Organized interest in the Danish Parliament 1975-2010
Helene Helboe Pedersen
Department of Political Science
Aarhus University
helene@ps.au.dk
Paper prepared for the Danish Political Science Association, November 2011
Very first draft, all comments are welcome
1
Introduction
Interest groups are important political actors in all democracies. They seek political influence by
organizing and mobilizing citizens and by contacting and informing political decision makers. As they try
to influence public policy, interest groups navigate in a complex environment. They operate within
different arenas such as the bureaucracy, the media and also the parliament and they possess different
resources usable in these different arenas (Eising, 2007:332-7; Dür & De Biévre, 2007: 3-6). However the
possible arenas of influence have caught uneven attention. Especially in Europe much attention has
been paid to the administrative arena and the corporatist structures of the bureaucracy whereas the
parliament as an important arena for influence has been less studied (Binderkrantz, 2003: 287;
Rommetvedt, 2002: 85; Norton, 1999: 2). The parliament is however an especially important arena to
study. First, even though many contacts may be established in the diffuse world of administration and
much information is shared in the different corporatist networks, all political decisions which are based
on laws or other parliamentary decisions needs a parliamentary majority. Hence, corporatism evolves in
the shadow of the parliament (Binderkrantz, 2008: 193). Second, the parliament is a unique democratic
institution directly elected by the voters and, hence, the most explicit legitimate representative of the
citizens. The interaction between parliament and interest groups is therefore of special democratic
interest (Christiansen & Nørgaard, 2003: 174-5). For instance, is it a restricted arena for the few and
powerful or an open arena for groups excluded from the corporatist structures of the bureaucracy?
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the contact between interest groups and the
parliament. The argument is twofold. First, we argue that the importance of the parliament as an arena
of influence for interest groups differ depending on the strength of the government vis-á-vis opposition.
Parliament serves at least two different purposes. It processes bills and it controls the government by
asking questions and raising issues in parliamentary debates (Damgaard, 2001: 89; Damgaard, 2007: 74;
Norton, 2002: xi). We argue that the extent to which groups seek influence in bill processing in
parliament depends on the relationship between the government and the opposition. When the
government is strong and governs by a well-established and stabile majority in parliament, the
parliamentary arena is less important than when the government is weak and needs to negotiate its way
through parliament in order to build winning majority coalitions. Hence, we expect more interaction
between interest groups and parliament in relation to bill processing when the government is weak.
Second, we argue that different types of interest groups evaluate the importance of controlling
and raising issues in parliament differently. Interest groups with restricted access to the corporatist
channel and with strong wishes for visibility in order to attract and maintain members are more likely to
2
engage in the parliament’s control function, since this is an opportunity to set the agenda and bring new
issues forward. So, we expect the level of group approaches to differ across interest groups.
We tests these expectations by providing an analysis of all interest group approaches to Danish
standing committees in selected years from 1975 to 2010. The analyses show that the level of interest
group approaches to parliament does indeed vary depending on the strength of the government in
relation to the opposition. Moreover, once parliamentary activities are divided into controlling and bill
processing it becomes evident that different types of groups approach the parliament on different
matters. Public interest groups are mostly active in relation to the agenda setting function of the
parliament whereas groups with corporative resources are more active in relation to the law-making
function.
The paper is organized in five main sections. First the different functions of parliament are
discussed and the expectation that the importance of the parliament for interest groups depend on the
strength of the government is presented. Second, the paper discusses how group strategies for public
policy influence depend on group type and how differences across group strategies relate to the
parliamentary arena. Third, the research design and data are presented before the analyses are carried
out in the forth section. Finally, in the fifth section the paper concludes and the findings are discussed in
relation to preliminary data on group influence in the Danish parliament.
The importance of the parliamentary arena
The European literature on interest groups has focused heavily on the corporatist channel. The
parliament – or the numerical channel – has been seen as less important since scholars have concluded
that coalition formation and substantial discussions on bills are carried out before the bill even reach
parliament (Damgaard, 1994: 85; Damgaard, 2001: 89; Norton, 1999: 2). However, this conclusion is
based on the premise that the most important function of the parliament is to process bills, while the
parliament is actually doing a lot more. Members of parliament ask questions to the minister in order to
control her or his initiatives and behavior and they put new issues on the agenda by asking questions,
proposing bills or parliamentary decision. Hence, the parliament is not only a law-making arena but also
an arena of debate and competition among political actors of different opinions (Blondel, 1973;
Damgaard, 2001: 89; Norton, 2002: xi). As such it is an arena worthwhile for interest groups to approach
(Norton, 1999: 9). Even in the case of law making, all bills need a parliamentary majority to be enacted
into law, no matter the degree of corporatism and prior discussion. So parliament is an important
political arena for interest groups seeking influence on public policy. However, its importance is likely to
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be valuated differently depending on 1) the strength of the parliament vis-à-vis the government and 2)
the strategic goals of the interest groups.
The strength of the parliament can be assessed based on the institutionalization and formal
rights of the parliament and/or based on the relation between the government and parliament (Norton,
1998; Döring, 1995). The institutionalization of the parliament can be divided into four factors: party
groups, committee structure, procedures and resources (Damgaard, 1990: 33). The institutionalization
and formal rights of the parliaments decides how well informed and specialized the parliament is and
which initiatives it can take in order to promote a specific case or control the government (Norton,
1998: 7-12). Hence, if the parliament is highly specialized and able to use effective devices such as asking
questions or demanding consultations with the minister, it is probably more attractive for interest
groups to approach than parliaments which are less institutionalized and able to influence the
parliamentary agenda. In our specific case (Denmark) the institutionalization is rather stable from 1975
to 2010. MPs are organized in powerful and cohesive party groups (Damgaard, 1990; Bille, 2000). Since
1972 the parliamentary work of the party groups have evolved around standing specialized
parliamentary committees (Damgaard, 1990), and the procedures for exercising control has also been
stable (ibid). The most important change has been the increase in resources allocated to the parliament
as well as the parliamentary party groups and individual MPs from 1975 to 2010. This increase in
resources has made it possible for MPs to do more political parliamentary work as for instance asking
more questions. Hence, increased resources may have increased the importance of the parliament as an
arena for control and agenda setting, and therefore we expect increased parliamentary resources to
increase the level of group approaches in relation to the control and agenda setting function of the
parliament (Expectation 1, E1).
The importance of the parliament as an arena of influence is also influenced by the relationship
between the opposition and the government in a specific time. When governments do not control a
majority either in the government coalition or via permanent external support in parliament, their
decisions and existence are based on insecure and shifting coalitions in parliament (Damgaard, 1994:
90). In this situation the parliament becomes attractive to interest groups seeking influence on
parliamentary decisions, because it becomes relevant for them to build alliances with parties in
parliament and influence the parliamentary coalition formation. In contrast, if the government is strong
and controls the majority in parliament, the parliament may become a mere “rubber stamp” (ibid.), at
least in relation to law making. In this situation groups interested in directly influencing the law making
of the parliament are wisest to approach the government rather than the parliament. In short, we
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expect more interest group activities in relation to the law-making function of the parliament when the
government is weak (E2).
In addition, the importance of the parliament for interest groups as a political arena may
depend on the importance of alternative arenas. Other possible arenas for influence are the
administration and the media. If it becomes less attractive or possible to use the administrative arena
for influence due to declining corporatism (Christiansen & Nørgaard, 2003; Öberg et al. 2011;
Christiansen et al. 2010), interest groups may be “pushed” into the parliament in order to try to
influence political decisions (Rommetvedt et al. 2011). So we need to take the administrative arena into
account when analyzing the importance of the parliament. The relationship between the media and the
parliament is complicated. One possibility is that interest groups approach the parliament in order to
start a debate that will eventually reach the mass media (Norton, 1999: 9). Another strategy is for the
interest groups to approach the media in order to start a debate in the parliament. In this paper the
linkages between the different arenas of influence will not be tested in-depth as the focus is mainly on
the parliament as a neglected arena, but the case study of Denmark does make it possible to consider
the relationship between the administrative and parliamentary arena and we expect declining
corporatisme to increase group approaches to parliament (E3).
Group type and different parliamentary strategies
What do interest groups want from parliament? This is an important question since the literature
provides limited arguments about why interest groups approach parliament (Binderkrantz, 2008: 180).
Interest groups are believed to approach the administrative arena to gain direct influence on important
political decisions. They are believed to approach the media to indirectly influence political decision by
influencing the agenda or mobilizing citizens and/or their members (ibid. 177-80). But why do they
approach the parliament? Norton argues that organizations can approach the parliament as a target and
as a channel. The parliament is a target because it can – though not very often – affect outcomes by
confronting the government. The parliament can also be approached as a channel through which groups
can gain publicity and articulate group views to the government (1999:8-11). Binderkrantz argues that
approaching the parliament is an example – along with approaching the administration – of a direct
strategy. A direct strategy is to approach public decisions makers, whereas indirect strategies are
defined as strategies in which groups seeks influence in less direct ways (Binderkrantz, 2005: 696; 2008:
176). Here, we will argue that parliament is both an arena for direct and indirect influence depending on
which functions of the parliament we focus on.
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As a law-making arena the parliament constitutes a target or a direct strategy of influence; i.e.
interest groups – as well as other actors such as companies, individuals or experts – can approach
political decision makers in order to influence their stand on a specific bill or decision. As a controlling
and agenda setting arena, on the other hand, the parliament constitutes a channel or an indirect
strategy of influence. By sending letters to parliamentary committees groups can alert MPs to a problem
or an issue and urge them to bring the issue forward in parliamentary debates by posing questions.
Through the controlling function of the parliament interest groups can indirectly influence political
decisions by influencing the parliamentary debate, bringing new issues on the agenda and articulating
problems with existing laws. So, in line with the media-strategy the parliamentary-strategy can be used
to set the agenda, mobilize important political actors and make the activities of the groups visible.
The reason why groups approach the parliament depends on group characteristics. The main
argument related to group type is, that different types of groups represent different types of interests
and hold different kinds of resources and therefore seek different venues of influence. They all want to
influence public policy but the nature of their interests and their different basis of resources may
influence how and what kind of policy they seek to influence (Eising, 2007; Dür & De Biévre, 2007;
Mahoney, 2007).
Interest groups are defined as membership organizations seeking political influence by other
means than running for public elections. They may organize all types of members such as individuals,
companies or even other organizations but in order to be classified as an organization they need at least
a minimum of formal structure. In the literature there are several ways to classify groups. In this paper
the classification suggested by Binderkrantz (2008) will be employed. According to this classification
groups are ordered along two dimensions: 1) whether or not they represent public interests and 2)
whether or not they have corporatist resources. This leaves us with three overall types of groups: 1)
Public interest groups, 2) groups with corporative resources and 3) other groups. The classification
scheme is shown in table 1.
Table 1: Classification of interest groups
Public interests
Corporative resources
Yes
No
Yes
Not applicable
Groups with corporative resources
No
Public interest groups
Other groups
Source: Binderkrantz, 2008: 182
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This rather crude classification serves the purpose of this paper well, since it orders interest groups in
relation to the basic interests they what to promote and the resources they possesses in order to do so.
These two basic characteristics - the goal and the means - are the factors most likely to influence the
activities of interest groups when they try to influence policy (Eising, 2007: 339).
Groups with corporative resources are basically the groups that are most important to state
economy and production. Interest groups, who are able to block essential state activities, are especially
important for political decision makers, since their protests are potentially more harmful to society. For
instance trade unions can paralyze society through strikes, and business groups have a significant power
over societal production (Binderkrantz, 2008: 178). Furthermore, groups representing essential public
sector personal or institutions also possess corporative resources since they control the public sector
production which has been important since the establishment of the welfare state (Christiansen &
Nørgaard, 2003: 73-77). Examples could be the association of the Danish regions or the association of
transport services organizations
Groups with corporatist resources are of course expected to be particularly active in the
administrative arena. However, we expect that when the government is weak the parliamentary arena
will be more important for these groups, as their corporative resources in this situation cannot directly
be transferred into the parliamentary arena via the government. Instead these groups are forced to
increase activities aimed at the parliament in order to secure majority support for the political
initiatives. However, groups with corporatist resources are not only forced into the parliament by weak
governments, they also have a privileged position since they could be expected to be included in the bill
preparation and hence likely to be interested in safeguarding this bill in parliament. So we expect, that
corporatist groups are more active in relation to the law-making function of the parliament compared
with groups without corporatist resources (E4) and we expect their activities related to law-making to
increase more than the activities of other groups when the government is weak (E5).
Public interest groups seek collective goods which will benefit the broader society than the
members of the organization. Hence, the realization of the goals of these groups will not selectively
benefit the members of the organization (Binderkrantz, 2008: 179). These groups are likely to have very
different concerns than groups with corporative resources when choosing a strategy to influence policy.
There are at least three reasons for this.
First, the potential members of these organizations are difficult to identify and mobilize.
Organizations for people with specific professions or businesses in specific branches are likely to know
their potential members, and these potential members are likely to directly enjoy the benefits which the
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organizations succeed to gain. Hence, these organizations know who to mobilize and the members can
potentially gain personally from being a member. In contrast, the potential members of public interest
groups are basically the whole population, and members of these organizations will not benefit from the
realization of the organization’s goal more than non-members will. So public interest organizations need
to find ways to identify and mobilize potential members. This means that they have a need for being
visible in public debates. Sending letters to the parliament is one way to seek visibility. First, it is a
concrete activity which could be made “visible” on group web-sites, and second, it may initiate debates
in parliament regarding the interests of the group (Binderkrantz, 2005: 698; 2008: 179-80).
Second, public interest groups do not possess the corporative resources that make them
attractive for the administration. This means, that they are not that capable of using the administration
for influencing policy and they are also less likely to have detailed information about bills entering the
parliament. Hence, they are less likely to have influenced the bills entering the parliament and to be
prepared for the parliamentary struggle about these bills than groups with corporatist resources.
Finally, public interest groups are almost by definition groups seeking the realization of goals
without concentrated interests. Hence, their most important job is probably to get their issues on the
political agenda. Bills on environment, human rights or child conditions need mobilization and publicity
to be initiated. So public interest groups are likely to fight for the agenda, but also less likely to be
engaged in a broad range of bills being processed in parliament.
These considerations make the parliament and especially the parliament as an agenda setting
institution attractive to public interests groups. First, the arena is not restricted in the sense that the
administrative arena is1, so the push factor is not present in the parliament to the same degree as in the
administration. Second, another important agenda setting arena, the media, is characterized by high
level of competition. It is not easy to get your story in the news. The parliament makes up a potential
ally in this competition. If you make politicians care about your cause it is more likely that the media will
care also (Norton, 1999: 9). The parliament is an important political agenda setter, and the more the
political system is concerned with your cause the more likely it is that your group will be visible in the
political debate and that possible decisions will be made in favor of your views. Hence, especially the
agenda-setting and controlling function of the parliament is likely to pull public interest groups into the
1
Parliaments differ in relation to how restricted access is, but at least in the Danish case much of the contact is
initiated by the groups and all letters and deputations to parliamentary committees are accepted. Cross country
studies are needed in order to decide how different practices of gate-keeping influence interest group activities in
parliament. However, the parliament is likely to be a less restricted arena compared with the administrative arena
across all democratic countries, since the procedures of the parliament are more public and transparent which will
make it difficult for parliaments to systematically exclude specific interests from being heard.
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parliamentary arena. Consequently, we expect public interest groups to be especially active in relation
to the agenda-setting function of the parliament and that their activities increase as the parliamentary
activities on these matters increase (E6).
The final group type is labeled “other groups”. These other groups consist of a broad range of
groups representing specific interests such as for instance the elderly, patients or owners of specific
dogs or horses. We may also call them interest based groups. These groups represent their members’
interests rather than the public interest and their members are likely to benefit directly from the
realization of group goals. These groups could be expected to be more active in relation to law-making
than public interest groups but less active than groups with corporative resources as they do not possess
corporatist resources. But this type of groups is very heterogeneous so it is difficult to spell out precise
expectations regarding these groups’ parliamentary behavior.
Research design
The expectations outlined above are tested with a dataset on interest group activities in Denmark. The
dataset includes all letters sent to parliamentary standing committees2 in seven parliamentary sessions
from 1975 to 2010. Denmark is selected as a test case since it has evolved from being a prime example
of a country with highly institutionalized corporatist structures of the bureaucracy in 1975 to a country
with declining corporatism and a comparatively strong parliament in the 1980s and finally to a country
with declining corporatism but also weakening parliaments in relation to the government in 2010.
Hence, by studying Denmark in this period it is possible to control for the impact of altering importance
of alternative influence arenas – in this case the administration. From 1975 to 1981 we have a case with
high importance of the administrative arena and medium strong parliament. From 1982 to 1992 we
have a case with declining (formal) importance of the administrative arena and a strong parliament, and
from 1993 to 2001 and especially from 2001 to 2010 we have a case with weak parliaments but still
declining importance of the administrative arena (Öberg et al., 2011; Christiansen et al., 2010;
Christiansen & Nørgaard, 2003; Damgaard, 1990; Damgaard, 1994; Damgaard, 2001).
The dependent variable: Level of interest group activity
Interest groups may approach the parliament in different ways. They can contact MPs or parties directly,
and they can contact the committees by sending a deputation or letter. Contacts to individual MPs or
parties are very difficult to estimate, since, even if the partners were willing to share this information,
2
A few commitees in 1975 are still not coded, this will of course be added in a final version of the paper
9
many such contacts are not registered. Instead we use letters sent to the standing committees of the
parliament as an estimate of group contact to the parliament.
Standing committees are important for the decisions made in parliament as they process bills in
their policy area. Committees are also important arenas for exercising control (Damgaard, 2001: 97-99),
since they – often on behalf of individual members of the committee - ask questions to primarily the
minister related to that committee. Through the committees groups can also assist or inspire individual
MPs to ask questions and/or propose bills or parliamentary decisions. By sending letters to committees,
interest groups feed MPs with issues they can bring up either in relation to decision-making or in
relation to the general party competition played out in parliament. Of course the direct contact between
MPs and interest groups is important, but as one MP says, even though an issue is discussed between
him and an organization, it will be wise for the organization to send a letter to the relevant committee in
order to get the debate started – a letter gives the MP a reason to bring the issue forward, so letters to
committees can spark a discussion in parliament.
Letters are selected rather than deputations for pragmatic reasons. As only letters were
registered from 1980 to 2001 this paper also focuses on the letters which cover the entire period of
study. Moreover, interest groups very often also send a letter in relation to a deputation, which means
that it is very likely, that analyses based on deputations will show similar results as analyses based on
letters.
To clarify, every letter send to a committee by an interest organization is counted as one
activity. If the letter is send to more committees it is counted as more activities. If more organizations
are senders of a letter, every sender organization is counted as a unit.
We divide group approaches according to parliamentary functions. The documents of the
Danish parliamentary committees are ordered into general matters, which is anything which is not
related to a bill of a decision proposal, and specific matters, which are documents related to specific bills
or decisions. Hence, all approaches regarding general matters are taken to be related to the controlling
and agenda setting function of the parliament whereas all approaches related to specific matters are
taken to be related to the law making function of the parliament.
The strength of this data is that we can compare interest group activities across a long time
span. This is, however, the most important weakness of the data. The number of groups in every group
type is likely to vary over the years. For instance the number of employee groups has decreased due to
centralization and the number of “other groups” has increased (Binderkrantz, 2003: 298-9).
Identification numbers for every single organization registrered are still not made available in 1975, and
10
will not be registered in the data from 1980 to 2001. Only in 2009/10 it is possible to track individual
groups and hence take the number of group into account. This makes it difficult to compare the
activities of different group types. We will try to handle these difficulties by comparing percentages of
the total number of approaches in a given year in order to decide whether the share of approaches for
every group type varies in the expected manner.
The independent variable: Parliamentary strength
Formally the Danish parliament – along with the other Scandinavian parliaments – is strong. It is highly
institutionalized and structured by strong and cohesive parliamentary party groups (Jensen, 2002; Bille,
2000; Damgaard, 1994). Since 1972 the parliamentary work of these party groups has been organized in
standing committees which are specialized committees typically related to a ministry in government
(Damgaard, 1990:35). Almost every bill is referred to standing committees before any decision is made
(Mattson & Strøm, 2004: 103). The parliament is especially strong on the controlling and agenda setting
aspects of its functions whereas it is less powerful in relation to drafting and proposing bills (Damgaard,
2001: 89; Mattson & Strøm, 2004: 101). However, this does not mean that the parliament has no
influence on the laws enacted in parliament. Parliamentary committees are important bodies for
decision-making since they bring together MPs and interests in society with specialized knowledge
(Damgaard, 1994: 88). Especially in situations where the government is weak the parliament becomes
crucial for law-making. The most important change in the formal strength of the parliament from 1975
to 2010 is the steadily increasing resources to the parliament staff as well as to the party groups and
individual MPs (Damgaard, 1990: 42).
After the landslide election in 1973, where the traditionally powerful parties all lost and new
parties emerged in parliament and fundamentally changed the party system, Danish governments have
become much less secure. Even though the regular term for election is four years there was an election
every second year during the 1970s. In the 1980s the vulnerability of the government in relation to the
parliament was even stronger. The bourgeois minority governments ruling from 1982 to 1992 accepted
defeats in parliament in order to stay in office and thus carried out the policy of the opposition or
parliament in relation to for instance foreign, defense and immigration policy. So from 1982 to 1992
Danish governments were weak minority governments who ruled on the basis of insecure and shifting
majorities in parliament (Damgaard, 1990: 24; 1994: 90). The Social Democrats regained office in 1993
and hereafter more stable minority coalition governments were formed. The government has been
11
particularly strong vis-á-vis parliament since the election in 2001 where the Conservatives and Liberals
formed a new government explicitly supported by the Danish Peoples Party.
To get a more solid picture of the strength of the government from 1975-2010 table 2 shows
numbers indicating the legislative success of the government and the parliament respectively. The table
shows how the government dominates the law making process. The government makes the most bill
proposals and almost all of them get enacted. Private bill proposals were, however, rather frequent in
the turbulent years from 1975 to 1992; and especially during the period of very weak governments from
1982 to 1992 did the share of enacted private proposals rise. From 1995 to 2010 the number of private
proposals has gradually decreased ending up with only five private proposals in 2009/10.
Table 2: Bills and amendments enacted in parliament in selected years, absolute numbers and percent
1975/76
Bills
Government proposals
Enacted hereof
Private proposals
Enacted hereof
Parliamentary decisions
Government proposal
Enacted hereof
Private proposals
Enacted hereof
1980/81 1985/86 1991/92 1995/96 2000/01
2009/10
179
90%
102
11%
163
93%
68
10%
203
88 %
73
15 %
244
90 %
59
29 %
231
98 %
41
12 %
213
100 %
26
12 %
230
97 %
5
20 %
6
83 %
72
7%
2
100%
106
3%
4
75 %
147
14%
3
100%
89
15%
14
100%
119
3%
8
100%
192
3%
8
75%
242
2%
Source: Folketingets årbøger in relevant years and the parliament’s homepage www.ft.dk for the most recent
years
Regarding parliamentary decisions – which are primarily the business of the opposition – there is a
constant rise in the number of private proposals over the period. However, it is evident from the table
that things changed during the 1980s in which 14-15 percent of private proposals were enacted. After
this period the share of enacted private proposals return to a level similar to the earlier period. Hence,
table 2 supports the interpretation that the bourgeois minority governments during the 1980s were
weak comparatively to the governments before and especially the governments that followed.
The independent variable: Group type
The groups are categorized into groups with corporative resources, public interest groups and other
groups in the following manner. Groups with corporative resources are classified into three subtypes in
order not to collapse too heterogeneous groups together. These three subtypes are: business groups,
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employee groups and institutional groups. All groups with corporative resources have the power to
influence the state economy or the state production via strikes or by altering production strategies in
the private as well as the public sector. Business groups organize businesses and employers, employee
groups organize employees and institutional groups organize primarily public institutions and
authorities. Hence, the subdivisions categorize groups with corporatist resources according to whom
they organize and represent on the labour market.
Public interest groups are identified as groups fighting for collective benefits which will not only
benefit the members if the groups succeed in realizing their goals. The categorization is not always easy.
Some groups have very broad appeals such as the group fighting cancer (Kræftens Bekæmpelse) or
fighting HIV. In these difficult cases the description of the members of the organization is consulted. If
the group mainly organizes members who will personally benefit from the realization of the group’s
goals the group is categorized as “other groups” rather than “public interest groups”.
“Other groups” consist of a wide range of interest based groups ranging from the above
mentioned very broadly appealing cancer group to very narrow appealing groups such as the group for
Falun Gong which is a special Chinese form of physical practices. Table 3 provides examples of all groups
categorized.
Table 3: Examples of group categorization
Group type
Examples
Groups with corporative resources
Business groups Danish Media Employers (Danske mediers arbejdsgiverforening)
Crafts Council (Håndværksrådet)
Insurance & Pension (Forsikring & Pension)
Employee groups Commercial and Clerical Employees in Denmark (Handels- og
Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark)
Danish Association of Social Workers (Dansk Socialrådgiverforening)
Scaffolding Section (Stilladssektionen)
Institutional groups Principal Association (Skolelederforeningen)
Danish Association of Building Inspectors (dansk bygningsinspektørforeningen)
Local Government Association (Kommunernes Landsforening)
Public interest groups
Amnesty International, Danish section
Consumer Council (Forbrugerrådet)
Free Electricity Consumers (Frie Elforbrugere)
Other groups
Danish Epilepsy Association
Danish Disability organizations (Danske Handicaporganisationer)
Women’s Council
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Organized interest in the Danish parliament
Figure 1 presents the total number of interest group approaches to standing parliamentary committees
from 1975 to 2010. The figure shows that the number of group approaches regarding general matters
increases constantly and dramatically over the years. The numbers in figure 1 are indexed, but 240
approaches are registered in 1975/76 and 822 approaches regarding general matters are registered in
2000/01. Hence, the number of groups approaches regarding general matters more than triples in this
period. From 2000/01 to 2009/10 there is a small decrease in the number of approaches regarding
general matters but overall the development supports the expectation that increased parliamentary
resources increase the importance of the parliament for the interest groups who increase their activities
(E1). The increase in activities regarding general matters resembles the results found in studies of
parliamentary activities which indicate that the parliamentary activities are generally increasing and this
is especially so for activities not directly related to the law-making of the parliament (Damgaard, 1994:
91-2, Green-Pedersen, 2010). However, this general increase in relation to parliamentary activities not
directly related to law-making is probably not only related to increased resources but also to
technological progress and increased party competition (ibid.).
Figure 1: Number of Interest group approaches regarding specific proposals and general matters
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
General
matters,
absolute
numbers
Proposals,
absolute
numbers
Proposals,
number per
proposal
Source: Own counts of approaches in 2009/10 and 1975/76. Numbers in the years between are made available by
Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz
14
The number of group approaches related to specific matter is not rising constantly and
dramatically. The development of these group activities complies with expectation E2: The number of
approaches is highest in the years with very weak governments from 1982 to 1992. There is a small
decrease in the number of approaches from 1975 to 1980 but hereafter the number increases up till
1992 where the number of approaches starts decreasing and continues decreasing until 2010. The
number of group approaches on proposals naturally depends on the number of proposals. The third line
in figure 1 shows the number of approaches per proposal. This line show a similar – through less drastic
– pattern of rising group activities in periods with weak governments.
Figure 2 shows that as a united group groups with corporatist resources are senders of the
greatest share of all approaches regarding specific matters across all years. Indeed, more than 70
percent of all approaches come from a group with corporatist resources in all years except for 2009/10
in which the share is significantly decreased primarily due to the decreased activities of the business
groups. Business groups alone are senders of around 40 percent of all letters in all years, and in 2000/01
more than 50 percent of the letters were from business groups. The employee groups are the second
most frequent senders of letters regarding specific matters until 1995/96 where the decrease of the
share of employee group approaches is stronger than the decrease of “other group” activities. The
institutional groups do not show a similar pattern. Actually, these groups send less than 10 percent of all
letters in all years except from 1975/76.
Figure 2: Interest group approaches regarding specific proposals according to group types, percentages
of total number of approaches
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
other groups
Public interest
groups
Institutional
groups
Employee
groups
Business
groups
Source: Own counts of approaches in 2009/10 and 1975/76. Numbers in the years between are made available by
Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz
15
So, the expectation (E4) that groups with corporative resources are generally more active in
relation to the law making function of the parliament is only partially supported. On average these
groups send more letters than other groups, but among groups classified as groups with corporative
resources quit dissimilar behavior exists. We need to consider this problem in future work. Part of the
explanation may be the development in the numbers of organizations in every group type. At least in
2009/10, only 39 different institutional groups contacted parliament compared with 105 different
business groups and 59 different employee groups.
Table 4 shows the increase and decrease of the number of group approaches per proposal in
periods of changing government strength. We expected groups with corporatist resources to be
influences the most by government weakness (E5). The table shows that the increase from 1980 to 1985
is strongest for business and employee groups. However, the impact of weak government is only small
for the institutional groups, and the impact is rather high for “other groups”. Business groups also
decrease their activities the most from 1991 to 1995 follow by the public interest groups and the
employee groups. Hence, the expectation (E5) that the impact of government weakness is moderated by
group type is supported. Business groups and also employee groups behave as expected, but once more
the results are blurred by the behavior of the institutional groups.
Table 4: Impact of government weakness on group activities according to group types
Increase from
Decrease from
1980/81 to 1985/86
1991/92 to 1995/96
Business groups
0.214
-0.132
Employee groups
0.159
-0.062
Institutional groups
0.036
0.001
Public interest groups
0.024
-0.090
Other groups
0.158
0.008
Average
0.118
-0.055
Source: Own counts of approaches in 2009/10 and 1975/76. Numbers in the years between are made available by
Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz
Regarding group approaches to general matters figure 3 shows that group approaches are more evenly
distributed across groups with the institutional groups lacking behind. We expected public interest
groups to be highly active in relation to the agenda setting and controlling function of the parliament
16
(E6). Figure 3 shows that public interest groups started out as being hardly active at all. In 1975/76 only
four percent of all approaches came from public interest groups; but already in 1980/81 public interest
groups are senders of 25 percent of all approaches. Most importantly public groups’ share of
approaches on general matter is significantly higher than their share of approaches on specific matters
in all years except for 1975. Hence, as expected public interest groups are definitely more active in
relation to the agenda setting function than in relation to the law making function of the parliament.
Figure 3: Interest group approaches regarding general matters according to group types, percentages of
total number of approaches
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Other groups
Public interest
groups
Institutional
Organizations
Employee groups
Business groups
Source: Own counts of approaches in 2009/10 and 1975/76. Numbers in the years between are made available by
Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz
Finally, it is also possible to make a few preliminary conclusions regarding the interaction between the
administrative and the parliamentary arena (E3). Comparing 1975/76 and 1980/81 with 2000/01 and
1995/96 we have cases with almost similar government strength but in 1975 the decline of corporatism
is still not evident whereas this is the case in 1995 (Christiansen & Nørgaard, 2003). Hence, if declining
corporatism pushes groups into the parliament we would expect a higher level of group activities in
1995/96 and 2000/01 compared with 1975/76 and 1980/81.
This is, however, not the case when we look at approaches per proposal in figure 1. There is also
no general increase in the level of activities related to specific matters when we look at group activities
according to group type (figure not shown). Business groups do show signs of increased activities and
this is noteworthy since business groups could be among the groups mostly affected by the declining
corporatism. However, in 2009/10 the number of approaches from business groups decrease
17
significantly which could indicate that these groups are not forced into the parliament by declining
corporatism. Of course this decrease could also be a result of increasing government strength and that
the bourgeois parties regain office, so further analyses are needed. Figure 1 do indeed indicate
increasing activities related to general matters which might be a result of declining corporatism as well
as increased resources in parliament but again further analyses are needed in order to decide this since
also party competition, societal complexity and parliamentary activity increase in this period. Based on
group behavior related to the law-making function of the parliament, declining corporatism does not
seem to force groups into the parliament – only government weakness seems to do this.
Conclusion and discussion of preliminary analysis of interest group influence in parliament
The literature on interest groups in Europe has mainly focused on the corporatist channel of influence.
However, the parliamentary arena is an important arena for influence, and the importance of the
parliament has increased in more countries. Still, not many explicit expectations have been formulated
about why groups approach the parliament and what might impact on the level of group activities in
parliament.
This paper argues that the level of parliamentary group activities measured as approaches to
standing committees depend on 1) parliamentary strength and 2) group type. The analyses conducted
show that 1) group activities regarding general matters are steeply and steadily increasing from 1975 to
2010. 2) Group activities in relation to the law-making function of the parliament depend on the
strength of the government. When the government is weak the number of group approaches increases.
3) Groups with corporatist resources are behind the largest share (50-70 percent) of approaches related
to the law-making function of the parliament. 4) The impact of government strength on group activities
related to law-making in parliament is especially strong for groups with corporatist resources –
specifically the business and employee groups. 5) Public interest groups are behind as much larger share
(around 25 %) of approaches related to general matters than to specific matters. And 6) declining
corporatism does not seem to increase groups activities related to the law-making function of the
parliament.
These results imply that the interest groups approach the parliament in different ways. Groups
with corporatist resources clearly dominate the interaction between parliament and organized interest
in relation to the law-making function of the parliament. In relation to the controlling and agenda
setting function of the parliament no specific group type dominates the interaction which seems much
more pluralistic. Further, the competition for influencing the agenda seems to increase without any
18
limit, while the struggle for influencing the law-making of the parliament seems to vary depending on
the relationship between the government and the opposition – but always dominated by groups with
corporatist resources.
Group activities may be an indicator for influence strategies, but we cannot claim that they are
indicators of influence. The problem of measuring group influence has made many scholars shy away
from probably the most important question: Who is influential? (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998: 13,
Mahoney, 2007; Dür & De Biévre, 2007). Here a few conclusive comments regarding the relationship
between activities and influence will be made based on a very preliminary analysis. Influence is
estimated in two ways. First, we have been able to code three month (March to June 2009) in the
calendars of 28 Danish MPs representing six different parties. We argue that contact to MPs is an
indicator of influence. Secondly we have started coding parliamentary responses to group approaches in
parliament. We code §20 questions, committee questions (both from the committee and from
individual committee members) and consultation questions. These data are only collected for 2009/10
and we have only coded 157 approaches so far.
Figure 4: Interest group strategies and influence in parliament according to group type, 2009/10
250
200
150
100
50
0
Approaches on
general matters
Approaches on
specific proposals
Parliamentary
responses
Contacts to MPs
Source: Contacts to MP: MP’s calendars from March to June 2009. Approaches and responses: counts from
parliamentary webpage.
Note: Contacts to MPs: N=261, parliamentary responses: N=157, approaches on specific proposals: N=275,
approaches on general matters: N=804
Figure 4 shows interest group activities and indicators of influence according to group type. The
small number of parliamentary responses is due to the small number of approaches coded. By taking the
total number of approaches and subtracting the sum of influence indicators, figure 4 shows that the
19
groups with corporatist resources are the most efficient. It is noticeable, that here institutional groups
seem to group with the rest of the groups with corporatist resources, whereas the business groups tend
to be the less influential groups compared to their level of activity. The “other groups” that were
comparatively active tends to be less efficient. Moreover, it seems to be very difficult to make the
parliament respond directly to group approaches, since public interest groups which are the second
most active group type in relation to the agenda setting function of the parliament get very few
responses from parliament. Hence the analyses conducted in this paper suggest that the parliament
allows access to a pluralistic set of interest groups – at least in relation to the agenda-setting function of
the parliament - but the preliminary analysis on influence shows that the parliament primarily respond
to the groups with important corporatist resources.
20
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