Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)
Case 14: Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant Disaster [Real-World]


Background
o Who/What
 General Public Utilities & Metropolitan Edison
 Partial Nuclear Meltdown
o Where/When
 Three Mile Island, PA
 March 28, 1979
Outcome
o Who/What
 Radioactive gases released to environment
 Plant site contaminated (14 year clean-up effort)
 Level 5: Accident with wider Consequence on the Nuclear Event Scale (Level 7 being the
worst)
o How/Why:
 Combination of design and human error lead loss of coolant, leading to partial meltdown.
The Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant Disaster - extracted from The United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission’s Fact Sheets accessed at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mileisle.html
The Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) reactor, near Middletown, Pa., partially melted down on March 28, 1979.
This was the most serious accident in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant operating history, although its small
radioactive releases had no detectable health effects on plant workers or the public. Its aftermath brought about
sweeping changes involving emergency response planning, reactor operator training, human factors
engineering, radiation protection, and many other areas of nuclear power plant operations. It also caused the
NRC to tighten and heighten its regulatory oversight. All of these changes significantly enhanced U.S. reactor
safety.
A combination of equipment malfunctions, design-related problems and worker errors led to TMI-2's partial
meltdown and very small off-site releases of radioactivity.
The accident began about 4 a.m. on Wednesday, March 28, 1979, when the plant experienced a failure in the
secondary, non-nuclear section of the plant (one of two reactors on the site). Either a mechanical or electrical
failure prevented the main feedwater pumps from sending water to the steam generators that remove heat from
the reactor core. This caused the plant's turbine-generator and then the reactor itself to automatically shut down.
Immediately, the pressure in the primary system (the nuclear portion of the plant) began to increase. In order to
control that pressure, the pilot-operated relief valve (a valve located at the top of the pressurizer) opened. The
valve should have closed when the pressure fell to proper levels, but it became stuck open. Instruments in the
control room, however, indicated to the plant staff that the valve was closed. As a result, the plant staff was
unaware that cooling water was pouring out of the stuck-open valve.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)
As coolant flowed from the primary system through the valve, other instruments available to reactor operators
provided inadequate information. There was no instrument that showed how much water covered the core. As a
result, plant staff assumed that as long as the pressurizer water level was high, the core was properly covered
with water. As alarms rang and warning lights flashed, the operators did not realize that the plant was
experiencing a loss-of-coolant accident. They took a series of actions that made conditions worse. The water
escaping through the stuck valve reduced primary system pressure so much that the reactor coolant pumps had
to be turned off to prevent dangerous vibrations. To prevent the pressurizer from filling up completely, the staff
reduced how much emergency cooling water was being pumped in to the primary system. These actions starved
the reactor core of coolant, causing it to overheat.
Without the proper water flow, the nuclear fuel overheated to the point at which the zirconium cladding (the
long metal tubes that hold the nuclear fuel pellets) ruptured and the fuel pellets began to melt. It was later found
that about half of the core melted during the early stages of the accident. Although TMI-2 suffered a severe core
meltdown, the most dangerous kind of nuclear power accident, consequences outside the plant were minimal.
Unlike the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents, TMI-2's containment building remained intact and held almost
all of the accident's radioactive material.
Federal and state authorities were initially concerned about the small releases of radioactive gases that were
measured off-site by the late morning of March 28 and even more concerned about the potential threat that the
reactor posed to the surrounding population. They did not know that the core had melted, but they immediately
took steps to try to gain control of the reactor and ensure adequate cooling to the core. The NRC's regional
office in King of Prussia, Pa., was notified at 7:45 a.m. on March 28. By 8 a.m., NRC Headquarters in
Washington, D.C., was alerted and the NRC Operations Center in Bethesda, Md., was activated. The regional
office promptly dispatched the first team of inspectors to the site and other agencies, such as the Department of
Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency, also mobilized their response teams. Helicopters hired by
TMI's owner, General Public Utilities Nuclear, and the Department of Energy were sampling radioactivity in
the atmosphere above the plant by midday. A team from the Brookhaven National Laboratory was also sent to
assist in radiation monitoring. At 9:15 a.m., the White House was notified and at 11 a.m., all non-essential
personnel were ordered off the plant's premises.
By the evening of March 28, the core appeared to be adequately cooled and the reactor appeared to be stable.
But new concerns arose by the morning of Friday, March 30. A significant release of radiation from the plant's
auxiliary building, performed to relieve pressure on the primary system and avoid curtailing the flow of coolant
to the core, caused a great deal of confusion and consternation. In an atmosphere of growing uncertainty about
the condition of the plant, the governor of Pennsylvania, Richard L. Thornburgh, consulted with the NRC about
evacuating the population near the plant. Eventually, he and NRC Chairman Joseph Hendrie agreed that it
would be prudent for those members of society most vulnerable to radiation to evacuate the area. Thornburgh
announced that he was advising pregnant women and pre-school-age children within a five-mile radius of the
plant to leave the area.
Within a short time, chemical reactions in the melting fuel created a large hydrogen bubble in the dome of the
pressure vessel, the container that holds the reactor core. NRC officials worried the hydrogen bubble might burn
or even explode and rupture the pressure vessel. In that event, the core would fall into the containment building
and perhaps cause a breach of containment. The hydrogen bubble was a source of intense scrutiny and great
anxiety, both among government authorities and the population, throughout the day on Saturday, March 31. The
crisis ended when experts determined on Sunday, April 1, that the bubble could not burn or explode because of
the absence of oxygen in the pressure vessel. Further, by that time, the utility had succeeded in greatly reducing
the size of the bubble.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)
The NRC conducted detailed studies of the accident's radiological consequences, as did the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now Health and Human Services), the
Department of Energy, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Several independent groups also conducted
studies. The approximately 2 million people around TMI-2 during the accident are estimated to have received
an average radiation dose of only about 1 millirem above the usual background dose. To put this into context,
exposure from a chest X-ray is about 6 millirem and the area's natural radioactive background dose is about
100-125 millirem per year for the area. The accident's maximum dose to a person at the site boundary would
have been less than 100 millirem above background.
In the months following the accident, although questions were raised about possible adverse effects from
radiation on human, animal, and plant life in the TMI area, none could be directly correlated to the accident.
Thousands of environmental samples of air, water, milk, vegetation, soil, and foodstuffs were collected by
various government agencies monitoring the area. Very low levels of radionuclides could be attributed to
releases from the accident. However, comprehensive investigations and assessments by several well respected
organizations, such as Columbia University and the University of Pittsburgh, have concluded that in spite of
serious damage to the reactor, the actual release had negligible effects on the physical health of individuals or
the environment.
A combination of personnel error, design deficiencies, and component failures caused the Three Mile Island
accident, which permanently changed both the nuclear industry and the NRC. Public fear and distrust increased,
NRC's regulations and oversight became broader and more robust, and management of the plants was
scrutinized more carefully. Careful analysis of the accident's events identified problems and led to permanent
and sweeping changes in how NRC regulates its licensees – which, in turn, has reduced the risk to public health
and safety.
Here are some of the major changes that have occurred since the accident:








Upgrading and strengthening of plant design and equipment requirements. This includes fire protection,
piping systems, auxiliary feedwater systems, containment building isolation, reliability of individual
components (pressure relief valves and electrical circuit breakers), and the ability of plants to shut down
automatically;
Identifying the critical role of human performance in plant safety led to revamping operator training and
staffing requirements, followed by improved instrumentation and controls for operating the plant, and
establishment of fitness-for-duty programs for plant workers to guard against alcohol or drug abuse;
Enhancing emergency preparedness, including requirements for plants to immediately notify NRC of
significant events and an NRC Operations Center staffed 24 hours a day. Drills and response plans are
now tested by licensees several times a year, and state and local agencies participate in drills with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency and NRC;
Integrating NRC observations, findings, and conclusions about licensee performance and management
effectiveness into a periodic, public report;
Having senior NRC managers regularly analyze plant performance for those plants needing significant
additional regulatory attention;
Expanding NRC's resident inspector program – first authorized in 1977 – to have at least two inspectors
live nearby and work exclusively at each plant in the U.S. to provide daily surveillance of licensee
adherence to NRC regulations;
Expanding performance-oriented as well as safety-oriented inspections, and the use of risk assessment to
identify vulnerabilities of any plant to severe accidents;
Strengthening and reorganizing enforcement staff in a separate office within the NRC;
Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)




Establishing the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, the industry's own "policing" group, and
formation of what is now the Nuclear Energy Institute to provide a unified industry approach to generic
nuclear regulatory issues, and interaction with NRC and other government agencies;
Installing additional equipment by licensees to mitigate accident conditions, and monitor radiation levels
and plant status;
Enacting programs by licensees for early identification of important safety-related problems, and for
collecting and assessing relevant data so operating experience can be shared and quickly acted upon; and
Expanding NRC's international activities to share enhanced knowledge of nuclear safety with other
countries in a number of important technical areas.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)
Case 16: Designing Aluminum Cans [Real-World]


Background
o Who/What:
 Ermal Fraze & Dayton Reliable Tool and Manufacturing Company
 Design of pull tab Aluminum can
o When:
 1960s-1970s
Outcome
o Who/What:
 Discarded tabs caused environmental pollution, countless foot injuries, injuries to marine
life and infants who ingested them.
 Led to development of modern day stay-attached opener Aluminum can
o How/Why:
 Littering of pull tabs after opening cans
Designing Aluminum Cans - extracted from Ethics in Engineering 4th Edition, Martin & Schinzinger pg. 3941(Available at 18th Avenue Library Reserve)
Henry Petroski chronicles the development of aluminum beverage cans with stay-on tab openers. Aluminum
cans are now ubiquitous – about 100 billion are produced in the United States each year. The first aluminum can
was designed in 1958 by Kaiser Aluminum, in the attempt to improve upon heavier and more expensive tin
cans. Aluminum proved ideal as a lightweight, flexible material that allowed manufacturing of the bottom and
sides of the can from a single sheet, leaving the top to be added after the can was filled. The trick was to make
the can strong enough to keep the pressurized liquid inside, while being thin enough to be strong enough to keep
the pressurized liquid inside, while being thin enough to be cost-effective. The can also had to fit conveniently
in the hand and reliably satisfy customers’ needs. Design calculations solved the problem of suitable thickness
of material, but improvements came gradually in shaping of the inward-dished bottom in order to improve
stability when the can is set down, as well as to provide some leeway for expansion of the can.
The first aluminum cans, like the tin cans before them, were opened with a separate opener, which required
additional manufacturing costs to make them readily available to consumers. The need for separate openers
also caused inconvenience, as Ermal Fraze discovered when, forgetting an opener while on a picnic in 1959, he
had to resort to using a car bumper. Fraze, who owned Dayton Reliable Tool and Manufacturing Company and
was hence familiar with metal, envisioned a design for a small lever that was attached to the can but which was
removed as the can opened. The idea proved workable as was quickly embraced by manufacturers. Gradual
improvements were made over subsequent years to ensure easy opening and prevention of lip and nose injuries
from the jagged edges of the opening.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)
Within a decade an unanticipated crisis arose, however, creating an ethical dilemma. Fraze had not thought
through the implications of billions of discarded pull tabs causing pollution, foot injuries, and injuries to fish
and infants who ingested them. The dilemma was what to do in order to balance usefulness to consumers with
protection of the environment. A technological innovation solved the dilemma in a manner that integrated all
the relevant values. In 1976 Daniel F. Cudzik invented a simple, stay-attached opener of the sort familiar today.
Once again, minor design improvements continue today because people with arthritic fingers or long and
breakable fingernails have difficulty using the current openers. All the while, of course, the broader problem of
pollution from cans themselves prompted recycling programs that now recycle more than 6 out of 10 cans
(leaving room for further improvement here as well).
Petroski recounts these developments in order to illustrate how engineering progresses by learning from design
failures – that is, designs that cause unacceptable risks or other problems. At each stage of the design process,
engineering are preoccupied with what might go wrong. The hope is to anticipate and prevent failures, drawing
on knowledge about past failures. Here, however, our interest is in how moral values were embedded in the
design process at all stages, in addition to surfacing in explicit ethical dilemmas concerning the environment.
If we understand moral choices broadly, as decisions involving moral values, then the development of
aluminum cans be understood as a ser4ies of routine moral choices interspersed with occasional moral
dilemmas. Moral values entered implicitly into the decision-making process of engineers and their managers –
decisions that probably appeared to be purely technical or purely economic. This appearance is misleading, for
the technical and economic decisions had moral dimensions in four general directions: safety, environmental
protection, consumer usefulness, and economic benefits.
First, human safety is obviously a moral value, rooted directly in the moral worth of human beings. Some
aspects of safety seem minor – slight cuts to lips and noses from poorly designed openers and minor injuries to
feet in recreation areas like beaches. But minor injuries might cause infections, and even by themselves they
have some moral significance. Again, various kinds of poisoning might occur unless all materials were tested
under a range of conditions, and there are potential industrial accidents during the manufacturing process.
Finally, extensive testing was needed to ensure that exploding cans, while not inherently dangerous, did not
cause automobile accidents when drivers opened cans.
A second set of moral values concern the environment. Many of them overlap with the first set, safety. Billions
of detached can openers raised the level of hazards to people walking with bare feet. Injuries to fish and wildlife
posed additional concerns. The damage to wildlife can be understood in different ways. Depending on ones’
environmental ethic, they might be understood either as indirect moral harms due to further impacts on human
beings or as direct moral harms to creatures recognized as having inherent worth. The broader problem of
environmental pollution from aluminum cans and their openers required both corporate action in paying for
recycled materials and community action in developing the technologies for recycling, not to mention changes
in public policy and social attitude about recycling.
Third, some moral values are masked under the terms like “useful” and “convenient” products. We tend to think
of such matters as non-moral, especially with regard to trivial things like sipping a carbonated beverage with a
pleasing taste. But there are moral connections, however indirect or minor. After all, drinking liquid is a basic
need, and convenient access to pleasant-tasting liquids contributes to human well-being, especially when
considered on the scale of mass-produced products. In addition, the aesthetic values pertaining to the shape and
appearance of cans also have some relevance to satisfying human needs.
Finally, the economic benefits to stakeholders in the corporation have moral implications. Money matters, and it
matters morally. Jobs provide the livelihood for workers and their families that make possible the material
Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)
goods that contribute to happiness – and survival. The corporation’s success contributes as well to the
livelihood of suppliers and retailers, as well as to stockholders.
All these values – safety, environmental protection, usefulness, and monetary – were relevant throughout the
development of aluminum cans, not merely when they explicitly entered into moral dilemmas. Hence the case
illustrates how moral values permeate engineering practice.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)
Case 18: Ford Explorer/Firestone Tires [Real-World]


Background
o Who/What:
 Ford Motor Company & Firestone
 Tire failures on Ford Explorers
o Where/When:
 All over US
 1999-2000
Outcome
o Who/What:
 250 deaths
 3000 serious injuries
 Firestone recalled 6.5 million tires.
 Ford also did its own recall of Firestone tires.
o How/Why:
 Vehicle rollovers caused by separation of tread from body of tire.
 Quality control issues at Firestone plant in Decatur, Illinois like using expired adhesives
and appearance of bubbles in the body of the tire.
 Firestone management wanted to keep tire production high.
Ford Explorer/Firestone Tires - extracted from Engineering Ethics 4th Edition, Fleddermann pg. 84-86
(Available at 18th Avenue Library Reserve)
In late 1999 and early 2000, Ford Motor Company began to receive reports from foreign countries of failure of
tires on the Ford Explorer. The Explorer is a popular sport utility vehicle (SUV) equipped with standard
equipment tires supplied by various manufacturers. The reports of tire failures were mostly from countries like
Brazil or Saudi Arabia, where the temperatures that the tires are subjected to can be expected to be relatively
high. During early 2000, Ford began a program to replace tires on Explorers overseas.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)
At first, it might not seem that tire problems have anything to do with engineering ethics. Nothing could be
further from the truth. Modern automobile tires use very complicated designs. Automobile tires are designed by
engineers using modern engineering tools such as computer-aided design (CAD) software. In addition,
engineers working for an automobile manufacturer such as Ford must be very concerned about what tires are
specified for the vehicles they design, how the tires are manufactured, and how they will interact with the
vehicle.
During the spring of 2000, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHSTA) opened an
investigation into the tire failures after receiving numerous complaints of failures leading to rollovers on SUVs.
The tires implicated in this problem were manufactured by Firestone, a major international supplier of tires. The
problem appeared to be that the tread would separate from the body of the tire. Firestone was originally a
company headquartered in the United States, but had been purchased by the Japanese tire manufacturer,
Bridgestone. Although the number of incidents was small, the tire separation often led to rollover of the vehicle,
which caused severe injury or death of the occupants. Although tire separation and subsequent rollovers were a
problem on several SUV models, the rollover problem appeared to be the most severe for Firestone tires
mounted on the Ford Explorer.
As a result of the NHSTA investigation, Firestone voluntarily recalled 6.5 million tires. This was only a fraction
of the total number of these tires that were already in service. Ford Motor Company was especially concerned
about the problem, since so many of the Explorers were equipped with Firestone tires. After much wrangling
between the two companies, both behind the scenes and in the newspapers, Ford decided to sever its
relationship with Firestone, announcing that the company would no longer equip new Ford vehicle with
Firestone tires. This was an especially surprising development, because Ford and Firestone had a business
relationship going back almost 75 years.
The problems with the tires were ultimately traced to a Firestone manufacturing plant in Decatur, Illinois. In the
course of the NHSTA investigation, many quality control issues were uncovered in this plant. One issue was the
use of adhesives that had exceeded the manufacturer’s specified shelf life. In addition, workers at the plant
reported that, sometimes during tire manufacture, bubbles would occur in the body of the tire. This is apparently
not unusual. Normally, if a bubble appeared during the manufacturing process, the tire would be scrapped. But
in the case of the Firestone tires used on the Explorer, the bubbles were punctured and the manufacturing
process continued. The workers suggested that these practices were the result of strong pressure from
management to keep production high.
Severing its relationship with Firestone did not solve the problem for Ford, which still had huge numbers of
their vehicles on the road with potentially flawed tires that Firestone would not recall. After much public
debate, Ford decided in May of 2001 to do its own recall of Firestone tires on Ford vehicles. Millions of
Firestone tires were replaced at Ford’s own expense.
One of the interesting aspects of this case was that the data uncovered by the NHSTA indicated that there was a
higher-than-normal rate of failure for these tires on all vehicles, but an especially large problem on Ford
Explorers. In other words, the combination of those particular tires and the Ford Explorer seemed to make the
problem with the tires worse. Indeed, Firestone tried to claim that the problem was really with the Explorer
rather than with the tires: They claimed that the Explorer was poorly designed and was already susceptible to
rollover accidents.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)
This is an illustration of the synergistic effects that occur often in engineering. Sometimes two parts of a design
that work well alone cause great problems when they are put together. It is important for engineering to keep
synergistic effects in mind in performing new designs, in modifying existing designs and in specifying the test
procedures for their designs.
Ford’s tire recall took many months to complete, but appeared to be successful since the incidence of tire
failures and rollovers on Ford Explorers seemed to have diminished. Ford also redesigned the Explorer to help
eliminated the problem with rollovers. Ford spent millions of dollars on its tire recall program, severely
affecting the company’s profits. Firestone has suffered from the negative publicity resulting from this case and
came close to filing for bankruptcy.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)
Case 21: Drinking in the Workplace [Hypothetical]
 Background
o Who/What:
 Branch Inc. adopted a substance abuse policy to improve its competitiveness.
 An employee, Andy Pullman has a drinking problem and is being considered for the
position of head of quality control.
 Outcome
o Who/What:
 John Crane, Andy Pullman’s friend and colleague knows about his drinking problem but
is in a dilemma as to tell the plant manager or not, since Andy Pullman’s drinking might
get in the way of his new position.
o How/Why:
 Branch Inc.’s substance abuse has been ineffective.
 Absenteeism is still high. Work is still shoddy.
 Management proposing a new mandatory drug testing policy
Drinking in the Workplace - extracted from The Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Research accessed
at: http://www.onlineethics.org/Resources/Cases/Drinking.aspx
Branch, Inc. has been losing ground to its competitors in recent years. Concerned that substance abuse may be
responsible for much of Branch's decline, the company has just adopted a policy that imposes sanctions on
those employees found to be working under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs.
John Crane and Andy Pullman have worked together in one of the engineering divisions of Branch for several
years. Frequently John has detected alcohol on Andy's breath when they were beginning work in the morning
and after work breaks during the day. But, until the new policy was announced it never occurred to John that he
should say anything to Andy about it, let alone tell anyone else about it. Andy's work has always been first rate,
and John is not the kind of person who feels comfortable discussing such matters with others.
Two days before the announcement of the new alcohol and drug policy, Andy tells John that he is being
considered for the position of head of quality control. Although pleased at the prospect of Andy's promotion,
John wonders if Andy's drinking will get in the way of meeting his responsibilities. John worries that, with
additional job pressures, Andy's drinking problem will worsen. What should John do?
1. Talk with Andy about his drinking.
2. Keep quiet and mind his own business, leaving the problem up to Andy and those who have the
responsibility to select someone for the job.
3. Other.
Harvey Hillman, Plant Manager at Branch, knows that Andy and John have worked together many years. He
has narrowed his choice for Head of Quality Control to Andy and one other person. He invites John out for
lunch to see if he can learn something more about Andy from John. Should John volunteer information about
Andy's drinking? Suppose Harvey says, "This is a really important decision. We need a top person for the
quality control job. We've had some real problems the last few years with shoddy production, probably because
of alcohol and drug abuse in the workplace. I had to move Jack Curtis out of head of quality control because he
was drunk on the job. We have to get this under control. The new policy might help. But quality control will
still have to keep a really close eye on things." Should John say anything now?
Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)
Branch's policy on the use of alcohol and drugs has been in effect for a year. It does not seem to have made a
significant difference. Absenteeism is still high. Shoddy workmanship continues. And Branch's profit margins
are still declining. Management is now proposing mandatory random drug testing for its non-professional
workforce, and mandatory drug testing for all new workers. The labor union protests that such a policy is
undesirable in two respects. First, it is an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of workers. Second, exempting
professionals from the testing is discriminatory and, therefore, unjust.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)
Case 22: A Troubled Engineer [Hypothetical]
 Background
o Who/What:
 Brutus Buckeye works at Scarlet & Gray Co.
 Currently part of a team trying to secure a tender on a project that will reverse the dire
fortunes of the firm.
 Outcome
o Who/What:
 Brutus learns from his boss that his good friend, O.H. Bucks, who is also a crucial
member of the team, might be let go after the transaction due to restructuring of the firm.
o How/Why:
 O.H. Bucks had been offered an excellent position with a rival company only to turn it
down so as to not let his team and his firm down at an important juncture.
 O.H. Bucks is the only person in the firm who possesses the necessary knowledge and
skills to secure the tender on time.
 Brutus Buckeye in dilemma over his loyalty to his friend, O.H. Bucks and his loyalty to
his firm regarding the information about the restructuring move that was given to him in
the strictest confidence.
A Troubled Engineer - extracted and based on a case study from the St. James Ethics Centre, which can be
accessed at: http://www.ethics.org.au/content/troubled-engineer
Brutus Buckeye is employed at Scarlet & Gray Co., an engineering firm and is currently part of a team working
on a tender for a major infrastructure project. The firm has been experiencing some financial vulnerability and
securing this project is essential to the restoration of the firm’s fortunes. The tender deadline is three weeks
away and Brutus’ team is working long hours to get the work done on time.
Now Brutus Buckeye’s boss has called him in to let you know that, even if they win the tender, a restructure of
the firm will be necessary. To avoid disruption until after Brutus’ team’s important job is completed, this
information is given to Brutus in strict confidence.
Brutus suspects, from your conversation with the boss, that one of his colleagues will lose his job in the coming
restructure. Brutus and O.H. Bucks, this colleague—a good friend—have been with the firm for ten years. O.H.
Bucks has told Brutus that he has just been offered an excellent position in a rival company. Having thought
long and hard about accepting the offer, O.H. Bucks has decided against it because he doesn’t want to let down
the team and the firm at this important time.
O.H. Bucks is a crucial member of the team preparing the tender—there is no one else in the firm with the
knowledge and skills to complete the job within the tight timeframe. He will never know that you had the
information about the restructure, and Brutus does not know with absolute certainty that his position is in
danger.
What ought Brutus Buckeye do in this difficult situation? Brutus certainly does not want to see O.H. Bucks pass
up this opportunity only to lose his current job in a month’s time.
Brutus’ loyalty to his friend urges him to alert O.H. Bucks to the possibility that his current job is in danger.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)
But Brutus knows how important he is to the team in the next few weeks, and how important it is that the firm
wins this tender. Brutus received this information in strictest confidence, and his loyalty to his employer seems
to demand that he respect this confidence.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)
Case 23: The Big Q [Hypothetical]
 Background
o Who/What:
 Greg and Natalie, both graduating seniors, have been taking business classes together
since freshman year
 Natalie has been invited by Greg and his friends to join their team on their senior
capstone project.
 Outcome
o Who/What:
 Greg soon learns that Natalie isn’t pulling her weight in the team.
o How/Why:
 After their final presentation, the professor asks all the students to evaluate their teammates and this evaluation will be the basis for their individual grades.
 Greg gives the rest of his team-mates good evaluations, but when it comes to Natalie, he
in dilemma over giving her an honest evaluation, such that she receives the grade that she
deserves or giving her a dishonest evaluation, since they are about to graduate soon and
their team did well, regardless of her performance.
The Big Q - extracted from Santa Clara University’s Ethics Center, which can be accessed at:
http://www.scu.edu/r/ethics-center/ethicsblog/thebigq/15667/Picking-Up-theSlack?utm_source=scu&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1306&
Greg and Natalie have been in business classes together since freshman year. While they’re not close friends,
they have always enjoyed each other’s company in class and have been in the same social circle as they’ve
moved from lower division courses to where they are now: senior capstone. Greg and a few of his friends invite
Natalie to join their group at the start of the term, and they begin to work on their project.
Fairly quickly, though, Greg realizes that Natalie isn’t pulling her weight. Any aspect of the project that’s
assigned to her has to be redone by other members of the group, she doesn’t pay attention in meetings, and she
consistently shows up late or hung over. Greg and his other groupmates think that Natalie needs to step it up
and take this project seriously, but they ultimately agree it would be more trouble than it’s worth to confront her
about it. They decide to just push through and let her do her own thing. Natalie continues to participate
marginally in discussions, planning, and writing, but makes it clear through her actions that their final
presentation is not her biggest priority.
After Greg’s group gives its final presentation, the members are asked to write an evaluation on their teammates
that the professor will use to determine individual grades. When it comes to most of his teammates, Greg easily
gives them all A’s and B’s for their participation and contributions to the project. However, when Greg comes
to Natalie’s evaluation, he is faced with a dilemma. It’s their last big project before graduation, and if he were
to evaluate her in a harsh way, it could negatively affect her cumulative GPA. He doesn’t want to throw her
under the bus; however, her apathy and poor work ethic put a huge burden on everyone else’s shoulders, and
Greg had to personally sacrifice a lot of time and effort to make up for her mistakes or tasks that she left
undone.
Is it worth giving her an honest evaluation, just so the professor will give her the grade she deserves? Or is
giving her a bad evaluation petty and unnecessary, considering that they are all about to graduate and their
group received an A, regardless of her performance?
Ethics Cases – Schedule 4 (ENG1181)