1. Modelling Realities
Hugh Gash • St Patrick’s College • hugh.gash/at/spd.dcu.ie
2. IC and the Observed/Observer Duality
Manfred Füllsack
3. Info-computationalism or Materialism? Neither and Both
Carlos Gershenson
4. On the Emergence of Meaningful Information and Computing
in Biology
Walter Riofrio
5. Information, Computation and Mind:
Who Is in Charge of the Construction?
Marcin J. Schroeder
6. Info-computational Constructivism and Quantum Field
Theory
Gianfranco Basti
7. Phenomenological Computation?
Søren Brier
8. A Mathematical Model for Info-computationalism
Andrée C. Ehresmann
1.
“society of agents” Minsky
ANSWER TO COMMENTS – CONSTRUCTIVIST FOUNDATIONS
LEARNING BY COMPUTATION OF INFORMATION AND
INFORMATION OF COMPUTATION.
How knowledge network of Info-computational Constructivism
relates to the knowledge network of Constructivism and how
foundations of matter and cognition may be understpood infocomputationally
When I sent in my target article to Constructivist Foundations, I was trying to anticipate what sort of
commentaries it would elicit. However optimistic I was, I would never dare to dream of such
richness and diversity of thought-provoking responses that I received. It is my first and pleasant duty
to thank all commentators for their attentive and very insightful contributions. I learned a lot
following their arguments and numerous excellent references. It will keep me busy for a while to
address them all in depth. Among the topics commentators addressed there are several fundamental
ones that merit a full article each, not just a brief exchange. My goal is thus to use this opportunity
and try in my response particularly to illuminate some fundamental issues related to infocomputationalism inspired by commentaries, which may result in further developments, and then to
try to answer particular questions. Thus I take the top-down approach for this purpose, and sort
topics in commentaries from the most general to the most specific ones.
1. Why IC and in what way is it constructivist?
Before we even start the discussion, one may ask question: why? Manfred Füllsack asks this
question in his commentary: Why a new framework, a new variety of constructivism?
The simple answer may be that the same question can be asked about anything new: why a new
poem, a new painting, a new theory? I would say that one could see it as an update. World is
changing, context is changing and our knowledge is changing constantly. So we have to make
updates in order to bring different pieces of information into a well-connected system. While
Herbert Wiener, Ernst von Glasersfeld, Heinz von Foerster, Humberto Maturana and Francisco
Varela were pioneers of a new world view and a new comprehension of knowledge generation, our
picture of the world continues to grow in many directions. Let me mention the most obvious sources
of the current growth of knowledge: information and communication/computation theory and
technology, information science and computing, neuroscience and study of brain, physics with its
new approaches to matter-energy in terms of information, but also to the question of observer in
physics (QUBISM, Endophysics), cognitive sciences, cognitive robotics, bioinformatics, … the list
goes on. All that new knowledge forms elaborate networks of information, that connect researchers,
schools, methodologies, theories, and data. Those networks of new knowledge from variety of fields
should be connected to the rest of existing knowledge, including network of constructivism as a
living adaptive learning system.
The reason why IC as a framework can be useful is that it can address in a productive way questions
that are important for constructivism. IC itself is constructive in several respects: the theory is
constructed from two basic concepts – information and computation, representing two
complementary phenomena: structure and process. All the other phenomena are derived from those
basic two. It is thus a bottom-up synthetic process that aims at re-constructing physics and biology
(cognition) in common terms. It connects matter-energy with agency and biology/cognition with
consciousness as the highest level of information integration in living agents with nervous systems.
Connections are made based on processes of natural computation on structures of natural
information on variety of levels of organization of information.
IC is interested in studying agency and cognition in any biological organism (including humans) as
well as anticipated possible agency and cognition in artifactual agents. Constructivist theory of
learning is focused on humans, and IC supports findings of constructivists in the domain of human
learning. However it is also interested in learning, adaptation and evolution in other living beings,
no matter how simple. Bacteria present an excellent example where info-computationalist thinking
can be applied to the analysis of the behaviour of single organisms and their colonies and films.
Information processing view of human cognition as modelled by IC includes all different levels of
computation going on in human body, nerves and brain, first sub-symbolic and on a higher level
even symbolic. Understanding that every living being has bounded resources, limited environment,
finite information sources, specific sensors and actuators, makes it obvious that the Varela’s
expression “system’s world” gets its full confirmation. Reality is a reality for an agent, not in the
first place as a subjective reality but as a consequence of agents different morphology that defines
different capability of information acquisition, processing and use. As well known, reality for a bat
is different from reality for a human.
Today many researchers discover process or change as something neglected that must be brought to
the fore. Perhaps we should blame Plato’s influence and his fascination for the eternal and
immutable, for the fact that evanescent, changing and processual have been considered “unworthy
of excellent men to lose their time in”1. Or it may also be that our modelling skills did not suffice for
the task before the rise of modern ICT. Within IC process relates to structures the way becoming
relates to being.
2. The relationships between Realities for Agents
“So if we agree with the constructivist assumption that there is no unobserved reality, we need a
rather demanding theory with not just one but two “first” entities to start with. “ Manfred Füllsack
1
Leibniz concerning manual computation. (Smith 1929, pp. 180-181) Smith, D.E.
1929 A Source Book in Mathematics. McGraw-Hill (1929).
There is no unobserved reality in a sense that remembered reality is previously observed reality,
while anticipated reality is a projection of the previously observed reality to the imagined potential
future circumstances (scenarios).
I do not think that theory of two observers is necessary for IC. Instead of theorizing about the
origins of observers (which is a very interesting topic) IC assumes already existing world. Humanity
consists of seven billion people who exchange information and learn from each other. In what way
can we say that there is no unobserved reality for humans? In a sense that nothing can be real that
never have been observed by anybody or anything. I agree, even though we can and do reconstruct
reality that no human have observed – like the life that dinosaurs may have lived in Mesozoic Era.
The entire history has that character of reconstructed knowledge, not only observed but also
memorized, forgotten, glued together from pieces of pottery and bones. Things are not all that
simple as direct observation. A satellite on the space mission is collecting information (observing)
and reacting to it. Ground control is getting signals from the satellite i.e. observing it in a very
limited sense. Their interpretation of those electromagnetic signals combined with previous more
complete observations allows them to reconstruct unobserved reality of it. Huge parts of modern
physics are non-observables – they are deduced. Can deductions be seen as results of observed
reality? In a sense yes, they reflect observed regularities of the physical world that also govern
functioning of human body and brain. The question of reality and observation deserves more
elaborate presentation that space does not permit.
IC takes constructivist position in the following. It assumes existing reality of physical objects that
can be modelled as agents when they act on their own behalf. Those agents use differences that
make difference for them to act. Differences that an agent is not able to detect (like a visible light for
a bat) do not present any information for such an agent. Networks of data form information,
networks of data networks (i.e. networks of information) form knowledge for an agent.
Is it necessary to double-check with one more observer so to get common view? It is always an
advantage and the more observers, the better. But it is really a hypothetical scenario. In the world as
it looks like everywhere we look there are observers. Those observers form vast communication
networks in which they exchange information. In that way inter-subjectivity functions as
“objectivity”. Observers negotiate what is the case. Similar is on board of a spacecraft. Redundant
computers vote about what is the case. If three of four vote equally, that will be “the case”. And it
works. If not, such procedure will not be used very long. Lesley Valiant has written an instructive
book: PAC – Probably Approximately Correct – describing learning algorithms that govern
evolution.
Observed/Observer Duality
Who Is in Charge of the Construction
Mathematical Physics and Physical Mathematics
From Minimal to Cognition to the Dominance of Offline Intelligence
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to Alexnder Riegler for careful reading of several versions of this article and numerous very
helpful discussions and Tom Ziemke for constructive comments.
Limitations of First Order Cybernetics
First Order Cybernetics describes aspects of defined systems, rather than the whole (i.e.
the actual) situation.
Here, defined means that it uses descriptions that focus on the local state of a system.
Traditionally, this is designed to take place in isolation from its whole situation or
environment.
It follows that, by defining (i.e. depicting or modelling) a system, the designer contributes
to its behaviour.
Complex situations were often visualized as 'black box' systems whose internal
mysteries were overlooked
A 'black box' system was portrayed as a closed system with some inputs and some
outputs.
This was seen as a practical way to deal with a shortage of information.
Whilst this process was often useful at the level of engineering it overlooked the role of
the observer.
Here, the observer may be designer, or user of the system - or even another, adjacent
thermostatic system.
It also tended to overlook the presence of positive feedback .
The observer makes a difference...
A significant problem with first order cybernetics is that it assumed that some systems
are 'closed'.
This black box approach is now discredited, because nothing is totally isolated.
Heinz von Foerster saw that first order cybernetics also, therefore, ignored the role
of the observer.
He described a Second Order Cybernetics , saying that it is a "cybernetics of
cybernetics." (Von Foerster, 1991)
His understanding of this idea is inclusive of what we now call Third and Fourth Order
Cybernetics.
This acknowledges that whole systems (not just parts) can change whilst they are being
used. See his webpage .
...because there are no 'closed systems'
. The thermostatic control system was depicted as a first order system (i.e. as totally
independent from its surroundings, therefore impervious to an observer).
. This model tended to acknowledge only negative feedback and its compensatation for
deviations from the target.
. Even a Black Hole is not a black box, because it has (at least) a gravitational
relationship with its neighbours.
. The 'observer' could be the system designer or someone who adjusts the thermostat.
. It could even be someone who doubts whether the thermostat is working and makes a
comment.
Second order cybernetics therefore raises important issues of an ethical nature.
Third Order Cybernetics regards a system more as an active-interactive element in a
circuit.
It acknowledged the way that a whole system may redirect itself in order to adapt to its
context.
Therefore, the observer and the system co-evolve together.
This mean that the observer can see himself as part of the system under examination.
Each player in a musical ensemble, for example, listens to each other player, and to his,
or her, own instrument.
The whole ensemble may then play as a unified, emergent sound, as though all the
instruments play as one.
This is a kind of System Transformation.
Wittgenstein's language games may help to explain the complexity of this.
It will be evident that in this case the System itself is regarded from the perspective of a
Loop in First Order Cybernetics.
Can we Define a Fourth Order System?
Fourth Order Cybernetics considers what happens when a system redefines itself.
It focuses on the integration of a system within its larger, co-defining context.
Ultimately, Fourth Order Cybernetics is difficult or, perhaps, impossible to conceive.
It unavoidably defies certain principles that make sense at the 'lower Orders' .
Fourth Order Cybernetics acknowledges the complex system's emergent properties.
Emergence entails a greater complexity that reduces knowability and predictability.
It also implies that a system will 'immerge' into its environment, of which it is part.
Immergence means 'submergence' or 'disappearance in, or as if in, a liquid'.
The Distributed Nature of 4th Order
Cybernetics
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Who (or what) is capable of seeing a Fourth Order system in its full complexity?
At the Fourth Order, the discrete observer's boundaries become problematic.
Who is sufficiently mercurial to notice all relevant changes as, and when they occur?
A single agent is unable to see enough - its standpoint is too fixed, partial or out of date.
In First Order Cybernetics the idea of a Network makes sense.
So could a network be described as an 'observer' of a Fourth Order system?
Yes, in theory, but we may not be able to learn what it 'knows' in any depth. (see neural
networks )
. Consider a musical ensemble, and how it attunes itself to audience responses (e.g.
cheering).
. This raises complex issues of consciousness - where, when, and how it emerges.
. We can discuss this by describing how the body manages many levels of knowing.
Fourth Order Systems Integrate the Inner
with the Outer
It is difficult to focus on the dark birds at the same time as the light ones
Some human knowledge is tacit rather than descriptive or declarative .
Embodied knowledge is an example of knowledge distributed within, and across a
network
It is something we may say we 'know', but it exists at a level that cannot be described.
Saying that we know how to ride a bicycle is not saying the 'knowing' itself.
When I am riding, my body uses knowledge that cannot be described in words.
Nevertheless I may sit quietly and meditate on what it was like to ride a bicycle.
When I do so my attention focuses inwards and distracts me from events around me.
Conversely, when in a difficult task (e.g. winning a cycle race) I soon forget the 'inner'
me.
This illustrates that systems appear to have distinct 'inner' and 'outer' realities.
Fourth Order Systems are Holarchic
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How can we view a system as though from the outside and the inside, simultaneously?
To do this would mean combining two (categorically) opposite descriptions.
In Fourth Order Systems, anything we notice can also be seen as the system.
The system can therefore seem to become its own inverse
This cannot be conceived in terms of classical science
The ethical system needed to sustain a 4th Order system is likely to be eudaimonic
Fourth Order Cybernetics can only be understood and described in terms if the inverse of
First Order Cybernetics.
Yet by understanding the underlying principle of system inversion, this makes it possible
to describe the Open System.
The 4th Order system is contextualised, embedded and integrated into the context
It can thereby become representative for the integrated context.
It therefore operates at two levels simultaneously.
It is no longer a system, but a meta-system.
It operates both as a system in its context, and as a system that is part of the context.
It thereby has the capacity to integrate and disintegrate the contact between both.
It is an active, interactive, reactive and ideally representative agent in/for/with/of that
context.
This requires a different level of description: not in relationship to the system, but to the
relationship between systems.
The Interface is now the system of reference, instead of the system.
This relationship is the basis of the interaction.
The transformation is the basis of the processing.
The integration is the basis of integrity.
The significant feature of the meta-system is its duality.
The essence is the same, but the relevance brings inversion.
The metasystem is an object; the meta-system is a subject.
Whereas a system can normally be described, a meta-system can only be experienced
The ‘pillars’ in this transition are the relationships (Second Order) and the interactions
(Third Order).
Fourth Order Design would integrate all activities in an inverted, contextualised form
It would be embedded in its context and responsible in, and for, its actions
The system would act as meta-system and design would act as meta-design.
This represents the level of self-awareness.
It is where the system reflects upon itself and steers itself (i.e. is autopoietic).
These attributes facilitate self-regeneration, thus self-healing.
They can therefore be managed to enable a healing process.
return to / go to New Definitions return to / go to metadesign overview return to / go
to m21 research return to / go to AU HOME PAGE
Xiao-Gang Wen
Can long-range entanglements account for all wonders of universe?
Seven wonders of universe:
1. Identical particles
2. Gauge interactions
3. Fermi statistics
4. Chiral gauge coupling (Parity violation in weak interaction)
5. Small fermion mass m (Fermion) 10 18 M Plank
6. Lorentz symmetry
7. Quantum gravity
long-range entangled qubits can naturally produce 1 - 5, maybe 6 and 7.
A unification of force and matter by quantum information via long-range entanglement
Long range entanglements are source of many wonders
Xiao-Gang Wen
Long-range entangled quantum matter and a unification of force, matter, and information - a second quantum revolution
We leave these subtle interpretational issues to future work.