Bruckner, Traci et al. 2005. Toward a Global Food and Agriculture Policy. Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture, Iowa State University. Available at: http://www.leopold.iastate.edu/pubs/staff/policy/globalag.pdf The surest way to success in addressing food availability, food safety and stability in the world is a global food and agriculture policy. For the economic system to function properly, it is critical to have (1) a system of market protection (or antitrust) to penalize collusion and to prevent undue concentration of economic power, and (2) policies in place to deal with cost externalities such as environmental degradation, odors, stream and groundwater pollution. This paper offers suggestions for changes in U.S. policy that might become part of a larger global dialogue. Preferred policy options: Fine tune the authorities in the permanent farm legislation and return powers to the Secretary of Agriculture. This would allow the Secretary to reduce output temporarily in accordance with market signals. Most attractive fine-tuning possibilities: 1. Farmer-owned food security reserve, 2. Acreage diversion program managed through short- and intermediate-term land idling programs and longer-term acreage reserves, and 3. Economically rational price support programs for the major program crops that are responsible for a great deal of the cultivated acreage in the country. Structural Transformation of the Agricultural Sector Over the past few decades, we have witnessed an unprecedented level of consolidation throughout the food, fiber and energy system. The United States provides the most striking examples of this consolidation. The greatest economic threat to farmers as independent entrepreneurs is the combination of concentration in input supply and output processing and vertical integration. The higher the level of concentration and vertical integration, the greater the risks of unacceptable market conduct. If farming is to be made up of independent entrepreneurs as producers, it is absolutely essential for producers to be assured of meaningful competitive options. This requires limits on concentration of input supply and output processing or handling, and possibly limits on the extent of vertical integration. Solutions: 1. Antitrust oversight The approaches used by the U.S. Antitrust Division of the DOJ and by the FTC in analyzing mergers have traditionally focused on the probably impact on consumers, not the impact of concentration on producers. For agriculture, however, the concern is assuring that producers continue to have competitive options. Threats to producer competitiveness include discrimination in distribution of inputs, agreements to control production, price fixing, agreements to divide markets, group economic boycotts, and tying products over which a firm does not have monopoly power to a product over which the firm does have monopoly power. Aggressive antitrust oversight at the federal level and among the states should focus on these concerns, with the objective of ensuring that all sectors and subsectors have equal, and low, economic power. It may be necessary for a body of the U.N. to be funded specifically to maintain a substantially higher level of oversight over structural shifts in food and agriculture on a worldwide basis. 2. Collective action by farmers One possible strategy for farmers is to forge alliances among producers (which is specifically allowed by federal law so long as it does not “unduly enhance” price). Greater market power is likely to be achieved by bargaining groups of relatively modest size and comprised of producers committed to collective marketing and committed to producing commodities at a quality level desired by processors and on a schedule consistent with the purchaser’s capacity. To facilitate the formation and operation of such collective marketing (and input supply) groups, enabling legislation at the state or federal level is needed to assure that (1) agribusiness firms would be required to bargain in good faith; (2) recriminatory behavior would not be allowed by agribusiness firms; and (3) members of the unit would be required to be producers (to bring the group within the exemption from antitrust strictures found in the Capper-Volstead Act). 3. Reform of contract practices Large disparities in market power tend to lead to contracts with oppressive features (as viewed by the weaker party), retaliatory practices by the stronger party, and vulnerability of the weaker party in terms of securing payment. Legislation has been proposed to provide full information and lien protection to the producer to secure payment of amounts due and reduce the probability of economic retaliation in producer-processor contract relationships. Specific provisions include: Require contracts to be stated in plain language and disclose material risks, Provide contract producers with a right to review and a three-day cancellation period, Prohibit confidentiality clauses, Provide producers with a first-priority lien for payments due under the contract, Prevent capricious or retaliatory termination of the contract, and Prevent retaliation against producers who participate in producer organizations. 4. More germ plasm in the public domain Another potential solution for concentration in seed supply is to increase support for crop breeding by land grant universities and other public agencies with transgenic hybrids and varieties made available to smaller seed companies, as long as germ plasm from public funds goes into the public domain and is not channeled to transgenic seed producers on a basis of exclusivity. Conservation Conservation-based policy should be designed to fulfill a mission to the environment rather than being tailored to fit the interests of large-scale agriculture. Conservation policy that is designed to fit large-scale agriculture only stands to fuel agricultural consolidation, which will ultimately fail to protect the environment as a whole. We must redefine agriculture as something more than the production of human food and fiber commodities, and more public policy away from a system that rewards production to one that rewards conservation practices. The value of species on our working land needs recognition, perhaps by creating a market system to accommodate these “conservation commodities.” Recommendations: Shift our present support away from crop subsidies to incentives for producing conservation commodities. More research on cellulosic ethanol, which would create markets for alternative crops and allow more crop diversity. The Conservation Security Program (CSP) is the beginning of such a system that could deliver a direct subsidy for conservation on private land. A program such as this, if adequately funded and implemented broadly and with integrity, would promote basic conservation on working lands, lessen distortions in agricultural markets, and provide some much-needed income to those who have responsibility for most of America’s landscape. Consider conservation policy as part of a broader rural development policy, in which rural communities market “conservation commodities” by providing public access to them. Create a National Private Lands Conservation Act that recognizes the importance of private lands for our nation’s environmental well-being and that commits us to a national program to support the millions of Americans who ant to work to improve the health of their lands. Adjust conservation programs to fit local needs and help beginning farmers. Strategies to Revitalize Rural America Establish a national rural policy that revitalizes rural communities through new initiatives and reforms to existing policy. Cap payments to large farms and invest the savings in sustainable rural community development. Establish a competition policy that provides fair market access to family farmers and ranchers. Expand value-added programs that enable producers to capture a fair share of food system profit. Award federal applied agricultural research grants based in part on whether the research would strengthen or weaken rural communities. Introduce modest supply management measures for years of extreme surplus to prevent free fall in farm commodity price. This would moderate the level of farm commodity payments and generate some savings for rural development initiatives without undermining family farms. Invest in rural entrepreneurship, such as financing for high speed internet access, government-matched savings accounts to assist counties suffering population loss, investment credits for non-farm micro-enterprises or operating capital for beginning farmers, and federal guarantees on contract sales and tax exemptions on interest income for beginning farmers.