determined in
the absence of a Waste Core Strategy. The completion of the Waste Core Strategy would be a first step
towards the development of locally accepted waste treatment plants.
126. The NPPF states that authorities should conserve heritage assets in a manner appropriate to their
significance, so that they can be enjoyed for their contribution to the quality of life of this and future
generations. The applicants admit that the proposed development would cause harm to the landscape
that cannot be adequately screened or mitigated. This further demonstrates that the proposed
development fails the sustainability test and the application should be dismissed.
127. The NPPF confirms that the Government is committed to ensuring that the planning system does
everything it can to support sustainable economic growth, supporting existing business sectors and
particularly economic growth in rural areas in order to create jobs and prosperity by taking a positive
approach to sustainable new developments. AWRP conflicts with this in that:
 It does not support the existing business sector where small local firms are handling North
Yorkshire waste There has been no assessment of the potential impacts of this scheme on the
existing local waste providers in North Yorkshire. The negative impacts of this scheme have
therefore not been assessed. By seeking to draw in commercial and industrial waste from the
County and beyond, the impacts of this are also not assessed.
 A multi site approach to waste treatment adjacent major producers would result in employment
opportunities in rural parts of the county.
128. The NPPF requires that all developments that generate significant amounts of movement should be
supported by a Transport Statement or Transport Assessment. The AmeyCespa scheme will result in a
significant increase in the distances waste will be transported and an increase in vehicle movements on
the dangerous A59/A168 junction yet the planning application does not include a Transport Statement.
129. The scheme also fails the NPPF requirements that:




Plans and decisions should ensure developments that generate significant movement are located
where the need to travel will be minimised.
Proposals are visually attractive as a result of good architecture and appropriate landscaping.
Should not increase urban sprawl or the impact of light pollution from artificial light on local
amenity, intrinsically dark landscapes and nature conservation.
Plans for new development should be in locations and ways which reduce GHG emissions. The
technology choice and increased waste transport distances do the reverse of this. The basic solution
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is worse than landfill. Transport costs in terms of CO2 are important, but also are the pollution they
bring and the cost of fuel.
The NPPF also advises that permission should be refused for development of poor design that fails to
take the opportunities available for improving the character and quality of an area and the way it
functions. AWRP fails on all these counts and permission should therefore be refused.

The NPPF states that Minerals are essential to support sustainable economic growth and our quality of
life. It is therefore important that there is a sufficient supply of material to provide the infrastructure,
buildings, energy and goods that the country needs. However, since minerals are a finite natural
resource, and can only be worked where they are found, it is important to make best use of them to
secure their long-term conservation. Authorities should put in place policies to ensure worked land is
reclaimed at the earliest opportunity
130. Mineral Extraction is an important contributor to the NYCC rural economy and reinstatement requires
landfill. NYCC has not quantified the impact of trying to eliminate landfill on this important rural North
Yorkshire industry.
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ANNEX A - Letters to Knaresborough Post – April 2012
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xii
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xv
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Stoke council faces £645k bill for incinerator tonnage shortfall http://www.mrw.co.uk/news/stokecouncil-faces-645k-bill-for-incinerator-tonnage-shortfall/8607111.article
xviii
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