Summary
The subject of the present work is the analysis of relations between the two most populous countries
of the former USSR: the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The main objective is to examine the
currently existing dependencies of Ukraine on the Russian Federation. These dependencies define to
a large extent the specifics of bilateral relations and influence the policy of Ukrainian state. They are
visible in the sphere of bilateral relations, and, what’s important, in different areas of political,
economic and social life inside Ukraine. The situation of dependence results in the “penetration” of
the dependent state by the dominating power, which is able to control the weaker partner from the
inside.
The present work consists of eight parts. The first one is devoted to theoretical issues. The study of
international relations defines dependence as “the situation of absolutely asymmetrical
interdependence” or “a situation in which our condition is determined or significantly influenced by
external factors”. The phenomenon of dependence is studied mainly by scholars from the globalist
school. The conception of imperialism explains the expansion of states by economic factors or human
nature. The dependency school traces the sources of problems of the Global South to the
international economic order imposed by the developed countries. An important representative of
the globalist school is Immanuel Wallerstein, the author of the world-systems conception, which
stipulates that since the 15th century the Western European countries have been developing at the
expense of peripheries, in particular Central and Eastern Europe as well as Latin America. The last
approach presented here is the postcolonialism. It is not a typical school of international relations.
However, it seems a useful tool enabling the analysis of dependence in particular in the sphere of
culture. This work proposes a theoretical model of the relation of dependence, based on historical
experiences as well as on the assumptions of the research approaches discussed. The framework of
this model is used to analyse the relation of dependence in the following six areas: the political
system of the dependent country, its economy, security and defence, society, culture, science and
religion, and finally foreign policy.
The second part of the present work is devoted to the historical roots of Ukraine’s dependence on
Russia. At the end of the first millennium A.D. most of the Ukrainian territories as well as the
Western Russian lands became part of the Kyivan Rus: the first state of the Eastern Slavs. The Grand
Prince Vladimir adopted Christianity from Constantinople, thus placing the Eastern Slavic lands within
the sphere of Byzantine (Orthodox) culture. In the 13th and 14th centuries the Western Ruthenian
lands were under the Polish and Lithuanian rule, while the Eastern lands – under the Mongolian one.
After rejecting the dependence from the Golden Horde, it was the Duchy of Moscow that began to
gain increasing significance in the region. Meanwhile, in the Polish-Lithuanian state, the contention
between the central authorities and the Cossacks, who exerted political dominance over the
Ruthenian lands, escalated. In the 17th century, the dispute turned into an armed conflict, and the
Cossacks sought protection from the Russian tsar. This resulted in the outbreak of the Polish-Russian
war, which led to the incorporation of the left-bank Ukraine into Russia. After the partitioning of the
Polish State the majority of the right-bank Ukraine also became part of the Russian empire. In the
second half of the 19th century, writers and political activists from Ukraine came to the fore, voicing
ideas about the distinctiveness of the Ukrainian and the Russian nations. However, their activities
were repressed by the tsarist authorities. It was the First World War and the revolution in Russia that
brought new possibilities. In 1917 the creation of Ukrainian People’s Republic was proclaimed.
However, the state turned out to be short-lived and in 1921 most of the Ukrainian lands came under
the Bolshevik rule. The Soviet authorities, unlike the tsarist Russia, acknowledged the existence of
the Ukrainian nation. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic became one of the founding states of
the USSR (in 1922). Ukrainian education was introduced and limited development of Ukrainian
culture was made possible. The economic policy of the Soviet authorities resulted in the
modernisation and industrialisation of the country, but, in the long run, turned out ineffective.
Collectivisation and the repressive policy towards the Ukrainian peasantry contributed to the Great
Famine of 1932-1933. In the 1940s, most of the Ukrainian lands were united within the borders of
the USSR, but it was at the expense of persecution of the opponents of the new regime and attempts
to eradicate the culture of Western Ukraine. The symbol of this ineffective and thoughtless policy
was the nuclear disaster in Chernobyl (1986), which significantly contributed to the intensification of
independence movements in Ukraine.
The subsequent six parts discuss the contemporary dependencies of Ukraine on the Russian
Federation with relation to the political system, economy, security and defence, society, culture,
science and religion, and foreign policy. The dependence of the Ukrainian political system on Russia
stems from the lack of a longer state tradition in Ukraine, the political and economic benefits that
political decision-makers derive from the co-operation with the Russian Federation, as well as other
types of dependencies which in some way force Ukraine to co-operate with the Russian neighbour.
The existence of the aforementioned dependencies can be confirmed by the evolution of the
Ukrainian political system over the last twenty years, as well as by the actions of the main political
actors in Ukraine. The political systems of Ukraine and Russia underwent a similar evolution after
1991: from a mixed presidential-parliamentary system which led to conflicts between the legislative
and the executive powers, to the new constitution which introduced a presidential system,
progressing authoritarianism and oligarchy. The evolution of the political system was faster in Russia
than in Ukraine, which suggests that the Russian Federation served, at least partially, as a model for
its Ukrainian neighbour. In 2005, after “the Orange Revolution”, Ukraine began to develop politically
in a different manner than Russia, but after the 2010 presidential election it returned to the
authoritarian model of governance. Two out of four presidents of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma and Victor
Yanukovych, conducted a policy that can be described as pro-Russian. Moreover, the majority of
parties in the Ukrainian parliament, in particular the Party of Regions, which dominates the Ukrainian
political scene, favour close co-operation with Russia. Most Ukrainian oligarchs, who play an
important part in the political and economic life of the country, also attach significant importance to
co-operation with Russia. The Russian Federation is not a passive observer of the Ukrainian political
life, but, using instruments at its disposal, it repeatedly supported pro-Russian political forces,
seeking to weaken their opponents. The best known display of this policy was the involvement of
Russia in the election campaign in Ukraine before the presidential election of 2004.
The economic dependence stems from the centralised character of the Soviet economy and the lack
of a consistent reform policy in Ukraine after 1991, which could have led to the elimination of links
existing between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The most visible manifestation of Ukraine’s
economic dependence on Russia is energy dependence. Ukraine’s economy is energy-intensive,
which forces Ukraine to import energy resources (mainly gas) from Russia, or via Russia from Central
Asia. An important advantage which makes it difficult for Russia to exploit the situation is the fact
that Ukraine is a transit country for most of the Russian gas exported to the European Union.
Therefore, Russia is seeking to become independent from the Ukrainian middleman. The commercial
dependence also plays an important part. Russia is Ukraine’s biggest commercial partner, and some
branches of Ukrainian economy (for example agri-food industry) depend to a large extent on the
Russian market. Finally, the Russian Federation is an important investor in Ukraine. Official data
suggests that Russian investment is significantly smaller than that of the European Union countries.
One can suspect, however, that this data does not reflect the reality. A significant part of Russian
investment is made covertly, for example via tax havens. As a result, Russia controls a significant part
of the Ukrainian economy.
The security and defence dependencies are a result of common membership of Russia and Ukraine in
the USSR, as well as the asymmetry in the military potential of both countries. In the last 20 years,
the following issues were of particular importance: the post-Soviet nuclear weapons located in
Ukraine, the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Ukraine-Russia border, the industrial and military cooperation between the two countries and the conflict in Transnistria. After 1991, pressure from
Russia and the Western states notwithstanding, Ukraine delayed the transfer of the post-Soviet
nuclear weapons to the Russian Federation, which had a significant negative impact on the image of
Ukraine in the West. 1994 saw the signing of agreements, in which Ukraine committed to returning
post-Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia in return for limited warranties from the Western powers and
the Russian Federation, as well as financial aid. Only in 1997 Russia and Ukraine reached accord
regarding the division of the post-Soviet Black Sea Fleet. The Ukrainian authorities agreed to further
stationing of the Russian part of the fleet in Ukraine; initially until 2017, and then until at least 2042.
Also in 1997 both countries confirmed the Ukraine-Russia border; however, the process of
delimitation and demarcation has not been completed to this date, due to Russia’s reluctance to
such a solution. Military co-operation seems justified from the economic point of view due to the
existence of an enormous defence industry in both countries since the Soviet times. From a political
perspective, however, this co-operation hinders the development of other partnerships by Ukraine
(e.g. the NATO) and increases Ukraine’s dependence on Russia in the area of security and defence. A
significant challenge for Ukraine is the existence of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, an
internationally unrecognized entity supported by Russia, which neighbours directly with Ukraine.
Ukrainian authorities do not undertake any decisive action to resolve this problem, de facto
supporting Transnistria. This stems both from the desire to maintain friendly relations with Russia,
and the wish to keep the benefits brought by co-operation with the unrecognized republic.
Many years of Ukrainian lands belonging to the Russian empire and later the USSR contributed to
creating strong societal dependencies between Ukraine and Russia. An important role was played in
particular by voluntary and forced migrations, both from Russia to Ukraine and vice versa, as well as
the policy of Russification implemented by Russian and Soviet authorities. As a result, there is a large
Russian minority in Ukraine. It is particularly strong in the Southern and Eastern regions, as well as in
Crimea, which, discreetly supported by the Russian authorities, in the 1990s undertook actions aimed
at gaining partial independence from Ukraine. However, societal dependencies are not only related
to the existence of a Russian minority in Ukraine. The majority of Ukrainian society is in favour of a
close co-operation with Russia, considering it is an important partner for Ukraine. What is more, one
can observe strong regional differentiation in Ukraine’s approach to relations with the Russian
Federation. The inhabitants of Southern and Eastern Ukraine are more favourable towards cooperation with the Russian neighbour, whereas those living in Western and Central regions display
relatively greater scepticism. It is also worth noting that there is a large community of Ukrainians
living in Russia: some of Russian citizenship, others who came after 1991 in search of employment.
Dependencies in the field of culture, science and religion have similar roots as the societal ones.
Moreover independent Ukraine has a decidedly smaller cultural potential than Russia, which makes it
easy for the latter to penetrate the Ukrainian society. The dependencies manifest themselves in four
principal areas. Firstly, the Russian language, which is officially the second most common language in
Ukraine, but in reality, dominates the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine, the press and the
digital media. The Ukrainian authorities have made some attempts at the Ukrainisation of the society,
while Russia is in favour of adopting Russian as the official language in Ukraine. The second element
is the legacy of the Soviet historiography in Ukraine. After 1991, Ukraine tried to create its own
national history, but some important events, such as the Second World War are still viewed through
the lens of the Soviet or Russian historiography by most of the political class and the society. One of
the two most important denominations in Ukraine is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow
Patriarchate), part of the Russian Orthodox Church. It is closely affiliated with the Russian authorities
and promotes ideas consistent with the political line of the Russian Federation, such as the unity of
the three Slavic nations. Finally, the last noteworthy element is the position of the Russia in the
Ukrainian media system. This position is a consequence both of the popularity of the central (i.e.
Moscow-based) media in the Soviet times, as well as of the weakness of the Ukrainian media. The
Ukrainian society still likes to watch Russian television and read newspapers mostly edited in Russia;
also, Russian websites enjoy great popularity in Ukraine.
The last important area of Ukrainian dependence on Russia is Ukraine’s foreign policy. Ever since
1991 Russia has been making efforts to reintegrate the post-Soviet area, or only some countries of
the region; and Ukraine was an important subject of these efforts for the Russian authorities. The
Ukrainian authorities consequently resisted Russian aspirations by blocking the attempts to
strengthen the Community of Independent States (CIS) and the Common Economic Area, as well as
by refusing to join the Customs Union. Russia’s attempts to hinder Ukraine’s co-operation with the
NATO and the EU turned out more effective. It was a result of both objective difficulties that Ukraine
had in meeting the requirements of the Western institutions and the Ukrainian society opposing the
attempts to join the NATO, as well as the reluctance of the Western states to co-operate more
closely with Ukraine, which could negatively affect their relations with Russia.
The dependencies linking Ukraine to Russia are a result both of independent factors, in particular
common history and geographical proximity, and the policies of both countries. Those relations are
created by institutions engaged in mutual co-operation, such as Gazprom and the affiliated
companies or the Russian Orthodox Church and its sub-part - the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
(Moscow Patriarchate). They are created by people who one way or another act in favour of bringing
both countries closer together: Konstantin Zatulin, Yury Luzhkov, Dmytro Firtash, Dmytro Tabachnyk,
Vadym Kolesnichenko and others. These dependencies are both formal and informal, with the latter
having considerably more weight in the long run. Ukraine has not acceded to those agreements in
the framework of the CIS which it considers harmful to its interests. It is also entitled to renegotiate
with Russia agreements regarding the gas supply or the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet. But the
Ukrainian authorities have only a limited power, should they deem it necessary, to influence the
society’s attitude towards Russia, the position of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow
Patriarchate) or the popularity of the public holidays dating back to the Soviet times.
In the foreseeable future, the asymmetrical character of relations between the Russian Federation
and Ukraine will not alter. Ukraine will continue to pursue a policy which will be to a lesser or greater
extent friendly to Russia. However, it is important that the relations with Russia do not contribute to
increasing the underdevelopment of Ukraine or hinder its freedom to act on the international stage
but contribute to the stabilisation of the international order created after the fall of the Soviet
empire.