Table of content
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 3
2. Methodology .............................................................................................................................................. 5
2.1. Data...................................................................................................................................................................... 5
2.2. Data Analysis ..................................................................................................................................................... 6
2.3. Choice of Case ................................................................................................................................................... 6
2.4. Limitations ......................................................................................................................................................... 7
2.5. Delimitation ....................................................................................................................................................... 7
2.6. Term used........................................................................................................................................................... 8
3. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) ....................................................................................................... 9
3.1. Language, Power and Ideology ................................................................................................................... 11
3.2. Fairclough’s Three Dimensional Framework ......................................................................................... 13
3.2.1. Text ............................................................................................................................................................................. 14
3.2.2. Intertextuality ........................................................................................................................................................... 15
3.2.3. Discourse as social practice................................................................................................................................. 15
4. Foucauldian Governmentality Theory ............................................................................................. 19
4.1. Foucault’s Concept of Governmentality ................................................................................................... 19
4.2. Foucault’s Concept of security .................................................................................................................... 20
4.2.1. Foucault’s traditional risk management .......................................................................................................... 21
4.2.2. Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero’s risk management through contingency .................................................... 21
5. Environmental Refugees: Conceptual and definitional issues .................................................... 22
5.1. The legal application of the term ................................................................................................................ 25
5.2. Politicisation of the term ............................................................................................................................... 29
6. The Context of Environmental change Vulnerability in Bangladesh ....................................... 33
6.1. High population density ................................................................................................................................ 33
6.2. Geography ........................................................................................................................................................ 33
6.3. High incidence of natural disasters ............................................................................................................ 33
6.4. Dependence on agriculture .......................................................................................................................... 34
6.5. Pre-existing socio-economic vulnerabilities ............................................................................................. 34
6.6. Environmental change and migration....................................................................................................... 35
6.7. Adaptation Strategies .................................................................................................................................... 36
7. Framing and Governing Environmental Refugees in Bangladesh ............................................ 37
7.1 International Organisations for Migration (IOM) .................................................................................. 37
7.1.1 Framing environmental refugees ........................................................................................................................ 37
7.1.2 Intertextual Representations of Environmental Refugees ........................................................................... 38
7.2 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)..................................................................................... 39
7.2.1 Framing Environmental Refugees ...................................................................................................................... 40
7.2.2 Intertextual Representation of Environmental Refugees ............................................................................. 40
7.3 European Union (EU) ..................................................................................................................................... 42
7.3.1 Framing Environmental Refugees ...................................................................................................................... 42
7.3.2 Intertextual Representation of Environmental Refugees............................................................................. 44
7.4. Asian Development Bank ............................................................................................................................. 45
7.4.1 Framing Environmental Refugees ...................................................................................................................... 45
7.4.2 Intertextual Representation of Environmental Refugees............................................................................. 46
7.5 Government of Bangladesh ........................................................................................................................... 47
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7.5.1 Framing environmental refugees ........................................................................................................................ 47
7.5.2 Intertextual Representations of Environmental Refugees ........................................................................... 48
7.6 Association for Climate Refugees (ACR)................................................................................................... 48
7.6.1 Framing Environmental Refugees ...................................................................................................................... 48
7.6.2 Intertextuality Representation of Environmental Refugees........................................................................ 49
7.7. Summary .......................................................................................................................................................... 50
7.8. International governing of environmental refugees: Discourse, Power and Governmentality ... 51
7.8.1. Environmental refugees are migrants: Customary law is required ........................................................ 52
7.8.2. Environmental change and migration as a security issue: development aid is required .................. 54
7.8.3. Lack of development as the major cause to migration due to environmental change ...................... 56
7.8.4. Local mitigation and adaptation as the best solution for Environmental change and migration. .. 57
8. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 59
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1. Introduction
Studies on the relationship between environmental change and migration have grown considerably in
the recent years, with an increasing concern on the role of environmental change in displacing people.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted already in 1990 that “the greatest
single impact of environmental change might be on human migration”, and it had been argued in
successive reports that environmental change is likely to have significant impacts on ecological and
social systems (EJF, 2012:5; Brown, 2009:11; Boano, et. al, 2008:4). Global environmental change
could displace millions of people, mainly in Africa and Asia, and force people to leave their homes
and find sanctuary elsewhere. According to some estimates, by 2050 the number of people forced to
flee due to environmental change could exceed 200 million (Biermann and Boas, 2010:68: Myers
and Kent, 1995). Most affected are the low-lying coastal developing countries, which have
contributed the least to greenhouse gas emissions. Bangladesh is one such case example. They have
been widely recognised as being the most vulnerable country to environmental change because of its
high-exposure and its already pre-existing socio-economic vulnerabilities (EJF, 2012:5). Bangladesh,
situated on the extensive low-lying Ganges-Brahmaputra-Jamuna river delta, is particularly
vulnerable to flooding, sea level rise, cyclones, and storm surges (MoEF, 2008), and has often been
cited as the worst victim of natural disasters, where more than five million people are living in coastal
areas at “high risk” (EJF, 2012:15). Some even suggests that environmental refugees from
Bangladesh might exceed the number of current refugees (Biermann and Boas, 2008:10). However,
although the increasing awareness of the role of environmental change on migration there exists no
legal term or institutionalised mechanism for the protection of people forced to flee across borders
due to environmental change. There is no clear definition on environmental refugees, or a conceptual
consensus of how to define the link, which is a key problem that hinders the possibilities of
formulating a protection regime for this category of forced migrants (McNamara, 2009:13; Biermann
and Boas, 2010:62). The consequences of labelling is likely to have great consequences for the
provision of assistance and protection. Thus, the nature of debates surrounding the issue of
environmental change and migration has emerged to become highly politicised, questioning if there
really exist such a thing as environmental refugees (Morrissey, 2009:2). Available studies operate
with different terminology and definitions, with little agreement on, and understanding of what these
categories might really mean, usually endorsing broad concepts and generalised assumptions (Black,
3
2001:13; Biermann and Boas, 2010:67). While policy-makers, international organisations and
scholars still cannot agree on how to conceptualise the link between environmental change and
migration, environmental change has already affected the lives of millions of people and “could
become one of the foremost human crisis of our time” (Myers and Kent, 1995:20; Biermann and
Boas, 2010:61).
It is for this reason this research will attempt to critically problematise the current discourses on
environmental refugees and the ways in which the debates have been articulated. How are
environmental refugees labelled? How is the phenomena of environmental change and migration
represented, what solutions are suggested, and what are the broader implications of these discourses?
These are questions which we will address in our research and more specifically: How is
environmental change and migration in Bangladesh framed by international and regional
organisations, local NGO and the Government in Bangladesh and how do these representations link
with the international governing of environmental refugees?
This research will especially focus on how environmental change and migration in Bangladesh is
represented both at the international, regional, national, and local level. We will use the theoretical
and methodological framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Foucault’s concept of
governmentality. Discourse is broadly defined as the use of written and spoken language, particular
ways of talking about and understanding the world, a key concept to emphasise the interaction
between writer and reader, which is highly relevant when analysing and contrasting the existing
discourses on environmental refugees (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002:1; Fairclough, 1992:3). The focus
will specifically be on Norman Fairclough’s approach that emphasises the role of discourse in
constructing the social world, and the complex interrelationships between language and power
(Fairclough, 1989; 2013). A textual analysis of the discourses on environmental change and migration
are then integrated with the theory of governmentality which enables this research to analyse texts
and their effects on power relations linked to different strategies of governmentality. Foucault’s
framework on governmentality refers, in a broad sense, to the practices actors engage in to produce
and manage knowledge about an object as a risk which in turn leads to different indirect techniques
of social control (Oels, 2013:186). These two theories in combination are particularly relevant for
this research focus as it aims to develop critical ways of analysing the discourses on environmental
refugees, the social effects of texts, more particularly, between language and unequal power relations,
4
including the role of language use in the production, maintenance, and changes in different strategies
of social control (Fairclough, 1989; Lemke, 2002).
2. Methodology
This research project aims to identify and explore different discourses on environmental change and
migration in Bangladesh, and how they link with international governing of environmental refugees.
By applying an interdisciplinary approach, Norman Fairclough’s approach to Critical Discourse
Analysis (CDA) which includes a theoretical framework and a set of methodological guidelines for
the empirical study of language use and Foucault’s concepts of governmentality, enables this research
to integrate a theoretical and analytical framework, combining a textual analysis with social analysis,
adapted according to the aim of this research project. Governmentality is used in the final analysis to
highlight how discourses could serve as indirect techniques for controlling individuals. The theory of
governmentality is applied on the background of our initial assessment of the expected outcome of
the first part of the CDA and the governmentality theory's relevance and applicability has only been
further confirmed after the first part of the CDA was completed. In order to understand the
relationship between text and social processes and structures, this following section presents the
methodology and theories that will provide the basis for our research focus.
2.1. Data
The data that are collected and represented in this research are written materials in the form of policy
documents and reports from international and regional organisations, national actors and NGOs. This
will enable us to explore the discursive practices adopted by the organisations at the international,
regional, national and local level. We have been highly selective in our choice of data as there are
many policy responses that deal with environmental change and migration in Bangladesh. The
selected materials (see table 1.) that have been chosen for this particular research, are International
Organisation for Migration (IOM) Policy Dialogue, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) policy paper and adaptation policy, EU report on environmental change and security,
Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) Report on environmental change and migration in Asia and the
Pacific, the Government of Bangladesh’ Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) 2009,
and the Association of Climate Refugees’ (ACR) website. We purposely included IOM and UNHCR
because they are the main international organisations that deal with issues related to refugees and
migration. EU and ADB represent two regional organisations concerned with environmental change
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and migration which could illustrate whether the discourses differ regionally. The Government of
Bangladesh is the main actor in this case together with ACR, which is a local NGO that has done
extensive work on environmental change and displacement in Bangladesh. These reports and policy
documents are only a few amongst many but could, in this research, provide different representations
and discourses through which we then can contrast, and analyse what consequences they have on the
governing of environmental refugees.
Table 1.
Level
International
Regional
National
Local
Organisation
IOM
UNHCR
Asian Development
Bank
European Union
Government
of
Bangladesh
Association
for
Climate Refugees
Title/Year
Assessing the Evidence, 2010
Climate
Change
Induced
Displacement:
Identifying Gaps and Responses 2011
Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Human
Displacement, a UNHCR perspective 2009
Climate
Change
Induced
Displacement:
Adaptation Policy in the Context of the UNFCCC
Climate Negotiations 2011
Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the
Pacific, 2011
Climate Change and International Security, 2009
BCCSAP 2009
Type of Document
Policy Dialogue
Adaptation Policy
Policy Paper
Adaptation policy
Report
Report
Policy Document
Website
2.2. Data Analysis
First, each document will be qualitatively analysed with a textual approach in order to identify the
meaning of the written text in the context of environmental refugees. Second, the wording and word
meaning is analysed on an intertextual level to reveal the different types of discourses and
representations there are surrounding environmental change and migration, and more specifically on
environmental refugees. We will include parts of the text that we find relevant for our research
question. In that way we will be able to get an overview of the material and the meanings they
represent, and identify the dominant discourses on environmental refugees. Third, after having the
material understood, the final analysis will integrate Fairclough’s theory of language and power with
Foucault’s governmentality theory in order to reveal how the discourses link to different ways of
governing environmental refugees.
2.3. Choice of Case
Bangladesh, with its geographical position and socio-economic vulnerabilities, has been cited as the
worst victim of natural disasters and is widely recognised as one of the most climate vulnerable
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countries in the world. In Bangladesh, migration due to environmental change is already happening,
while the frequency and severity of environmental disruptions is estimated to increase (Displacement
Solutions, 2012). Being one of the most densely populated countries in the world, the effects of
environmental change is likely to have negative effects in the region, thus Bangladesh is selected as
case study because it shows a good example when discussing and analysing how different discourse
construct their representation.
2.4. Limitations
Although it may seem problematic that the material consists of different kinds of documents (policy
documents and reports) that have different focus, we do regard these to be relevant when
demonstrating the discursive practices at the different levels. Although each organisation is presented
through one document, the three policy papers from UNHCR were interlinked and able to provide
more validity on the stance of UNHCR. The documents selected are not an exhaustive list of available
policies and reports on this subject, as the amount of documents that highlight the relationship
between environmental change and forced migration in Bangladesh is vast. However, the documents
demonstrate an adequate example of the broader discussion at different levels. Possible
methodological complexities could occur due to our interpretation of the meanings of the texts. Thus,
the aim of this project is not to take a stance in the debate on the terming of environmental refugees
and we strive to make the analysis as neutral and objective as possible.
2.5. Delimitation
In order to carry out a thorough analysis, focusing on our research question, we have set up some
delimitations prior to our research. First, we do not intend to discuss whether or not there is a direct
link between environmental change and forced migration, or if environmental change is merely one
influencing factor among many. The current debate is primarily a question to what extent the two
factors are interconnected, not a question of whether or not the link is there. Second, we do not intend
to position ourselves in the debate on the correct terming of environmental refugees or discuss the
ethical aspects of it. Our main concern is to identify how the various actors frame the different terms
and what implications it has on international governing of the refugees. Third, we are not interested
in the quantitative numbers of environmental refugees, which is an important factor to mention here,
since it differs between the organisations. The different organisations use different numbers on
environmental refugees in their representation of the phenomena to give it more legitimacy. Some
submit a lower number to downplay the seriousness of the problem whereas others set a higher
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number in order to underpin the severity of the problem, especially when it comes to predicting future
scenarios. Fourth, we have concentrated on documents that specifically deal with environmental
change and migration (both internal and cross-border movement). In order to focus on policies that
directly address this link, we have not included policy documents such as disaster management and
urban planning policies.
2.6. Term used
We use the term environmental refugees throughout the project. Although the term is highly contested
among scholars and policy-makers, our choice of term relies on two factors. First, we made the
distinction between “climate change” and “environmental”, because we view the term “climate
change” to be too narrow in its inclusion of what is “climate change induced” as opposed to
environmentally induced, which embraces all types of disasters or changes to the environment.
Second, we also distinguish between “migrants” and “refugees”, since there are multi-causal
connections and assumptions tied to the term “migrant”, which refers to any type of movement, and
we wish to be clear in our arguments when referring to environmental refugees. However, we do
acknowledge that it is difficult to differentiate between people forced to flee due to environmental
change and economic factors, and that some of the organisations included in our research rather use
the term migrant than refugee. Despite the fact that it is not officially endorsed by the international
community, we will apply this term in this research is based on Myers (2001:1) definition, that
”environmental refugees are people who can no longer get a secure livelihood in their homelands
because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation, and other environmental problems,
together with the associated problems of population pressures and profound poverty. In their
desperation, these people feel they have no alternative but to seek sanctuary elsewhere, however
hazardous the attempt”.
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3. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)
Here, we introduce the key features of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the tools and concepts that
lay ground for the theoretical framework, the methodological guidelines for the empirical study of
language use, and the philosophical assumptions on the role of language in the social construction of
the world. CDA is both a method for discourse analysis, and a theoretical framework on how to
conceptualise the role of language in society, thus it is a method of analysis which cannot be separated
from its theoretical and methodological foundations (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002:3-4). The focus will
specifically be on Norman Fairclough’s approach that emphasises the role of discourse in
constructing the social world, and the complex interrelationships between language and power
(Fairclough, 1989; 2013). Discourse is a key concept to emphasise the interaction between writer and
reader (speaker/addressee), and the context in which the processes of production and interpretation
of written language occur, more generally referring to the use of written and spoken language
(Fairclough, 1992:3). CDA is a relational form of research as it focuses on social relations rather than
entities or individuals. It seeks to explore different relations between communicative events, both
written and spoken (such as conversations and newspaper articles), and the relations between
discourses and other objects of the physical world. Thus, discourse is understood only through
analysing different sets of relations, both the internal (communication between people) and the
external relations with other dimensions and structures of the society (Fairclough, 2013:3). However,
text analysis alone is not sufficient for CDA, since everything is not discourse, and texts in themselves
cannot provide a real understanding of the social effects of discourses. Therefore, to make sense of
discourse analysis, other forms of analysis are often required (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002:66;
Fairclough, 2003:2-3).
The many approaches within discourse analysis engage in critical research under the umbrella of
social constructionism, which all share the same starting point “that our ways of talking do not
neutrally reflect the world, identities and social relations but, rather, play an active role in creating
and changing them” (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002:1). Although different approaches to discourse
analysis diverge in the methods and focus of analysis, they share common philosophical assumptions
characterised by all critical approaches within social constructionism. First, CDA engage in critical
approaches to knowledge and representations of the world and challenge taken-for-granted
knowledge claims. Our knowledge of the world cannot be regarded as objective truths of a reality
“out there”, but is rather products of different ways of categorising the world. Second, knowledge of
9
the world is historically and culturally specific and subject to constant change. Discourse analysis
thus takes an anti-essentialist position, meaning that they view the world as socially and discursively
constructed and that there are no pre-given or fixed characteristics. Discourse plays a significant role
in producing the social world, including knowledge, identities and social relations. Third, knowledge
is created through discourse and the struggle between different discourses competing about the truth.
Thus, different understandings of the world are created and maintained through social processes.
Fourth and most importantly for this research, different understandings of, and knowledge about the
world is socially constructed and has social consequences. Knowledge is linked to social actions
because within a certain understanding of the world some social actions become natural while other
unthinkable (Ibid.:5-6). It is specifically this view on knowledge and social action that is of
importance when analysing how different discourses link to the governing of environmental refugees.
For CDA, language is thus regarded as being fundamental when analysing the structural relationships
on power, dominance and domination expressed through the use of language (Wodak, 2001:4).
Discourse is seen as historically produced and interpreted, and structured by dominance legitimised
through ideology by dominant groups. The effects of power and ideology, through the production of
meaning, helps to make structures as a “given” and establish conventions (Wodak, 2001:5).
Fairclough attempts to explain these pre-existing conventions and “common-sense” assumptions as
an effect of power relations and power struggles. An example would be the common-sense
assumptions conditioning the relationship between a doctor and a patient, where the doctor’s position
as authoritative is taken as a given. For this research, these conventions are particularly relevant for
understanding how pre-existing assumptions on the refugee phenomena also influence the way
environmental refugees are perceived and represented. According to Fairclough, these assumptions
are embedded in different forms of language use. However, language by itself is not powerful, but
rather the use of it by powerful groups (Fairclough, 1989:2; Wodak, 2001:15). The aim of CDA is to
explain the existing conventions in which people interact linguistically, and how these are linked to
power relations and power struggles (Fairclough, 1989:2). Since interpretations and explanations of
the social world are discourses which have social effects, in terms of reproducing and creating
unequal power relations between different social groups (minorities and majorities, men and women,
social classes), the research focus of CDA aims to reveal the discursive processes where discourses
are constructed and given meaning and the ways “language contributes to the domination of some
people by others” (Fairclough, 1989:4; Fairclough, 2013:8; Jørgensen and Philips, 2002:14,63).
10
3.1. Language, Power and Ideology
CDA views language as being our primary access to reality (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002:8).
Language defines certain potential and possibilities while excluding others (Fairclough, 2003:24).
However, language can only create representation and interpretations of reality, meaning that there is
no pre-existing reality through which language can neutrally capture. Language is structured around
several systems of meanings (there can be no general system of meanings) which means that from
discourse to discourse meanings will be different, e.g. freedom fighter and terrorist will have different
meanings depending on the context of discourse. According to Fairclough, these changing meanings
of words are not random, but rather generated to in the struggle between different ideological
positions. Moreover, discursive practices (text production and consumption) maintain and transform
discursive patterns, and should therefore be analysed within the specific context of the language use.
Language is thus only a construction of reality; a ‘machine’ that generates the social world, through
which information and knowledge of the world is communicated, meaning that changes in discourse
could also change and reproduce the social reality (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002:9-12; Fairclough,
1998:94). For this research it is particularly important to take this into account when we address
questions of why and for what purposes some information and knowledge of the world are more
represented than others. Not that reality does not exist, but it is through discourse that meaning of
physical objects gain meaning. Truth is thus to a large extent constructed discursively. Take the sealevel rise as an example. The rise in sea level is a material fact, land will go under water irrespective
of what people think and say about it, and it is when people attempt to give meaning to it that it falls
within discourse. The rise in sea level will thus be appropriated with meanings and explanations from
different perspectives and discourses (natural phenomena discourse, meteorological discourse,
greenhouse effect discourse, political mismanagement discourse, etc.) which will point to different
courses of action for mitigation. It is within this process that discourses works to constitute the world
(Ibid.:9, 13).
There are two important aspects between the relationship between power and language. That is power
in discourse and power behind discourse. Power in discourse, is often manifested in face-to-face
discourse, and has to do with how dominant participants control and constrain the contribution of
other non-powerful participants. However, here, we will focus on the hidden relations of power
behind discourses because our main concern here is with written language involving participants
separated in time and place. The power behind discourse is the exercise of power of text producers
over interpreters in that they can determine what is included and excluded and how issues and events
11
are represented (Fairclough, 1989: 43,50). According to Fairclough, the power that is being exercised
is the “power to disguise power”, i.e. to present the consequences without causes or responsibilities.
It is a form of hidden power that constrain the content of what is said, where some interpretations and
wordings (while excluding alternative wordings) favour those of the power-holders in society.
Identifying who's producing the texts is less clear and involves an intertextual approach (explained
below) to address the question of whose perspective is adopted in the reports (Ibid.:50-52). This is
especially relevant for our research focus when analysing the ways environmental refugees are
represented and the agenda behind certain interpretations.
Fairclough emphasises how power can be achieved through consent, and the importance of ideology
in maintaining a particular power relation (Fairclough, 2003:45). Meaning that ideological power, the
power to present particular practices as universal and common sense, influence the way people act
and interact which directly or indirectly legitimizes existing power relations. According to
Fairclough, “language has become perhaps the primary medium of social control and power”, which
increasingly has come to be practiced through consent. Power, in this sense is not about coercion and
physical force, but power exercised through manufacturing consent, often by integrating people into
apparatuses of control which they themselves feel part of (such as media and news reporting can
contribute to social control). Thus, discourse is the main vehicle of ideology, through which consent
can be achieved. Power relations, according to Fairclough, are always relations of struggle where
social groups of different interests engage with one another (Fairclough, 1989:2-4, 34-37).
Language is closely linked to ideologies. Ideologies are understood as constructions of reality, as
different representations and explanations of the social world; the physical world, social identities,
and social relations, which are embedded in various forms and meanings of discursive practices.
Discursive practices, understood as the processes of text production, distribution and interpretation,
are then ways of reproducing and transforming relations of domination. The nature of ideological
assumption in particular conventions, could be found in different forms of language use and depends
on power relations underlying these conventions. There exists within discourses particular value
systems and common-sense assumptions, including assumptions about the social event, what is the
case, what is possible and necessary (e.g. the assumptions of neo-liberal economic discourse on
flexibility and efficiency), which are ideological since “relations of power are best served by
meanings which are widely taken as given” (Fairclough, 2003:58; Fairclough, 1989:2-4). Some
12
interpretations are better than others depending on the consistencies with the available evidence, the
event that has taken place, how people have acted and what consequences these actions have had.
Some explanations become dominant and implemented as “natural” and as conventions, which in
turn have effect on how people act and interact, and ways of being (identities) that contribute to
establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination and exploitation. An
example could be the conventions conditioning classroom teaching, which illustrate a set of
expectations and assumptions on the role of the professor and students, and the conventions governing
their interaction. Thus, within the context of classroom teaching, the conventions affect the ways both
students and professors act and interact. Breaking these conventions could contribute to changing
social relations of power. However, a dominant discourse can establish or maintain a certain
ideological assumption as commensensical and in a relatively stable ideology the possibility of
breaking or changing the conventions are constrained (Fairclough, 1998:90,94). It is therefore
important to look at the power behind discourse to understand why and how certain discourses
become dominant. The power behind the conventions of a discourse is shaped by those who hold the
power behind discourses, who increasingly impose (deliberately or not) ideological assumptions in
their language use. Thus, for this research the critical analysis of language are primarily concerned
with the language use of those in power, those who have the means to improve conditions (Wodak,
2001:10). However, there can never be ideological uniformity as there are to some degree ideological
diversities, struggling to make their representation of the world more legitimised. The workings of
ideology in discursive practices are most effective when they become naturalised and taken as
common sense assumption, and when its workings are least visible, meaning that when people have
come to regard it as the ‘right way’ to behave or the correct representation of a social issue. The more
commonsensical a assumption is the more ideological character it loses. Thus, invisibility is achieved
when ideologies have become background assumptions which direct the reader to interpret the text
in a particular way. One such example could be how competitiveness have become commonsensical
in the neo-liberal discourse on the global economy which have influenced the emergence of new
‘business-like’ ways of administering organisations, such as universities (Fairclough, 1992:87-88;
Fairclough, 2003:8-9; Fairclough, 1989: 85-86; Wodak, 2001:14).
3.2. Fairclough’s Three Dimensional Framework
A key area of interests in Norman Fairclough’s approach to CDA is the emphasis on the role of
discourse in constructing the social world and its potential to create change. Fairclough’s approach
to CDA is a text-oriented discourse analysis, providing a three dimensional framework, including a
13
set a set of methodological guidelines. He uses the concept of discourse in three different ways,
language use as a social practice, as a specific language use in a particular field (e.g. political and
scientific discourse), and the concrete usage of discourse as a count noun referring to ways of
speaking and giving meaning to experiences from a specific perspective (feminist discourse,
consumers discourse, etc.). According to Fairclough, language can be said to have three functions
and dimensions of meaning. First, it has an “identity” function that contributes to the construction of
social identities and subject positions. Second, it has a “relational” function that constitutes the
construction of social relationships between people, more specifically, the between discourse
participants. The third function of language use is the “ideational” function, which contributes to the
construction of systems of knowledge and belief, and how text ascribes meaning to the world and its
processes (Fairclough, 1992:64). Language use seen as discourse is a form of social practice. This
implies that discourse is a mode of action, in which people act and interact internally, between each
other, and externally with social structures, as well as it refers to a mode of representation. Linguistic
phenomena are social in the sense that the production and consumption of language is determined by
social conditions, social conventions and social relationships which in turn have social effects either
by maintaining or changing those relations.
3.2.1. Text
Discursive practices are manifested in linguistic forms, what Fairclough calls texts, referring to, in a
broad sense, the product of both written and spoken language. Texts are regarded as one dimension
of discourse (social practice and discursive practice another), where traces of different discourses and
ideologies can be seen as a struggle for dominance. Thus, the focus of the analysis of discursive
practices within a particular discourse is placed upon the processes of text production, distribution,
and interpretation (Fairclough, 1992:71; Wodak, 2001:15). Texts have causal effects. First, they can
create change. Texts have an effect upon changing our knowledge, beliefs and values. Texts could
also, as a long-term effect, contribute to shaping the identity of people (e.g. gender and consumers’
identities), it could bring changes in the physical world, on social actions and social relations. The
effects of text, mediated through meaning-making, could for example start wars, bring changes in
education, changes in development practices, etc. Texts must be seen within their context as there are
many other factors that determine the effects a text might have on different interpreters, which usually
makes texts ambivalent, open to multiple interpretations (Fairclough, 2003:8; Fairclough, 1992:75).
Text analysis is only one of part of CDA, involving the analysis of the formal features of written
language, such as wording, grammar, cohesion, modality and structure of the text. Our analytical
14
focus will be particularly on wording and modality of the text, more specifically the term
‘environmental refugees’ and how the text are modalized in order to control the representation of the
reality by using
different degrees of determination and words such as, may, could,
possibly (Fairclough, 1992:158). There are many competing wordings in different social domains
and practices, involving processes of wording the world, which is differently depending on time,
place and by whom. Thus, the meaning of a word is not isolated, but depends on the relationships of
similarity, contrast, overlap and inclusion of the word with others, consisting of clusters of words
associated with meaning systems. Analysing texts also involves addressing the question of word
meaning, focusing on how particular meanings of words fits within the wider struggles, and the
ideological significance of alternative wording as part of social and political struggle, e.g. freedom
fighter as opposed to terrorist (Fairclough, 1998:94; Fairclough, 1992:75-77). According to
Fairclough, the particular structuring of the relationship between words and the meanings of words
are forms of hegemony (Ibid.). The major concern for CDA is the causal effects of texts, through
which ideology works to promote, maintain, or change social relations of power and seek to naturalise
particular meanings in the service of maintaining dominance (Fairclough, 2003:9,58). However, texts
cannot be analysed in isolation, but can only be understood through the relation to other texts and in
relation to the social context (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002:70).
3.2.2. Intertextuality
Most language use draws on earlier discursive structures as people tend to build on already
established meanings. Intertextuality refers to the text production, how texts transform prior texts,
draws on elements and discourses of other texts, and restructure existing conventions (genres and
discourses) to create new ones. It is through creative language use, and by combining elements from
different discourse types that language use can change discourses and consequently also the social
world (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002:7; Fairclough, 1992:85, 102). According to Fairclough, all text
are inherently intertextual, carrying elements of other texts. In any type of text there could be traces
of other text, other voices which is particularly relevant for an intertextual approach to analysis of
text when asking question of which voices are included and which are excluded (Fairclough,
1992:102; Fairclough, 2003:47).
3.2.3. Discourse as social practice
All language activity, which takes place within social contexts, are not only expressions of social
processes and practices but also an integral part of those. While all linguistic phenomena are socially
15
shaped, language is only one dimension of the society which is both a form of social action through
which one can make a change and a form of action that is socially and historically situated in a
relationship with other non-linguistic forces in society (Fairclough, 1989:23; Jørgensen and Philips,
2002:62). Viewing discourse as a form of social practice implies that there is a dialectical relationship
between discourse and social structures. This is central in Fairclough’s approach to CDA, “social
structures not only determine discourse, but they are also a product of discourse” (Fairclough,
1989:38). Social structures are understood, in a broad sense as defining a potential, a set of
possibilities, including social relations in society as whole and within specific institutions, both
discursive and non-discursive elements. Discourse in this view is seen as both constitutive and
constituted, meaning that discourse, as a form of social practice, both reproduce and change
knowledge, social relations, including power relations and at the same time also conditioned by other
social practices and structures, meaning that discourse not only “contributes to the shaping and
reshaping of social structures but also reflects them” (Fairclough, 2003:23; Jørgensen and Philips,
2002:61,65). It is a two-way relationship, meaning that discourse is being determined by social
structures as well as it can contribute to continuity and change of social structures (Fairclough, 1989:
37; Fairclough, 1992: 63-64). Social practice is here understood as particular ways of acting, the
articulation of discourse together with non-discursive social forces (Fairclough, 2003:25).
Fig. 1. Source: Fairclough, 1992:73
Fairclough’s three dimensional framework to discourse analysis involves three levels of analysis, (1)
the formal features of the text, (2) processes of text production, and (3) the social effects of discursive
16
practices on the broader social practice (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002:68). Meaning that we first need
to know how different texts link to each other, and how they represent aspects of the world it
presupposes. The third level of analysis is then focusing on making a “fit” between the texts and the
social world (Fairclough, 1989:78). Thus, the three levels of analysis each corresponds to our three
subquestions; how are environmental refugees labelled? How is the phenomena of environmental
change and migration represented and what solutions are suggested, and what are the broader
implications of these discourses, providing both the theoretical and methodological means for
investigating the research focus. The three levels of the CDA are very interlinked, mainly when it
comes to the first and second level there can be some overlapping sections when it comes to applying
it on the policy documents and reports. In the first level of analysis, our particular focus will be on
the formal features of the text, here we will focus primarily on modality, wordings, and word
meaning. Here, our main objective is to identify how international and regional organisations, NGOs
and the Government of Bangladesh are labelling environmental refugees and what meanings are put
into their terminology. The focus is on key words and their meaning potential and to contrasts the
different ways meanings are worded. This means addressing questions on what dominant wordings
exists in the text and what theoretical and ideological significance they carry (Fairclough, 1992:236237). The second level of analysis relates to discursive practices, the processes of text production,
including intertextuality (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002:69). Our focus will be on discourse as a mode
of representation; how are environmental change and forced migration represented, what explanations
are there and what solutions do the policy documents and reports suggest? The aim here, is to identify
the dominant discourses on environmental refugees. By applying an intertextual approach to the
analysis, we are also able to investigate which voices are included and excluded, and more
importantly whose perspective is adopted in the policy documents and reports. As texts are shaping
and being shaped by social practices, the discursive dimension also works to mediate the relationship
social practice and texts (Fairclough, 1992:86). Social practices, the third dimension of the framework
take into account the dialectical relationship between discursive practices and the wider context of
social practices, that is how different policies and reports links to the reality of the social world and
how this influence policy makers decisions on managing environmental refugees. This means
addressing questions related to Fairclough’s conceptualisation of language and power, looking at the
social and ideological effects of the discourse on environmental refugees and exploring the hidden
power of ideologies (the exercise of power through consent) and to reveal the common-sense
assumptions surrounding the discourse on environmental refugees. The concept of ideology will be
17
applied when analysing the dialectical relationship between discourse and social structures, together
with Foucault’s concept of governmentality, which can reveal how discursive practices are part of a
larger social practice, involving power relations (Jørgensen and Philips, 2002:76). Thus, our main
concern here is with the causal effects of texts in maintaining or changing ideologies, and the relation
of power between different discourses and their consequences.
18
4. Foucauldian Governmentality Theory
As mentioned above, textual analysis are not sufficient as it does not shed light on how texts links
with social processes and structures, rather discourse must be understood through analysing the
external relation with social structures Therefore, we will integrate the Foucauldian governmentality
perspective along with CDA, to investigate how different discourses link with modes of securitizing
environmental refugees. Applying the governmentality theory can provide an analytical lens through
which we can critically explore the link between the discourses and different strategies of governing
environmental refugees. Our governmentality analysis of environmental change and migration as a
security issue takes into account that the meanings and explanations given to the phenomenon are
products of regimes of power-knowledge. We will investigate different governmentality techniques
and strategies of international and regional organisations, NGOs and the Government of Bangladesh
through which environmental refugees in Bangladesh is rendered governable.
4.1. Foucault’s Concept of Governmentality
The French philosopher Michel Foucault use the term “governmentality” to describe the art of
government in a wider sense, referring to the idea of government that is not limited to state politics
alone, but includes an array of institutions (in our case UNHCR, IOM, EU ADB and the GoB), forms
of knowledge and a wide range of control techniques, which apply to a wide variety of objects, from
one's control of the self to the “biopolitical” (denoting social and political power over life) control of
populations (Foucault, 1978 in Lemke, 2002). Biopolitical, according to Foucault, is the application
and impact of political power on all aspects of human life. In a governmental regime based on
biopolitics, the population is rendered productive by disciplining individual bodies and by
establishing regulatory controls at the level of the population (Duffield, 2010). The notion of
governmentality is also linked to a concept of power-knowledge. Power can manifest itself positively
by producing knowledge and certain discourses that get internalized by individuals and guide the
behavior of populations. This leads to more efficient forms of social control, as knowledge enables
individuals to govern themselves (Foucault, 1978 in Lemke, 2002).
Foucault uses governmentality in reference to "neoliberal governmentality" (Lemke, 2002). This type
of governmentality refers to societies where power is de-centered and its members play an active role
in their own self-government, which is the idea that individuals need to be regulated from 'inside' to
fulfill certain political rule. It is characterized by indirect techniques for leading and controlling
19
individuals without being responsible for them and the main mechanism is through the technology of
power which is “responsibilisation”. This involves subjects becoming ‘responsibilized’ by making
them see social risks such as unemployment, poverty, etc., not as the responsibility of the state, but
actually being in the domain of the individual's responsibility, transforming it into a problem of ‘selfcare’ (Lemke, 2002). Another technology of power that Foucault discussed is that of normalization.
A norm is that which is socially worthy, statistically average, scientifically healthy and personally
desirable to society. The important aspect of normality is that while the norm is natural, those who
wish to achieve normality will do so by working on themselves. Foucauldian perspective is critical
of the interventionist liberal regime that can emerge from a human security perspective, which leads
to Foucault's concept of security (Reid, 2010).
4.2. Foucault’s Concept of security
Security, according to Foucault, is about governmentality not about rhetoric or discourse (Oels,
2013). Rendering an issue governable as a security issue does not necessarily involve a “speech act”
most importantly; it requires “technologies of security” (Oels, 2013:18). Oels defines technologies of
security as “… specific practices that actors engage in to produce and manage knowledge about an
object as a security problem and more specifically as a risk”. They serve as a mechanism to induce
in individuals a desire of security that they work to satisfy.
Foucault describes governmentality as a biopolitical technology of risk management. While
biopolitical techniques aim at the improvement of the well being and security of a population,
Foucault argues that they also serve as a technique for the circulation of oppressive power (Duffield,
2007). In contrast to sovereign power which was based on the ‘threat of death’, biopolitics aims to
‘foster life’ (Foucault, 1978 in Oels, 2013; Duffield, 2010) and to facilitate the controlled inclusion
of bodies into the machinery of production. The population is subjected to continuous monitoring,
comprehensive regulations and precise controls by heterogeneous alliance that may, in the case of
international governance, include, INGOs, governmental authorities and other bodies. The
problematisation of security renders society governable in a certain way, and is indicative of a specific
rationality or mentality of government that is governmentality. Different strategies can be employed
in rendering an issue governable as a biopolitical risk. Oels (2013) distinguished between Foucault’s
traditional risk management, and Dillon’s risk management through contingency, which is based on
Foucault’s governmentality theory.
20
4.2.1. Foucault’s traditional risk management
Foucault’s traditional biopolitical risk management is a security technique of governmentality (Oels,
2013). It aims at securing the strength and productivity of the referent objects by providing a social
environment in which they can live, work and reproduce as a self organizing system. Referent object
denotes the object that is being threatened and needs to be protected, that is national governments.
However, this social environment can be interrupted by the circulation of people, goods, information,
disease etc. Therefore, the task of governmentality would be eliminating its dangerous elements,
managing circulation which is making a division between good and bad circulation and diminishing
the bad circulation (Oels, 2013). Bad circulation is not eliminated rather reduced to a tolerable level
based on economic cost–benefit calculations. Knowledge provided by science plays a great role in
identifying and legitimating a tolerable level of risk (Aradau and van Munster, 2007). Traditional risk
management assumes that risks can be known, calculated and controlled on the basis of scientific
probability calculations. One technology of risk reduction is the targeting of risk groups (Beck in
Aradau and van Munster, 2007). Governmental interventions are then prioritized to these dangerous
groups in order to equate the most unfavorable with the more favorable (Oels, 2013).
4.2.2. Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero’s risk management through contingency
Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008) describes life as the referent object of biopolitical security practices
viewed as being characterized by circulation, connectivity, complexity and contingency. Biopolitical
security therefore requires governmental strategies that enhance life’s capacity for adaptive
emergence to secure species existence (Oels, 2013). Survival depends on the capacity to become
something that one was once not (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). This emphasis of security
practices shifts from Foucault’s traditional risk management which is protection to transformation
(ibid.). This life that is to be secured must be mobilized in order to participate in preventing of its
own emergent potential (Oels, 2013). This type of risk management secures through contingency,
providing technologies for its navigation (Dillon, 2008).
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5. Environmental Refugees: Conceptual and definitional issues
Here, we will outline some of the key literature on environmental change and forced migration with
particular focus on environmental refugees. The academic literature is characterised by a divide
between the proponents and critics of the concept, between those who, on the one hand, declare an
‘alarmist’ prediction of the number of displaced persons driven by environmental factors and favour
the term environmental refugees (Myers and Kent, 1995; Biermann and Boas, 2010), and on the other
hand, the ‘sceptics’, who reject the term environmental refugees due to the complexity of multicausality (Black, 2001; Kibreab, 1997). Initial work on environmental refugees were largely produced
by environmentalist scholars during a time when conservation was seen as a priority of environmental
lobbying. Thus, the term environmental refugee first came into usage to promote support for
environmental protection. Scholars within migration studies however showed little interest and have
later opposed the term due to their experiences of studying migration questioning assumed
relationship between environmental change and the manner in which individuals decides to migrate
(Morrissey, 2009, 2012). Exploring how the debate has evolved and been articulated is important in
terms of the consequences it carries for the provision of assistance and protection of environmental
refugees.
There is a wide range of different terms used to describe those forced to flee due to environmental
change with different meanings and typologies, such as climate refugees, environmentally displaced
persons, environmentally impelled migration, eco-migrants, eco-evacuee, eco-victim, ecological
displaced person, environmentally motivated migrant, disaster refugee, etc. (Boano, et. al, 2008:4;
Kent and Myers 1995:20; Black 2001:1). However, there is little agreement on and understanding of
what these categories might really mean (Black, 2001:13; Biermann and Boas: 2010:67), which in
turn has significant implications for how people forced to flee as a result of environmental factors are
defined and represented. Although, as we mentioned earlier, our concern here is not to prove a direct
link between environmental change and forced displacement, these discussions do provide us with
important insights as to why academics and scholars have not been able to agree on which term to
use. Exploring the discursive terrain of environmental refugees and the ways in which the debates
have been articulated could also provide one way in which we can understand the absence of policies
for these categories of forced migrants (Ibid.).
22
The term first came into common usage in 1985 by Essam El-Hinnawi’s policy report for United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) where environmental refugees were defined as “people
who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a
marked environmental disruption that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality
of their life” (El-Hinnawi quoted in Myers and Kent, 1995:17; Morrissey, 2009:3). Although, the
definition says little about the different types of environmental refugees or any criteria distinguishing
environmental refugees from other type of refugees or migrants (Bates, 2002:466), it was considered
as the starting point for further research and debates surrounding environmental refugees (Morrissey,
2009:3). El-Hinnawi further distinguished between three broad categories of environmental refugees:
1) persons displaced temporarily, who can return once the environmental damage is repaired; 2)
persons permanently displaced, who have resettled elsewhere, and; 3) persons who have decided to
migrate because of the degradation of their natural habitat no longer can provide for their basic needs
(Keane, 2004:210; Williams, 2008:506). However, the critics of the term environmental refugees
questioned the legal and operational usefulness of such typology, by arguing that such a definition
includes a large number of people, making it conceptually flawed and vague (Bates, 2002:466).
The ecologist Norman Meyers, another proponent of the notion of environmental refugees belonging
to the alarmist position, defines environmental refugees as, “persons who can no longer gain a secure
livelihood in their traditional homelands because of environmental factors of unusual scope, notably
drought, desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, water shortages and climate change, also natural
disasters such as cyclones, storm surges and floods. In face of these environmental threats, people
feel they have no alternative but to seek sustenance elsewhere, whether within their own countries or
beyond and whether on a semi-permanent or permanent basis” (Myers and Kent, 1995:18-19)
Myers and Kent estimated, during their time of their writing (1995), that there were 25 million
environmental refugees, and argued that the number is likely to increase more rapidly as global
warming starts to take hold (Myers and Kent, 1995:16-17). According to them, people migrating due
to poverty and extreme deprivation driven by root factors of environmental degradation or caused by
environmental breakdown, have their fundamental human rights seriously threatened and should not
be considered any less serious than those fleeing political and religious persecution (Ibid.:19). The
outcomes are often quite similar to those of refugees fleeing political or religious persecution; loss of
livelihood and access to basic needs, landlessness and homelessness, loss of cultural and religious
23
lands, mental and physical health risks, many of these groups already lacking secure rights and access
to resource (Boas and Lunstrum, 2014:5-7). Proponents of the term ‘environmental refugees’ have
long used the term to highlight the urgency of peoples’ situations (Brown, 2008:13), however,
according to one of the sceptics, Richard Black (2001:6), there is a need for more empirical evidence
that link environmental change and migration, and more research on the causes and consequences of
migration in order for the environmental refugee thesis to be plausible. Black acknowledges that
environmental degradation may be important factors when deciding to migrate but conceptualising
environmental change as the primary cause to the forceful displacement of people is “unhelpful and
unsound intellectually, and unnecessary in practical terms” (Ibid.:1). Migration is part of the
economic and social structures of the region, and should perhaps be understood as a customary coping
strategy, rather than a response to environmental change. As the world has become more complex
and multidimensional, causes to migration have become significantly more mixed and without any
agreed definition of who can be included in this category of forced migrants, there is no way of
knowing if the number is increasing, nor is it likely that an adequate definition can be formulated
(Black, 2001:6, 14).
According to Myers’ estimates, 80 million people are suffering semi-starvation in Sub-Saharan Africa
primarily due to environmental factors, 135 million are threatened by desertification, and 550 million
people are constantly subject to recurring water shortages, claiming that the total number of
environmental refugees could reach 200 million by 2050, well exceeding the number of convention
refugees (Myers, 2005). Although it is difficult to differentiate between people forced to flee due to
environmental change and economic factors, it should not be as relevant as the fact that the person is
forced to seek sanctuary elsewhere. So rather than debating the underlying motives, we must “beware
the tyranny of labels” (Myers and Kent, 1995:17, 29). However, Myers’ studies have been highly
contested by Black, amongst others, that they are methodologically flawed, unable to demonstrate a
direct causal link, are weak and far from providing convincing evidence that environmental change
will lead to large-scale displacement (Black, 2001:3). Kibreab argues that the studies have failed to
take into account the multi-causality of displacement, which have only led to confusion, “poorly
defined and legally meaningless terms, such as ‘environmental refugees’” (Kibreab, 1997:21). Castle
(2002:3) argues that Myers’ linkage between environmental degradation and forced displacement is
rather based on a common sense logic, as he has not been able to provide figures of people who have
actually been displaced by environmental change. Thus, the term environmental refugee is
24
“simplistic, one-sided and misleading”, implying a conceptual frame of environmental change as the
single cause to migration which in reality is not the case (Ibid.:8). However, according to McNamara,
such critique has rather had the effect of discharging the phenomenon of environmental refugees
altogether (McNamara, 2007:16).
The sceptics, who emphasise the complexity of multi-causality, argue that it is highly problematic
labelling all migrants refugees, when in fact there are great distinctions between those who have made
an active choice to migrate and between those who are forcefully displaced. They also perceived the
arguments of the alarmist proponents as simplistic and linear, the natural environment cannot that
easily be distinguished from the social, political and economic context and are thus sceptic about
environmental factors being the primary driver of migration. Moreover, the alarmist predictions
suggest long distance and permanent migration, while the sceptics argue that migration linked to
environmental stress are mainly short distance, temporary and cyclical (Morrissey, 2012:39).
Morrissey note there are some agreements between sceptics and alarmist opinions. While the
proponents of the term environmental refugees agree that human displacement is driven by more than
one cause, the sceptics agree as well that environmental change do play an important role in decisions
to migrate. Thus, Morrissey argues that the disagreement in the debates surrounding environmental
refugees is not about the link between environmental change and displacement but is rather about
which term to use and how “the relationship is presented” (Ibid,:40). Despite the growing awareness
of the role environmental change play on human displacement, there is still no agreement on the
extent environmental change affect human societies, the nature of that relationship, and no adequate
definition to apply to these category of forced migrants. Although it may not be possible to isolate
environmental factors from economic, political, social and institutional factors, the lack of empirical
evidence should not imply the absence of the problem, nor should it result in excluding the
environmental dimension from refugee discussions. The problems with defining environmental
refugees should not lead to policy makers downplaying the seriousness of the problem, but rather
promote further research on the issue (McNamara, 2007:14-15; Morrissey, 2012:39; Myers and Kent,
1995:33).
5.1. The legal application of the term
Another side of the debate surrounding environmental refugees is the one concerned with the legal
aspect related to the protection and assistance to environmental refugees. The international refugee
regime, primarily based on the legal instruments of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
25
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol to the Convention, has the legal responsibility for the provision of
protection to refugees who “owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country” (McNamara, 2007:12-13). The 1951 Refugee Convention clearly defines
who is a refugee, their rights, and the legal responsibilities of signatory states. There are four main
elements in the definition: 1) the person must be outside their country of origin; 2) he/she is unwilling
or unable to gain the protection of his country or return there due to fear of persecution; 3) persecution
must be based on reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, and; 4) it must be well-founded (Keane, 2004:214; McNamara, 2007:13). People
fleeing their habitual residence due to environmental change are not included in this definition, hence,
there are no legal responsibilities for states to recognise this category of displaced persons, nor is
there is any legal term or institutionalised mechanism to represent this group of persons (Ibid.). The
1951 Refugee Convention was established in response to post-war Europe, without this category of
people in mind, adopting a fairly restrictive approach to the legal interpretation of the refugee status,
which is also reflected in the work of UNHCR, the main UN agency responsible for providing
assistance and protection to those refugees defined by international law (Williams, 2008:507; Keane,
2004:215; McNamara, 2007:16). McGregor argues that such a definition contained in the Refugee
Convention is inappropriate for describing root causes of flight in developing countries, excluding a
large number of people suffering economic and social persecution, and victims of environmental
disruptions where state is unable or unwilling to provide protection (McGregor, 1994:126). It’s
Eurocentric in its origin and purpose ignoring the reality of displacement occurring in the South, it is
argued (Castle, 2002:9). According to Myers and Kent, the “established way of doing things”, the
structure of the legal procedure and institutional system favours a traditional approach, which fails to
reflect changes that constantly reshape the world (Myers and Kent, 1995:20-21).
Some suggest that the problem of environmental refugees could be solved by extending the definition
of refugees in line with international human rights and the systems of global governance for the
recognition of environmental refugees (Keane, 2004; Biermann and Boas, 2010:61). However, such
an approach would most likely meet resistance from states (Keane, 2004:215; Williams, 2008:510).
First, extending the Convention definition of refugees would lead to devaluation of the current
protection regime for refugees as displacement due to environmental factors are rarely based on
26
“persecution”, meaning that the key features determining whether one is “legitimately” allowed the
protection from the international community could be undermined (Ibid.; McGregor, 1994:128).
Second, the majority of people displaced by environmental disruptions are most likely internal, which
means they have not crossed an international border as required by the official definition. In theory,
this means that they still depend on the protection or their own state. Third, extending the definition
could only be done in a minimal manner due to the enormous amount of people currently displaced
as a result of environmental change. An argument most likely raised by the concern of state
governments, that such an extension would lead to the opening of “refugee floodgate” (Williams,
2008:509; Keane, 2004; McAdam, 2011). Moreover, considering the legal obligation states already
have towards Convention refugees, and the fact that the current refugee regime is already pressured
by 43.3 million (in 2009) refugees and displaced persons with no durable solution in sight, there is
little commitment to further responsibility sharing, and even if the definition would be extended it
would most likely overwhelm the current system (McAdams, 2011:16; Biermann and Boas, 2010:7).
The consequences of the inability of the international community and scholars to agree on reasons
for displacement, particularly debates attempting to differentiate between economic and forced
migrants, have a significant impact on how environmental refugees are perceived in legal terms.
When is the decision to migrate based on economic or environmental factors, and when is it voluntary
or forced? These are question circulating in the academic community with still no clear answer.
Attempts of trying to conceptualise different categories of environmental refugees, whether internal
or international, or the degree of voluntariness, offers little to no help if it were to be operationalised
for a legal protection regime. It may even have the effect of downplaying the plight of some groups
of people (Biermann and Boas, 2010:65). Moreover, the differentiation between refugees, internally
displaced persons and migrants lies at the core of traditional refugee law defining who can and cannot
receive international protection (Williams, 2008:510). Distinguishing between environmental
refugees and voluntary migrants based on the degree in which one is able to relocate pre-emptively
or on continuum of choice, dismisses the fact that the most affected populations are in poor
developing countries, where states are simply unable to offer protection and assistance to its citizens,
and where environmental change exacerbate already existing socio-economic vulnerabilities. For
some countries, international support may be the only viable option (Williams, 2008: 510). According
to McAdams, it is practically and conceptually impossible to distinguish between those who
“deserve” international protection and those who “only” suffer economic and environmental hardship
27
(McAdams, 2001:13). There is a widespread assumption that a universal treaty will solve the problem
of environmentally induced displacement, however, McAdams questions whether a treaty actually
would provide the answer to the problem. She argues that if formulating a treaty becomes the main
focus, other more immediate and alternative responses, that may address the plight of people forced
to flee environmental change, may be overlooked. Since movement due to environmental change is
perceived differently depending on the geographical, demographics, cultural and political
circumstances, and the fact most of the movement as a result of environmental change tends to be
internal rather than international, a local or regional response would perhaps be more effective in
meeting the needs of the people, rather than a universal treaty. Especially when the process of
negotiating and discussing a treaty usually tends to get stuck in linguistic details, UN bureaucracy
and the reluctance of member states, thus providing an excuse of inaction (McAdams, 2011:4-6;
Castle, 2002:10). Considering the limits and weaknesses of the current refugee regime, where the
displacement of millions of people has remained unsolved, a treaty will not solve the problem
(McAdams, 2011:17). Mayer, another proponent for regionally based approaches towards
environmental refugees, argues that global approaches to environmental migration would not work
and are unlikely to provide protection to those in Asia and the Pacific as they fall outside the
geographical scope of universal standards. Few states in South Asia have signed the 1951 Refugee
Convention and 1967 Protocol, which is also likely to remain if a new treaty would emerge. Thus,
suggestions on a convention on environmental refugees will “not make much sense when dealing
with countries that are not willing to ratify the Refugee Convention” (Mayer, 2013:116).
The discussions related to environmental refugees and international law clearly demonstrate the limits
of the global refugee regime and the limited applicability of the 1951 Refugee Convention. All people
suffering forced displacement should be provided with dignity and protection, however, the complex
structure of the global refugee regime providing protection tends to differentiate and prioritise people
forced to flee conflict and persecution based on reasons of political and religious beliefs (Boas and
Lunstrum, 2014:7). While millions of people are displaced as a result of environmental change,
scholars and policy makers are still unable to agree on the nature and mechanism for such triggers,
which in turns leads to inaction from the international legal community. While other categories of
refugees have dominated the refugee issue for decades (Myers and Kent, 1995:20), the plight of those
forced to flee due to environmental change has remained unrecognised, entirely lacking support from
the international community (Williams, 2008:502)
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5.2. Politicisation of the term
Understanding the broader political context in which the debates around environmental refugees have
emerged and been articulated is important, not only for understanding why the arguments and
viewpoints are so contradictory and diverse (Morrissey, 2009:8), but also why there is an absence of
commitment to multilateral protection which have significant implications for the lives’ of millions
of people at risk of displacement. Behind the conceptual and legal problems surrounding
environmental refugees is the political aspect. While gaining refugee status has remained the only
systematic entry route (Zetter, 2007:180) the possibilities of the refugee law adapting to new
challenges to incorporate environmental refugees are highly unlikely, as there are currently no
consensus on extending the refugee regime to include other types of forced migrants. Rather most
states want to further restrict it, which has led to successful efforts of ignoring the scale of the problem
(Castle, 2001:10; Brown: 2008:36).
Forced migrants are only one category within a larger populations of migrants and the increasing
complexity of determining who is a refugee, has posed serious challenges to national governments’
attempt to manage migration. According to Zetter, the globalisation of the refugee phenomenon is
characterised by the proliferation of new labels for forced migrants, particularly during the time when
Europe became the main destination for many refugees and migrants, and when refugees no longer
were contained in the South. Thus, new labels have been formed, transformed and politicised by
government bureaucracies in the global North, and not by humanitarian agencies operating in the
South as in the past. More specifically, he argues, that the creation of different labels to describe
different migratory processes, are increasingly mixed and confused (economic migrant, IDP,
clandestine, undocumented, asylum seeker, temporary protection label, etc.) which lies at the core of
the problem of defining who is a refugee and which have provided grounds for more politicised
interpretations of the Convention label (Zetter, 2007:175-177). E.g. the label of IDP, which according
to Zetter, have been constructed in order to contain and restrict forced migrants to access to label
‘refugee’, and the labels of ‘refugee’ and ‘economic migrant’ which have frequently been conflated
by national interests. The result is that refugee status and the available protection inherently
associated with the label has come to be seen as “a highly privileged prize which few deserves”
(Ibid.:177, 182-4).
29
According to Kibreab (1997:20), much of the literature on the relationship between environmental
change and forced displacement has emerged and coincided with an increasingly environment of
hostility towards refugees and asylum seekers, and the tightening of asylum laws and procedures to
hinder refugees from the South to access the territories of Northern states. The current ‘non-arrival
regime’ have led to more refugees increasingly experiencing difficulties to gain admission and
recognition, making it almost impossible for them to even leave their countries (Castle, 2002:9). It is
precisely this global hostility towards migration in general that leads to the absence of any political
will to include environmental refugees in the current system of the refugee regime (Mayor, 2013:111).
Thus, anti-immigration rhetoric and the alarmist predictions of large-scale displacement due to
environmental change will most likely have the opposite effect of what those advocating for the plight
of environmental refugees have intended for. Rather anti-asylum lobbyists have used the term
environmental refugees to strengthen the discourse on ‘bogus’ asylum seekers. The perception of
North being invaded by millions of people have consequently led to what Kibreab means the
invention of the term ‘environmental refugees’, as to depoliticise the nature of flight, enabling states
to avoid taking their moral and legal responsibility to provide asylum. Accepting the term which has
no basis in international refugee law would also imply that states have no obligations to provide
asylum to those fleeing environmental disruption, because they are not genuine victims of persecution
(Kibreab, 1997:20-21; Morrissey, 2009:9; Black, 2001:11). Therefore, the term environmental
refugees is not only misleading, but could even be harmful (Castle, 2001:10). The concept of
environmental refugees have gradually been endorsed by states to justify restrictive policies and to
support policies that prevents population at risk from leaving their home. Therefore, there is nothing
altruistic in recognising this category of people. Kibreab further claims that the many authors, who
have been using the term uncritically, have consequently contributed to the restrictionist attitudes and
policies towards forced migrants (Kibreab, 1997:21).
According to Morrissey, the proponents of the term environmental refugees invoke the possibility of
millions of environmental refugees as a consequence of continued inaction on greenhouse gas
emissions and for national governments, accepting the term would also imply accepting
responsibility, which was in turn created fear that such responsibility could be used as arguments for
compensating people for the impacts of environmental change (Morrissey, 2012:38-39). Thus,
recognising environmental refugees would require governments to take action towards the causes of
environmental degradation and include a significant financial burden on donor countries (Biermann
30
and Boas, 2010:82; Black, 2001:12). Therefore, governments have strong incentives to keep the
refugee definition narrow because of the obligation it would involve.
According to Myer, the term ‘environmental refugees’ is a predominantly Western construct, more
specifically by Western media and NGOs, based on a Western bias in the studies of environmental
migration. He argues that there exists a gap, a disconnect between the normative research in Western
institutions and the reality of environmental migration in Third World which has obstructed the
policy-oriented debate. Moreover, the term refugee has been limited to only represent people of the
Third World, and thus reproduced the image of environmental refugees as vulnerable, passive other.
The alarmist projections of possible large-scale cross border movement of environmental refugees
further invokes images of political instability, conflict triggered by environmental scarcity, human
suffering and pressures on receiving societies, which implies a security-based conception of
environmental migration (Mayer, 2013:17,118-120; Boano, et. al. 2008:4; Morrissey: 2009:8). Thus,
investing in the protection of environmental refugees would also mean investing in global security,
which could provide incentives for the governments in the North to contribute with financial support,
since it highlights the potential costs of inaction on environmental change (Biermann and Boas,
2010:83; Morrissey, 2009:14). However, for Mayer the question of what needs to be done, is not that
relevant but rather the question of who decides what should be done (Mayer, 2013:104).
The key problem is perhaps not environmental refugees itself, but the ability of countries to adapt
and cope with the environmental change (Castle, 2002:4). A developed state can address the problems
of environmental change more effectively than what a developing (and possibly corrupt) state can do.
For Castle, the real issue of concern is adopting policies that deal with the root causes of all types of
forced migration, which in turn is linked to problems of development and North-South relationships.
It is the countries in North that are responsible to the greatest environmental problems, while
developing countries are the ones who have to bear the burden for the consequences. According to
Castle, the first step towards addressing the root causes of forced migration, involves making the
practices of Northern states less harmful for the countries in the South (Ibid,:10-11). According to
Black (2001), environmental change is only a proximate cause of displacement, while the root causes
lie in the global inequalities between North and South, and poorly planned development which are
held responsible for generating vulnerability to environmental change. However, as Mayer notes,
while development is generally viewed as increasing the capabilities to adapt to environmental
31
change, in the Asian context, development often goes hand in hand with increased environmental
stress and greater social vulnerability (Mayer, 2013:106).
32
6. The Context of Environmental change Vulnerability in Bangladesh
Bangladesh is widely recognised as one of the most vulnerable countries to environmental change,
and has often been cited as the worst victim of natural disasters (Ahmed, et. al., 2012). This
vulnerability largely stems from its high population density, geographical location, high incidence of
natural disasters, dependence on agriculture, and pre-existing socio-economic vulnerabilities (EJF,
2012).
6.1. High population density
Bangladesh, with a population of over 150 million people on a small land mass, is one of the world
most densely populated countries in the world, with around 1,209 persons per km², of whom 75%
live in rural areas, (Ahmed, et. al., 2012:24; Agwara et al., 2003). Many of these occupy remote and
ecologically fragile parts of the country, such as floodplains and river islands, or the coastal zones
where cyclones are a major threat. The increasing trend in population growth means that while
disaster preparedness may have improved in many ways, an ever growing number of people are
exposed to these environmental threats (BCCSAP, 2009).
6.2. Geography
Water is a defining characteristic of the country; it has 230 rivers dissecting it in all directions
(BCCSAP, 2009). Roughly 80 percent of its land area is coastal or inland floodplain with about half
of Bangladesh located only a few meters above sea level. It is estimated that one third of the land
mass is flooded in the rainy season (Lee, 2001). The floods recharge the land with nutrients like salt,
and also constrain the accessible land, intensifying land scarcity. 85 percent of Bangladeshis live in
the vulnerable coastal plains or inland floodplains, and environmental change will worsen all these
vulnerabilities.
6.3. High incidence of natural disasters
In Bangladesh the causes of natural disasters depends on its geographical setting allowing for almost
all natural disasters to strike it, such as earthquakes, floods, droughts, famine, cyclones, and tidal
waves, etc. Bangladesh is located on the delta of Ganges-Brahmaputra-Jamuna river systems, which
makes the country highly vulnerable to flooding and river-bank erosion. It is estimated that 9000
hectares of mainland is affected by erosion every year, causing 60,000 people to become landless,
and 15-20 million people at risk due to river-bank erosion (Hutton and Haque, 2004). Bangladesh has
also witnessed the effects of rising sea-level, including permanent inundation of land masses in
33
coastal areas, which have led to sea-water intrusion in coastal drinking, affecting between 35-77
million people to be at risk of drinking contaminated water (Shamsuddoha and Chowdhury, 2007:10;
Mahmood, 2012:230). Moreover, changing rainfall patterns have led to excessive rainfall during
monsoon and decline in rainfall during dry season, which have significant consequences for waterrelated food production and livelihood (Ahmed, et. al., 2012:23). Between 1991 and 2009,
Bangladesh experienced more than 259 extreme natural disasters, causing over US $16 billion in total
damage (Mahmood, 2012:227). From 1976–2001, droughts affected 25 million people, floods
affected 270 million people, and rain and wind storms affected 41 million people (Reuveny, 2008).
Due to recurring disasters, the country is subject to food shortages in spite of its fertile land, network
of rivers or subtropical monsoon climate.
6.4. Dependence on agriculture
With 75 percent of the population living in rural areas, agriculture is the most important economic
sector in Bangladesh (BCCSAP, 2009). 55 percent (which equals 24,5 million people) of all rurally
employed are producing food through agriculture and fisheries contributing 18 percent to the national
GDP (Ahmed, et. al., 2012). With around half of the Bangladesh labor force engaged in farming,
there are few other livelihood options, making other economic sectors dependent on it. This makes
the country’s economy very sensitive to environmental change. The negative impacts of
environmental change on agriculture such as variations in rainfall and temperature and increasingly
intense and extreme weather events associated with environmental change have serious implications
for food security.
6.5. Pre-existing socio-economic vulnerabilities
Bangladesh ranks low in almost all measures of economic development. This rank is below average
South Asian per capita income and per capita income for low income countries (Agwara et al., 2003).
The weak economy, and poor social development indices makes Bangladesh one of the least
developed countries. The extent of poverty is widespread and one of the most challenging problems
facing the Government of Bangladesh (Ahmed, et. al., 2012:24-25). Although there have been some
successful achievements towards the Millennium Development Goals, such as reducing child
mortality and improvements in education, there are still 47 million people living in relative poverty,
and 26 million (18 per cent) in extreme poverty (Ibid.;25). One half of Bangladesh’s rural household
have no direct access to land, although they depend on agriculture, meaning that the majority of rural,
poor people survive on subsistence livelihood (Hutton and Haque, 2004:43).
34
In 2000, the World Bank estimated that only 9.5% of Bangladesh’ 207,500 km network of roads were
paved, putting it well below the average for low income countries of 16.5% (Agwara et al., 2003),
which suggests that its physical infrastructure in general might be less developed than that of low
income countries. Bangladesh had only 51 scientists and engineers per million people, a number
comparable to that of low income countries in general (Agwara et al., 2003). Considering the state of
its infrastructure and social and human capital the country is less capable of adapting to environmental
change, and thus has higher vulnerability. This low level of development, combined with other factors
such as its geography, makes the country highly vulnerable to environmental change.
6.6. Environmental change and migration
Problems related to environmental change, such as rising sea levels, extreme weather events, land
degradation, declining freshwater resources, etc., whether singly or in combination, have profound
effects on human settlement patterns (Ibid.). Developing countries, including Bangladesh, are at high
risk for such problems, particularly because they depend on the environment for livelihood. When
there is a direct and immediate threat to life, or when environmental pressures compound socioeconomic stresses and households cannot adapt, people will be forced to move (Ibid.; Myers, 1997).
In Bangladesh rising temperatures, irregular rainfall and worsening storms and flooding, linked to
environmental change, have resulted in the loss of homes and assets, land degradation, severe declines
in water and food security, increasing pressures on human health and the collapse of rural livelihoods
(EJF 2012). These pressures place additional burdens on communities that are for the most part living
in poverty already. Reuveny’s studies (2007) implies that land degradation and scarcity has been
growing in Bangladesh (East Pakistan before 1971) since the 1950s. Being poor and dependent on
agriculture, many Bangladeshis became less able to make a living, while frequent storms, floods, and
droughts made things worse. This contributed to increased domestic migration, particularly to major
cities such as Dhaka and Chittagong. According to several authors Haque and Zaman (1994), Lein
(2000), Siddiqui (2005) cited in Panda (2010), between 64,000 and 1 million Bangladeshis are
rendered homeless every year due to riverbank erosion alone. About 400,000–600,000 people moved
internally to the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Lee, 2001). Bangladesh’ capital, Dhaka, for example
increased in population size by 966 percent between 1970 and 2010, and an average of 880 new
migrants arrive from rural areas every day (EJF 2012). According to EJF (2012), Dhaka and
Chittagong are the two cities with the highest proportional increase in the number of people exposed
35
to rising sea levels. Largely due to these forces, it is estimated that 12-17 million Bangladeshis already
moved to India (Lee, 2001). Estimates of the impact of environmental change on migration are
contested and vary radically but it is generally agreed that it will be both a source of migration in its
own right and more significantly a multiplier for other underlying causes to forced migration (Myers,
1997). UNHCR, IOM, ADB and other humanitarian actors are being drawn into addressing
humanitarian crisis and displacement created by serious natural disasters (Betts, 2009). There is
consequently a growing recognition that the environment and migration are closely related and that
there is a need to address this relationship on an international political level.
6.7. Adaptation Strategies
The Government of Bangladesh have become fully aware of the potential risks of environmental
change which have led to integrating environmental change adaptation in development projects
(Ahmed, et. al., 2012:24). With the support of the North countries, they have invested over US $10
billion to make the country more environmental-resilient and less vulnerable to natural disasters
(BCCSAP, 2009). The country has two comprehensive climate change policy documents, the
National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA 2005) and the Bangladesh Climate Change
Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP 2009). The activities include flood management schemes, coastal
polders, cyclone and flood shelters, and the raising of roads and highways above flood level. In
addition, the Government of Bangladesh has developed warning systems for floods, cyclones and
storm surges, and is expanding community based disaster preparedness. Climate resilient varieties of
rice and other crops have also been developed. The Bangladesh government has also recently
established a National Climate Change Fund, with an initial capitalization of US $45 million, and a
Multi-Donor Trust Fund of US $150 million with the support of the UK (BCCSAP, 2009). Though
one of the pillars of action of the BCCSAP is to ensure that the poorest and most vulnerable in society
are protected from climate change problems. Many millions of Bangladeshis living on the
embankment have thus far received too little protection, safe housing, or access to basic services from
the Government and the country needs political commitment and support from the international
community to for securing the well being of the people (BCCSAP, 2009).
In the following chapter we will incorporate the Bangladesh context when analysing the policy
documents and reports
36
7. Framing and Governing Environmental Refugees in Bangladesh
In the following chapter, CDA will be applied when interpreting the chosen policy documents and
reports (see table 1 on page 6.) from international, regional and local organisations, which will be
presented according to Fairclough’s framework. Here, we have distinguished between the different
levels of discourse analysis (text and discursive practices) by each organisation which will enable this
research to contrast different discourses and reveal how environmental change and forced migration
in Bangladesh is framed by international and regional organizations, the Government of Bangladesh
and a local NGO. In the final part, the dominant discourses will be analysed drawing upon
Fairclough’s theory on language and power, and Foucault’s concepts of governmentality in order to
understand how the discourses link to different strategies of governing environmental refugees.
7.1 International Organisations for Migration (IOM)
IOM’s report, Assessing the Evidence: Environment, Climate Change and Migration in Bangladesh
(2010), was made in conjunction with Bangladesh’s first Policy Dialogue on climate change and
migration on the one year anniversary of Cyclone Aila, including discussion from government policy
makers, representatives of civil society and donors (IOM, 2010:vi)
7.1.1 Framing environmental refugees
When it comes to wording, IOM uses the term "environmental migrants", which are defined as
"persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment
that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or
choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or
abroad” (IOM, 2010:4). This definition incorporates both forced and voluntary, temporary and
permanently, whereas people in most need of protection are blurred and left unrecognised. By using
such structuring of the words as a mode of argumentation, it helps IOM to construct the labelling of
environmental refugees as migrants (Fairclough, 1992: 235-236).
In relation to this, migration is not seen as wholly forced or voluntary, because there are clear cases
of both, but also indefinable ones, they argue (IOM, 2010:4). This leads IOM to refer to migration as
a "continuum", which means that forced and voluntary migration is put into one category, which
includes a large grey area (IOM, 2010:ix, 3-4). This leaves the definitional and conceptual issues of
environmental refugees rather vague. Seen from the CDA perspective, the choice of wording results
in reproducing the uncertainties surrounding the relationship between environmental change and
migration (Fairclough, 1992: 236).
37
Moreover the report uses wordings, that relates to policy-making in the favour of planned migration,
such as "minimize the risks and maximize the benefits of environmentally induced migration" (Ibid.:
vii, x, xi, xiv, 6, 9, 11, 22, 34, 41, 42). For example, it is mentioned that a benefit could be managed
and controlled migration from and between vulnerable regions, because it may diversify the sources
of livelihood income, create remittances and alleviate pressure on degraded land (Ibid.:xiv, 6). This
choice of wording highlights the positive aspects of migration, when it is controlled (Fairclough,
1992: 236). Other dominant words are "exposure", "vulnerability", "threat", "human security", and
"victims of displacement", which place focus on security with concern on victimization (especially
for elderly, women and children; Ibid.:ix, xi, xii, 3, 7, 11, 21, 25, 27). According to Fairclough, the
use of language and the way the subjects are constructed, is emphasised through terms, which indicate
their passive role as victims (Fairclough, 1992:235-236).
7.1.2 Intertextual Representations of Environmental Refugees
IOM presents the problem of climate change to be a multi-causal one, which means that
environmental degradation may be the driver of migration, but it is compounded with social or
economic factors as well (IOM, 2010:ix). IOM also states that migration is a response or adaptation
strategy to climate change, but it is individual whether someone "decides" to move or not, depending
on resources, networks and the individual ability to cope with shock or stress (Ibid.). Even though
IOM problematises the complex nature of migration and environmental change by assigning the greyarea term "continuum", they also assert that there has been an interdependency between the
environment and the migratory patterns of people, but that migration is usually compounded by other
factors, such as economic and social ones (IOM, 2010:2-3). By this reasoning, IOM represent an
ideational meaning that migration and environmental change have a “naturalized” relationship by
claiming that it has been an adaptation strategy for “millennia” to migrate, and, consequently, they
suggest a solution centered on a “naturalized” approach for people to adapt (Fairclough, 1992: 234).
The report also highlights the problems of poverty, increasing population, while citing the IPCC
report that “a lack of adaptive capacity is often the most important factor that creates a hotspot of
human variability” and thus put focus on the problem of environmental refugees as being one related
to development. According to IOM, “fundamental to assessing adaptive capacity is a country's level
of development, because wealth and technology increase capacity, while poverty generally limits it”
(IOM, 2010:8). This way of representing the problems of environmental change in Bangladesh,
suggests that development could help solve the problems of environmental migrants, and that climate
38
change could be tackled through domestic solutions, which is further legitimized by referring to
scientific knowledge. The policy-making suggestions by IOM rely on mainstreaming migration into
development, climate change and environment policy and allow adaptation strategies to "minimize
the risks and maximize the benefits of human mobility (IOM, 2010:x, xiii, 6).
Furthermore, IOM warns that the highlighting stories, or "narratives" as IOM calls them, about mass
displacement in coastal areas, which are affected by repeating floods, are damaging to the
development of the area because the stories "risk undermining the case for investment and adaptation
measures in vulnerable coastal regions..." (IOM, 2010:xii). Thereby, IOM places development as one
of the main strategies and priorities for easing the effects of climate change for the population and
country also by the use of references, arguments and suggestions made about the adaptation strategies
of migration (Fairclough, 1992:232). IOM refers to the Government of Bangladesh in ways that
support their approach of solutions (see the Government of Bangladesh further down) for example
by using statistics and policy documents from the Government of Bangladesh (GoB), and crediting
that GoB’s adaptation measures are “certainly feasible (for example, those outlined in Bangladesh's
NAPA and Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan)” (IOM, 2010:xii, 1). Thereby, the
intertextuality in the use of references creates a constitutive standpoint on the GoB’s approach from
the side of IOM, by which they agree and align with their discourse (the GoB), which will be analysed
further down (Fairclough, 1992:233-234).
The wordings reflect the production of uncertainties between environmental change and migration,
while the terminology victimizes the affected. However, it underlines migration as a benefit as well,
and the discourse types from the IOM report are conclusively "development" or rather the lack of it
as a cause of migration due to environmental changes (Fairclough, 1992:232, 234).
7.2 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
The policy papers by the UNHCR includes: a general policy paper that is updated in line with
developments within the debate concerning climate change (UNHCR, 2009:1); "Climate Change
Induced Displacement: Identifying Gaps and Responses" (2011a) and; "Climate Change Induced
Displacement: Adaptation Policy in the Context of the UNFCCC Climate Negotiations" (2011b). The
latter two were done for the expert roundtable on climate change and displacement (UNHCR, 2011a).
39
7.2.1 Framing Environmental Refugees
UNHCR states that any policies on climate change should target "vulnerable and socially
marginalized groups, such as the poor, children, women, older persons, indigenous peoples and, in
some cases, migrants and displaced people who may be particularly exposed to environmental
impacts." (UNHCR 2011b:15). The use of language in the above quote, distinguishes migrants and
displaced people from what is perceived to be vulnerable groups of people. The keywords in the
sentence are "in some cases" and "who may be", because these words fall under Fairclough's category
of modality, which underlines the affinity expressed in the statement (Fairclough 1992:236). Hereby,
the UNHCR distances itself from including migrants and displaced fully in protection needs, and
keep them in the uncertain.
Furthermore, the wording used by UNHCR, when mentioning people affected by environmental
change, make no use of the term “refugee” as they argue that this has no basis in international refugee
law (UNHCR, 2009:8; Fairclough, 1992:236-237). By this, UNHCR mainly underpins their argument
on the basis of a legal aspect and they add a legal meaning to the word refugee (Fairclough, 1992:236).
This will be further elaborated in the second part of the CDA, but here it is interesting to explore
UNHCR’s choice of words when defining the environmental refugees, based upon the above
argument. UNHCR mainly uses terms such as “those/people affected by climate change” and
"environmentally induced migrants" (UNHCR 2009) when defining environmental refugees, which
is a vague formulation and open for interpretation, whereby the choice of words contributes to
downplay the seriousness of the problem (Fairclough, 1992:236)
UNHCR uses the term ”threat multiplier” in relation to the effects of climate change (UNHCR
2011a:1) and climate change is equally presented as an exacerbating factor to “the scale and
complexity of human mobility and displacement” (UNHCR 2009:1). This type of wording indicates
both that the environmentally induced displacement is seen as a threat but it is also witnessing the
complexity and multicausality which UNHCR links to the issue (Fairclough, 1992: 236).
7.2.2 Intertextual Representation of Environmental Refugees
The UNHCR reasons that when the term “refugee” is not legally endorsed, it could undermine the
international legal regime for the protection of refugees, protected by the 1951 Refugee Convention.
It is argued by the UNHCR that if the current refugee definition were to be changed to include people
affected by environmental changes, it could renegotiate the entire definition of what a "refugee" is,
and moreover, it may lower the protection standard for refugees (UNHCR, 2009:9). In addition, the
40
core issue of giving "climate refugees" a legal status is seen to be whether people, who do cross an
international border because of climate related reasons, are in need of protection, and if so, on what
grounds this would be an entitlement (UNHCR 2009:3, 5). Hence, "their status remains unclear", as
Walter Kälin puts it (Ibid.:4-5). The effect of such a position further reinforces the dominant discourse
of who is a legitimate refugee, and that is those that can meet the specified standards of the 1951
Convention (McNamara, 2007:19, Keane, 2004:215; Williams, 2008:514; Fairclough, 1992).
As for the term “threat multiplier” used by the UNHCR concerning the effects of climate change,
stems from an earlier UN Security Council report on security implications which the “Climate change
and displacement: identifying gaps and responses” makes use of (UNHCR 2011a:1). "Threat
multiplier" refers to the exacerbating effect, which climate change has on existing issues such as
conflicts and it could be an international security issue (Ibid.). The terms “threat”, “threat multiplier”
and “security issue” relate directly to a perceived security problem which not only extend to
neighbouring areas but also the directly affected people themselves, in the sense that their safety of
lives, health and income is affected (UNHCR 2009:10). In the context of intertextuality and
interdiscursivity, the reference to the UN Security Council highly works as a representation of the
migration-security discourse whereby it bears witness of a framing of the environmental refugees as
a threat to security (Fairclough, 1992:232-233).
The UNHCR's way of reasoning seems to falter between two arguments: the growing demand for
protection if more conflicts occur, and the difficulty of tracing conflicts' origin, which is relevant for
environmental refugees in the sense that they are not internationally recognized, while it depends on
conflicts resulted from environmental change to occur (UNHCR 2009:6). The implication is that no
legal solution is applied and the importance of protection relies on more conflicts in the future
(UNHCR 2009:3). The dilemma is how would these conflicts be traced back to the effects of climate
change, and hence, the UNHCR does not produce a consistency between their arguments and their
plans, which Fairclough terms “coherence” in critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992:233).
In addition, much focus is placed on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement for the
protection of people affected by environmental change as long as they are displaced within the
country. If they cross an international border, they enjoy no such rights. Hence, the responsibility for
people affected by environmental degradation, where displacement is internal, relies on the national
and local authorities. This can be seen in connection with the adaptation measures being increased
targets for funding and encouraged by the UNHCR to be a win-win perspective because vulnerability
41
reduction and support of sustainable development may ease the most vulnerable countries, which in
turn can help reduce migration pressures and minimize forced international migration (UNHCR
2011b:13, 15, 17). Cross-border migration is then the least desired option for the UNHCR, and the
solution framework works on a national level.
The arguments result in linking adaptation measures and the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement with preventive strategies of cross-border displacement, which give other countries
incentive to support developmental programmes because it may reduce international displacement if
people within the country are less vulnerable (Fairclough, 1992:232). The way the UNHCR
represents the problem becomes a matter of national development which puts pressure on the
government instead of the international community. Conclusively, the dominant discourses of
UNHCR are “development” also regarding adaptation measures to combat inadequate resilience to
environmental change, but also “security” in the form of presenting the problem as a threat to different
aspects of life, such as health, social tensions and economy.
7.3 European Union (EU)
The report is a joint report by the High Representative and the European Commision to the European
Council on the matter of the impact of Climate Change on international security (EU, 2008:2).
7.3.1 Framing Environmental Refugees
EU starts the report with the statement: “The risks posed by climate change are real and its impacts
are already taking place” (EU, 2008:2), and continues later on in the report: “It is important to
recognise that the risks are not just of a humanitarian nature; they also include political and security
risks that directly affect European interests.” (EU, 2008:3). By choosing the noun ‘risk’ in the context
of climate change, it is understood that EU perceive the consequences of climate change as a threat.
This opening sentence of the EU report expresses the extent to which the understanding is throughout
the text, and in the light of the CDA this can be seen as the multifunctionality of the clauses used and
expresses both the actual textual meaning but also as a presentation of the ideational part of the report
(Fairclough, 1992:76). The wording here is interesting because the main theme of the text to a large
degree becomes ‘risk’ instead of ‘climate change’ due to the composition of the sentence. The last
part of the sentence contains the utterances that the problems “are real and its impacts are already
taking place”, whereby it is emphasized that the problem is indeed present and urgent, implying that
the ‘risks’ associated with environmental change and migration needs to be addressed in an immediate
fashion. The impact or consequence, that is perceived as a threat, is among other things “unmanaged
42
migration” (EU, 2008:8), which is not specifically defined in the report, but its associations are
migration, which is not ‘controlled’ or ‘planned’. In this sense it refers to security issues with the term
‘unmanaged’, and this threat is linked to the European context as a source of conflict in transit areas
and receiving countries (EU, 2008:5).
As for the term environmental refugees, EU uses the term “environmental migrants” or
“environmentally induced migration” (EU, 2008:5), and thereby not defining whether it is forced or
voluntary, but by linking the migration with words such as “unmanaged”, “risk”, “threat” and
“conflict”, the focus is shifting towards the increasing effects of climate change on migration and the
unwanted consequence. The ‘migration-conflict’ link can be found elsewhere in the report where the
subject of environmental refugees are further elaborated under the headline “Threats” and with the
words introducing it as “...some of the forms of conflict driven by climate change…” (EU, 2008:4).
Here, the scenario of migration as a threat is described with wordings such as “millions of
environmental migrants…” and “...increased migratory pressure”, the last to be understood in the
European context (EU, 2008: 5). There is a cohesion when all the different parts of the text are viewed
in a broader context or as a larger unit of the text (Fairclough, 1992:77). By considering the various
utterances within one textual combined unit, the overall understanding of environmental migration is
the “increased” and “unmanaged” problem and furthermore in the amounts of “millions”. This also
has indeed political significance which will be further elaborated in the second and third level of
analysis.
As for the overall understanding, EU uses IPCC as a reference, defining climate change as an increase
in the temperature on a global level that is global warming. This reference to a scientific definition is
then directly linked to the security issue as it is phrased that the global warming will “...trigger a
number of tipping points… and lead to unprecedented security scenarios…” (EU, 2008: 2). By the
composition of the sentences and the claims made, it is not salient which statement is based on the
reference and thereby presenting it as an objective angle, that are a part of the reports’ own
assessment, but by intersecting the two parts, the statement of the climate change as a security threat
appears just as objectively indisputable as the fact that global warming will lead to temperature rise.
In relation to the CDA this has to do with the modality of the text and how truth is represented
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002:84). When stating that ‘global warming’ will lead to “unprecedented
security scenarios” there is no uncertainty embedded in the sentence whereby the consequences of
global warming on the international security is set up as a truth. There is indeed a great amount of
modality when the interpretation is presented as a fact as it is the case in the sentence above (Jørgensen
43
& Phillips, 2002:84), since that presumably comes to predictions of future scenarios that can not
necessarily be seen as objective facts or an absolute truth. Climate change is also seen as a “threat
multiplier” which “amplify instability” in already “fragile and conflict prone” areas (EU, 2008:3). So
the threat is in fact already existing but can be worsened by the effects of climate change.
7.3.2 Intertextual Representation of Environmental Refugees
The dominant discourse in the text is largely about security and the way of representing
environmental refugees is based on this conception. Labelling environmental refugees as
“environmental migrants” and linking the term with wordings such as “unmanaged”, and “risk”
indeed represent the dominant security discourse (Fairclough, 1992: 234).
In the light of the CDA, it is relevant to look at the intertextuality and what references EU uses when
stating their assessment of the issue of environmental refugees, since EU refers to IPCC as a source
of knowledge. The facts from the IPCC are used without clarification and demarcation whereas the
quotes from the reference is translated into the representing discourse of the report (Fairclough,
1992:232-234). All of this will have implications on which solutions are suggested to address the
problem, and how the international governing of environmental refugees is represented which will be
further elaborated in the third part of the analysis.
It is noteworthy that EU, in a geographical example, emphasises South Asia as one of the areas where
climate change will multiply already existing pressure (EU, 2008:7-8). Again, migration is described
as “unmanaged” and linked to “conflict”, but the main threat highlighted is that this can lead to
instability in a region where Europe has economic interests (EU, 2008:8).
There are mainly three recommendations suggested (EU, 2008:9). First, the enhancement of the
capacities at the EU level. This means researching and monitoring the security threats, meaning here
radicalisation, etc. (EU, 2008:10). Second, a recommendation that focuses on EU in charge of
multilateral leadership. EU describes their own role in the international climate change negotiation
as vital and is advocating for a multilateral response (EU, 2008:10). Action is suggested such as
strengthening international laws (for example the law of the sea) and further development of a
comprehensive European migration policy (EU, 2008:11). Third, there should be focus on
cooperation with third countries, mainly through various adaptation and mitigation strategies onsite
(EU, 2008:12). The implications of these solutions suggested will be elaborated in the third part of
the CDA.
44
7.4. Asian Development Bank
The report is mainly based upon analysis and research on climate change and migration carried out
by different contributors, mainly from the academic world, on behalf of the ADB. The report is a part
of a larger project on the issue of climate change and migration (ADB, 2011:v).
7.4.1 Framing Environmental Refugees
The main theme of the text is climate change and migration in Asia and the Pacific, and more
specifically that environmental refugees will pose a “serious threat to growth and stability of Asia
and the Pacific” (ADB, 2011:v). In contrast to the EU report, this type of wording puts more emphasis
on migration as a threat to development and growth rather than conflict and radicalization.
(Fairclough, 1992:236-237), but still the threat is partly described as the risk of instability in receiving
countries in the context of cross border migration (ADB, 2011:vi). ADB defines the climate induced
migrants as, “...persons or groups who, for compelling reasons of climate induced changes in the
environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to move from their
habitual home, or choose to do so, within their country of residence or abroad.” (ADB, 2011:5). This
definition, including the choice of wording, such as “compelling reasons” and “obliged to move from
their home”, one is free to interpret whether this should be understood as convincing and
overwhelming reasons or this could be translated directly to forced (Fairclough, 1992: 236-237).
Along with the phrase “obliged to move from their home” may indeed downplay the seriousness of
the situation and set up a line throughout the report where it is made clear that the migrants are not to
be compared with refugees. Had the wording on the contrary been “forced to flee their home”, this
would indeed lead in another direction. Furthermore, ADB distinguishes between the international
and intranational migration. This is discussed on the basis of the legal platform of the already existing
laws for IDPs and refugees since the problems related to the overall framework of legislation is indeed
the same (ADB, 2011:30). This concerns the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the
legal terming of refugees from the 1951 Refugee Convention (ADB, 2011:30, 65). ADB uses this
reference to further argue why it would not be correct to apply the refugee label on people forced to
flee as a result of environmental change. In relation to intranational migration, they argue that the
problem of developing legislation for intranational climate change migrants are the same as with IDP
since the sovereignty of the states still is an indisputable factor in relation to the legislation. As for
international migration ADB assesses that the migrants do not meet the criteria for being legally
recognized within the aforementioned frames (ADB, 2011:30-31). Referring to international
acknowledged guiding principles and legal regulations to underpin ADBs arguments to make them
45
somewhat more credible at the international arena. An additional argument from ADB of relevance
to the debate about whether or not environmental refugees could be included in the existing legal
framework on IDPs and refugees, is that it is not very “easy” to distinguish between voluntary and
forced migration (ADB, 2011:31-32). The term “climate induced migration/migrants” are used
throughout the report but with the recognition that environmental factors are only one factor among
many that works as drivers for migration (ADB, 2011:4).
7.4.2 Intertextual Representation of Environmental Refugees
In relation to the term “climate induced migration/migrants” there are two main points that underpin
ADB arguments further; first, climate induced migration mainly takes place within national borders,
however ADB assesses that there will be an increase in climate induced cross border migration in the
near future (ADB, 2011:vi). Second, it is emphasized how the multi-causality of migration makes it
difficult to form an adequate definition, but there is still an urge to define climate induced migration
due to the fact that it is necessary to develop comprehensive policies (ADB, 2011:5). ADB
approaches this complexity by aiming to “position climate induced migration within the broader
framework of migration dynamics in Asia and the Pacific” (ADB, 2011:vi, 2). The report suggests an
approach where climate induced migration is seen as an “adaptation strategy mobilized by migrants
themselves” rather than “a failure to adapt”, suggesting that the issue of environmental change and
migration could be tackled through local mitigation and adaption strategies (ADB, 2011:vi). The
overall aim of the report is to provide recommendations for policies and cooperation on an
international basis as it is emphasized that "whether migration can become an adaptation strategy or
will be a survival option of last resort depends upon the policy decisions we make today" (ADB,
2011:vii).
The terming of environmental refugees as “climate migrants” with the issue of multicausality
incorporated, is representing a broader discourse on the understanding of drivers for migration, and
the ADB also uses various academic references in conceptualizing climate change: migration nexus
(ADB, 2011:29; Fairclough, 1992:234). In the report, Bangladesh as part of the South Asia region is
recognized as to be one of the most vulnerable of the region to the impact of climate change, and
furthermore it is expected to be one of the most affected in the world (ADB, 2011:24, 46-50). ADB
assesses, referring to IPCC, that “climate changes in Bangladesh would likely exacerbate present
environmental conditions” (ADB, 2011:21).
46
ADB uses a theoretical model by Richmond and Hugo (ADB, 2011:29) to conceptualise climate
change-migration nexus (ADB, 2011:29). The main point of using the theoretical model as a
representation of ADB’s understanding, is to further highlight the multicausality of climate change
induced migration. In line with this, ADB also stresses the inapplicability of a theoretical approach
that does not recognize this and thereby present a discourse that rejects the deterministic typologies
that attempt to create a direct link between certain environmental changes and migration patterns
(ADB, 2011:30).
7.5 Government of Bangladesh
The Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (2009) is a revised version of an earlier
plan from 2008, and it was published by the Ministry of Environment and Forests of the Government
of the Republic of Bangladesh (BCCSAP 2009:ix).
7.5.1 Framing environmental refugees
The report from Bangladesh uses the term “environmental refugees" and uses dominant wordings
such as "the poor and vulnerable, including women and children" to denote people who are very
affected by climate change (BCCSAP, 2009:xvii, 2, 27). Other examples of dominant wordings
concerning subjects are "hardship on women and children" and "climate change is likely to affect
women more than men", which are terms that highly victimize the affected people (BCCSAP
2009:14, 16). Besides these, other words such as "threats", and "terror of climate" are used, suggesting
urgency and security (BCCSAP 2009:xi, xvii, 16). Thus, by using such words in relation to climate
change, the word meaning of the language use, attempts to construct their subject position as
vulnerable and victimised in need of help (Fairclough 1992:236).
We have included the foreword of the IOM report, by Dr. Hasan Mahmud (MP, State Minister,
Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh), as
representative of the Government of Bangladesh. He uses wordings, which include: "growing threat
of climate change", "Bangladesh is plagued", "[most] vulnerable", and "human insecurity" (IOM
2010:vi), which further helps to construct Bangladesh as victims of environmental change. Thus by
highlighting words such as “growing threat”, it indicates that the problems are present and urgent,
and that future scenarios will be even worse. The meaning of the word “plague” also implies that the
effects and consequences of environmental change is something beyond the control of Bangladesh.
This rhetorical mode of representing the reality in Bangladesh further emphasises the moral
responsibility of the international community (Fairclough, 1992:235-236).
47
7.5.2 Intertextual Representations of Environmental Refugees
The representation of the problems in Bangladesh focuses on development in the sense that it
highlights the effects environmental changes on the population and the economy of Bangladesh
(BCCSAP 2009:4-14, 38). For example, the report cites that the goal of BCCSAP is to "reduce and/or
eliminate the risks climate change poses to national development" and to "rapidly develop the
country" (BCCSAP 2009:24). This is also reflected in the way the data, statistics and numbers are
used to highlight the "facts" and the severity of the situation in Bangladesh as the "most vulnerable"
(Ibid.). It is stated that it is a priority to secure a stable "growth path" for Bangladesh and that any
approach requires the business sector, as well as implementation of development programmes
(BCCSAP 2009:19). Coupled with the emphasis and victimisation of the poor, women and children,
and "environmental refugees" the reports indicate that the problem is a developmental issue as well
as environmental (BCCSAP 2009:xiii, xv). This is done by making a coherence between the
vulnerability of poverty and the creation of the fact used throughout the report which states that
climate change poses a risk to national development, because it relies heavily on agriculture, which
in turn is affected by environmental change (Fairclough 1992:233). The truth, or fact, is created
through statements such as "climate change is one such major and long-term constraint permeating
all sectors of the economy adversely affecting the well-being of men and women, young and old..."
(BCCSAP 2009:xi). It is not backed up with any explanation or reference, rather taken as a fact or a
truth that the problem lies in development which influences the wellbeing of population (Fairclough
1992:233-234). The focus on national development points toward capacity building of climate change
resilience as the most preferable option, and does not mention cross-border migration. The
combination of focus on development and victimisation could also be a way to attract more
international support, since the development budget is "burdened" (BCCSAP 2009:25). The dominant
discourse is that of "development" with focus on building up strong resilience through adaptation
measures and poverty reduction.
7.6 Association for Climate Refugees (ACR)
The datas used from the ACR are mainly web-based online publications from the organisation on the
matter of climate refugees in Bangladesh.
7.6.1 Framing Environmental Refugees
The ACR uses the term “climate refugees”, and it is evident that the chosen parlance is characterized
by this terming (ACR, 2013a; Fairclough, 1992:236). The refugees are described with the wordings
48
such as “the face of the human tragedy” of climate change, as “held captive” by the impacts of climate
change and “forced to flee”. From this choice of words it could be understood that the labeling is
mainly associated with victimisation of the people affected by climate change (Fairclough, 1992:
234-237).
Environmental change is described as the “single most important global issue there is” and ACR
assesses that there are around 6.5 million climate refugees in Bangladesh and this number will
increase in the future, even more than the official numbers estimating around 30 million climate
refugees in the year of 2050 (ACR, 2013a). As ACR phrases it; “The climate refugees’ issue has
gained ground but greater challenges lies ahead” (Ibid.), and thereby ACR outlines both the
seriousness of the present situation but furthermore the severity of future scenario.
ACR does not see the current solutions submitted on the national level as adequate, and in particular
when focusing on the most vulnerable, ACR assesses that the strategies of the Government of
Bangladesh will not be sufficient (Ibid.). Concerns about the political ability to establish sustainable
solutions is also evident as ACR phrases that “Even if the government does develop a comprehensive
policy on climate induced migration, many suspect that it will fail to implement such policy because
of widespread corruption within the government.” (Ibid.). It could thus be understood from the above
phrasing that ACR are somewhat sceptical towards the government’s ability to play the leading role
but nevertheless they do see them as “duty bearers” (Ibid.). The solutions suggested by the ACR does
indeed differ from the government’s approach, which will be further elaborated in the section
below.
7.6.2 Intertextuality Representation of Environmental Refugees
ACR sees migration as an adaptation strategy but mainly within the border of the country (Ibid.).
Here it should be noted that ACR does see migration leading to cross border movement as well, but
they emphasise that successful relocation to other countries is dependent on the Government of
Bangladesh to succeed in sustainable local solutions first, implying that ACR sees the Government
of Bangladesh as “duty bearers” and indeed does not live up to their responsibility (Ibid.) ACR’s
overall mission on the national level is to ensure that every climate refugee in Bangladesh is
guaranteed “new land for lost land, new house for lost house and new livelihood option for the lost
ones” (ACR, 2013b) but ACR also focuses on the global level and pledges for a comprehensive legal
framework protecting the refugees (Ibid.).
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As mentioned above ACR uses the term climate refugees but they are working on making a distinction
between climate refugees, climate-induced economic migrants, climate displaced person and
environmental refugees (ACR, 2013c), in order to prioritise the need of the people according to the
degree of vulnerability. That means that they recognise that not all displaced persons are climate
refugees, but rather take into account the different circumstances in which climate change affects the
decision to migrate. The diversity of the definition helps to ensure that the people in most need can
be recognized as refugees, and this initiative is also a part of the larger international debate and
struggle to whether or not environmental refugees can be included under an already existing legal
framework. It can thus be understood that ACR are working towards obtaining an international
accepted “refugee label” as the one in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Furthermore, ACR experiences
shortcomings when it comes to the international organisations to provide such refugee label, “there
is also a great reluctance on the part of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) regarding
revision of the definition of refugees to include climate refugees” (ACR, 2013b). It is interesting that
ACR is somewhat critical towards the dominant actors in the governing of environmental refugees in
Bangladesh; the Government of Bangladesh and UNHCR.
7.7. Summary
To contrast the different representations of environmental change and forced migration (See table 2.),
and how environmental refugees are framed, we can conclude that the policies and reports on the
international level, by the UNHCR and the IOM, convey discourses centered around development,
poverty and lack of capacity to adapt to climate change, and thus suggests domestic solutions to the
effects of climate change. UNHCR, however, also focus on possible security implications of
migration caused by climate change. Meanwhile at the regional level, EU is explicitly concerned with
security threats caused by environmental related conflicts, while ADB is more focused on threats to
growth and development. The government of Bangladesh reflects the developmental focus with the
priority of increasing national capacity building resilience to climate change. These discourses differ
from the local level where ACR focuses more on highlighting the vulnerability and plight of
environmental refugees.
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Table 2.
Organisation
IOM
Terminology
Environmental
migrants
Problem Definition
Climate change is not the only
reason for migration, hence
multi-causality. Poverty further
enhances the problem perception
Solutions Suggested
Mainstream migration into
development, climate change
policy. Allow domestic
adaptation strategies
UNHCR
Environmentally
induced migrants,
people affected by
climate change
Europe Union
Environmental
migrants,
environmentally
induced migration
Climate migrants,
climate induced
migration
Climate change is seen as a
“threat multiplier”, resulting in a
domino effect of impacts in
health, society, and economy.
This complicates human
mobility and displacement
Climate change is presented as a
risk and a threat to security in
Europe
Mitigation options and
domestic adaptation
strategies, which other
countries may fund in order
to reduce migration pressures
(win-win perspective)
Strengthen the European
migration policy and
international law.
Local adaptation.
Migration is seen as an,
intranational adaptation
strategy rather than a failure
to adapt
Mitigation and adaptation
measures through building up
the economy and investing in
poverty reduction
Migration as an local
adaptation strategy
A global legal framework
that acknowledge the climate
refugees
Asian
Development
Bank
Government of
Bangladesh
Environmental
refugees, the poor and
vulnerable
Association for
climate
refugees
Climate refugees
Climate change is not the only
driver for migration, thus the
multicausality
Climate change negatively
permeates all sectors of the
economy, risking the well-being
of people and the country
Climate refugees as victims
No legally founded protection
for them exists
No durable solutions on both the
national and international level
7.8. International governing of environmental refugees: Discourse, Power and
Governmentality
From the textual analysis from above, we can identify three dominant discourses on environmental
change and migration. First, climate change vulnerability due to poverty and a lack of development
is framed as a major cause to migration. Second, security concerns were framed as a consequence of
environmental change and migration. And third, adaptation and mitigation at the national level has
been presented as the most appropriate solution. In this final part, we will engage in a critical approach
to these representations of the environmental refugee phenomena, including the social effects of these
discourses on power relations and critically analyse how these discourses link with different strategies
of governing environmental refugees. This is done by drawing upon Foucault’s concept of
governmentality to investigate how environmental change and migration in Bangladesh is constructed
as a risk, combined with Fairclough’s theory on language and power. Here, it is important to consider
the dialectical relationship between the discourses and social practices, meaning that these dominant
51
discourses, that is how some explanations have come to be regarded as universal and natural, are
reflections of a deeper social reality, which also shapes discourses (Fairclough, 1992:65). As we are
concerned with the ideological effects of the language use of those in power, those who have the
means to change and improve conditions, we will especially focus on why some ways of making
meaning are dominant and have come to regarded as the “right way”. As we shall argue below, the
policy documents and reports from the organisations we have analysed (EU, UNHCR, ADB, GoB)
all carry with them an ideological dimension that further reinforces particular representations as
common-sense, resulting in the rendering environmental refugees governable as a security issue in
one way or another.
7.8.1. Environmental refugees are migrants: Customary law is required
How the concept of environmental refugees is defined, applied and denied in the policy documents
and reports convey how environmental change has been securitized as a risk and how power has
operated in this sphere. Describing the nature of the phenomena of environmental change and
migration, EU, UNHCR, IOM, ADB avoids taking a position on whether there is a direct link between
environmental change and migration and questions the existence of environmental refugee, by
arguing that the phenomena is just one of the many factors influencing the decision to migrate based
on scientific knowledge.
Identity construction is a technique of governmentality through which different actors exercise power
over the individuals and society (Foucault, 1978 in Lemke, 2002).When referring to environmental
refugees in Bangladesh the actors studied (this does not include ACR and the GoB), uses different
terms for the same end. They have constructed identities that pose restrictions on the rights of these
people in order to include and exclude. Identities such as “environmental migrants”, “climate induced
migrants”, “environmental displaced persons” render the refugees unprotected by existing refugee
legislative framework. The actors used different arguments to represent environmental refugees as a
sub-category of internal migrants. The main concern is that by accepting the term environmental
refugees, they might be bound to offer the same protection as with political refugees. Therefore,
environmental refugees are given alternative names and explanations and needed to be constructed
as helpless victims of environmental change who are in need of protection on the base of human right
approach. Thus, falling outside the scope of the international framework of refugee law, they are
consequently left under customary law. This practice of managing unwanted circulation of people
aims to keep the lifestyle of the referent object, the nation-state, uninterrupted (Foucault, 2007 in
52
Oels, 2013). This approach at the same time responsibilizes the government of Bangladesh which has
to deal with the social, economical and political impacts environmental change migration within the
country.
We argue that this top-down provision of protection on the base of humanitarian approach is a
traditional risk management governmentality which aims to manage risks at a tolerable level based
on cost and benefit analysis. It serves as a containment strategy that reduces the risk of cross border
migration to developed nation. It is also biopolitical technology of risk management where the
intention seems to improve the well being and security of the affected people, but serves as a
technique of keeping the refugees at the gate of Bangladesh. Through a human rights approach on
environmental refugees, borders of the developed nations are fortified to contain (Duffield, 2007).
Duffield argues that this need to control the migration of future environmental refugees is the
international actors’ concept of race where migrant communities represent poverty and therefore a
strain on the referent object’s public resources, and an end to their way of life.
Moreover, the discourses articulated through the policy documents and reports could be seen as
relations of power struggle where groups of different interests engage with one another. In this context
this is particularly visible through the different positions taken on the issue of environmental refugees
by the local organisation ACR and the international organisations. ACR struggling to make their
representation of the world more legitimised through rewording their experience of environmental
change and migration, which is a part of broader social and political struggle to become recognised
as environmental refugees (Fairclough, 1992:77). In the case of IOM and UNHCR, the language use
expressed in the texts is shaped by the structures of the international refugee regime, and the social
structures determining their relationship with donor governments and towards the 1951 Refugee
Convention. Thus, while ACR wishes to extend the definition of refugee to include those forced to
flee due to environmental factors, IOM and UNHCR is constrained by the interests of national
governments, and therefore uses the term migrant instead, which further reinforces the perception of
economic “pull” factors in the decision to migrate, as the term migrant carries more negative
connotations, implying a voluntary movement towards a more attractive lifestyle (Oli, 2008:13). As
has been argued, language use defines certain possibilities while excluding others, and in this context,
the language use by international organisation has the implications of excluding the legal rights of
people forced to flee as a result of environmental factors. By contrasting how the different
organisations frame environmental change and forced migration, and label the people forced to flee
53
as a result of environmental changes, the different knowledge claims presented at the different levels
are understood as reproducing and transforming relations of domination; the international
organisations dominating the monopoly of defining the term ‘refugee’, excluding any other type of
forced migrants, while ACR attempts to transform the meaning of the term to bring changes in the
physical world and overcome the subordination of this category. Thus, the rewording of the term
‘refugee’ to include those who are forced to flee as a result of environmental change, could be seen
as an attempt to change discourses and consequently also the social world, however, the effects have
been rather marginalised as other dominant representations have been mainstreamed in the discourse
on environmental refugees (Fairclough, 2003:206).
Moreover, there exists within the discourses, articulated by the international organisations, particular
value systems and common-sense assumptions, including assumptions about what is the case, what
is possible and necessary, that is particularly embedded in their language use, such as drawing upon
poverty alleviation and development aid as being necessary to combat migration caused by
environmental change. This ideological power of Western institutions to present some practices as
universal has thus significant implications on the ways and strategies to control and manage
environmental refugees is constructed. Also, the meaning of the term ‘refugee’ most usually include
particular value systems associated with sympathetic images of suffering, conflict, persecution which
calls for assistance and protection. In this sense, using the term environmental refugee challenges the
taken-for-granted assumptions of refugees, not only by contesting the dominant perception of
refugees but also by invoking new imaginaries.
7.8.2. Environmental change and migration as a security issue: development aid is required
Whose perspective is adopted in the discourses and is there an agenda behind certain explanations?
To address this question it is necessary to also explore how the term environmental refugee has come
to be increasingly politicised, particularly by governments in the global North. According to
Fairclough, the power behind discourse is the exercise of power of text producers in that they can
determine what is included and excluded and how issues and events are represented (Fairclough,
1989:43,50), which also carries significant implications on the way the issue of environmental
refugees are addressed. As seen above, the dominant discourse emphasises the possible security
threat that environmental change and migration may cause, particularly by EU, ADB and to some
extent UNHCR which have emerged and coincided with an increasing global climate of hostility
towards refugees and asylum seekers which have lead to refugees increasingly experiencing
54
difficulties to gain admission and recognition. Thus, the current non-arrival regime is not only
determined by the discourse on security, but is also the product of the discourse. This dialectical
relationship between the discourse and society is especially particular for EU, where the agenda
behind the security discourse has emerged during circumstances of increasing anti-immigration
rhetoric, which has been further reinforced by the alarmist predictions of large-scale displacement
due to environmental change (Castle, 2002:9; Kibreab, 1997:20). Thus, highlighting the possible
security threat and avoiding the term environmental refugees can further legitimize their agenda of
restricting the arrivals of a new category of refugees. Moreover, the possibility of large-scale cross
border movement of environmental refugees further invokes images of political instability, conflict
triggered by environmental scarcity, and pressures on receiving societies, which implies a securitybased conception of environmental migration (Mayer, 2013:17,118-120; Boano, et. al. 2008:4;
Morrissey, 2009:8). Although IOM and UNHCR does not explicitly represent the problems of
environmental change and migration as a security threat, the discourses thus implies that investing
financial support to reduce poverty and enhance development to increase the adaptive capacity of
Bangladesh to face climate change is investing in global security since it highlights the potential costs
of inaction on climate change. Thus, investing in development aid in Bangladesh also helps to contain
the problem.
The representation of environmental change and migration as a security risk is an important
component of governmentality strategy. Technology of security needs the phenomena of
environmental change and migration to be represented as catastrophic events which are threatening
and out of control. We argue that this implies elements of traditional risk management through
prediction. Of the actors studied, EU, IOM, ADB and GoB predict the phenomena of environmental
migration would be a regional security threat. They predict how decreasing natural resources and
hence increasing competition over them will trigger new conflicts and fuel existing ones and force
people to migrate.
These predictions portray Bangladesh as a security threat that will put populations in danger and
therefore in need of being under control. The phenomena of environmental migration needed to be
riskified, as Corry (2013) put it, or presented as a security threat so that the refugees’ “dangerousness”
can be used as an apparatus to control migration flow within Bangladesh. This security based
conceptualisation of environmental refugees is not because of any actual harm or danger they pose
(Hartmann, 2010). In fact, the link between environmental change and worsening violent conflict has
not yet been supported by empirical evidence (Hulme, 2007).
55
Threat construction through prediction helps to legitimize stricter border controls in the name of
preventing potential social conflicts and harm. Any security risk have to be suppressed through
development aid in order to prevent the countries weakening social cohesion that would lead to
potential mass migration to the developed countries (Duffield, 2007). The idea is that the countries
in north cannot have security unless the economy of developing countries is secured, or normalized.
In this sense, development assistance as a means to address environmental changes and migration is
a biopolitical governmentality strategy used to keep them within Bangladesh so that migration flow
to the developed nations can be prevented. This concept of development is not based on a notion of
selfless concern for the well being of people in Bangladesh to reduce poverty rather it is a strategy of
containment (Duffield, 2006).
7.8.3. Lack of development as the major cause to migration due to environmental change
What is significant about these reports and policy documents is that there are few traces in the texts
related to the responsibility of international community to address to problems of environmental
change, such as the collective responsibility of reducing the greenhouse gas emissions. The reports
and policy documents at the international or regional level were not vocal in suggesting mitigation
by developed countries for controlling global warming to prevent environmental migration. It is
important to remember that it is the countries in the North that are responsible for the human induced
environmental problems, while developing countries are the ones who have to bear the burden for the
consequences. To mention global warming as a cause of environmental migration indicates that the
reasons are human induced, which means that the international community bears the legal and
political responsibility for addressing the issue of environmental change and migration. Accepting
the term environmental refugees would imply accepting responsibility and provide compensation to
people for the impacts of climate change (Morrissey, 2012:38-39). Thus, avoiding the recognition of
environmental refugees also allow governments to ignore the causes of environmental degradation,
which could explain why labels such as “refugee” and “economic migrant” have frequently been
conflated by national interests. Excluding the root causes in their representation of environmental
change and migration is a form of hidden power that is being exercised through the “power to disguise
power”, presenting the consequences without causes or responsibilities. Here, the power of the
dominant groups (EU, UNHCR, IOM) lies in constraining the content of what is said that favour
those of the power-holders in society, that is the national governments.
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Rather than highlighting the underlying root causes to environmental change, special attention has
been drawn to domestic solutions, such as capacity building of the Bangladesh society and building
resilience of vulnerable people, thus shifting the role of responsibility and focus towards the lack of
development as a major factor which the national government itself needs to solve it. The phenomena
of environmental migration needed to be constructed as a problem caused by lack of development so
that development assistance for the GoB could be used as a confinement strategy that is to keep the
risk of cross border migration at a minimum level, although the issue of environmental change
requires international solutions. Development assistance is a way of neo-liberal governing which
serves to silence the urgency required to mitigate the root causes of environmental change (Oels,
2011). Environmental refugees in Bangladesh are being represented as threats at the border of
governments in the North due to environmental degradation and poverty that is actually caused by
these same nations (Duffield, 2007; Lemke,2002). In this sense, the discourse on development aid as
a means to contribute to enhanced national mitigation and adaptation is structured by dominance of
the “Western way” of representing reality, legitimised through the power of the neo-liberal ideology
to present development aid as a universal solution. This way of constructing systems of knowledge
and beliefs surrounding environmental refugees has contributed to viewing development as the
dominant explanation which has been implemented as natural and as the right way.
7.8.4. Local mitigation and adaptation as the best solution for Environmental change and
migration.
Adaptation strategy including local mitigation aims to secure sustainable development by targeting
particularly vulnerable economic sectors with technological innovation and social engineering. All
of the actors studied underline the importance of local mitigation and adaptation strategy for
managing risks associated with environmental migration. EU, UNHCR, IOM, ADB and GoB
acknowledge adaptation strategy as a key strategy of building resilience to physical and economic
disaster in the face of a rising number of expected extreme weather events, resulting in
recommendations focused on building capacity for disaster risk reduction, disaster preparedness and
conflict prevention. Further, they recommend resilience strategy such as capacity building to cope
with adaptation to climate changes at individual, household and community level. This is a strategy
of risk management through contingency which renders communities responsible for the management
of their own risks (Oels 2013). EU, ADB, and UNHCR’s recommendations are based on perceptions
of Bangladesh as a particular security threat, as the country’s institutional capacities could be
overwhelmed by extreme weather events and resulting in mass migration to the developed countries.
57
Thus, the population of Bangladesh are marked out for intervention to enhance their coping capacity
to serve the best interest of the powerful nations. ADB and GoB’s recommendations for preparedness
through adaptation aim to achieve regional and internal economic security.
This could be understood as have been driven by a governmentality of neoliberal government.
Neoliberal government responsibilises actors to adapt, and seeks to change perception so that people
recognize that enhancing their adaptive capacity to environmental change is in their own best interest.
This could be understood as a technology of security where the actors govern through anticipating a
change of mind at the individual level.
When analyzing the discourses on the phenomena of environmental change and migration and the
solutions suggested by the actors studied, we can reveal that the discourses have aided in constructing
environmental refugees that have been rendered governable as a security issue, the vulnerable are
constructed as becoming a possible threat to the industrialised North (Oels, 2013). Thus, while the
responsibility for causing environmental change is left outside discourse, the affected populations of
Bangladesh are disempowered (Oels, 2011, Duffield, 2007).
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8. Conclusion
While environmental change is a global issue which needs global solutions, it is the most vulnerable
low-lying coastal developing countries, countries that have contributed the least to greenhouse gas
emissions that must bear the burden of the effects of environmental change. This has been the case in
Bangladesh, the most vulnerable country to environmental change because of its high-exposure and
its already pre-existing socio-economic vulnerabilities, where the most vulnerable people are forced
to migrate due to loss of livelihood, lack of basic needs, loss of land and homelessness as a result of
environmental change. Many of these groups already lacked secure rights and access to resources
from the beginning. Thus, migration due to environmental change in Bangladesh is already
happening, forcing many people to leave their homes and find sanctuary elsewhere, whether
internally or crossing international borders. However, the weaknesses of the global refugee regime
and the limited applicability of the 1951 Refugee Convention, tend to differentiate and prioritise
people forced to flee conflict and persecution based on reasons of political and religious beliefs. The
established ways of doing things have been unable to reflect the reality of displacement occurring in
the South and failed to reflect changes that constantly reshape the world. Although, there is an
increasing awareness of the role of environmental change on human displacement there exists no
legal term or institutionalised mechanism for the protection of people forced to flee due to
environmental change, thus, the plight of environmental refugees has remained unrecognised, entirely
lacking support from the international community as they have been left outside the scope of
international refugee and immigration policy.
The aim has been to explore the ways environmental refugees are represented, the agenda behind
certain interpretations, and the broader implications of these discourses linked to international
governing of environmental refugees. What we have been analysing and discussing is the hidden
power behind certain dominant explanations and representations of environmental refugees and why
some knowledge of the phenomena are more represented than others. We have engaged in a critical
approach on the ways environmental refugees have been framed and represented at the international,
regional, national and local level by applying Fairclough’s framework to Critical Discourse Analysis
to reveal how the discursive practices of IOM, UNHCR, EU, ADB, the Government of Bangladesh,
and ACR have constructed meaning in their ways of representing the reality of environmental change
and migration in Bangladesh. As different understandings of, and knowledge about the phenomena
is socially constructed and have social consequences, we have applied Foucault’s concept of
governmentality, in combination with the Fairclough’s theory on language and power, to understand
59
the social effects and the dialectical relationship between discourses and other dimensions and
structures of the society, more particular between discourse and the different strategies of governing.
As has been argued above, the dominant discourses, ways of representing and framing environmental
refugees, emphasise the issue of environmental refugees as being one related to poverty and
development, security, and a lack of adaptive capacity to environmental change which is linked with
different strategies of traditional risk management to prevent cross border migration. Traditional risk
management assumes that risks of future migration caused by environmental change can be known,
calculated and controlled on the basis of scientific probability calculations. One such technology of
risk reduction is the targeting of the risk group where governmental interventions are then prioritized
to these dangerous groups in order to differentiate between the most unfavourable and the more
favourable. By highlighting the possible threats environmental change and migration could pose in
the future, by referring to instability, scarce resources, mass migration, and conflict, have allowed
environmental refugees to be rendered governable as a security issue which requires technologies of
security. Technologies of security have thus helped to construct environmental refugees as a security
problem and more specifically as a risk. The aim is to keep national governments uninterrupted by
managing unwanted and wanted circulation of people by framing them as IDPs or migrants, and by
avoiding the term environmental refugees. Governments have strong incentives to keep the refugee
definition narrow because of the obligation it would involve. As has been implied in this research,
labelling is important, as it determines whether or not one has the right to international assistance.
The discourses on environmental refugees have referred to them as IDPs or migrants, which have had
the effect of downplaying the seriousness and urgency.
The effects of the policy documents and reports have worked to promote and maintain relations of
power, through excluding environmental refugees from the restrictive definition of the Refugee
Convention, which has served to naturalise developmental practices in the service of controlling
migration, thus reinforcing the unequal power relations between donor governments and developing
countries. The ideological power, the power to present developmental practices as universal and
implemented as natural, indirectly legitimises existing power relation. Moreover, the technology of
security has served to reduce the risks of cross border movement to a tolerable level, and
responsibilises the people and the Government of Bangladesh to deal with the burden of climate
change themselves, by making them see social risks such as environmental change and poverty, not
as the responsibility of the developed countries, which have been largely responsible for human
induced environmental change. The form of hidden power by representing the problem of
60
environmental change and migration in Bangladesh, without the underlying causes and consequences,
they have been framed in such way to emphasise national and local mitigation and adaptation
capabilities thus shifting the responsibility from the international community to the national and local
level and transforming it into a problem of ‘self-care’.
To conclude this research, although the causes to environmental change requires international
political solutions, the discourses on environmental change and migration have been framed as a risk,
as threatening and out of control, which could be managed through domestic solutions. Through these
representations and by giving environmental refugees such labels as IDPs and migrants, they are
incorporated into apparatuses of control which legitimises stricter border controls in the name of
preventing social harm. Based upon traditional risk management governmentality, this serves as a
containment strategy, to prevent and reduce the risk of cross border migration to developed nations
to a tolerable level based on cost and benefit analysis. Thus, the perspective adopted in the dominant
discourses are those of the governments of the North, the developed countries, that have resulted in
different strategies of risk management through contingency, which renders communities responsible
for the management of their own risks. Development aid is thus a means for the developed countries
through which security threats could be suppressed, and could be understood as a biopolitical
technology of risk management to keep people forced to flee as a result of environmental change
within the borders of Bangladesh.
61
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