1) Core cognition vs. perception – what makes a perceptual inference diff than conceptual? Qualitative vs. quantitative difference? 2) Core cognition’s iconic format? What are the implications of it being iconic, does it vary from domain to domain? What does the iconic representation for agency look like? The role of sensorimotor processes? 3) Why is language not core? 4) Why is cause not core? For similar or different reasons than language? 5) What do we gain from calling core domains core? 6) What else can be core? Spatial, time, social hierarchy, substances, cause 7) Other conceptual representations vs processes that might be innate? (quinian bootstrapping processes) 8) Boostrapping: What enables us, but not animals, to bootstrap? Is it the placeholders / access to language as placeholders? (Does it have to be language?) How do we know bootstrapping is in place? 9) The role of fast mapping in bootstrapping? If dogs can fastmap, how is that different from having a placeholder system as would be necessary for boostrapping? Limited to enrichment? 10)Features of CS1, just before CS2, placeholder? Are there different kinds of CS1? What are the differentiating features? When you transition to CS2, what happens to CS1? If it’s core it sticks around, otherwise does it go away? Experts (mathematicians, physicists) under load -> what do they look like? Where do they slide back to – core or CS1? 11) Gallestel’s review of the book? 12)Conceptual change in children vs. scientists? Origin of placeholder? 13) What are the implications of her view of origins of concepts for a theory of concepts?