Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for CHILDS,TAIRROYN
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Page 1
2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
Childs v. Desormeaux
Zoe Childs, Andrew Childs, Pauline Childs, Heather Lee Childs and Jennifer Christine Childs (Appellants) and
Desmond Desormeaux, Julie Zimmerman and Dwight Courrier (Respondents) and Mothers Against Drunk Driving
(MADD Canada) and Insurance Bureau of Canada (Interveners)
Supreme Court of Canada
McLachlin C.J.C., Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella JJ.
Heard: January 18, 2006
Judgment: May 5, 2006
Docket: 30472
© Thomson Reuters Canada Limited or its Licensors (excluding individual court documents). All rights reserved.
Proceedings: affirming Childs v. Desormeaux (2004), 239 D.L.R. (4th) 61, 4 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 23 C.C.L.T. (3d) 216,
187 O.A.C. 111, 71 O.R. (3d) 195, 2004 CarswellOnt 2001 (Ont. C.A.); affirming Childs v. Desormeaux (2002),
2002 CarswellOnt 2885, 217 D.L.R. (4th) 217, 13 C.C.L.T. (3d) 259, [2002] O.T.C. 628 (Ont. S.C.J.); reversing
Childs v. Desormeaux (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 799 (Ont. S.C.J.); additional reasons at Childs v. Desormeaux
(2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2885, 217 D.L.R. (4th) 217, 13 C.C.L.T. (3d) 259, [2002] O.T.C. 628 (Ont. S.C.J.)
Counsel: Barry D. Laushway, Scott Laushway, Beth Alexander, for Appellants
No one for Respondent, Desmond Desormeaux
Eric R. Williams, Jaye E. Hooper, for Respondents, Julie Zimmerman and Dwight Courrier
Kirk F. Stevens, for Intervener, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD Canada)
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Page 2
2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
Alan L.W. D'Silva, Nicholas McHaffie, Vaso Maric, for Intervener, Insurance Bureau of Canada
Subject: Public; Torts; Civil Practice and Procedure
Public law --- Liquor control — Offences — Principles of liability — Liability in tort of person serving liquor
Defendants Z and C hosted social house party and invited defendant D, known to hosts to have history of impaired
driving — At party, D consumed alcohol he brought himself and became intoxicated, initially expecting to be offered ride, taxi or overnight stay invitation by hosts who had made these offers to D in past — At conclusion of party D decided to drive self home and caused motor vehicle accident which resulted in catastrophic injuries to plaintiff
— Plaintiff brought action against, inter alia, hosts — Action was dismissed as against hosts and plaintiff appealed
— Appeal was dismissed — Court of Appeal found that imposition of civil liability to third-party users of public
highway on social hosts would expand traditional categories of duty of care — On findings of fact by trial judge,
hosts neither provided nor served alcohol to D, did not assume control over D's drinking and were not aware either
of quantity of alcohol consumed by D or of fact of D's impairment — It was found that mere fact that hosts were
aware of D's history of impaired driving did not impose positive duty on hosts to monitor D's drinking — Court of
Appeal ordered that to impose duty of care on hosts to secure safety of unknown third-party users of public highway
would violate remoteness principles and result in injustice contrary to public policy — Plaintiff appealed to Supreme
Court of Canada — Appeal dismissed — Duty owed by commercial hosts to third parties where they are injured by
patrons who have been drinking does not apply to private hosts — Duty is different as monitoring by commercial
hosts is easier to accomplish, is expected by patrons and members of community; sale and consumption of alcohol is
strictly regulated by legislatures and commercial hosts are expected to comply with strict rules by training and employing staff to monitor age and consumption of patrons; and contractual relationship exists between patrons and
commercial hosts — There was no proximity between plaintiff's injuries and hosts' behaviour; therefore, hosts owed
no duty of care to plaintiff — Defendant's drinking and driving was not foreseeable on facts of case as history consumption and impaired driving does not make drunk driving and injury reasonably foreseeable — No duty of care
arose from defendants' failure to act as their actions did not fall into any category, as holding house party was not
invitation to dangerous activity, guests have autonomy, and there is no requirement to care for highway users —
Hosting party at which alcohol is served does not, without more, establish degree of proximity required to give rise
to duty of care on hosts to third-party highway users who may be injured by intoxicated guest.
Negligence --- General principles — Duty and standard of care — Duty of care
Defendants Z and C hosted social house party and invited defendant D, known to hosts to have history of impaired
driving — At party, D consumed alcohol he brought himself and became intoxicated, initially expecting to be offered ride, taxi or overnight stay invitation by hosts who had made these offers to D in past — At conclusion of party D decided to drive self home and caused motor vehicle accident which resulted in catastrophic injuries to plaintiff
— Plaintiff brought action against, inter alia, hosts — Action was dismissed as against hosts and plaintiff appealed
— Appeal was dismissed — Court of Appeal found that imposition of civil liability to third-party users of public
highway on social hosts would expand traditional categories of duty of care — On findings of fact by trial judge,
hosts neither provided nor served alcohol to D, did not assume control over D's drinking and were not aware either
of quantity of alcohol consumed by D or of fact of D's impairment — Court of Appeal also found that mere fact that
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
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Page 3
2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
hosts were aware of D's history of impaired driving did not impose positive duty on hosts to monitor D's drinking —
To impose duty of care on hosts to secure safety of unknown third-party users of public highway would violate remoteness principles and result in injustice contrary to public policy — Plaintiff appealed to Supreme Court of Canada — Appeal dismissed — Duty owed by commercial hosts to third-parties where they are injured by patrons who
have been drinking does not correspond to private hosts — Duty is different as capacity by commercial hosts is easier to accomplish, is expected by patrons and members of community; sale and consumption of alcohol is strictly
regulated by legislatures and commercial hosts are expected to comply by strict rules by training and employing
staff to monitor age and consumption of patrons; and contractual relationship exists between patrons and commercial hosts — There was no proximity between plaintiff's injuries and host's behaviour therefore hosts owed no duty
of care to plaintiff — Defendant's drinking and driving was not foreseeable on facts of case as history consumption
and impaired driving does not make drunk driving and injury reasonably foreseeable — No duty of care arose from
defendants' failure to act as their actions did not fall into any category, as holding house party was not invitation to
dangerous activity, guests have autonomy, and there is no requirement to care for highway users — Hosting party at
which alcohol is served does not, without more, establish degree of proximity required to give rise to duty of care on
hosts to third-party highway users who may be injured by intoxicated guest.
Droit public --- Réglementation de l'alcool — Infractions — Principes de responsabilité — Responsabilité délictuelle de la personne qui sert de l'alcool
Défendeurs Z et C ont donné une soirée chez eux et y ont invité le défendeur D, sachant que celui-ci avait conduit en
état d'ébriété par le passé — À la soirée, D a consommé de l'alcool qu'il avait lui-même apporté et s'est enivré,
s'étant au départ attendu à ce que les hôtes lui offrent un taxi, de le ramener chez lui ou de rester chez eux comme ils
l'avaient fait antérieurement — Lorsque la soirée s'est terminée, D a décidé de conduire son auto pour rentrer chez
lui et a causé un accident d'automobile qui a causé de graves blessures à la demanderesse — Demanderesse a intenté
une action contre diverses personnes, dont les hôtes — Action a été rejetée à l'égard des hôtes et la demanderesse a
interjeté appel — Pourvoi a été rejeté — Cour d'appel a conclu qu'imposer aux hôtes sociaux d'une soirée une responsabilité civile à l'égard des tiers usagers de la route élargirait les catégories traditionnelles visées par l'obligation
de diligence — Selon les conclusions de fait du premier juge, les hôtes n'avaient ni fourni ni servi de l'alcool à D,
n'avaient exercé aucun contrôle sur sa consommation d'alcool et ne savaient pas quelle quantité d'alcool il avait consommé ou qu'il était en état d'ébriété — Il a été conclu qu'on ne pouvait imposer aux hôtes une obligation positive de
surveiller la consommation de D du simple fait qu'ils savaient que ce dernier avait conduit en état d'ébriété par le
passé — Cour d'appel a estimé qu'imposer aux hôtes une obligation de diligence pour veiller à la sécurité de tiers
inconnus et usagers de la route serait contraire aux principes relatif au caractère éloigné et donnerait lieu à une injustice contraire à l'intérêt public — Demanderesse a interjeté appel à la Cour suprême du Canada — Pourvoi rejeté —
Obligation qu'ont les hôtes commerciaux envers les tiers qui sont blessés par des clients qui ont bu ne s'applique pas
aux hôtes privés — Obligation est différente parce que: les hôtes commerciaux peuvent agir plus facilement et que
leurs clients et les membres de la communauté s'y attendent; la vente et la consommation d'alcool sont rigoureusement réglementées par les législateurs et on s'attend des hôtes commerciaux qu'ils respectent ces règles strictes en
entraînant et employant des employés qui vont surveiller l'âge et la consommation des clients; une relation contractuelle existe entre les clients et les hôtes commerciaux — Vu l'absence de lien de proximité entre les blessures de la
demanderesse et le comportement des hôtes, ces derniers n'avaient aucune obligation de diligence envers la demanderesse — Selon les faits de cette affaire, la conduite en état d'ébriété du défendeur n'était pas prévisible, parce
que ses antécédents de consommation et de conduite en état d'ébriété ne rendaient pas raisonnablement prévisible la
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
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Page 4
2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
conduite en état d'ébriété et les blessures — Défaut d'agir des défendeurs n'a pas donné lieu à une obligation de diligence, puisque leurs actions ne tombaient dans aucune catégorie; le fait de donner une soirée chez soi ne constitue
pas une invitation à participer à une activité dangereuse, puisque les invités conservent leur autonomie et que rien
n'exige d'agir avec diligence envers les usagers de la route — Fait de donner une soirée où il est servi de l'alcool ne
suffit pas à établir le degré de proximité nécessaire pour imposer aux hôtes une obligation de diligence envers les
tiers usagers de la route qui risquent d'être blessés par un invité en état d'ébriété.
Négligence --- Principes généraux — Obligation et norme de diligence — Obligation de diligence
Défendeurs Z et C ont donné une soirée chez eux et y ont invité le défendeur D, sachant que celui-ci avait conduit en
état d'ébriété par le passé — À la soirée, D a consommé de l'alcool qu'il avait lui-même apporté et s'est enivré,
s'étant au départ attendu à ce que les hôtes lui offrent un taxi, de le ramener chez lui ou de rester chez eux comme ils
l'avaient fait antérieurement — Lorsque la soirée s'est terminée, D a décidé de conduire son auto pour rentrer chez
lui et a causé un accident d'automobile qui a causé de graves blessures à la demanderesse — Demanderesse a intenté
une action contre diverses personnes, dont les hôtes — Action a été rejetée à l'égard des hôtes et la demanderesse a
interjeté appel — Pourvoi a été rejeté — Cour d'appel a conclu qu'imposer aux hôtes sociaux d'une soirée une responsabilité civile à l'égard des tiers usagers de la route élargirait les catégories traditionnelles visées par l'obligation
de diligence — Selon les conclusions de fait du premier juge, les hôtes n'avaient ni fourni ni servi de l'alcool à D,
n'avaient exercé aucun contrôle sur sa consommation d'alcool et ne savaient pas quelle quantité d'alcool il avait consommé ou qu'il était en état d'ébriété — Cour d'appel a aussi conclu qu'on ne pouvait imposer aux hôtes une obligation positive de surveiller la consommation de D du simple fait qu'ils savaient que ce dernier avait conduit en état
d'ébriété par le passé — Imposer aux hôtes une obligation de diligence pour veiller à la sécurité de tiers inconnus et
usagers de la route serait contraire aux principes relatif au caractère éloigné et donnerait lieu à une injustice contraire
à l'intérêt public — Demanderesse a interjeté appel à la Cour suprême du Canada — Pourvoi rejeté — Obligation
qu'ont les hôtes commerciaux envers les tiers qui sont blessés par des clients qui ont bu ne s'applique pas aux hôtes
privés — Obligation est différente parce que: les hôtes commerciaux peuvent agir plus facilement et que leurs clients et les membres de la communauté s'y attendent; la vente et la consommation d'alcool sont rigoureusement réglementées par les législateurs et on s'attend des hôtes commerciaux qu'ils respectent ces règles strictes en entraînant
et employant des employés qui vont surveiller l'âge et la consommation des clients; une relation contractuelle existe
entre les clients et les hôtes commerciaux — Vu l'absence de lien de proximité entre les blessures de la demanderesse et le comportement des hôtes, ces derniers n'avaient aucune obligation de diligence envers la demanderesse —
Selon les faits de cette affaire, la conduite en état d'ébriété du défendeur n'était pas prévisible, parce que ses antécédents de consommation et de conduite en état d'ébriété ne rendaient pas raisonnablement prévisible la conduite
en état d'ébriété et les blessures — Défaut d'agir des défendeurs n'a pas donné lieu à une obligation de diligence,
puisque leurs actions ne tombaient dans aucune catégorie; le fait de donner une soirée chez soi ne constitue pas une
invitation à participer à une activité dangereuse, puisque les invités conservent leur autonomie et que rien n'exige
d'agir avec diligence envers les usagers de la route — Fait de donner une soirée où il est servi de l'alcool ne suffit
pas à établir le degré de proximité nécessaire pour imposer aux hôtes une obligation de diligence envers les tiers
usagers de la route qui risquent d'être blessés par un invité en état d'ébriété.
The defendants Z and C hosted a social house party and invited defendant D who was known to the hosts to have a
history of impaired driving. At the party D consumed alcohol he brought himself and became intoxicated, and initially expected to be offered a ride, taxi or overnight stay invitation by the hosts who had made these offers to D in
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY
Page 5
2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
the past. At the conclusion of the party D decided to drive himself home and en route caused a motor vehicle accident which resulted in catastrophic injuries to the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought action against, inter alia, the hosts.
The action was dismissed as against the hosts and the plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeal found that the imposition of a civil liability to third-party users of public highways on social hosts would expand the traditional categories
of duty of care. On the findings of fact by the trial judge, the hosts neither provided nor served alcohol to D, did not
assume control over D's drinking and were not aware either of the quantity of alcohol consumed by D or of the fact
of D's impairment. The Court of Appeal also found that the mere fact that the hosts were aware of D's history of
impaired driving did not impose a positive duty on them to monitor his drinking. To impose a duty of care on the
hosts to secure the safety of unknown third-party users of public highways would violate remoteness principles and
result in injustices contrary to public policy. The plaintiff appealed.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
The duty owed by commercial hosts to third parties where they are injured by patrons who have been drinking does
not apply to private hosts as the duty is different. Monitoring by commercial hosts is easier to accomplish as it is
expected by both patrons and members of the community; the sale and consumption of alcohol is strictly regulated
by legislatures and commercial hosts are expected to comply by strict rules by training and employing staff to monitor age and consumption of patrons and a contractual relationship exists between patrons and commercial hosts.
There was no proximity between the plaintiff's injuries and the host's behaviour therefore the hosts owed no duty of
care to the plaintiff. The defendant's drinking and driving was not foreseeable on the facts of this case as a history of
consumption and impaired driving does not make drunk driving and injury reasonably foreseeable. No duty of care
arose from the defendants' failure to act as their actions did not fall into any applicable category as holding a house
party was not an invitation to a dangerous activity, guests had autonomy, and there was no requirement to care for
highway users. Hosting a party at which alcohol is served does not, without more, establish the degree of proximity
required to give rise to a duty of care on hosts to highway users who may be injured by an intoxicated guest.
Les défendeurs Z et C ont donné une soirée sociale chez eux et y ont invité D, sachant qu'il avait conduit en état d'ébriété par le passé. À cette soirée, D a consommé de l'alcool qu'il avait lui-même apporté et s'est enivré, s'étant au
départ attendu à ce que les hôtes lui offrent un taxi, de le ramener chez lui ou de coucher chez eux comme ils
l'avaient fait antérieurement. Lorsque la soirée s'est terminée, D a décidé de conduire son auto pour rentrer chez lui
et, alors qu'il conduisait, il a causé un accident d'automobile qui a causé de graves blessures à la demanderesse. Celle-ci a intenté une action contre diverses personnes, dont les hôtes. L'action a été rejetée à l'égard des hôtes, et la
demanderesse a interjeté appel. La Cour d'appel a conclu qu'imposer à des hôtes sociaux une responsabilité civile
envers des tiers usagers de la route aurait pour effet d'élargir les catégories traditionnelles de l'obligation de diligence. Selon les conclusions de fait tirées par le premier juge, les hôtes n'avaient ni fourni ni servi d'alcool à D,
n'avaient exercé aucun contrôle sur sa consommation d'alcool et ne savaient pas quelle quantité d'alcool il avait consommé ou qu'il était en état d'ébriété. La Cour d'appel a aussi conclu qu'on ne pouvait imposer aux hôtes une obligation positive de surveiller la consommation d'alcool de D du simple fait qu'ils savaient que ce dernier avait conduit
en état d'ébriété par le passé. Imposer à des hôtes une obligation de diligence afin d'assurer la sécurité des tiers inconnus et usagers de la route serait contraire aux principes relatifs au caractère éloigné et donnerait lieu à des injustices contraires à l'intérêt public. La demanderesse a interjeté appel.
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Page 6
2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été rejeté.
L'obligation qu'ont les hôtes privés n'est pas équivalente à celle qu'ont les hôtes commerciaux envers les tiers qui
sont blessés par des clients qui ont bu. Il est plus facile pour les hôtes commerciaux de surveiller la consommation
d'alcool, d'autant plus que c'est ce que leurs clients et les membres de la communauté attendent d'eux; la vente et la
consommation d'alcool sont rigoureusement réglementées par les législateurs et les hôtes commerciaux doivent respecter des règles strictes, en entraînant et en employant des employés pour surveiller l'âge et la consommation des
clients; finalement, une relation contractuelle existe entre les clients et les hôtes commerciaux.
Puisqu'aucun lien de proximité n'existait entre les blessures de la demanderesse et le comportement des hôtes, les
hôtes n'avaient aucune obligation de diligence envers la demanderesse. Selon les faits de cette affaire, la conduite en
état d'ébriété de D n'était pas prévisible, parce que le fait d'avoir conduit en état d'ébriété par le passé ne rendait pas
raisonnablement prévisible la conduite en état d'ébriété. Le défaut d'agir des défendeurs ne donnait naissance à
aucune obligation de diligence puisque leurs actions ne tombaient dans aucune catégorie applicable; le fait de donner une soirée ne constituait pas une invitation à participer à une activité dangereuse, puisque les invités conservaient leur autonomie et que rien n'exigeait d'être diligent envers les usagers de la route. Le fait de donner une soirée
où il est servi de l'alcool ne suffit pas à établir le degré de proximité nécessaire pour imposer aux hôtes une obligation de diligence envers les tiers usagers de la route qui risquent d'être blessés par un invité en état d'ébriété.
Cases considered by McLachlin C.J.C.:
Anns v. Merton London Borough Council (1977), [1978] A.C. 728, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 1024, (sub nom. Anns v.
London Borough of Merton) [1977] 2 All E.R. 492 (U.K. H.L.) — followed
Bain v. Calgary Board of Education (1993), 14 Alta. L.R. (3d) 319, [1994] 2 W.W.R. 468, 18 C.C.L.T. (2d)
249, 146 A.R. 321, 1993 CarswellAlta 194 (Alta. Q.B.) — distinguished
Cooper v. Hobart (2001), 2001 SCC 79, 2001 CarswellBC 2502, 2001 CarswellBC 2503, [2002] 1 W.W.R.
221, 206 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 96 B.C.L.R. (3d) 36, (sub nom. Cooper v. Registrar of Mortgage Brokers (B.C.))
277 N.R. 113, 8 C.C.L.T. (3d) 26, (sub nom. Cooper v. Registrar of Mortgage Brokers (B.C.)) 160 B.C.A.C.
268, (sub nom. Cooper v. Registrar of Mortgage Brokers (B.C.)) 261 W.A.C. 268, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 (S.C.C.)
— followed
Crocker v. Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd. (1988), 44 C.C.L.T. 225, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1186, 51 D.L.R. (4th)
321, 86 N.R. 241, 29 O.A.C. 1, 64 O.R. (2d) 64n, [1988] R.R.A. 444, 1988 CarswellOnt 962, 1988 CarswellOnt
744 (S.C.C.) — distinguished
Dunn v. Dominion Atlantic Railway (1920), 60 S.C.R. 310, [1920] 2 W.W.R. 705, 28 C.R.C. 214, 52 D.L.R.
149, 1920 CarswellNS 50 (S.C.C.) — distinguished
Dziwenka v. R. (1971), [1972] S.C.R. 419, [1972] 1 W.W.R. 350, 25 D.L.R. (3d) 12, 1971 CarswellAlta 136,
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Page 7
2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
1971 CarswellAlta 100 (S.C.C.) — distinguished
Hendricks v. R. (1969), [1970] S.C.R. 237, 9 D.L.R. (3d) 454, 1969 CarswellNat 359, 1969 CarswellNat 359F
(S.C.C.) — distinguished
Hollis v. Birch (1995), (sub nom. Hollis v. Dow Corning Corp.) [1995] 4 S.C.R. 634, (sub nom. Hollis v. Dow
Corning Corp.) 129 D.L.R. (4th) 609, (sub nom. Hollis v. Dow Corning Corp.) 190 N.R. 241, (sub nom. Hollis
v. Dow Corning Corp.) 67 B.C.A.C. 1, (sub nom. Hollis v. Dow Corning Corp.) 111 W.A.C. 1, [1996] 2
W.W.R. 77, 14 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, 27 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1, 26 B.L.R. (2d) 169, 1995 CarswellBC 967, 1995 CarswellBC 1152 (S.C.C.) — distinguished
Horsley v. MacLaren (1971), [1972] S.C.R. 441, 22 D.L.R. (3d) 545, 1971 CarswellOnt 171, 1971 CarswellOnt
171F (S.C.C.) — distinguished
Jane Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police (1998), 160 D.L.R. (4th) 697, 126
C.C.C. (3d) 12, (sub nom. Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police) 39 O.R. (3d)
487, 1998 CarswellOnt 3144, 43 C.C.L.T. (2d) 123 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — distinguished
Lambert v. Lastoplex Chemicals Co. (1971), [1972] S.C.R. 569, 25 D.L.R. (3d) 121, 1971 CarswellOnt 174,
1971 CarswellOnt 174F (S.C.C.) — distinguished
McAlister (Donoghue) v. Stevenson (1932), [1932] A.C. 562, [1932] All E.R. Rep. 1, 101 L.J.P.C. 119, 147 L.T.
281, 37 Com. Cas. 850 (U.K. H.L.) — considered
Menow v. Honsberger (1973), (sub nom. Jordan House Ltd. v. Menow (Can.)) 38 D.L.R. (3d) 105, [1974]
S.C.R. 239, 1973 CarswellOnt 230, 1973 CarswellOnt 230F (S.C.C.) — distinguished
Nielsen v. Kamloops (City) (1984), [1984] 5 W.W.R. 1, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, 10 D.L.R. (4th) 641, 54 N.R. 1, 11
Admin. L.R. 1, 29 C.C.L.T. 97, 8 C.L.R. 1, 26 M.P.L.R. 81, 66 B.C.L.R. 273, 1984 CarswellBC 476, 1984 CarswellBC 821 (S.C.C.) — followed
Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse (2003), 2003 SCC 69, 2003 CarswellOnt 4851, 2003 CarswellOnt 4852, 19
C.C.L.T. (3d) 163, 70 O.R. (3d) 253 (note), [2004] R.R.A. 1, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, 11 Admin. L.R. (4th) 45, 233
D.L.R. (4th) 193, 312 N.R. 305, 180 O.A.C. 201 (S.C.C.) — considered
Stewart v. Pettie (1995), 23 C.C.L.T. (2d) 89, 25 Alta. L.R. (3d) 297, [1995] 3 W.W.R. 1, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 131,
177 N.R. 297, 8 M.V.R. (3d) 1, 121 D.L.R. (4th) 222, 162 A.R. 241, 83 W.A.C. 241, 1995 CarswellAlta 1,
1995 CarswellAlta 406 (S.C.C.) — distinguished
Teno v. Arnold (1978), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287, 3 C.C.L.T. 272, 19 N.R. 1, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 609, 1978 CarswellOnt
586, 1978 CarswellOnt 588 (S.C.C.) — distinguished
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2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
Statutes considered:
Liquor Control Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.18
Generally — referred to
Liquor Licence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.19
Generally — considered
Regulations considered:
Liquor Licence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.19
Licences to Sell Liquor, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 719
Generally — referred to
APPEAL from judgment reported at Childs v. Desormeaux (2004), 239 D.L.R. (4th) 61, 4 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 23
C.C.L.T. (3d) 216, 187 O.A.C. 111, 71 O.R. (3d) 195, 2004 CarswellOnt 2001 (Ont. C.A.), denying plaintiff's claim
for damages from social hosts of intoxicated defendant driver who caused accident that caused injuries.
POURVOI à l'encontre de l'arrêt publié à Childs v. Desormeaux (2004), 239 D.L.R. (4th) 61, 4 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 23
C.C.L.T. (3d) 216, 187 O.A.C. 111, 71 O.R. (3d) 195, 2004 CarswellOnt 2001 (Ont. C.A.), qui a rejeté l'action de la
demanderesse en dommages-intérêts contre des hôtes sociaux du conducteur défendeur qui, alors qu'il était en état
d'ébriété, avait causé un accident infligeant des blessures à la demanderesse.
McLachlin C.J.C.:
1. Introduction
1
A person hosts a party. Guests drink alcohol. An inebriated guest drives away and causes an accident in which
another person is injured. Is the host liable to the person injured? I conclude that as a general rule, a social host does
not owe a duty of care to a person injured by a guest who has consumed alcohol and that the courts below correctly
dismissed the appellants' action.
2. Facts
2
This case arises from a tragic car accident in Ottawa in the early hours of January 1, 1999. At 1:30 a.m., after
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2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
leaving a party hosted by Dwight Courrier and Julie Zimmerman, Desmond Desormeaux drove his vehicle into oncoming traffic and collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Patricia Hadden. One of the passengers in Ms. Hadden's car was killed and three others seriously injured, including Zoe Childs, who was then a teenager. Ms. Childs'
spine was severed and she has since been paralyzed from the waist down. Mr. Desormeaux and the two passengers
in his car were also injured.
3
Mr. Desormeaux was impaired at the time of the accident. The trial judge found that he had probably consumed 12 beers at the party over two and a half hours, producing a blood-alcohol concentration of approximately
235 mg per 100 ml when he left the party and 225 mg per 100 ml at the time of the accident — concentrations well
over the legal limit for driving of 80 mg per 100 ml. Mr. Desormeaux pleaded guilty to a series of criminal charges
arising from these events and received a 10-year sentence.
4
The party hosted by Dwight Courrier and Julie Zimmerman at their home was a "BYOB" (Bring Your Own
Booze) event. The only alcohol served by the hosts was three-quarters of a bottle of champagne in small glasses at
midnight. Mr. Desormeaux was known to his hosts to be a heavy drinker. The trial judge heard evidence that when
Mr. Desormeaux walked to his car to leave, Mr. Courrier accompanied him and asked, "Are you okay, brother?" Mr.
Desormeaux responded "No problem", got behind the wheel and drove away with two passengers.
5
The trial judge found that a reasonable person in the position of Mr. Courrier and Ms. Zimmerman would
have foreseen that Mr. Desormeaux might cause an accident and injure someone else. However, the prima facie duty
of care this gave rise to was negatived, in his view, by policy considerations involving the social and legal consequences of imposing a duty of care on social hosts to third parties injured by their guests, government regulation of
alcohol sale and use and the preferability of a legislative, rather than a judicial, solution. Accordingly, the trial judge
dismissed the action ((2002), 217 D.L.R. (4th) 217 (Ont. S.C.J.)).
6
The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Ms. Childs' appeal. In its view, the circumstances did not disclose
even a prima facie duty of care. Unless social hosts are actively implicated in creating the risk that gives rise to the
accident, they cannot be found liable. Here, the social hosts "did not assume control over the supply or service of
alcohol, nor did they serve alcohol to [Mr.] Desormeaux when he was visibly impaired" ((2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 195
(Ont. C.A.), at para. 75). Unlike commercial hosts, they were under no statutory duty to monitor the consumption of
alcohol or to control the premises where alcohol was served, nor did anyone rely on them to do so. The Court, per
Weiler J.A., concluded (at para. 75):
...I cannot accept the proposition that by merely supplying the venue of a BYOB party, a host assumes legal responsibility to third party users of the road for monitoring the alcohol consumed by guests. ... It would not be
just and fair in the circumstances to impose a duty of care.
7
Ms. Childs appeals to this Court and asks that we reverse the courts below and conclude that Mr. Courrier and
Ms. Zimmerman, as social hosts of the party where Mr. Desormeaux was drinking, are liable for the injuries she
suffered.
8
The central legal issue raised by this appeal is whether social hosts who invite guests to an event where alco-
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163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
hol is served owe a legal duty of care to third parties who may be injured by intoxicated guests. It is clear that commercial hosts, like bars or clubs, may be under such a duty. This is the first time, however, that this Court has considered the duty owed by social hosts to plaintiffs like Ms. Childs.
3. Analysis
3.1 The General Test for a Duty of Care
9
Before the decision of the House of Lords in McAlister (Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (U.K.
H.L.), the law governing tort liability for wrongs to others was a complex of categories derived from cases decided
over the centuries. In McAlister (Donoghue) v. Stevenson, the House of Lords replaced the category approach with a
principled approach. It recognized the existence of a "general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of
which the particular cases found in the books are but instances" (p. 580, per Lord Atkin). The general concept of a
duty owed to those whom one might injure proved both powerful and practical. However, it brought with it a question — a question we wrestle with to this day. How do we define the persons to whom the duty is owed?
10
Lord Atkin recognized this problem in McAlister (Donoghue) v. Stevenson. He accepted that negligence is
based on a "general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay", but distinguished legal
duties from moral obligation: "... acts or omissions which any moral code would censure cannot in a practical world
be treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to demand relief" (p. 580). My legal duty, he said,
extends to my "neighbour". Legal neighbourhood is "restricted" to "persons who are so closely and directly affected
by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind
to the acts or omissions which are called in question" (p. 580). This concept, sometimes referred to as proximity,
remains the foundation of the modern law of negligence.
11
In Anns v. Merton London Borough Council (1977), [1978] A.C. 728 (U.K. H.L.), Lord Wilberforce proposed a two-part test for determining whether a duty of care arises. The first stage focuses on the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, and asks whether it is close or "proximate" enough to give rise to a duty of
care (p. 742). The second stage asks whether there are countervailing policy considerations that negative the duty of
care. The two-stage approach of Anns was adopted by this Court in Nielsen v. Kamloops (City), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2
(S.C.C.), at pp. 10-11, and recast as follows:
(1) is there "a sufficiently close relationship between the parties" or "proximity" to justify imposition of a
duty and, if so,
(2) are there policy considerations which ought to negative or limit the scope of the duty, the class of persons to whom it is owed or the damages to which breach may give rise?
12
In , [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, 2003 SCC 69 (S.C.C.), the Court affirmed the Anns test and spoke, per Iacobucci J.,
of three requirements: reasonable foreseeability; sufficient proximity; and the absence of overriding policy considerations which negate a prima facie duty established by foreseeability and proximity: para. 52. Some cases speak of
foreseeability being an element of proximity where "proximity" is used in the sense of establishing a relationship
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2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
sufficient to give rise to a duty of care: see e.g. Kamloops (City). Odhavji Estate, by contrast, sees foreseeability and
proximity as separate elements at the first stage; "proximity" is here used in the narrower sense of features of the
relationship other than foreseeability. There is no suggestion that Odhavji Estate was intended to change the Anns
test; rather, it merely clarified that proximity will not always be satisfied by reasonable foreseeability. What is clear
is that at stage one, foreseeability and factors going to the relationship between the parties must be considered with a
view to determining whether a prima facie duty of care arises. At stage two, the issue is whether this duty is negated
by other, broader policy considerations.
13
The plaintiff bears the ultimate legal burden of establishing a valid cause of action, and hence a duty of care:
Odhavji Estate. However, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie duty of care, the evidentiary burden of showing countervailing policy considerations shifts to the defendant, following the general rule that the party asserting a
point should be required to establish it.
14
The courts in this case applied these general principles and concluded, for different reasons, that they did not
give rise to a duty of care on social hosts of parties where alcohol is served, to members of the public who may be
injured by an intoxicated guest's conduct. The trial judge found that the first stage of the test had been met, but that
policy considerations at stage two negated a duty of care. The Court of Appeal, by contrast, found that the first stage
of establishing a prima facie duty of care had not been met, making it unnecessary to go on to the second stage of
the Anns test.
3.2 Is the Proposed Duty Novel?
15
A preliminary point arises from a nuance on the Anns test developed in Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R.
537, 2001 SCC 79 (S.C.C.). The Court in Cooper introduced the idea that as the case law develops, categories of
relationships giving rise to a duty of care may be recognized, making it unnecessary to go through the Anns analysis.
The reference to categories simply captures the basic notion of precedent: where a case is like another case where a
duty has been recognized, one may usually infer that sufficient proximity is present and that if the risk of injury was
foreseeable, a prima facie duty of care will arise. On the other hand, if a case does not clearly fall within a relationship previously recognized as giving rise to a duty of care, it is necessary to carefully consider whether proximity is
established. Following Cooper, the first issue raised in this case is whether claims against private hosts for alcoholrelated injuries caused by a guest constitute a new category of claim. Like the courts below, I conclude that it does.
16
Canadian law does not provide a clear answer to the question of whether people who host social events
where alcohol is served owe a duty of care to third-party members of the public who may be harmed by guests who
leave the event inebriated. The closest comparison is that of commercial alcohol providers, who have been held to
owe a duty to third-party members of the public who are injured as a result of the drunken driving of a patron: Stewart v. Pettie, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 131 (S.C.C.). Although the action was dismissed on the facts, Stewart affirmed that a
special relationship existed between taverns and the motoring public that could require the former to take positive
steps to protect the latter.
17
The situation of commercial hosts, however, differs from that of social hosts. As discussed, in determining
whether a duty of care arises, the focus is on the nature of the relationship between the parties. Three differences in
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163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
the plaintiff-defendant relationship suggest that the possibility of a duty of care on commercial hosts does not automatically translate into a duty of care for social hosts.
18
First, commercial hosts enjoy an important advantage over social hosts in their capacity to monitor alcohol
consumption. As a result, not only is monitoring relatively easy for a commercial host, but it is also expected by the
host, patrons and members of the public. In fact, commercial hosts have a special incentive to monitor consumption
because they are being paid for service. Patrons expect that the number of drinks they consume will be monitored, if
only to ensure that they are asked to pay for them. Furthermore, regulators can require that servers undertake training to ensure that they understand the risks of over-service and the signs of intoxication (see e.g. Liquor Licence Act,
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 719). This means that not only is monitoring inherently part of the commercial transaction, but
that servers can generally be expected to possess special knowledge about intoxication.
19
Second, the sale and consumption of alcohol is strictly regulated by legislatures, and the rules applying to
commercial establishments suggest that they operate in a very different context than private-party hosts. This regulation is driven by public expectations and attitudes towards intoxicants, but also serves, in turn, to shape those expectations and attitudes. In Ontario, where these facts occurred, the production, sale and use of alcohol is regulated
principally by the regimes established by the Liquor Control Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.18, and the Liquor Licence Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. L.19. The latter Act is wide-ranging and regulates how, where, by and to whom alcohol can be sold
or supplied, where and by whom it can be consumed and where intoxication is permitted and where it is not.
20
These regulations impose special responsibilities on those who would profit from the supply of alcohol. This
is clear by the very existence of a licensing scheme, but also by special rules governing the service of alcohol and, as
noted above, special training that may be required. Clearly, the sale of alcohol to the general public is understood as
including attendant responsibilities to reduce the risk associated with that trade.
21
The importance of this regulatory environment does not relate to the statutory requirements per se, but what
they demonstrate about the nature of commercial alcohol sales and about the expectations of purveyors, patrons and
the public. Selling alcohol is a carefully regulated industry. The dangers of over-consumption, or of consumption by
young or otherwise vulnerable persons, means that its sale and service in commercial settings is controlled. It is not
treated like an ordinary commodity sold in retail stores. The public expects that in addition to adherence to regulatory standards, those who sell alcohol to the general public take additional steps to reduce the associated risks. Furthermore, patrons are aware that these special responsibilities have very real and visible manifestations. The imposition of a "cut-off" at the bar is understood, and expected, as part of the institutionalization of these responsibilities.
Similarly, in many establishments, "bouncers" both enforce admission and assist other members of the staff who
might have to deal with patrons who may have become intoxicated. These features have no equivalent in the noncommercial context. A party host has neither an institutionalized method of monitoring alcohol consumption and
enforcing limits, nor a set of expectations that would permit him or her to easily do so.
22
Third, the contractual nature of the relationship between a tavern keeper serving alcohol and a patron consuming it is fundamentally different from the range of different social relationships that can characterize private parties in the non-commercial context. The appellants argue that there is "nothing inherently special" about profit making in the law of negligence. In the case of alcohol sales, however, it is clear that profit making is relevant. Unlike
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2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
the host of a private party, commercial alcohol servers have an incentive not only to serve many drinks, but to serve
too many. Over-consumption is more profitable than responsible consumption. The costs of over-consumption are
borne by the drinker him or herself, taxpayers who collectively pay for the added strain on related public services
and, sometimes tragically, third parties who may come into contact with intoxicated patrons on the roads. Yet the
benefits of over-consumption go to the tavern keeper alone, who enjoys large profit margins from customers whose
judgment becomes more impaired the more they consume. This perverse incentive supports the imposition of a duty
to monitor alcohol consumption in the interests of the general public.
23
The differences just discussed mean that the existence of a duty on the part of commercial providers of alcohol cannot be extended by simple analogy to the hosts of a private party. The duty proposed in this case is novel. We
must therefore ask whether a duty of care is made out on the two-stage Anns test.
3.3 Stage One: A Prima Facie Duty?
24
Applying the first stage of the Anns test requires, as noted above, an examination of the relationship between
the parties to determine if it meets the requirement of sufficient proximity. The question is: What, if anything, links
party hosts to third-party users of the highway?
25
The law of negligence not only considers the plaintiff's loss, but explains why it is just and fair to impose the
cost of that loss on the particular defendant before the court. The proximity requirement captures this two-sided face
of negligence.
26
I conclude that the necessary proximity has not been established and, consequently, that social hosts of parties where alcohol is served do not owe a duty of care to public users of highways. First, the injury to Ms. Childs
was not reasonably foreseeable on the facts found by the trial judge. Second, even if foreseeability were established,
no duty would arise because the wrong alleged is a failure to act or nonfeasance in circumstances where there was
no positive duty to act.
3.3.1 Foreseeability
27
Ms. Childs argues that the parties are linked by the foreseeability of physical harm due to the manner in
which the party hosts exercised "control or influence over" the party at which Mr. Desormeaux was drinking.
28
The question of foreseeability is complicated by ambiguity in the findings of the trial judge. The trial judge
found that Mr. Desormeaux would be showing "obvious signs of impairment" (at para. 73), but did not find that the
hosts in the circumstances knew, or ought to have known, that Mr. Desormeaux was too drunk to drive. The risks of
impaired driving, and their consequences for motorists and their passengers, are well known. However, if there is no
finding that the hosts knew, or ought to have known, that the guest who was about to drive was impaired, how can it
be said that they should have foreseen that allowing him to drive might result in injury to other motorists?
29
Instead of finding that the hosts ought reasonably to have been aware that Mr. Desormeaux was too drunk to
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2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
drive, the trial judge based his finding that the hosts should have foreseen injury to motorists on the road on problematic reasoning. He noted that the hosts knew that Mr. Desormeaux had gotten drunk in the past and then driven.
He inferred from this that they should have foreseen that unless Mr. Desormeaux's drinking at the party was monitored, he would become drunk, get into his car and drive onto the highway. The problem with this reasoning is that a
history of alcohol consumption and impaired driving does not make impaired driving, and the consequent risk to
other motorists, reasonably foreseeable. The inferential chain from drinking and driving in the past to reasonable
foreseeability that this will happen again is too weak to support the legal conclusion of reasonable foreseeability —
even in the case of commercial hosts, liability has not been extended by such a frail hypothesis.
30
Ms. Childs points to the findings relating to the considerable amount of alcohol Mr. Desormeaux had consumed and his high blood-alcohol rating, coupled with the fact that Mr. Courrier accompanied Mr. Desormeaux to
his car before he drove away, and asks us to make the finding of knowledge of inebriation that the trial judge failed
to make. The problem here is the absence of any evidence that Mr. Desormeaux displayed signs of intoxication during this brief encounter. Given the absence of evidence that the hosts in this case in fact knew of Mr. Desormeaux's
intoxication and the fact that the experienced trial judge himself declined to make such a finding, it would not be
proper for us to change the factual basis of this case by supplementing the facts on this critical point. I conclude that
the injury was not reasonably foreseeable on the facts established in this case.
3.3.2 Failure to Act: Nonfeasance Versus Misfeasance
31
Foreseeability is not the only hurdle Ms. Childs' argument for a duty of care must surmount. "Foreseeability
does not of itself, and automatically, lead to the conclusion that there is a duty of care": G. H. L. Fridman, The Law
of Torts in Canada (2nd ed. 2002), at p. 320. Foreseeability without more may establish a duty of care. This is usually the case, for example, where an overt act of the defendant has directly caused foreseeable physical harm to the
plaintiff: see Cooper. However, where the conduct alleged against the defendant is a failure to act, foreseeability
alone may not establish a duty of care. In the absence of an overt act on the part of the defendant, the nature of the
relationship must be examined to determine whether there is a nexus between the parties. Although there is no doubt
that an omission may be negligent, as a general principle, the common law is a jealous guardian of individual autonomy. Duties to take positive action in the face of risk or danger are not free-standing. Generally, the mere fact that a
person faces danger, or has become a danger to others, does not itself impose any kind of duty on those in a position
to become involved.
32
In this case, we are concerned not with an overt act of the social hosts, but with their alleged failure to act.
The case put against them is that they should have interfered with the autonomy of Mr. Desormeaux by preventing
him from drinking and driving. It follows that foreseeability alone would not establish a duty of care in this case.
33
The appellants' argument that Mr. Courrier and Ms. Zimmerman committed positive acts that created, or
contributed to, the risk cannot be sustained. It is argued that they facilitated the consumption of alcohol by organizing a social event where alcohol was consumed on their premises. But this is not an act that creates risk to users of
public roads. The real complaint is that having organized the party, the hosts permitted their guest to drink and then
take the wheel of an automobile.
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163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
34
A positive duty of care may exist if foreseeability of harm is present and if other aspects of the relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant establish a special link or proximity. Three such situations have been identified by the courts. They function not as strict legal categories, but rather to elucidate factors that can lead to positive
duties to act. These factors, or features of the relationship, bring parties who would otherwise be legal strangers into
proximity and impose positive duties on defendants that would not otherwise exist.
35
The first situation where courts have imposed a positive duty to act is where a defendant intentionally attracts
and invites third parties to an inherent and obvious risk that he or she has created or controls: Hendricks v. R. (1969),
[1970] S.C.R. 237 (S.C.C.); Horsley v. MacLaren (1971), [1972] S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.); Teno v. Arnold, [1978] 2
S.C.R. 287 (S.C.C.); and Crocker v. Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1186 (S.C.C.). For example,
it has been held that a boat captain owes a duty to take reasonable care to rescue a passenger who falls overboard
(Horsley) and that the operator of a dangerous inner-tube sliding competition owes a duty to exclude people who
cannot safely participate (Crocker). These cases turn on the defendant's causal relationship to the origin of the risk
of injury faced by the plaintiff or on steps taken to invite others to subject themselves to a risk under the defendant's
control. If the defendant creates a risky situation and invites others into it, failure to act thereafter does not immunize
the defendant from the consequences of its acts. These cases are akin to the positive and continuing duty of manufacturers or transferors of goods to warn of inherently dangerous products or dangerous uses of safe products: Lambert v. Lastoplex Chemicals Co. (1971), [1972] S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.); Hollis v. Birch, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 634 (S.C.C.).
36
The second situation where a positive duty of care has been held to exist concerns paternalistic relationships
of supervision and control, such as those of parent-child or teacher-student: Dziwenka v. R. (1971), [1972] S.C.R.
419 (S.C.C.); Bain v. Calgary Board of Education (1993), 146 A.R. 321 (Alta. Q.B.). The duty in these cases rests
on the special vulnerability of the plaintiffs and the formal position of power of the defendants. The law recognizes
that the autonomy of some persons may be permissibly violated or restricted, but, in turn, requires that those with
power exercise it in light of special duties. In the words of Virtue J. in Bain, in the context of a teacher-student relationship, "[t]hat right of control carries with it a corresponding duty to take care for the safety of, and to properly
supervise the student, whether he or she is a child, an adolescent or an adult" (para. 38).
37
The third situation where a duty of care may include the need to take positive steps concerns defendants who
either exercise a public function or engage in a commercial enterprise that includes implied responsibilities to the
public at large: Dunn v. Dominion Atlantic Railway (1920), 60 S.C.R. 310 (S.C.C.); Menow v. Honsberger (1973),
[1974] S.C.R. 239 (S.C.C.); Jane Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police (1998), 39
O.R. (3d) 487 (Ont. Gen. Div.). In these cases, the defendants offer a service to the general public that includes attendant responsibilities to act with special care to reduce risk. Where a defendant assumes a public role, or benefits
from offering a service to the public at large, special duties arise. The duty of a commercial host who serves alcohol
to guests to act to prevent foreseeable harm to third-party users of the highway falls into this category: Stewart v.
Pettie.
38
Running through all of these situations is the defendant's material implication in the creation of risk or his or
her control of a risk to which others have been invited. The operator of a dangerous sporting competition creates or
enhances the risk by inviting and enabling people to participate in an inherently risky activity. It follows that the
operator must take special steps to protect against the risk materializing. In the example of the parent or teacher who
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Page 16
2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
has assumed control of a vulnerable person, the vulnerability of the person and its subjection to the control of the
defendant creates a situation where the latter has an enhanced responsibility to safeguard against risk. The public
provider of services undertakes a public service, and must do so in a way that appropriately minimizes associated
risks to the public.
39
Also running through the examples is a concern for the autonomy of the persons affected by the positive action proposed. The law does not impose a duty to eliminate risk. It accepts that competent people have the right to
engage in risky activities. Conversely, it permits third parties witnessing risk to decide not to become rescuers or
otherwise intervene. It is only when these third parties have a special relationship to the person in danger or a material role in the creation or management of the risk that the law may impinge on autonomy. Thus, the operator of a
risky sporting activity may be required to prevent a person who is unfit to perform a sport safely from participating
or, when a risk materializes, to attempt a rescue. Similarly, the publican may be required to refuse to serve an inebriated patron who may drive, or a teacher be required to take positive action to protect a child who lacks the right or
power to make decisions for itself. The autonomy of risk takers or putative rescuers is not absolutely protected, but,
at common law, it is always respected.
40
Finally, the theme of reasonable reliance unites examples in all three categories. A person who creates or
invites others into a dangerous situation, like the high-risk sports operator, may reasonably expect that those taking
up the invitation will rely on the operator to ensure that the risk is a reasonable one or to take appropriate rescue
action if the risk materializes. Similarly, a teacher will understand that the child or the child's parents rely on the
teacher to avoid and minimize risk. Finally, there is a reasonable expectation on the part of the public that a person
providing public services, often under licence, will take reasonable precautions to reduce the risk of the activity, not
merely to immediate clients, but to the general public.
41
Does the situation of the social host who serves alcohol to guests fall within the three categories just discussed or represent an appropriate extension of them having regard to the factors of risk-control and reasonable
preservation of autonomy that animate them? I conclude that it does not.
42
The first category concerns defendants who have created or invited others to participate in highly risky activities. Holding a house party where alcohol is served is not such an activity. Risks may ensue, to be sure, from what
guests choose to do or not do at the party. But hosting a party is a far cry from inviting participation in a high-risk
sport or taking people out on a boating party. A party where alcohol is served is a common occurrence, not one associated with unusual risks demanding special precautions. The second category of paternalistic relationships of
supervision or control is equally inapplicable. Party hosts do not enjoy a paternalistic relationship with their guests,
nor are their guests in a position of reduced autonomy that invites control. Finally, private social hosts are not acting
in a public capacity and, hence, do not incur duties of a public nature.
43
More broadly, do the themes that animate the cases imposing positive duties to act — risk enhancement and
control, autonomy and reasonable reliance — suggest that the social hosts in this case owed a duty of care to thirdparty users of the highway, to take reasonable steps to prevent what happened? Again, the answer is that they do not.
44
Holding a private party at which alcohol is served — the bare facts of this case — is insufficient to implicate
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Page 17
2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
the host in the creation of a risk sufficient to give rise to a duty of care to third parties who may be subsequently
injured by the conduct of a guest. The host creates a place where people can meet, visit and imbibe alcohol, whether
served on the premises or supplied by the guest. All this falls within accepted parameters of non-dangerous conduct.
More is required to establish a danger or risk that requires positive action. It might be argued that a host who continues to serve alcohol to a visibly inebriated person knowing that he or she will be driving home has become implicated in the creation or enhancement of a risk sufficient to give rise to a prima facie duty of care to third parties, which
would be subject to contrary policy considerations at the second stage of the Anns test. This position has been taken
in some states in the U.S.A.: N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A: 15-5.5 to 5.8 (West 2000). We need not decide that question
here. Suffice it to say that hosting a party where alcohol is served, without more, does not suggest the creation or
exacerbation of risk of the level required to impose a duty of care on the host to members of the public who may be
affected by a guest's conduct.
45
Nor does the autonomy of the individual support the case for a duty to take action to protect highway users in
the case at bar. As discussed, the implication of a duty of care depends on the relationships involved. The relationship between social host and guest at a house party is part of this equation. A person who accepts an invitation to
attend a private party does not park his autonomy at the door. The guest remains responsible for his or her conduct.
Short of active implication in the creation or enhancement of the risk, a host is entitled to respect the autonomy of a
guest. The consumption of alcohol, and the assumption of the risks of impaired judgment, is in almost all cases a
personal choice and an inherently personal activity. Absent the special considerations that may apply in the commercial context, when such a choice is made by an adult, there is no reason why others should be made to bear its
costs. The conduct of a hostess who confiscated all guests' car keys and froze them in ice as people arrived at her
party, releasing them only as she deemed appropriate, was cited to us as exemplary. This hostess was evidently prepared to make considerable incursions on the autonomy of her guests. The law of tort, however, has not yet gone so
far.
46
This brings us to the factor of reasonable reliance. There is no evidence that anyone relied on the hosts in this
case to monitor guests' intake of alcohol or prevent intoxicated guests from driving. This represents an important
distinction between the situation of a private host, as here, and a public host. The public host provides alcohol to
members of the public, under a strict regulatory regime. It is reasonable to expect that the public provider will act to
protect the public interest. There is public reliance that he will comply with the rules that prohibit serving too much
alcohol to a patron and that if this should occur and the patron seeks to drive, that the public host will take reasonable steps to prevent the person from driving. The same cannot be said of the private social host, who neither undertakes nor is expected to monitor the conduct of guests on behalf of the public.
47
I conclude that hosting a party at which alcohol is served does not, without more, establish the degree of
proximity required to give rise to a duty of care on the hosts to third-party highway users who may be injured by an
intoxicated guest. The injury here was not shown to be foreseeable on the facts as found by the trial judge. Even if it
had been, this is at best a case of nonfeasance. No duty to monitor guests' drinking or to prevent them from driving
can be imposed having regard to the relevant cases and legal principles. A social host at a party where alcohol is
served is not under a duty of care to members of the public who may be injured by a guest's actions, unless the host's
conduct implicates him or her in the creation or exacerbation of the risk. On the facts of this case, I agree with the
Court of Appeal, at para. 75, per Weiler J.A.:
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2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d)
163, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245
The person sought to be held liable must be implicated in the creation of the risk. ... The social hosts had no
statutory duty to monitor the consumption of alcohol or to control the structure of the atmosphere in which alcohol was served. There is no evidence that anyone relied on them to do so.... I cannot accept the proposition
that by merely supplying the venue of a BYOB party, a host assumes legal responsibility to third party users of
the road for monitoring the alcohol consumed by guests. ... It would not be just and fair in the circumstances to
impose a duty of care.
48
Having concluded that a prima facie duty of care has not been established, it is unnecessary to consider
whether any duty would be negated by policy considerations at the second stage of the Anns test.
4. Conclusion
49
I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Pourvoi rejeté.
END OF DOCUMENT
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KEYCITE
Childs v. Desormeaux, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245, 210 O.A.C. 315, 347
N.R. 328, 2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 CarswellOnt 2711, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d) 163, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), 2006
SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, [2006] S.C.J. No. 18, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C., May 05, 2006)
History
Direct History
1 Childs v. Desormeaux, 217 D.L.R. (4th) 217, 2002 CarswellOnt 2885, 13 C.C.L.T. (3d) 259, [2002]
O.J. No. 3289, [2002] O.T.C. 628 (Ont. S.C.J. Aug 30, 2002)
Additional reasons in
2 Childs v Desormeaux, 2003 CarswellOnt 799, [2003] O.J. No. 831 (Ont. S.C.J. Mar 10, 2003)
Reversed by
3 Childs v. Desormeaux, 239 D.L.R. (4th) 61, 187 O.A.C. 111, 2004 CarswellOnt 2001, 23 C.C.L.T.
(3d) 216, 71 O.R. (3d) 195, [2004] O.J. No. 2065, 4 M.V.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. C.A. May 19, 2004)
Leave to appeal allowed by
4 Childs v. Desormeaux, 206 O.A.C. 394 (note), 334 N.R. 195 (note), 2005 CarswellOnt 603, 2005
CarswellOnt 604 (S.C.C. Feb 17, 2005)
AND Affirmed by
=>
5 Childs v. Desormeaux, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245, 210 O.A.C.
315, 347 N.R. 328, 2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 CarswellOnt 2711, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d) 163, 80 O.R.
(3d) 558 (note), 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, [2006] S.C.J. No. 18, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C. May
05, 2006)
6 Childs v. Desormeaux, 217 D.L.R. (4th) 217, 2002 CarswellOnt 2885, 13 C.C.L.T. (3d) 259, [2002]
O.J. No. 3289, [2002] O.T.C. 628 (Ont. S.C.J. Aug 30, 2002)
Affirmed by
7 Childs v. Desormeaux, 239 D.L.R. (4th) 61, 187 O.A.C. 111, 2004 CarswellOnt 2001, 23 C.C.L.T.
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.
(3d) 216, 71 O.R. (3d) 195, [2004] O.J. No. 2065, 4 M.V.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. C.A. May 19, 2004)
Leave to appeal allowed by
8 Childs v. Desormeaux, 206 O.A.C. 394 (note), 334 N.R. 195 (note), 2005 CarswellOnt 603, 2005
CarswellOnt 604 (S.C.C. Feb 17, 2005)
AND Affirmed by
=>
9 Childs v. Desormeaux, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245, 210 O.A.C.
315, 347 N.R. 328, 2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 CarswellOnt 2711, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d) 163, 80 O.R.
(3d) 558 (note), 2006 SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, [2006] S.C.J. No. 18, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C. May
05, 2006)
Negative and Cautionary Citing References (Canada)
Recently added (treatment not yet designated)
10 R. v. Tremblay, 2013 CarswellBC 1202, 2013 BCSC 816 (B.C. S.C. Feb 22, 2013)
Distinguished in
11 Ault v. Canada (Attorney General), 80 C.C.P.B. 1, 2008 CarswellOnt 9415, 186 A.C.W.S. (3d) 704,
[2008] O.J. No. 5863 (Ont. S.C.J. Sep 03, 2008)
12 Sidhu (Litigation Guardian of) v. Hiebert, 2011 CarswellBC 2779, 2011 BCSC 1364, 207 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 602, [2012] B.C.W.L.D. 2791, [2012] B.C.W.L.D. 2901 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers] Oct 13,
2011)
13 Ferrier v. Hubbert, 2013 CarswellOnt 5243 (Ont. S.C.J. Apr 30, 2013)
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1
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The material accompanying this summary is subject to copyright. Usage is governed by contract with Thomson Reuters,
West and their affiliates.
Date of Printing: May 30, 2013
KEYCITE
Childs v. Desormeaux, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245, 210 O.A.C. 315, 347
N.R. 328, 2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 CarswellOnt 2711, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d) 163, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), 2006
SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, [2006] S.C.J. No. 18, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C., May 05, 2006)
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J.E. 2006-986
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TairroynChilds@gmail.com
The material accompanying this summary is subject to copyright. Usage is governed by contract with Thomson Reuters,
West and their affiliates.
Date of Printing: May 30, 2013
KEYCITE
Childs v. Desormeaux, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245, 210 O.A.C. 315, 347
N.R. 328, 2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 CarswellOnt 2711, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d) 163, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), 2006
SCC 18, J.E. 2006-986, [2006] S.C.J. No. 18, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C. May 05, 2006)
Citing References
Negative and Cautionary Cases (Canada)
Recently added (treatment not yet designated)
1 R. v. Tremblay, 2013 CarswellBC 1202, 2013 BCSC 816 (B.C. S.C. Feb 22, 2013)
Distinguished in
2 Ferrier v. Hubbert, 2013 CarswellOnt 5243 (Ont. S.C.J. Apr 30, 2013)
3 Sidhu (Litigation Guardian of) v. Hiebert, 2011 CarswellBC 2779, 2011 BCSC 1364, 207 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 602, [2012] B.C.W.L.D. 2791, [2012] B.C.W.L.D. 2901 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers] Oct 13,
2011)
4 Ault v. Canada (Attorney General), 80 C.C.P.B. 1, 2008 CarswellOnt 9415, 186 A.C.W.S. (3d) 704,
[2008] O.J. No. 5863 (Ont. S.C.J. Sep 03, 2008)
Positive & Neutral Cases (Canada)
Followed in
5 Lutter v. Smithson, 2013 CarswellBC 185, 2013 BCSC 119, 225 A.C.W.S. (3d) 874, [2013]
B.C.W.L.D. 2928, [2013] B.C.W.L.D. 2969 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers] Jan 28, 2013)
6 Paquette c. Federation (La), cie d'assurances du Canada, [2012] R.J.Q. 1944, 2012 CarswellQue
9316, 98 C.C.L.T. (3d) 114, J.E. 2012-1870, EYB 2012-211124, 2012 QCCS 4284 (C.S. Que. Sep
12, 2012)
7 Jenkins v. Muir, 2012 CarswellAlta 943, 2012 ABQB 352, 219 A.C.W.S. (3d) 589, [2012] A.W.L.D.
3026 (Alta. Q.B. May 28, 2012)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.
8 Pardhan v. Bank of Montreal, 2012 CarswellOnt 4295, 96 C.C.L.T. (3d) 173, 215 A.C.W.S. (3d) 26,
2012 ONSC 2229, 26 C.P.C. (7th) 99 (Ont. S.C.J. Apr 12, 2012)
9 Gilbert v. Benoit, 2011 CarswellOnt 15939, 219 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1001 (Ont. S.C.J. Oct 27, 2011)
10 Haggerty Estate (Litigation Administrator of) v. Rogers, 2011 CarswellOnt 10421, 89 C.C.L.T. (3d)
256, 208 A.C.W.S. (3d) 252, [2012] W.D.F.L. 756, 2011 ONSC 5312 (Ont. S.C.J. Oct 12, 2011)
11 Beatty v. Waterloo (Regional Municipality), 2011 CarswellOnt 4484, 203 A.C.W.S. (3d) 445, 85
M.P.L.R. (4th) 269, 2011 ONSC 3599 (Ont. S.C.J. Jun 08, 2011)
12 Williams v. Toronto (City), 2011 CarswellOnt 3277, 202 A.C.W.S. (3d) 663, [2011] O.J. No. 2196,
2011 ONSC 2832, 7 C.P.C. (7th) 248 (Ont. S.C.J. May 13, 2011)
13 Elder Advocates of Alberta Society v. Alberta, 331 D.L.R. (4th) 257, [2011] 6 W.W.R. 191, 499
A.R. 345, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 261, 416 N.R. 198, 2011 CarswellAlta 763, 2011 CarswellAlta 764, 81
C.C.L.T. (3d) 1, 514 W.A.C. 345, 2011 SCC 24, 201 A.C.W.S. (3d) 344, [2011] A.W.L.D. 2159,
[2011] A.W.L.D. 2160, [2011] A.W.L.D. 2197, [2011] A.W.L.D. 2203, [2011] A.W.L.D. 2205,
[2011] A.W.L.D. 2206, J.E. 2011-868, [2011] S.C.J. No. 24, 41 Alta. L.R. (5th) 1, 2 C.P.C. (7th) 1
(S.C.C. May 12, 2011)
14 Children's Aid Society of Toronto, 2011 CarswellOnt 2894, 195 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1037, [2011]
W.D.F.L. 3742, 1 R.F.L. (7th) 211 (Ont. C.J. Jan 04, 2011)
15 Morrison v. Hooper, 322 D.L.R. (4th) 757, 2010 CarswellOnt 5876, 192 A.C.W.S. (3d) 689, [2010]
O.J. No. 3421, 2010 ONSC 4394 (Ont. S.C.J. Aug 12, 2010)
16 South Yukon Forest Corp. v. R., 365 F.T.R. 13 (Eng.), 2010 CarswellNat 1308, 2010 CarswellNat
4639, 189 A.C.W.S. (3d) 105, [2010] F.C.J. No. 532, 2010 FC 495, 2010 CF 495 (F.C. May 05,
2010)
17 Collins v. R., [2010] 4 C.T.C. 1, [2010] G.S.T.C. 36, 366 F.T.R. 40 (Eng.), 2010 CarswellNat 486,
2010 CarswellNat 2035, 2010 D.T.C. 5051 (Eng.), 185 A.C.W.S. (3d) 836, 2010 FC 254, 2010 CF
254 (F.C. Mar 05, 2010)
18 Fullowka v. Royal Oak Ventures Inc., 315 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 4 W.W.R. 35, 474 A.R. 1,
[2010] 1 S.C.R. 132, 398 N.R. 20, 2010 CarswellNWT 9, 2010 CarswellNWT 10, 6566 CarswellNWT 2010, 71 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1, 479 W.A.C. 1, 80 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 2010 SCC 5, 185 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 250, 6566 A.W.L.D. 2010, [2010] A.W.L.D. 623, [2010] A.W.L.D. 624, [2010] A.W.L.D. 632,
[2010] A.W.L.D. 633, [2010] A.W.L.D. 634, [2010] A.W.L.D. 635, [2010] A.W.L.D. 636, [2010]
A.W.L.D. 637, [2010] A.W.L.D. 709, [2010] A.W.L.D. 725, [2010] A.W.L.D. 726, [2010]
A.W.L.D. 727, [2010] A.W.L.D. 730, [2010] A.W.L.D. 735, [2010] A.W.L.D. 736, [2010]
A.W.L.D. 743, [2010] A.W.L.D. 745, [2010] A.W.L.D. 746, [2010] A.W.L.D. 749, [2010]
A.W.L.D. 750, [2010] A.W.L.D. 752, [2010] A.W.L.D. 753, [2010] A.W.L.D. 754, [2010]
A.W.L.D. 755, [2010] A.W.L.D. 756, [2010] A.W.L.D. 757, [2010] A.W.L.D. 758, J.E. 2010-416,
[2010] W.D.F.L. 737, 5466 A.C.S. No. 398, [2010] A.C.S. No. 5, [2010] S.C.J. No. 5 (S.C.C. Feb
18, 2010)
19 Costello v. Hornby Island Local Trust Committee, 2009 CarswellBC 2629, 2009 BCSC 1334, 181
A.C.W.S. (3d) 823, [2010] B.C.W.L.D. 491, [2010] B.C.W.L.D. 492, [2010] B.C.W.L.D. 495,
[2010] B.C.W.L.D. 511, [2010] B.C.W.L.D. 523, 64 M.P.L.R. (4th) 197 (B.C. S.C. Sep 30, 2009)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.
20 Donaldson v. John Doe, [2009] 5 W.W.R. 43, 265 B.C.A.C. 257, 2009 CarswellBC 191, 63 C.C.L.T.
(3d) 1, 446 W.A.C. 257, 2009 BCCA 38, 175 A.C.W.S. (3d) 290, [2009] B.C.W.L.D. 1776, [2009]
B.C.W.L.D. 1787, [2009] B.C.W.L.D. 1789, 89 B.C.L.R. (4th) 52 (B.C. C.A. Feb 04, 2009)
21 Luther v. Ontario (Ministry of Training, Colleges & Universities), 2009 CarswellOnt 6307 (Ont.
S.C.J. Jan 20, 2009)
22 Heaslip Estate v. Mansfield Ski Club Inc., 305 D.L.R. (4th) 125, 2008 CarswellOnt 7222, 62
C.C.L.T. (3d) 306, 171 A.C.W.S. (3d) 972 (Ont. S.C.J. Dec 02, 2008)
23 Paxton v. Ramji, 299 D.L.R. (4th) 614, 242 O.A.C. 34, 2008 CarswellOnt 5983, 59 C.C.L.T. (3d)
179, 92 O.R. (3d) 401, 170 A.C.W.S. (3d) 649, [2008] O.J. No. 3964, 2008 ONCA 697 (Ont. C.A.
Oct 14, 2008)
24 Mirage Consulting Ltd. v. Astra Credit Union Ltd., 2008 CarswellMan 472, 231 Man. R. (2d) 269,
437 W.A.C. 269, 2008 MBCA 105, 169 A.C.W.S. (3d) 486, [2008] M.J. No. 314, 59 C.P.C. (6th) 24
(Man. C.A. Sep 08, 2008)
25 Karn v. Sturgeon, 2008 CarswellOnt 9725, 90 C.C.L.T. (3d) 103 (Ont. S.C.J. Mar 31, 2008)
26 Irvine v. Smith, 2008 CarswellOnt 723, 54 C.C.L.T. (3d) 307, 160 A.C.W.S. (3d) 199, 166 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 199, [2008] O.J. No. 547 (Ont. S.C.J. Feb 15, 2008)
27 Wareham v. Ontario (Minister of Community & Social Services), 2008 CarswellOnt 176, 166
C.R.R. (2d) 162, 164 A.C.W.S. (3d) 65, [2008] O.J. No. 166 (Ont. S.C.J. Jan 17, 2008)
28 Lane v Alcock Enterprises Ltd., 270 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 32, 2007 CarswellNfld 402, 822 A.P.R. 32,
2007 NLTD 157 (N.L. T.D. Sep 11, 2007)
29 Doug Boehner Trucking & Excavating Ltd. v. United Gulf Developments Ltd., 258 N.S.R. (2d) 41,
2007 CarswellNS 379, 824 A.P.R. 41, 64 C.L.R. (3d) 159, 2007 NSCA 92, 160 A.C.W.S. (3d) 194,
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2007 CarswellNfld 271, 817 A.P.R. 290, [2007] N.J. No. 297, 2007 NLCA 54 (N.L. C.A. Aug 28,
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Considered in
35 Cavanaugh v. Grenville Christian College, 2012 CarswellOnt 6373, 216 A.C.W.S. (3d) 833, 2012
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37 Kherani v. Bank of Montreal, 2012 CarswellOnt 4326, 215 A.C.W.S. (3d) 306, 2012 ONSC 2230,
26 C.P.C. (7th) 195 (Ont. S.C.J. Apr 12, 2012)
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39 Dennis v. Ontario Lottery & Gaming Corp., 344 D.L.R. (4th) 65, 286 O.A.C. 329, 2011 CarswellOnt
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40 Kent (Litigation Guardian of) v. Laverdiere, 2011 CarswellOnt 9647, 85 C.C.L.T. (3d) 296, 208
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48 Dickerson v. 1610396 Ontario Inc., 329 D.L.R. (4th) 542, 273 O.A.C. 385, 2010 CarswellOnt 9920,
80 C.C.L.T. (3d) 172, 2010 ONCA 894 (Ont. C.A. Dec 23, 2010)
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51 Tayview Properties Inc. v. Perth (Town), 2010 CarswellOnt 7801, 195 A.C.W.S. (3d) 843, 78
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52 Nadeau Poultry Farm Ltd. v. Desjardins & Desjardins Consultants Ltd., 367 N.B.R. (2d) 272, 2010
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54 Richardson v. Sanayhie, 2010 CarswellOnt 3488, 188 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1187, 2010 ONSC 3000 (Ont.
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55 Brophy v. United Taxi Transportation Services (K-W) Ltd., 2010 CarswellOnt 3685, 189 A.C.W.S.
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59 Healey v. Lakeridge Health Corp., 2010 CarswellOnt 556, 72 C.C.L.T. (3d) 261, 185 A.C.W.S. (3d)
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C.A. Sep 01, 2009)
65 Wilson Fuel Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), 280 N.S.R. (2d) 298, 2009 CarswellNS 382, 68
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72 Santagapita v. Williams Coffee Pub Inc., 2008 CarswellOnt 4351, 168 A.C.W.S. (3d) 760 (Ont.
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73 Douglas v. Kinger (Litigation Guardian of), 294 D.L.R. (4th) 267, 270 O.A.C. 201, 2008 CarswellOnt 3266, 57 C.C.L.T. (3d) 15, 90 O.R. (3d) 721, 166 A.C.W.S. (3d) 793, [2008] O.J. No.
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74 Fullowka v. Royal Oak Ventures Inc., [2008] 7 W.W.R. 411, 433 A.R. 69, 2008 CarswellNWT 32,
56 C.C.L.T. (3d) 213, 429 W.A.C. 69, 66 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 2008 NWTCA 4, 168 A.C.W.S. (3d) 443,
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76 Hamilton v. Kember, 2008 CarswellOnt 1012, 165 A.C.W.S. (3d) 246 (Ont. S.C.J. Feb 27, 2008)
77 Street v. Ontario Racing Commission, 232 O.A.C. 346, 2008 CarswellOnt 42, 88 O.R. (3d) 563,
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85 Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. v. Pitblado & Hoskin, 2007 CarswellMan 100, 215 Man. R. (2d)
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87 755165 Ontario Inc. v. Parsons, 273 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 260 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 222, 2006 CarswellNfld
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88 Carriere v. Bell Canada, 2006 CarswellOnt 3549 (Ont. S.C.J. Jun 13, 2006)
Referred to in
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90 Pardhan v. Bank of Montreal, 2013 CarswellOnt 662, 225 A.C.W.S. (3d) 322, 2013 ONSC 355 (Ont.
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91 Elder Advocates of Alberta Society v. Alberta, 355 D.L.R. (4th) 25, 539 A.R. 251, 2012 CarswellAlta 2034, 561 W.A.C. 251, 2012 ABCA 355, 221 A.C.W.S. (3d) 469, [2013] A.W.L.D. 612, [2013]
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92 McClements v. Pike, 2012 CarswellYukon 143, 99 C.C.L.T. (3d) 270, 226 A.C.W.S. (3d) 88, 2012
YKSC 84 (Y.T. S.C. Oct 23, 2012)
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93 Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2012 CarswellBC 2892, 2012 BCSC 1401, 221
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94 Persaud v. Suedat, 2012 CarswellOnt 11434, 96 C.C.L.T. (3d) 147, 220 A.C.W.S. (3d) 715, 2012
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95 Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP, 2012 CarswellOnt 10102, 94 C.C.L.T. (3d) 215, 220 A.C.W.S. (3d)
681, 2012 ONSC 4642, 24 C.P.C. (7th) 68 (Ont. S.C.J. Aug 16, 2012)
96 Weninger Farms Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, 2012 CarswellOnt 9749, 219 A.C.W.S. (3d)
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97 Berry v. Pulley, 2012 CarswellOnt 9324, 2012 C.L.L.C. 220-052, 218 A.C.W.S. (3d) 993, 2012
ONSC 1790 (Ont. S.C.J. Jul 25, 2012)
98 Ashak v. Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office), 2012 CarswellOnt 11102, 97 C.C.L.T.
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99 Green v. Diack, 530 A.R. 347, 2012 CarswellAlta 56, 2012 ABQB 45, 216 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1022,
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100 Benoit (Litigation Guardian of) v. Banfield, 2012 CarswellBC 532, 2012 BCSC 265, 213 A.C.W.S.
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101 Cowan v. Hydro One Networks Inc., 2011 CarswellOnt 11719, 88 C.C.L.T. (3d) 185, 209 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 955, 63 C.E.L.R. (3d) 18, 2011 ONSC 6377 (Ont. S.C.J. Oct 31, 2011)
102 Rausch v. Pickering (City), 2011 CarswellOnt 13502, 210 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27, 92 M.P.L.R. (4th) 99,
2011 ONSC 6387 (Ont. S.C.J. Oct 28, 2011)
103 Allarco Entertainment 2008 Inc. v. Rogers Communications Inc., 2011 CarswellOnt 11054, 92
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104 Wellington v. Ontario, 333 D.L.R. (4th) 236, 277 O.A.C. 318, 2011 CarswellOnt 2334, 81 C.C.L.T.
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