Account for the changes in Roman land and naval warfare during this period (25 marks)
The period of 264-133 BC was undoubtedly a time of significant change for Rome. Aside from the economic, social and cultural changes that occurred, it was in this period that the Roman military machine began to become the awesome power that it would reman for more than 400 years. The
Punic, Macedonian, Illyrian and Greek wars taught Rome a number of lessons with regards to its military organisation and strategy. A number of important changes occurred with regards to both land and naval warfare, perhaps most notably the development of the corvus and changes to the military command structure.
The changes to Roman naval warfare in this period can be attributed directly to the First Punic War.
This was a conflict with the rival power of Carthage, centred upon the island of Sicily. At the outset of the war, Carthage was undoubtedly the dominant sea power; giving her an edge over the
Romans. However, Rome, demonstrating that factor so essential to its success – adaptability – immediately recognised that it needed to develop naval forces beyond the limited ones it already possessed. Capturing a Carthaginian ship, they were able to mimic its construction, both due to markings inscribed upon the timber, as well as the captured sailors. Thus, by 260 BC, the Romans had constructed a fleet of around 120 quinqueremes, and were ready to challenge Carthage’s supremacy at sea.
The development of a fleet, however, was not to be enough to defeat Carthage. After a number of minor naval defeats, the Roman commanders recognised that they needed some sort of an edge over the Carthaginians. Sinnegin and Boak describe the result of this process, writing that they
‘’neutralised superior Carthaginian seamanship by converting naval battles into land warfare’’. This they did by way of the corvus. The corvus was a gangplank like structure with a large, sharp spike on the end not connected to the Roman vessel. The Roman ships would sail next to their Carthaginian counterparts before dropping the corvus. The spike ensured that the corvus held fast to the deck of the enemy ships, allowing Roman legionaries to charge across. The trained soldiers then made short work of the Carthaginian sailors.
The development of Rome’s fleet, and particularly the use of the corvus, was certainly a significant contributing factor to her victory in the First Punic War. Through the battles of Mylae, Ecnomus and the Aegates islands, Rome was able to put sufficient pressure on Carthage, forcing her to surrender despite the successes of Hamilcar’s guerrilla warfare in Sicily. Thus Rome, after and as a result of the lessons learned during the First Punic War was able to become the dominant naval power of the
Mediterranean.
Rome’s mastery of the seas was also to benefit her greatly during the Second Punic War. Rome, through her naval dominance, did in fact determine the terms of this climactic struggle. Hannibal was forced to invade Italy via the Alps due to a lack of passage by sea. Indeed, after the Battle of
Cannae, a key factor contributing to Hannibal’s relative impotence in Italy was the way in which the
Roman navy prevented reinforcements from reaching him. As Ernle Bradford writes, ‘’the
ascendency of the Romans at sea was an essential factor in their ultimate victory’’.
Perhaps the greatest military changes to occur in this period were those to land warfare. Over the course of all the wars of expansion, but particularly the Punic Wars, the Roman land army, and especially its command structure, was proven to be deficient. First, there was the issue of

inflexibility. The Roman army fought in such a rigid fashion as to make it easily exploited by
Hannibal. In particular, the psyche of the Roman forces was inherently linked to open field battles.
Thus, Hannibal’s ‘’master of the ambuscade’’ (T. Dodge) effectively hamstrung the Roman army, leading to more than 40,000 Romans dying at Trebbia and Trasimene combined.
The most important change relevant to land warfare was with regards to the command structure of
Roman armies. Hannibal’s annihilation of the Roman forces at Cannae exposed the strategically inconsistent command structure of alternating consuls. Not only did the Consuls, limited by their one year tenure, lack the time to master the command of their army, but the two consuls were also generally from opposing political factions; creating disunity. This problem was first remedied with
Scipio’s rise to the position of commander-in-chief of the Roman forces in Spain. As Ernle Bradford writes, ‘’his appointment was made the subject of a special law’’. Undoubtedly, Scipio’s unfettered command over his forces directly facilitating his victories at the Battle of Illipa in Spain, and the
Battles of the Great Plains and Zama in Africa.
Scipio was also responsible for a number of other reforms, particularly to the Roman infantry body.
Hannibal’s successive victories had proven that the Roman legions, still reminiscent of the Greek
Phalanx-style, desperaterly needed attention. This was to be manifest in Scipio’s ‘customisation’ of his forces in Spain. He altered the structure of his army, transforming it into a number of small tactical bodies that could operate independently or come together as an impenetrable mass. As T.
Dodge writes, ‘’Scipio’s reforms to the manipular legion were to benefit Rome forever’’. His formula was to be perfected during the Marian reforms.
This period also saw a number of small but important changes and additions to the Roman land army. Scipio’s war in Spain, and later the small defeats in Macedonia, convinced Flamininus (and later commanders) of the need for specialist units. In particular, mercenary archers, and also the
Numidian cavalry, became essential parts of the Roman army. Similarly, Scipio Aemilianus pioneered a range of tactics which helped Rome develop a mastery of siege warfare. His use of things such as incendiary missiles, and the construction of a large structure to block the Carthaginian harbour were essential to his breaking of the Siege of Carthage in 149 BC.
Undoubtedly, this period was one of great change for Rome. Many of these changes provided the foundation for Rome’s future success, but none more so than the changes to naval and land warfare.
As A. Goldsworthy writes, Rome’s ‘’flexible and adaptive attitude to warfare’’ was exemplified in the development of the corvus and the changes to the military command structure. The important changes to both naval and land warfare delivered to Rome victory in her wars of expansion, and were to ensure military dominance for the next 400 years.