“Mind Reading” through the lens of cognitive science
Dana Samson
Course description:
How do we infer other people’s mental states? The course will provide the opportunity to make an
in-depth analysis of the cognitive processes underlying “mind reading” on the basis of a selected
review of classic and state of the art empirical findings and theoretical models.
Compared to other domains of cognition such as memory, language, or perception, the field of “mind
reading” has far less been subject to a cognitive analysis. During the course, classic concepts of
cognitive psychology will be used to (a) examine current theories and empirical evidence (in adults),
(b) highlight points of agreement, disagreement, and needs for clarification (c) explore future
avenues to develop cognitive models of “mind reading”.
Learning outcomes:
At the end of the course, the student will be able to apply concepts of cognitive psychology to
analyze experimental designs, empirical findings and theories in the field of mind reading.
Teaching activities:
Lectures, class and group discussions and individual readings.
Assessment:
Students will be graded on the basis of their individual participation in the class discussion during the
different sessions (20% of the mark). Students (in groups of 2 or 3) will also be asked to write and
orally present an experimental design that would shed a new light on the cognitive processes
involved in mind reading (60% of the mark). Finally, each student will be asked to peer-review one of
the proposals and the quality of the peer-review will be marked (20% of the mark).
Contact:
Dana.samson@uclouvain.be
Drop in times will be advertised during the first session.
Sessions outline:
Note: references mentioned for each session are the articles that will be presented during the
lectures and discussed in class. Articles with a * are those that students are expected to have read
before the session to facilitate class discussions. The other articles are optional and are listed for
students who wish to go beyond the material presented in class.
Session 1: About Mind Reading
 Terminology: Theory of Mind, perspective taking, mentalizing, mind reading, empathy
 *Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 515–526.
 Decety, J., & Lamm, C. (2006). Human empathy through the lens of social
neuroscience. The Scientific World Journal, 6, 1146–63. doi:10.1100/tsw.2006.221
 Why a cognitive analysis? Heterogeneity in clinical populations, involvement of a
widespread brain network, unsatisfactory Theory Theory/Simulation distinction, mind
reading in nonhuman species and infants
 Apperly, I. A. (2008). Beyond Simulation-Theory and Theory-Theory: why social
cognitive neuroscience should use its own concepts to study “theory of mind”.
Cognition, 107(1), 266–83. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.07.019
 Apperly, I. A. (2009). Alternative routes to perspective-taking: Imagination and ruleuse may be better than simulation and theorising. British Journal of Developmental
Psychology, 27(3), 545–553. doi:10.1348/026151008X400841
 Schurz, M., Radua, J., Aichhorn, M., Richlan, F., & Perner, J. (2014). Fractionating
theory of mind: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies. Neuroscience
and Biobehavioral Reviews, 42, 9–34. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.01.009
 What does the cognitive analysis entail? Identifying components, characterizing the
nature of the components, describing the relation between components, task analysis.
Session 2: Level 1 visual perspective taking
 Automaticity (effortfulness, voluntariness, triggering factors)
 Qureshi, A. W., Apperly, I. A., & Samson, D. (2010). Executive function is necessary
for perspective selection, not Level-1 visual perspective calculation: Evidence from a
dual-task study of adults. Cognition, 117(2), 230–6.
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.08.003
 Ramsey, R., Hansen, P., Apperly, I., & Samson, D. (2013). Seeing it my way or your
way: frontoparietal brain areas sustain viewpoint-independent perspective selection
processes. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 25(5), 670–84.
doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00345
 *Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Braithwaite, J. J., Andrews, B. J., & Bodley Scott, S. E.
(2010). Seeing it their way: Evidence for rapid and involuntary computation of what
other people see. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 36(5), 1255–66. doi:10.1037/a0018729
 Domain-specificity

Santiesteban, I., Catmur, C., Coughlan Hopkins, S., Bird, G., & Heyes, C. (2013).
Avatars and Arrows: Implicit Mentalizing or Domain-General Processing? Journal of
Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 39(6), 1–9.
doi:10.1037/a0035175
Session 3: Level 2 visual perspective taking
 Automaticity (effortfulness, voluntariness, triggering factors)
 *Furlanetto, T., Cavallo, A., Manera, V., Tversky, B., & Becchio, C. (2013). Through
your eyes: incongruence of gaze and action increases spontaneous perspective
taking. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7(August), 455.
doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00455
 Surtees et al. (manuscripts submitted to be discussed in class)
Session 4: Visual and spatial, Level 1 and Level 2 perspective taking
 Do we put ourselves in the other’s shoes? Line of sight and embodiment
 *Kessler, K., & Thomson, L. A. (2010). The embodied nature of spatial perspective
taking: embodied transformation versus sensorimotor interference. Cognition,
114(1), 72–88. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.08.015
 Michelon, P., & Zacks, J. M. (2006). Two kinds of visual perspective taking. Perception
& Psychophysics, 68(2), 327–37.
 Surtees, A., Apperly, I. a, & Samson, D. (2013). Similarities and differences in visual
and spatial perspective-taking processes. Cognition, 129(2), 426–38.
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2013.06.008
 Surtees, A., Apperly, I. a, & Samson, D. (2013). The use of embodied self-rotation for
visual and spatial perspective-taking. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7(November),
1–12. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00698
Session 5: Belief reasoning (part 1)
 Automaticity (effortfulness, voluntariness, triggering factors)
 Apperly, I. A., Riggs, K. J., Simpson, A., Chiavarino, C., & Samson, D. (2006). Is Belief
Reasoning Automatic? Psychological Science, 17(10), 841–844.
 Kovács, Á. M., Téglás, E., & Endress, A. D. (2010). The social sense: susceptibility to
others’ beliefs in human infants and adults. Science, 330(6012), 1830–4.
doi:10.1126/science.1190792
 Phillips, J., Ong, D. C., Surtees, A. D. R., Xin, Y., Williams, S., Saxe, R., & Frank, M. C. (in
press). A second look at automatic theory of mind: Reconsidering Kovacs, Teglas and
Endress. Psychological Science.
 Schneider, D., Lam, R., Bayliss, A. P., & Dux, P. E. (2012). Cognitive Load Disrupts
Implicit Theory-of-Mind Processing. Psychological Science, 23(8), 842–7.
doi:10.1177/0956797612439070
 *Schneider, D., Nott, Z. E., & Dux, P. E. (2014). Task instructions and implicit theory of
mind. Cognition, 133(1), 43–7. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.05.016

Van der Wel, R. P. R. D., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2014). Do people automatically
track others’ beliefs? Evidence from a continuous measure. Cognition, 130(1), 128–
133. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2013.10.004
Session 6: Belief reasoning (part 2)
 Beyond the explicit-implicit divide: Two-systems model and limit signature
 Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs
and belief-like states? Psychological Review, 116(4), 953–970. Retrieved from
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0016923
 Butterfill, S. a., & Apperly, I. a. (2013). How to construct a minimal Theory of Mind.
Mind & Language, 28(5), 606–637. doi:10.1111/mila.12036 + response to
commentaries:
http://www.butterfill.com/pdf/minimal_brains_discussion_replies.pdf
 Kovács, A. M., Kühn, S., Gergely, G., Csibra, G., & Brass, M. (2014). Are all beliefs
equal? Implicit belief attributions recruiting core brain regions of theory of mind.
PloS One, 9(9), e106558. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106558
 Low, J., & Watts, J. (2013). Attributing false beliefs about object identity reveals a
signature blind spot in humans’ efficient mind-reading system. Psychological Science,
24(3), 305–11. doi:10.1177/0956797612451469
 Submentalizing
 *Heyes, C. (2014). Submentalizing: I am not really reading your mind. Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 9(2), 131–143. doi:10.1177/1745691613518076
Session 7: Self and other (part 1)
 Self as anchoring point
 Epley, N., Keysar, B., Van Boven, L., & Gilovich, T. (2004). Perspective taking as
egocentric anchoring and adjustment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
87(3), 327–39. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.87.3.327
 Epley, N., & Caruso, E. M. (2009). Perspective taking: Misstepping into others’ shoes.
In K. D. Markman, W. M. P. Klein, & J. A. Suhr (Eds.), Handbook of imagination and
mental simulation (pp. 295-309). New York: Psychology Press. Available online:
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/eugene.caruso/docs/Epley%20&%20Caruso%20(20
09)%20Misstepping%20into%20Others'%20Shoes.pdf
 Self-bias and other-orientation
 Cunningham, S. J., Turk, D. J., Macdonald, L. M., & Neil Macrae, C. (2008). Yours or
mine? Ownership and memory. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(1), 312–8.
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.04.003
 Mattan, B., Quinn, K. A., Apperly, I. A., Sui, J., & Rotshtein, P. (in press). Is It Always
Me First? Effects of Self-Tagging on Third-Person Perspective-Taking. Journal of
Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition.
doi:10.1037/xlm0000078 (manuscript will be provided)

*Sui, J., Rotshtein, P., & Humphreys, G. W. (2013). Coupling social attention to the
self forms a network for personal significance. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America, 110(19), 7607–12.
doi:10.1073/pnas.1221862110
Session 8: Self and other (part 2)
 Self-other attribution/distinction
 Schuwerk, T., Schecklmann, M., Langguth, B., Döhnel, K., Sodian, B., & Sommer, M.
(2014). Inhibiting the posterior medial prefrontal cortex by rTMS decreases the
discrepancy between self and other in Theory of Mind reasoning. Behavioural Brain
Research, 274, 312–8. doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2014.08.031Self monkey cell
 Self-perspective inhibition
 Hartwright, C. E., Apperly, I. A, & Hansen, P. C. (2014). The special case of self
perspective inhibition in mental, but not non-mental, representation.
Neuropsychologia, 1–12. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.12.015
 *Hartwright, C. E., Apperly, I. A, & Hansen, P. C. (2012). Multiple roles for executive
control in belief-desire reasoning: distinct neural networks are recruited for self
perspective inhibition and complexity of reasoning. NeuroImage, 61(4), 921–30.
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.03.012
 Leslie, A. M., German, T. P., & Polizzi, P. (2005). Belief-desire reasoning as a process
of selection. Cognitive Psychology, 50(1), 45–85. doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2004.06.002
 Samson, D., Houthuys, S., & Humphreys, G.W. (accepted). Self-perspective inhibition
deficits cannot be explained by general executive function deficits. Cortex.
(manuscript will be provided)
Session 9: Insights from the neuropsychological approach (part 1)
 Methodological considerations: Study of dissociations, single case vs. case series vs. group
studies
 Functional and neural necessity
 Samson, D. & Apperly, I.A. (unpublished). The cognitive and neural basis of theory of
mind: Insights from cognitive neuropsychology (manuscript will be provided)
Session 10: Insights from the neuropsychological approach (part 2)
 Isolation of mind reading reading components
 Samson, D., & Michel, C. (2013). Theory of Mind: Insights from patients with
acquired brain damage. In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, & M. Lombardo (Eds).
Understanding other Minds 3e, Oxford University Press. (manuscript will be
provided)
Session 11: New directions for future research (part 1)


Deadline for group coursework submission
No class – time should be used for each student to peer-review one proposal
Session 12: New directions for future research (part 2)
 Oral group presentations of the research proposals and class discussion